

The "Merit Order Effect"


July 2012

Dr Joel Gilmore Dr Richard Bean

Clean Energy Week





The "Merit Order Effect"




Merit Order Effect is already observed








- Also in international markets
 - Texas (ERCOT), Denmark,
 Spain, Ireland



Cutler NJ, et al. High penetration wind generation impacts on spot prices in the Australian national electricity market, <u>Energy Policy</u> **39**, 5939-5949.




ERCOT



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Also for solar in Germany

Solar photovolatics in Germany



Preissenkende Effekte der Solarstromerzeugung auf den Börsenstrompreis, Kurzstudie im Auftrag des Bundesverbandes Solarwirtschaft (BSW), Eva Hauser & Jörg Frantzen, 2012




ROAM modelling - methodology

- Simulations with 2-4-C dispatch model
 - Forecast of 2019-20
 - Based on historical half-hourly bids for each generator
- Renewables modelling
 - Bureau of Meteorology hourly gridded solar data
 - Historical weather station wind speed data
 - ROAM's Wind and Solar Energy Simulation Tools
- Generation development plans from ROAM's market and least cost modelling




ROAM's modelling – wind in 2019-20






Large-scale solar in 2019-20



Solar Generation Australian Market Modelling, available from http://www.australiansolarinstitute.com.au/reports/




Renewable energy revenue at risk





Solar plant in particular



LGC price doesn't rise enough to compensate solar generators




Merit order effect is a positive outcome for renewables, with caveats

But is it permanent?



Generator revenues also reduced




Revenues net of variable costs

Must be sufficient cover fixed costs



If non-renewable generators do have sufficiently large profit margins



Renewables reduce profit margins

Reduced costs for consumers

If nonrenewable generators do not have large profit margins



Incumbents cannot repay capital debt

No new unsubsidised investments

Possible plant closures with severe MOE



Prices rise (MOE is transient)



No longer meet Reliability Standard



AEMC makes
market changes
Increase the MPC?
(risk)
Introduce a capacity
market?

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Issue: Market Power

"We have seen generators exercising market power to drive up prices in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania over the past couple of years" (AER 2009)

> "Hydro Tasmania has substantial market power". "They are almost always the marginal bidder and can choose to set the spot price" (Electricity Supply Industry Expert Panel, 2011)

"Price spikes have become a recurring summer event in South Australia. There is limited transmission capacity to import electricity from Victoria, allowing AGL to set prices in peak periods around the \$10,000/MWh cap" (AER 2009)

• Vertical integration - owners of generation assets don't want extreme prices (also operate as retailers). Set the price to a reasonable level that covers costs.



Market Power Indicators

- 4-Firm Concentration Ratio
- Pivotal Supplier Indicator
- Residual Supply Index
- Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index

Tend to not capture presence of market power at times of tight supply-demand balance.



TC-PSI Indicator

- The transmission-constrained pivotal supplier indicator (TC-PSI) of Hesamzadeh et al (2011) addresses these weaknesses
- "Pivotality" measures the extent to which the output of a generator is required in order to satisfy the physical limits of the transmission system




TC-PSI Indicator (2)

- Takes transmission limits into account
- Modelling distinct generation firms in the NEM
- Measuring the "zonal must-run ratio" of a plant taking into account the import capacity of a zone
- Torrens Island power station in South Australia demonstrates use of indicator



Example of TC-PSI





SA: 2009 vs 2012

- For AGL in SA, in order to have the same number of periods in 2012 (summer) with TC-PSI > 0.2, would need extra 330 MW of scheduled demand
- Need long periods with high TC-PSI, but
- Significant growth in non-scheduled and semi-scheduled wind in SA since 2009



Market power conclusion

- The merit order effect is unlikely to be negated in the medium term by market power effects (in terms of demand growth)
- SA operational demand figures (10% POE) forecast by AEMO to be below 3,500 MW until 2020; plus Heywood upgrade being considered
- Plant retirement or mergers of significant participants would be required to affect market power indicators



Summary

- Merit Order Effect probably will reduce wholesale prices as more renewables are integrated, could be sufficient to offset low FiT costs on consumer bills
- But there are reasons to be cautious about pushing the "good news" story:
 - 1. Likely to be transient
 - 2. If not transient, may necessitate market restructure
 - 3. Could be perceived as a risk to renewables, making negotiation of PPAs more challenging
 - 4. Models may overstate the effect
 - 5. There are other renewable integration costs
 - 6. Market power may offset the effect