Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den

... "نقل از افشاگری شماره ۲ همین کتاب" چاپ و انتشار از "د انشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام" - به راپ 40-

The Honorable L. Bruce Laingen Charge d'Affaires, a.i. L. Bruce Laingen American Embassy Tehran Dear Bruce: I was finally able to see your cable dealing with the same subject as the enclosed piece. I liked your thoughts very much and believe -- with a few details of difference -- we are in accord. My paper was prepared at Newsom's request with strict instructions not to cut anyone else in except those shown as clearing and Peter. So please protect me absolutely. Sincerely, Henry Precht Director Office of Iranian Affairs Enclosure. SECRET - \underline{\text{EYES ONLY}}

SECRET/SENSITIVE Planning for the Shah to Come to the United States This paper outlines some concepts we should address in considering the Shah's desire to come to the United States. We believe there are three broad questions: -- What new circumstances could justify a change in the USG position? -- What conditions should we seek from the Shah or state prior to his arrival here? -- What arrangements should we make for Embassy personnel to provide protection? 1. New Circumstances The PGOI has laid out a plan for the adoption of a new constitution and election of a new government. If the plan is followed -- and that seems unlikely -- elections for an assembly of experts will be held on August 3. The assembly will conclude its work in one month; the draft constitution, which the experts will have reviewed, will be submitted to a popular referendum probably in September; and elections for a president and Majlis could take place as early as October. Because the Iranian government has placed a high priority on establishing a stronger and legitimate single authority for the country, we believe the PGOI and Khomeini will make every effort to meet this schedule. Even with the inevitable delays, there is a good chance that the process will be completed by the end of 1979. Once it is completed, we should inform the new government that we wish to clear our decks of old issues on the agenda. One of those old issues will be the status of the Shah. We could inform the government that we have resisted intense pressures to allow him to come to the U.S. because we did not wish to complicate the PGOI's problems or our efforts to construct a new relationship. Now with the new government firmly established and accepted, it seems appropriate to admit the Shah to the U.S. The new government may not like it, but it is best to get the issue out of the way. This discussion with the new GOI should take place after it is in place some 2-3 weeks and some few days before the Shah would come here. In the meantime, SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE we should begin to prepare the Iranians by telling them of the intense pressures for the Shah to come here -- pressures which we are resisting despite our traditional open-door policy. If the constitutional process does not proceed and Iranian instability seriously increases, and if there is no prospect for Iran to settle down, there may be an argument for going ahead and admitting the Shah anyway to get that inevitable step behind us, but it will be necessary first to review how dangerous the situation is. In either of these scenarios we should aim for a positive change in our position on the Shah by January 1980. If this plan is adopted it probably would not be advisable to disseminate it beyond a close circle in the Executive Branch; perhaps a few key individuals outside might be informed so as to reduce pressures for a change. We would also have to discuss the issue with Members of Congress to indicate that we were addressing the issue and hope to resolve it successfully. This would reduce pressures which could lead, for example, to a Congressional resolution calling on the Administration to admit the Shah. However, this would increase the likelihood of leaks and our having to deal with the PGOI before we are ready. 2. \underline{\text{Conditions}} It would help substantially in explaining our position to the Iranians if the Shah were to renounce his family's claim to the throne. We believe the likelihood of his doing so is extremely remote, but the idea could be explored privately by trusted intermediaries so that if the Shah refused he would have no possibility of blaming the USG for a course he rejected. Should the Shah refuse to renounce his claim, we should leave no doubt in the Iranian mind as to our attitude. We should make it quite clear publicly that we consider any claim to the throne by his family rendered invalid by the Iranian constitutional process, and we should make it clear privately to the Shah and his friends that we would not tolerate any counter-revolutionary acts here which might violate U.S. law, or our customary policies regarding political activities of persons admitted for temporary visits. SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3. \underline{\text{Security}} We have the impression that the threat to U.S. Embassy personnel is less now than it was in the spring; presumably the threat will diminish somewhat further by the end of this year. Nevertheless, the danger of hostages being taken in Iran will persist. We should make no move towards admitting the Shah until we have obtained and tested a new and substantially more effective guard force for the Embassy. Secondly, when the decision is made to admit the Shah, we should quietly assign additional American security guards to the Embassy to provide protection for key personnel until the danger period is considered over. Before proceeding further we should have more detailed work on the legal, security and Congressional relations issues. SECRET/SENSITIVE Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp 8/1/79 - ext:20313 Clearances: NEA - Mr. Saunders L/NEA - Mr. Small

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Waa... D C 20420 MEMORANDUM June 3, 1979 TO: KFA/RA Robert Day MED/PA Rusty Graham NFR/TEN - Mark Johnson JACK Joseph Parrish BED/CAGNE Mickey Smith BED/CAGNF Don Ryan BED/OEPE Charles Gendreau FROM: EB/OCA - Lynne Lambert SUBJECT: FY 80 CAP for Iran The attached FY 80 Commercial Action Program for Iran is submitted for your clearance. Since I shall be in Saudi Arabia on a TDY assignment from June 7 - July 9, please telephone your clearance and/or additions to Mark Johnson (tel. 632-0915). Mark will handcarry the CAP to Iran during his visit to the Post in July. In presenting the CAP, Mark will emphasize (1) that the program we have prepared envisions an improved political climate and that conditions may not permit all the activities we have suggested; (2) that the intention of the CAP is to provide some guidelines and priorities to assist the incoming team; and (3) that the Post is free to make substantial changes since we in Washington have had little information on which to devise a program. Thank you for your input and cooperation.

-Yoo COMMERCIAL ACTION PROGRAM FOR IRAN Section I - Overview Iran has been one of the more important markets worldwide for U.S. goods and services. In 1978 Iran's non-military imports from the United States totaled 3.6 billion. The political upheavals of 1978 and 1979 will result in a major decline of total Iranian imports and, consequently, of U.S. exports to Iran during 1979. The political turmoil in Iran has caused widespread labor strikes, considerable damage to plant and property, and a paralysis in the country's vital services. Petroleum exports, the chief source of foreign exchange, declined in October 1978, halted completely in late December, and did not resume until March 1979. During this period Iran lost nearly 7 billion in revenues. The outlook for calendar 1979 is not encouraging; a serious stagflation has created critical unemployment and rising prices. The country's planners must reestablish confidence, reorder priorities and begin to lay the framework for future economic growth. In the current political climate, these will be difficult objectives to achieve. Looking beyond this immediate period, there is hope. Iran's oil will assure the country of sizable income. At present petroleum prices, Iran should look forward to earnings of 18 - 20 billion for the next fiscal year. In addition,

foreign exchange reserves of nearly $10 billion provide a cushion. The key to any sustained growth will not be money, but effective management. The most important U.S. commercial objective in Iran is to help American firms rebuild a strong market position and tap the opportunities which are expected to emerge in FY 80. The purpose of this document, which assumes a return to more normal political and economic conditions, is to establish a management plan and priorities toward this end. Special emphasis is given to servicing American business visitors and alert reporting on major projects. Campaigns in agribusiness and housing are projected. These sectors have been identified by the Government as high priority areas. The campaigns are not organized around Department of Commerce sponsored events, but instead emphasize development of information and contacts. As conditions change, revisions of the goals, priorities and actions may become necessary. The document establishes a framework for a dialogue on the commercial program between the Post and the Departments of State and Commerce at four month intervals. This periodic reporting requirement will provide a useful format for assessing the role which U.S. Government personnel will have in expanding U.S. exports to Iran and for planning future market promotion events.

Section III - Campaign Development Campaign Number 1 Priority Rank 3 Campaign Title: Agribusiness Campaign Manager: Commercial Attache and designated FSN Objective and Rationale: Development of the agricultural sector, which received low priority by the previous regime is a major priority of the new government. Attention will be focused on improving the system which now exists, rather than on instituting large airbus business projects. U.S. citizens in this field is well established, and the United States has traditionally held a strong market share in Iran's agribusiness market. Goals of this campaign are: (1) identifying the type of agricultural reform the government plans to undertake and the means of implementation, including the types and nature of government supports and subsidies; (2) reporting on major government expenditures related to agriculture, including plans for irrigation; (3) reporting on the status of local agribusiness manufacturing facilities; (4) establishing, with the cooperation of the Agricultural Attache, contacts with Ministry of Agriculture officials, local manufacturers and agents; (5) developing trade opportunities for U.S. suppliers and consultants; and (6) identifying suitable trade promotion events for Department of Commerce sponsorship in FY 82 and FY 83. Campaign Actions: Cumulative Milestones JAN MAY SEP 1. Make calls on government officials, private manufacturers and agents to develop information required for subsequent actions listed under this campaign. 31 31 30 2. Prepare an annotated list of government contacts for agri-business projects. 10 20 35 3. Report spot trade opportunities by telegram. X X 4. Prepare three periodic reports on agricultural plans and opportunities for U.S. exporters. X X 5. Prepare a report on local agricultural machinery production. X X

Section III - Campaign Development Campaign Number 1 - Agribusiness Campaign Actions Cumulative Milestones JAN MAY SEP 6. Prepare or update 20 WTDRs on agents for agribusiness. Reports should be prepared to insure FTI input. 31 31 30 7. Update market research or prepare a market note on agribusiness. 7 14 20 8. Identify suitable events (if any) for Commerce sponsor-ship in FY 82 and 83. X X

Campaign Number 2 Campaign Title: Housing Systems and Related Equipment Campaign Manager: Commercial Attache and designated FSN Objective and Rationale: There is a strong demand for low income housing, which the new government has already said it will attempt to satisfy. This will probably be locally constructed or pre-fabricated housing, with emphasis on making use of local suppliers. There should be some opportunity for consulting or licensing agreements in this area as well as in providing pre-fabricated or modular housing units, but cost will be a significant factor. Sales opportunities should also exist for suppliers of air conditioning equipment and other equipment and supplies related to the housing industry. The goals of this campaign are: (1) obtaining and analyzing the sections of the new government plan relating to housing; (2) establishing contacts in the Plan Organization and in ministries supervising housing projects, as well as with private sector engineering and construction firms; (3) identifying trade opportunities for U.S. equipment and supplies exporters and locating agents for these exporters; and (4) identifying suitable trade promotion events for the Department of Commerce to sponsor in FY 82 and FY 83. Cumulative Milestones JAN MAY SEP 31 31 30 1. Make calls on government housing officials, private sector engineering and contracting firms and agents to develop information required for subsequent actions listed under this campaign. 15 30 45 2. Prepare an annotated list of government contacts in the housing sector. X 3. Report spot trade and project opportunities by telegram. X X X

Section III - Campaign Development Campaign Number 2 - Housing Systems and Related Equipment Campaign Actions Equipment Cumulative Milestones JAN MAY SEP 4. Prepare three periodic reports on government housing plans. Reports should summarize specific projects by location, type and quantity of units, project supervisor and financing, and should include information on product and equipment requirements and on local production of same. 31 31 30 X X X 5. Develop an annotated list of potential partners for U.S. engineering and contracting firms for use by the Post and the Department of Commerce. X 6. Prepare or update 20 WTDRs on agents for equipment and supplies related to the housing industry. Reports should be prepared to ensure FTI input. 7 14 20 7. Identify suitable trade promotion events (if any) for Commerce sponsorship in FY 82 and FY 83. X 8. Update research or prepare a market note on the housing sector.

Section IV - Other Special Post Efforts Activity No. 1 Business Services Priority1 Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache Description/Justification Maintaining the traditionally strong U.S. market position will require considerable and imaginative assistance by the Embassy staff to individual American businessmen. In addition to the normal services, priority will be given to the following: (1) performing advance work and follow up services for visiting American businessmen as requested; (2) making appointments and providing translating services whenever appropriate and possible; (3) attempting to settle trade disputes resulting from outstanding claims and other unsettled issues; (4) responding to Washington requests on behalf of American firms; and (5) preparing handout materials for visitors and correspondence. The Post's initiatives and some specific examples of services rendered should be identified in progress reports three times during the year as outlined under Section VII. Activity No. 2 Major Projects Priority 2 Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache Continual alert reporting on major projects is one of the most important goals of the commercial program. Two major projects sectors --agribusiness and housing-- are the subjects of campaigns, and other important areas should be identified by the Embassy and reported to Washington on a continuing basis. Goals and actions indicated under this effort include: (1) reporting major projects leads on an alert basis and following up such leads at appropriate intervals; (2) expanding contacts in major projects areas, including in the Plan Organization and ministry planning departments, and making annotated lists of contacts under heading such as Power, Housing, and so forth; (3) identifying projects whenever possible prior to the proficiency phase; (4) developing status reports by sector, including long and short range plans; (5) reporting changes in laws and procedures; and (6) selecting projects as candidates for 661 (Foreign Assistance Act) pre-project studies; (7) updating the major projects list prepared in 1978. Progress towards these goals should be reported in progress reports three times a year as outlined under Section VII.

Activity No. 3 Investment Protection/Facilitation Priority 5 Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache The changed political conditions have given rise to a number of unsettled issues relating to American investments in Iran. The Embassy will inform Washington of any substantive changes in laws or procedures relating to foreign investment. It will also give prompt attention to and attempt to settle issues relating to American investment brought to its attention by Washington or by the principals concerned. Activity No. 4 Foreign Traders Index Priority 6 Primary responsibility: Iranian agent/distributor firms have undergone considerable changes recently, and American firms will require updated information on these changes as well as information on new potential agents. Updating WTDRs on established agents and preparing WTDRs or PIRs on new agents will require a special initiative. Activity No. 5 Trade Opportunities Reporting Priority : Primary responsibility: Establishing contacts in the private manufacturing sector and identifying trade opportunities for American products is an important goal. At least six plant visits in addition to those conducted under the two campaigns should be carried out each period. Activity No. 6 Trade Promotion Event Planning Priority 8 Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache With the possible exception of the Tehran International Trade Fair, there are no Department of Commerce sponsored trade promotion events scheduled during FY 80, and there are none planned presently for FY 81. However, planning for events to be held in FY 82 and 83 will be undertaken during the year. The Post will identify, on a spot basis, themes and vehicles for future trade promotion events for consideration by Commerce in the process of developing an events program. Early identification will permit a more active program for FY 82. The Post will also prepare, upon receipt of instructions from Washington, a Best Prospects Report (no longer a CERP requirement), a preliminary CCP for FY 82 and a CAP for FY 81.

SECTION V PERSONNEL RESOURCES ALLOWED PERSONNEL RESOURCES (in workdays) CONCEPT A. BY INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITY\n(Some categories may be omitted) Projections FSO/R FSN/P CLER. TOTAL 1. Trade Promotion Event Supp. 2. Mkt. Research a. Contract 70 25 b. Post-conducted 3. Major Projects/Products 30 150 30 4. Foreign Buyer Program To be completed during consultation with the Post. 5. Trade Opportunities Prog. 10 80 80 6. W.T.D.R. Program 5 30 50 7. Agent/Distributor Serv. 5 70 50 8. FT Index 15 200 300 9. Investment Protection/ Facilitation 30 30 5 10. Travel Promotion 11. Scheduled CERP Reporting 12. Commercial Newsletter 13. Business Services 60 160 6 14. Other Reporting/Negotiation/ Representation 15. Management 16. Other E/C Activities 17. Non-E/C Activities TOTAL REQUIRED/AVAILABLE 1/ B. BY CAMPAIGNS 1. Agreements 2. Housing 20 130 30 3. 20 130 30 4. TOTAL C. BY OTHER SPECIAL POST EFFORTS 1. NA nearly all are listed under A. 2. under A. 3. 1/ Average annual number of workdays per employee in equals \underline{215}

Section VI - Financial Resources Schedule -14 Roman VI. Financial Resources Schedule (State Funds Only) Description/Column Heading FY 78 (ACT) FY 79 (EST) FY 80 (RQ) 1. Commercial Representation Dols Dols Dols 2. Commercial Travel Dols Dols Dols 3. Contract Services Dols Dols Dols Of Which ( ) ( ) ( ) WTDR Support ( ) ( ) ( ) Printing Newsletter ( ) ( ) ( ) Other (Specify) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4: Reference Library Materials Dols Dols 5. Other (Specify) Dols Dols Grand Totals,0000Y,0007,000 Principal E/C officer and principal administration officer have approved.

Section VII - Reporting The Post is requested to submit a brief report every four months on the progress of the CAP. This report should focus on significant successes and failures of actions taken under each campaign or special effort, and an evaluation of time actually taken as against time estimated in Section V. The Post may wish to use periodic reports to propose changes in campaigns or special efforts as circumstances may indicate. Progress reports should arrive in Washington on approximately February 10, July 10 and October 10.

Drafted: LLambert:klk5/9/79 X22363 Clearance: State/EB/OCA: PFFrost State/EB/OCA: ALZuccs State/EB/OCA: WERaf NEA/RA: RDay NEA/RA: RGraham NEA/IRN: MJohnson NEA/IRN: Jhary Commerce: BED/CAGNE: Smith BED/CAGNE: DRyan BED/OEPE: CGendreau

1. YES ARE AGAIN CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND TO THE SHAH'S CONTINUING QUERY TO US THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS REWARDING ESTABLISHING RESIDENCE FOR HIMSELF, THE SHAHBANOU, AND HIS FAMILY IN THE U.S. (FI CAN REMAIN IN MEXICO AT LAST) 2. WOULD YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION POSED IN PARA 1 BE DIFFERENT IF (A) THE SHAH RENOUNCED HIS CLAIM AND THAT OF HIS HEIRS TO THE THRONE, OR (B) THAT HE AGREED TO FOR- SHAH POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ANY SORT AND THAT THIS BE CONFIRMED PUBLICLY. 3. WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE KEY TO MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF THE SHAH'S ADMISSION WOULD BE IN BAZARGAN AND THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY IN SUCH A SITUA- TION TO CONTROL AND COMMAND THE SECURITY FORCES GUARDING OUR PEOPLE AND TO MINIMIZE ANY HOSTILE PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST OUR PEOPLE OR OUR RELATIONS. 4. SINCE THIS QUESTION IS BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN WASHINGTON, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR NOT SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH ANYONE PLEASE ON YOUR STAFF. PLEASE SEND YOUR REPLY NODIS/CHEROKEE, FOR THE SECRETARY. WITH BEST REGARDS.

Botswana, Chief of Immigration, Israebad Cispt Belgium, Chief of Foreign Residents Bureau With the compliments of the American Embassy خذ بن سمن ضررناي With the compliments of the American Embassy بيت جتم اداره الاساس المباطة Laghafi, Deputy Chief, Foreign visits Tourism Col. Khoshkhoi, Deputy Chief, Foreign Residents Bureau With the compliments of the American Embassy مباح مضمون قهفي معاولت منها إدارة أماست أماك بها With the compliments of the American Embassy بيت جتم ادارها التجارية المباطة "الإيطانى على إدارة المواد" Col. Mahboobi, Deputy Chief Foreign Residents Bureau With the compliments of the American Embassy ب منهج قمري بنت جتم إدارة الاسس المباطة

SION To act as eyes and ears of the Islamic revolution and work as special task force of Iman Khomeini to crush any counter-voluntary activities with the Government or any Political Upsurge against Islamic Government. To work as Parallel Force to Amid Forces so as to maintain parity and prevent any coup attempt by them. Revolutionary Guard Corps to take over the rash of Imam Committee Volunteer Force once it is dissolved. Revolutionary Guards to work as counter insurgency force inside the country and also assist other law-forcing agencies to carry out their duties smoothly and to remain always on call to move any direction at short notice.

e. Revolutionary Guard Corps to work as hard core sentinel of the Islamic Revolution indoctrinated with patriotic zeal and Islamic sacrificing spirit. Other Information a. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran-E- Enqilab) will have 30000 strong force which will be completed in phases. At present this organisation is having ten to fifteen thousand forces all over Iran. As per plan every city of 5000 population is supposed to have a unit of 200 strong revolutionary guards. b. All the 21 Provincial Capital Cities will have 1000 strong guards each under the local revolution committees. This may vary from Province to Province depending on the Political situation of the provinces. c. 20 Units of 200 Strong Guards each have been already raised in Tehran having AT at saltanatabad, to maintain security in Tehran City with special emphasis at night. d. Revolutionary Guards will not be under the administrative or technical control of any Ministry of the Government, but it will be under the direct control of Imam Khomeini through the Central Islamic Revolution Committee. e. Presently there is no age limit for Pasdaran. They can be of any age between 16 years to 60 years. f. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps so far has been raised 42 Units in Iran. NO PLO Trained Instructor has been employed in training camp. Aliabad. Instructors are all from the Army.

Memorandum for the File Subject: Iranian Investment Copoportation Mr. Iradj Kejnejad, Managing Director, Pars Investment Corp., called today about a visa. Mr. K. estimates that the Iranian industrial sector, outside of oil, is functioning at about 20 percent of capacity. He expects increasing bankruptcies of companies over the next few months. Pars Investment is a subsidiary of the old consortium, formed to invest locally as a favor to the government. He has about 300 million rials which he would like to transfer abroad, capital which has not been invested. Central Bank permission is pending. An embarrassment since some of the companies in which Pars holds interests are hard up for cash, near bankruptcy. No dividends have been repatriated for about a year. Mr. K. will xxxxxt American oil company stockholders. Expects that the consortium will meet in New York shortly to discuss company affairs. Mr. K. has been harassed by committees; called in and held three days; interrogated blindfolded by unknowledgable types. Later by an educated man who decided that he had not done wrong by sending routine commercial reports. to London. E/C:ROB

-f9- 7/12 CRUd it go to Frankfurt 83 NO, SIR LBSL ECA44-1F 776 1937513 JUL 79 STATE WASHDC PASS TEHRAN FLIGHT 3/14 CONFIDENTIAL 170016 E.O. 12365 GDS, 7/11/85 (GREENE, TYPES) TAGS: CVIS, IR SUBJECT: KIV APPLICANT: ADMIRAL VALID HABIBOLLAHI (C - ENTIRE TEXT) HABIBOLLAHI, COMMANDER OF IRANIAN NAVY DURING LAST TWO THREE YEARS OF SHAH'S REGIME, HAS BEEN HELD UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN IRAN SINCE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION. VERY RECENTLY ALLOWED USING IRANIAN PASSPORT WITH ASSUMED NAME AND IS IN FRANCE. HE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US EMBASSY IN PARIS AND APPLIED FOR VISIT TO U.S. HIS REQUEST IS FOR A 30 DAY VISIT TO SEE HIS FAMILY IN U.S. AND TO SEEK MEDICAL TREATMENT. HE IS RECEIVING VISA UNDER HIS ASSUMED NAME AND IS IN PARIS. IN ANY CASE, WE ARE PASSING ON THIS INFO TO YOU AS A FRIEND THAT HABIBOLLAHI SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENTER U.S. HAVE CLEARED THAT HIS REAL NAME IS AND HIS PASSPORT IS VALID FOR TRAVEL TO U.S. UNDER THAT NAME. ADMIRAL HABIBOLLAHI IS STILL AND NATURALLY FEARS TO RETURN TO IRAN. HE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN. IF YOU HAVE PROBLEMS IN VISA ISSUANCE FOR HIM, PLEASE LET US KNOW. IF YOU DO NOT NEED HIM FOR VISA, PLEASE LET US KNOW.

AG is the principal US military presence in Iran. Its is to promote the presence of Iranian military forces, an Iran's ability to resist aggression and to further US is in Iran. y Lend Lease Mission was established in Iran in 1941. This organized as "NARISH" United States Military Mission with Army) in 1943. In 1947, the basic agreement between the consent (1947) and the Overseas of Iran (GOI) which provided finalizing US military advisor assistance to the Army, Navy, and see was signed. In 1950, the Mutual Defense Assistance to the Navy, and Air Force was signed by the USG and GOI. This agreement was separate and distinct from the ARMISH agreement, Pro-US military administration of the Military Aid Program (NAP). In 1942, the first grant aid was delivered to the Armed Forces. In 1958, ARISH and NAAG were consolidated. In the Foreign Military Sales (UMS) and Credit program was started. In 1972. AG is contained by a Major General, and his principal advisory is to provide daily advice to the Chief of the Supreme Court's other high ranking Training Military Commuters, is well as the old men with his initial Majesty to discuss Iran's and future development. of the ARMISH-MAAG provides advice to the Supreme Court under the Imperial Indian Armed Forces, (the military staff of the (199). Each of the major Indian staff directorates, such as Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Plans and Firms, and management has one or more advisors assigned, usually in the colonel. ARMISH-MAAG is fully committed to meeting the multiple of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces (IIA) modernization projects. Inception of the FMS Program in 1972, Iran has related services related to access of tax-billion dollars. The actions are focused on the acquisition of this equipment and of IIA personnel in the use of the equipment. To aid the G in accomplishing the job, the GOI has purchased the services divided Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT's). All costs with this program are time to the Government of Iran (GOI). This have fluctuated based on DOI needs and supportive capacity the USG. The TAFT's originate under the guidance and direction office Sections and for the most part are geographically throughout Iran, collected with the IIA forces they are.

In order to develop the proof of the accident throughout the process, for example, the Imperial Air Force (IIAF) growth technical competence has allowed us to increasingly move away from technical assistance toward management distance where we can concentrate on the development and training of the middle managers and future leadership. The Imperial Iranian Group Forces (IIGF) are beginning to show definite progress in such areas maintenance and supply procedures. The Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) smallest service and last to get started, is working well on fleet pension and the achievement of operational readiness. Overall, we see the IIA personnel beginning to perform tasks on a routine basis would have been extremely difficult; if not impossible a short time to despite this progress, ARMISH-MAAG continues to stress and seek management attention on such key areas as utilization of TAFT resources and counterpart relationships. An advisory section is collocated in headquarters of the Imperial Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy. A Brigadier General heads the Army and Air Force Sections, and the Office of the Navy Section is a Rear Admiral. Field teams are located in Kermanshah, Shiraz, Tabriz, Abadan, Ahwaz, Mashed-E-Soleman, Kerman, Gazvin, Mashad, Rezaiyeh, Farujerd and Isfahan with the principal quarters and schools. Effective 1 July 1977 ARMISH-MAAG Staff Sections were redesignated the following Directorate organization. (Organization chart at S.) Directorate of Personnel Support Management (ARPSM) previously Serves as the principal advisor to Chief, ARMISH-MAAG on matters to U.S. Support Mission Policies in Iran and performs special acti training to the Command Support Mission. Acts as Coordination/Agency for all U.S. Personnel Policy Matters as relates to the and keeps Chief, ARMISH-MAAG appraised of Health, Morale and Well-grams. Prepares annual Joint Manpower Program for the ARMISH-MAAG functions as central point of contact for Technical Assistance (TAFT) to include Program Development. Serves as principal cood agency for new or revised support policy matters as required. Serves ARMISH-MAAG principal staff element for Coordination/Control of S.Assistance Funded Support Activities--United States Support Activity United States Army Communications Command-Iran and Medical Activity Provides Acting Inspector General for Command. Directorate of Studies, Plans, and Operations (ARSPO) previously dir of Plans, Policies and Programs. Conducts systems analysis and prepares related studies regarding pro-IIA Acquisitions of U.S. Defense Systems. Develops a comprehensive ARMISH-MAAG position regarding proposed weapon acquisitions based on Iranian needs and absorptive capacity, the U.S. capability to deliver

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (Continued) 28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (Continued) 8. COMMENTS. Particularly comment upon the officer's overall leadership ability, personal traits not listed on the reverse side, and the case of actual performance in combat. Include comments pertaining to unique skills and distinctions that may be important to career development and future assignment. A mark in boxes with an asterisk (*) indicates adversity and supporting comments are required. COMMENTS: CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH HAS BEEN THE NAVAL ATTACHE AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN IRAN DURING THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE REVOLUTION. DURING THE SEVERAL MONTHS WHEN THIS REVOLUTION WAS DEVELOPING, HE ACCURATELY REPORTED THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TRANSPIRING IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. HIS AMIABILITY AND KNACK IN QUICKLY DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS RESULTED IN RELIABLE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE REPORTING. IN THE MATTER OF ONLY A FEW WEEKS HE ESTABLISHED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH MANY OTHER FOREIGN ATTACHES AND ESTABLISHED A MOST BENEFICIAL CROSSTALK. HE OBSERVED AND CRITICALLY REPORTED UPON THE TENSIONS AND FISSURES WHICH WERE BUILDING UP IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. NUMEROUS STRESSFUL SITUATIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED BY CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH DURING THE SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HIS RESPONSE TO NEARLY ALL THESE SITUATIONS WHICH INCLUDED ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION WERE EXEMPLIFIED WITH CALMNESS, DECISIVENESS AND RATIONAL THINKING. WHEN THE LOCAL SITUATION DETERIORATED TO THE POINT THAT AMERICANS HAD TO BE EVACUATED, CAPTAIN HOLWORTH PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION PHASES OF THIS MAJOR EVACUATION EFFORT. HIS EXPERTISE, INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIVENESS INSURED THE SAFE AND TIMELY MOVEMENT OF MANY THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HIS UNTIRING AND UNSELFISH EFFORTS AIDED IMMEASURABLY IN A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION. SEVERAL TIMES CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH ACTED AS DEFENSE ATTACHE DURING THE ABSENCE OF THE DATT. IN THIS CAPACITY HE READILY ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFECTIVELY MANAGED THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE. CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH IS AN EXCELLENT OFFICER WHO IS REGARDED AS A TRUE PROFESSIONAL AND HIGHLY COMPETENT ATTACHE BY HIS COUNTERPARTS. HIS PERSONAL BEHAVIOR WAS NORMALLY EXEMPLIFIED BY HIGH STANDARDS OF BEARING, CONDUCT AND COURTESY WHICH ENHANCED THE IMAGE OF THIS NAVAL OFFICER. HIS DIRECT AND EXPERT SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY MISSION IN TEHRAN ADDED GREATLY TO THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFENSE ATTACH OFFICE.

-09- ★U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973 — 488 - 668 BUPERS USE ONLY P1611-1 BUPERS USE ONLY REPORT ON THE FITNESS OF OFFICERS

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RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION

PERSONAL TRAITS (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET)

WEAKNESSES DISCUSSED?

82. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER EVALUATED: (IAW BUPERS INST. 1611-12-SERIES). "I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS REPORT AND HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF MY PERFORMANCE." 85. SIGNATURE OF REPORTING SENIOR Thomas E. Schaefer 83. DATE FORWARDED 84. 87. SIGNATURE OF REGULAR REPORTING SENIOR ON CONCURRENT AND CONCURRENT/SPECIAL REPORT 86. DATE FORWARDED NAV PERS 1611/1 (REV. 9-72) S/N 0106-078-3113 WORK SHEET (0-73) DETACH WORK SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING FORM * Comments are required. Enter comments in Section 88 on RECORD and OFFICER copies. DO NOT ATTACH CONTINUATION PAGES TO OCR COPY. " DRAFT "

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (Continued) 28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (Continued) 8. COMMENTS. Particularly comment upon the officer's overall leadership ability, personal traits not listed on the reverse side, and the estimated or actual performance in combat. Include comments pertaining to unique skills and distinctions that may be important to career development and future assignment. A mark in boxes with an asterisk (*) indicates adversity and supporting comments are required. FAMMENTO • FAOTATM UAIL THUADTI HA DE DEU MIE DEU DEU DEU 21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (Continued) 28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (Continued) 88. COMMENTS Particularly comment upon the office's overall leadership ability personal traits not listed or the reverse side and estimated or actual performance combat. Inclusive comments pertaining to unique skills and directions that may be important to career development and future assignment. A mark in boxes with an ten-sk in indicates adversity and supporting comments are required. COMMENTS: CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH HAS BEEN THE NAVAL ATTACHE AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN IRAN DURING THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE REVOLUTION. DURING THE SEVERAL MONTHS WHEN THIS REVOLUTION WAS DEVELOPING, HE ACCURATELY REPORTED THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TRANSPIRING IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. HIS AMIABILITY AND KNACK IN QUICKLY DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS RESULTED IN RELIABLE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE REPORTING. IN THE MATTER OF ONLY A FEW WEEKS HE ESTABLISHED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH MANY OTHER FOREIGN ATTACHES AND ESTABLISHED A MOST BENEFICIAL CROSSTALK. HE OBSERVED AND CRITICALLY REPORTED UPON THE TENSIONS AND FISSURES WHICH WERE BUILDING UP IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. NUMEROUS STRESSFUL SITUATIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED BY CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH DURING THE SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HIS RESPONSE TO NEARLY ALL THESE SITUATIONS, WHICH INCLUDED ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION, WERE EXEMPLIFIED WITH CALMNESS, DECISIVENESS AND RATIONAL THINKING. WHEN THE LOCAL SITUATION DETERIORATED TO THE POINT THAT AMERICANS HAD TO BE EVACUATED, CAPTAIN HOLLORTH PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION PHASES OF THIS MAJOR EVACUATION EFFORT. HIS EXPERTISE, INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIVENESS INSURED THE SAFE AND TIMELY MOVEMENT OF MANY THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS OTHER FOREIGNERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HIS UNTIRING AND UNSELFISH EFFORTS AIDED IMMEASURABLY IN A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION. SEVERAL TIMES CAPTHOLLINGWORTH ACTED AS DEFENSE ATTACHE DURING THE ABSENCE OF THE DATT. IN THIS CAPACITY HE READILY ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFECTIVELY MANAGED THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE. CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH IS AN EXCELLENT OFFICER WHO IS REGARDED AS A TRUE PROFESSIONAL AND HIGHLY COMPETENT ATTACHE BY HIS COUNTERPARTS. HIS PERSONAL BEHAVIOR WAS NORMALLY EXEMPLIFIED BY HIGH STANDARDS OF BEARING, CONDUCT AND COURTESY WHICH ENHANCED THE IMAGE OF THIS NAVAL OFFICER. HIS DIRECT AND EXPERT SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY MISSION IN TEHRAN ADDED GREATLY TO THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFENSE ATTACH OFFICE. U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE APO NEW YORK 09205 REVIEWED BY: REVIEWED + SIGNED BY: J. O. TUTTLE i. RADM, U.S. NAVY ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICY

1. NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE): HOLLINGWORTH, ROY MILTON 2. GRADE: CAPT 3. DESIG.: 1310 4. SSN: 460-40-9504 5. ACDUTRA/TEMAC: [ ] 6. UIC: bcc50 7. SHIP/STATION: USNAO IRAN 8. DATE REPORTED: 78JUN30 OCCASION FOR REPORT 9. PERIODIC: [ ] 10. DETACHMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR: [ ] 11. DETACHMENT OF OFFICER: [X] PERIOD OF REPORT 12. FROM: 78OCT01 13. TO: 79MAY31 TYPE OF REPORT 14. REGULAR: [X] 15. CONCURRENT: [ ] 16. SPECIAL: [ ] 17. OPS CDR: [ ] BASIS FOR OBSERVATION 18. CLOSE: [X] 19. FREQUENT: [ ] 20. INFREQUENT: [ ] 21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE OF RECORD COPY): THIS IS A JOINT STAFF ASSIGNMENT AT DOD LEVEL 22. DAYS OF COMBAT: N 23. REPORTING SENIOR (LAST NAME, FI, MI): SCHAEFER, T E 24. TITLE: DATT 25. GRADE: COL 26. DESIG.: USAF 27. SSN: 112-24-1183 28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE OF RECORD COPY): ALUSNA-NAVAL ATTACHE-C SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE (TYPE IN OCR CODE LETTER FROM WORK SHEET) 29. GOAL SETTING & ACHIEVEMENT: A 30. SUBORDINATE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT: A 31. WORKING RELATIONS: A 32. EQUIP & MATERIAL MANAGE.: A 33. NAVY ORGAN. SUPPORT: A 34. RESPONSE IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS: B 35. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A 36. SPEAKING ABILITY: A 37. WRITING ABILITY: A WARFARE SPECIALTY SKILLS (FROM OCR WORK SHEET) 38. SEA-MANSHIP: A 39. AIR-MANSHIP: A 40. WATCH STANDING: N 41. [ ] 42. [ ] 43. [ ] 44. SUBSPECIALTY CODE: [ ] REQUIRED BY BILLET 45. YES: [ ] 46. NO: [ ] UTILIZATION 47. FREQUENT: [ ] 48. INFREQUENT: [ ] 49. NONE: [ ] (WORK SHEET CODE) 50. PERFORMANCE: N MISSION CONTRIBUTION NOT OBS. HIGH MID LOW MARG. UNSAT. 51. EVALUATION: [X] 52. SUMMARY: 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 TREND OF PERFORMANCE 53. FIRST REPORT: [X] 54. CONSISTENT: [ ] 55. IMPROVING: [ ] 56. DECLINING: [ ] DESIRABILITY (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET) 57. COMMAND: A 58. OPERATIONAL: A 59. STAFF: A 60. JOINT/OSD: A 61. FOREIGN SHORE: A RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION 62. EARLY: [ ] 63. REGULAR: [X] 64. NO: [ ] RANKING FOR EARLY PROMOTION 65. NUMBER RECOMMENDED: [ ] 66. RANKING: [ ] PERSONAL TRAITS (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET) 67. JUDGMENT: A 68. IMAGINATION: A 69. ANALYTIC ABILITY: A 70. PERSONAL BEHAVIOR: B 71. FORCEFULNESS: A 72. MILITARY BEARING: A 73. [ ] 74. [ ] 75. [ ] 76. [ ] WEAKNESSES DISCUSSED? 77. NONE NOTED: [X] 78. YES: [ ] 79. NO: [ ] STATEMENT 80. NOT DESIRED: [ ] 81. ATTACHED: [X] 82. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER EVALUATED: (IAW BUPERS INST. 1611-12-SERIES). "I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS REPORT, HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF MY PERFORMANCE AND RIGHT TO MAKE A STATEMENT." COPY PROVIDED 83. DATE FORWARDED: 79SEP24 84. [ ] 85. SIGNATURE OF REPORTING SENIOR: [ ] 86. DATE FORWARDED: [ ] 87. SIGNATURE OF REGULAR REPORTING SENIOR ON CONCURRENT AND CONCURRENT/SPECIAL REPORT: [ ] NAV PERS 1611/1 (REV. 5-77) S/N 0106-LF-016-1100 ★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 — 240-818/013 REPORTING SENIOR’S COPY NAV PERS 1611/1 (REV. 9-72) S/N 0106-078-3113 WORK SHEET (0-73) DETACH WORK SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING FORM * Comments are required. Enter comments in Section 88 on RECORD and OFFICER copies. DO NOT ATTACH CONTINUATION PAGES TO OCR COPY. "DRAFT"

ATTN: Col Schaefer. your COPY OF SITREP ON CAPT. Hollinsworth. NAVPERS 1611/1 (REV. 9-72) S/N 0106-078-3113 DETACH WORK SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING FORM • Comments are required. Enter comments in Section 88 on RECORD and OFFICER copies. DO NOT ATTACH CONTINUATION PAGES TO OCR COPY. "DRAFT"

Dévan Army 16 Jun 79 02 11:2 NNVV ES028BRN458 PP RUQMR N A k ,Sun DE RUEKJCS #4204 1662140 21357 JUN 79 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD: ISA// l TO CARMISH MAAG TEHRAN IR SECRET 1143 FROM: ESAA-TS (1399/79) SUBJECT: PROCLOSURE GUIDANCE FOR IRAN (U) 1. (S) COURSE: OBJECTIVE GUIDANCE DATED 12 MAR 1979 IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE: DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO IRAN (U) (U) OBJECTIVE TO PROMULGATE NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY COMMITTEE (NDPC) GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (GOI). (C) BACKGROUND (C) A. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TURMOIL WHICH IS EVIDENT IN IRAN AT THIS TIME AND WHICH IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEAR TERM, PLACES IN QUESTION THE ABILITY OF THE GOI TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT UNITED STATES CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION. (c) B. IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT UNITED STATES CLASSIFIED MILITARY PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 4204 S E C R E T INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY RELEASED TO THE GOI HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO COMPROMISE. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CANNOT AFFIRM THE EXTENT OF SUCH COMPROMISE AT THIS TIME. (C) C. NOTWITHSTANDING, MEASURES MUST BE ADOPTED TO ENSURE TEAT DISCLOSURES CULMINATING FROM PRIOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS ARE HELD TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND NO NEW INITIATIVES ARE UNDERTAKEN REGARDING IRAN WHICH MAY INVOLVE THE DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY INFORMATION WHICH, IF COMPROMISED, WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. (U) GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE (C) A. NEW INITIATIVES SHALL NOT BE UNDERTAKEN WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION OR MATERIAL TO THE GO TO WITHOUT SPECIFIC NDPC APPROVAL. (S)B. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE GOI'S ELIGIBILITY LEVELS AS REFLECTED IN ANNEX A, NDP-1, FOR CATEGORY 1 (ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES), CATEGORY 2 (MILITARY MATERIAL AND MUNITIONS), CATEGORY 4 (PRODUCTION INFORMATION), CATEGORY 5 (COMBINED MILITARY OPERATIONS, PLANNING AND READINESS) AND CATEGORY 8 (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE) ARE SUSPENDED. THIS SUSPEND-

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 4204 S E C R E T SION WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS: (1) THE NDPC CAN DETERMINE TEAT THE GOI CAN ADEQUATELY PROTECT U.S. CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION AND, (2) THE GOI FORMALLY REAFFIRMS THE PRO- VISIONS OF THE UNITED STATE/IRANIAN GENERAL SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT, DATED JUNE 6, 1974. EXCEPT AS NOTED IN C., BELOW, WHILE THE SUSPENSION IS IN EFFECT, ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF U.S. CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION AT ANY LEVEL WILL BE HANDLED BY NDP-1. THIS SUSPENSION IS APPLICABLE TO BOTH NEW INITIATIVES AND TO THE DELIVERY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL AND DOCUMENTATION UNDER PRIOR COMMITMENTS. (C) C. THIS SUSPENSION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE ORAL/VISUAL DISCLOSURE OF CMI PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED BY DESIGNATED DISCLOSURE AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT IRANIAN PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE ONGOING, PROGRAMMED AND SCHEDULED TRAINING WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MATERIAL PROVIDED TO THE GOI UNDER PREVIOUSLY APPROVED FMS OR GRANT AID PROGRAMS, UNLESS DESIGNATED DISCLOSURE AUTHORITIES DETERMINE SUCH DISCLOSURE WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. (C) D. THESE GUIDELINES ALSO APPLY TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PAGE4 RUEKJCS 4204 S E C R E T DEVELOPED IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH MAY CONCEIVABLY REACH IRAN 2. (U) A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT IS ALSO BEING MAILED TO YOU. 3. (C) THE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE IS NOT RELEASABLE TO THE GOI. DECL 13 JUN 95. BT 4204

-9Y- UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 11414 DE ROUTE #1414 362 ** CNR UL'UU 225 R 2917222 CCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO USICA WASHDC BT UNCLAS TEHRAN 11414 USICA E.O. 12065: N/A SUBJ: HEJIRA CELEBRATION IN U.S. 1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TODAY ORDERED THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE PGOI TO COME UP WITH "REVOLUTIONARY PLANS TO MARK THE GREAT AND AUSPICIOUS OCCASION" OF THE BEGINNING OF THE 15 CENTURY ON NOVEMBER 21 (HEJIRA). 2. POST URGENTLY NEEDS INFORMATION ON U.S. PLANS TO CELEBRATE HEJIRA WITH VIEW TO TYING THEM INTO IRANIAN CELEBRATION. 3. IF U.S. PLANS TO CELEBRATE HEJIRA INCLUDE INVITING IRANIAN PARTICIPANTS, POST NEEDS DETAILS ASAP. GRAVES BT #1414 UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 11414 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED CERE: USICA 10/29/79 APPRV: USICA:PAO:GRAVE IRFTD: USICA:PAC:GRAVE CLEAR: NONE DISTR: ICA-4 CHARGE POL CHU 2

TELEGRAM □CHARGE TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECRET 11652:\TAGS:\nJECT: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC\SECRET TEHRAN 00367 ACTION:\n- E.O. 11652: GDS\TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, IR\nSUBJ: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN DCM2\nAMB 2\nP022 (A)\nREF: /77 STATE 291277; (B) 77 STATE 295486 ECON2\nPM 1. WE NOTE WITH APPRECIATION DEPARTMENT'S RECOGNITION THAT AS USIS\nCORS STATEMENTS OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED/NEXH OR2\nDAO FIXED OR IMMUTABLE. WE HAVE EXAMINED WITH CARE THOSE SET NAG2\nCRIT FORTH IN REFTEL B. IN LARGE MEASURE WE BELIEVE THEY ARE POUCH\nSHIR REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE AND ADDRESS OUR CENTRAL CONCERNS TABR\nISFA2 AND INTERESTS IN IRAN. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MODIFIED AND 20/reh EXTENDED THIS STATEMENT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RECENT\DEVELOPMENTS AND SLIGHTLY ALTERED PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT OUR\CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OUGHT TO BE. THERE FOLLOWS A\FULL RESTATEMENT IN THE FORMAT USED IN REFTEL B.\n2. BEGIN TEXT. I. A SUSTAINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC\RELATIONSHIP BUILT UPON TRUST CONFIDENCE, AND MUTUAL\RESPECT. DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM: JCMIKLOS/SW 1/10/77 1102 DCM: JCMiklos/SW ～

-- MAINTAIN AND REINFORCE THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SHAH. -- ASSESS THE RANGE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY AND INITIATE STEPS TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH THOSE FORCES AND GROUPS WHICH ARE EVOLVING INTO IMPORTANT CENTERS OF INFLUENCE AS IRAN MODERNIZES. THIS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY RECENT EASING OF SOME GOVERNMENT STRICTURES ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY RECOGNIZING THAT SOME RISKS MAY BE INVOLVED IN CERTAIN CASES REQUIRING THAT WE PROCEED SELECTIVELY AND PRUDENTLY. -- ENCOURAGE PRIMIN AMOUZEGAR AND HIS CABINET TO REFLECT ON IRAN'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GOALS AND TO PLAN A SPECIFIC AND INTEGRATED PROGRAM OF INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC MOMENTUM AS OIL REVENUES INEVITABLY DIMINISH. IN THIS RESPECT ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT IRANIAN INITIATIVES TO SEEK OUTSIDE EXPERT ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE FROM THE IBRD AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SOURCES. -- ENGAGE FULL RANGE OF USIS CAPABILITIES IN KEEPING IRANIAN DECISIONMAKERS AND OPINION MOLDERS INFORMED OF US POLICIES AND ATTITUDES AFFECTING IRANIAN INTERESTS AND IRANIAN-US RELATIONS. II. AN ENHANCED US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN NON-MILITARY FIELDS.

-- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF A RELIABLE PETROLEUM SUPPLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES AND THE ADOPTION OF A MODERATE PRICING POLICY. EXPLAIN U.S. ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND THE NEED OF THE WORLD ECONOMY FOR OIL AT BEARABLE PRICES. -- FACILITATE AN INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES' SHARE OF THE MARKET IN IRAN AND BE PREPARED TO USE THE WEIGHT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE IN SUPPORT AT A MINIMUM, OF NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY AMERICAN FIRMS TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAN. -- ASSESS HOW WE CAN MAKE THE US-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION MORE EFFECTIVE, INCLUDING HOW TO INVOLVE THE US PRIVATE SECTOR MORE FULLY. --- PURSUE WITH DR. ETEMAD AND HIS ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATES FORMULATION OF FINAL TEXT OF US-IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS PRESIDENT'S NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. -- MAINTAIN US INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING PRIVILEGES IN IRAN, AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE QUID PRO QUO LIAISON SUPPORT IN RESPONSE TO THESE PRIVILEGES. CAREFULLY WEIGH ANY PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL PRIVILEGES TO ENSURE THAT THEY LO NOT ENDANGER EXISTING ASSETS. --- SEEK TO ENGAGE IRAN MORE FULLY IN REGIONAL NARCOTICS EFFORTS AIMED AT REDUCING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND REDUCING ILLICIT NARCOTICS

TRAFFIC INTO AND THROUGH IRAN. -- WORK WITH GOI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO R IMPROVE PROCEDURES IN THE EVALUATION AND PROCESSING OF IRANIANS SEEKING AN EDUCATION IN THE US. -- EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IRANIAN STUDENTS PLANNING TO STUDY IN THE US TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE ORIENTATION, COUNSELING, AND ENGLISH INSTRUCTION PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE. -- CONTINUE TO PRESS IRAN FOR FULL PAYMENT OF THE DELINQUENT SURPLUS PROPERTY DEBT. III. CAREFULLY COORDINATED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM. -- MAINTAIN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE SHAH AND HIS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISORS ON HIS MILITARY NEEDS WITH THE AIM OF AVERTING NONESSENTIAL MILITARY SALES REQUESTS. -- CAREFULLY SUPERVISE EXISTING AND ANTICIPATED FOREIGN MILITARY SALE CASES. -- CLOSELY MONITOR ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF US ARMS MANUFACTURERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE OBSERVING THE NEW REGULATIONS ON SALES PROMOTION AND SEEK WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF US DEFENSE-RELATED CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAN TO THEIR ESSENTIAL NUMBERS. -- MONITOR OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE IRANIAN DEFENSE NEEDS ARE MET WITHIN THE

REEXAMINE US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE THAT THAT IT IS, CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC LAW 95-92. -- ENCOURAGE GOI TO ACCEPT INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED MILITARY MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND INTERNAL STAFFING TECHNIQUES WITH THE ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING ON US MILITARY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE. - MAINTAIN US OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO IRANIAN 5 FOR NAVAL SHIPS. IV. TENANCE OF IRAN'S BALANCED POSTURE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS. -- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF IRAN'S BALANCED APPROACH TO ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS AND ITS SUPPORT FOR OUR MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. -- ENCOURAGE THE MAINTENANCE OF A POSITIVE IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, INCLUDING AN CIL SUPPLY LINK. -- MAINTAIN IRAN'S OPPOSITION TO PAKISTAN REPROCESSING. -- SUPPORT IRAN'S COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, AND OTHER ARABIAN PENINSULA STATES ON PERSIAN GULF SECURITY, KEEPING INFORMED ON RELEVANT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ AND IRAN'S OTHER REGIONAL NEIGHBORS. ENCOURAGE --/ENCOURAGE A CONTINUATION OF RESPONSIBLE IRANIAN COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES.

Classification -- ENCOURAGE IRANIAN SUPPORT OF OUR PRINCIPLE POLICIES IN AFRICA. V. IMPROVEMENT IN IRAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. -- REVIEW WITH THE SHAH AND OTHER RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS, ON APPROPRIATE OCCASION, US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES, FOCUSING ON IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS (WHICH IS ATTAINABLE) AS OPPOSED TO PUSHING FOR CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (WHICH MAY SMACK OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE), NOTING THE IMPACT ON UNFAVORABLE IRANIAN PUBLIC IMAGE ON THIS ISSUE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE. SULLIVAN SECRET Classification

انشناك اميرييا ليسم

(AA) 2/A 10/AMS 45/US 30/AM 6/P/M A US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225323 [illegible] 5

(A9) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL In the previous exposures we explained that the only way liberation movements could be freed was out of the norms of dominance relations between the superpowers and the oppressed peoples of the world and we noted that the embassy was the spy den of the imperialists, the center of conspiracy and plots against the Islamic Iranian Revolution and we presented the reasons which obliged us to occupy this den of espionage. Now we will present documents to the general opinion of the world, documents which prove that this place had to be closed so that plots end conspiracy would end. Disclosing Announcement No. 11 In the room behind room 225 in the main building of the embassy among the remaining material we found instruments which indicated that in this place illegalacts of forging documents and stamps took place and we found an envelope containing two stamps which are used when entering and leaving countries. The authorities of Mehrabad claim that these stamps should only be found in the airport office. A tablet containing all numbers for the dates was also found. Apparently the stamps have been used before. But the problem is what are these stamps used for. Smugglers and spies use these forged stamps to enter the country and criminals wanted by the police use them to escape from the country. Now one must ask why these two stamps were found in the former U.S. embassy. The American government and people must respond to this question. The American government must answer why it allows diplomats and representatives to forge documents of other countries. Does the American people accept the responsibility of the escape the thousands of thieves murderers and criminals from our

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 12 In the former revealing of documents showed, the general lines through which imperialism penetrated in the different economic, military, political, social and cultural aspects of Iran and generally thirdworld countries. so that these very few documents which remain could open the path of the enslaved and oppressed peoples towards freedom and independence. By exposing this document we clarify a new line which has for years been one of the basic pilars of the ruining policies of American (and before it English) Imperialism. Just as we will see in this document, they trap with different plots and conspiracies influential men and alienated intellectuals and present their own policies as the main basis of these peoples work. Then they prepare the background for these agents so as to, in the proper time, impose them upon our deprived nation.

（91） TELECOM 1378 1637 12 INDICATE COLLECT □} C A I F P O E T O FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL 1652: AGS: ECT: TION: :3 ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11014 LINDIS E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJ: LINDIS 1. ON SUCCESSIVE NIGHTS RECENTLY POL COUNSELOR MET WITH MOHAMAD DERAKHSHESH, HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION, AND SENATOR MOHAMAD ALI MASSOUDI, PROMINENT SUPPORTER OF SHARIF-EMANI AND SHAH LOYAL6TO. CONVERSATION WITH DERAKHSHESH COVERED A LOT OF GROUND OVER PAST 17 YEARS HE HAS BEEN INACTIVE IN GOVERNMENT AFTER HAVING SERVED AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND REFUSED OFFER FOR THAT JOB IN ALAM CABINET OF THOSE DAYS. HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ABOUT A WEEK AGO AFTER SPENDING TWO WEEKS, MAINLY IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL DUE TO BLOOD PRESSURE PROBLEM, HAVING BEEN ARRESTED BY MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES FOR OPPOSITION STATEMENTS. AS FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND LEADER OF A UNION WHICH CONSISTS OF 2000 TEACHERS THROUGH - BY: POL:GBLambrakis DRAFTING DATE: 11/16/78 TEL. EXT. 1110 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED: MIN:CWNaas CONFIDENTIAL ___ CLASSIFICATION

(97) ) country? Do the American people accept participation, in the crimes of the illegal entry of thousands of professional smugglers and anti-revolutionaries and spies to our country. We are sure that the American people if they become aware and understand the decieving nature of the propaganda of agencies depending on CIA and Moussad they will then protest to these illegal acts and in human plots. Our moslem nation will never forgive the crimes of the cooperation of the traitors, criminals' spies and is determined to uproot these corrupted systems. Moslem Students Following The Line Of Ima

KING, DESPITE THEIR RECOGNITION OF HIS HAVING MADE MANY I ERRORS. MASSOUDI AND HIS DAUGHTERS WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE SINS OF PEOPLE WHO SURROUNDED THE KING OVER PAST DECADE AND PROFITED BY THEIR ROLE AS INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN THE KING AND HIS PEOPLE. HOVEYDA IN PARTICULAR CARE IN FOR HEAVY CRITICISM. 4. WE REPORT THESE TWO MEETINGS TO INDICATE COMPLEXITY IN DOMESTIC INDIAN SITUATION. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF ELEMENTS IN THE POPULATION WHO WOULD DEARLY LIKE TO SEE SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD KEEP THE SHAN AND AVOID A TOTAL VICTORY FOR KHOMEINI FORCES. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE ARE CONVINCED COMMUNISTS WILL ENFICIALLY MANAGE TO TAKE OVER ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT DURING THE THEIR RELATIVELY LOW POSTURE IN PRESENT OPPOSITION. OWNERS WANT TO AVOID WHAT THEY SEE AS RELIGIOUS FANATICISM. ALL RECOGNIZE KEY ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY THE ARMED FORCES WHITIVER THE OUTCOME OF PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT BE. SULLIVAN L. CONFIDENTIAL Classification

(9△) OUT IRAN, DERAKHSHESH IS ONE OF RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE IN IRAN WHO CAN MOBILIZE SOME SORT OF ORGANIZATION. HE INDICATED HE WOULD DEARLY LOVE TO FOLLOW CONCILIATORY COURSE WHICH WOULD PERMIT SHAH TO REMAIN AND REIGN, NOT RULE, BUT CONVURMENT HAS CLOSED DOWN ALL EFFORTS HE AND HIS GROUP HAVE MADE TO PUBLISH OR BE POLITICALLY ACTIVE. 2. DERAKHSHISH DESCRIBES GROUP THAT FOLLOWS HIM AS MAJORITY OF TEACHERS. SMALL MINORITY FOLLOW CRYPTO COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION ACCORDING TO HIM WHILE LARGER MINORITY ARE RELIGIOUS SUPPORTERS DOMINATED BY KHOMEINI. HE CONSIDERS PEOPLE WHO HAVE POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT OVER PAST 17 YEARS AS "CORRUPT" MORALLY EVEN IF NOT IN EVERY CASE FINANCIALLY. HE CITES HIS OWN EXPERIENCE WHEN HIS SALARY WAS CUT OFF FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND HE HAD TO SURVIVE ON HIS WIFE'S EARNINGS. ALL THIS APPEARS TO HAVE HIM NOT TOO EMBITTERED AND POL COUNSELOR AS WELL AS VISITING INR DEPARTMENT OFFICER GRIFFIN WERE IMPRESSED BY HIS READINESS TO FOLLOW A MIDDLE COURSE THAT MIGHT SAVE HIS COUNTRY FROM THE POLARIZED EXTREMES INTO WHICH SITUATION IS SLIPPING. HE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN REMAINING IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY. 3. MASSOUDI, WHO WAS ACTIVE BEHIND THE SCENES IN SUPPORT OF SHARIF-EMAMI AS PRIME MINISTER, AND CONTINUES ACTIVE WITH MANY OPPOSITIONS AS WELL AS LOYALIST ELEMENTS, REPRESENTED CONTINUING LOYALTY MANY IRANIANS FEEL FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 13 Revolutionary people of Iran American people we have revealed in the previous exposures that high authorities of the American State Department specifically Vance had planned from long ago to take the fugitive Mohammad Reza to the United States. In the document which will be disclosed we see how the American criminals give asylum to the Shah under the pretext of sickness so to deceive the general opinion of the world we hope the exposure of this document will unravel the plots of imperialism. We demand from all enlightened nations of the world specifically the freedom seekers to put the ruling class of America and especially Carter on trial. Since the Security Council of the United Nations cannot reply to the persistent demands of the masses of the Iranian people based on the extradition of the Criminal Mohammad Reza and cannot condemn U.S. government for its crimes according to international laws, The American people must expose Carter and the under his cover of humanrights.

(101) FI R 2506273 ** INT SSSS ZZH 0301328Z SEP 79 IN AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3998 PT SEC R E T TEHRAN 12506 NODIS CHEROKEE 10R NEWSON IFOM CHARGE 1.0. 1965: GDS 9/30/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M 1965: PART, IR, US, MX SUBJECT: THE SHAH OF IRAN REF: STATE 256611 1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. I CANNOT SUGGEST THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE AS YET IN THE KIND OF OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC ACTION TO THE SHAH ENTERING THE UNITED STATES THAT WOULD DIFFER FROM THE ASSESSMENT I GAVE IN LATE JULY (TEHRAN 7930). THE CONSTITUTIONAL TIMETABLE HAS SLIPPED AND A NEW GOVERNMENT IS NOW UNLIKELY TO BE INSTALLED BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP IS IMPROVING BUT ONLY SLOWLY. AND IT IS NOT YET OF THE SUBSTANCE THAT WOULD WEATHER VERY WELL THE IMPACT OF THE SHAH ENTERING THE UNITED STATES. 5. MEANWHILE THE CLERICS HERE ARE IN THE ASCENDANCE, AND THAT I FEAR WORSENS THE PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE AS REGARDS ANY GESTURE ON OUR PART TOWARD THE SHAH. THAT WAS ILLUSTRATED THIS PAST WEEK IN THE VERY TOUGH REMARKS BY KHOMEINI CONCERNING THE SHAH IN HIS REPORTED INTERVIEW VI'S ORIANA FALLACI, IN WHICH HE DENOUNCED THE SHAH AS A TRAITOR WHO MUST BE RETURNED TO IRAN AND TRIED PUBLICLY FOR FIFTY YEARS OF CRIMES AGAINST THE IRANIAN LOVE. 4. GIVEN THAT KIND OF ATMOSPHERE AND THE KIND OF PUBLIC POSTURING ABOUT THE SHAR BY THOSE WHO CONTROL OR INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION HERE, I DOUBT THAT THE SHAR BEING ILL WOULD HAVE MUCH AMELIORATING EFFECT ON THE IEGFFE OF REACTION HERE. IT WOULD FRESUMAELY MAKE OUR VON POSITION MORE DEFENSIBLE IF WE WERE SEEN TO ADMIT BIM UNDER DEMONSTRABLY HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS. 5. TEAT BEING SAID, IT IS AS YOU INDICATE OF UTMOST IMPRANCE THAT WE TALK QUIETLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IN ADVANCE IF WE INTEND TO ADMIT BIM, EVEN FOR A VERY SORT PERIOD. IF WE TO INTEND TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AND IF THE MATTER IS URGENT, CLEARLY THE BEST MEANS OF SMOKING SOME COOPERATION FROM THE PGOI WOULD PE FOR THE SOCIETY TO RAISE IT WITH YAZDI WEIN HE SEES BIM ON OLDER B. TIGER CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: STAT 9/30/79 APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGE DRFTD: CHARGE:LPLAINGE CLEAR: NONE DISTR: CHARGE

(107) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 14 Who has the criminal Embassy of the U.S. of America served? What portion of our society has been secured by this mobilized espionage house? Now that the dirty plots of the American Government has been known for our raised people, the answer is clear, the Embassy of United States has secured the imperialism, the CIA and its agents in Iran. It would not be surprising that after the Islamic Revolution in Iran also we could see the bases of the Imperialism among the Shah's regime supporters that have spent their life in serving the Shah's regime. The following documents show the relationship between the American consulate in Iran and other elements who spent their life serving the oppressors. These are including the plot of the treacherous of American Government in Wash D.C. for the Embassy of U.S. in Iran and other countries, that has asked them to issue the special Visa for the Iranian criminals and traitors to the country, who have been working for SAVAK, to help them to continue their treacherous activities.

(107) 12. USMF #2421 213 54 ENY CCCC 12H C 241422 SEP 79 FM EMBASSY TIFRAN TO PUBLIC/SECSTAK WASBLC IMMEDIATE 2348 INFO RUSRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0131 RUFAFT/AMCONSUL FRANFURT 2248 PT CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL SC GR: ST4T 3/21/79 APFRV: CONS: RH40PEFIII LPFD: CONS: EMHORLEFIELD CLEAR: NONE PISTR: CONS3 CRRG' CHWN LIMITED OFFICIAL USF TEHRAN 12421 ROME AND FRANKFURT FOR INS E.O. 12965: K/A TAGS: CVIS, SHEF, IR SUBJECT: VISA CLEARANCES FOR MEMBERS OF PREVIOUS REGIMES REF: (A) FRANKFURT 3-352S (NOTAL); (B) TEHRAN 9907 (NOTAL); (C) FRANKFURT 2420; (D) ROME 25295 (NOTAL) 1. (LOU - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. REFERENCES A AND D REQUEST TEHRAN CLEARANCE FOR EITHER CONDITIONAL ENTRY OR REFUGEE STATUS FOR MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS OR SAVAK UNDER THE SHAH. THE PURPOSE OF REFETL B WAS TO ALERT INS FRANKFURT THAT DEPARTMENT MIGHT WANT OFFORIUMITY TO CONSIDER ANY POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN GRANTING SUCH STATUS. REFETL C INDICATES INQUIRY WITH DEPARTMENT NOT NORMALLY MADE. 3. EMBASSY FILES WERE EITHER DESTROYED OR EVACUATED TO WASHINGTON PRICE TO OR DURING RIOTS EARLIER THIS YEAR. ONLY MEANINGFUL CHECK WOULD BE OF WASHINGTON FILES. WE STILL BELIEVE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER INPUT FOR CASES SUCH AS THESE. LAINGEN BT 40401 NN

7 AUG 2023 CN 260 CONS CHB CHRON NNKNVV ESR246BRA223 PP RUQMHR DP RUSHC #4597 2190023 ZNY CCCC2 ZZB P 262149Z AUG 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO EMBASSY TPHRAH PRIORITY 3699 BT CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 224597 L.O. 12065: N/A TAGS: CVIS, IR SUBJECT: VISAS: NIVS - IZADPANAH, ALIREZA AND MARYAM 1. (U - ENTIRE TEYT) 2. WE FAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT ALIREZA AND MARYAM IZADPANAH HAVE APPOINTMENT AT 2620 ON AUGUST 8 TO APPLY FOR NIV. THEY WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR MOTHER MRS. AZIMEH KOMEILY (IZADPANAH), WHO ALREADY HAS VISA. ALIREZA AND MARYAM ARE THE CSILDEN OF MR. G. IZADPANAH, FORMER DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION. MR. IZADPANAH UP UNTIL FEBRUARY 12 WAS VERY HELPFUL TO THE FAA CIVIL AVIATION ASSISTANCE GROUP IN TEHRAN AND IS WEIL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN TO THE FAA AND THE DEPARTMENT. HE IS CURRENTLY IN THE US. ANY ASSISTANCE THAT CAN BE APPROPRIATELY RENDERED WOULD BE APPRECIATED. VANCE BT 4597 expected10/1/79

(10Y) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 15 In this document we will expose one of the acts of imperialism. before the oppressed peoples. To secure its untrusts, imperialism spreads spy networks in all of the world. The CIA is the most sophisticated of these. Any where there is a ruthless oppression of the people footprints of the CIA are left behind in Chile at the time of Dr. Allendeh in Iran. at the time of Mossadegh when the CIA helped the Shah in acts of oppression. Even during the Islamic revolution led by Imam Khomeini which succeeded after 60 thousand martyrs were given and 100 thousand were handicapped the U.S. did not stop supporting this criminal for a moment and later when this puppet was overthrown with the will of the Iranian people the CIA continued its involvement in our internal affairs and this is all evident violation of human rights. And it is interesting to note that the these acts were led by people who claim to defend humanrights. In this document we see that the CIA uses the embassy for carrying out their dreadful plots.

(10λ)) Rise \underline{\text{oh}} Infinite Ocean Of Humans. "Imam Khomeini" Peoples of the world! In the course of history, peoples have always been victims of a powerful minority. In other words history reflects the struggles of deprived peoples, seeking to obtain the freedom from the claws of the dominating powers just as we witnessed last year the will and faith of a nation struggle before the strongest powers and succeeded finally.

ANGER CHANNEL 8. WITH CPFPORTUNITY AVAILABLE TO US IN THE SENSE THAT WE ARE STARTING FROM A CLEAN SLATE IN SRE COVERAGE AT THIS MISSION. BUT WITH REIAND ALSO FOR THE GREAT SENSITIVITY USUALLY TO ANY HINT OF CIA ACTIVITY. IT IS OF THE RIGHT IMPORTANCE THAT COVER IS THE BEST WE CAN COME UP WITH. SENSE THERE IS NO QUESTION AS TO THE NEED FOR SECOND AND THIRD SECRETARY TITLES FOR THESE TWO OFFICERS. WE WEST HAVE IT. 4. I BELIEVE COVER ARRANGEMENTS IN TERMS OF ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN EMBASSY ARE APPROPRIATE TO PRESENT OVERALL STAFFING PATTERN. WE SHOULD EQUIVER HOLD TO THE PRESENT TOTAL OF FOUR SHF OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. KEEPING SUPPORTING STAFF AS SPARSE AS POSSIBLE AS VELL. UNTIL WE SEE HOW THINGS GO HERE. 5. WE ARE MAKING EFFECT TO LIMIT TNCALEDGE WITHIN SMB OF ALL SAF ASSIGNMENTS: THAT EFFECT APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO DAUGHERTY. PURSUANT TO NEW PROGRAM OF WHICH HE IS A PRODUCT AND ABOUT WHICH I HAVE BEEN INFORMED. 6. I SUPPOSE I AREI NO MIND THAT DEPARTMENT THAT THE CUP AND APPARENTLY INSOLUBLE PROBLEM OF R DESIGNATION FOR SRF OFFICERS WILL INEVITABLY COMPLICATE AND TO SOME DEFRBE WEAKEN COA COVER EFFORTS LOCALLY, NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE ACCEPT AND TO LAINGEN

(117) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 16 What was the criminal American Government doing in Iran? How have they been gathering their information and how have they been using these Intelligence Reports. With revealing the Shah's SAVAK during the revolution in Iran, it became clear that SAVAK has been receiving his information from its sources in all of the part of the country. As SAVAK was brought up by CIA it is clear that the U.S. embassy, this den of Espionage of the CIA with cooperating with SAVAK has had spy network and all kind of information sources in Iran. Who have been delivering the Intelligence Reports and First-hand information to them. The traitors, who have been inserving the foreign have been against the Moslem people of Iran. But after the revolution they were set back by the clenched fist and strong will of the militant and revolutionary Moslem Iranian people, But they are not destroyed yet. The following documents show the relationship between their intelligence network and the American Embassy in Iran.

(117) DE RUQMER #5925 158 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 071221Z JUN 79 PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1877 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 05925 E.O. 12065: KDS-4 6/7/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P TAGS: PINT, PINR, PINS, OR SUBJECT: EMBASSY SOURCES DRY UP REF: (A) TEHRAN 4059, (B) TEHRAN 4158, (C) TEHRAN 5842, (D) FBIS TEL AVIV 0619182 JUN 79, (E) TEHRAN 5681, (F) TEHRAN 5519 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.) 2. SUMMARY: AS RESULT OF TURN FOR WORSE IN U.S. - IRAN TIES, PROBLEM OF WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH EMBOFFS NOTED REFTELS A AND B IS INCREASING. LATENT EFFECT OF CONTROL-VERY OVER AMBASSADOR CUTLER'S APPOINTMENT AND CONTINUING CHARGES THAT U.S. AND CIA ARE MEDDLING IN IRAN HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED FEAR OF BEING SEEN WITH OR TALKING TO EMBOFFS TO POINT WHERE IT IS IMPAIRING OUR EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION. END SUMMARY. 3. UNWANTED CONSEQUENCE OF TURN FOR WORSE IN U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS IS DAYING UP OF MANY OF OUR BEST SOURCES AND AN INCREASING UNWILLINGNESS ON PART OF IRANIANS TO BE SEEN WITH OR TALK TO U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS. BEGINNING WITH REACTION TO MAY 17 SENATE RESOLUTION, THEN DEMONSTRATIONS AT EMBASSY MAY 24-26, YAZDI'S COMMENTS ON CUTLER IN PRESS (REF C), AND HEAVY MEDIA ATTACKS ON U.S. (REF C AND D), SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED SIGNIFICANTLY EVEN FROM IMMEDIATE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD. 4. FOUR-YEAR VETERAN ECON OFFICER NOTES THAT MANY WHO WOULD FORMERLY RECEIVE HIM IN THEIR OFFICES OR ANSWER QUERIES BY PHONE NOW AT BEST ASK FOR PRIVATE MEETINGS OR WILL PHONE AT NIGHT (CONVINCED THAT THE EMBASSY PHONES ARE COMPROMISED) AND ARE GENERALLY RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS MATTERS THEY TALKED OF FREELY SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS AGO. MANY, LUE TO LONG, WARM ASSOCIATION ARE EMBARRASSED TO FLAT OUT REFUSE BUSINESS OR SOCIAL APPOINTMENTS, REPEATEDLY GIVE THE PERSIAN PUT-OFF WITH PROMISES TO CALL, ETC. FARSI-SPEAKING PETROLEUM OFFICER, FINISHING THER-YEAR TOUR, REPORTS SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES WITH MANY OF HIS EXCLUSIVE CONTACTS. SOME NO LONGER HAVE ACCESS TO FREIVIOUSLY-FIELD INFORMATION; ALMOST ALL ARE RELUCTANT TO TALK. 5. ALL POLITICAL SECTION OFFICERS HAVE EXPERIENCED SAME PHENOMENON. IN MANY CASES, SOURCES HAVE LEFT COUNTRY. EVEN PERSONAL FRIENDS OF FOUR-YEAR TOUR TEHRAN POLOFF ARE RELUCTANT TO MEET WITH HIM, THOUGH SOME REMAIN WILLING TO SERH IM PRIVATELY AT THEIR HOVES. OF COURSE, A FEW CONTACTS STEK POLITICAL OFFICERS OUT, BUT THESE ARE FREQUENT DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR ECON ICA RF

(115) LY CEILING SOLUTIONS AND ARE NOT ALWAYS TOORE BE MIGHT PREFER TO IALK *11H. OTHERS TO HAVE BEEN HERE MORE THAN SHORT TIME REPORT SAME RELUCTANCE, OF EVEN LONG-TIME FRIENDS, TO BE SEEN PUBLICLY WITH OFFICIAL AMERICANS. 6. CHARGE HAS NOTED THAT OF SOME DOZEN FORMER IRANIAN AMBASSADORS WHO HAVE RETURNED TO TEHRAN WHOM HE KNEW PERSONALLY IN THE PAST, NONE HAVE TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM SINCE THEIR RETURN TO TEHRAN. VETERAN RETIRED AMBASSADOR TOLD POLOFF THAT MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES ARE COMING TO SEE ANY AMERICAN CONNECTION AS "PROFESSIONALLY VERY DANGEROUS THING IN ISLAMIC IRAN." WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW MANY IRANIANS ARE WILLING TO TURN UP AT PAREWELL FUNCTIONS FOR VETERAN OFFICERS WHO WILL BE DEPARTING WITHIN NEXT MONTH. 7. POST'S EXPERIENCE IN OBTAINING INFORMATION ON JEWISH PROBLEM HERE IS EXCELLENT CASE IN POINT. WHILE WE HAVE MANAGED TO GET TO SOME SOURCES WHO WILL HELP US, THEY ARE ALL SCARED AND FEARFUL OF WHAT EFFECT U.S. CONTACT WILL HAVE ON THEM (REF E AND F). 8. SOME OF OUR PRIVATE CITIZEN CONTACTS HAVE NOTED IN-CREASED SUSPICION OF THEM AMONG IRANIAN COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE IN UNIVERSITIES, WHERE LEFT HAS BEEN BOMBARDING INTELLECTUALS WITH ANTI-U.S. MATERIAL. AS ONE CONTACT PUT IT, "EVEN THOSE WHO OUGHT TO KNOW BETTER ARE BEING SWEPT ALONG BY THE TIDE." 9. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT CONTEXT BEING ESTABLISHED BY CURRENT EVENTS IS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO GATHER KIND OF INFORMATION WE NEED. WHILE SITUATION HAS NOT YET REACHED LEVEL IN SOME THIRD-WORLD STATES WHERE CONTACT BETWEEN EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND LOCAL CITIZENS IS SEVERELY RESTRICTED OR CONTROLLED, BASIC IMPACT OF RECENT WEEKS HAS PUSHED IRAN IN THAT DIRECTION. NAAS BT #5925 NNN

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 17 The American Blood thirsty Imperialism has been using all its facilities to penetrate in all aspects of the dominated country and they have continued after the revolution of the people, They have continued their activities, to be able to govern the political and economical policy of these countries by getting the intelligence reports from their Agents. In Iran the criminal American government in its visa section in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran has been cooperating with the Shah's regime Agents and has used them as the intelligence sources. Also they tried to get the information from the top Iranian officials in exchange of Visa The people who could give the helpful information to the American Embassy were forced to become a source of Information. They have been dealing the Visa with Intelligence Reports. Through this way, the American Embassy changed cooperation with U.S. against the Islamic Iranian revolution. The following documents show these dirty activities

NOT I EXHIBITED TO BE HIGH LANDMALS Page 2 personnel may wish to assist, may be provided a consular section interview card. However, no more than one of these cards will be issued per day from the Defense Attache Office. CC: Consul General Charge THOMAS E. SCHAEFER Colonel1, USAF Defense Attache CONFIDENTIAL NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

NOT HESSE TO FOR IN ROLANDS EMBASSY OF THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE TEHRAN, IRAN 18 September 1979 TO: A11 USDAO Tehran Personnel SUBJECT: Visa Referrals (U) REFERENCE: Consul General Morefield's Letter of 19 August 1979; same subject 1. (U) This letter establishes guidelines to be used by USDAO personnel for handling and submitting visa referrals and amplifies procedures contained in referenced Consul General's letter. 2. (C/NOFORN) Visa referrals by USDAO personnel will be limited to immediate family members of, A. Iranian military, (gendarmarie) and police officers equal to the rank of field grade or above; B. the civil aviation organization, and C. senior Iranian or foreign diplomatic officials who have a direct association with the Defense Attache Office. Friends of the above will not be handled. Visa referrals will only repeat only be handled to gain intelligence information useful to the United States Government. Applicants who do not meet requirements of A, B or C above, but are considered to be extra-ordinary cases (i.e. Homafars who have provided valuable information to DAO) will only be approved by Colonel Schaefer. Those applicants who do meet A, B or C above will be approved by the DATT or Acting DATT before submission to the Consular Office. 3. (C/NOFORN) The visa referral service can be very valuable to the Defense Attache Office for gathering information not normally accessible through other means, but it should not be abused. Contacts are important, but only if they provide us information or open doors that will lead to valuable intelligence. I expect quid pro quo from these contacts and information that will show up in intelligence reports. 4. (U) As a guideline for the Defense Attache Office, we should submit no more than five referrals per week. Those people who do not meet the limitations in paragraph 2 above, but include personal friends that DAO CONFIDENTIAL NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

الله (صلى الله عليه وسلم) 02651 NNNNVV FSB234BRA133 RR RUQMHR ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUEHCR RR RUEHCR RUEERO RUFHFT DE RUEHC #3554 2801911 ZNY CCCCC 7ZH R 071537Z OCT 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4886 INFO RUEERO/AMEMBASSY ROME 3133 RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1924 BT CON FI DE N TIA L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 263564 ROME AND FRANKFURT FOR INS E.O. 12265: N/A TAGS: CVIS, SREF, IR SUBJECT: VISA CLEARANCES REF: A) TEHRAN 10401; B) STATE 59696 FOR MEMBERS OF PREVIOUS REGIME DEPARTMENT STILL BELIEVES THAT A SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION OR NAME CHECK ON MEMBERS OF FORMER IRANIAN REGIME WITH DEPT OR FROM OTHER SOURCE SHOULD ONLY BE MADE IF, DURING INTERVIEW, THE CONSULAR OFFICER FINDS TEAT INELIGIBILITY MAY EXIST. VANCE BT 3564

(177) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No. 18 We want to disclose the shameful activities of the American government. We want to say the American government, Although it claims to defend humanrights, not only it does not conform to that. On the contrary it violates the rights of the nations. American government does not conform to any laws. To secure their own benefits. The great world propaganda systems which are in try to keep the truth away form the people of the world and try to forge and distort the news. The American government and its ally governments and international organizations which cooperate with them are decieving the people of the world and call our just activities, Anarshism, Terrorism and violation of international laws. We are asking for delivering of the Shah who has been committing crimes with his aids during his 37 years reign in Iran. In the past two years of the Revolution, he has killed more than 60,000 people of Iran. We do have more than 100,000 injured and invalids from the revolution. His Dungeons were full of our youth, they have saved the leg of our youth in which country and which dictatorship, has killed the small children in the arms of their mothers. In which logic of which dictatorship it he answers of the people fist, is with the American Weapons and Bullets. Are'nt Carter and the American government ashamed to talk about the human rights. Do Carter and his government, that have given asylum to the greatest criminal of the history know the human rights, or the 35 million Iranians who want to try the murderer of their children in a court of justice to clarify for all of the world that what these dictatorships and their supporters have done

(175) S E C R E T COVER CONSIDERATIONS ACCORDING TO PERSONAL DATA IN YOUR PASSPORT, YOU ARE SINGLE, WERE BORN IN ANTWERP, BELGIUM 08JUL34, HAVE BLUE EYES, HAVE NO DISTINGUSHING CHARACTERISTICS, AND ARE APPROXIMATELY 1.88 METERS TALL. YOUR COVER OCCUPATION IS THAT OF A COMMERCIAL BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON TO FIND A BELGIAN WHOSE NATIVE LANGUAGE IS FLEMISH LIVING IN A NOMINALLY FRENCH-SPEAKING SECTION OF BELGIUM, SUCH AS JETTE. YOU CAN SAY THAT YOU WERE BORN IN ANTWERP, BEGAN WORK WITH A COMPANY WITH A REGIONAL OFFICE IN ANTWERP, THEN WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE MAIN OFFICES IN BRUSSELS. DESPITE THE FACT IT IS ONLY ABOUT 90 MINUTES DRIVING TIME BETWEEN BRUSSELS AND ANTWERP, YOU DECIDED TO LIVE IN ONE OF THE SUBURBS OF BRUSSELS, JETTE. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN THE ISSUANCE LOCALE OF YOUR DOCUMENTATION. WORKING FROM YOUR BRUSSELS BASE, YOU HAVE TRAVELLED IN EUROPE ON BUSINESS IN THE PAST (AS REFLECTED IN YOUR PASSPORT) AND ARE NOW ASSIGNED TO THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF YOUR COMPANY. YOUR NON-BACKSTOPPED ADDRESS IN JETTE IS 174 AVENUE DE JETTE, JETTE, BELGIUM. N/TS-87-92 S E C R E T

(1YY) with the nations. Carter by giving as asylum to the Shah, has insulted the American people. Carter with delivering the Shah to Iran should apologize, in practice from the American people. Because of this insult which made America an asylum for criminals. Did not you try the criminals of the second war? Now we will show you that what Carter claims to do is following human rights, but what he does in reality is violating all the human rights. Oh! people of the world The place that we have occupied, has not been the embassy and its staff are not diplomats and we by disclosing these documents show you that the American government tries to deceive the public opinion of the peoples of the world. The American government calls the freedom seekers who strives for freedom and independence as terrorists and anarchists. But it is itself the worst terrorist equipped with the deadly CIA network. The U.S. by forging passports and stamps has violated the sovereignty of the nations. Carter by forging documents and stamps has sent spies to our home. With the hope of the liberation of all mankind from evil and the success of their struggle for obtaining the just rights of the people.

PAGE2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR ACTIVATING PASSPORT YOUR BELGIAN PASSPORT #N745653 WAS OSTENSIBLY ISSUED IN JETTE, BELGIUM (A SUBURB OF BRUSSELS) ON 16 MARCH 1977, WAS REVALIDATED IN JETTE ON 15 MARCH 1978, AND IS SET TO EXPIRE ON 14 MARCH 1982. TO ENHANCE ITS VALIDITY, THE FOLLOWING BACK TRAVEL WAS ADDED: A TRIP TO MADRID, SPAIN IN APRIL 1977; A TRIP TO LISBON, PORTUGAL IN AUGUST 1977; A TRIP TO DELHI, INDIA IN JANUARY 1978; A TRIP TO MADRID, SPAIN IN MARCH 1978; A TRIP TO HEL- SINKI, FINLAND IN JUNE 1978; AND A TRIP TO ATHENS, GREECE IN NOVEMBER 1978. UNDER CURRENT (AUGUST 1979) REGULATIONS, A BELGIAN DOES NOT NEED A VISA TO ENTER IRAN; INSTEAD, HE WOULD BE LIMITED TO A STAY OF NINETY (90) DAYS. TO ACTIVATE THIS PASSPORT YOU WILL HAVE TO ENTER OSTENSIBLE ENTRY AND EXIT CACHET IMPRESSIONS INTO THE PASSPORT. FIRST YOU MUST ASCERTAIN WHICH CALENDAR SYSTEM WAS IN USE FOR YOUR OSTENSIBLE ENTRY AND/OR EXIT DATES. WOLOCK HAS SEEN THREE VERSIONS: 1) USING THE PERSIAN CALENDAR; 2) USING THE MOSLEM CALENDAR BUT WITH THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE YEAR ONLY; AND 3) USING THE MOSLEM CALENDAR AND USING THE FULL FOUR DIGITS OF THE YEAR. S E C R E T NITS-8792 NITS-8792

S E C R E T PAGE3 IF THE PERSIAN CALENDAR IS IN USE, USE THE ENTRY/EXIT CACHET MOUNTED ON WOODEN BLOCKS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE "PERSIAN CALENDAR" DATE CHIPS. SELECT A CORRECT DATE AND SET THE CHIPS INTO THE CUT-OUT PORTION OF THE CACHET(S). USING THE #280 INK PAD FOR AND ENTRIES OR THE #295 INK PAD FOR ANY EXITS, INK THE CACHET(S) WITH THE DATE CHIPS SET IN, THEN MAKE AN IMPRESSION INTO THE PASSPORT. FOR THE MOSLEM CALENDAR SYSTEMS, YOU WILL FIRST IMPRESS THE DATE USING THE BANDED DATERS, THEN USE THE ENTRY/EXIT CACHE MOUNTED ON THE C. FIRST, SELECT THE CORRECT BANDED DATED (EITHER TWO-DIGIT YEAR OR FOUR-DIGIT YEAR) AND THE CORRECT INK FAD (#280 FOR ENTRIES, #295 FOR EXITS), THEN ENTER THE DATE INTO THE PASSPORT. THEN, INK THE CORRECT CACHE (EITHER ENTRY OR EXIT) IN THE CORRECT PAD, AND ENTER THIS IMPRESSION SO THAT THE DATE APPEARS MORE OR LESS CENTERED IN THE IMPRESSION. PEER THROUGH THE PLASTIC TO ASSURE THE DATE IS CORRECTLY PLACED. PLEASE SEE PAGE 4 FOR MOCK-UPS AND EXEMPLARS, SHOULD YOU NOTICE ANY CHANGES, EITHER IN THE CACHET STYLES OR INK COLORS, SEND COLOR EXPOSURES TO EZNOVA, WITH SCALE AND COLOR PATCH INCLUDED IN EACH PHOTO: EZNOVA WILL THEN REPRODUCE THE NEEDED MATERIAL AND FORWARD IT/THEM TO YOU. S E C R E T NITS-8792 NITS-8792

S E C R E T YOUR CACHET IMPRESSIONS SHOULD BE LEGIBLE--TO PRACTICE ON THE ENCLOSED PAPER UNTIL YOU FEEL ABLE TO ADD THE CACHETS INTO THE PASSPORT. N.B.: SINCE MEHRABAD ENTRY AND EXIT CACHETS EACH HAVE A DIFFERENT INSPECTOR NUMBER AND IS WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY THAT A TRAVELER WOULD HAVE THE SAME CACHET NUMBERS FOR CONSECUTIVE TRIPS, THE ATTACHED CACHETS SHOULD ONLY BE USED ONCE IN THE PASSPORT. CACHETS NEEDED FOR ADDITIONAL IRANIAN ENTRY/EXITS SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM EZNOVA OR THE DOCUMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED THERE FOR UPDATING.

VISAS — VISA — SICHTVERMERKE — VISAS EXEMPLAR EXIT CACHET WITH MOSLEM YEAR AND USING ONLY LAST TWO DIGITS EXEMPLAR ENTRY CACHET WITH PERSIAN YEAR

VISAS — VISA — SICHTVERMERYE — VISAS NATIONAL POLICE OF THAN DEPARTURE IRTY / AY / Y YY - YB T MEHRABAD AIR PORT MOCK-UP ENTRY AND EXIT CACHETS WITH FOUR DIGIT MOSLEM YEAR VISAS — VISA — SICHTVERMERKE — VISAS

VISAS — VISA — SICHTVERMERKE — VISAS MOCK-UP ENTRY AND EXIT CACHETS WITH TWO DIGIT MOSLEM YEAR VISAS — VISAS — SICHTVERMERKE — VISAS

S E C R E T PAGE7 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CERTIFICATE OF VACCINATION CACHETS FOR OSTENSIBLE SMALLPOX, YELLOW FEVER, AND CHOLERA VACCINATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ENTERED INTO THE SHOT RECORD. PLEASE SIGN IN ALIAS UNDERNEATH YOUR NAME FOR EACH SHOT. THE SMALLPOX VACCINATION IS VALID FOR THREE YEARS: IT WILL BE RENEWED IN JULY 1982. PLEASE CONTACT EZNOVA OR WOLOCK IF YOU WILL NEED THE SHOT RECORD BEYOND THIS DATE. THE YELLOW FEVER VACCINATION IS GOOD FOR TEN YEARS: NOTHING FURTHER HAS TO BE DONE FOR THIS VACCINATION. THE CHOLERA VACCINATION IS VALID FOR ONLY SIX MONTHS. NEW CACHET ENTRIES WILL HAVE TO BE MADE, BEGINNING IN JANUARY 1980. CONSULTING THE MOCK-UP (OVERLEAF) USE THE "DR R. COOSEMANS" AND "OSSOM-FI" CACHETS AND REFLEX BLUE INK PAD. USING ANY BALL POINT OR WET INK PEN, ENTER A SUITABLE DATE USING A DAY-MONTH-YEAR ORDER (WITH THE MONTH IN ROMAN NUMERALS) AND SIGN ABOVE THE DOCTOR'S NAME CACHET. UPDATE THE CHOLERA VACCINATION AS NEEDED EVERY SIX MONTHS, USING THE SAME CACHETS AND INK PAD. REMEMBER, YOU WILL OSTENSIBLY GET THESE SHOTS IN BELGIUM, AND YOUR PASSPORT SHOULD NOT SHOW YOU IN IRAN WHEN YOU UPDATE YOUR CHOLERA SHOT. S E S C R E T NITS-8792

INTERNATIONAL CERTIFICATE OF VACCINATION OR REVACCINATION AGAINST CHOLERA CERTIFICATE INTERNATIONAL DE VACCINATION OU DE REVACCINATION CONTRE LE CHOLERA This is to certify that (PAUL TIMM,RELMANS date of birth 18.4.1934 sex) M Je soussigne(e) certified que ne(z) le sexe whose signature follows Paul G. dont la signature suit has on the date indicated been vaccinated or revaccinated against cholera. a été vaccinée) ou revaccine) contre le choix à la date inquiée. Date Signature and professional status of vaccinator Signature & quality professionnelle of vaccinator Approved stamp Cachor d'authentication 1 02.24.19 20.24.19 M.O. ANGER 436 R. (0001444444 OSSOM-FI 2 Service Medical 42, rue du Commerce BRUXELLES 4 T [?] 12 [?] 76 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 Continued overleaf Suite au verbo SECRET NITS-8792

(147) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT THE MERCIFUL Disclosing Announcement No 19 Courageous people of Iran! From the beginning of the occupation of the American nest of spies which belong to the Iranian people so as to expose the devilish lines of penetration of the criminal America in Iran and exposing the American spies and agents now captives of the Iranian people, and show to all peoples of the world specially the moslem people of Iran that the American Embassy was a cover for the espionage acts of America. We have been successful to a great extent to show how CIA agents begin work here with forged passports as diplomats and monitor plots against the Islamic Revolution. The CIA agents of the embassy used different methods like inviting western educated intellectuals to different parties so as to absorb and use them as information sources, of the international news. The prowestern intellectuals and dependent capitalists due to their unpopular nature placed themselves in the hands of the plundering America and continue to betray the moslem nation of Iran.

to: SecState & niact immediate 214 secret limdis tehran 2728 Pol: JOSE clne Econ.ొ [?] ell Pol v Tonsell eo: RDS-4 3/5/99 (stempel, J.D.) OR-P tags: PGOV, PINR, IR subject: Mediation Committee 1. Secret--entire text 2. Summary: Group led By Mehdi Rowghani is planning to establish large committee to mediate between Bazargan's GOI and Khomeini Committee Structure. Hope is to make final arrangements by March 10. END SUMMARY. 3. Mehdi Rowghani, Khomeini confidant, told POLOFF Stempel oroping March 5 that he had spent previous weekend in Qom working on establishment of a coordinating committee to mediate between GOI structure and Khomeini committee organization. He admitted that as of March 4, coordination between Qom and Tehran was "a mess," and said committee structure is still not obeying GOI in many many places. 4. Rowghani seeks to form group of 100 in units of 8 to ten to deal with specific problem areas. Rowghani would not give names, but said they were prestigious figures from all sides of the revolutionary movement. Committee would be based in Tehran, and Rowghani inferred that its main purpose would be to make Khomeini committees toe the line a bit more as they work out their relations with GOI. Rowghani hopes to travel to Qom March 9 and 10 to make final arrangements. Khomeini has already approved idea, and work is now going on with GOI. 5. When asked whether the thought one more committee (the is closely discussed with the of each

NOV 15392 14 ANY OCCCC ZH 2421 Z41Y T PM AMTAS7 IRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1822 T CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 25392 E.O. 17965: YDS-4 5/24/99 (STEMPFL, J.D.) OR-F TAGS: PINT, IF SUBJECT: VISIT BY MEHDI HOWCHANI 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. ROUGHANI LEFT TEHRAN THIS MORNING FOR A FOUR TO SIX AFTER TRIP TO THE U.S. POLOPE GAVE HIM PREVIT'S NAME AND PEOPLE NUMBER AND STRONGLY SUGGESTED ROUGHANI GET IN TOUCH WITH PREVIT. ROUGHANI HAD ASSED POLOPEES IF THERE WAS ANY IF FY SHOULD CALL ON. ROWGHANI WILL BE WILLING TO TALY WITH PRETCH AND MAY WILLING TO HAVE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS. I CHOOSE OF HIS FAMILY RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI. HE IS IN INTERESTING SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON KHOMEINI INTQUARIA. NAAS CONFIDENT'L TERPAN 5707

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 83072 E.G. 12265: 3DS 7/30/35 (TCMETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P TAGS: PINT. CVIS. IR /CLAS: CONFIDE: INITIAL CH-GE: 8/30/78 TOPAV: CHARGE: IBLAIN: N TRTD: POL: VLTOMSET: GO CLAR: ECON: BOSCHILL OLIP: POUCH: CHS FGON SUBJECT: MEHDI ROWGHANI 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). EFF: STATE 193549 CONFIDENTIAL AT THE RISK OF SOUNDING TYPICAL, WE NOTE THAT ROWGHANI'S OPTIMISM HAS INCREASED PROPORTIONATELY TO THE DISTANCE HE HAS PL INW PILF AND IRAN. WHEN HE LET IN MAY (FCR 'FOL O S (V)K) HE WAS DISPAIRING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN COM AND UNDERING WHERE THE REVOLUTION WENT WRONG. IF THINGS HAVE TURNED AROUND, WEAT USE DOES HE HAVE FOR A GREEN CARD? WE WERE STRUG BY AN ITEM IN ONE OF THE FARSI-LANGUAGE PAPERS A MONTH AND THAT HE HAD FLED THE COUNTRY. B. RE THE PROBLEM WITH FORD MOTOR COMPANY LONDON OS363, AN INFO COPY OF WHICH WAS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT. PROVIDED A STATUS REPORT ON ROWGHANI APRIL 4. FORD HAD INDICATED THAT IN PRINCIPAL. MOST OUTSTANDING ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED, THOUGH SOME ADDITIONAL BUREAUCRATIC PLAYS COULD BE EXPECTED. WE CANNOT VERIFY LOCALLY BEFTHER CR NOT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. ROACHANI IS I BEE U.S. AND THE FORD LAWYER IN TEHRAN IS TEMPORARILY BUT OF IRAN. LAINGEN 3872 A 123344 9372 a

(1△○) LE ROUGH #2110 0641355 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 0513452 MAK 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO BUENC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0210 KUOTC/EMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0003 ET C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 2718 Jus For BS E.0. 12065: GDS 3/5/85 (STEMPEL, J) OR-P TAGS: SDIS IR SUBJECT: TRACE COMPLAINT 1. THE FOLLOWING TRADE COMPLAINT WAS PRESENTED TO THE EMBASSY BY MEHDI RJGHANI, MR. RO GHANI'S FATHER SHELTERED AYATULLAH KHOMEINI DURING HIS LAST 15 DAYS IN IRAN PRIOR TO HIS EXILE IN 1963. THE FAMILY, THEREFORE, HAS CLOSE PERSONAL TIES TO KHOMEINI AND HIS GROUP, RJGHANI HIMSELF WAS MOST HELPFUL TO THE EMBASSY. IN OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF MARINE SGT. KRAUS WHO WAS HELU FOR SEVEN DAYS FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY 14 ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY. PROMPT ACTION ON THE FOLLOWING COMPLAINT WOULD THEREFORE BE APPRECIATED. 2. THE ROUGHANIS HAVE FOR 27 YEARS BEEN THE FORD DEALERS FOR IRAN. IN OCTOBER OF 1977 IN THE COURSE OF A MEETING IN LONDON, AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ACCORDING TO WHICH FORD WOULD PAY THE ROUGHANIS'S A 4 PER CENT SERVICE COMMISSION ON CARS PURCHASED OUTSIDE OF IRAN AND LATER IMPORTED. FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT, FORC REQUESTED INFORMATION REGARDING THE VEHICLES IN COUNTRY, ALL OF WHICH WAS PUKPORTEDLY FURNISHED, AND CHECKED TWICE BY FORD REPRESENTATIVES. ABOUT 1500 VEHICLES ARE INVOLVED AND PER MR. ROUGHAN, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE SUM TO BE PAID. HE NOW DISHES TO KNOW WHEN FORD CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE PAYMENT. THE CONTACT IN LONDON IS MR. RUDOLPH H. BONIFACE, VICE PRESIDENT JIE-EAST AND AFRICA SALES OPERATIONS, 169 KINGS ROAD, BRENKDOO ESSEX CM 144 EN, TELEPHONE, GRENTWOOD 219 500, TELEX 995511. 3. FOR LONDON: PLEASE INFO THE DEPARTMENT WHEN YOU RESPOND. FOR THE DEPARTMENT: DEPENDING UPON THE INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN LONDON, FOLLOW-UP WITH THE FORD MAIN OFFICE MAY OR MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE. 4. IN ADDITION TO THE SERVICE COMMISSION PROBLEM, RUGHANI HAS A SECOND ONGOING DISAGREEMENT WITH FORD REGARDING THE SALE OF ABOUT 60 HEAVY DUTY TRUCKS TO THE NATIONAL IRANIAN CIL COMPANY (NIOC). HIS CLAIM IS THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FORD EXPORT SALES PRICE AND THE SELLING PRICE TO NIOC IS DUE HIM, THE DEALER. NIOC PAID FORD DIRECTLY AND HE HAS YET TO BE REIMBURSED THE SUM HE FELLS IS FIRED HIM. THIS PROBLEM APPARENTLY DATES BACK ABOUT FOUR YEARS AND HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. ANY INFORMATION YOU COULD DEVELOP REGARDING FORD'S POSITION AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PAYMENT WOULD BE APPRECIATE. SULLIVAN 312713

(101) IN THE NAME OF GOD THE BENEFICIENT, THE MERCIFUL. Disclosing announcement No. 20 From the beginning of the revolution two lines and the interests of the society. The First line is strongly faithful to the Islamic revolution under the leadership of Imam, Khomeini, they considered weakening the leadership and dividing the people who were united on orders of Imam Khomeini as anti revolutionary acts and they fought this. This group saw the main danger for the revolution not dictatorship despotism or backwardedness but they saw this danger in individuals who never understood the depth, and greatness of the revolution and who did not view Islam as a school which could in any age present solutions to the problems of human societies. Individuals who lost their identity are the decieving appearances of the west and particularly America. And who desperately sought to impose and dominate western values, although this line claimed to be popular, intellectual radical, and etc. in reality it was dependent on America. American government this strong devil and number one enemy of the people, in all of this twenty-five years that it reigned in Iran it used these westernized intellectuals as a secure base. Thus Imam of the people great Khomeini directs his attacks on these westernized people who betray their people very easily. The second line which has from the beginning opposed the Islamic Revolution of Iran had no faith and assurance in the people's movement and they directed their attacks against Imam Khomeini and strengthened in many cases the position of the westernized intellectual. The experiences of the past months has separated from some extent the noble revolutionary elements from the elements dependent on imperialism and has exposed

their face to the peoples of the world. Now we expose the face of Moghadam Maraqhaie one of the apparently revolutionary intellectuals. Mr. Moghadam Maraghaie was seeking to reimpose US dominance on Iran after it had exploited the resources of the people and at the expense of the blood of thousands of Martyrs.

(1△△) CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11462 DE RUQMHR #1462 303 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 301309Z 001 79 PM EMBASSY TEHRAN 10 SECSTATE WASHDC IAMEDIAPE 4549 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 1146 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL AGE STAT 10/30/7S POV CHARGE: L'LAINGEN REFID POL: FASVIFT:EM COR: POL:VLTOMSETH DISTR: PCL-2 CHARGE ECON F F CHRON E.O. 12065: GIS 10/30/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) CR-P AGS: PINT, IR SUBJECT: MEETING WITH RADICAL MOVEMENT LEADER MOGTADAM-MARAGHEIE 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: RADICAL MOVEMENT LEADER MOGHADAM GAVE DEPTOFF PRECHT HIS VIEWS ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND STRONGLY URGED THAT CHARGE PAY CALL ON SHOEINI TO CON- VINCE IRANIANS OF USG ACCEPTANCE OF REVOLUTION. END SUMMARY. 2. IN THE COURSE OF A DISCUSSION ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS SEPTEMBER 29, RADICAL MOVEMENT LEADER RAHMATOLLAH MOGHADAM-MARAGHEIF, A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS REVIEWING THE CONSTITUTION, REPLIED TO A QUESTION ON HOW THE U.S. COULD IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN BY STRONGLY ORGING THAT THE U.S. CHARGE CALL ON KHOMEINI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MOGHADAM APPEARED CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT MADE ANY EFFORT TO REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT SINCE MAY, AND URGED THAT NO MATTER WHAT THE DIFFICULTIES MIGHT BE, THE U.S. SHOULD ASK IMMEDIATELY FOR AN APPOINTMENT. MOGHADAM POINTED OUT THAT THE TIME WILL NEVER BE RIGHT, THAT KHOMEINI IS NOW OLD AND QUITE INFLEXIBLE. HOWEVER, SHOULD KHOMEINI LIT SUDDENLY BEFORE THE U.S. PAYS A CALL, EVEN MODERATES WHO DO NOT FULLY SUPPORT KHOMEINI WILL CRITICIZE THE U.S. AND SAY THAT THE LACK OF A MEETING WAS A SIGN OF THE U.S. LACK OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION. MANY WOULD BLAME THE U.S. FOR KHOMEINI'S DEATH. 4. MOGHADAM WAS HOPEFUL, BUT NOT PARTICULARLY OPTIMISTIC, ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE FELT THAT KHOMEINI HELD THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE MASSES AT THE MOMENT AND THAT OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS HE HAS TAKEN AN INCREASINGLY HARD STAND ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. KHOMEINI IS ALIENATING THE INTELLECTUALS AND MOGHADAM FELT THAT AT SOME POINT SOON HE WILL REALIZE THIS AND RECTIFY THE SITUATION. MOGHADAM SAID THAT HE SUPPORTS KHOMEINI AND THE IDEA OF THE VALIAT-E-FAQIH BUT THAT HE FEELS THE FAQIH SHOULD NOT HAVE POLITICAL POWER. MOGHADAM SAID HE THOUGHT THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE FINISHED BY THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS IN 3-4 WEEKS. IN RESPONSE TO PRECHT'S QUESTION, HE SAID HE FAD TALKED TO BEHESHTI ABOUT POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE DRAFT AND BEHESHTI SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO REVIEW ALREADY PASSED ARTICLES IF THEY WERE INCONSISTENT. MOGHADAM NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN HAD EARLIER ASKED HIM THE SAME QUESTION AS PRECHT. MOGHADAM DID NOT SEEM TO HOLD OUT MUCH HOPE THAT THE PRESENT FORM OF THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE CHANGED. HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT FEEL THAT HE REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTIONOR ELECTIONS COULD CONFIDENTIAL

(105)) TEHRAN 11460 BE HELD ANYTIME SOON GIVEN THE PROBLEMS IN KURDESTAN. IF THE TEXT WERE NOT CHANGED, ESPECIALLY THE SUNNI-SHIA PROVISION, THE REFERENDUM MIGHT NOT GO WELL FOR THE REGIME. 5. MOGEADAM SAID TEAT MANY PEOPLE WERE CRITICIZING SHARIAT-MADARI FOR LACK OF LEADERSHIP AT THIS POINT. THIS WAS UNJUST AS THIS WAS THE WRONG TIME AND KHOMEINI WAS TOO STRONG AT PRESENT FOR SHARIAT-MADARI TO OPPOSE. THE TIME WOULD COME, MOGHADAM INTIMATED, AND THE AZERBAJANI ARE JUST WAITING FOR A SIGNAL FROM HIM. 6. QUESTIONED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN KURDESTAN. MOGHADAM FLATLY STATED HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY THAT THE CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT WILL SUCCEED. HAD THE GOVERNMENT MADE THIS TYPE OF EFFORT 6 WEEKS AGO IT MIGHT HAVE WORKED BUT HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY NOW. HE COULD OFFER NO SOLUTIONS FOR SETTLEMENT. 7. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, MOGHADAM URGED THAT MORE VISITORS BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SUCH AS RAMSAY CLARK AND RICHARD COTTAM BE SENT TO IRAN TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH IRANIANS OF ALL POLITICAL PERSUASIONS. LAINGEN BT 1460 UNNNN CONFIDENTIAL

1000 CARTRIDGES cal 9mm FOR SUBMACHINE GUN ONLY WATERTIGHT PACK 195/69

EMBASSY OF THE i EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Tehran, Iran October 4, 1979 CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL-INFORMAL Mr. R. T. Curran Director for North African, Near Easter and South Asian Affairs United States International Communications Agency Washington, D.C. 20547 Dear Ted: At the end of my second month in Tehran, it should be useful for me, and perhaps for you also, to try to sort out where I think we are now and what we should do in the next six months to promote U.S. interests in Iran. The Revolution: As I see it, the revolution which suddenly found itself victorious last February was essentially a revolt against privilege. The forces opposing the Shah were a disparate lot -- Shi'a traditionalists, Westernized democratic liberals, socialists, Marxists -- who coalesced for one purpose only, to oust the Shah. These disparate groups could never, however, have mustered the force to face down the Shah without the fanatical backing of the masses who were fired up by the charisma of Khomeini. In addition to opposing entrenched privilege, many who fought the Shah were profoundly upset by rapid change and Western (especially American) influences which permeated Iranian society and in the view of many were undermining traditional values and institutions. In brief, the revolution was against privilege and rapid Westernization. I believe it is essential that we keep this firmly in view as we go about trying to promote U.S. interests by entering into ongoing communication processes with influential Iranians. There are, of course, specific communication tensions, but the deep-seated tensions stemming from revolt against privilege and Westernization underlie most of the other limited tensions we may address. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Influence Structure: Iran is still a long way from lending itself to normal USICA program planning. The country has undergone a genuine revolution. Members of the pre-revolution establishment have, for the most part, been executed, gone into exile, or are living in the limbo of "taghout" (tainted ones). Prominent members of the old anti-Shah liberal and leftist groups are in exile (i.e., Bakhtiar), in hiding (i.e., Matin Daftari) or obliged for the moment to be unenthusiastic fellow travelers (i.e., Tudeh Party) on the road to fundamental Islam. An analysis of the power structure of post-revolution Iran would place Khomeini and the other ayatollahs at the top, along with the Shi'a clergymen elected to the Council now conjuring over a constitution. Next would come the mullahs who have infiltrated the provisional government and the revolutionary courts, committees and para-military organizations. In third place, I would place the politicians (i.e., Bazargan) who have managed to adapt to the prevailing Islamic winds and maintain a precarious grip on the helms of provisional government or quasi-government organizations, including the oil industry (NIOC). In fourth place, are the buccaneers who lead the various para-military groups (pasdaran) and local revolutionary committees. Finally, come the unsophisticated mullahs and the masses they serve in the villages and teeming urban ghettos whose fanatical support is the chief source of the power which Khomeini and the ayatollahs wield. Shadow Influence Structure: A good analysis of the influence structure of a society which has undergone a revolution and has not yet settled into anything like a stable pattern would also include the frustrated "outs" jockeying on the sidelines. None of the "outs," however, is likely to make a move to grab power so long as the Islamic fundamentalists continue to enjoy the overwhelming support of the masses. The silent opposition counts on the inability of the mullahs to manage a society in the 20th century world eventually to provide them with opportunity to take power or at least strongly influence decision making because they have the skills or organization to cope with pressing security or economic problems. Here I would place the leaders in the conventional armed forces, the Westernized managers and technicians, the liberal-democratic politicians, para-military romantics, and finally the hard-line leftists, including the communists. CONFIDENTIAL

(T9A)) CONFIDENTIAL None of these groups can move overtly to take power without risking annihilation at the hands of the Islamic fundamentalists who at present enjoy the overwhelming support of the masses. The Islamic fundamentalists are nonetheless vulnerable. I see at least two scenarios which could result in chaos and their eventual downfall: the centrifugal forces generated by ethnic and regional disaffections, if they are badly enough handled, could shut down the oil fields, disrupt the traditional economy, or so frustrate nationalism that the masses would become disenchanted with their incept Islamic leaders; dissension in the schools among both the students and faculty could either shut down the schools over a long period and lead to mass dissatisfaction or degenerate into violence and set off the 40-day martyr cycle which contributed enormously to the downfall of the Shah. (Iranians have a pathological penchant for mourning and a typical third-world vulnerability to the demands of youth.) Target Audiences: If the foregoing analysis is a reasonably accurate picture of the influence structure of post-revolution Iran, in theory USICA target audiences are: the clergy, the secular politicians who run government and quasi-government organizations, the leaders of para-military groups, the leaders of the conventional armed forces, the Westernized managers and technicians, the liberal politicians, the leaders of the hardline leftists, ethnic and regional leaders, students and teachers, the media people who influence all these groups, and finally the masses. Including the masses among our primary audience may appear heresy, but I believe it is justified in the case of post-revolution Iran where institutions are so weak that real power depends almost entirely on the thrust of mass sentiment. There are no institutions or procedures to cushion the thrust of aroused mass sentiment, capricious or unrealistic as it may be. Inaccessibility of Target Audiences. Because America in particular and the West in general are blamed (scanegoats) for most of the problems which beset Iran and are seen as the enemy of both traditional Islam and revolutions, USICA does not have easy access to many of the influential audiences cited above. Nor can we take initiatives without running some risk of arousing active hostility. Many of the means which USICA normally uses to engage target audiences in an ongoing communication process focused on issues of mutual interest are not feasible in post-revolution Iran. There are few Iranian fora for most American participants; Western art and publications are often seen as anti-Islamic and corrupting; and our exchange programs are ill-adapted to the needs and CONFIDENTIAL

(ㄱㅇㅇ) CONFIDENTIAL interests of most of the target audiences. (Mullahs and pasdars, along with Kurdish and oil-field guerrillas are hardly the types our program officers are used to dealing with!) USICA Successes: The foregoing list of obstacles should not be interpreted as so formidable that USICA is hopelessly hamstrung. We are not "hunkered down" or dispirited. On the contrary, more opportunities for useful action present themselves than we can cope with comfortably with our reduced resources and only partly reorganized operation. In recent weeks, we have, for example: --Placed Science Report and Vision on the national TV network. --Gained access to IAS Shiraz's bank account and enlisted the Governor General of Shiraz in our effort to recover the occupied IAS building. The IAS board has been reconstituted and plans are far along to begin teaching English. --Responded to a Foreign Ministry request for material on Cuba's relations with other Latin American countries --presumedly this was part of the Foreign Ministry's attempt to get ready for the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana. --Produced copies of the U.S. Constitution in Farsi and English in response to a request from the Office of the Constitutional Assembly which has responsibility for acquiring documentation useful to the Council now in the process of producing a constitution for Iran. --Placed several releases regarding our newly reopened consular operation with all the principal media outlets; created signs for the consular operation which helped reduce disorder; laid ugly rumors and misunderstandings to rest by engaging in long discussions with editors which resulted in helpful stories; installed a loudspeaker system outside the consular operation so we can talk directly with the crowds. Developed a plan which will in the next few weeks reinstitute programming at IAS Tehran: a.film series, a concert, art exhibits, and a members' night. IAS Isfahan is planning a similar program. --Organized a dinner at the PAO's house which featured a VTR showing an example of how American television reported the Iranian Revolution. Guests included prominent members of the working press, Foreign Ministry CONFIDENTIAL

(T\(\nabla\circ\circ) CONFIDENTIAL officials, a writer, an artist, and an IAS Tehran board member who is also a distinguished professor of law at Tehran University. --Helped organize dinners at the Charge's residence which featured American films and in one case an American pianist. Guests included high ranking government officials, doctors, lawyers, and professors. --Came up with books on state and local government requested by the Deputy Prime Minister for Cooperation. --Talked with the Minister and the Spokesman at the Ministry of Guidance about recent expulsions of American journalists. In addition to the items noted above, English courses at IAS Tehran and Isfahan are bringing in thousands of Iranians and enrollment figures may even approach pre-revolutionary figures by the second semester. Reservations about the Regime: There is, of course, a good deal about the post-revolutionary Iran which is disconcerting to Americans: human rights violations, including summary executions; expulsion of American journalists; bans on much of the domestic press; mistreatment of minorities such as the Kurds and Bahais; frequent characterization of America as imperialist and Zionist dominated; and foreign policy postures inimical to U.S. interests. To make matters worse, we are not able to enter into meaningful dialogue about many of these issues with influential Iranians. It could therefore be argued that it is in the long-term U.S. interest to sharply limit our relations with Iran in order to avoid being identified with policies and actions which are opposed to our ideals and interests. Recommendations: I believe that it is in the long-term U.S. interest to publicly express our concern over Iranian violations of human rights. We should also take firm issue with pronouncements by Iranian leaders which characterize us as imperialists and Zionists lackeys, or accuses us of intervention in Iranian internal affairs. Finally, we should strenuously object to the expulsion of American journalists. On the other hand, I am convinced that Iran is today so fractured and disparate that it would be a mistake to assume that any disconcerting action or pronouncement represents Iran in toto. We should therefore avoid reacting on an across-the-board basis and treat each incident or pronouncement on an ad hoc, limited basis. Similarly, we should deal with each CONFIDENTIAL

(701) CONFIDENTIAL issue and each opportunity for dialogue on its merits without linking it to any other issue or rebuff. I recognize that such an attitude on our part makes planning and resource management difficult. But I nonetheless feel confident that we can operate on such a basis to excellent long-term effect. I therefore recommend that USICA Iran give top priority to acquiring the equipment, personnel, insights, structure, organization, and procedures which will give us the flexibility and resources to take full advantage of opportunity. (The revolution and its aftermath destroyed our physical plant, scattered our personnel, and made our old organization, program and procedures obsolete.) More specifically, I am comfortable with the initiatives proposed in Ms. McAfee's "Communication on Environment Problems, Prospects, Ideas" and the subsequent proposals developed by USICA Washington for Assistant Secretary Saunders and the NSC. I am particularly pleased with the plan to expand VOA Farsi services and our recent success in placing Agency films on national television, as I noted earlier, at this juncture the mass audience is a prime audience. I am also convinced that we should make the effort and take the risks involved in trying to enter into a genuine dialogue with the Islamic clergy and the leftists. I recognize that we are ill-equipped to communicate effectively with these two groups and that the kind of Americans (i.e., Jesse Jackson, Andy Young) most acceptable to them may be less than representative of the views of our own establishment. But the mullahs or the leftists are likely to be dominant for a long time to come. If Iran is important to us, self-interest suggests that we accept a sizeable portion of discomfort and learn to communicate effectively with mujahedin mullahs, pasdars, and even Fedayeen Khalq -- being careful of course to avoid being identified with them or with any other faction for that matter. With warmest regards, John Graves Public Affairs Officer PAO:JEGrraves:em10/4/79 CONFIDENTIAL

OF THE ALONG TALE IS WHO IS CONSIDERED A HILFIGHTT TAI AIMLESS WORLDS OF HUNDRED OF WHO KAI, THE STREETS OF DOWNTOWN TABLES. THIS HAS INCREASED EARLY SINCE 1674, REPORTEDLY MOSTLY SINCE THE REVOLUTION. HERE ARE HUNDRED'S OF UNEMPLOYED OR UNIER-EMPLOYED SELLING ISHERITIES, APPLES, KNICK-KNACKS, COMES, ANYTHING THAT CAN ING IN A FEW RIALS. AND THE AIMLESS WORLDS ARE PAYED ECON TO THOUSANDS. A MERCHANT FRIEND WHO RECENTLY MOVED IN THE BALZAN TO A DOWNTOWN LOCATION STRESS! THAT THE COALIC THATEN OF THE FAELAVI TRANS WAS THE LICLOCATION OF LEMANS WHO WAS ATtracted TO THE CITY BY HIGH CON- SECTION AGES. WITH DRASTIC OUT-PACKS SINCE THE BYNO- ACTION, THIS DISOSESSED JOBLKSSE BALLY-EDUCATED PEOPLE- KARIAN COULD HE NEARED, BY AS TISILY LED AFTER THE IN- NIGALITY TISILLUCIONMENT SETS IN BY CONCHIST ACITATOCS AS BY EAS PLAN BY THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. DISCUSSIONS WITH MERCHANT FRIENDS INDICATED CONCEPT WITH CHRONIC SLOWDOWN OF ECONOMY - IN THESE CASES OUTBACK IN CREDIT PURCHASES OF CONS MER DTRABLES. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN HEI THERE-PRONGED PROMOTION OF CONSUMER CREDIT: LANKS, PAZAARIS AND THE MERCHANTS THEMSELVES. CONSUMER CREDIT NOW HAS VIRTUALLY CEASED AND PURCHASES ARE FOR CASH. AS A LAWIER FRIEND PUT IT, ALL CONTRACTS ARE GENENPORCRABLY, THERE ARE NO COURTS, NO JULILES, NO LAWYERS, YEST QAZIS (MILICIOG S JUILES). WHILE PEOPLE FAVE PY EGRCE HAD TO TRUST THEIR LIVES OR PRISON SENTENCES TO PAZI JUSTICE, NO MERCHANT CE LAWYER DESIRS TO TRY TO ENFORCE TIL CONTRACTS IN A QAZI COURT. SO EVERYONE SELLS FOR CASH AND PAYS THAT HIS CRFIDORS WILL PAY LATER. A LAW-KER FRIEND SAIT HE WAS OWED OVER 300,002 DOLLARS IN FIES. RATHER THAN CHANCE QAZI JUSTICE HE WILL WAIT THIS ONE OUT. 7. BULL OF EMBOET FRIENDS DURING TOUR IN TABRIZ HAD BEEN NILLE CLASS: DOCTORS, LAWYERS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, PLANT MANAGERS, BUSINESSMEN, ENGINEERS, SOME BUREAUCRATS. MOST HERE STILL IN TAPNIZ, BUT QUICK SURVEY OF ICOTOP INLINS INDICATE THAT HIGHLY-PUBLICAL PHYSICIANS BLAIN MAIN INDUSTRY 4-10, 22 OUT OF 3,00 4312

(710) 11 C CHINA CONVERSATIONAL WITH MINI'S CLASS I, PART OF THE SOLVE AARD THESE JUSTICES: 1. WHAT IS GOLD TO PAY TO IT, I SHOULD NOT HAVE CH�STAY, IN LOME VACATION ON US. INVOLVING IN FRIENDS POWER AND USING HIS BOPPE UP TO A TATON, I CONGRESSION TO THE FOOD OF THE AMERICAN TATONIRAT OF THE ZAIRE AND CHAMRAN THAT SOME OF THEM VENIZIAR THE EAI RULERS OF IRAN. THE TICIICITY OF THE TUEFF TO ACCEPTED AS GLYME. BUT THE ATI-AMERICANISM IS ONLY UPON AS A NECESSARY TACTIC TO NONSCILITATH POWER IN REVOLUTION-EYIRAN. 12 C WHILE UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS IN PARTICULTAE EXPRESSED SOME CONCREN ABOUT FUTHESS CAPRICIOUSNESS OF ONGOING PURGE OF "TAGGOTIS" AND "SAVAZIS" FROM FACULTY, FRIENDS SAI THEY ARE MORP RELAXED ABOUT PERSONAL SECURITY THAN THEY WERE AS RECENTLY AS TWO MONIES AGO. WHILE MORE HAVE SAI FRIENDS OR RELATIVE IS PRISON, PW HAD CLOSE ACCUAIMPANCES WHO WERE EXECUTED. EVALS HAVE ACCELLED ENOUGH INTO THE PAST FOR FRIENDS TO JOIL OF THESES OF THE ECMITHE ENROCK ON THE IOCH AT MIDNIGHT, THE COMMITTEE LAIS LOOKING FOR LIQUOR, THE SECRET BURNING OF FLAVOAGAZINES. TAFRIZIS EVEN GREN A LITTLE ABOUT HOE LEEIETT AFRAID OF RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IUPING THE REVOCATION AND WERE READY TO FLEB TO TURKEY IF NECESSARY. PARTICU-ALLY AMONG PIQUIT OVER 40 THE MEMORY OF THE PISHEVALS IS STILL STRONG. AS SEVERAL FRIENDS PUT IT: ALL IT TOOK TO DRIVE OUT 45,000 AMERICANS WAS AN INDICATION THAT THEY WEREN'T WANTED, THE RUSSIANS ICN'T LEAVE AS EASILY. 13 C LADIZIS ANT ACT YOT SCREPT OUT TAI ANT AERIS SHANGI OVIED FOR ANT THE NEW GOVERNMENT FOCUS IS TREASURED TO ME SOON IT'S FOUND IT A SOLUTION TO ANCO TO EY ASHT FOR AVIOLS IT TILEN OY EO TO THEOLOGY THEY SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OF STAY, WHAT IF THE OIL JOIN THE GOVERNMENT OR STAINNASHIE, YO, NO ILL. I THE REVOLUTION'S FAILURES, THERE IS ONE CIGAR SING. EUPO FOR THE FACT THAT NO ONE DAES TO PUBLICLY FOUND IN ILOUILY IN PRIVATE) SUPPOSES ON SHANG'S CIGAR TOY. IS AN INCEPTIBLE INCREASE IN FREDDO OF EXPERTIBLE OF THE REVOCATION. FRIENDS WAR TO "GO A PROMLING OVER THE LIEPHON AN SHAN FRANZI ON POLITICS IN IAGH BUT THE INJED. WILL NOCE OF CEITICI OF U.S. POLICY IN MINI'S ON CINICAL AND CONSPIRATORIAL IN NATIONAL COMMITTEE'S SAVAK HAS CERTAINTY ZER A LALTY INTEREST IN HOT E INTERNAL AN T POLITICS, MINI 14

( [?] ) NOES CAI "IRAN UTDAN" "195, 1979 I. \underline{\text{Revolution}} The causes of the revolution were:The causes of the revolution were: 1. Corruption: a. The personal corruption of the Shah b. The corruption of his family (including Phalavi Foundation) c. The corruption of his ministers a. The corruption of his friends - the so-called "51 leading industrialists" e. The corruption of the military 2. Social/Economic Upheaval: a. "The billion dollar industrial syndrome" b. Missive modern armament - from bow to bozuka in five years c. Quadruppling oil price d. Lack of trained managers, skilled technicians e. Cultural shock f. No agriculture improvement g. U.S. doctrine of "regional cooperation" 3. Shah being too remote, misread his people, Mistook quiescence for stability. The revolution is political, not social, in nature. Note that only 1/3 of the population of Iran speak Fashi at home. II. \underline{\text{Factions Involved}} 1. Religious-Ayatollahs and mujhilias. It has always been the function of the religious leaders to protect the common people from the government, i.e., oppression. There has never been a participant government in the long history of Persian. The hold the Ayatollahs have over the common people is far greater than that which the Popes had over Europe in the Middle Ages. 2. The Bazaar. Unlike the so-called "51 leading industrialists", those merchants are of the old school, shun Western ways, are deeply religious, are suspicious of modernization, and are angry at the government and private corruption. ^{*} All of whom have either fled the country or have been shot.

( [?] 1) -2 The money for the revolution was the bazaar. So did the direction. The religious Muslim always tiths. Weis putvast sums of money at the disposal of the religious, who dispense it to the poor. Unlike the government, the religious are honest - no rials stick to their fingers. 3. Technocrats. About 12% of the man people are educated in Western ways. They are the middle-managers, the scientists, and the professionals. Most are young and litoral. They saw the Shah's clique grow wealthy while inflation took away any monetary gains they may have made. This group is essential to run the country. 4. The Universities. Perhaps the most prominent group before the revolution were students and young instructors. Liberal to radical in belief, led or used, by underground political leaders, they were visual and vocal adherents of the revolution in Teheran. 5. Unrecognized political parties including minority ethnic groups (Arabs, Kurds) and communists. This uneasy coalition of right, center, and left joined together in a common cause - hatred of the Shah. III. \underline{\text{Intelligence}} The U.S. State Department has never understood Iran, culturally, religiously, or economically. It had only eager clues to the depth of the Iranian dissatisfaction. The few reports, hinting at severe problems, were suppressed. Rather: 1. CIA mid-1978 "all is well" report 2. House of Representatives Staff Report 3. Carter's statement on December 8 asserting that the Shah would retain power. This was the day that Iranian troops shot hundreds of demonstrators in the streets of Teheran. The U.S. press has been unfair in its reporting. It demonstrates: 1. Bias 2. Little or no knowledge of the culture and traditions of the country. Example: The press reported the executions in detail. Yet a summary of those executed (about 300) reveal: 83% were secret police, security personnel, torturers 9% criminals, mostly murders and rapists 7% politically elite under the Shah 1% prominent industrialists

[?] IV. Present Situation Iran is living on borrowed time. The Habs have always been pro-sectors of the people against the government. They have never governed; they cannot govern. But they are the only force that can hold the country together at this time. Future situation: Each speaker had a different conclusion. All agreed that: 1. The economy must be re-started 2. The military must be strengthened 3. The people must continue to receive food. V. \underline{\text{Future Government}} 1. The Liberal religious leaders are the bridge between the common people, the new military, the Bazaar merchants, and the Western educated. A government far more liberal than the present one, but still adhering to Islamic beliefs, will be formed incorporating these four elements - Jim Bill. 2. The present government will not remain in power. As in so many cases, the highly disciplined communist minority will simply insert itself into what had been a power vacuum. Saudi Arabia is most fearful of this action - Frank Mencker. 3. If the communists time their move correctly and all elements of the coup fall into line, then Iran will continue to be one nation, albiet communistic. The odds against this happening are huge. In all probability, Iran will be partitioned along racial lines - Arabic, Persian, Kurd. This would most likely cause armed conflict since the oil fields are in the Arab ethnic territory - uncertain. VI. Business Climate Despite rhetoric against the U.S., we are liked and our technology is admired. Business opportunities are good. Motto now is think small. Germans and Japanese are back in force, sending their best men. Priorities have changed. Food, raw materials for basic industry, low cost housing, construction, and communications are now high priority. Comeback - Comback in force - Iran will remember those who helped her in her hour of need.

( [?] At this point I asked a question Q: JN. "What would you conscient to the probability is for Iran to join the Israeli boycott?" A: A: Don Weldon. "Relations between Iran and Israel have been severed and will remain to for a long time. But I doubt if, with all Iran's pressing problems, they will try to set up a boycott list and boycott office." Q: JR. "No, I simply am on the Throw boycott as now constituted with offices in Damascus." A:A: D. "Oh; very, 'very likely." Q: JR. "Gentlemen, you have just finished telling us to rush back into Iran, even though re-exploiting our presence will be very expensive, even though their-term profits are very iffy. Now suppose we fought the corner office, won, re-entered Iran, and then got slapped to "the boycott." A:A: DW. "Don't you believe in corporate courage." Q: JR. "At what age." VII. U.S. Government Business can expect no help from our government. As pointed out from the floor, the Japanese government is guaranteeing every yen invested by its companies in Iran. The current Iranian government is, naturally, much opposed to our government. Current government policy is "very low profile." Worst move since January 1 was Javits Resolution. No ambassador in sight. VIII. \underline{\text{legal}} 1. The U.S. has recognized the new government of Iran. 2. The Iranian courts are still working but in a political context. This is no time to sue. 3. Of the U.S. State Department list of about 222 Iranian lawyers, only seven are still practicing and they are very busy. 4. The Teheran Bar Association is evaluating all its members. Religious affiliation will be a problem. All hand-outs pertinent to legal, and there were several, have been sent to Dave McCalmont.

(YYY) IX. \underline{\text{Competition}} The DuPont polyacryl plant in Isfahan is not operating. It had been at start-up stage before the revolution. It was extruding, but only to the waste stage. Capacity was about 20000 lbs./year of polyfil, polystaple, and acrylic staple. POY was to be drawn textured at Iran Knitting in Goshin. DuPont entered this project with a 40% holding and four board members cut of an 11 man board. A 75% vote was necessary for any approvals; 50% interest was held by 5 of the 51 leading Iranian industrialists; the remaining 10% by the Iranian government. The five DuPont partners have either fled the country or have been shot. DuPont has a new partner, the Islamic government, represented by the workers committee. Somehow, DuPont can get back its 40% holding by paying $100,000? This I believe is to pay the workers for not working. The purpose of this commercial intelligence is not to gloat over the misfortunes of a competitor, especially one as honorable and capable as DuPont, but simply to emphasize the uncertainties of making capital investments in developing countries. In 1973 when it was rumored that DuPont was going to build in Iran, we had the distance feeling that DuPont had outmaneuvered us. Since they had firm contacts with the industrial loaders, our strategy (if you can call a vague feeling in the pit of the stomach strategy) was to work with the smaller mills, all of whom were Bazaar merchants. By good luck, not good management, our approach seems successful. We have a large and ready market for our products until the Polyacryl situation is resolved. Our customers are alive, well, and most vocal in demand for product, as the last month has amply demonstrated. Opportunistic business perhaps, but business nevertheless. We have formed a vague hypothesis over the last several years in doing business with developing countries of "Never align yourself with the government, members of the government, or entrepreneurs close to the government." The DuPont/Iran impasse brings a vague hypothesis close to being axiomatic.

CONFIDENTIAL (EXDIS) TEHRAN 10528 DE RUQMHR #0528/01 274 ** CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL ENT CCCCC ZZH CHARGE: STAT 10/1/79 0 010711Z OCT 79 APPRV: CHARGE:LELAINGEN TM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN D FTD: CHARGE:LRLAINGEN:M TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4013 CLEAR: NONE RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 023 DISTR: CHARGE CHRON BT 1/WEB CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10528 EXDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE E.0. 12065: GDS 10/1/79 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, UNGA, PINR, IR SUBJECT: BILATERAL WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, OCTOBER 3 1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. YOU MEET WITH YAZDI AT A TIME THAT MAY MARK A SIGNIFICANT WATERSHED IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHILE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ANY OBSERVER TO AVOID HASTY JUDGMENTS ABOUT THIS PLACE, IT IS HARD TO AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THE CLERICS ARE NOW IN THE MOOD TO STEAMROLLER VIRTUALLY ANY AND ALL OPPOSITION TO THEIR DESIGNS FOR AN ESSENTIALLY THEOCRATIC STATE, WITH ISLAM AS THE IDEOLOGY AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY POSSIBLY PROVIDING CONTROLLING PARTY APPARATUS. ITEMS: A. THE KURDISH "REBELLION" HAS BEEN PUT DOWN IN A WAY INTENDED TO SERVE AN OBJECT LESSON FOR OTHER MINORITIES. B. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND ITS LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN BRANDED COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND OTHER OPPOSITION ELEMENTS SIMILARLY WARNED. C. A CLERIC-DOMINATED COUNCIL IS RAMRODDING THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCESS THAT WOULD SEEM TO INSTITUTIONALIZE AN IRON-CLAD SHIA ISLAMIC CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS. D. EXECUTIONS ARE CONTINUING, EVEN OF COMMON CRIMINALS, DESPITE TALK OF AMNESTY. QUM SEEMS DETERMINED TO AVOID ANY SHOW OF JUDICIAL MERCY OR COMPASSION. E. THE HEAD OF THE REVOLUTION-BORN PASDARANS ("GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION") HAS JUST TAKEN OVER AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. F. NAZEH'S OUSTER AT NIOC IS A FORCEFUL AND VERY PUBLIC REMINDER TO THE SECULARISTS OF QUM'S DETERMINATION TO PREVENT ANY LESSENING OF ITS CONTROL OVER WHAT MATTERS, INCLUDING THE OIL SECTOR.

( [?] ) CONFIDENTIAL (EXDIS) G. A KIND OF PARANOIA PERSISTS OVER AN ALLEGED CONSPIRACY BY THE WESTERN PRESS AGAINST THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. (THERE ARE NO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS NOW RESIDENT HERE.) H. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BE DENOUNCED BY KHOMEINI AS MASSIVELY INVOLVED WITH INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM IN FRUSTRATING THE HOPES OF THE PALESTINIANS; INDEED KHOMEINI SEEMS TO SEE HIMSELF AND THE REVOLUTION AS BECOMING THE REAL UNIFYING FORCE THROUGHOUT THE AREA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. 3. THERE IS MORE, BUT THIS IS ENOUGH TO UNDERSCORE THE POINT THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE CLERICS ARE IN A FLOOD TIDE OF ASCENDANCE. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NOTHING THAT WILL PREVENT THEIR SOLIDIFYING THEIR POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE — NOT THE MILITARY, NOT BAKHTIAR FROM PARIS, NOT POPULAR DISILLUSIONMENT OVER THE LACK OF MUCH BREAD AND BUTTER RETURNS FROM THE REVOLUTION, NOT BAZARGAN AND OTHER MODERATES IN THE PGOI. (BAZARGAN IS QUOTED IN AN INTERVIEW IN TODAY'S PRESS WITH ORIGINAL FALLACI AS SAYING "... FROM AN OFFICIAL POINT OF VIEW THE GOVERNMENT RUNS THE COUNTRY BUT IN AN IDEOLOGICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY SENSE (HOMBINI AND HIS COUNCILS CONTROL. TRUE INDEED.) 4. WHAT COULD ARREST THE TREND PERHAPS, BUT ONLY WITH TIME, WOULD BE A GREATER APPRECIATION THAN NOW EXISTS OF THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNING A PLURALISTIC BODY POLITIC AND A PARTIALLY MODERNIZED ECONOMY SUCH AS IRAN'S WITH RELIGIOUS PRECEPTS THAT SEEM TO PROVIDE SO LITTLE ROOM FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE SECULAR ELEMENTS OF THIS COUNTRY. 5. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER KHOMEINI APPRECIATES THIS AT ALL, AND THERE THE RETURNS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. EVEN IF HE DOES THERE IS A REAL QUESTION. WHETHER EVEN HE COULD PREVAIL AGAINST A SUBSTANTIAL TIDE NOW RUNNING AND AN ENTOURAGE IN QUM THAT BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS EVEN MORE OBDURATE THAN KHOMEINI. BT 0528 NNN

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 10528 6. THE EASY ANSWER IS THAT AN INEXORABLE PROCESS IS UNDERWAY THAT WILL SWEEP ASIDE THE MODERATE FORCES AND THAT WILL EVENTUALLY ALSO SEE BAZARGAN OUSTED, IN THE MANNER OF NAZEH AT NIOC. 7. I AM NOT SO SURE. I FIND MUCH LESS GROUND FOR OPTIMISM THAN A MONTH AGO, BUT KHOMEINI IS NO FOOL POLITICALLY AND MAY YET APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR SOME ACCOMMODATION TO THE MODERATES (WHICH BAZARGAN WEAKLY BUT STILL GAMELY REPRESENTS) TO ASSURE CONTINUED POLITICAL STABILITY AS HE SEEKS TO ASSURE WHAT MATTERS TO HIM, AND THAT IS PRIMACY OF ISLAM IN THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FABRIC OF FUTURE IRAN. 8. YOU MAY WISH TO PROBE WITH YAZDI HOW HE SEES FUTURE TRENDS IN THIS AREA. HE IS A DEEP BELIEVER. A REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS AS CLOSE AS AND IN THE PGOI TO KHOMEINI BUT WHO MAY APPRECIATE THE NEED TO BALANCE HIS IDEALISM WITH REALISM. HE HAS SAID AS MUCH TO ME, AND I AM PREPARED TO BELIEVE HIM. YOUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM, THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL CONTACT WE HAVE HAD WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP, IS CRUCIAL TO OUR PURPOSES HERE. IN AFFIRMING TO HIM THAT WE ACCEPT THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN, AND INDEED THAT WE WISH IRAN WELL IN DEVELOPING ITS NEW INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT, YAZDI SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT WE ARE TROUBLED BY A RIGIDITY AND AN ABSENCE OF A HUMAN FACE IN THE REVOLUTION THAT SEEMS TO LEAVE SO LITTLE SCOPE FOR THE RIGHTS OR INTERESTS OF MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS IN TODAY'S IRAN. KHOMEINI CARES LITTLE ABOUT IRAN'S IMAGE IN THE UNITED STATES BUT THERE ARE OTHERS, LIKE YAZDI, WHO DO. LAINGEN BT #0528 NNN C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHPA N 10528 ربط-الجزار صرّر ٣٧٧ أوضّر رسمي

(YYA) The recent impressions of ICA Country Affairs Officer McAfee's visit to Iran (Tehran and Shiraz) and subsequent events there tend to confirm the Embassy judgment that the current religious-dominated pattern of government will continue in Iran for the foreseeable future. At the same time the civil government, be it Bazargan's or a successor, seems likely to become even further weakened as competent professionals decline to serve in the government. McAfee's conversations and contacts further document that Khomeini is firmly backed, indeed venerated, by the majority of Iran's poor, Persian-speaking population. Life goes on. The bazaars are bustling. There are no bread lines. It was particularly interesting for me to hear at first hand the impressions that actions and rhetoric emanating from the religious leadership which are jarring to us and to the Western-oriented in Iran are perceived through a different prism and weighed against a different value system by Khomeini supporters. The Ayatollah rejects Western values and priorities as decadent and unislamic. According to impressions from McAfee's conversations, Khomeini is dedicated to pan-Islam and sces himself in a world role (a vision notably not shared by other Islamic countries in the area who drew the line, if they had not before, with the executions of Kurdish Sunnis). Assuming that the short term will not bring a more flexible government to Iran, relations between the U.S. and Iran are likely to continue to be difficult. In these circumstances, it seems all the more important for ICA to focus its public diplomacy efforts on our long term relationship. While present circumstances require circulation channels. Amending my paper in this regard, submitted September 24, 1979, and based on recommendations from field officers ICA/NEA will concentrate on the following:

(ΨΨσ) CONFIDENTIAL Iran-America Societies: Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz The U.S. has been associated with the Iran America Society since its founding in Tehran over fifty years ago. Its institutional respectability, its widely-desired English language teaching capability, and, acknowledged U.S. affiliation provides us an important (and one of the few remaining) windows to Iranian audiences. We propose to lend it whatever support needed and, as opportunities permit, promote its use of programming pursuant to our interests. This will include continued emphasis on our USICA library in the Tehran IAS and renewed support to the Isfahan IAS library. We have initiated "behind-the-scene" efforts to revive the IAS in Shiraz. Explore possibilities of assigning a Regional Islamic Specialist to the NEA Area who would assist in building bridges to the Islamic leadership both directly and through sensitizing our ICA and State officers in the field. Consider the assignment of an "R" cultural officer or grantee to Iran with a background in Persian language and culture to improve our contact with the emerging leadership and academic. Use of the celebration of the 1400 anniversary of the Hegira as a vehicle to include Iranians in a U.S. hosted international seminar on Islam. Travel around the U.S. after the seminar would be included to broaden their exposure to the U.S. We would hope that these communication links, once established, might be broadened. Include, as possible, Iranian participants in multiregional International Visitor programs. Work with VOA to expand the non-news content of its Persian broadcasts, emphasizing such areas as American Islamic studies and interviews with American Iranologists and appropriate public figures. Explore possibilities for American Participant visits to Iran, particularly in the area of American Islamic studies, foreign policy, economics and agriculture. Exploration of some institutional affiliations (nct necessarily bilateral)involving Iranians and Iranian institutions.

(228) Tehran, Iran Nov 1, 1979 Dear folks, Well this has been another one of these special sort of days in Iran... a day that had us worried but that turned out not so bad after all. It was Eid-e-Gurban, an Islamic holiday celebrating the feast of sacrifice. And being such there was a large sermon and prayer meeting scheduled here and in most of the cities of Iran. Well enough, but the day also coincided with a growing surge of government and clerical stimulated criticism of the US for our admission of the Shah for medical treatment in New York. And so the pre-Eid celebrations also became a day to mount a strong public agitation against us. Here in Tehran it had been announced that after the big rally in the south of the city the crowd would move in procession to the US Embassy where speeches against us and slogans would be mounted. So we were prepared for up to a million demonstrators in the streets around the Embassy. That meant getting all non-essential personnel off the compound, the marines concentrated inside the Chancery to protect it, and those of us who were needed inside the Chancery - among other reasons to destroy records and comms equipment if we were again invaded and to keep in touch with Washington by phone and cable ... and also to keep in touch with the local government authorities to be sure that we had some kind of protection from them. The marines of course were in battle dress and eager to defend the place.... But all of that proved unnecessary in the end, happily. Late last evening it was announced on the radio that the procession would not go all the way to the Embassy, but that instead it would go to a square about a mile or so south of here where the speeches against us would be heard and the slogans adopted. The reason being that the distance was far, it was Eid holiday, and time was needed for prayers and visits with families. Nonetheless we stuck to our contingency plans, and by 0900 we had our demonstrators here, but much fewer in numbers. The group, possibly organized by the Communist party here, started at about 50 and eventually grew to about 4000....their tactics seemed to be to keep us off balance and worried all day, since they stuck with us until about four in the afternoon, marching back and forth around our compound, chanting slogans and shaking their fists against us all the while. (We've decided that for the next week anyone who shows up at the consulate and asks for a visa with a sore throat will be rejected on the spot!). The crowd included a lot of women in Chadors and even some children in strollers. At no time did they try to come over the walls but they did manage to spray paint a lot more graffiti on our walls... we had enough as it was from previous demonstrations! We kept in touch with worried Washington by telephone and stuck it out. The only real trouble developed late in the afternoon as the thing was winding up... one of our security officers decided to take down a large cloth banner that had been put up on the large iron grill gates at the Embassy's ceremonial entrance... the banner said something derogatory about Carter and praised Khomeini... well, some of the last of the crowd saw what was happening and didn't like it at all.... in fact the crowd got very angry and got the Iranian police (about 45-50 were guarding the Embassy today, unarmed, and had been pretty good about keeping the crowd moving...)... got the police to join them(!) in demanding that the banner be put back on the gate... we said ok, provided it was hung on the walls. Well by that time we decided we would not stand on our pride if it meant turning the police against us. So the banner went back up (much to the disgust of our marines) and there was another hour of angry slogans against us... but no violence.... That was it, except for a brief flurry this evening when large crowds leaving a sports stadium nearby paraded past us, yelling more angry slogans. Again we retreated to the chancery, but it proved brief, over in about 15 minutes. You probably wonder what triggered all of this, though I suspect you know. Guess I mentioned it above... the Shah. There is mounting irritation over this, and we are in for some trouble if the Shah stays on for further treatment on an outpatient basis. We have emphasized, at the highest levels here short of the Ayatollah, that our admission of the Shah was entirely on a humanitarian basis, we regard him without any political authority in Iran, we deal with the present government, we respect and support Iran's independence and territorial integrity, we have reminded the Shah's party that he cannot engage in political activity while in the US, etc., etc. But that has not satisfied either the government or the press, which sees some other purpose on our part in what we have done, regards the Shah as the basest of criminals and wants him back here for trial.

(349) Where this will all end is unclear at the moment but we are going to have some heavy weather for a while I fear, especially if he remains in the US for extended treatment. Pity, because up to now we had been making some progress, however slowly, in gaining confidence here, in what is a real uphill struggle. But not everything has been trouble... we've tried to continue reasonably normal lives when we can. The Community has organized a volleyball league ("Laings's Invitational volleyball series"), we've lost tennis matches to both the Italian and the British Embassies, and we've had a splendid Halloween dance, the latter organized by the young people in the Defense Attache Office. The weather cooperated, so we could put tables out on the terraces and so we were able to have something more that 250 people for a magnificent dinner prepared by our amazing Italian cook and dancing again until three in the morning. They organized dance contests... disco, waltz, polka, and slow... and a great time was had by all. In fact we are becoming celebrated in the diplomatic community for the parties at this embassy. Never fear, we are discreet too. The Residence is far enough from the street so that we do not disturb the Islamic fundamentalists.... a few Iranians come, but mainly it is the diplomatic and private community... all of which are frankly starved for such "taghooti" (corrupt) entertainment, because none of it is available in the city.... although there is a rumour going around that there is dancing occasionally at the roof restaurant of the Sheraton Hotel.... there are a good number of fine hotels here, but most of them have about 10-20% occupancy, given the total absence of tourists. And some of the hotels have been taken over by students this past week, grumbling about the absence of dormitory space... this poor government! It has so many problems on its hands and it is very reluctant to offend the students who after all had so much to do with the overthrow of the Shah. Nothing further has developed on the question of the assignment of an ambassador here... again the time is a bit inappropriate, given the ruckus over the Shah... so I don't know where things stand at the moment.... I was asked recently to take an assignment as Consul General in Jerusalem, but I have asked to be removed from consideration for that job.... it seems very peripheral to the main activity in the Middle East, what with our Embassies in Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Amman very much in the act; not to mention all the other players like Straus and all the other cast of characters.... it would have been a comfortable place to live, perhaps, but not all that good for schools for Jim, a prime consideration affecting wherever we go next in this transient life that is the Foreign Service of the United States.... P.S. We called on a leading Mullah at the Senate building last week - an interesting conversation with a man deeply suspicious, yes, but apparently prepared to listen, recognizing that Iran has problems not dealing with us. But perhaps the most interesting part of the call was the 12-14 year old girl who saw our black Chrysler limousine waiting outside and who asked my security officer: "Who's car is this?" When told it was the American charge, she said, "...but I thought all the Americans had American cars!" She is not representative, but left... we're going to chase them out!" She said something about the impact of some of the propaganda which she said says something about the impact of some of its proponents, genuinely heard in much of the press - propaganda that some of its proponents genuinely mean and which others express to effect.

(T△F) Ali N. Izadi Agricultural research Center Pahlavi University Shiraz, Iran June 9, 1278 er 'ir; During my stay in America (part, 1966-1967, 174) I was very involved in Americans especially their attitude toward other set of foreigners. I studied years in the U.S. before coming back to Iran. Since coming back, however, I now feel after careful reflection that I would like to go back and attempt to become a useful citizen of the U.S. if it is not very difficult to get in. I have a Ph.D. and M.S. degree in Agricultural Economics, a B.S. degree in Agricultural Education in addition to a B. degree in General Agriculture. My capital assets are $500,000.00. I have had twenty years associate experience managing a large farm along with training and research in agriculture. I feel by immitting to the U.S. I could become an asset and certainly in the world cause not a liability to the country of my choice. I inquired about the proper forms at the Shiraz american Consulate and was told to complete the Optional Form 17 Biographic Date for Visa purposes and send it to the I.V. Section, a rican Embassy, C. Box 50, Teheran Iran. I did this and sent the form on Sept. 1977. I was also told that there was no assurance that a visa would be issued. I was also told that the process takes between 9 to 12 months and would receive a reply about this time. At the present time I have not received any word concerning its progress and am becoming a little worried since it is of great importance to me. I attempted to find out what progress has been made by calling the Immigration section in Teheran but found that they had no record of it. I then went personally to Teheran Immigration Visa Section and spent two days waiting my turn only to find they also had no record of my application. Finally yesterday, June 8, 1978, I did make contact with someone in the Teheran Immigration office who then told me it would take not 9 to 12 months but 2 to 3 years. Could you help me by investigating into this matter and letting me know 1) the status of my application and 2) the approximate time period I will have to wait? I would really appreciate if you would do this for me. Sincerely, Ali M. Izadi Ali M. Zadi

1... section .crican chnessy .c. Box 50 Tehran, Iran Ali I. Ibn S. Agricultural research Center Pahlavi University Shiraz, Iran Sep. 11,197 XCP Sirs I would not be a review letter (Check, I think) for this possible project. I think this is a review of the project to be the first time I had to be in the public into for this commercial. I am still from instructors by the American Consulate at Yiraz to the American embassy, I. section, 6. Box 50 in Tehran. I now believe the process, approximately two to three years, is too long. Areby I formally request that all completed documents be returned to me and the application terminated. Thank you for any effort you have taken on my behalf. Sincerely, Ali M. Izadi Ali. فرستنده ناهج، على محمد ایزدی گیرنده نامه کنسول ایالات منحده بخش صدور ویزای صهاجوت مرکز تحقیقات کشاورزی دانشگاه پهلوی شیراز-ایران ۵۲ شهریور ۱۱ سهلاسر ۹۷۸ مطابق با ۱۳۹ بهش ۷-۷ صندوق پستی ۵۰ تهران - ایران عالیه جفاپی: من در نامه، قبلی بسه شماره، ۹ ژوئن ۱۹۷۸ راجع به مهاجرت احتمالیم به تومیکا نوشتم من قبل فرما ختیاری ۱۷۹ اطلاعات ببوكرافی را جهت ویزا پر کردهام. واین فرمرا همانطور که کنسولگری تومیکا در شیراز دستور داده بود به سفارت تومیکا در تهران بخش ۷.7 صندوق پستی ۵۰ فوستادم. من حالا فكر مي كنم كه مدت دويا سه سال براياين عمل (گرفتن ويزا جهت مهاجرت به آمریکا) خیلی زیاد است. من بدینوسیله رسما از شطا تقاضا مي كنم كه تمام فرمصهای پر شده را بمن برگشت داده و تقاضایم را پایان یافته تلقى نمایند. از تمام زحماتیکه برایم متحل شدهاید متشکرم با احترام عليمحمد ایزدی

(709) DE RUQMHR #1066 290 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH RAN 11056 PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0407 CONFIDENTITALTEHRAN11066 APRV: RSO:ABGOLACINSKI CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL CHARGE: STAT 10/17/79 TRFTD: ARSO:HOWLAND ST CHANNEL CLEAR:NONE MISTR: RSO-2 CHRON 3/WEB FOR RSO PLEASE PASS USSS B.C. 12065: GLS 10/17/35 (GOLACINSKI, ALAN B.) OR-A TAS: ASEC SUBJECT: ALLEGED CCOUNTERFITTING RING REF: (A) TEHRAN 12367 (3) PARIS 32L35 1. AS REQUESTED IN REF P, KAZEMIAN WAS QUERIED ON OCTOBER 15, 1979 REGARDING HIS WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH USS OUTSIDE OF IRAN. PREFERABLY IN TURKEY. KAZEMIAN HAS AGREED TO SUCH A MEETING, BUT IS HESITANT ABOUT THE MEETING TAKING PLACE IN TURKEY. IT IS KAZEMIAN'S BELIEF THAT THE COUNTERFEITING ORGANIZATION HAS GOOD CONTACTS IN FURNISH NATIONAL POLICE AND THAT HIS COOPERATION WITH THE USG MIGHT BECOME KNOWN. KAZEMIAN STATES THAT HE WILL MEET YOUR AGENT IN ANY OTHER LOCATION, AT USS EXPENSE. (COMMENT: KAZEMIAN'S NATIVE LANGUAGE IS FARSI, HIS ENGLISH IS LIMITED, BUT HE CLAIMS HE SPEAKS TURKISH.) 2. KAZEMIAN WAS BRIEFED ON REF B, PARA 10 AND BELIEVES THAT HE CAN PROVIDE THE ASSISTANCE MENTIONED. IN REGARD TO A DATE FOR THE PROPOSED MEETING, KAZEMIAN HAS INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE MEETING OCCUR AFTER THE NEXT SHIPMENT OF DOLLARS ARRIVES IN TEHRAN. SOURCE HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE QUALITY OF THIS SHIPMENT IS TO BE MUCH BETTER THAN RECENT ONES. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO BRING SAMPLES OF THESE NEW BILLS WITH HIM WHEN HE MEETS WITH YOUR AGENT. 3. (AZEMIAN WAS ONCE AGAIN STRONGLY DISCOURAGED FROM BECOMING ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ANY UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY. (COMMENT: RSO BELIEVES THAT AZEMIAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUNTERFITTING OPERATION GOES BEYOND HIS CLAIMED CASUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PRINCIPALS. SOURCE IS IN ALL PROBABILITY WORKING AS A FENCE/PASSER OF THE COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY.) 4. DURING RECENT MEETINGS, KAZEMIAN HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (A)ONE COUNTERFEIT 10,000 RIAL NOTE (APPROXIMATELY 100 DOLLARS AT THE CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE) AND ONE 100 MARK NOTE, BEARING SERIAL NUMBER L12096360. USSS MAY BE INFRIESTED IN PASSING 100 MARK NOTE TO GERMAN LIAISON. IF SO, WE WILL HOUSE DIRECTLY TO USSS PARIS. (CAVEAT: WE DO NOT LISH TEAT IDENTITY OF INFORMANT BE MADE KNOWN TO GERMANS CONFIDENTIAL

(TF1) CONFIDENTIAL IN THAT THEY MAY CHOOSE TO PURSUE OWN INVESTIGATION IN TEHRAN *EICH COULD BURN SOURCE. ERAM 11866 (A) COUNTERFIT CURRENCY IS BEING SMUGGLED INTO TEHRAN VIA PASSENGER BUS OPERATING BETWEEN TEHRAN AND ISTANBUL AND OWNED BY THE DERRIA TOURIST COMPANY, IS ANBUL TURIFY. (C) SUBJECT IDENTIFIED AS HOLLEIS WAS ALLEGEDLY BORN AT MARAS, TURKEY ON AN UNKNOWN DATE. (D) SUBJECT IDENTIFIED AS SHAPKI, PRESENTLY IN TOREY AWAITING WORD TO SHIP THE NEXT SHIPMENT OF DOLLARS TO TEHRAN. (E) ON OCTOBER 3, APPROXIMATELY 500,000 DOLLARS IN COUNTERFEIT DOLLARS ARRIVED IN TEHRAN-AS WELL AS APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF OTHER Currency INCLUDING WEST GERMAN MARKS, RIALS AND SAUDI ARABIAN Currency. THE SAMPLE RIAL AND MARK NOTES CAME FROM THIS SHIPMENT. SOUTH STATES THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SAMPLES OF THE DOLLARS BECAUSE THEY WERE SOLD THAT TAY TO INDIVIDUALS DEPARTING IRAN. 5. TYI: ON OCTOBER 14, TEHRAN PRESS CARRIED STORY ALERTING PUBLIC TO PRESENCE OF COUNTERFIT 10,000 RIAL NOTES IN TEHRAN. ON OCTOBER 17, TEHRAN PRESS CARRIED ARTICLE THAT THREE BULGARIAN NATIONALS WERE ARRESTED ON OCTOBER 15, 1979 IN TEHRAN FOR PURCHASING JEWELS WITH COUNTERFEIT 10,000 RIAL NOTES. DESCRIPTION OF THE RIALS GIVEN IN THE PRESS THE SAME AS THAT GIVEN RSO BY SOURCE. LAINGEN HANN

دادن (۱۵ اکتبر). جزئيات این اسکناس‌های تقلبی دقیقاً همان بود که منبع اداره ثبت منطقه‌ای گزارش داده بود. نمونه پول تقلیب ۱۵۵ مارکری

نمونه پول تقلبی دههزار ریالی 10000RIALS

(790) CONFIDENTIAL //SY CHANNEL// TEHRAN 13357 DE RUQMR #0367/01 268 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 251332Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUWHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3757 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2357 BT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 21 OF TEHRAN 13367 R: ASO-2 3480 SY CHANNEL DEPT FOR A/SY/CC ALSO PLEASE PASS TO USSS; PARIS FOR RSO PLEASE PASS TO USSS E.O. 12065: GDS 9/25/85 (GOLACINSKI, ALAN) CR-A TAGS: ASEC SUBJECT: INFORMATION CONCERNING ALLEGED COUNTERFEITING RING 1. ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL. 2. ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1979, KAZEMIAN, RASOL (DOB UNKNOWN) CONTACTED THE SECURITY OFFICE AND ADVISED THAT HE HAD INFORMATION CONCERNING AN ALLEGED INTERNATIONAL COUNTERFEITING RING DEALING IN U.S. DOLLARS. KAZEMIAN, WHO HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED ON TWO SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS, HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AS WELL AS WHAT APPEARS TO BE TWO COUNTERFEIT U.S. BILLS. 3. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THERE IS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WHICH IS SMUGGLING COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS AND GERMAN MARKS INTO IRAN AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES FOR SALE. THE PAPER FOR THE BILLS ALLEGEDLY ORIGINATES IN PARIS, BUT THE BILLS ARE REPORTEDLY PRINTED IN ISTANBUL, TURKEY. THE DENOMINATIONS ARE PRIMARILY 50 AND 100 DOLLAR BILLS. SOURCE HAS PROVIDED THE RSO WITH ONE 50 AND ONE 100 DOLLAR BILL. THE BILLS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PRODUCED BY A PHOTOMECHANICAL PROCESS AS THE QUALITY OF THE PAPER IS POOR, AND THE BILLS LACK RED AND BLUE FIBERS. THERE IS ALSO A LOSS OF DETAIL ON THE BILLS AND SEVERAL MINOR FLAWS. THE 50 DOLLAR BILL IS A SERIES 1974, FACE PLATE NO. E 12, BACK PLATE NO. 22, CHECK LETTER E, QUADRANT NUMBER 2, FEDERAL RESERVE NUMBER 2, SERIAL NUMBER B43771109A AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IS NEW YORK. THE 100 DOLLAR BILL IS A SERIES 1974, FACE PLATE NO. C22, FEDERAL RESERVE NUMBER 2, BACK PLATE NUMBER 16, CHECK LETTER C, QUADRANT NUMBER 2, SERIAL NUMBER B73495537A AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IS NEW YORK. SOURCE WILLINGLY TURNED OVER THE BILLS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD NEVER SEE THEM AGAIN. SOURCE, HIMSELF, STATED THAT THE BILLS WERE OF POOR QUALITY, AND ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BILLS OF BETTER QUALITY NEXT WEEK. THE BILLS THAT HE PROVIDED ARE ALLEGEDLY PART OF A HALF MILLION DOLLAR SHIPMENT THAT ARRIVED IN TEHRAN DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 10. A SECOND SHIPMENT OF APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION DOLLARS IS SUPPOSED TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 1. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE BILLS THAT ARRIVED DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 10 WERE PRINTED ON POOR PAPER, AND HAD BEEN CUT UNEVENLY. THE OCTOBER 1 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL ORIG: STAT 9/25/79 APPRV: RSO:AB.OLACI TFTI: ISC:AB.OLACI CLAR: NONE

CONFIDENTIAL//SY CHANNEL// EHRAV 10357 SEGMENT IS SUPPOSED TO BE PRINTED ON BETTER QUALITY PAPER. SOURCE ADDED THAT THERE IS A RUSH TO GET THE ONE MILLION DOLLAR SHIPMENT INTO TEHRAN BECAUSE OF THE UPCOMING HADJ. 4. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS CONTACT WITH THE COUNTERFEIT ORGANIZATION IS THROUGH TWO TURKISH MALES WHO RESIDE IN TAIWAN ON AN IRREGULAR BASIS. THE FIRST INDIVIDUAL, WHO IS KNOWN ONLY BY HIS NICKNAME "SHAFI" (SPELLED PHONETICAY) WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING 33-35 YEARS OLD, SHORT IN HEIGHT, BROWN HAIR WITH A MUSTACHE. THE SECOND INDIVIDUAL, AGAIN ONLY (KNOWN BY HIS NICKNAME "HOLLS" (SPELLED PHONETICALLY), IS 21-32 YEARS OLD, APPROXIMATELY 6'9' IN HEIGHT, DARK HAIR, YEARS A FULL BEARD AND HAS A LARGE SCAR ACROSS HIS FACE. HE DESCRIBED THEIR DRESS AS BEING HIPPY IN STYLE. TO THE BEST OF SOURCE'S KNOWLEDGE, BOTH INDIVIDUALS ARE OF TURKISH NATIONALITY AND NEITHER HAVE A POLICE RECORD IN IRAN'OR TURKEY. 5. SOURCE STATED THAT HE FIRST CAME INTO CONTACT WITH SLAE I APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS AGO WHEN SHAFKI WAS BUYING CANE IN IRAN. SOURCE, WHO SPEAKS TURKISH, WAS INTRODUCED THOUGH A FRIEND AND SOURCE ASSISTED SHAFKI IN THE PURCHASE OF VEHICLES. SOURCE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD GIVEN SLAKI I MONEY TO PURCHASE A CAR FOR HIM, BUT SHAFKI DISAPPROVED WITH HIS MONEY WITHOUT PRODUCING THE CAR. APPROXIMATELY 26 DAYS AGO, SOURCE HEART THAT SHAFKI WAS BACK IN LONDON AND WAS ADLEO MADE CONTACT WITH HIM. SOURCE'S MOTIVE FOR CONTACTING SHAFKI WAS TO ATTEMPT TO RECOVER HIS LOST MONEY. DURING HIS MEETING WITH SHAFKI, HE WAS OFFERED A POSITION IN THE ROIE OF MARKETING AGENT FOR THE COUNTER-FEEL HILLS. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS TRUSTED BY SHAFKI BICACUSI HE HAI NEVER TURNED HIM INTO THE POLICE WHEN SHAFKI DISAPPEARED WITH HIS MONEY. IT IS SOURCE'S UNDERSTANDING THAT SHAFKI AND HOLLEIS SELL THE MONEY IN IRAN FOR SOMEONE IN TURKEY. IN ADDITION, HE STATED THAT SHAFKI AND HOLLEIS TO NOT BRING THE MONEY INTO IRAN THEMSELVES, BUT IT IS SMUGGLED IN TO THEM. HE BELIEVES THAT MOST OF THE CURRENCY COMES IN BY TRUCK. SHAFKI AND HOLLEIS, IN TURN, USU INDIVIDUALS LIKE SOURCE TO SELL THE CURRENCY. SOURCE ALSO STATED THAT HE F [?] Y UTILIZE' YOUNG FORLISH NATIONALS TO IT

PASS THE MONEY ON A SMALLER SCALE. (COMMENT: THERE IS A BIG MARKET FOR HARD CURRENCY IN IRAN AT THIS TIME AS MANY IRANIANS ARE DESPERATE TO GET THEIR MONEY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.) THE COUNTERFEIT DOLLARS ARE SOLD FOR RIALS AND THE RIALS ARE THEN EXCHANGED ON THE BLACKMARKET FOR REAL DOLLARS AND/OR OTHER HARD CURRENCY. 6. SOURCE CLAIMS THAT HE HAD NOT YET AGREED TO JOIN THE ORGANIZATION, BUT IS WILLING TO JOIN IF THIS OFFICE FEELS IS WOULD BENEFIT AN INVESTIGATION. SOURCE HAS STATED THAT HE WOULD OBTAIN PRECISE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE IDENTITIES OF THE SUPPLIERS IN FRANCE AND TURKEY, AS WELL AS THE ITINERANT OF THE NEXT SHIPMENT IF HE WERE TO BECOME MORE INVOLVED WITH THE RING. SOURCE INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD ACCEPT THEIR OFFER OF JOINING THEM. ESO ADVISED THAT HE SHOULD WAIT FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. 7. ON SEPTEMBER 25, SOURCE CONTACTED RSO AND ADVISED THAT SHAFAI AND TWO OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MALES WOULD BE DEPARTING TEHRAN ON SEPTEMBER 29 FOR GERMANY BY BUS. SOURCE BELIEVESTEAT THEIR FINAL DESTINATION IN GERMANY WILL PF FRANKFURT. RSO HAS DETERMINED THAT THE IRAN-PAYMA BUS COMPANY RUNS A DAILY BUS FROM TEHRAN TO MUNICH VIA ISTANBUL. THE BUS DEPARTS DAILY AT 1900 HOURS ARRIVING IN ISTANBUL 45 HOURS LATER WITH A 24 HOUR LAYOVER AND CHANGE OF BUS, THEN CONTINUING TO MUNICH. THE BUS COMPANY IS DEPORTELY TURKISH AND IS REGISTERED TO THE ALBRICH CO. THAT IS ALSO A BUS SERVICE TO ISTANBUL FROM TEHRAN PRO- VICED BY THE MIHAN-TOUR COMPANY WHICH DEPARTS AT 1900 HOURS DAILY. TRAVEL TIME IS 48 HOURS WITH CONNECTIONS AVAILABLE TO GERMANY. SOURCE IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE MORE PRECISE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE IDENTIFIES OF THE TRAVELERS AS WILL AS THEIR ITINERARIES. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE TRANS- AITED IF AND WHEN DETERMINED. S. SUSPECT MILLS ARE BEING POUCHED TO A/SY/CC, REGISTRY FOR APPROPRIATE EXAMINATION. WOULD APPRECIATE RESULTS OF EXAMINATION. 3. THIS INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY SKETCH, IS PRO- VIDED FOR EVALUATION BY U.S.S.S. U.S.S.S. PARIS MAY DEEM WORTENFILE PURSUING LEAD CONCERNING TRAVEL OF INDIVIDUALS (CITED ABOVE) TO GERMANY. RSO WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SOURCE IF IT IS CONSIDERED HELPFUL BUT IS RELUCTANT TO ENCOURAGE SOURCE TO BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED WITH ALLEGED RING DUE TO LOCAL POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION. ALSO, COORDINATION WITH IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE IS NOT AN OPTION AVAILABLE TO US SINCE THE POLICE DO NOT REPRESENT A VIABLE AUTHORITY AT THIS TIME. (10). FOR U.S.S.S.: REQUEST U.S.S.S. ADVISE WHAT ACTION AND/OR INFORMATION IT DESIRES FROM THIS OFFICE. TELEGRAPHIC TRAFFIC SHOULD BE HANDLED BY CHANNEL THROUGH RSO PARIS OR DOS. 11. FOR A/SY: REQUEST GUIDANCE ON EXTENT TO WHICH THIS OFFICE SHOULD PURSUE THIS INFORMATION. LAINGEN BT

1 Copy TO DO! ACT 2022 sent MN JKUVV ESA653BRA225 120ct79 21 31z DO RUQMHR 002814 SY CHANNEL DE RUFNPS #2135 2852018 ZNY CCCCC ZZH NIACT IMMEDIATE OR 122016Z OCT 79 ZFF 4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS RSO TO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 4417 INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6702 CHRN RUEHSE/USSS WASHDC BT C ON FID E N T I A L PARIS 32135 SY CHANNEL USSS FOR CFT. DIV (PASS DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS) SUBJECT: UNKNOWN PASSER ISTANBUL, FILE 123-2119-S REF: YOUR 037437, DATED 9/25/79 1. ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL. 2. SUBJECT RASOL KAZEMIAN IS NOT OF PRIOR RECORD WITH THE USSS PARIS, HOWEVER THE SPECIMEN COUNTERFIET 50 AND 100 NOTES DES-CRIBED IN YOUR TELEX ARE OF RECORD UNDER INDICATIVE NUMBERS 12A 6617, AND 12A 6508, RESPECTIVELY, UNDER PARENT NOTE 12A6491, THAT FIRST APPEARED IN DAMASCUS IN JULY, 1977. 3. SINCE THAT TIME NOTES OF THIS GROUP HAVE PROLIFERATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 4. IN MARCH 1978 A PLANT WHICH ALLEGEDLY PRINTED THE PARENT GROUP AND SWISS FRANCS WAS SEIZED IN THE USKUDAR DISTRICT OF ISTANBUL. THE PRINTER, MAIMUT IPEK, WAS ARRESTED AND NAMED ELEVEN OTHER INDIVIDUALS AS ASSOCIATES IN THE OPERATION. ALSO SEIZED WERE A PRESS, NEGATIVES, PLATES, 1600 COUNTERFIET $100 US, AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CYPRUS LIRAS.

(ψoγ) 2. DURING INTERROGATION, IPEK ADMITTED PRINTING THE U.S. NOTES AND FURTHER STATED THAT "ONE MILLION U.S. DOLLARS WERE SENT TO SYRIA SO THAT IT COULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL OVER THE WORLD FROM THERE." 6. IT IS NOT CERTAIN IF ALL THE NEGATIVES AND PLATES WERE SEIZED. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT A CURRENT PRINTING IS IN PROGRESS, HOWEVER, THE NOTES REFERRED TO BY KAZEMIAN MAY BE REMNANTS OF THE UNACCOUNTED FOR $1 MILLION REPORTED BY IPEK. 7. THE USSS IN PARIS WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH XAZEMIAN, BUT WOULD PREFER THE MEETING OCCUR IN TURKEY. THE EXACT LOCATION, DATE, AND TIME COULD BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN KAZEMIAN, YOUR OFFICE AND USSS PARIS. 8. REGARDING XAZEMIAN JOINING THE COUNTERFEIT OPERATION. THE USSS STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT HE NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN UN.AWFUL ACTIVITY. USSS CANNOT ASSIST SHOULD HE BE ARRESTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. 9 IF NECESSARY, USSS PARIS WILL INCUR THE COST OF KAZEMIAN'S TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM THE MEETING WITH AN AGENT OUTSIDE IRAN. 10. AT THE MEETING KAZEMIAN WILL BE EXPECTED TO FURNISH INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION ON ALL PRINCIPALS INVOLVED AND TO PROVIDE AS MANY SPECIMENS OF THE COUNTERFIET NOTES AS POSSIBLE. 11. USSS REWARD POLICY FOR INFORMATION IS BASED ENTIRELY ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION. THIS DECISION WILL BE MADE SUBSEQUENT TO ANY ARRESTS AND SEIZURES OF COUNTERFIET NOTES. 12. PLEASE APPROACH KAZEMIAN WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED INFORMATION AND INFORM USSS PARIS OF HIS DECISION TO MEET WITH THE AGENT. 13. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. HARTMAN

(￥29) DESIGNED BY BYDATE OF SIGNATURE SIGNATURE BY DESIGNED BY REMARKS BY DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL OFFICE COPY DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE COPY DATE TIME SIGNATURE 1 4 2 5 3 6 DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box) THE LATERAL ALLOWED HEREOF, DESTROYED, OR ORAL PLACED IN BAG NO. AND CIVIL INDUSTRIAL AREA, AREA OF LEGAL SIGNATURE, OR ORAL SYMBOL SIGNATOR OF LE. EMBLOI OF NAME OR NAME_NAME OF CODE DATE DATE DIA FORM 13-1-49 DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD Previous Edition to Authorized DIA ROUTING 13-1-49 / 1976-771-484/59 ORIGINATOR DATE CLASSIFICATION CONTROL NUMBER DATE RECEIVED IN DIA SUSPENSE DATE REC STREED NUMBER FILE DESIGNATION DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL OFFICE COPY DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE COPY DATE TIME SIGNATURE 1 4 2 5 3 6 DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box) THE MATER ALLOWED HEREON HAS BEEN DESTROYED OR ORAL PLACED IN BAG NO. AND COMMITTED TO THE AUTHORIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITY. IDIAR NO-2 SIGNATURE OF PERMITING OFFICIAL OF IDIAR SYMBOL SIGNATURE OF WELLING OFFICIAL OF IDIAR SYMBOL DATE DATE DA FORM 1-1-68: D A FOUTING & CONTROL RECORD ^{1} P=10000000 DIAR 50-2

DOCK LAMP SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS DOCK LAMA T PP RUE KLICS DE RUDMR #0009 0901344 ZNY SSSSS P 3113437 MAR 79 RI USDAO TEHRAN IC DIA WASHDC PRIORITY BT SECRET NOFORN DOCK LAMP SCPET NOFORN DOCK LAMP DL-100-79 DELIVER TO DOCK LAMP CONTROL CENTER ONLY FOR MG ATKINSON AND COL WINNER ONLY FROM COL SCHAEFER SUBJ: COUNTER PARTS IN WASHINGTON (U) REF UR SECRET DOCK LAMP 2766 DIG 271409Z MAR 79 1. (S/NOFORN) WE HEARTELY CONCUR THAT IS IN THE BEST U.S. INTEREST TO AID OUR COUNTERPARTS IN U.S. HOWEVER AMB SULLIVAN DOES NOT FAVORABLY CONSIDER USE OF DIP POUCH FOR SENDING FUNDS, BUT SUGGESTED WE INVESTIGATE OTHER MEANS FOR MAKING TRANSACTIONS. THIS WE HAVE DONE. 2. (S/NOFRON) IF APPROX 7 TO 9 THOUSAND DOLLARS IS THE TOTAL AMOUNT. WE CAN MANIPULATE THE TRANSACTION IN ANOTHER MANNER. THE MONEY CAN BE GIVEN TO DATT AS IF IT WERE PAYMENT FOR A VEHICLE. FINANCE WILL THEN EXCHANGE FOR DOLLARS (PAPER TRANSACTION ONLY) AND A CHECK WILL BE SENT FROM PARIS TO DATT OR DATT'S BANK IN U.S. THE BIG ADVANTAGE WITH THIS PROCESS IS THAT THE OFFICIAL IRANIAN EXCHANGE RATE OF 74 RIALS TO DOLLAR IN TEHRAN IS MUCH BETTER THAN 150 RIALS TO THE DOLLAR IN U.S. REVW 31 MAR 99 REAS 7 BT 0001 SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS MNN DOCK LAMP S-0358-79 DLO-100-79

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 S-4171/SC-2 Colonel Thomas Schaefer USDAO Tehran Dear Colonel Schaefer, (U) Please refer to our DOCK LAMP 2746, 27 Mar 79, and your reply DL-100-79, 31 Mar 79. (U) Appreciate your reply and concur that alternative way sounds better. (S/NQFORM) Enclosed find an unsealed envelope containing a check and a letter from Captain Baharmast to his sister-in-law. Request you put local postage on the envelope and mail it somewhere outside of Embassy grounds. Please seal before mailing! (S/NOFORN) The letter states that you will call Mrs. Fatema. Davari (from a public phone) within a few days after the letter has been mailed in Tehran, and asks that she meets with you per your instructions to effect the cash transfer. Mrs. Davari's phone number is 68 73 88. (S/NOFORN) We worked out the above procedure based on the assumption that Embassy phones and local mail probably are under surveillance. Procedures for forwarding cash to Captain Baharmast here will be at your discretion. Let me know how I may help. (U) General Tight appreciates your help in this matter, as do all others concerned. Good luck in this effort, as with all the other challenges you now face. I hope things start looking up there. Sincerely, 1 Enclosure a/s DONN C. WINNER Colonel, USAF Chief, Foreign Liaison Classified by D1A/SC-2 Declassify co Review on 31 May 99 Extended by___ Reason 2-301.2.7 SECRET Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(411) DATE DATE DATE

مهماني سنتو (پیمان آمریکایی)

کاپیتان لوری از سازمان اطلاعاتی وزارت دفاع آمریکا و سیوروس بهارمست

از "آوانسا اطلاعاتی دفاعی آمریکا (کاپیتان سیروس بیهارمست ژنرال تیک

مهماني وكلاي مجلس محمدرضاشاهي

ضیافت مهماني وكلاي مجلس محمد رضاثاهي

ضيافت مهماني وكلاي مجلس محمد رضاشاهي

ضیافت مهمانی و کلای مجلس محمد رضاهای

مهمانی و کلای محمد رضا شاهی

مهماتی و کلاری محمد رضاهای

مهماتی و کلاری مجلس محمدر و شاهی

SECRET I STATE 106426 27 APR 79 18 09z E.O. 12065 GDS 4/26/85 (PRECHT, HENRY) TAGS: PINR, IR Pol mm Dcm No CHow k= return SUBJECT: REPORTING SUBJECTS AS YOU REQUESTED AND AS OPPORTUNITIES DEVELOP IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, HERE ARE SOME OF THE TOPICS ON WHICH WE COULD USE ADDITIONAL OR CONTINUING INFORMATION: 1. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP. A) WHO ARE THE POTENT FIGURES WITH AND WITHOUT OFFICIAL POSITIONS? WHOM SHOULD WE WATCH AS COMERS? NEED BIOS. B) WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL ALLIANCES AND STRENGTHS OF AMIR ENTEZAM AND SABAGHIAN? WE KNOW RELATIVELY LITTLE OF EITHER. C) WHERE DOES YAZDI STAND IN THE HIERARCHY AFTER HIS SHIFT TO MFA? DID REGAIN OR LOSE POWER? HOW HAVE MFA PERSONNEL REACTED TO HIM AND ARE THERE ANY PREDICTABLE EFFECTS ON POLICY? 2. WHAT IS THE POPULAR IMPRESSION OF BAZARGAN? HOW IS HE REGARDED BY VARIOUS KEY GROUPS? DOES HE HAVE ANY RIVALS? 3. WE DO NOT HAVE A VERY GOOD FIX ON TALEGHANI, HIS ENTOURAGE AND LINKS TO OTHERS IN THE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ESTABLISHMENTS. 4. WE NEED SOME FAIRLY SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE DEPITION OF TRENDS, INCLUDING A DESIGNATION OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AREAS TO WATCH AND PERIODIC REPORTING. SEVERAL CATEGORIES WERE MENTIONED IN OUR EARLIER CABLE. 5. HOW IS THE US PERCEIVED? WHAT ACTIONS OR INACTIONS SINCE MID-FEBRUARY HAVE HELPED OR HURT US? WHAT COULD WE DO BETTER? 6. REPORTS OF MILITARY CONVERSATIONS ARE MOST HELPFUL. FROM TIME TO TIME IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SUMMARIZE, DEPIC-TING TRENDS, FOR EACH OF THE SERVICES. POLICE AND GENDARMERIE INFO ALSO VALUABLE. 7. WE APPRECIATE EXTREMELY VALUABLE ECON REPORTING. WE COULD USE (AS PART OF NO. 4 ABOVE) REGULAR COVERAGE OF MARKET BASKET PRICES AND SHORTAGES, EMPLOYMENT, GRIPES. HOW ARE THE UNEMPLOYED MAKING ENDS MEET?

( \Delta y\lambda ) B. WHAT ARE THE ACTIVITIES, STRENGTHS, PLANS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (MATIN-DAFIARY), NATIONAL FRONT (SANJABI), LEFT GUERRILLAS (FADEYEEN), VARIOUS NUJAHEDIH GROUPS, PRO-SHAH ILEDEFIEH 9. HOW PARK THE PROVINCES. PARTICULARLY HARVESTS. FOOD AVAILABILITY 10. WHAT IS STATUS OF EFFORTS TO CLOSE DOWN, SELL OFF OR SHIP OUT MILITARY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT II. WHAT CAN YOU GATHER OF PERCEPTIONS OF KEY EMBASSIES? WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS UP TO? 12. WHAT IS THE SITUATION WITH THE UNIVERSITIES. MIR. OTHER MEDIA 13. STATUS OF PLANNING FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS: 14. WHAT HAVEPGOI/KHOMRNIDONEONAMENSTYFORMILITARY. 1%, AND, IN BETWEEN, DON'I FORGET TO PLAN THE FOURTH OF ULY PARTY. VANCE

(△YY) EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OFFICIAL-INFORMAL CONFIDENTIAL September 2, 1979 L. Paul Bremer III, Esquire Deputy Executive Secretary Department of State Washington, D.C. Dear Jerry: I have been very busy lately and I'm a bit behind on my correspondence. You've been having your hands full moving into a new job, too, I suppose. I hope Francis and the kids are settling in all right. Sharon, I gather from her letters, is beginning to pace a bit in Michigan; if she can't come out here fairly soon, she will move to Washington when school is out next year. Don't say it: you told me so. Things are quite exciting in Tehran. Not surprisingly. I am spending about 85% of my time helping American businessmen distinguish between revolutionary rhetorical form and back-to-business substance. The Khomeini crowd really seem to want to get people back to work and they are willing to take the necessary steps (and make the necessary compromises in revolutionary terms) to do it if Americans will modify contracts to reflect the changes wrought by the revolution. I've had some successes, and my problem most often is to convince some of the American players that if they come out here to talk, they won't go up against a wall. This brings me to goings on in Iran politically. Frankly, I disagree with our position that there is dual government, i.e., Bazargan and Khomeini. I suspect the dual government analytical construct is popular because it implies we can influence at least part of the policy machinery; to contend that Khomeini is the only real source of power means we then have to explain how it is we can protect our interests here by only indirect communication through a third party obviously not in aathy with us on many questions (and itself not all tra plugged in to the people that matter). CONFIDENTIALGDS 9/2/85

(AYF)) CONFIDENTIAL It seems to me that if there ever was a dual government, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly because the source of power. I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on the Kurds, attacks on the left, public contempt for the critical intelligentsia, and apparently temporary restrictions on the press in recent weeks, rather than as a panic action to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of convenience who would seize the movement for their own ends. I think there is a question of timing here, too. Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional assembly completing the constitution he wants for the Islamic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the revolution will in effect be declared a success and the new permanent government will be launched. It seems to me Khomeini couldn't give it a better christening present than an opposition that has been disarmed and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement for order and submission to the government made transparently clear. Besides, at this point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the streets on a few hours notice; his revolutionary guards will throw themselves joyously on any group, defenseless or not. In six months or a year, the inevitably disenchantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom--from strength and when it is ready to do so than to appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line. What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to contain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability fairly soon and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people back to work to ensure a decent-and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, CONFIDENTIAL

our interest in continued access to Iran's oil should be safeguarded by the new government's ability to maintain order in the oil fields and need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs through either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a force we will have to reckon with. Incidentally, Jerry, I wish I could say I have good contacts with the important Mullahs who confirm all this. Obviously, I don't. I do have contacts with some of Khomeini's emissaries to the business world, a half dozen, half shaved, but fairly sane, young "new men" and a couple of greasy old "new men" who make good sense. Still, it's mostly conjecture. I've got one other officer besides myself in what is supposed to be a four-man section. I particularly need a good economic analyst. A guy on the Iranian desk, Mark Johnson, is "thinking" about volunteering; he has been for two months. Any chance of an appropriately senior officer calling him in and giving him a push? Sorry about how long this has become. All the best. Sincerely, AndrewD.Sens CONFIDENTIAL

(AYP) E.I.'BASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONFIDENTIAL September 4, 1979 NOTE FOR POL - Mr. Limbert FROM: ECON - A. D. Sens The implications as I read them—of your recent cable on the political structure here correctly seem to be right on the mark. I think you should have gone further to say what the implications are of the demise of the "dual government" construct for US interests. I've suggested that I give you my thoughts in case they might be useful for a follow-up cable at some point. Here goes: It seems to me that if there ever was a dual government, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly became the source of power. I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on the Kurds, attacks on the left, public contempt for the critical intelligentsia, and apparently temporary restrictions on the press in recent weeks, rather than as a panicky reaction to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of convenience who would seize the movement for their own ends. I think there is a question of timing here, too. Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional assembly completing the constitution he wants for the Isalmic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the revolution will in effect be declared a success and the new permanent government will be launched. It seems to me Khomeini couldn't give it a better christening present (pun intended) than an opposition that has been disarmed and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement for order made transparently clear. Besides, at this point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the streets on a few hours notice; his revolutionary guards will throw themselves joyously on any group, defenseless or not. In six months or a year, the inevitable disenchantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics

(∆vr) CONFIDENTIAL will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom--from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line. What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to contain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people back to work to ensure a decent-and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, our interest in continued access to Iran's oil should be safeguarded by the new government's ability to maintain order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs through either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force we will have to reckon with. cc: CHG:Tomseth C ^{1} DENTIAL

(∆YY) CONFIDENTIAL 15 AUQSHR 45930/01 15c ** ZNY CCCCC 22H P 2713122 JUN 79 TM ANYEASSY TEHRAN 10 RUTHC/SECSTATE WASEDO PRIORITY 1002 INFO FUQMRI/AMEMBASSY ABU DRABI 3113 RUFEAD/CSINT BAGHDAD 0129 74ERAN 5330 RUGNOI/AMEMBASSY DORA 0102 GUSAQT/AMEMBASSY ISLAM MABAD 2149 ALOMRA/AMEM PASS JIDDA 0143 EUSELY/AMEMBASSY (AEUL 0159 Qus APPRV: CH7:APPRV: CWNAAS TRTD: POL:DCMC3APPLY CH [?] GE: STATE 5/7/99 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2156 CLEAR: POL:VLTOMSETH CONFI,DENTITALTEERAN35930 E.O. 12265: 3DS 6/7/85 (MCGAFFEY, DAVID C.) OR-P TAGS: PINT, IR SUBJ: KHOMEINI EXCLUDES SECULARS FROM HIS REVOLUTION REP: TEHRAN 5785 CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL DISTR: POL RF 1. (C — ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE) 2. SUMMARY: IN SPEECH ON JUNE 5, COMMEMORATING 16TH ANNIVERSARY OF ABORTIVE UPRISING WHICH, FOR KHOMEINI, WAS START OF REVOLUTION, KHOMEINI CONDEMNED AS DEVITATIONISTS ANYONE OUTSIDE HIS BRAND OF REACTIONARY ISLAM, GIVING OUTSIDERS' CHOICE OF TOTAL CAPITULATION OR DESTRUCTION. END SUMMARY. 3. SINGH THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION IN FEB 1979, AUTHORITIES IN IRAN HAVE FEEN ANXIOUS TO DISCOUNT ITS LARGELY SPONTANEOUS NATURE. SERVING ITS ORIGINS IN (AND CLAIMING ITS CONTINUITY FROM) HISTORICAL EVENTS. MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE POGI, AND MOST SECULAR POLITICAL GROUPS. THREE ITS BEGINNINGS TO 1853 AND THE MOSSADEGH PERIOD. THE EXTREME-LEFT PLAYER-I-HALQ TRACE IT BACK MERELY TO THEIR ORGANIZATIONS FOUNDING IN THE LATE '60S. IN PROCLAIPIING THE FIFTEENTH MORTAD (JUNE 5) A DAY OF NATIONAL MEERNING, AND SPECIFICALLY IN HIS SPEECH ON THAT DAY, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI NOT ONLY CLAIMS JUNE 5, 1963, AS THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION, BUT EXPLICITLY EXCLUDES THESE OTHER GROUPS FROM PARTICIPATION IN "HIS" REVOLUTION. 4. JUNT 5, 1963 MARKED AN ABSORPTIVE UPRISING OF A COAL- TION OF BAZAARIS, ELEMENTS BACKED BY LAND HOLDING IN- TERESTS, AND PIOUS MUSLIMS, LED BY THE CLERGY INCLUDING HOMSINI, PROTESTING THE SHARE'S WHITE REVOLUTION" WHICH HAD BEEN PROCLAIMED THE PREVIOUS JANUARY AND INCLUDED LAND REFORM AND RATIFICATION OF A LAW WHICH PROVIDED FOR CONFIDENTIAL 700

G O W i F I D E N T I A L T H E R A N 03030/2 INADEQUATE---THESE PEOPLE SHOULD SEPARATE THEIR IN RANKS FROM THAT OF THE NATION. MY BROTHERS WHAT YOU ARE SEEING LIES IN ISLAM. I ADVISE YOU NOT TO SEPARATE YOUR PATH FROM THE CLERGY. IF THIS POWER IS LOST YOU WILL TURN INTO NOTHING OR GOD BEAR WITNESS THAT I AM NOT SUPPORTING THE CLERGY JUST BECAUSE I AM A MAN OF THE CLOTH... IT IS THIS ...THAT THE PEOPLE WANT. END EXERPTS. 7. SOME OBSERVERS POINT OUT THAT HIS EXPLICIT THREAT OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS IS NOTHING MORE THAN A RESPONSE TO THE IMPLICIT THREAT OF CIVIL WAR RAISED BY THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT IN THEIR LETTER TO KHOMEINI, AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. OTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE FEARFUL. THEY STATE THAT KHOMEINI WAS DEFINED THE "ELECT" IN SUCH SPECIFICATIONS THAT THE SECULAR PARTIES NOW HAVE NO CHOICE OTHER THAN EITHER TOTAL SUBMISSION (AND ABANDONMENT OF THEIR PRINCIPLES) OR OPEN-OPPOSITION. THERE ARE STILL MANY WHO TREAT KHOMEINI'S STATEMENTS AS THE WORD OF GOD, AND THOSE MAY TATE THE SPEECH AS PERMISSION FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST ANY WHO OPPOSE (HOMFINI. e. COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT KHOMEINI WAS SERIOUS IN CALLING FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF DEVIATIONISTS, THIS SPEECH IS CLEARLY AN ESCALATION IN THE SPLIT BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND HIS CRITICS. THE ONE GROUP KHOMEINI DID NOT ATTACK, WAS THE OTHER AYATOLLAHS WHO HAVE CRITICIZED HIM. THEIR COMBINATION OR COOPERATION WITH THE SECULARISTS COULD BLUNT THIS ATTACK, BUT HE MAY BE HOPING TO ISOLATE THE SECULAR GROUPS BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY GOING OF FORCES. THE POSSIBILITY OF A VIOLENT CON-FRONTATION HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THIS SPEECH, BUT SOME�INI CLEARLY HAS THE POWER TO WIN AGAINST ANY SINGLE SECULAR OPPOSITION GROUP. THIS MAY THEN ACT AS AN IMPETUS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS, AND BETWEEN THEM AND KHOMEINI'S RE-LIGIOUS CRITICS. NAAS [?] C C N F I D T T A T T E F T A N 75930/2 NAN

(ΔΥο) CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5333 FEMALE SUFFRAGE. A RIOT WHICH FOLLOWED KHOMEINI'S SPEECH WAS PUT DOWN BRUTALLY AND KHOMEINI WAS ARRESTED. SUBSEQUENT ACTION BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS PREVENTED HIS TRIAL AND (PROBABLE) EXECUTION. THE "MARTYRS" OF THAT RIOT WERE PRIMARILY LOWER-CLASS CONSERVATIVE BAZAARIS AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS. 5. KHOMEINI HAS RECENTLY BEEN RECEIVING INCREASING CRITICISM AND OPPOSITION. HIS DENIGRATION OF EX-PREMIER MOSSADEGH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY MOST SECULAR PARTIES AND POLITICIANS, INCLUDING PREMIER BAZARGAN. THE FORGHAN GROUP OF TERRORISTS HAVE PUBLICIZED THE IDEA OF "ISLAM WITHOUT CLERGY." THE BAR ASSOCIATION HEAD HAD DECLARED THAT ISLAMIC LAWS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE 20TH CENTURY. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT HAS DENOUNCED KHOMEINI AS A DICTATOR. AYATOLLAHS TALEGHANI AND SHARIATMADARI HAVE SPOKEN OUT AGAINST KHOMEINI'S CANDIDACY FOR THE PRESIDENCY, AND AGAINST HIS PLAN FOR A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT AN ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. HE RESPONDED TO ALL THESE CRITICS IN A SPEECH TO FARMERS AND THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS IN QOM ON JUNE 5. 6. BEGIN EXCERPTS. WHO CREATED THE JUNE 5 INCIDENT, WHO FOLLOWED IT UP...AND WHO IS TO BE RELIED ON FROM NOW ON? ...IT WAS THE LOWER CLASSES...THE FARMERS...THE WORKERS...THE MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN OF THE BAZAARS. IT IS THIS CLASS OF PEOPLE THAT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE A SAY IN RUNNING THE COUNTRY. OTHER HAVE NO RIGHT....THOSE WHO IMAGINE ANYTHING OTHER THAN ISLAM BROUGHT DOWN THE PREVIOUS REGIME, THOSE WHO CLAIM NON-MUSLIMS CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE SHAH'S REGIME...YOU WILL NOT FIND ANY. THOSE WHO OPPOSE US...SHOULD BE PUT STRAIGHT BY GUIDANCE IF POSSIBLE...OTHERWISE THE SAME PEOPLE WHO DESTROYED THE REGIME WILL DESTROY THOSE ASSOCIATED, NOT-EXCLUSIVELY-ISLAMIC ELEMENTS. O YE WHO SUFFER FROM WESTERNIZATION...YOU, OUR JURISTS, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, DO NOT FOLLOW THESE OTHER (WESTERN) JURISTS ...THESE CLASSES WHO BROUGHT ABOUT THE REVOLUTION ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS....THOSE WHO HAVE DEVIA-TIONIST VIEWS, THOSE WHO REGARD 1400-YR OLD ISLAM AS BY #5930 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5930 4

(△F1) (04211547134 74RAN 7425/01 DE OLDER 4425/01 107 ** 2N1 COCCC E2H CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL 0.1712537 ATR 79 HUGE: STATE FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS TO SECSTATE WASHEO IMMEDIATE 1927 TRFFD: POL:JDSTEMPEL BT CLEAR: ECON: TAYLOR CONSIDER N TIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 24225 ICA: ROSEN DISTR: POL (3) ECON OF E.D. 19 AER: RLS-4 4/17/29 (STEMPEL; J.D.) OK-P TAGS: PINT, PGDY, PINS, SCUL, IR SUNG: ATMOSPHERICS: THE REVOLUTION AFTER TWO MONTHS FEB: 23THAN 3971 2. SUMMARY: ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'S POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE REYORMANCE HAS BEEN MIXED TO DATE. PARALLEL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES CONTINUED TO CAUSE PEACELEMS AND GENERATE CON- POLICTS. PALESTINIAN ROLE IN REVOLUTION MAT GROW. PUBLIC FRACTION TO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IS MIXED AND NO UNZING GROUNDSWELL HAS YET EMERGED. ECONOMIC PER- INFORMATION WILL EXACERBATE BOTH RESISTING AND FUTURE POLITICAL ISOLAYES. END SUMMARY. 2. DRAWING ON SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS AND SEVERAL VISITS TO FRIENDS IN SOUTH AND RASTEEN TEHRAN, ACTING POL CHIEF OSPERS FOLLOWING ATMOSPHERICS ON UNFOLDING OF ISLAMIC EVOLUTION OVER FAST TWO MONTHS. 4. ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT FAS CONTIUSED TO DETERIORATE, EVEN WITH A GENEROUS ALLOWANCE FOR REVOLUTIONARY DIFFICULTIES. MANY ARE SURPRISED THAT ANYTHING IS CLITTING DONE, GIVEN PROBLEMS OF KHOMEINI COMMITTEE INTSEVENIONS IN DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITY OF GOVERNMENT. THOUSHEMOST EVIDENT IN SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHERE COMMITTEE FORCES OFTEN ARREST, TRY AND SHOOT PROFILE WITHOUT POOL'S KNOWLEDGE, DUAL STRUCTURE IS ALSO BOTHER-SOME IN OTHER ARRAS AS WELL. OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS ARE UNWILLING TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO PREPARE DOCUMENTS UNLESS SUPPLICANT HAS SOME KINDS OF COMMITTEE CLEARANCE. SITUATIONS, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO IMPROVE SOMEWHAT HAVE NOT YET DONE SO. DIRECT RE-CONFESS FOR BRIEFS HAVE TAPERED OFF SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT THOSE WHO HAVE HAD OCCASION TO SEXT GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTATION FOR SALE OF LANDS, BUILDING APPROVAL, ETC. PEEL IT STAN INGENUITY IS SWIFTLY FINDING NEW WAYS AROUND IS LEMIC MORALITY. DONATIONS TO ONE'S FAVORITE MOSQUE SEN TO BE THE MOST FAVORED CURRENT PLOY. IN ECONOMIC SLETOR, DECISION-MAYING IS STILL CONFUSED (SEE REVTEI) NOT HAS PROGRESSED FROM DEADLOCK POSED BY IMMEDIATE FOR REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD WHERE BANGING HAD COME TO A STANDSTILL. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IS SPOTTY-SHIRAZ ABPORTS NEARLY ALL PLANTS OPERATING; TABRIZ REPORTS NONE. COMMITTEE CONFIDENCE IS DOWN, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IS THE SYSTEMS THAT STALKS ISLAMIC POLITICS. 5. PURELY POLITICAL SPHERE, REFERENDUM WAS TRIUMPH OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE AND WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS SUCH. EVEN BY RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, TERRA#4825/

(△FA)) WHO, NOEALLY ADMINISTERS-ELECTIONS, WAS ALMOST WHOLLY ON ELECTRINS. MINISTRY OFFICIALS INDICATE THE KHOMEINI LONGITTINE AT INTELLOR BAN ENTIRE ELECTORAL PROCESS TETTALLY ALONE. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN COUNTRY WERE BARAZAN, STORECI OF BALLOT WAS RESENT, AND VOTE PLANT WAS VIDILY REGARDED AS A JOKE AT ALL LEVELS OF BLOOD, IN ORAL VAT. ALL THIS HAS BEEN BENEFICIAL-JOLAN ORIGINATED ON BALORID NOEALINE AND SOME EXCESSIVE EXPECT- CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY. FROM UNDER TO ASSENT ITSELF MORE FIPLY, AT LEAST IN THE INDIVIDUAL INDIVIDUAL AND PROVISION OF SERVICES. . MUR� SYSTEMIC CAUSE OF CONTINUED ADMINISTRATIVE ALTO OF THE BANNER IS INCONSIGNIATION OF PARALLEL SITE OF THE CIVIL-THE-HAZARA ADMINISTRATION ON THE CHANG AND THE WHOLE IN COMMITTEES ON THE OTHER. THE APPROACHING PRE COMMITTEES HAVE CONTINUED IN GENERAL INTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE INVESTMENT IMPACT ON THE POOL'S ABILITY OF THE FORMING MINISTERS SANJAPI'S FOUGHT REGIONATIONS OF JUSTICE AND EVEN OF BAZARGAN HIMSELF ARE MANI- AND UNION PERFORMANCE BY VARIOUS SHOPPING SENFUL UNDER PEELIC CRITICISM. THE COMMITTEE COMMITTEES LAST WEEK GOT INTO WITH MINISTER LAI JAVADI SADR WHEN BE AND THE LEVEL AERIDENTMENTS WITH GROUP. THE ORDURANT MINISTRY STAFF TO GO ON THE FORTH CARE TO WORK, ACCORDING TO JUNIAE, THE SITUATION IS REAUTLY WITH THE CONDITION HAVE NOT GOTTEN THAT BAD IN THE UNIDENTIFIED CONSERVE HAVE BEEN SIC- THE COMMITTEE AND GOVERNMENT LEAD THE OPEN MINISTRIES--L. TSIRAN 04225/01

C-N Y I D E N T I A L S X C T I O N 93 OF 27 MONTHS, BROKE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT KHOMZI V NJOTS AS CRACKS APPEAR IN THE ISLAMIC PICTURE OF PARADISE COUSHT. 18. MIXED REACTION TO REVOLUTION BECOMES POSITIVELY SCHIZOPHRENIC WHEN QUESTION OF REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIONS COMES UP. THOSE BELOW BE ARE CONVINCED OF JUSTICE OF KILLING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF SHARE'S SUPPORTERS. THEIR PARENTS AND ELDERS ARE HORRIFIED. EVEN MANY OF THOSE WHO HAVE NOT AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY FORM OF MONAISCRIVAL RESTORATION. AT LEAST TWO EMPORES HAVE THEN RISING AT "GENERATION GAP" DISCUSSIONS WHEN COMMITTEE YOUTH (COT INTO VIRTUAL SHOUTING MATCHES WITH PARENTS OVER QUESTION OF JUSTICE OF REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIONS. TEHRAN OVER PAST SEVEN DAYS WAS SEEN ADDITIONAL PHOENOMINA—GANGS OF YOUTH'S WHOSE PARENTS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED BANDING TOGETHER TO EXACT REVENGE ON REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. NUMBER OF SY�WITNESSES HAVE SEEN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS KILLED. PERSIAN WHO RUNS SMALL SHOPS AT SEVERAL SOUTH TEHRAN LOCATIONS JAYS UNPUBLICIZED NIGHT KILLINGS DID IN AN AVERAGE OF 36 REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS A NIGHT IN PERIOD APRIL 19-14 IN AREAS NEAR HIS STORES. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS ARE NOT GOOD, BUT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ARE WORSE—SLOOM IS OFF REVOLUTION FOR MANY IN SOUTH TEHRAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE BEING "VOLUNTEERED" FOR GUARD DUTY BY LOCAL COMMITTERS WHO ARE CONDUCTING HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES. THOUGH THIS SITUATION IS MANAGABLE IN THE SHORT-RUN, IF IT BECOMES WORSE, REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL COULD DEGENERATE EVEN FURTHER INTO INTRA-MOVEMENT DOGYIGHTING. 11. NUMBER OF PERSIAN OBSERVERS BELIEVE REACTION TO KILLINGS AS FORMER ELITE COMES OUT OF ITS SHOCK AND STARTS TO FIGHT BACK, HOWEVER FIEBLLY WILL EVENTUALLY COUPLE WITH DISILLUSION OVER ECONOMIC PROSPECTS TO PRO- MOTE REAL TROUBLE FOR PGOI AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ITSELF. THERE IS ALSO A PAINLY DISCERNABLE ANTI-PALESTINIAN BACKLASH, STEMMING FROM FAIRLY WILD PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT THEY MAY BE COMING TO FILL VOIDS LEFT BY DEPARTING WESTERNS. REVOLUTION PROMISED A LOT AND BOOSTED EX-PECTATIONS. PERSIANS ARE MASTERS OF THE WHAT-HAVE-TO-DO-FOR-MS LATELY SCHOOL OF POLITICS, AND THERE PRE-SENTLY EXIST ELEMENTS IN THE HURLY-BURLY OF CONTEMPORARY IRANIAN POLITICS WHO WILL ACTIVELY EXPLOIT DIVISIONS WITHIN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND BETWEEN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND PGOI. THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO REAL UNIFICATION OF OTHER IDEOLOGICAL THEM OR ADMINISTRATION, AND MANI ARE POSITIONING THEMSELVES TO EXPLOIT THE BREACH. ONLY THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL WEAKNESS HAS PREVENTED A SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE TO DATE. IN THIS CONNECTION, DIFFERITION OF TALEGHANI FROM THOMBINI CAMP, AND QUICK- NEED OF FEDAYEEN TO BALLY TO HIS SUPPORT ARE TROUBLING, DEMONSTRATIONS BEGINNING APRIL 15 AND MARCH OF CHANTING STUDENTS AROUND TEHRAN OVER PAST THREE DAYS ARE VERY REMINISCENT OF THE NOVEMBER-JANUARY PERIOD JUST PASS. CONFIDENTIAL PERPAN 04025103

(OFF) CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 24325/ THE DEJA VU IS SOBXRING. NAAS BT #4025 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 24325/

CONFIDENTIAL SPECTR: 72.77 71.15 74.77 OSTENSIBLY OF THE SAME ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS BEEN TO ANAKEN HOPZ IN THOSE OF ALL CLAIMS AND ARE CHANGALLY BE- GINNING TO REJECT MUCH OF WHAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AS STANDING FOR. INSTEAD OF MOVING TOWARD MIGHT AND COMPROMISE, EHOMELINI AND HIS COMMITTEES HAVE STAINED REVOLUTIONARY PURISTS. PESSECIALLY OF STALING GILLS TO THE FENTONIS OF OLD REGIME AND ON IMPOSITION OF ISLAMIC UNITS ON SOCIETY. FEDAYEEN AND MARXISTS PARTS SAFETY AT A CRUITING FIELD DAY. WHILE THEN REMAIN WHAT ISLAMIC TO MOSQUE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMICS, THEN A LIG. STONG ORGANIZATIONAL EXPORT IN SOUTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIELDS. THEIR LITERATURE IS KIDFLY AVAILABLE THROGPROFT CITY AND NOTABLE NEW POSTER FAIL CIT. SUCTUAL. BEUPPING OFFICER SPOKS WITH TWO IRANIANS, ONE AND ONE POTENT. AND HAVE BEEN ATTENDING FEDAYEEN-RUN POLITICAL CLASSICS PAST TWO WEEKS. AT FATHER LARGO DINNER OF ISLAMIC PROFESSIONALS PRESENT, ONLY TWO MAINTAINED THEY WOULD SIDE WITH ISLAMIC MOTIVENT AGAINST MARGINS IN SHOODON. THIS IS INDICATIVE. NOT DEFINITIONS WENT IS GROOL? SOME IS THAT MODERNISTS IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ARE THE D-WELSIVE, AND FEDAYEEN AND OTHER MARXISTS HAVE A SOCIETY BRANDSTART ON BUILDING UP A VERY CREDIBLE BASE AMONG IRAN'S FUTURE MOVERS AND SHAKERS WHICH THEY DID NOT HAVE A MONTH AGO. SEVERAL PERSIAN ACADEMICS ARE CONVINCED FEDAYEEN HAVE ALSO MOVED DISCREPPLY TO FORGE USABLE ALLIANCES WITH IMPORTANT TRIAL GROUPS (A VIVI DEPUTY PH YAZDI SHARES). B. UNEXPECTED WINDS FOR RECOGNIZED OFFICER PRODUCED CHANCE TO HEAR JABER. SQUARE MUJARIDIN CENTRAL COMMITTEE-MAN EXPOUND ON MUJARIDDIN PLANS FOR NEXT SEA MONTHS. REPORTING OFFICER WAS VISITING HOME OF SOLD THIRD VAP JALEH SQUARE EVENING APRIL 13 WEEN POUR JESTE ARRIVED, EMPOFF WAS INTRODUCED AS SOMEONE WHO TAUGHT WITH HOST. AND GROUP REMAINED UNAWARD OF EMS CONNECTION. ASSIMALLY IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO TALI POLITICS, AS MOST GROUPS DO IN IRAN THESE DAYS—VITALITY OF PERSIAN DISCOURSIVE LIFE IS SHOWN BY POPULAR APHORISM WHICH SAYS ANY FIVE IRANIANS WHO MEET WILL IMMEDIATELY PRODUCE SEVEN POLITICAL POSITIONS. MUJARIDDIN COMMITTEEMAN DESCRIBED EXPENSIVE PALESTINIAN POLE IN PREPARATION FOR REVOLUTION AND WEEN QUESTIONED BY OTHERS. INDICATED PLO WAS STILL PROVIDING EXTENSIVE SUPPORT IN MILITAUE AREA FOR BOTH MUJARIDDIN AND FEDAYEEN, PLUS SOME ADMINISTRATIVE HELP FOR KHOMEINI MOVEMENT. COMMITTEEMAN LAUGHED WITH IRANIAN PROFESSOR ASKED HIM WHAT HE CHOTIT OF PIOL SPOKESMAN ENTEZAM'S STATEMENT THAT THE ROOL WOULD LIVE NO MILITARY HELP TO FLO, AND SAID THIS WAS "NONSENSE FOR WESTERN CONSUMPTION; IRAN WILL HELP THE PIOL KEYN IT IS THE TO HELP. COMMITTEEMAN DEFY PICTURE OF ISLAMIC MOUNT BUILDING ITS ORGANIZATION IN PILO HELP, AND PARTIED ROY PICTURE TO AS COMMITTEE WEGAN TO COMMIT A REITT TO ISLAMAS COMMITTEE-MAN'S ISL.

BY PGOI LEARNING TO FOLLOW COMMITTEE INSTRUCTIONS BETTER. ONE INTERLOCUTOR ASKED WHAT MATH MAINED IN SO SUBI PLO GROUP WOULD NOT SECRETLY STRENGTHEN THEIR FEDAYEEN FRIENDS AT EXPENSE OF MUJAHIDDIN. COMMITTEEMAN EXUDED CONFIDENCE ON THIS POINT, BUT WAS THIN ON SPECIFICS. TWO OTHERS PRESENT THOUGHT PLO AND FEDAYEEN HAD MORE IN COMMON THAN PLO AND MUJAHIDDIN, BUT GROUP AGREED TO DISAGREE. (COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCES WHO EVEN BEEN ATTENDING FEDAYEEN TRAINING SESSIONS. PLO BANNERS AND SLOGANS ARE PRESENT IN FORCE AT FEDAYEEN READ-QUARTERS, AND FEDAYEEN MILITARY TRAINING IS GIVEN EVERY WEEK DAY BY INSTRUCTORS WHO WERE TRAINED IN LEBANON. TRAINING IS PROVIDED ON ALL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. MACHINE GUNS AND MORTARS. 9. GENERAL PUBLIC REACTION TO REVOLUTION IS MIXED BUT GENERALLY ACCEPTING. MANY OUTSIDE CITIES ARE NOT AFFECTED AT ALL. LOWER AND LOWER MIDDLE CLASSES IN EAST TEHRAN SHOULD SLOONS OF REVOLUTION, BUT SEX LITTLE CHANGES IN LIFE. MIDDLE CLASSES PEAN ISLAMIC JUSTICE, BUT IT DOES NOT AFFECT MANY ON THE LOW END OF THE SCALE. SHORTAGES HAVE PREVAILED FOR SO LONG THAT THEY ARE RE-GADED AT MING IN NO AVAILABLE. SIPE IS MARGINALLY RESTER THAN IT WAS LAST WINTER, AND WILL REVOLUTION GETS GRSDIT FOR SOME IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC SITUATION FOR LOWER CLASS GROUPS, CONNING OF SPRING CETS MORE. POLITICALLY, ORDINARY PROBLEMATIC AND THEIR AND ARE READY TO COLOUE BUSINESS OF LIFES, WHICH NOT NEVER HAVE SEEN APPL TO RETAINING CHANGING OF UNIFYING THEME. BYAN A FEW TIGER-SOR IS THE BEST ONE OF THE MASTERS UPTODAY ARE LEGAL SECOND THOUGHTS A CUTT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. TOURMENT OF POLITICAL CLIMATOLOGY FOR THE WINDS IS PARLIARY TO RESTORE THE AUTHORITY TO THE ISLAMS TO BE IN COMMON NO ON THE POLLY IN A CUTT TO THE CET AND MEDIUM TERM. THERE IS NO MAY, NOTHING BY [?]

SECRET STATE CHG:CWNAAS SECRET PAO:JSHELLENBERGER, POL:JDSTEMPEL PAO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS FROM CHARGE E.0. 12065: GDS 5/2/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M TAGS: PFOR, IR SUBJ: VOA INTERVIEW 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING MESSAGE) 2. IN ALL MY RECENT CALLS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE HIT ME HARD WITH COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE CRITICAL MANNER IN WHICH THE WESTERN MEDIA, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., IS TREATING THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THE FOLKS CURRENTLY IN THE SADDLE, NO LESS THAN THEIR PREDECESSOR, ARE PRETTY THIN SKINNED AND PRONE TO SEE A CONSPIRACY. --USG, ZIONIST, OR OTHERWISE. ALSO, I HAVE BEEN RE-MINDED OF OUR DAILY STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR IN JANUARY AND OUR OFFICIAL SILENCE (WHICH I HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED) ON THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LAST MANY WEEKS. THERE IS NO CURE, OF COURSE, FOR PERSIAN PARANOIA, BUT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER SOME EFFORT TO PRESENT A MORE POSITIVE U.S. VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT. 3. OUR PAO TOLD ME THAT, WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON IN LATE MARCH, VOA WAS TO APPROACH YOU RE AN INTERVIEW ON IRAN. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN EXCELLENT FORUM AND I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE ON THE TASK SOON. YOU ARE AN OLD HAND AT THIS AND CAN PLAY THE THEMES OF NORMALIZATION, HISTORICAL TIES, PARALLEL INTERESTS, THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE, ETC. WITHOUT TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE OF THE GOVERNMENT, EITHER TO ITS DISADVANTAGE OR OUR OWN. NAAS##

(△FF) InternationalCommunicationAgency CONFIDENTIAL United States of AmericaWashington, D.C. 20547 September 26, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: State/NEA - Mr. Harold H. Saunders FROM: ICA/NEA - R. T. Curran SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Communication Between United States and Iran October 1979 - February 1980 Based on discussions in your office on September 7, ICA agrees that some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for communication between the United States and Iran in the public diplomacy area is in order in the next four or five months. As a guiding practice, we will try to encourage institutional linkages, a concept of communication endorsed on September 7. These linkages will stress the two-way flow of relations. At this time it must be recognized that their development depends on creating an atmosphere of trust and respect. In initial stages, friendly and understanding one-on-one personally developed ties are essential. Through such personal rapport can be built carefully determined institutional linkages which, in turn, can nurture further mutual relationships. Likely fields for initiating or reestablishing contact include Iranology, the humanities, physical sciences, English teaching, and physical education. Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest fashion with currently limited, one-way — Iranians to the United States — programs, is the work of the Fulbright Commission. The United States should maintain its financial support of these operations as a well-established and core institutional link between private and public CONFIDENTIAL Classified by 1.6 Subject to General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 12065. Automatically Downgraded at Two Year Intervals and Declassified on September 26, 1985.

(ΔF1) CONFIDENTIAL educators and institutions in both countries. Similarly, judiciously planned activities of the American Institute for Iranian Studies should be fostered. Within this general approach and responding to the recommendations of the Charge' and our Public Affairs Officer, we will examine the following venues for some restrained initiatives which may be considered if Iranian authorities make it clear that our interest in enhanced relationships is reciprocated: 1. Propose visits to Iran by carefully selected scholars and public figures. Whenever possible, the visits will be privately arranged. Individuals should have credibility and relevance to present-day Iran. 2. Encourage invitations to Iranian Islamic scholars and, possibly, Iranian religious figures to the Hejira anniversary celebrations in the United States. Events during the visit should also include similar representatives from other Islamic societies to stress the multi-national nature of the observances. Sponsorship should be privately arranged with the Hejira Anniversary Committee playing a major role. 3. Discuss with private entities, such as the Johnson Foundation or university-based seminars including the East-West Center, bringing groups of Iranian scholars to the United States to consider non-controversial topics. Preferably the meetings should be multi-national. Possible fields are literature, creative writing or, more pragmatically, library development and library science. 4. Work with a few carefully selected foreign student advisers and admissions officers at universities sophisticated in handling Islamic and Iranian students a) to assess during this period of change in Iran evolving needs and attitudes of Iranian students so as b) to look toward plans for a possible student conference or other type dialogue in the United States at some future propitious date.

CONFIDENTIAL 5. Explore with American educational institutions which take part in linkages or support other educational exchange operations in Islamic third-countries, such as those of the University of Nebraska at Omaha in Pakistan, possibilities for inviting Iranian students and academics to take part in such seminars or projects which foster intellectual understanding and on-going contact. 6. Consider augmentation of current ICA/IAS English-teaching and cultural institutions provided that administrative claims for past damages and sequestrations are given cognizance by Iranian authorities. 7. Be alert to opportunities to invite Iranians to take part in multi-regional exchange programs, particularly those in mass media. NOTE: The VOA confirms plans to increase broadcast time to Iran in Persian by one hour a day about the turn of the new year. It will add a thirty-minute morning show featuring news and news-related material and an additional thirty minutes to the front end of the current half-hour evening show. The extended evening show will provide greater opportunity for in-depth coverage and cultural material. Considerations cover: events in Iran outside the political sphere, a series on Iranian Islamic studies and Centers in the United States, and interviews with American scholars and Iranologists and appropriate public figures representing a wide spectrum of political and foreign policy viewpoints. DISTRIBUTION: D - The Acting Director ECA - Ms. Alice Ichman MGT - Mr. James Isbister PGM - Mr. Harold Schneidman VOA - Mr. Peter Straus State/NEA - Mr. Peter Constable State/NEA - Mr. Henry Precht

CONFIDENTIAL February 9, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR FROM: NEA - R. T. Curran SUBJECT: Weekly Report: Iran — The Psychological Problem and Some Solutions This report updates you on the situation in Iran and what is being done about it —especially from an ICA perspective. It may be some time before Iran is fully able to resolve its political dilemma and establish a long term, viable government. However the present crisis is resolved, there are serious problems in Iranian perceptions of the United States which are likely to impede U.S.-Iran relations for some time to come. These problems are exacerbated by a pointedly anti-U.S. information flow both into and within Iran. The following outlines the problem and identifies action taken and proposed. The Problem Many Iranians, with their xenophobia showing, are describing U.S. influence as all-pervasive and all-powerful. Long a traditional mode of thought, this perception is now a heated mixture of fact, fantasy, wishful thinking, and dread, depending on who is talking from which perspective at which point in time. What seems especially vivid is the Iranian fear of American intervention. Connected to this fear and certainly stimulated by it is a strain of strident anti-Americanism which, though it might well become more subdued in the long run, is likely to impede relations between our two countries. Anti-Americanism is rooted in 1) our support of the Shah and, by extension, the excesses of his government, 2) our identification with the now negatively perceived sense of westernization and materialism; 3) our image as arms purveyor and super salesman of the "expensive and the unnecessary" combined with a "colonialist"/"imperialist" image stemming from the former presence of thousands of Americans in Iran. The anti-American themes are aided and abetted by the Soviet Union which is using its radio broadcasts and probably its local adherents to fan anti-U.S. flames. CONFIDENTIAL Classified By R. T. Curran Subject to General Declassification. Schedule of Executive Order 12065. Automatically Downgraded at Two Year Intervals and Declassified on February 9, 1985.

CONFIDENTIAL Action Taken and Proposed NEA is participating in Under Secretary Newsom's Working Group. Among the actions being carried out are: A Persian language shortwave service on ICA's Voice of America (VOA) has been authorized and will be inaugurated in mid-March. At Working Group request, Secretary Vance has asked Foreign Secretary David Owen to intervene with BBC to allow VOA to use one hour of medium wave (standard broadcast) to transmit American news and views into Iran from a British transmitter on Masirah Island (off the coast of Oman). The shortwave and standard (if approved) broadcasts will give us an effective medium to deliver into Iran accurate news about U.S. intentions and policy, countering Soviet and clandestine broadcast distortions. ICA and State have begun giving special attention to funding broader intellectual contacts between Iran and the United States to stimulate the flow of accurate information in both directions. We are examining the lessons learned from the Iran debacle and have begun consulting with official (including DOD) and private American organizations to see if remedial measures are needed —especially regarding the size and intrusiveness of the American presence — in other countries of the region. — State and ICA are considering assignments to Iran of American Persian scholars who might establish special relationships with the more conservative religious elements. ICA will emphasize areas with which Iran's new leadership can identify —philosophy, law, comparative religion, sociology, the problems of modernization, the politics of development, labor and agriculture. Emphasis will be on the commonality of our basic values. CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. John Golden Quarry Hill, Incorporated P. O. Box 9392 Arlington, Virginia 22209 Dear John: Thanks for your qualified Christmas greetings and the copy of the article on Iran which you published in the National Defense journal. On this Christmas eve, the only caroling we hear is from a rather scruffy crowd of teenagers marching by the Embassy and chanting "Yankee Go Home." It has been some time since I have had the benefit of your views on the situation here, but I think both of us would agree that it deteriorated more rapidly and to a greater depth than we could have anticipated last year at this time. The worries which you and I used to share were addressed to a somewhat longer time-frame than has proved to be the case. You have doubtless seen the many mutual recriminations abounding in Washington on "who lost Iran." Many of them touch upon the issue of the Embassy's access to dissident groups, particularly in the bazaar and among the religious. In that regard, I once again want to thank you for the assistance you gave to me in assisting our people to broaden their contacts in those two areas. I still, of course, remain frustrated in some measure about our inability to comprehend everything that makes these people tick, but at least in these days we do not lack voluble expressions of their often illogical viewpoints. I hope you will visit us again in the new year and trust it will be a better one than the year just passed as far as Iran is concerned.

With all good wishes, William H. Sullivan Ambassador

(△△△) SECRET could get better terms in Europe and asked for a rate of only 0.375 point over LABOR—a rate rejected by private Japanese banks. (S NF) Late last month, Japanese businessmen countered with a proposal for the establishment of a 10 billion special development fund to promote Chinese trade. The fund, no doubt blessed by Tokyo, would be underwritten by private banks with support from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Japanese Export-Import Bank, and the Japan Long-Term Credit Bank. Loans would be extended at average interest rates of from 6.0 to 6.5 percent. The Japanese are also exploring the possibility of offering Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund credits at rates of between 3.0 and 3.5 percent. The potential here is small, however, because total funding of the OECF is less than 1 billion. (S NF NC) Tokyo's efforts to pave the way for more imports of Chinese oil have been spurred by concern over the Iranian cutoff and the general vulnerability of Middle East supplies. The Japanese reportedly have just reached agreement with Beijing to spend 2 billion on offshore development with repayment in oil if a discovery is made. Japanese oil companies claim they can handle only 200,000 b/d of the wax. Chinese crude without building new capacity. Tokyo has now decided to fund a 100-b/d test facility to process Chinese crude and is preparing to compensate refiners for conversion costs. The government seems determined to buy whatever crude the Chinese have to offer despite industry objections. Before going ahead with any refinery conversion program, however, Tokyo will require firm evidence from Beijing that it can supply the large amounts of crude presently under discussion. (S NF NC) (Secret Noforn-Nocontract) ***** IRAN: EXPOSURE OF FOREIGN SUPPLIERS TO IMPORT CUTBACKS (U) The political crisis in Iran already has curtailed imports and triggered cancellations of some major contracts for future delivery. Even if the new Khomeini-backed regime succeeds in restoring order, imports are unlikely to return to anywhere near the 18 billion annual rate of a few months ago. Foreign exchange constraints as well as new economic priorities point to a much smaller Iranian market for foreign goods. This article surveys the exposure of foreign suppliers to an Iranian import cutback, it does not attempt to estimate the extent of sales losses or the impact on particular industries. (C) Supplier Role of the Developed Countries The developed countries have been by, far the largest supplier providing 55 percent of total imports; the less developed countries contributed roughly 10 percent

¹ NA = Not Available (100)

(ΔΔΓ) SECRET and the Communist countries about 5 percent.* Manufactured goods comprised the lion’s share of imports; foodstuffs accounted for 13 percent and raw materials for 6 percent. The commodity composition differed markedly by exporting group in 1977; only 8 percent of imports from developed countries were foodstuffs, and two-third of these came from the United States. Almost half of LDC sales were foodstuffs. (U). The United States, West Germany, and Japan have held the largest market shares. In 1977-78, the United States supplied 24 percent of Iranian imports from the major developed countries; West Germany, 22 percent; and Japan, 18 percent. Other important developed country suppliers included the United Kingdom (9 percent); Italy (8 percent); and France (5 percent). Manufactures accounted for more than 90 percent of developed country exports to Iran, with capital-intensive products predominating. The key sales items, in order of value, were: industrial and electrical machinery, motor vehicles and parts, iron and steel; chemicals, and aircraft. (U).

Export from the United States to Iran grew from $2.7 billion in 1977 to an

¹ Data include only three quarters. ² Aggregate data for the OECD include only those countries listed in the table. Unclassified * From Iranian data for 1977. Information in subsequent paragraphs comes primarily from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country data on trade with Iran and covers most of 1978. 16 February 1979 SECRET 13

SECERT annual rate of $3.7 billion in the first nine months of 1978, accounting for 2.7 percent of total US exports. Manufactured goods made up about four-fifths of the total and agricultural products most of the rest. The US aircraft industry sold nearly 8 percent of its commercial exports to Iran, the largest share for any US industry. Should Iran cancel orders for commercial aircraft, the impact would be softened by the industry’s strong order backlog and a willingness of other customers to move up their delivery dates. Sales to Iran also accounted for a significant share— about 3 percent—of total US exports of iron and steel and industrial machinery. (U) US military goods deliveries to Iran declined substantially last year because of a fall off in deliveries of aircraft and missiles, which together accounted for about 90 percent of total shipments in 1977. Shipments of ammunition and vehicles, on the other hand, jumped in 1978. Given the phased delivery of big-ticket items such as aircraft, the value of military deliveries varied widely from quarter to quarter. (C) US firms further increased their exposure in Iran in 1977-78 by signing an estimated $4.5 billion in new contracts.* The largest contracts were for military goods United States: Deliveries of Military Goods and Services to Iran¹ Thousand US $

¹ Foreign Military Sales (MFS) deliveries including support equipment. Values for military exports are not comparable with those for total US exports in the other tables because separate reporting systems are used. ² Includes technical services. Confidential Noform * Information on new contracts is incomplete, and value figures should be treated as minimums. Joint contracts are counted in the data for only one of the principal countries. 14 SECRET 16 February 1979

SECRET and services, communications networks, and construction projects. In addition, contracts valued at about 2.7 billion for highway construction were won by joint French-US ventures. (U) Military suppliers have been hardest hit by contract cancellations. Roughly 7 billion in outstanding US military contracts for weapons purchases were canceled by the Bakhtiar government to save foreign exchange and to curb the large military buildup. Major contracts canceled included the F16 fighters, air warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, two Spruance class destroyers, and RF4E reconnaissance aircraft. Sales of missiles and armored vehicles will also be reduced. Iran will initially pay termination and default charges on contracts it cancels from a trust fund Tehran has established with the US Government. If weapons originally ordered by Iran can be sold to other buyers, Iran could receive some repayment. (U) West Germany's exports to Iran of 2.7 billion in 1977 and 2.5 billion in the first three quarters of 1978 represent about 2 percent of its total exports. More than 300 West German companies with a total of 10,000 German employees operated facilities in Iran, ranging from sales offices to major manufacturing plants and construction sites. West German firms reportedly received contracts worth about 700 million in 1977-78, about three-fourths for power projects. (U) Loss of the Iranian market would be particularly troublesome for the depressed steel and nuclear reactor industries. Few companies, however, would lose money on existing contracts because of the widespread use of export and investment insurance financed by the West German Government. Two major companies—Kraftwerk Union and the Krupp conglomerate—could be severely affected by changes in Iranian industrialization policies. Kraftwerk Union, which has a 5 billion contract to build two nuclear power plants at Bushehr, has substantial unused capacity; cancellation of the Bushehr project would push the company further into the red at a time when the world demand for nuclear power plants is low. Recently, construction was halted at the Bushehr site because of material shortages. Krupp may be better able to maintain its position in Iran than other industrial firms because the Iranian Government owns 25 percent of Krupp stock. A new Iranian Government, however, might take a more active part in Krupp's management and try to cut the average annual 175 million profit on Iranian deals. (C) Japan, which sold goods to Iran worth 1.9 billion in 1977 and $2.2 billion in the first nine months of 1978, stopped issuing export bills to Iran last month. No goods destined for Iran have been shipped since then presumably because the Iranians are not paying for them. In 1977 Japanese sales to Iran accounted for 5 percent of Tokyo's global iron and steel exports, 7 percent of its total metal manufactures exports, and 4

(ΔΔο) SECRET OECD: Share of World Commodity Exports Shipped to Iran, 1977 Percent

¹ Total values include data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany. Unclassified percent of its textiles exports. Japan will probably more than make up losses from a cutback in Iranian modernization by switching to China as a major market for Iran and steel exports. (U) In 1977-78 the Japanese received $1.1 billion in reported contracts from Iran; $450 million were for power-related projects and $120 million for construction of industrial facilities. The large Bandar Shahpur petrochemical complex being built by Japanese firms is not threatened by cancellation so far. Japan is anxious to negotiate a 16 SECRET 16 February 1979

(O¥4) SECRET OECD: Exports to fran, by Commodity, 1977 f.08 | ! Sued wwe Nato Rar Sauna td GS Be EF 2 ~ ~ CeBcmouneanGSGnuBinvuduioud i Be B ateotasindu Seana new contract to cover the increase in costs of the Project and to reestablish economic links with the new government. (U) The United Kingdom's exports to Iran exceeded $1 billion in 1977 and again in 1978, accounting for about 2 percent of total UK exports. The most apparent success has been in the arms field. Iran is Britain’s largest arms client, and half of the $700 million in new contracts in 1977-78 were for military goods. In 1977, UK sales to Iran 16 February 1979 SECRET 17

SECRET accounted for 6 percent of motor vehicle exports and 4 percent of industrial machinery exports. Vehicle exports to Iran were particularly important to BL Limited (formerly British Leyland) and Chrysler UK, both ailing enterprises. Chrysler has laid off 1,500 workers because exports to Iran have been disrupted. (U) Iranian contract cancellations will be a blow to UK exports. Plans for most of a 1.5 billion British-built complex at Isfahan to manufacture guns, ammunition, and spare parts for tanks have been suspended by the Bakhtiar government. British arms export contracts totaling nearly 2 billion also are in jeopardy. These include an 800 million antiaircraft missile contract held by state-owned British Aerospace and a billion-dollar contract for Chieftain tanks held by the Royal Ordnance Factories of the Ministry of Defense. (U) Italy's sales to Iran have been running at about 1 billion, or 2 percent of total exports, in each of the last two years. Italian construction and engineering firms are heavily exposed, with orders totaling 6 billion. Such orders have become a major factor in exports to Iran of industrial and electrical machinery and appliances, which totaled 355 million in 1977. Eighteen percent of Italian aircraft exports—mostly helicopters—were destined for Iran. (U) In 1977-78 Italian firms negotiated contracts with Iran valued at 1.5 billion. Reported contracts for construction of a steel plant and port facilities worth 600 million are part of a series won by government-owned concerns and associated with the 3 billion Bandar Abbas Industrial complex. Helicopters valued at 425 million and construction work worth 200 million associated with the IGAT II gas pipeline are also to be provided by Italy. (U) Accustomed to political unrest, strike activity, and bureaucratic delays, Italian firms supplying Iran are not panicking. Although payments delays are causing liquidity problems, work on most projects is continuing. The Italians are hoping that the new government, no matter how radical, will not abandon public works projects already under way. (U) France's economic stake in Iran has been comparatively small since French firms have often lost major contracts to US, West German, and Japanese bidders. The French sold Iran goods worth about 700 million in each of the last two years, just over 1 percent of total exports. Recently, however, France has led the developed countries in signing contracts with Iran. In addition to the joint French-US ventures, French firms won outright 6.5 billion in new contracts, most signed in 1977. Roughly one-half were for electric power facilities, primarily nuclear. (U) The nuclear power plant contracts, valued at 2.5 billion to $3.0 billion, were

(△FY) SECRET recently canceled by the Bakhtiar government. Construction of the power plants, to be built by Framatome and planned for completion in 1982-83, was already under way, and the company had hoped to win additional nuclear plant orders in Iran. Framatome is in financial trouble because of slowdown in France's own nuclear program and a decline in orders from other countries. Even though Framatome recently signed a letter of intent to build two similar plants in China over approximately the same period, cancellation of the Iranian project will seriously set back company plans. Most direct financial losses from the Iranian cancellation, however, will be covered by COFACE, the French foreign trade insurance company. (U) (Confidential/N. orn) ***** SAUDI ARABIA: MORE MODERATE PACE IN DEVELOPMENT SPENDING (U) As the end of the fourth year in Saudi Arabia's Second Development Plan approaches, we see mounting signs that the pace of development will be moderated. For more than a year unsettling experiences with inflation and the influx of foreign labor have led a substantial group in the Saudi hierarchy to question the wisdom of forced-draft modernization. Cautious statements concerning the follow-on Third Development Plan also have suggested that future plans for growth will follow more conservative lines. Last year's cash flow crisis, coupled with the Iranian upheaval, probably has clinched the decision for a more measured rate of economic expansion. (C) The Rush To Modernize Saudi Arabia's initial effort to accelerate the development process came with the introduction of the First Development Plan (FY 1971-75), which envisioned government expenditures of 10 billion. With the sharp rise in oil prices of 1973/74, budget allocations during the latter years of the plan were expanded far beyond original targets, and actual spending in the period came to 21 billion. The Second Development Plan (FY 1976-80) aimed at continued rapid growth through diversification of the economy's productive base, manpower training, expansion of social benefits, and development of roads, ports, and other supporting facilities. Planned government expenditures of $142 billion were seven times actual spending during the First Plan. Even though budget allocations were not fully spent, the upsurge in actual government outlays led to a boom atmosphere with rapidly rising wages and prices. (U)

(\Delta F) ECM2 FMB CRU ADN ACTION: SECRETATE MARIND SICORT2 CHORAL 0% RTF: STATE 103651 1. OFFICIAL US-TRAVEL RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT. THEY HAVE RECENT AND INFORMED BY A STATE VISIT OF THE E-MAIL ASSIGNATION IN NOVEPFEN AND A RETURN VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT THAN THE END OF DECEMBER. OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS CONTINUED ON MUTUAL SECURITY INCREASING AND CONSIDERS VIEWS ALMOST ALL ISSUES OF REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICAL CONSISTENT WITH ITS GROWING POWER AND INFLUENCE, IRAN HAWILLING TO PLAY AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS IN WAYS THAT BUTTRESS OUR OWN INTERESTS. ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNIFIL IS A RECENT EXAMPLE. ANOTHER TOTAL INTEREST TO US IS IRAN'S POSTURE IN OPEC AND ITS

A CITRAH, IN THE OF ORR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, ON LIVE A BILAD MOSAID OF OTHER INTERPISIS AS WILL. OUR EXPERTS OF LON-MILITARY GOODS TO IRAN ARE NOT ACHING AT ABOUT A 2 ILLUION DOLLAR PER VOT LEVEL. THE 50 OF THE SECTOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ENERGY, HANPOWER, AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND FINANCE, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NET FOR THE FOURTH TIME IN WASHINGTON IN PELIURARY UNDER THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF SECRETARY VANCE. OVER 50 AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES HAVE LINKS WITH IRANIAN UNIVERSITIES OR GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND THE IRANIAN STUDENT POPULATION IN THE US IS NOW IN EXCESS OF 30,000. IRAN CURRENTLY PROVIDES THE US WITH BETWEEN 8 - 9 PERCENT OF OUR OIL IMPORTS. 3. IN A MAJOR SENSE IRAN HAS NOW REACHED THE POSITION OF A STABLE AKD MODERATE MIDDLE-LEVEL POWER WELL DISPOSED TOWARD THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS BEEN A GOAL OF OUR POLICY SINCE THE END OF WWII. 4. THERE ARE NO OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF SUCH SERIOUS MAGNITUDE THAT THEY LEAD BE IDENTIFIED IN THIS HEMCRANDUM. OUR CONCERNS ABOUT STAINING AND LEQUATE FACILITIES FOR SECRET Classification OPTIONAL

1. TERRA GOLD SETS OUT TO SOGMA AND CAPHOTIVES IN ARAN, AODI OF CHASE CITIZINGS ARE ORTH UDED RECRUITING OLIVE AND CITIZING ATHOLIA. HE BELIVE TOWN THRA IS NOT IDENTIFIED AS OF LRTING AND NTHU TOWN TILS WITH THE LRTING FALL IN KIN THE FOLD THAT HE HAVE PURSUD THEM UNHATTERIES MATT CARL ALL ROVE MEASURE OF SUCCESS. PROGRESS ON HUMAN LIGHTS, EXPLAINED CONTACTS, NUCLEAR ENERGY, COOPERATION IN REGIONAL MANCOLOGICS CONTROL, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS SUPPLY POLICY ARE SOVE OF THE NORF SICIFICANT AREAS COVERED. SULLIVAN

(OYT) 11 Jul 2022 NNNNVV ESROOZPRA453 OO RUQMR DE RUFHIA W6252/01 1911704 ZNI CCCC O 101702Z JUL 79 IM USICA WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE BT CON FLII FNT I AL SECTION 01 OF 25 USICA 16052 USICA EO 12065 GD/5/85 SUEJOF: COUNTRY PLAN PROPOSAL REFERENCE: TEHRAN 4826 CLASSIFIED BY: RICERD H. CURTISS, DEPUTY DIR., NEA 1. (S) APPRECIATE YOUR BCR SUBMISSION AND BELIEVE A WORKING DOCUMENT IMPORTANT AND USEFUL. TOWARD THAT END, AND BASED ON YOUR THOUGHTS AND INPUT OF SNOW AND MCAFFE, WE OFFER THE POL- LOWING AS RECOMMENDED BCR, ISSUES AND PROGRAM PLANS. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE FEASIBLE PROJECT PRO- POSAL AND SUGGEST THAT THIS PART OF CP BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY MIGHT BE PEASIBLE. IN THE MEANTIME, PCR AND PROGRAM PLANS SHOULD OUTLINE EFFECTIVELY YOUR NEEDS AND PROBLEMS AS A BASIS FOR WHATEVER WASHINGTON SUPPORT SEEMS IN- DICTATE AND WHATEVER POST ACTION SEEMS PRUDENT AND POSSIBLE. AT SUCH TIME AS YOU BELIEVE AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS CAN BE DRAWN WITH SOME VALIDITY, PLEASE FORWARD THAT TO NEA. 2. PCR A. IRAN CONTINUES TODAY IN THE AFTERSHOCK OF THE REVOLUTION WHICH BROUGHT DOWN THE GOVERNMENT OF SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA FARLAVI. ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS CONTINUE, UNEMPLOYMENT IS ESTIMATED AT OVER THREE MILLION, TRIBAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES ARE AGITATING FOR AUTONOMY, MINORITY RELIGIONS ARE FEARFUL, AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUPS WRESTLE WITH WAYS AND MEANS TO PROMOTE THEIR INTERESTS AND THWART THE POLITICAL ASCENDANCE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. B. INDUSTRY IN THE COUNTRY IS DIFFUSE WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN STRUGGLING TO ESTABLISH CONTROL AND WREST EFFECTIVE POWER FROM A WELTER OF LOCAL "KOMIPEES" WHICH SPRANT UP DURING THE REVOLUTION. REAL POWER IN IRAN CONTINUES IN THE HANDS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WITH THE CHARISMATIC HEAD OF THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THE CENTRAL FIGURS: TO BE ACTIVITY AIDES IRAN LARGE LARGE PARALYZED. RELIANCE TO THE LATEST WHICH IS NEVER AGAIN PROFOUND AND REFUNDING EFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO MEET DOMESTIC NEEDS AND RESEARCH EXPORTS ON A REDUCED SCALE, VIRTUALLY ALL INDUSTRIAL

ACTIVITY REMAINS AT A STANDSTILL. THE SPEED AND VISOR WITH WHICH IT WILL EVENTUALLY REVIVE REMAINS UNCERTAIN GIVEN POLITICAL VICISSITUDES, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, THE FLIGHT OF CAPITAL PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION, AND THE DEPARTURE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ESSENTIAL MANAGERS AND TECHNOCRATS (BOTH IRANIAN AND FOREIGN). RESULTANT UNEMPLOYMENT, ESTIMATED AS HIGH AS 3.5 MILLION OF A TOTAL POPULATION OF ONLY ABOUT 35 MILLION, COULD EFFECTIVELY THWART THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S RESTABILIZATION EFFORTS AND SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE FRAGILE POLITICAL EQUATION COUNTRYWIDE. D. "THE PROMISED NEW CONSTITUTION AND REFORMS TO REDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS, ABUSES IN IRAN HAVE BEEN SLOW INCOMING. ALTHOUGH A DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION PAS BEEN PUBLISHED, ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER IT HAVE BEEN POSTPONED. THE SAVAK PRISONS, WHICH WERE EMPTIED DURING THE REVOLUTION, HAVE BEEN REFILLED WITH PRISONERS ACCUSED OF A VARIETY OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE DURING THE SHAR'S REIGN, OFTEN TO BE SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOLLOWING CLOSED TRIALS CONDUCTED BY REVOLUTIONARY COURTS" OUTSIDE THE IRANIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SUCH TRIALS IS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE VEEMENT REACTION TO THE U.S. SENATE'S RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THEM SUGGESTS THE DIFFICULTY WE WILL ENCOUNTER IN PRESSING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS. CULTURALLY IRAN IS IN PERCENT. PART AND PARCEL OF THE REJECTION OF WESTERN, AND PARTICULARS A REJECTION OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ANNOUNCED HIS TENTION TO RESTRUCTURE THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ALONG ISLAMIC TIGER IT OF DECADENT WESTERN INFLUENCES. IMPORTANT CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED OR CONVERTED INTO REVOLUTIONARY CULTURE. IRAN'S HARD-WON SUCCESSES IN ADVANCING WOMEN'S PIGETS ART BEING ERODED AS WOMEN ARE TREASSED

11 Jun 73 07 202 NNNNN Y ESP228BRA4E2 0 RUQMHR DE RUHEIA #6052/02 1911716 ZNY CCCCC 01017022 JUL 79 PM USICA WASIDO TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 25 USICA 16052 USICA EO 12269 GDS 6/5/95 TO RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL VEIL OR "CHADOR" AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THEM UNDER THE SHAH ARE THREATENED WITH PRECISION. FOREIGNERS OF ALL SORTS ARE BEING EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY AS THE TIDE OF XENOPHOBIA RISES. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY IRANIANS CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE INDISPENSABILITY OF SOME FORM OF FOREIGN CONTACT, AND MANY, PARTICULARLY THE WESTERN EDUCATED, OPPOSE THE MORE RIGID STRICTURES OF ISLAMIC PENDAMENTALITY. INTEREST IN STUDYING FOREIGN LANGUAGES, PASTICALLY ENGLISH, REMAINS HIGH AND LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIAN SUSTENTS CONTINUE TO ASPIR TO WESTERN AND U.S. EDUCATIONS.

SPONTANEOUS, CANDID AND OFTEN EVEN CORDIAL. BUT PUBLIC RHETORIC AS CONVEYED BY AN UNFORGIVING, OFTEN VITRIOLIC MEDIA, IS UNRELENTINGLY HOSTILE. H. U.S. MISSION GOALS IN IRAN AT PRESENT ARE TO MAINTAIN AS OPEN AND COOPERATIVE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS POSSIBLE DESPITE INVECTIVE FROM THE MEDIA, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND EXTREMISTS. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE WHEREIN THE USG (IN LEAGUE WITH THE U.S. MEDIA) IS ALLEGED TO BE AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S TROUBLES IS CONJECTURAL AT BEST, AND FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE IMAGE IRAN PROJECTS INTERNATIONALLY. THE U.S. MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS TENDED TO BE NEWS AND NOT ANALYSIS-ORIENTED, FOCUSING UNSYMPATHETICALLY ON WHAT IS WRONG. CLOSELY MONITORING SUCH COVERAGE LEADS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES IN IRAN TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH THEM WELL, AND CONVERSELY, TENDS TO CONFIRM IN AMERICAN MINDS THAT IRAN IS A DISASTER IN EVERY SPHERE. I. OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHAH AND LONG-TERM SUPPORT OF HIS REGIME HAS NOT AND WILL NOT SOON BE FORGOTTEN. ITS LINGERING EFFECT IS TO CAST THE USG IN AN INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WHOSE PRACTICES BELIE ITS PRINCIPLES AND WHOSE PAST ACTIONS DENY IT THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. J. WHILE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN DWARFED BY IRAN'S DOMESTIC CONCERNS, ITS FOREIGN POLICY CAN BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT THE BIFURCATED STATE OF IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS THAT IS TO SAY, THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO MOVE AT A POLITICALLY PLEASE PACE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WESTERN COUNTRIES AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO REFLECT THE POLICIES OF THE AYATOLLAH AND BE SUBJECT TO HIS INTERFERENCE AT WILL. STATED AND EXPECTED POSITIONS INCLUDE: DEEP ANTIPATHY FOR ISRAEL, CLOSE TIES WITH THE PLO, AND SUNDERING OF IRAN'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE ARAP STATES.

NNNNV ESBOO9RA409 DE RUENIA #6852/03 1911728 ZNY CCCCC 01017022 J0L79 PM USICA WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 05 USICA 16952 USICA EO 12065 GDS 6/5/85 SUPPORT FOR POLICIES FAVORED BY THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA. INCLUDING PARTICIPATING IN THE NAM. -- HAWKISH POSITION IN OPEC ANTIPATHY TOWARD THE PRO-SOVIET REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN (SEEN TO BE ANTI-ISLAM). K. IRAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, ASIDE FROM RESPONDING TO IMMEDIATE SHORT TERM NEEDS, AND REJECTING THE GOALS AND EMPHASIS OF THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT, ARE NOT YET FULLY CLEAR. IT IS EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN ADDITION TO FAVORING THE POSITIONS OF THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S AND BEING HAWKISH ON OIL PRICES, THAT THEY WILL BE PARTICULARLY SUSPICIOUS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN, THE ROLE OF MULTINATINAL CORPORATIONS AND THE RELEVANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY IS LIKELY TO EMPHASIZE AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL SECTORS WITH CONCENTRATED EFFORTS TO SHIFT ELEMENTS OF THE UNEMPLOYED URBAN POPULATION TO RURAL AREAS, INCREASE IRAN'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND DECREASE THEIR LARGE FOOD IMPORTS. HOW THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IS YET UNCLEAR. L. IRAN'S ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS ONE YEAR AGO HAD SCORES OF AMERICANS TEACHING, CONSULTING, ADVISING, RESEARCHING. NO MORE THAN A HANDFUL ARE LEFT AND THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES IN THE AGGREGATE ARE FOR THE MOMENT ESCHEWING IMPORTED LECTURERS. WITH THE LARGE SCALE EXODUS OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL, BOTH IRAN-IAN AND AMERICAN, THIS SITUATION MAY BE REVERSED, BUT CERTAINLY NOT UNTIL ANTI-FOREIGN, AND PARTICULARLY ANTI-AMERICAN SENSITIVITIES BECOME LESS ACUTE. LINKS WITH IRANIANS, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION WAS THE BINATIONAL CENTER (IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY). BOTH THE ISFAHAN AND TEHRAN CENTERS EMERGED FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE UNSCATHEED (QUITE DE2 LIFE ONLY, ONE MUST PRESSURE), AND HAVE RESUMED ENGLISH TEAM AND LIBRARY OPERATIONS (TEE USICA LIBRARY IN TEHRAN

(△γλ) IS LOCATED IN THE BNG). WHILE REVOLUTIONARY CADRES STILL OCCUPY THE SHIRAZ BUILDING, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN EFFECT ITS RETURN SOON AND THAT ENGLISH TEACHING CAN ALSO RESUME THERE. WE CONSIDER THE CONTINUANCE OF THESE INSTITUTIONS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS EXTREMELY TENSE PERIOD OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. THEY BECOME ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT WITH THE NECESSITY TO MOVE USICA OFFICES INTO THE HIGH SECURITY CONFINES OF THE CHANCERY GROUNDS. THE BNCS ARE NOW OUR ONLY WINDOWS TO IRANIAN AUDIENCES. ISSUE ONE: IRANIANS HAVE A WIDESPREAD DISTRUST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE SUSPICION PREVAILS THAT THE U.S. IS ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION, INTER-EVENING BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. THE AMERICAN MEDIA WITH THEIR UNSIMPATHETIC TREATMENT OF IRAN CONTRIBUTE TO AN IRANIAN PERCEPTION THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH IRAN WELL. FOR IRANIANS LONG-TERM U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH HAS CAST THE U.S. IN AN INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WHOSE PRACTICES BELIE ITS PRINCIPLES AND DENT IT THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. ISSUE TWO: WITH MANY IRANIANS, AND PARTICULARLY THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP THERE IS A REJECTION OF THE MATERIALISM AND DECADENCE OF THE WEST INCLUDING AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE, THOUGHTS AND VALUES. PARTICULARLY SUSPECT IN VIEW OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE SHAH IS U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. ISSUE THREE: THE PGOI IS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE SHAN'S RT

NNNNV ESBO10BRA526 0 RUQMER DE RUBHIA #6052/04 1911739 ZNY CCCCC 01017022 JUL 79 PH USICA. WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 05 USICA 16052 USICA FO 12065 GDS 6/5/85 ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PRIORITIES, WHICH EMPHASIZED ORBAI INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, CONSUMER GOODS, ARMS PURCHASES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN EXPERTISE. THE U.S. AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER IN THESE SECTORS WILL ENCOUNTER SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN ATTEMPTING TO NORMALIZE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT, IF CONFUSED BEFORE, WILL BE FURTHER CLOUDED BY THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE ECONOMIC EXCESSES OF THE SHAN'S REGIME. IRANIAN HAWKISHNESS ON OIL PRICES AND REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICING ON AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ARE SERIOUS ISSUES FOR THE U.S. ISSUE FOUR: WHILE DOMESTIC CONCERNS PREDOMINATE OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN TODAY'S IRAN, STATED AND EXPECTED POSITIONS OF THE IRANIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL FURTHER AGGRICATE ALREADY TENSE U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, IRAN WILL REFLECT A DEEP ANTIPATHY TOWARD ISRAEL AND U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS (SEEN TO BE IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS). THE GOVERNMENT WILL BACK THE PLO AND HAS SUNDERED TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. THE REGIME CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE POLICIES OF MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN THE NAM. 4. PROGRAM PLANS PRIORITY.NO.1. ISSUE: THE U.S. AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. (1) THE U.S. SEEMS A COOPERATIVE AND OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. IT WILL NOT BE PARTY TO ANY ACTIONS WHICH ARE DISRUPTIVE OR INCLUSIVE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. (2) THE U.S. ACKNOWLEDGES THE DEEP DESIRE OF THE IRANIAN MAJORITY FOR CHANGE. BORN OF A REVOLUTION OURSELVES, WE SYMPATHIZE WITH THOSE WHO LABOR FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST SOCIETY. (3) U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES REFLECT THE ESSENTIAL FABRIC OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE CORE OF OUR BELIEFS. OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE AND MUST SUPPLIED OF SHORT TIRM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, EVEN AT THE

( \Delta T^{c} ) RISK OF ACCUSATIONS OF INTERVENTIONISM. (4) THE AMERICAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF IRAN HAS TENDED TO BE NEW AND NOT ANALYSIS ORIENTED RESULTING IN PERCEPTIONS OF A LESS THAN POSITIVE IMAGE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION IN THE U.S. NONETHELESS, U.S. MEDIA HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ADHERE TO FACTS AS THEY SEE THEM AND HAVE SOUGHT TO REPORT EVENTS OBJECTIVELY. (5) THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SYMPATHY FOR IRAN'S REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE CASE, BU SYMPATHY, BOTH IN THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONALLY, HAS BEEN ERODED BY IRAN'S ON-GOING SECRET TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. PRIORITY NO. 2. ISSUE: AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND VALUES (1) RELIGION AND SPIRITUALISM IS A PART OF THE WEAVES OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY. AMERICA HAS A HISTORY OF RESPECT AND TOLERANCE FOR ALL RELIGIONS. ISLAM, IF LESS WELL KNOWN TO MOST AMERICANS, ENJOYS EQUAL RESPECT AND IS THE SUBJECT OF SCHOLARLY INTEREST IN OUR PREMIER ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS. (2) U.S. ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE A POSITIVE FORCE IN AMERICAN LIFE. THEY HAVE FREED THE INDIVIDUAL FROM MUCH THAT WAS DRUDGERY, AND ELEVATED THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL SECTORS OF OUR POPULATION. (3) AMERICAN CULTURE IS RICH IN CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, THE ARTS. (4) AMERICAN EDUCATION IS EGALITARIAN AND WORKS TO SERVE ALL SECTORS OF OUR POPULATION. ITS PREMISE AND INNOVATIONS HAVE RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WORKING TO IMPROVE THEIR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS. (5) U.S. SCHOLARSHIP IN IRAN IS EQUAL TO THE BEST IN ANY COUNTRY OUTSIDE IRAN. (6) THERE IS IN IRAN WIDESPREAD IGNORANCE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHICH IS BASED ON FEDERALISM. SEPARATION OF POWERS, CHECKS AND BALANCES, AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IS AN EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND BALANCE.PRIVATE INTERESTS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD. BT 6252

00 RUQMHR NNNVT ESB011BPA540 DE RUEHIA #6052/05 1911753 ZNY CCCCC 010170222 JUL 79 PM USICA WASHDC TO EMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE BT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 25 OF 25 USICA 16052 USICA EO 1:2085.GDS 6/5/85 (7) BASIC AMERICAN VALUES INCLUDE A BELIEF IN HARD WORK, HONESTY, OPTIMISM CONCERNINGS MAN'S ABILITY TO IMPROVE HIS LIFE AND THE WORLD AROUND HIM, A COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY AND FAIR PLAY, LOIALTY TO FRIENDS AND FAMILY, BELIEF IN THE WORTH OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE, CHARITY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE. THESE ARE NOT VALUES UNIQUE TO THE UNITED STATES, NOR ARE THEY ALWAYS FOUND IN EQUAL MEASURE IN ALL AMERICANS, BUT THEY SUGGEST DIMENSIONS OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER BEYOND AND ABOVE "DECADENCE" AND "MATERIALISM". PRIORITY NO. 3. ISSUE: U.S.-IRAN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. (1) OIL IS A CRITICAL COMMODITY WORLDWIDE AND OIL PRICES HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON A RELATIVELY FRAGILE WORLD ECONOMY. HIGH OIL PRICES AFFECT MOST SEVERELY THE ECONOMIES OF POOR AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. (2) FOREIGN INVESTMENT CAN BE A VERY POSITIVE FORCE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS CENTRAL TO U.S. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL GROWTH. SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. CONTINUES TODAY AND IS WELCOME FOR THE CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT IT PROVIDES. AND FOR THE INVESTMENT IN U.S. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY IT REPRESENTS. (3) MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ARE A VERY EFFICIENT AND COST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF TRANSPERRING TECHNOLOGY AND STIMULATING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. (4) ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY IS AGRICULTURE. THE U.S. IS VERY WILLING TO SHARE WITH IGA NOT ITS EXPERIENCE AND ITS TECHNOLOGY. PRIORITY NO. 4. ISSUE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1) THE U.S. IS STRONGLY COMMITTED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS TO A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INVOLVING ALL OF THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. (2) THE U.S. SUBSCRIBES TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN WESTERN ASIA. OUR CONCERN IS FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. (3) THE U.S. IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE SENSITIVITIES AND NEEDS OF

(\Delta T F) LETS AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND A MORE EQUITABLE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER. 5. ADVISE CONCURRENCE. RFINDARET 57 6252

( \Delta T T) \(115/P0.5/A-1/3/D Chion CONFIDENTIAL STATE CHG: CWNAAS CHG: CWNAAS POL: JDSTEMPEL POL: DMCGAFFEY, NGARRETT, ECON: CRAYLOR CHG POL(3) OR ECON ICA RF AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DAHBI AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY ANKARA USINT BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BAHRAIN AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMEMBASSY PEKING AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY ROME AME:BASSY TOKYO AMEMBASSY TELAVIV AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI AMEMBASSY TUNIS USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE CINCPAC HONOLULU HI TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, IR E.0.12065: XDS 5/10/89 (NAAS, CHARLES) OR-M SUBJ: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC GOVERN-MENT MENT

(△) CONFIDENTIAL REF: (A) TEHRAN 4377(NOTAL), (B) STATE 106426(NOTAL), (C) TEHRAN 4302(NOTAL), (D) TEHRAN 4314(NOTAL), (E) TEHRAN 4679(NOTAL) 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE. 2. SUMMARY: JUST AS THE GOVERNANCE OF IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL STRUCTURE, SO IS THE DIRECTION OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. THAT POLICY IS LIKELY TO OSCILLATE BETWEEN EXTREME ISLAMIC RHETORIC AND SUPPORT FOR RADICAL CAUSES AND MORE CONSERVATIVE, GEO-POLITICAL, NATIONAL INTEREST-BASED BEHAVIOR. DISTINCTIVE HALLMARKS AS SEEN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WILL BE A STRONG TILT TOWARD THE RADICAL AND AWAY FROM THE MODERATE ARABS, STEADY ATTACKS ON ISRAEL AND ZIONISM, CONTINUED SUSPICION OF THE GREAT POWERS ON A VERBAL PLANE, COUPLED WITH THE DESIRE TO DO DEALS ON GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS, AND A MORE LDC-ORIENTATED LINE IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THESE DUAL PATTERNS WILL LAST AT LEAST UNTIL THE CONSTITU- TIONAL FRAMEWORK IS ESTABLISHED OR THE PGOI IS REPLACED. OUR ABILITY TO MODERATE IRAN'S MORE RADICAL POLICY POSITIONS IS VERY LIMITED AT THIS TIME. END SUMMARY. 3. IRAN'S GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE FORMAL PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN, AND A STRUCTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES LED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND LEADING RELIGIOUS FIGURES (REFS C AND D). THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE OPERATES LARGELY INDEPENDENTLY OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND KHOMEINI HIMSELF GIVES ORDERS TO BOTH. THERE ARE FREQUENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARALLEL STRUCTURES, AND THESE ARE REFLECTED IN IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. BAZARGAN AND MANY OF HIS OLDER GOVERNMENTAL COLLEAGUES TEND TO VIEW IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN TRADITIONAL GEO-POLITICAL TERMS. THE HISTORY OF IRAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS WEIGHTS HEAVILY ON THEM. THEY ARE GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE MEN WHOSE PRINCIPAL QUARRELS WITH THE SHAH ON SUCH MATTERS WERE THE HIGH EXPENDITURES ASSOCIATED WITH HIS POLICIES TO THE NEGLECT OF DOMESTIC NEEDS AND IRAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN MATTERS FAR BEYOND ITS BORDERS IN SUPPORT OF WESTERN POLICIES. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL SUPPORTERS SHARE TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE THE SUSPICION OF THE SOVIETS, BUT THEIR EXTERNAL VIEWS AT THIS TIME ARE PRIMARILY INFLUENCED BY HATRED FOR WHATEVER THE SHARE OF MECHANIC ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. 4. CONTINUED CONFLICT BETWEEN THESE TWO VIEWS WILL BE A FUNCTION OF THE REGIME'S INTERNAL STRUGGLES AND EVOLUTION. SHOULD THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES AND THE FORMAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE EASE OR FADE AWAY, THEN RHETORIC AND BEHAVIOR WILL PROBABLY BE SYNTHESIZED TO A GREATER DEGREE. IF CONFLICT DOES NOT AATE, THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE REFLECTED IN IRAN'S POSTURE ABROAD, AND THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WILL LAST AT LEAST UNTIL AN ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION IS FINALLY ESTABLISHED OR UNTIL THE PGOI IS OVERTHROWN OR ITS BEHAVIOR MODIFIED BY OTHER DOMESTIC FORCES. THE APPOINTMENT IN LATE APRIL OF CLOSE KHOMEINI ASSOCIATE DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI AS FOREIGN MINISTER (REF A), REPLACING THE LARGELY INEFFECTUAL, SECULAR, NATIONAL FRONT LEADER KARIM SANJABI, WAS IN PART AN EFFORT TO GET SOME ORDER INTO THE IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY MECHANISM, BUT ALSO TO ENSURE THAT IRAN'S POLICIES WILL MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE WORLD VIEW OF KHOMEINI. AT THE SAME TIME, YAZDI IS A MAN OF THE MODERN WORLD AND CAN PROBABLY UNDERSTAND, AND RELATE TO, BAZARGAN'S CONCERNS BETTER THAN MOST OF KHOMEINI'S CLOSE ADVISORS. 5. IN THE MONTHS AHEAD WE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL BE DEALING IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AREA WITH A SCHIZOPHRENIC AND UNSTABLE IRANIAN STRUCTURE. THE BASIC LINES OF POLICY, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUES WHICH ARE IN THE PUBLIC-DOMAIN, WILL BE DOMINATED BY THE AYATOLLAH AND SUBJECT TO HIS INTERFERENCE AT WILL. (FOR EXAMPLE, HE ISSUED THE ORDERS PUBLICLY TO BREAK WITH EGYPT, WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT; THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD TO PLAY CATCH UP.) IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, THEREFORE, WILL BE MARKED BY: --STRONG APPEALS FOR ISLAMIC UNITY; --DEEP ANTIPATHY TO ISRAEL; --CLOSE TIES WITH THE PLO; --A STRONG TILT TOWARD THE RADICAL, CONFRONTATION ARAB STATES AND AWAY FROM IRAN'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT OF THE MOLCERATE ARABS; CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL --VOCAL SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RADICAL CAUSES THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD, INCLUDING ZIMBABWE; --ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES THE SHAH ABHORED, E.G., PDRY AND LIBYA; --CONTINUED DEEP SUSPICION OF, AND OCCASIONAL MARRANGUES AT THE U.S. AND USSR; --PARTICIPATION IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT; --OUTSCREECHING THE HAWKS IN OPEC; AND --SUPPORT FOR POLICIES FAVORED BY THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLICIAL FORA. 6. ON THE OTHER HAND, I EXPECT THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE WILL ATTEMPT TO MOVE AT THE PACE IT BELIEVES POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO NORMALIZE ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. MY MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES CLEARLY INDICATE A DESIRE FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL TIES, INCLUDING SPARE PARTS AND ADVICE IN THE MILITARY FIELD. ALSO, THIS GROUP IS LIKELY TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO PREVENT THE QUOTE ISLAMIC WING UNQUOTE FROM TAKING FINANCIAL OR MILITARY STEPS TO BACK UP RHETORIC. TO WHAT DEGREE THIS MORE MODERATE BEHAVIOR WILL REASSERT ITSELF IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL INTEREST AGAINST STERILE IDEOLOGY IS DIFFICULT TO GXUGE, AND DEPENDS MUCH MORE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUGGLE THAN IT DOES ON ANY FOREIGN ATTITUDE. 7. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, I SEE NO QUICK OR EFFECTIVE WAY TO MODERATE IRAN'S NEW INTERNATIONAL EXTREMISM. AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE, WE CAN TRY TO CHIP AWAY DIRECTLY AT THE MIND SET OF KHOMEINI AND HIS SUPPORTERS AND ARE INDIRECTLY DOING SO THROUGH PERSONS CLOSE TO HIM. OUR CURRENT POSTURE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS ABOUT RIGHT. WE SHALL WANT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO ITS REQUESTS FOR POLITICAL INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE IN THE MILITARY SUPPLY AREA, AND BE AS POSITIVE AS LEGALLY POSSIBLE IN THE HOST OF CONTRACT DISPUTES WHICH ARE CERTAIN TO ARISE. IF THIS GOVERNMENT LASTS, IRAN'S GEO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES WILL SLOWLY REASSERT THEMSELVES TO PUSH US INTO A BETTER POSITION HERE. NAAS##

THE INFORMATION OF ALL AMERICAN STAFF NEW YORK THE IS LARS FORDAM ON SMITH CREATIVE WITH LARS THE APPETT OF THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AT THE THE NOT LOS SIGHT OF THE IN EFFICIENCIES WITHSTAND- THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT SOMETIME IS CREATING IN A THE TO BE EVERY BIT AS DICTORIAL AND REPRESSIVE AS THIS DESPITE THE METORICAL PERFUCCOUPATION WITH NOW, IT AS A SECOND INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT FOR NO FOR US A YANING SUITE DIFFERENT THAN THE WEISHER LITION OF IT. IT LOES NCT. FOR EXAMPLE. ENCOMPASS THE THIS TO REPORT THE NEWS ACCURATELY IF ACCURACY IS CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF ISLAM. IN IRAN TRANSCORD ANY PARTICULAR ACTING. INTO AMAZON WITH THE NEW FULFES OF IN HALSHINIONS IHL WE CONTINENT TO COLLIE FOR THE NOMENI. II APPROXES TO OUR ST SERVET TROIDE NOI LIG IITE ZN AT OF MEHDI HARZJAN TO REESTILLING IATIATIONS BETWEEN IRAN A.T AN U.S. WILL PANT IS TA INI LLAQ STAND IS IN PLACE. PROBABLY LATER IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO CONCILE THAT IS GOVERNMENT OF ITS SUCCESSOR IS THE CURRENT TABLE TOWARD BE AN REVERSED. SE MAY INTIFIED WITH THE REGIME

12NOV100 DATES REC'D DATE DUE OFFICE POR IN OUT INT OFFICE POR IN OUT INT 00 M3 01 11/0 0 31 SMA 00D 000 311 NTD4 00A 11/2 4 312 MPNS 00B NCP0C 1 313 MLS 01A 314 CONEM AUXIN 3141 CORTAC NLVPERS 315 HYDRO SCRY 32 AVLA TRANS 33 ENG OER BETT 34 ORD 11B IG W4 N1 4A N1A 40 SUPPSYS 10 TRA PLAN 41 PHL 11 TRA IMF 42 AST 3-5 12 LIN PERS 43 LOG AD 13 LANG NS 14 ADF 51 N2 PROJECTS ILS 993 563 A - ACT R - RETAIN N6 I - INFO P - SEE ME N7 W9 C - COMPLY P - FILE 91 T(AIR) 92 T(SUR) 91 T(POR) REMARKS 1

(△) TELEGRAM INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO E.O. 11652: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE https://www.uscber.edr INFO DHAIRAN TAGS: USINT BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI ANKARA DOHA ISLAMABAD JIDDA KABUL KUWAIT LONDON MANAMA MUSCAT NEW DELHI PARIS 10828 10828 SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10828 10828 ACTION: ACTION ACTION ACTION POI-3 POI:11652: E.O. 11652: GDS E.O. 11652: GDS POI:11652: TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, SHUM, IR PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, SHUM, IR SUBJECT: SUMMARY: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT NOV 6 SUMMARY: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT NOV 6 SUMMARY: SUMMARY: SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT. RESIGNED, HAS BEEN REPLACED 14 SUMMARY: SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT. RESIGNED, HAS BEEN REPLACED SUMMARY: BY MILITARY GOVT UNDER GENERAL AZHARI. TEHRAN MARTIAL BY MILITARY GOVT UNDER GENERAL AZHARI. TEHRAN MARTIAL NEW MARCHES. LAW ADMINISTRATION ISSUED TOUGH DIRECTIVE. CROWDS NONE- TAKEN PLACE. AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLS FOR CALM, WITHOUT TAKEN PLACE. AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLS FOR CALM, WITHOUT DRAFTING DATE: 11/6/78 1187 MINIMAAS POL:JOStern (contribution)

EXPECTED. EMB ADVISED ANCITS TO SAY HOME TODAY. SANJABJ KHOMEINI JOINT COMMUNIQUE REJECTS COMPROMISE, CALLS MONARCHY ILLEGAL. YESTERDAY'S DAMAGE WAS SELECTIVE. AND WIRESignED. END SUMMARY 1. SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT HAS RESIGNED IN WAKE OF YESTERDAY'S LARGE-SCALE RIOTING, TO BE REPLACED BY MILITARY GOVT HEALED BY GEN QOLAM REZA AZHARI, CHIEF OF SUPREME COMMANDER'S STAFF, AND ASSISTED BY CHIEFS OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES. EACH MILITARY CHIEF WILL SUPERVISE SEVERAL MINISTRIES, WITH DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS IN HANDS OF CAREER UNDERSECRET-ED DATE MORNING (SEPTEMBER), TARIES SHAH ESL ADDRESS THE NATION 2. SHAH HA TOLD ANEXSEADOR PARLIAMENT WILL PROBABLY BUT HE WAS NOT SURE (NOTE: SPEECH IN SEPTEL DOES NOT HAVE THIS) BE DISSOLVED,/ AND THERE WILL EE ARRESTS OF DISSIDENTS, BUT NO NATIONAL FRONT, PAN-IRANIST (PEZESHKPOUR) OR BANI-AHMAD FOLLOWERS WILL BE ARRESTED. (COMMENT: THIS APPARTIALLY LEAVES SUCH PROMINENT DISSIDENTS AS MINATCHI, MOGHADAM, AND THELIBERATION KOVENENT OF IRAN LIABLE TO ARREST.) 3. TEHRAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION THIS MORNING ISSUED TOUGH NEW DIRECTIVE REPEATING PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW CURFEW HOURS OF 9 PM TO 5 AM, MLA RESTATED ORIGINAL POLICY THAT GATHERINGS OF TWO OR MORE PEOPLE ARE PROHIBITED. MARTIAL JAW VIOLATORS WILL BE WARNED BY AN OFFICER; IF THEY DO NOT OBEY, TROOPS WILL FIPE ON THEM. ALL SCHOOLS ARE TO REMAIN CLOSED THROUGH NOV 12. FRIENDTAR NO-G1-NEON CONFIDENTIAL Classificational

TROOPS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED IN SOUTH TEGHN TODAY RELATIVELY TEN TROOPS ARE IN EVIDENCE AS FAR AS WE AND NEAR UNIVERSITY EMBASSY HAS REPORTS OF FIRING NEAR ROUDAKI HALL IN CENTRAL CITY AND HEAVY FIRING, INCLUDING AUTOMATIC HOWEVER, MOCH OF FIRING HAS BEEN WAS LOCKED WEAPONS, IN TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AREA. CAMPUS WAS LOCKED BUT STUDENT FORCED THEIR WAY IN. POLICE THEN DISLODGED THEM, AND THEY ARE CONFRONTING TROOPS DEPLOYING IN UNIVERSITY DISTRICT. PEOPLE NAL ALSO GATHERED NEAR BRITISH EMBASSY, WHICH WAS DAMAGED YESTERDAY, AND TROOPS WERE SEAT AT OUR REQUEST TO PROTECT HAVE NOT APPEARED TO DISPERGL THEN U.S. EMBASSY IS, HOWEVER, UNDER MILITARY GUARD HOWEVER, UNDER MILITARY GUARD LAST LIGHT SET UP GUARD AT 4. ARMY SEIZED NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT), AND TODAY'S BROADCASTS INCLUDED VOICES DIFFERENT FROM THOSE USUALLY HEARD. NIRT DIRECTOR HAS ONLY RASTAKHIZ NEWSPAPER APPEARED THIS MORNING. RESIGNED. /NGIXXIXIXIXIXIXXIXXIXX 5. PROMINENT DISSIDENT AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI WAS QUOTED OVER GOVT RADIO AS APPEALING FOR GALM TODAY, TELLING PROTESTORS NOT TO MARCH IN STREETS, WHICH RAISES QUESTIONS AS TO WHO TODAY'S DEMONSTRATORS ARE. 6. SHAH CONSULTED WITH SEVERAL LEADERS, INCLUDING AMINI AND ENTEZAM BEFORE AGREEING TO MILITARY GOVT. HE DID NOT SEE BAZARGAN OR MINATCHI AND HAS INTERPRETED NATIONAL FRONT POSITION AS INFLEXIBLE. EMBOFFS LEARNED AFTERNOON NOV 5 THAT KARIM SANJABI HAD ISSUED JOINT STATEMENT WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN PARIS, WHICH CONTAINED THREE POINTS: A) THE MONARCHY WITH ITS PERPETUAL VIOLATIONS OF

CONSTITUTION, TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION MUST NOT BE SUPPORTED. B) THE NATIONAL-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT CANNOT APPROVE AN ILLEGAL MONARCHY. C) THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN OUGHT TO BE BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES "APPROVED BY THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE". ("VOICE OF THE PEOPLE" WAS TO DESCRIBED/BY LOCAL PRESS KISSEKH BY NATIONAL FRONT SPOKES-MAN AS "REFERENDUM OF THE PEOPLE," THOUGH NATIONAL FRONT LEADER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR TOLD EMBOFFS AND VISITORS HE THOUGHT IT MEANT MURELY FREE ELECTIONS.) BAKHTIAR'S INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT WAS THAT IT OPENED WAY FOR POSSIBLE MODERATE RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT. BUT PREDOMINANT LOCAL INTERPRETATION SEES TEXT AS VICTORY FOR KHOMEINI. BAKHTIAR RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM PARIS WHICH INFORMED HIM THAT RADICAL IRANIAN STUDENT GROUPS, ESPECIALLY GERMAN CONFEDERATION, WERE "VERY DISAPPOINTED" THAT KHOMEINI HAD "BEEN SO SOFT." IN LARGE SECTIONS OF TOWN EVERY BANK WAS LOOTED OR BURNED. TRAVEL OFFICES, MOVIE THEATERS, LIQUOR STORES AND SEVERAL HOTELS WERE DESTROYED OR HEAVILY DAMAGED. RIOTERS ALSO BURNED MANY BUSES AND AUTOMOBILES. MIN. OF INFORMATION AMELI-TEHRANI WAS REPORTED BY BEATEN WHEN MOB STORMED HIS MINISTRY, SETTING IT ON FIRE. PUBLIC ORDER IN CENTRAL TEHRAN COLLAPSED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. WHERE TROOPS WERE PRESENT, THEY DID LITTLE OR NOTHING TO PREVENT ATTACKS ON CONFIDENTIAL Classification OPTION FOR15 January 1st Date:

BUILDINGS. CONSULATES TABRIZ AND ISFAHAN REPORT NO SPECIAL DISTURBANCES YESTERDAY. TABRIZ DID HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS BUT NO VIOLENCE. CONSULATE SHIRAZ REPORTS LARGE DEMONSTRATION NOV 4 AND ANOTHER YESTERDAY, THIS TIME RESULTING IN TROOPS OPENING FIRE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF TWO KILLED. TEAR GAS FORCED EVACUATION OF SAIDI HOSPITAL. TODAY LARGE CROWD IS GATHERING ON PAHLAVI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS.

TELEGRAM INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO 10835 FROM CLASSIFICATION AMEMBASSY TEHRAN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 11652: ACTION: SECURITY WASHDC TAGS: CONSUL SUBJECT: INFO: CONSON DHAHRAN USINT BAGHDAD ACTION: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI ANKARA BONN DOHA POL:3 ISLAMABAD JIDDA AMB KABUL MIN KHARTOUM ECON KUWAIT PM LONDON ICA MANAMA OR MUSCAT SY NEW DELHI ADM PARIS DAO USCINCEUR VAXIIINGEN GE AFOSI USCINCPAC CRU SEO 15 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 10835 E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PINS, IR SUBJ: FIRST REACTIONS TO SHAH'S SPEECH REF: TEHRAN 10817 1. ONE OPPOSITION REACTION WE HAVE COMES FROM RELIGIOUS AND HUMAN RIGHTS SPOKESMAN MINATCHI. HE SAID SPEECH IS NOT BAD IF MILITARY GOVT IS SHORT AND LEAVES THE WAY OPEN FOR A NEW COALITION GOVT TO EMERGE EASILY. EARLIER IN THE DAY, NATIONAL FRONT'S SPOKESMAN HAD SPOKEN OF THE CHARTED BY POL:GBMhorakis CLARIFING DATE TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED 11/6/73 1110 MIN:CWMas CLEARANCES

NEED TO MAINTAIN UNITY AND CALM, REFRAINING FROM "ILLOGICAL EXCITMENT." This falls in the same category as AYATOLLAH TALAGHANI (KHOMEINI SUPPORTER) CALL EARLY TODAY FOR THE MASSES TO AVOID CONFLICTS SO AS NOT TO BE BLAMED FOR ARSON, DESTRUCTION AND BLOODSHED.. LEADING PARKEXAMINER/OPPOSITION POLITICIAN-MOGHADAM ALSO FELT FINALLY, NATIONAL FRONT LEADER KERK SPEECH SEEMING GOOD. /BAKHTIAR TOLD US HE THOUGHT SPEECH WAS "CALM AND REASONABLE." 2. AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, PRESUMABLY REFLECTING REACTIONS OF THEIR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS, ESPECIALLY LIKED SHAH'S REFERENCE TO RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF LAW AND ORDER. MEMBER KOKKK OF IRANIAN BANKING COMMUNITY SAW IN THE SPEECH A FIRM HAND BY THE SHAH, HAVING LEARNED THE LESSONSOF THE PAST. 3—LOYALIST LADY—MEMBER OF—PARLIAMENT—THOUGHT—THE SPEECH GOOD, BUT NOTED ITS SIGNIFICANCE WOULD DEPEND ON HOW IT IMPRESSED THE DEMONSTRATORS IN THE STREET. GOVT NEEDS PRACTICAL MEASURES IN ORDER TO REGAIN ITS CREDIBILITY. LONG TIME IRANIAN JOURNALIST NOTED ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT MISSLEFROM OTHERWISE GOOD SPEECH -- NO MENTION OF PUNISHMENT OF THOSE GUILTY OF PAST WRONGS. HE THOUGHT OMISSION THIS WOULD BE AN/GUAYSHYER THAT WOULD BE REMARKED UPON. X.X.X. XTEYCSNWTNGGNNHXHNGMMKXNTNHTSXSXNHZSHXNHXNYHXNGKXGNH XHMXXHMXXHMXXHMXXHMXXHMXXHMXXH XIEGIJHXIYXAIJIHXIEGIJHXIYXIEGIJHXIYXIEGIJHXIYXIEGIJ YEAR KONTHON

4. IN BRIEF SAMPLING BY ICA OFFICERS OF SENIOR NATIONAL EMPLOYEES, A SENATOR, INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, SOME STAFF INHIBING OF NENT, THE UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR, A COLLEGE PROFESSOR AND TWO IRANIAN BUSINESSMEN, FOLLOWING WAS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS: (A) SPEECH WAS GENERALLY APPEALING; IT IS GOOD THA (A) SPEECH WAS GENERALLY APPEALING; IT IS GOOD THA THE SHAH APOLOGIZED FOR PAST ACTIONS AND SUPPORTED CONTINUED MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY; (B) PITCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE MONTHS AGO; MAY -BE TOO LATE; (C) MILITARY GOVT WILL NOT LAST LONG BUT MAY COOL THE SITUATION FOR THE BEING: (D) ALL DOUBTED ABILITY OF THE MILITARY TO RUN THE GOVT OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME DUE TO XX ITS INEXPERIENCE IN CIVILIAN MATTERS: (E) THOSE WHO KNOW NEW PM PERSONALLY SPOKE HIGHLY INCORRUPTIBLE OF HIN AS AN HONEST AND/THOROUGHTHREED OFFICER. 5. A VERY SMALL SAMPLING OF COLLEGE STUDENTS FOUND THEM GENERALLY CYNICAL AND BELIEVING THAT YESTERDAY'S VIOLENCE WAS CARITULLY STAGE-MANAGED TO PERMIT THE IMPOSITION OF MILITARY RULE. TO THESE STUDENTS, THE SHAH'S CREDIBILITY REMAINS VERY MUCH IN QUESTION.

( [?] 19) 19. 1 \times 15 = 15 ANASSIA ANKARA SILEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7136 OFUGRAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 9523 RLK/AIKEASSY KABUL. 1826 HIO/AIKEASSY MOSCOW 1368 THE/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6112 HAD/USINT EAGHCAD 236 LEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 9260 PL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6144 PLRA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1468 THNA/USMISSION USMATO 6654 C O M E T I A E N T I A L S E C T I O N_1 OF_2 ANKARA 4647 L'DIE 1205 GDS 6/19/25 (SPIERS, RONALD) OR-M TAGS8 PEPP, TU, IR, IQ S J (CO VISIT OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TO IRAN 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN INFORMATION MESSAGE. 2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER GKUN BELIEVES THAT A GOOD, DIALOGUE WAS BEEN STARTED WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN REGIME. THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON EXPANDING ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, BUT FEW SPECIFICS. GKUN FOUND THE IRANIANS INCLINED TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US, BUT SUSPICIOUS. THEY WERE DOWN ON THE SOVIETS AND ISRAELIS. THERE WAS NO INTEREST IN THE RCD AND NORMAL SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN REBEDS. SUMMARY. AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, FORMIN OKCUN PROVIDED EXTENSIVE FILL-IN ON MIS JUNE 9-11 VISIT TO TEHRAN. FORMIN SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF STARTING SCHOOL GUIDE TO WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN TESEIN HAD IN ACCEIVED AND THE BASIS LAID FOR ENDED ECONOMIC/ TECHNICAL CORPORATION. THE IRANIANS APPEARED TO RECIPROCEED TO POLITICAL WILL FOR CLOSER COOPERATION. HOWEVER, CICUN FOUND IT HAD TO SAY HOW THINS WOULD DEVELOP AS THE IRANIANS APPEARED UNREADY TO FOCUS ON SPECIFICS, SUCH AS ESTABLISHING A JOINT COMMISSION. THEIR PRIMARY CONCERERREMAINED INTERNAL RATHER THAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHILE THE IRANIANS ACTED AS IF THEY HAD FULL CONTROL, KCUN WAS SKEPTICAL. 2. DURING HIS STAY, DEPREMIUM AND MINI ACID ACID AS PRINCIPAL HOST AND WAS WITH HIM OF THE BETTER PART OF ONE AND ONE-HALF DAYS. 3. APPROVED, THE FORMIN NET FOR ABOUT 40 MINUTES 4. IN THE INJALARGAN AND FORONE AND ONE-HALF 5. THE BYATOLLA KHOMEINI. THERE WAS ALSO A 6. PLEASE SEEING WITH A MUSCLE OF MINISTERS. 7. INDIVIDUAL THE READ OF THE RATIONAL IRANIAN OIL CO.

- KHOMEINI: A TOURNE-NINGO, TACATO REVOLU- T INAARY VIO APPLIED TO MAIL NO CONCLASSING TO OTHER. IDEOLOGIES. KHOMEINI LIMITED OKCUN OF ARCHIEISHOP MAKARIOS. HE APPEARED STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE VEST FOR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS REASONS. THE SESSION WITH AYATOLLAH WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT TV AND NEWSMEN WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT. -- YAZDI! YAZDI HANGLED HIMSELF VELL. HIS APPROACH WAS "MODERN" BUT HAD STRONG UNDERTONES OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY. FOR THE MOMENT HE WAS THE LINK BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, AND REFLATIONS WITH THE PRIMIN SEEMED FRIENDLY. IT WAS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHAT THE FUTURE WOULD BRING. GKCON THOUGHT YAZDI WAS NOT ANTI-WESTERN AND WAS INTERESTED IN BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US. (OKCUH'S AISE, OYMEN, OSTIONED THE MINISTER'S OPINION ON THIS POINT.) -- BAZARGAN: AN ABLE ELDER STATESMAN WHO FAVORED COOPERATION WITH TURKEY, BAZARGAN WAS GLAD THAT A DIALOGUE HAD STARTED. HIS APPROACH SEEMED MORE SECULAR THAN THAT OF YAZDI. SHARIAT MADARI & OKCUN'S FAVORITE AMONG THE IRANIANS. HE FOUND THE TURKISH-ORIGIN AYATOLLAH MORE DEMOCRATIC AND HUMANISTIC THAN XPOHEINI AND MORE INTERESTED IN BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO AYATOLLAHS WERE POOR AND THAT THEY WERE QUARRELLING ON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. 6. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RELATION WITH THE US: OKCUN HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IRANIANS WANTED TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, BUT WERE TERRIBLY SENSITIVE OVER MATTERS SUCH AS THE SENATE'S CRITICISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS. OKCUN URGED THE US TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN A LOW KEY, TRYING TO ASSURE THE IRANIANS THAT COOPERATION WAS IN THE INTEREST. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO NAME A NEW ENVOY TO TEHRAN. THE AREAS-SAND NOTHING THAT THE IRANIAN FEPUSAL OF AMBASSARAT-DESIGNATE OUTLETS, AFTER FIRST HAVING GRANTED ACHIEVE, WAS THE TYPE OF ACTION WASHINGTON FOUND HARD TO ALLOW. MOREOVER, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE CENTER ADMINISTRATION HAD EXERCISED CONSIDERABLE FESTIAINT IN ITS COMMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN REVOLUTIONARY ITAN. ALTHOUGH IT WAS CRITICIZED THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT ON MIAN RICHTI ISSUES.

(△15) A NEW CONSOL GENERAL TO ISTANBUL. OLCUN DID NOT EXPLAIN WET THEY WERE SENDING A CHARGE RATHER THAN AN AMBASSADOR HERE. - OILs OLCUN SAID HE WAS "SATISFIED" WITH DISCUS- SIONS ON OIL SUPPLY, ADDING THAT 1968 MIGHT SHOW EXPANDED TRADE IN OIL AND OTHER PRODUCTS. (ANKARA 4538) 7. COMMENTS: OVCUN'S PRIVATE IMPRESSIONS ARE LESS GLOWING THAN THE EXTREMELY POSITIVE PRICE REPORTING ABOUT HIS VISIT TO IRAN. THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT CLEARLY IS TRYING TO MAKE THE BIST OF A DIFFICULT SITUATION WITH THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. TIME WILL TELL HOW MUCH SUBSTANCE FOLLOWS THE MICK SOUNDING WORDS ABOUT ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. SPIERS

INNVV IS3324001954 E RUQMER (△1Y) X BJQMGU #4547/2 1701450 2 791914257 JUN79 I'M EMBASSY ANKARA TC RUERC/SECS/STATE VASEDC PRIORITY 7137 1'0 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATEEHS 9526 OLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1527 CEZMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 13€9 CIFLEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA D261 RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL B145 QMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6113 SHAD/USINP BAGHDAD 237 NUFLAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1469 UFUNA/USMISSION USNATO B055 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 4547 LIMDIS — RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS: OLCUN SENSED THAT TEE IRANIANS WERE NOT WELL INCLINED TOWARD THE SCIENTS. ONE POINT OF CONTENTION WAS THE WIDESPREAD RELIEF THAT THE SOVIFIS WERE ASSISTING DISSIDENT GROUPS. IN CONTRAST, OLCUN NOTIFIED IEAT THE IRANIANS TOLD him they did NOT BELIEVE THAT THUS WAS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THIS TYPE OF INTERFERENCE. - ISRAELI THE FARSEST ATTITUDE WAS AGAINST ISRAEL. FEELINGS WERE STRONG, AND IRANIANS BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE COLLOOING WITH REMNANTS OF SAVAK TO STIR TROUBLE AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS. -- IRAQI TEE IRANIANS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQI POSITION, ESPECIALLY ON KEUZBETAN WHERE THE IRAQI WERE BELIEVED TO BE ASSISTING DISSIDENTS. — AFTENISTIAN: THE IRANIANS SERVED AT LEAST - FORMAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE AGEAN ISLAMIC REBELS. THE IRANIANS SAW THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT IN DIFFICULT STRAITS. -- RCD↑ OKCUN FOUND THE IRANIANS NOT REPEAT NOT IN FAVOR OF USING THIS ORGANIZATION AS A VEHICLE TO PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION. INSTEAD, THE IRANIANS WANTED TO DEAL BILATPERALLY. - KAVOY FOR TURKEY'S TPS IRANIANS WERE PLAN- NTO ASSIGN A NZV CHARGE D'AFFAIRS TO ANKARA AND

V2C2C 650 (△1△) RRUEHSD DE RUQMHR #9174 2311035 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 191002Z AUG 79 ZDK CITE UR SVC 1015W FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN = ☐0-RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3294BT S C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 09174 USICA E.0.12065:N/A SUBJECT: BUILDING CONCEPTUAL BRIDGES TO SHI'A ISLAM 1. AT PRESENT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION IN IRAN. POWER IS DIFFUSED AT BEST, AND EVEN RELATIVELY SIMPLE DECISIONS OFTEN GET POSTPONED FOR WANT OF CLEAR AUTHORITY. IT IS THEREFORE IMPRACTICAL TO TRY TO MAP CUT MORE THAN A TENTATIVE POWER STRUCTURE WHICH IDENTIFIES SOME INFLUENTIAL GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONS. AND OF COURSE IT IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO FOREST WHO THE PLAYERS WILL BE A YEAR OR, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TEN YEARS HENCE. 2. IT IS, NONETHELESS, VERY MUCH IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO BEGIN, INSOFAR AS PRACTICAL, DISCREETLY AND CAUTIOUSLY BUILDING BRIDGES TO GROUPS WHICH APPEAR CERTAIN TO PLAY MAJOR ROLES IN IRAN DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS. IRANIAN HISTORY, THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH, AND THE SITUATION AT PRESENT ALL INDICATE THAT SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADERS WILL CERTAINLY BE ONE GROUP WHICH WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN IRAN REGARDLESS OF WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMY EMERGE FROM THE PRESENT FLUX. 3. WHILE IT IS EVIDENT THAT IRAN'S DEEP, GRASS-ROOTS ATTACHMENT TO SHI'A ISLAM MAKES IT CERTAIN THAT THE CLERGY WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ENORMOUS INFLUENCE IN IRAN, IT IS EQUALLY EVIDENT THAT AMERICANS HAVE AT PRESENT LITTLE ABILITY TO RELATE TO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WHICH INFORMS THE ULAMA. WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THEY ARE COMING FROM. CONVERSELY, THE ULAMA HAVE LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPTS WHICH UNDERLIE WESTERN THOUGHT. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, BOTH SIDES ARE BURDENED WITH A STOCK OF SUPERFICIAL INFORMATION AND MISLEADING GENERALIZATIONS. 4. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO QUICK WAY TO CLOSE THE COMMUNICATION GAP BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THE SHI'A CLERGY. IN THIS CASE, THE AMERICAN PENCHANT FOR CRASH PROGRAMS AND QUICK ACTION IS HOPELESSLY INAPPROPRIATE. RUSHING OUT TO TAKE A MULLAH TO LUNCH, SENDING THE CLERGY OUR PUBLICATIONS, OR EVEN DEVISING PROGRAMS WITH THEM IN MIND IS UNLIKELY TO DO MUCH BY WAY OF REDUCING THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM.

5. CONVENTIONAL EXCHANGES WHICH INVOLVE MODERN IRANIAN INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOLARS DO LITTLE TO PROMOTE DIALOGER BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THE ULAMA. THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS HAVE STUDIED IN THE U.S. OR WESTERN EUROPE. BUT WHEN THEY RETURN TO IRAN THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND LIFE STYLE TEND TO CONFIRM THE ULAMA'S RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO WESTERN VALUES AND CONCEPTS. IN THEIR EAGERNESS TO ASSIMILATE A SPECIFIC DISCIPLINE OR TECHNOLOGY, CONVENTIONAL IRANIAN STUDENTS PROVIDE AMERICANS WITH LITTLE INSIGHT INTO TRADITIONAL PERSIAN THOUGHT. THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CONCERNS AND THEIR MEAGER KNOWLEDGE OF THE GREAT BODY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT FURTHER REDUCE THEIR ABILITY TO ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THOSE PEW AMERICANS PREPARED TO EXPLORE A TOTALLY FOREIGN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. 6. THE POST THEREFORE SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE, UNDER FULBRIGHT PROGRAM AUSPICES, WHICH WOULD BRING ONE OR TWO ADVANCED STUDENTS FROM THE PAYZIYEH SCHOOL IN QOM WHERE MANY OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS TRAINED AND TAUGHT (INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI) TO AN APPROPRIATE AMERICAN SCHOOL SUCH AS UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY FOR TWO YEARS. THE FIRST YEAR WOULD BE DEVOTED TO ENGLISH LANGUAGE STUDY AND EXPLORATION OF WESTERN THOUGHT. THE SECOND YEAR WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR DEEPENING DIALOGUE WITH APPROPRIATE AMERICANS AND MIGHT INCLUDE SOME FORMAL TEACHING. AT THE SAME TIME, ONE OR TWO AMERICAN GRADUATE STUDENTS OR YOUNG PROFESSORS FROM UNION THEOLOGICAL OR SOME SIMILAR INSTITUTION WOULD COME TO STUDY AND EVENTUALLY ENGAGE IN CONCERTED DIALOGUE WITH COLLEAGUES AT QOM. 7. THE POST RECOGNIZES THAT ESTABLISHING MEANINGFUL CONTACT WITH THE FAZZIYEH SCHOOL WOULD, AT BEST, REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME, EFFORT, PATIENCE, AND TACT. THE ODDS AGAINST SUCCESS ARE GREAT. BUT THE POST HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE WHO KNOW FAZZIYEH WELL AND MIGHT ACT AS DISCREET INTERMEDIARIES WHO COULD EXPLORE THE PROPOSAL APPEARS PROMISING TO THE AGENCY, THE AGENCY EXPLORE THE PROSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE WITH APPROPRIATE AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS. GRAVES

( \Delta 1r ) DE RUQMER #1376 301 ** i ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 281342Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO USICA WASHDC BT CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CHRGE: USICA 10/28/79 APPRV: USICA:PAO:JGRAVES DRFTD: USICA:PAO:JGRAVES:MN CLEAR: NONE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11375 DISTR: ICA-3 CHARGE POL CRU USICA FOR: NEA, PGM/C, PGM/P, PGM/T, ECA E.0.12065: N/A SUBJ: USICA IRAN'S PROGRAM NEEDS: TURN ON THE SPIGOT 1. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION, THE POST FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CURTAIL ITS STAFF AND ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES BE REDUCED OR SUSPENDED. 2. THE CLIMATE IN IRAN HAS NOW SUFFICIENTLY STABILIZED TO PERMIT RENEWED PROGRAM ACTIVITY. THE BINATIONAL CENTER IN TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS INITIATED A FEATURE FILM SERIES AND TWO PERSIAN PLAYS ARE CURRENTLY BOOKED IN THE IAS THEATRE. THE IAS IS ALSO EXHIBITING A PERSIAN ARTIST AND THE ART WORK OF PERSIAN CHILDREN. A PIANO CONCERT IS SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER AND SOME 3,500 STUDENTS ARE ENROLLED IN ENGLISH CLASSES. THE LIBRARY IS ATTRACTING ABOUT 150 USERS AND FIELDING 20-30 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION A DAY. THE STUDENT COUNSELING SERVICE HAS DIFFICULTY COPING WITH DEMAND. THE BINATIONAL CENTERS IN ISPHAN AND SHIRAZ ARE ALSO ACTIVE. THE FULBRIGHT COMMISSION IS ONCE AGAIN ORGANIZING EXCHANGES AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY COME UP WITH CANDIDATES FOR AGENCY PROGRAMS. 3. BOTH THE CLIMATE IN IRAN AND POST OBJECTIVES LIMIT SHARPLY, HOWEVER, THE KIND OF PROGRAMMING WHICH IS PESIBLE. IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES PRECLUDE ALL.BUT CLASSICAL MUSIC AND NO FILM, PLAY, OR DANCE WHICH HAS ANY OVERT SEXUAL ASPECT CAN BE USED. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES CURRENTLY MAKE PUBLIC PROMOTION OF SOME U.S. OBJECTIVES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (I.E., HUMAN RIGHTS, MIDDLE EAST PEACE BASED ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, AMERICAN SECURITY CONCERNS). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POST CAN MAKE EXCELLENT USE OF ANYTHING WHICH SHOWS U.S. INTEREST IN ISLAM, PERSIAN CULTURE, THE WELFARE OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN, SPIRITUAL VALUES, THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT, SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NATIONS. 4. THE POST'S KEY OBJECTIVE MUST OF NECESSITY BE TO REDUCE IRANIANS SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO UNDERmine THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND IS NOT REALLY PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IRAN TO RESOLVE ISSUES AND PROMOTE MUTUAL INTERESTS. THE POST RECOGNIZES, OF

COURSE, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AND IS THEREFORE TAKING A LONG-TERM VIEW IN PLANNING ITS COMMUNICATION PROGRAM. IRANIANS RECALL PAST U.S. POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT REASSURING TO THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. USICA IRAN THEREFORE MUST DEVOTE RESOURCES TO ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT APPEAR MARGINAL IN OTHER CONTENTS: A SERVICE ORIENTED LIBRARY WHICH FOCUSES ON IRANIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY, GENERAL REFERENCE WORKS, STUDENT COUNSELING, AND RESEARCHING REFERENCE QUESTIONS; SPEAKERS CONCERNED WITH MORAL VALUES, ISLAMIC HISTORY, PERSIAN CULTURE, AND THIRD WORLD ISSUES; FILMS AND VTR'S WHICH SHOW AMERICAN INTEREST IN MORAL VALUES, SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE, FAMILY AND CHILDREN, PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SERVING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS; FEATURE FILMS WHICH APPEAL TO IRANS STARVED FOR ENTERTAINMENT AND INDICATE U.S. INTEREST IN HAVING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. 5. THE POST THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES AGAIN INCLUDE TEHRAN AS AN ADDRESSEE WHEN ANNOUNCES AVAILABLE MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS. THE POST RECOGNIZES THAT MUCH OF WHAT IS BEING OFFERED TO POSTS BY THE AGENCY IS INAPPROPRIATE TO IRAN AT PRESENT, BUT THE POST IS PREPARED TO COPE WITH A LARGE AMOUNT OF PAPER IN ORDER TO FASTEN ON THOSE FEW OFFERINGS WHICH ARE USEFUL IN IRAN TODAY. THE POST ALSO REQUESTS THAT PGM AND ECA ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN ACQUIRING OR DEVELOPING PROGRAM OFFERINGS WHICH MEET THE NEED OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS MESSAGE. 6. THE POST REQUESTS THAT THE AGENCY SUSPEND, IN THE CASE OF USICA IRAN, RESTRICTIONS ON AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES WHICH PRECLUDE ALERTING POSTS TO OFFERINGS WHICH ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THEIR PROJECT PROPOSALS BECAUSE USICA TEHRAN DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROJECT PROPOSALS ON RECORD. IF THE CLIMATE IN IRAN REMAINS REASONABLY STABLE, THE POST WILL, HOWEVER, PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE AGENCY'S NEXT PLANNING CYCLE. GRAVES BT NNN

(△111) 22110142 JAN 79 PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RDFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3659 INFO RUEEC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3261 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 01108 I.O. 12065: N/A TAGS: PINT, IR SUBJECT: FRENCH MAGAZINE ON ALI SHARIATI 1. FRENCH EMBASSY CONTACT TELLS US PARIS PERIODICAL LES NOUVELLES LITTERAIRES" DEVOTES PRACTICALLY ITS ENTIRE ISSUE FOR TEE WEEK DECEMBER 7-14 TC IRANIAN THINKER ALI SHARIATI (WHOSE THOUGHT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN PRESENT SITUATION HERE). WOULD APPRECIATE PARIS AIR POUCHING US A COPY ASAP (ATTENTION LAMBRAKIS, POLITICAL SECTION). WILL PROVIDE FISCAL DATA IP DESIRED. 2. ASSUME DPT WILL WANT ONE OR TWO COPIES (NEA/IRN AND INR). SULLIVAN CHARGE: STATE 1/23/ APFRV: MIN:CWNAAS DRFTD: FOL:GBLAMBR CLEAR: NONE DISTR: POL 3 AMB D ECON-2 PM I DISTR: POL 3 AMB D ECON-2 PM I OR ADM SY DAO AFCSI CHRON/15

TONETI N'TITAN THE FUTURE #1319/21 299 ** INT. 2000 CZZA 267377 SOP. UN EMBASSY TURN TO PUBLIC SECURITY ALONE 478 IN NO BEXJOS/SNCTE/ WASP DO KIKOS/JOS WASP DO MINI/AMEMBASSY ARU EHAB1 0743 BUOMG/AMEMBASSY A KATA 1336 GUARD/USINT BAGHDAD 2341 BUCHOR/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2313 BUSCOD/AMEMBASSY ILLAMBAD 0395 REINRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0421 RERLO/AMEMBASSY LABEL 0332 KUMW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2351 GULTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2467 TAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0312 URERO/AMEMBASSY MGSCCOV 2348 KOMM/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0221 KPS/AMEMBASSY FABIS 0415 CONAAA/USCINGOUR VALHINGEN GE N Y I D E S I I A L S E C T I O N Q1 O1 T 54RAN 113 12265 G.S. 10/25/23 TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P FIN, SHIM, FING, IR CTO. MODERATION: DOES IT HAVE A CHANCE? C - ENTIRE TEXT). THE MODERATE IRANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES. THE ACTIVE DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND HAVE I LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAN. THE FISHED INTO THE BACKGROUND BY THOSE INITIATIVES WHO FOLLOW A NARROW AND AUTHORITARIAN INTERACTION OF ISLAM. WITHIN THE PAST FEW WIDES, MODELING NO FAVOR A MORE BALANCED SOCIETY RESERVING A SOCIAL-THOUGH, HAVE BECOME MORE VOCAL. ILL INDECTLY CPTICITIZING ATOLLAH KHOMEINI. THEY WAS SINGING THE CHRISTMAS ON SOME OF THE OFIOUS PARTS. THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE GROUPS STILL PRECARIOUS. IT EXPRESSES ITSELF TO POTAT A NIT SOCIAL SPONSEMEN. SOME LIBERAL CLERICS, AND COME SMALL NEWSPAPERS. WITHOUT STILL NOT A MAJOR FORCES ON THE IRANIAN TOTAL SCENE. IN SEN GROUP HAS BEEN APPLY TO ORGANIZE TIMESELVES ENOUGH TO EXPRESS IDEAS CONTRARY TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS STARIZE THE. END SUMMARY. MATTSOFDEBATI.SINGH THE REVOLUTIONIGLRS SUCAS MATIN-DAFTARI NAZIE. FOUQUER,SANJARI, AND BAZARGAN HINGEL HAVE BEEN OVERSHADORED BY KHOMEINI AND BY HIS ALLIES WHO SHARE HIS VISION OF A THOCKATIC NOT ALL OF THESE SUPPORTERS OF HOMRINI ARE NOT THEY INCLUEN THE "SECULAR MULLAHS" SIT AS IN THE, YAZDI, CHAMRAH, TABATABAI AND OTHER. THIS IS LOMINATEL THE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESS, THE LOALY COUNCIL, AND THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. IT CONFIDENTIAL THAN 11111

OVERNATIONAND THE AZARBAIJAN DELEGATES THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. ALL RIGHT TO THE AUGURION AND SPEAKERS AT NO AFFECTION FOR THE OLD PUGGING, THE WORLD FILLING OF AYACOLA NOEINI, AND NO ANTI ICAN STING. THE SPEEDING FLICITES THE GRAPHY HEART OF THE ATTACKS ON A ENDRAZI (CLINICAL MEDDLING). COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, AND ON ATTENTS TO STAY AT LISH A TERC- CIAL DICTATORSHIP THROUGH THE VELAYAT-2-FAZIN. ONE OF THE SPEAKERS COUNT THE CHOW'SPUISE IFEN HE SAIT. ANT THE ISLAM OF DRN STAR IATI; WE DON'T WANT THE ILAH ..... ) AND LIFT THE END EMPTY FOR THE CROWD TO THE COLE OF QUADAM-MANAGE AND ALIZATE HERE THE VELAYAT-2-FAZIN. THE LATER SAID, THIS IS AN NOT OF TREASON AGAINST FUGING GERATICS THE VELAYAT PEOPLE. WE HAD A REVOLUTION NOT TO PEACE THE GROUND BY TREASINE KIND OF ORALISM. SAIL IN THE FELIGINGS INADERSHIP HAS NOT GATIZED THAT IT IS NOT TO SELL THE VELAYAT-2-FAZIN TO THE THE ISLAND OF IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS LIMITED TO REOPEN DURATE ON THIS ISSUE. I CIL THAT SAVES THE OF IMPROVEMENT IT IS POSSIBLE. 7. The IBRAS, IN SEITISISINN VETAYAP—-PAIN, AV GOND SOA AILINS AMONG CLEASICE SEO AYATOLANS AT SNG SHARI—-MORI WHO SHARE TIA VION 12 SOH NO INSTITUTION, IN LOT PROPERLY DROSED, COOLS LOD ID A EV LOD TO SCREEN THE LATAH E AYATOLAND COOL IS ON, 300J T A-ISLAM PARAS ISOOTINI, IS TOA TAT BAT O IS SURGE. IN THESE DEALS, THE TOURS HOON IN IN POSITION WHICH HAS VOCIN COMMON WITH MODATE VIBS TOOT VELAYAT-E-PAIDN AS EAT OY CONSTITUTION, CONTAINS SOME PANDOROUS AARICITIS. CLASS I ALL INSTRUCTIONS THIS QUESTION IS MORE CRATII I

Cn:1547741 FOR DECAUS FOR DECAUS THEY HAD BEEN FOR THE TIMES THE MILLION IN WEDNESDAY ALL OF THE WORLD IS MELOVO TO? MOST IMPORTANT THE MODERN THE ON THE TIAN PARTY. THE ARTICAL PROCT. THE OTHER GROUPS ARE ONCE AGAIN FIRING THEIR VOICE AND ENGINEERING TO SPEAK OUT. IN DOING SO, THEY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME SITTERIAL MAJOR OBSTACLES: A) THE MEDIA REMAIN FOR THE MOST PART IN THE HANDS OF THEIR OPPONENTS. CONSOLI-YE-ISLATI BECOMES MORE MUSIC BY THE DAY, AND THE OTHER MAJOR PAPERS ARE KYTREMBLY CAUTIOUS. THE RIVIO AND THE TELEVISION, UNDER GOTBZADIN'S OECHTUNISTIC AND UNRELIGTENED GUIDANCE. HARPLY DEVIAS FROM ITS DAILY MEMO OF PSEUDO-REZIGIOU DRIVEL INTER-SPERSEL WITH PSEUDO-REZIGIOU TIONARY TRIVIL. HONFINI'S DENUNCIATIONS. HIS Famous AUGUST DECLARATION THAT "WE DO NOT WANT INTFLLECTUATS" IS STILL REMEMBERED. HIS DIATRIBES AGAINST WESTERN DECADENCE HAVE MADE ALL WESTERN MANIFESTATIONS, INCLUDING NECKTIES, SUSPECT IN HIS FOLLOWERS' EYES. 11. THESE MODHRATS GROUPS STILL LEAD A PRECARIOUS EXISTENCE ON THE FRINGES OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE LEFT ALONE TO HOLD THEIR MEETINGS AND PUBLISH THEIR NEWSPAPERS BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSISTED IRRELEVANT TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. HOWEVER, IN HIS CUST RECENT SPEECHES, KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN NOT OF PERMANED HAS CRITICIZED THEM HARSHLY FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON VELIYA-E-FAIR AND ON THE CLERGY. IN A SPEECH TO IERRAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON OCTOBER 20, (ECMRINI REFERRED IECTLY TO THE MPRF MEETING, SAYING, RECENTLY, IN ONE OF LIFEIR MEETINGS, ONE OF THESE MISGUIDED ONES, WHO KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT ISLAM, SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL OF LOPERTS SHOULD BE DISSOLVED. AND THE REST CHEERED... YOU, WHO DID NOT EVEN PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTING (FOR THE COUNCIL) HAVE NO RIGHT TO SAY THIS...IT WAS THE LIGIOUS LEADERS WHO GAVE YOU (OPPONENTS OF VELAYAL-E-FAIR) THE FREEDOM TO SAY WHATEVER YOU WANT TO SAY. YOU WERE IN HIDING WHEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE STRUGGLING AGAINST THE SHAH AND HIS FATHER. NOW YOU WANT TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY?...YOU DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DO SO. I WILL SLAP YOU IN THE MOUTH. STOP THIS AND JOIN THE SAN'S OF ISLAM AND LET THIS COUNTRY PUT ITSELF IN ORDER." 12. KHOMEINI'S ATTACKS ON THIS GROUP ARE STILL ONLY ACCESS AND DLE MULIFELY TO TAKF THE FORM OF ALL-OUT PROCESSION INVOLVING THE CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS, THE BANNING OF MEETINGS. AND THE ARREST OF LEADERSHIP. MANY OF THESE GROUPS AND MYIR LEADER'S HAVE DISTINGUISHED LEGENDS OF OPPOSITION TO THE MONARCH-RECORDS WHICH ARE TRENDS TO IGNORE. HOWEVER, THIS HARD-LINE CLERGY AND ALL IS HAVE BEEN ISOLATING AND ATTACKING INDIVIDUAL ARE FROM AMONG THE MODERATES SUCH AS NAZIH, MATIN-AITT, AND FORUHA THIS AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO MISHARDLE SUCI MAT2RS

CONDITIONAL AS ARAB-IRANIAN RELATIONS, PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS, AND AVCLUTIONARY JUSTICE, THE MESSAGE OF THESE MODERATE GROUPS COULD ATTRACT A WIDER FOLLOWING. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO OFFER A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO AYATOLLAH CONFIDE THIS POSITIONS ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS THOSE NOTED ABOVE. PERFAIS THEY COULD FORCE SOME CONCESSION TO THOSE WHO CO NOT SHARE THE IMAM'S VISION OF AN IRAN RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TRACINGS OF THAT SPECIALIZED VIEOLISLAM HELD BY ONE SECTOR OF A MINORITY SECT OF THAT CONFIDENTIAL JAN 117193/

(Δ∆F) 12 1 1 1

△00△ HAS HARRASED AND ISNOKEL ITS OPPONENTS. HAZARIAN RETAINS POWERLESS; MATIN-DAFTARI AND NAZIH ARE IN FELIXING FOR THE IS IGNACRED; AND SANJARI COIT HIS JOIN DISGUST AND LET THE COUNTRY. 4. Although the position of the MCDFRATE PARTIES is still very fragile, in recent weeks they have shown some signs of life. Although their most important organs, including the newspaper ATANDETA AND THE POPULAR HOMORNAGAZINE AHANGAR, were suppressed in an illustri, they have begun publishing small papers such as KALAI-E-MOSALMA. FROM THE MOSLEM REPUBLICAN PROPERTY; CONBESH (TULISHED 51 ALI ASGAR) AND EVIL JAVA). JEIFER-YEAZAI FROM THE IRAN PARTY AND AZATI FROM THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FORT. ALTHOUGH THE CIRCULATION OF THESE PAPERS IS LIMITED AND THEY CARRY MUCH LESS INFLUENCE THE TREEL MAJOR LAIZIS (KAYHAN, ETHELAAT, AND BAMDAD) THEY DO OFFER SUBSISTENTIAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON EVENTS -- A COMPETITORY OF THE AT PARITY WITH THE OFFICIAL VERSION. FOR THE LAST SIX MEETS. THE MUSLIN REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY MEETS HAS ORGANIZED FRIDAY AFTERNOON MEETINGS AT 100 THAN GATQUATTERS. ALTHOUGH THE FIRST MEETING ATTRACTION ONLY AMOUNT 100 PEOPLE, EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER AND POLITICAL ASSISTANT ATTHIRD OCTOBER 19 THING AND FOUNDIAN OVERFLOW OF OVER 1500. THE CRCKD THE LAAGFLY MIDDLE-CLASS AND WELL-EDUCATED. THERS OST N. WOMEN, SOON YELLOW. A NEW CLINIC. THE SOFAKARS INCLUDED ALMOST ALIZATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MEP, AND POLITICAL SOCIAL-MATHEMATI, LEADER OF THE NATIONAL CHAMANT AND BEST AWARD JAN FELIGATE TO THE COUNCIL OF

14. IN THE LONGER TERM, IF THESE GROUPS CAN PRESERVE SOME CONFERENCE THEY MAY PRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE TO A PERICAL MONOPOLY OF POWER IN POST-KHOMEINI IRAN. AT AT TIME TENT EVOLUTIONARY GREEDENTIALS MAY BECOME NATIONAL NORTANTI FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THIS PROBABILITY PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE PERIPERCY OR IRANIAN SPLIT. --ARTICULATE INTERESTING, BUT WILDLING LITTLE REAL POCK. LAINGEN

Research Study Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran Secret PR 76 10017 February 1976 Copy N° 148

Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods involved (WNINTEL) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN— Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT— Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants PROPIN—Caution—Proprietary Information Involved USIBONLY... USB Departments Only ORCON— Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL... This Information has been Authorized for Release to... Classified by 005139 Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(2) Automatically declassified on date impossible to determine CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY i CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH February 1976 ELITES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN IRAN by Earnest R. Oney

NOFORN/ORCON- SECRET

SECRET 5

NOTE This paper is arranged to serve multiple audiences. The Summary and Conclusions is designed for those who, in a limited amount of time, need to grasp the essence of this complex, ancient yet modernizing, society. The main body of the study is aimed at those whose professional responsibilities require more intimate knowledge of the societal structure and the family relationships that provide its motive power. The main body and the annexes together form a reference for those in virtual daily contact with Iranian officialdom. The paper was prepared in the Office of Political Research: It has been read and commented on by persons in other components. Their suggestions were most helpful and are gratefully acknowledged, but there was no attempt to produce a formally coordinated paper; however, the author wishes to express special appreciation to CRS/NEA/NESA for its cooperation. Research and analysis was completed in December 1975. Comments and reactions are welcome; they may be directed to the author (gray 8252).

THE IRANIAN ELITE Iran's importance need not be stressed. A major oil-producer and one of the most influential states in OPEC, it aspires to a position of power and influence. This paper is not focused on its political and international prospects ^{*} but rather attempts to portray and to analyze the people who run Iran, dominate its politics, control its businesses, set its cultural and moral standards and even try to change its ways. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Requisites for elite status in Iran are the traditional ones of family connection, influence in patron-client relationships, wealth and education. In this century education has become more and more Western in thrust, bringing on conflicts with values developed over the centuries by a society which has absorbed, been changed by foreign influences, but never overwhelmed by them. The contemporary Western-educated Iranian bureaucrat often finds on return to work in his horneland that he is facing, and perhaps being frustrated by, an institution far older than the Harvard Business School. The analysis below tries to portray the Iranian elite as it now exists and functions, and to convey some understanding of how it will perform in the years ahead. At the top of the elite structure is the Shah, by virtue both of his position as monarch and of his personal power. The centuries-old Iranian tradition of kingship has been stronger than any dynasty or of any individual ruler. Iran without a monarch to rule and protect the nation against outside enemies, would be, for most of its people, a contradiction in terms. Acceptance of the monarch, however, has been coupled with a willingness to accept the elimination of an individual shah who was unable to defend himself or the nation. The incumbent Mohammad Reza Shah, acceded to the throne in 1941. The somewhat insecure son of a tyrannical and domineering father, he has developed remarkably in the years since. For a third of his reign, he was dominated by others and frustrated by his lack of power to carry out his

decisions. For another third he engaged in a successful struggle to establish his dominance. For the last third he has been clearly in charge and is now so strong that his word is law. In Iran's clearly defined social structure, families count for much; that is, those families whose members compete to carry out the Shah's decisions, and who are themselves powerful. There are some 40 national elite families whose members move from government to political to private pursuits and back again with facility. There are an additional 150 or so families of major but not national importance. These numbers are not fixed; families' fortunes rise and fall according to luck, connections, and the skill of their representatives. Nearly a quarter of today's top families were powerful and influential under the dynasty that the present Shah's father overthrew 50 years ago. The royal court has traditionally been a hotbed of byzantine scheming. In the Shah's family are an assortment of licentious and financially corrupt relatives, notably his twin sister, Ashraf, a lady possessed of a greedy nature and nymphomaniac tendencies. The Court's tone has been much improved since the Shah in 1959 married a woman from one of the lesser branches of a national elite family. French-educated Queen Farah takes a personal and constructive interest in the working of the Shah's programs of social and economic reform. Together with his family, the Shah is also surrounded by a host of officials and hangers-on. He appears to rely on a small group, perhaps a dozen persons, in whom he reposes special confidence and on whom he depends for information and whom he uses as channels to various groups in the society. While these people have official positions, their status with the Shah is for the most part independent of job title and totally dependent on their closeness to him. Of these dozen, three represent national elite families, although this is not their chief asset. Long friendship and faithful service are essential attributes. For example, Minister of Court Alam of a national elite family, has been close to the Shah for 40 years, and General Fardust whose father had been a sergeant, has been a friend for 50 years. Although surrounded, the Shah is alone, to the best of any observer's knowledge. He seeks information. He does not seek advice, and few in Iran would dare to give him any. He decides; others execute. The successful execution of the Shah's programs requires a bureaucracy possessing a variety of skills. Lawyers, engineers, economists and medical doctors predominate; those educated in the political and social science are scarcer. A prerequisite for the opportunity to exercise one's skills is loyalty to the Shah combined with self-restraint in political ambition—a factor which becomes important at the higher levels where an official might be in a position to develop an independent political base. There seems to be a considerable number of educated, competent individuals who refuse to work for a regime of which they disapprove or, if they are employed, work at less than their full potential. The career of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda illustrates the limitations of ambition and power. Hoveyda's unprecedentedly long tenure in office (11 years) can be attributed to: —the ability to maneuver among the conflicting personal ambitions of other officials who are in at least covert competition for his job; —the ability to avoid any serious errors in interpreting and carrying out the Shah's wishes and, perhaps more important; —the ability to play second fiddle to the Shah. This last point has been the downfall of previous politicians, for a prime minister strong enough to be effective has usually ended up believing he is more competent than the Shah to make important decisions. Hoveyda has not yet fallen into that trap. The cabinet of today is a classic example of how an important Iranian institution, the dowreh, works, in this case to the advantage of several young politicians, Hassan Ali Mansur, Amir Abbas Hoveyda and their friends. (The dowreh "circle" is an informal associational group often cutting across class lines, formed for social reasons, e.g., card playing, for literary or professional discussions or simply for amiability. A well-established dowreh provides a forum for the exchange of information and opinions and a means of promoting the political and economic fortunes of its members.) Mansur had already been a cabinet minister, when he gathered in 1959 a youngish group of middle-level bureaucrats interested in the problems of Iranian development. Within two years the group had expanded and became the Progressive Center, at which point the Shah gave his blessing. The establishment

reformism the group indulged in seemed to dovetail with the plans he was formulating, and, in 1964, Mansur became Prime Minister and the Progressive Center transformed itself into the Iran Novin Party. Mansur was assassinated in 1965 by a religious fanatic. Dowreh member Hoveyda, the Minister of Finance, was appointed Prime Minister. Two other ministers in the present cabinet were original members of Mansur's dowreh; three more have served in Hoveyda's first cabinet. Several of the cabinet ministers are in competition with each other and with Hoveyda, seeking a dominant position with the Shah, within the cabinet or in the various programs. This rivalry is encouraged by the Shah, who uses it as a mechanism to prevent any single individual from gaining too much personal influence. Parliament has its role to play in the Shah's system of government, although not as the legislative body that the term parliament implies. In the absence of an authoritarian ruler, the dominant interest in a constituency has generally dictated the choice of deputies. Local landlords, merchants, tribal leaders, religious leaders or their representatives have usually been selected. In constituencies where these were weak, the army, the prime minister or the Royal Court might predominate. Sometimes these forces cooperated; sometimes they competed. During periods when the parliament was relatively free from royal control, e.g., 1906-1923 and 1941-1960, it was rent by factionalism and by the competing interests of those groups who had manipulated the elections. During the last 12 years parliament has been a tool of the Shah. In 1961961, frustrated in an attempt to get a land reform bill through a landlord-dominated parliament, he dissolved that body declaring that it had been elected through rigged elections. That was true, but it was not news, since the same statement could have been made for nearly every parliament. It served the purpose that the Shah wanted, however. His land reform bill was enacted by decree and, when parliament was once more elected nearly two years later, all the deputies—carefully chosen by the Shah—were enthusiastic supporters of his programs. This has been the pattern ever since. The public retains its traditional skepticism toward elections, but membership in parliament is still sought and prized. It provides an opportunity for personal advancement, gives one local prestige and does provide a channel by which grievances can be expressed and through which favors can be sought and granted. Probably no group is more favored by the Shah than his officer corps. Special privileges such as pay differential, subsidized housing, education and low-price stores are designed to make the military—traditionally not held in high repute—an attractive profession. Not only professional competence but also skill in military politics are essential for advancement to the higher ranks. Having the confidence and the ear of the Shah are keys to success and, as in the civilian bureaucracy, political ambition or the too enthusiastic promotion of a policy the monarch has not approved is dangerous to an officer's career. Elite families were once heavily represented in the officer corps; such representation could help protect the family and its interests. From the scanty evidence available, it appears that more and more men from the middle, and even the lower classes are coming into the officer corps. At company and lower field grade, the officers probably still think and react in much the same way as the non-military in the same class. By the time a man has reached general's rank, however, he is likely to have absorbed the attitudes of the elite in general and, indeed, may have assured his position in the traditional manner, by accumulating wealth, making the right marriage—or a less formal liaison—and securing a circle of friends, acquaintances and family who can help him. A new elite class with a potential for challenging the traditional system may be in the process of formation. Described by an academic investigator as the bureaucratic intelligentsia or the professional middle class, it is characterized by its members' rejection of traditional power relationships and dependence on modern education and skills as means to establish their own influence. This element is receptive to a wide range of experience and ideas outside the traditional ones and, for the most part, rejects Islam as a guide to life. This class includes professionals of all kinds—doctors, lawyers, teachers and bureaucrats as well as artists, writers and poets who often serve as its spokesman. The more vocal of this group see themselves as opponents of the Shah, as the vanguard of a modernizing, democratic force which will change Iranian society by sweeping away the traditional order. It is not yet evident that this group will emerge as a relatively homogenous, self-conscious class. It may rather fragment with its more ambitious

members becoming part of the traditional elite, others accommodating to a middle class status with little power, and a small number pursuing active opposition on the fringes of Iranian society. Many of the members of this potential elite are the persons to whom the Shah must turn to carry out his programs. The Shah clearly recognizes his problem and chooses his people carefully. A member of this group can get ahead only by playing the game, but by doing so (by permitting himself to be co-opted) he supports and strengthens the system. The Shah has successfully co-opted many who formerly, and perhaps still secretly, would rather see the monarchy reduced to a figurehead. The Shah's ambitious industrialization plans seem certain to bring a new element into the elite. The large entrepreneurs, businessmen, merchants and financiers are the sparkplug of the private sector. A few families, interrelated in many cases, seem to predominate. For the most part, they are not the same as the 40 families and the traditional political elites, but they do have connections with them which are of value to both. Even a partial picture of these business, professional and political relationships is difficult to draw on the basis of present information. The Shah's attempt to control inflation and profiteering has resulted in arrests, imprisonment and fines not only for small shopkeepers accused of overpricing but also some of Iran's most prestigious—if not most honest—businessmen. This campaign, together with a decree mandating the sale of stock in private concerns to the workers and to the public has created a climate of uncertainty which, if not dispersed, could have a serious effect on investment in the private sector. Iran does have some who have resorted to violence to destroy the Shah and his system. There are not many in this category and, barring a successful attempt on his life, the terrorists do not threaten the stability of the regime or the Shah's programs. The present violent opposition is embodied in an organization, Mujahadin-e-Khalq, the "People's Warriors," composed of the religious community and Marxist/Communists who have submerged their antipathy to each other in the interests of attacking a greater target, the Shah and the system he represents. The monarchy as an essential feature of Iranian existence is a concept which is likely to be destroyed eventually by more widespread education and by exposure to other political concepts, systems and customs. If the monarchy is accepted by the bulk of the population, for much of the educated minority, the monarchy has already lost its meaning. If they accept Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi it is for reasons other than the venerability of the institution he represents—a desire for personal security and advancement or the lack of any effective alternative. The clergy would probably not prefer the elimination of the monarchy but would be happy to see the present Shah go. For them a secular government would be as dangerous as the present Shah, but in the eyes of the religious leaders Mohammad Reza has betrayed an essential element of his role, protection of Islam. The present generation of religious leaders, moreover, seems to be convinced that the Shah, as his father before him, is determined to destroy Islam in Iran. At age 56 the Shah seems very aware that he has a limited time to establish his policies firmly enough to be irreversible. A return to landlordism, at least in its old form, is unlikely; industrial development is likely to go ahead with or without the Shah, and programs of more widespread educational opportunities would be an imperative for any government. How effective such programs would be under the Shah's designated successor—Crown Prince Reza Cyrus, now 15—can only be conjectured. The Shah has not lavished great praise on his son's potential; the most he has found to say is that a king of the future could do a great deal if he were willing but on the other hand, "we are fixing things so he can do no harm." This Shah has dominated Iran so completely that trying to project the behavior of the elite into a time when he is gone is most difficult. Lacking a strong authoritarian leader the divisiveness which has always been a characteristic of Iranian society is likely once more to predominate. Personal and family loyalties still take precedence over institutional loyalties and the scramble for political power which has so long been suppressed will re-emerge as a major factor. Even the Army, potentially the most powerful institution in Iran is not likely to escape the personal competition which would reduce its effectiveness as an instrument of any single individual. The scope of relations between high-ranking military officers on one hand and the political or

industrial elites on the other is not known. Such linkages are inherent in the nature of Iranian society but their effectiveness in any particular situation would depend on the personalities involved. Even the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia, the one new group which might eventually produce a structural change in Iran's centuries-old system remains an uncertain quantity. What does remain more predictable is a continuation of the traditional competition between two major factors—an authoritarian leader dominating or sometimes dominated by a group of competing, power-seeking elites. A WORD ON ELITES I have not cast this paper in the mold of any of the several elite theories which exist but have used the general ideas and approaches which seem useful. Published academic studies of the Iranian elite prudently refrain from discussing, in detail, the individuals who exemplify their broader conclusions.* I have reversed this and discuss some of the specific individuals who make decisions, and otherwise exert influence in the Iranian milieu believing that this will be more useful for those dealing with the Iranian system. A useful definition of elite is that of Ted Gurr in Why Men Rebel. The elite are, “Individuals with the acquired or inherited personal characteristics that are culturally prescribed requisites for high value positions, whether or not they have actually attained those positions. In Western societies these characteristics usually include high degrees of intelligence, technical training, managerial ability, ambition and skill in interpersonal dealings.” In Iran the requisites have traditionally been family connections, influence in a patron-client relationship, education and wealth. There are some pressures in the direction of the Western model and the conflict can be seen frequently in the presentation which follows. Iran is best understood by understanding the role and functioning of its traditional elites rather than by examining the formal bureaucratic structures which prevail. The bureaucracies more often than not have been the personal tools of the power brokers or the ground on which personal battles have been fought. Even completely westernized Iranians have found it necessary to conform to the prevailing patterns if they are to find a constructive role. Those who refuse are isolated, often retiring into purely private pursuits, or leaving the country. This comes about not so much because of anyone's

conscious decision but because the structure of power and participation does not provide for the nonconformist. The Iranian system, however, is flexible and bends when it must to avoid shattering. New faces come into the elite and old ones disappear. When the bases of influence change the elite shift their interests to maintain their positions; the Court, parliament, banking, commerce, all have served, are serving or will serve in the future, as primary foci for maintaining power and position. The persons appearing in the following pages are to be seen not only as individuals with whom Americans will work, negotiate and socialize but also as types who, whatever the names or the faces, will continue to occupy positions of influence.* Two other papers on this general subject may be found useful; "Centers of Power in Iran," CIA/OCI, No. 2035/72, May 1972 (SECRET/NOFORN) and "Preliminary Observations on the Iranian Monarchy," a Research Study produced by CIA/OPR in May 1974 (SECRET). 1. TRADITIONAL IRANIAN SOCIETY “We have decided that a National Consultative Assembly shall be formed and constituted in Tehran deputies to be elected by the following classes of people: The Princes, the clergy, the Qajar family, the nobles and notables, landowners, merchants and tradesmen.” (Proclamation of Mozafar-ad-Din Shah establishing the first national assembly. 5 August 1906.) Iran has had from the earliest times a clearly defined class structure, explicitly recognized by all participants. The major class categories have occupied almost the same relative positions through the centuries; first, the ruling family, then tribal leaders and warriors, bureaucrats, religious leaders, businessmen; and finally the peasants and laborers.* Even major historical events have had little effect on this structure. Thus, when the Arabs conquered Iran in the 6th century A.D. and imposed Islam, the Persian ruling classes quickly went over to the Arabs, converted to Islam, and preserved their own position and social structure. In the process, however, they put a unique Persian stamp on the governmental institutions that evolved from the Arab conquest. New Moslem religious leaders, for example, fitted neatly into the slots vacated by the Zoroastrian priestly class, and the masses became Islamized without serious resistance. Again, when the Qajar dynasty was dethroned by Reza Shah in 1925, most of the nobles and notables went over to the new dynasty, thus preserving their wealth and status, although in this case sharing power with new faces brought in by Reza Shah. The social structure, as it has existed for the last two centuries, is summarized in the following chart. The weight carried by the various groups has varied with particular historical circumstances. Thus Figure 1. The Traditional Social Structure The Ruling Class—The Shah Families of the reigning dynasty Tribal nobility Landlords System-supporting religious leaders Military leaders Traditional Middle Class—Bureaucrats—the civil services which staffed the state apparatus. The bourgeoisie—merchants, traders, businessmen, the bazaarism. The clergy and their students. Lower Class---Workers Peasants Tribal nomads except for a short period of time in the 1950s the Royal Family under both Pahlavis has been kept out of politics. Individual members can affect events through court intrigue and personal influence but none hold executive posts. The tribal nctibility and the landlords have all but disappeared as groups, but as individuals and families may have retained nearly as much power and wealth as in the past. New groups have joined the traditional system; the ruling class now includes an economic elite composed of upwardly mobile members of the lower or bourgeois middle class and former landlords who have turned to business and industry. A new middle class segment has emerged, a professional-burgeueric intelligentsia, in response to the moderating requirements of the country. This class has evered from but not replaced the traditional middle class. Finally, an urban industrial working class draws from the traditional lower classes has appeared. Despite the persistence of the classics, the power of the elite is not unfettered. Even the power class has had mechanisms by which they need being pressure for change. Upward social mobility has always been possible. Lower and lower-middle class individuals

SECRET have moved into the political elite to become prime ministers, even shahs, as typified by Reza Shah. Gardeners, water carriers, stable boys and cobblers have climbed to positions of power. Channels for this upward mobility have been few and scattered, but there are enough examples to provide credibility. Normally, entry into the ruling class has been controlled by the political elite themselves through sponsorship of selected individuals, and the ever-present possibility of advancement has served to deflect demands for structural changes. The ability to co-opt has been an important mechanism for obtaining new blood without sacrificing the old system. Thus, the Shah today obtains the technical skills and modern expertise he needs to carry on his reform program. Whether the new arrivals in the elite will become part of the traditional establishment as they have in the past, or become the nucleus of reformers capable of altering the status quo remains an open question. Informal contacts provide the real motion in Iranian political life, and two key elements in the functioning of the Iranian political system are the death, or circle of associates, and family connections. A. The Dowreh The contacts and connections necessary for political or social status often are made through membership in one or more dourehs.* These meet periodically to promote mutual interests, and while the basic reason for the formation of a doureh may be professional, family, religious, or intellectual, the circle's most important function is the building of a network of personal ties to assist the members in their political and economic endeavors. If, for example, one member is appointed to a ministerial position, other members of the doureh can expect to move forward politically. Most active politicians belong to several dourehs. Moreover, the dourehs frequently cut across class lines, thus serving to relieve inter-class pressures and animosities. In this function, the doureh also serves as a mechanism for the non-elite to move into the elite status. A typical dowreh, the “French-doctorate group,” met weekly for 25 years. In one three-year period its 11 members included a prime minister, three cabinet ministers, two senators, three ambassadors, the director of the National Oil Company and the president of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce. Another prominent dowreh, in this case a poker club, included General Hossein Fardust, then Deputy Chief of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK); the late General Mohammad Khatami, Chief of the Air Force, Taqi Alavi-Kia, brother of a retired SAVAK general, who is a builder with lucrative contracts for Air Force housing. This dowreh had direct contact with the Shah through Fardust and Khatami, and in addition Fardust enjoys the confidence of Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister. Alavi-Kia provides a channel to the business and commercial worlds through his own contacts and those of his brother, who is engaged in the agro-business industry. B. The Families “No man, in spite of his riches, can succeed without his family and without their backing him by their deeds and their words. They are the greatest people to protect him, to congregate around him, to give sympathy when disasters strike... Do not exchange anything for blood kinship, and do not be ashamed of it. Whoever holds his hand away from his tribe will only be holding back the hand of one individual, while many hands will be held away from him.” (Iman Ali, founder of Shiah sect of Islam.) Below the monarchy, Iranian society is dominated as it always has been by a relatively small group of elite families, which wield power and influence not only in politics but also in business, commerce and the professions. Members of these families move from government to political jobs to private pursuits and back again with facility, and indeed their political influence may be nearly as great when they are in private life as in public office.* The large elite families frequently will have sub-families which fall into one or another of the middle classes. The latter may profit from the association, though not becoming part of the political elite. So again, the boundaries of the class system are blurred and the chance of true class conflict is lessened. The principal criterion for membership in the elite of Qajar times was wealth to buy land, office and political power. At the end of the 19th century the principal offices, whether for local tax collector or cabinet minister were, in effect, auctioned off at the annual New Year's ceremony. Low birth or social status was no obstacle to high position. In actual practice, most of the peasant population was cut off from the means of attaining wealth and hence from political power. Once obtained, however, either by personal ability or, more likely, by sponsorship of an already influential person, social acceptance and political power followed almost automatically. Land ownership was an essential part of elite status. An aspiring individual, as for example, a military officer, could affirm his high position by becoming a landowner. The national elite, concentrated mostly in Tehran, buttressed its wealth and influence by high office, investment and other opportunities available in the capital. The provincial elite was more dependent on land for their wealth and influence and depended on representation in parliament to protect its interests. Although new faces often did enter the elite, over time much of the political power tended to be passed around within the same group of families. The change of dynasty in 1925 produced a new crop of elite personalities, but these quickly became indistinguishable from the bulk of the influentials who easily transferred their allegiance from the Qajars to the Pahlavis. Bill identifies 40 national elite families, of whom a dozen have been predominant in the 20th century. An additional 150-160 families are provincial elites who exert deep influence in a relatively limited area. As individuals, some 250 persons are considered the most politically influential, with a handful near the Shah the most powerful (see sect. II, C). Bill's findings are accepted in this paper. They accord well with the more impressionistic conclusions of official observers over a long period of time. Even today, 50 years after the dynasty disappeared, perhaps 20 percent of the families, including most of the top 40, were prominent under the Qajars. The immediate family of the Qajars lived in political obscurity under Reza Shah although maintaining a sort of shadow court among themselves, and a few served the Pahlavis in minor capacities. Although many of the Qajar period elite made their peace with Reza Shah, others, depending on the closeness of their relationship and loyalty to the Qajars, barely hung Figure 2. The Top Forty Families Adl ^{{*}} Hakimi Afkhami ^{{*}} Hedayat Akbar ^{{*}} Jahanbani Alam ^{{*}} Khajenuri A'lam Khalatbary Amini Mahdavi Ardalan ^{{*}} Mansur ^{{*}} Ashtiyani Pahlavi ^{{*}} Bakhtiyari Panahi Bayat ^{{*}} Pirnia Bushehri Qaraqozlu ^{{*}} Daftari Qashqa'i Diba ^{{*}} Qavam Dowlatshahi Saffari Ebrahimi Sami'i ^{{*}} Emami Vakili Emami-Khoy Vossuq Eqbal Zand Esfandari ^{{*}} Zanganeh Farmanfarmayan ^{{*}} Zolfaqari These should be considered core families. Besides interrelationships among those named, nearly every family has other relatives with different names clustered around it.

on But it is worthwhile noting their capacity to survive. Speaking of the period following the dispossession of the Qajars by Reza Shah, a British scholar wrote "The sons of this aristocracy, which was in danger of being eclipsed and in perpetual danger of being deprived of its wealth between 1925 and 1944, survived to take a leading part in affairs after Reza Shah's abdication. They became deputies in parliament and their families names, Pirnia, Amini, Hedayat, Bushihri, etc., were to reappear in public affairs along side the new men, the sons of their former clients and dependents. History has not yet done with Iran's old landed aristocracy; nor with those newly rich creatures of the Pahlavi regime who emulated them and who have also invested in land." C Monarchy At the top of the whole political and social structure is the Shah. His style of rule—the norm in the traditional Middle East**—has six dominant characteristics: 1) Personalism: the ruler governs through his personal relationships rather than formal bureaucratic organizations. 2) Proximity: those who are closest to the person of the leader are the most influential. 3) Informality: political control and authority are exerted through informal, often covert, channels rather than formal institutions such as political parties or legislatures. 4) Balanced conflict: the leader, as well as most of his subordinates, governs through a divide and rule policy, encouraging conflict among rivals but ready to shift positions in order to maintain a balance among conflicting groups and personalities. 5) Military prowess and personal courage: a military force at the disposal of the leader is essential in this system. The warrior-hero is an admired figure in Middle Eastern history and success (or failure) on the battlefield has important impact on domestic political position of the leader. 6) Religious rationalization: traditional Middle Eastern rulers have attempted to rationalize their rule by linking it in some manner with the divine. II. THE MONARCH, HIS FAMILY AND COURT "In every time and age God (be He exalted) chooses one member of the human race and having adorned and endowed him with kingly virtues, entrusts him with the interests of the world and the well-being of His servants" (Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092)) The Shah of Iran has been on his throne 34 years, far longer than any other leader in the Middle East. He has not only outlived most of these rulers but has outlasted the many official and unofficial observers who, two decades ago, were confidently predicting his imminent downfall. His longevity can be seen as resulting from a combination of circumstances, cultural, historical and political, which not only favored the development of an authoritarian ruler but also permitted the present Shah to become that ruler. The Pahlavi dynasty, of which Mohammad Reza is the second Shah, does not have a long history. In 1925, the Iranian parliament granted the throne to Reza Khan, a general who four years earlier had been one of the leaders of a coup d'etat. But if the dynasty does not have the weight of years to support its right SECRET to rule it does have an even more important weight of national tradition. Even in those periods when Persian ^{*} was in chaos, and this was frequently the case, somewhere there was a Shah. He was often of foreign origin but—like the later Caesars—he assumed the traditional authority associated with the office. The tradition—the myth—of kingship has been stronger than any dynasty or any individual ruler. These could and did disappear as they became unable to hold the support of important segments of the population or as they failed to protect themselves and their territory against rivals. The Shah, however, remained. A key role in the persistence of the tradition of kingship has been played by a classic Persian poem, the Shahname, the Book of the Kings. Written by Ferdowsi in the 10th century A.D. the Shakname celebrated the heroic deeds of Iran's Shahs. Although both the Shahs and the deeds were mostly mythical, this mythology became for millions of Persians in later centuries the true history of Iran. The Shakname also marked the rebirth of Persian as a language of literature and culture after being eclipsed for three centuries by Arabic. So, throughout the Iranian cultural area the deeds of mythical kings recited in Persian, even when the mother language was Turkish, Kurdish, Baluchi or any one of several other languages, became imbedded in the consciousnesses of generation after generation. That there should be a Shah, then, became the natural order of things; who that Shah might be as an individual is of less concern. Both Pahlavis have been concerned with establishing the legitimacy of the dynasty and their right to rule. Mohammad Reza, perhaps realizing that the modern education he is pushing will eventually undermine the monarchical mystique, has devoted a significant amount of official propaganda to the thesis that the monarchy is essential, effective and the only institution capable of developing the country "the Iranian way" rather than the imported, foreign way. Such propaganda would have been inconceivable in an earlier age when the monarch's position as the Shadow of God on earth was undisputed. To the institutional argument the Shah has added the argument that he as a person has always defended Iran's interests from outside assaults and that he is uniquely qualified to do so.* He is also building his own semi-mythological version of modern Iranian history in which he, from the very beginning, has struggled against nearly overwhelming odds, including opposition from the British, Americans and Russians, to secure Iran's independence and welfare.** A. The Pahlavis The dynasty's founder, at least in his earlier years, seemed to feel the lack of a respectable monarchical tradition and encouraged the creation of a mythical genealogy which alleged that he was descended from an early royal family. This was also reflected in the family name he chose; Pahlavi occurs often in the Shahname in connection with the deeds and attributes of the mythical monarchs. Reza Shah had four wives—although not all at one time—in an ascending degree of social prominence from his first, probably a concubine whom he married in his early years, to a princess of the previous Qajar dynasty whom he married just as he was about to be declared Shah. His second wife, the daughter of a commanding officer of the Cossack brigade*** in which he served, is the mother of the present Shah. Reza Shah, although a man of limited formal education, was intelligent and well-informed. He realized that his successor would face a more complicated world than he did and he attempted to prepare his Crown Prince for the throne he would someday ascend. Mohammad Reza received his primary education in a palace school with his brother and several other selected boys. At age 12, he was then

Figure 4. Reza Shah as a Cossack General sent to school in Switzerland, with his brothers, two boyhood friends and a Persian tutor. It was here that Mohammad Reza received the fundamentals of the Western education on which he was to build in later years. Returning to Iran he attended the military academy and after graduation in 1938 he became, in effect, an apprentice to his father. Reza Shah was not a man one bandied words with and it is unlikely that the son did much more than listen. Reza Shah seems to have inspired both fear and admiration in his Crown Prince and he set an example which, it appears, the latter has since tried to emulate. The apprenticeship did not last long. Reza Shah, in his drive to modernize and to squeeze out traditional British and Russian influence in Iran had turned to the Germans in the 1930s. Several thousand Germans were in Iran when World War II broke out and their presence provided the excuse for the joint British-Soviet invasion in the summer of 1941 which secured Iran as a safe transit route for supplies to the Soviet Union. Reza Shah abdicated and the present Shah ascended the throne with the reluctant agreement of Great Britain and the Soviet Union which, it seems, had initially intended to eliminate the Pahlavi dynasty. The opening of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign was unpropitious. Although Iran was nominally neutral it was occupied by foreign powers and would soon become an ally of the occupiers. Inflation, financial and commodity manipulation, food shortages at times, verging on starvation and a chaotic political situation produced a turmoil that would have challenged the abilities of an experienced monarch. The established politicians, with Reza Shah's iron grip finally removed, were out to promote their own political and financial fortunes. At an early point the Shah apparently tried to emulate his father in dominating the politicians and there was even muttering of a royal dictatorship. This did not last long, however; Mohammad Reza was not the commanding figure his father was and, more importantly, he did not control any of the levers of power, except for the Army which was at that time so demoralized by its defeat by the British and Russians that it was useless in any power play by the Shah. For nearly a decade the Shah appeared to be a weak figure unable and perhaps unwilling to act. He did sometimes take a decisive action e.g., when he took a strong stand against the breakaway province of Azerbaijan and, by military action, expelled its Soviet-dominated government in 1946. In this action he had, however, the support of a strong prime minister with the same aim and the backing of the US. The Shah—or at least the Court—was said to have been implicated in the assassination of two powerful military men who provided a threat to the Shah's position and the monarch always resisted strongly any attempt to remove the Army from his direct control. In retrospect these years may be seen as formative—the time during which the Shah learned about his country and its power system. Equally Figure 5. Crown Prince Mohammad Reza accompanies his father on an inspection important, he learned a great deal about the rest of the world. He read widely and retained much; he seems to have depended in his early years on two advisers, Mohammad Ali Forughi and Hossein Alaqab, both of whom ultimately served him as prime minister. Both were generally esteemed for their learning, their wide experience and, what is more rare, their lack of personal ambition. Neither, however, was an outstanding prime minister. The Shah also tried out his developing ideas in private conversations with foreign diplomatic representatives, primarily the American and the British ambassadors. The general trend of their advice, that the Shah should try to be a constitutional monarch, that he should reign and not rule, was a concept that in the end he found unworkable. The vacillation and indecisiveness which he displayed during the first third of his reign can be seen as a conflict between his Swiss-acquired concepts of democracy fortified by well-intentioned advice on the one hand and a desire to emulate his father bolstered by the realities of Iranian political behavior on the SECRET other. A prime minister weak enough to present no danger to the throne was incapable of spurring a lethargic bureaucracy into action; a prime minister strong enough to attack Iran's problems seemed to consider the Shah the first bastion to be reduced. The Shah's apprenticeship ended with the Prime Ministry of Mohammad Mossadeq (1951-1953). Mossadeq combined a unique inability to get things done with a tenacious resolve to reduce the Shah to the status of a figurehead. His supporters contributed mightily to both. A heterogeneous collection of parties, cliques and individuals called the National Front, they were united by only two things, a hatred for the British and an intense dislike of the Pahlavis. When members of this motley melange were not inveighing against the British they were attacking each other with equal enthusiasm. This disunity was ultimately a key fact in Mossadeq's downfall. The Prime Minister's main accomplishment, however, has ^{*} The National Front coalition ranged the political spectrum from the moderate socialism of Allahyar Saleh's Iran Party to the religious reaction of Ayatollah Kashani's Warriors of Islam.

SECRET Figure 6. Major Events in Life of Mohammad Raza Shah 1919 Born in Tehran 1926 Reza Khan crowned Shah of Iran; Mohammad Reza declared Crown Prince 1936 Returns to Tehran; enrolls in military academy 1939 Marries Princess Fawziah of Egypt, divorced 1948 1941 Reza Shah abdicates; Mohammad Keza takes oath as Shah of Iran; Tudeh Party established in Tehran 1946 Russian Army withdraws from Azerbaijan 1951 Marries Soraya Esfandiari, divorced 1959 1950 Announces intention to divide lands among peasants 1951 Dr. Muhammad Mossadeq becomes Prime Minister; nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1953 Fall of Dr. Mossadeq; Shan reassumes power 1959 Marries Farah Diba 1960 Birth of Crown Prince Rêza Cyrus 1963 Announces White Revolution; countrywide riots and demonstrations put down with force 1967 Formal coronation of Mohammad Reza Shah and Queen Farah 1971 Celebration of 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy never been undone. The national canon of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was a move on which every Iranian could agree. Once done, however, the less exciting task of resuming production proved impossible.* The Shah has since depicted the nationalization as an act for which he was personally responsible in spite of obstructionism by the National Front. To reduce the Shah to a figurehead, or at least to the role of a constitutional monarch, it was necessary to remove the Army from Mohammad Reza's control. Mossadeq's attempt to do this precipitated his own downfall and created the conditions that permitted the Shah to assume the dominant position he holds today. Figure 7. An early picture of the 8th In Augus: 1955, after months of political maneuvering that progressively weakened the Shah's position he determined on an action, which in the climate of the time was an act of near desperation—the removal of Mossadeq by a royal decree. He entrusted the Firman to the commander of the Royal Guard for delivery to Mossadeq. The Prime Minister refused the Firman and had the officer arrested, announcing triumphantly that a coup against him had been thwarted. The Shah, who had proudly withdrawn to a Caspian resort while this was going on, decided that he had lost the game and flew to safety in Rome. Pro-Mossadeq mobs, butressed by Communist Party organizers, poured into the streets, rearing down states of the Shah and his father, detacing public buildings and demanding that the dynasty by blotted out in favor of a republic. The violence of the assault on the monarchy and the apparent strength of the Communists for once drew together the unorganized and hitherto inarticulate pro-Shah elements and within two days a reaction set in. Military units loyal to the Shah spearheaded a move against Mossadeq in which they were joined by thousands of Tehranis, some bought, but most participating spontaneously. Loyalists, whose voices had been muffled by the overwhelming cacophony of the Mossadeqists for three years, had their day. Mossadeq fled to be captured later, tried and sentenced finally to exile to his village. General Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed Prime Minister and the Shah returned to public acclaim. Figure 8. The Shah's Reform Program proposed at a meeting of Iranian Form Cooperatives in January 1963. Subsequently ratified by a popular referendum. Points 7-14 were added in later years. Ever since that time the Shah has believed that the Iranian people have given him a mandate to act on their behalf. From that point he was increasingly confident. In the next decade he would clash with a few strong men but without exception he outmaneuvered and neutralized them. 3. Public sale of state-owned factories to finance land reform 1. Land Reform 2. Nationalization of forests 4. Amendment of electoral law to include women 5. Profit sharing in industry 6. Creation of a Literacy Corps 7. Creation of a Health Corps 8. Creation of a Reconstruction and Development Corps 9. Creation of House of Equity, i.e. rural courts 10. Nationalization of water resources 11. National reconstruction 12. Administrative and educational revolution 13. Sale of corporate stock to workers 14. Control of inflation The announcement of his extensive reform program in 1963 was the culmination of the process by which the Shah gathered all power into his own hands and took a direct responsibility for Iran's future. In the years since then his programs, although probably falling short of the brilliant achievement portrayed in SECRET official propaganda have been sufficiently effective to set Iran on a new course of economic and social development. B. The Royal Family Reza Shah had 11 acknowledged children. Ten of them are still alive. They and their wives and children, the Shah's mother, plus Queen Farah and her mother comprise the Royal Family. The Shah's own household has provided him with one of his major problems for most of his reign. The Court was at one time a center of licentiousness and depravity, of corruption and influence peddling. The image may have softened somewhat, or is less the subject of common gossip, but the old picture remains in the public mind and some of the derelictions continue but perhaps with more discretion. Two members of the Shah's immediate family seem to have had the most influence on him in the past. His mother, now an octogenarian harridan brought up in the harem, held the Shah in contempt in his earlier days as unworthy of her husband. She was frequently reported as plotting against Mohammad Reza to replace him with her other son Ali. The Shah's twin sister, Ashraf, has a near legendary reputation for financial corruption and for successfully pursuing young men. Her more recent role as a supporter of women's organizations, rights and activities in Iran and in international forums has been largely the work of the Shah who probably not only wished to improve the game of the Royal Family but also to put Ashraf's considerable energy and abilities to socially acceptable use. She has occasionally tried to use her position to build a personal political following, a move that has brought the Shah's displeasure. On the positive side, Ashraf's devotion to her twin brother has never been questioned and she was probably responsible for stiffening his backbone at critical junctures in the past. The Shah has been unwilling or unable to take effective action to curb the shady activities she and her son Shahram engage in. He may truly be unaware of the extent of such activities; the occasional attempt to point out her manipulations to him have sent him into a blood spots. Perhaps the natural success of twins creates a blood spot, although he is sensitive to her political intrigues. At any rate, the periodic anti-corruption campaigns which the Shah

Note: Except for Reza Shah all marriages were serial and not concurrent. Figure 9. Pahlavi Family (Partial) Figure 10. Princess Astrad launches would have greater believability if he saw fit to publicly reproach Ashraf. The rest of the Royal Family is a mixed bag. None have any abilities or following which could challenge the Shah, and they appear mostly engaged in private pursuits. The Shah's oldest half-brother, Gholam Reza, has an official military position but it is a sinecure. Others have semi-official protocol jobs. Abdol Reza, the one Prince who might have developed a competence and personality, has voluntarily withdrawn himself from the family circle and another one, Hamid Reza, has been drummed out of the family and is no longer recognized as a prince. He apparently had been in touch with General Timur Bakhtiar who in the 1960s was plotting against the Shah. Queen Farah and her mother stand in sharp contrast to the Shah's family. The Shah married Farah Dibs in 1959 after two previous marriages.* Both were unsuccessful from a dynastic standpoint; Figure 11. Queen Fanch the only issue was a daughter Shahniaz, now 35, born to Fawzia, the Shah's first wife. Farah, who was 21 when she married the Shah, promptly fulfilled her primary duty of providing a Crown Prince Reza Cyrus, born in 1960. She followed this with another son and two daughters. Of almost equal importance, however, is the role she has come to play as Queen. More public spirited than either of the Shah's previous Queens, she plays a prominent role in promoting the Shah's programs and has been able to present a more constructive image of the monarchy than had previously been the case. The Shah's confidence in her ability was demonstrated when he arranged to have her designated as Regent if he should die or become incapacitated before the Crown Prince comes of age. The Crown Prince is now 15 years old. In the last three or four years he has been getting more public exposure. His activities have been reported in the newspapers, he has visited the provinces and has made trips abroad. Reza Cyrus is being educated privately and it is not clear how much of a hand the Shah has in his son's training. The Shah has been careful about predicting too much for his son; "A king of the future will be able to do a great deal of good if

Figure 12. The Royal Family he is willing. On the other hand, we are fixing things so he can do no harm."* Whether on the throne or waiting to ascend it, Reza Cyrus will have Mohammad Reza looking over his shoulder. (For more detail on Royal Family, see Annex A.) The Court Entourage Surrounding the Shah and the Royal Family is a large coterie of persons either holding official or semi-official positions on the staff of one or another member of the family, or simple hangers-on, friends or clients of the Court or one of its members. These persons range from the intelligent, capable and competent to the drones, sycophants and self-servers. Overall the balance is probably on the mediocre side. Little is known about the majority of those who circulate around the princes and the princesses although a few, by reason of their notoriety, have come to the attention of official observers. The Shah's circle is much better known. Figure 13. Crown Prince Korea The Ministry of the Royal Court. This Ministry is the bureaucratic entity which houses all those officials serving the Shah and other members of the Royal Family. It is not considered a cabinet ministry. Although the precise organization fluctuates, the people remain pretty much the same. As of 1975, 30 persons headed various units of the Ministry of Court. Most of them also have staffs under them but, with few exceptions, there is no information on them. Under the Qajars and earlier Shahs the entire governmental apparatus was considered the personal staff of the Shah. With the modernization of the government, starting under the Qajars and continuing to the present, bureaucracy moved out from under the direct control of the Shah. The need for a personal staff continued, however, and the Ministry of Court was the result. Personal loyalty to the Shah, and reciprocity, the Shah's trust, has been the principal requirement for holders of any of these offices. This accounts in part for the longevity, the mediocre character of many of the incumbents, and the interrelationships of many of the Court personnel. Many of Reza Shah's officials carried over into the present Shah's reign and served him for many years. Age has eliminated most of these but their never replacements show every evidence of maintaining in turn the same sort of longevity. Anyone seeking favors or influence is likely to do so if at all possible through some member of the Ministry of Court as even the lowest ranking person is apt to provide a better access than regular burnarcotic channels. The average age of the top 10 officials of the Court is about 58. This is comparatively young compared to earlier court bureaucracies. The oldest (currently on the job) is 79 and the youngest is 40. Eight of the 10 have had some foreign education, two in the U.K., one in the US and the others scattered, Turkey, France, Lebanon and Switzerland. Some of the top 10 have been associated with the Court for more than 30 years. The head of the Court bureaucracy is the Minister of Court, a title which seems to have been first used in 1941. This post has usually been held by a senior politician, respected, experienced and trusted. In the last 35 years all have been ex-prime ministers. The present incumbent, Amir Assadollah Alam is one of the youngest, he was 48 when the Shah appointed him in 1966. His two immediate predecessors had been 75 and 68 respectively when they first held this office. Alam has been associated with the Court and with the Shah since childhood. His family has been important in eastern Iran for generations.* It was subsidized by the British for a long time, a practice London followed in much of the area to protect the approaches to its Indian Empire. Amir Assadollah was Minister of the Interior in 1952 at the age of 32, the youngest man ever to hold a cabinet position in Iran. In 1957 he formed, at the behest of the Shah, a loyal opposition party. He served for 20 months as Prime Minister, then became Minister of Court. The Chief of the Imperial Special Office. A position also described as "Chief of the Shah's personal ^{*} See Annex B for more detail. SECRET Figure 14 Aak Post-Posted Alarm, Minister of Court secretariat" and "Private Secretary to the Shah," is second only to the Minister of Court in importance and in some matters may be even more important. The present incumbent, Noscatloth Moinian has held the job since the winter of 1966. He was a newcomer in the Court but not to the Iranian bureaucracy. He does not seem to come from an influential family since he earned a law degree in night school while working for the Railway Administration. Soon thereafter he turned to newspaper writing. During the Shah's dispute with Mossadeq, Moinian came out for the Shah. After Mossadeq's downfall, Moinian was appointed an assistant to the director of publications and broadcasting. He had the backing of two influential pro-Shah publishers and almost certainly the approval of the Shah. Moinian rose steadily through the hierarchy becoming a cabinet minister in 1964. He apparently became close to the Shah while he was directing the Shah's anti-communist press campaign in the late 1950s and early 1960s. When Rahim Hirad retired after many years in the post, the Shah showed

his appreciation for Moinian's efforts on behalf of the throne by appointing him to his present post. There is no reason why Moinian should not hold this position for the rest of his life providing he remains on good terms with the Shah and the sensitivity of the position's suggests that the Shah would not move him for frivolous reasons. The Chief of the Queen's Special Office heads the private secretariat of the Queen, but it appears that Farah has not been able to choose her own candidate for the post. Her first secretary was Fazlollah Nabil, a professional diplomat, son of a diplomat and longtime friend of elder statesman, Hossein Ala who probably engineered the appointment.* Farah's current secretary is Karim Pasha Bahadori who owes his position probably to Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda and/or Princess Ashraf. His major job seems to be to screen any petitions to the Queen to make sure that she has only a limited ability to take independent action, a practice which the Queen is aware of. Bahadori is from a prominent Azerbaijan family which has long been influential in politics. He married into an important merchant-trader family. Neither family is of the national elite but both have been important in provincial affairs and their future seems assured. The Inner Circle The Shah's inner circle at present includes a dozen people who have official positions but whose standing with the Shah is totally dependent on his placing trust and confidence in them. They have the most influence with the Shah and they provide channels of access to important segments of the population. They are the first group in Fig. 15. Others are in the Shah's entourage but appear to serve a different function. The three senators in group two are best described as cronies of the Shah, and the three officials in group three may be considered candidates for the inner circle.* The Shah's link with the military and security officials is through one of his oldest friends, Major General Hossein Fardust. He was one of those chosen to be educated with Mohammad Reza in the special elementary school established for that purpose. Little is known of Fardust's family background. His father was a sergeant—later promoted to captain—who probably was associated with Reza Shah in his pre-monarchical days; he might have been Reza Shah's orderly. Hossein Fardust accompanied the Shah to Le Rosey School in Switzerland and to the Military College in Tehran. Except for a brief period he has always held important positions and had great authority even though his military promotions have been at or near normal rate. Mohammad Reza may have used him as early as 1941 as a go-between with the German Embassy. Fardust is the long time chief of the Shah's Special Intelligence Office, he was concurrently deputy chief of SAVAK and at present heads the Imperial Inspectorate which functions as the Shah's watchdog over government operations. He is quiet, unassuming and meticulous in carrying out his duties. Fardust is well-off financially but is considered personally honest. In his own words, "Whatever I have, I have through the grace of the Palace." Dr. Abdol Karim Ayadi, the Shah's personal physician, appears to be the major channel through which the Shah dabbles in commercial affairs. He is also said to have been a childhood friend of the Shah. He was chief medical officer of the Imperial Guard Division and is a Lieutenant General. It is said that Ayadi even accompanied the Shah on his honeymoon with his second wife, Soraya. Ayadi was reported at one time as fronting for the Shah in the Southern Iran. Fishing Company, an enterprise described by knowledgeable observers as a mass of inefficiency and corruption whose board of directors was filled with retired generals. The scandal involved in this business Figure 15. The Shah's Inner Circle Chief, Imperial Inspectorate\minister of Court\shah's personal physician\chairman of the Board, NIOC\prime Minister\imam Jomeh of Tehran\president of Senate\ambassador to the US\private Secretary to the Shah\brother-in-law of Shah and\commander of the Air Force\wife of Shah\twin sister Fardust, Major General Hossein\nAlam, Amir Assadollah\nAyadi, Dr. Abdol Karim\nEqbal, Dr. Manuchehr\nHoveda, Amir Abbas\emami, Hassan\sharif-Emami, Jaafar\zahedi, Ardeshir\nMoinian, Nosratollah\nKhatami, General Mohammad Amir Senator\senator\senator Farah\ashraf Aalam, Jamshid\nDavalu, Amir Hushang\nAqayan, Felix Ansari, Hushang\nSabeti, Parviz\nNassiri, Nematollah was apparently so great that the whole company was reorganized and put under different management. Ayadi, a Bahai, is credited by one observer with being one of those who protects the sect against persecution by the more fanatical Iranian Moslems. Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, a physician, is from one of the 40 national elite families. He provides a link between the Shah and various business and professional personalities. For more than a century the Eqbal has been powerful in the province of Khorassan. Manuchehr was a protege of Ahmad Qavam, the most powerful politician of the late 1940s. Eqbal has been Prime Minister, Minister of Court, and has held at least six other cabinet posts. He has been a parliamentary deputy, a senator, an ambassador, a civil adjutant to the Shah, and chancellor of the University of Tehran. He is at present Chairman of the Board of the National Iranian Oil Company. Eqbal is a competent administrator but has been described as a "consummate demagogue." When he became Prime Minister in 1957, he disappointed many of his supporters by being a complete yes-man for the Shah. From a personal point of view, however, this was a wise decision; his subsequent career has been notably successful. Eqbal's daughter, Maryam, married and divorced the Shah's half-brother, Mahmud Reza, and later married Ashraf's son, Shahyar. Amir Abbas Hoveyda achieved his membership in the Shah's inner circle when he became Prime Minister. A true measure of the Shah's trust in him will be to see if he retains his position in the circle after he is no longer Prime Minister. Since 1955, three of the four living former prime ministers who preceded Hoveyda have remained close to the Shah.* Hoveyda is reported to be from a Bahai family, a fact which he would understandably wish to keep quiet. His grandfather, a tailor from Qazvin, is said to have been a follower of the founder of Bahaism and his father a secretary to the Bahai leader in Acre. This would account for Hoveyda's early education in Beirut. Hoveyda's father eventually entered the diplomatic corps and served in relatively minor posts.

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to total membership in each group. Figure 17. Gen. Hossein Fordust, Chief of the Imperial Inspectorate Hoveyda's career well illustrates the upward mobility possible in the Iranian system and one way in which it can be done. Hoveyda, now 57, was a professional diplomat from 1944 after he finished military service, until 1958 when he left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for greener pastures. Important to the future Prime Minister's career was his friendship with Hassan Ali Manaur and Abdollah Entezam when all three served in the Iranian Consulate in Stuttgart immediately after World War II. Abdollah Entezarn, from a family that was prominent in politics under the Qajars, achieved high diplomatic rank. When he left the diplomatic service to become Director of the National Iranian Oil Company—1958, he chose Hoveyda as his special assistant. Two years later in 1960, Hoveyda became a member of the board of directors of NIOC and was thus in a strategic position when Hassan Ali Mansur started forming his cabinet. SECRET Figure 18. Gen. Abdol Karim Ayodi, Personal Physician of the Shah Mansur, a member of one of the top 40 families whose father had been prime minister, served in a number of increasingly important positions after his Stuttgart days including Secretary-General of the High Economic Council and a cabinet ministry. He finally caught the Shah's eye as a safe establishment reformer and when he was appointed Prime Minister he turned to his old colleague Hoveyda to assume the post of Minister of Finance. Mansur was assassinated in 1965 and the Shah appointed Hoveyda Prime Minister. Thus, in a space of two decades with the help of two influential friends, Amir Abbas Hoveyda rose from a vice-consul to the second highest position in the country. Hassan Emami, the Imam Jomeh of Tehran, ^{**} is the major clerical figure in the Shah's retinue. By

Figure 19. Manuchehr Eqbal, Chairman of the Board, National Iranian Oil Co. virtue of his position he has some religious and political influence but as a firm supporter of the Shah's regime he swings little weight with most of the clergy. He has always had extensive political connections, however, and it is primarily in this field that he is of most use to the Shah. He is now 72 and may not play his role much longer, but he is active and frequently sees the Shah. Emami is a descendant of the Qajar royal family and both his grandfather and father held the post of Imam Jomeh before Hassan. As far as is known, Hassan, Emami has no sons to succeed him. How did a traditional theological education but is not so old as the first rate theologian or Islamic jurist. He does, however, have an excellent European education, an LL.D from Lausanne, and is much more familiar with European history and philosophy than the average high-ranking Shiah clergyman. Figure 20. Prime Minister Amir Abbas Noveyda Jr. Jh. Sharif Emami, 65 year-old president of the Soviet states and other veteran government official and politician, with some reputation for venality. He has extensive business interests, especially in the construction industry, although a conflict of interest law forbids this. He was a long time civil servant in the Railway Administration, at one time a key element in Reza Shah's modernization. He was trained as an engineer in Germany and was jailed during World War II for pro-German activities. He has held a variety of subcabinets and cabinet-level jobs. Sharif Emami is generally considered responsible for leading the Soviets in 1958 to believe that Iran would be receptive to a non-aggression pact. It is possible that he was acting at the Shah's behest in an effort to persuade the US to increase economic and military aid. At any rate, although the Shah was said to have been embarrassed by the unexpected arrival of a high-level Soviet delegation prepared to negotiate a pact, the incident did not hurt Sharif-Emami's career; he was later chosen by the Shah to be Prime Minister. The circumstances under which he came to the attention of the Shah are not known. Possibly he played a role in restoring the Shah to the throne in 1953. He has a long association with the Rashidian brothers and his sister was married to the late Ahmad Aramesh. The Rashidian organization was influential in the anti-Mossadeqist and pro-monarchist movement in 1953 and Aramesh was part of their organization. Ardeshir Zahedi, currently Iran's Ambassador to the United States, started at the top. His first government job, at the age of 33, was as the Iranian Ambassador to the United States (1960 to 1962). He came to the Shah's attention in the course of the events which accompanied the ouster of Mossadeq in mid-1953. Ardeshir, who had been forced by Mossadeq to resign from his job with a US-sponsored rural improvement project, served as a liaison between groups of the Shah's supporters and his father, General Fazlollah Zahedi, who finally ousted the Prime Minister. After the fall of Mossadeq, the Shah rewarded Ardeshir by appointing him to the ceremonial post of civil adjutant. When General Zahedi fell from favor in 1955 and was sent into respectable exile as a roving Ambassador in Europe, Ardeshir temporarily disappeared from the Court but he soon returned and in 1957 married Shahnaz, then the Shah's only daughter. Three years later he was appointed Ambassador to the United States and after that Ambassador to the U.K. In both jobs he performed in a mediocre manner. He remained in the Shah's favor, however, even after his divorce from Shahnaz in 1964. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1967 to 1969 and then returned to Washington. The Shah suffered the loss of one of his most trusted inner circle in September 1975 when General Mohammad Khatami, the Air Force chief and husband of the Shah's youngest sister, was killed in a gliding accident. Khatami, who had been the Shah's pilot when the monarch fled Iran in 1953, was generally believed to have been in a key position to influence events in the case of the Shah's demise. The Zahedis are from an influential former landowning family from Hamadan and had connections with at least two of the top 40 families, the Pirnia and the Qaraqozlu. The increasing age of the Shah's intimates—the average age is nearly 60—raises the problem of their replacement. With the possible exception of General SECRET Nematollah Nassiri, chief of the Security Organization (SAVAK), there appears to be no one on the scene who could play the same role as most of the present incumbents. The complete, if self-serving, loyalty they give the Shah may not be easy to find in a newer generation. Perhaps more important, the Shah might not feel the same degree of trust in newer associates as he does in the older ones who, when he needed them most, stood by him. The Shah then may find himself relying on a progressively smaller and aging group of advisers, well-attuned to the Shah but less in tune with needs of the country. N. THE BUREAUCRACY "I consider the Shah more wise and more discerning and more knowledgeable in the details of affairs than all other beings. The alteration, transfer, adaptation, and ordering of affairs and officials has always been reserved to His Majesty alone and is still reserved to the dictates of the Exalted Will. If you find the present situation good, keep things as they are; if you find it bad, change them." (The reply of Nasr-ed-Din Shah's Minister of Finance to a request from the Shah that the cabinet try to bring order out of the bureaucratic chaos in 1881.) A. The Uncivil Servants The Persians have always had a bureaucratic tradition. The Achemenids and the later Sassanians had a sophisticated organization whose influence persisted after the dynasties disappeared; the governmental organization of the Arab empire in the centuries after the death of Mohammad owes much to the Persian expertise. Repeated invasions of that area by Mongols and Turks shattered but did not destroy the Persian bureaucracy. Indeed the Turkish and Mongol chiefs once they had imposed their hegemony by force found it necessary, as had the Arabs before them, to call on the administrative skills and experience of Persian officialdom to rule their new possessions. This bureaucracy in general appears to have had no great difficulty in switching its allegiance and even when national government was in chaos as it frequently was, local officials continued to hold the line, waiting to see who their new masters would be. The oriental bureaucratic tradition was embodied in manuals complied through the centuries by various officials as an aid in explaining to their illiterate and uncouth masters how a civilized government should work. This tradition held sway as late as the 1920s

SECRET although from 1850 on there was increasing import of European governmental styles. Under the Pahlavis, modern methods have been imposed, and new bureaucrats no longer learn from the old manuals. But old traditions die hard and the foreign-educated official trying, often vainly, to impose order on his unwieldy domain may be unaware that he is facing an institution far older than the Harvard Business School. He often loses the fight and becomes indistinguishable, except for dress, from his predecessor of a century ago, or he goes to modern industry where new traditions are being formed. Today's Prime Minister and cabinet preside over a bureaucratic empire of more than three-quarters of a million white- and blue-collar workers. As with practically everything else, a major problem is finding people with the education and training needed to meet the increasing demands of the many new and accelerated programs under wav in the country. Figure 21 shows the development of the bureaucracy in the 16 years from 1956 to 1972.* Figure 21. Total Government Employees Percent Increase Year 1956 1958 1972 1956-1972 Men 430,109 605,833 682,000 62 Women 30,678 56,831 92,800 202 Total 450,787 662,664 774,800 72 Only 13 percent of the white-collar workers are educated above high school The grafting of new administrative forms on traditional bureaucratic structures has not been a complete success. Government service has been prized as a relatively safe job in an economy where uncertainty has been the rule and as an opportunity to improve one's generally meager salary by accumulating bakhahish. Even the lowest ranking civil servant has considered his position a personal fiedom and has jealously guarded the prerogatives that he or his predecessors have managed to accumulate. In this attitude he is little different from the tax collector of a century ago for whom tax records were personal property to be handed down to his son.* Under these circumstances, persons wishing service from the bureaucracy have been well-advised to pay a "finders fee," to assure that an official's special knowledge and competence would be brought to bear on his case. The very low rate of official pay was in part predicated on the tacit assumption that unofficial supplementary income would be available. The rate of "tipping," however, has usually been negotiable and tailored to fit the circumstances. An office receptionist, himself of low rank socially, might, for a few cents, make sure that one visitor was given priority over others in seeing a higher-ranking official, if the visitor was of equal or lower position in the pecking order. If the receptionist judged the visitor to be his superior he might accord him priority because of this but in return the visitor might well reward the receptionist with a tip. On a much higher level this system produced the kind of corruption which is frequently the target of the Shah's ire, primarily because it involves government funds. The sort of high-level corruption case that results in prosecutions, imprisonment or dismissal is used as an object lesson to discourage similar conduct on the part of others and as proof that the Shah does not condone corruption. Whether or not it accomplishes either object is an open question. The cynics, and they are in the majority, can point to a large number of unhung rascals who appear to be The traditional clues to social status are breaking down in Iran as Westernization spreads. Intuitive judgments are made on the basis of dress, the presence or absence of neckties, a shirt with a collar, headgear, not only the type but the condition, traditional or Western shoes. Speech and demeanor play a role. An obviously rustic accent will usually get less consideration from the sophisticated (by definition). Tehranic civil servant than a more urban sounding accent. Deferrential terms of address are expected but if the petitioner overdoes this it may be taken as a deliberate insult by the hearer. Subordinates generally assume a characteristic deferential position in the presence of superiors, real or fancied. Women may be more difficult to judge if they wear, as many still do, the traditional chador, a garment which covers them from head to ankle. Even so, clues may be gained from the type and condition of the material, and a glimpse of the footgear or the clothing beneath may help. The chador may cover a cotton print of an urban lower class woman, pants suit or miniskirt and high heels of a middle class or upwardly mobile aspirant, or the long-bloomers of a village woman. But this would be Pishkesh, a gift and not bakkhishik, a donation. SECRET immune, and personal or political vendettas may be as responsible for many prosecutions as official investigations. The problem of extra-legal emoluments is, of course, not unique to Iran but in Iran it has become more institutionalized than is usually the case elsewhere. Today, there is much more money flowing through more hands than ever before and the opportunities for graft are correspondingly greater. Graft pervades the entire system in spite of periodic campaigns of the Shah to stamp it out. B. The Cabinet At the top of the bureaucracy is the cabinet. Under the constitution the two houses of parliament are given considerable authority over the cabinet. The Shah appoints the cabinet but under the constitution the ministers are responsible to parliament, must appear before parliament to answer questions if asked to do so and the cabinet or any minister may be dismissed by a no-confidence vote by a majority of either house. Although not legally required, both houses of parliament customary give a “vote of inclination” to a prime minister designate. In times of intense political activity this has had the effect of a vote of confidence. In current practice the Shah's cabinet choices are not questioned and if a minister were to receive a no-confidence vote it would be because the Shah wanted it. Cabinet officers have always been drawn from a limited pool of talent and appointments have in the past been made more for political than substantive reasons. Rapid cabinet turnover has, until recent decades, been the norm and periods of maximum cabinet stability have been periods of minimum political freedom. In periods of instability, cabinet officers have been chosen more often for the influence they have had in certain segments of society than for the ability to do the job. From the beginning of constitutional government in 1907 until 1975 there have been about 120 different cabinets but only 38 prime ministers. Two prime ministers each headed 11 different cabinets. One of these first held the post in 1922, the last time in 1983. The other one served off and on between 1910 and 1928. The average cabinet life has been about seven months, but one was as short as a month. At the peak of Reza Shah's autocracy cabinet life averaged about one and one-half years but one cabinet served with only slight changes for nearly five years. Prime SECRET Minister Hoveyda has now been in office for an unprecedented 11 years. There has been considerable turnover in cabinet personnel during this time but the character of the cabinet has changed very little. In the past decade the Shah has not had an easy time assembling a team which combined technical competence and loyalty to himself. One can make a good case for the argument that the Shah's dominance could have come about only after the old generation of politicians had passed away and the younger, better educated generation had come to maturity. The old generation sought personal power and prestige through political position. The present generation of officials seems to seek the same goals through technical competence, avoiding the proftless attempt to win national political influence. Nineteen different men have served Mohammad Reza as prime minister for a total of 26 different governments in the last 34 years. It was 20 years before the Shah could find as prime minister a man who had not started his career under Reza Shah. Mohammad Reza's first prime minister in 1941 had also been Reza Shah's first prime minister in 1925 and Ali Mansur, to whom the Shah turned in 1950 had also served in the same capacity for Reza Shah 10 years earlier. Nearly 15 years later, Mansur's son became prime minister. At least one politician, Ahmad Qavam to whom the Shah turned three times, had been prime minister under the last of the Qajar Shah and even the prime minister who was to become Mohammad Reza's bote noire, Mohammad Mossadeq, had first served in a Qajar cabinet. The present cabinet can be seen as a lineal descendant of a dowreh established by a former cabinet minister, Hassan Ali Mansur, about 1959. The nine men, drawn together by professional and social association, were a youngish group with an average age of about 37. They could be called establishment reformers with a strong component of political self-interest. Eight of them were foreign-educated, four of them in France. Except for Mansur, Figure 22. Mansur's Original Downs Mansur, Hassan Ali Hoveyda, Amir Abbas Sarlak, Mohammad Taqi Kalali, Manuchehr Khajenuri, Mohsen Hedayati, Hadi Sotudeh, Fathollah Shadman, Zia ed-Din Nikpay, Gholsm Reza

SECRET a private citizen but a former cabinet minister, all were middle level bureaucrats. Hoveyda was at the time special assistant to Abdollah Entezam, Chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company. At least three others in the group, Kalali, Nikpay, Hedayati were from important, long established families and a third, Sarlak, had married into the Khalatbari family, one of the top 40. Another member represents a familiar way of getting ahead, political opportunism. Mohsen Khajenuri ^{*} was once described by a colleague by referring to a story about Mollah Nasreddin. The Mollah, as a prank, started to tell people that gold coins were being given out at the other end of town. As everyone began to run in that direction the Mollah joined them, "because it is possible that the story is true." He is of middle-class merchant background but his father was well enough known to be selected as a parliamentary representative of the Tehran merchants in the First Majlis (1906). Mohsen Khajenuri started his career as a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Labor in 1947 but had retired by the time he became associated with Mansur. He was an urban landowner and had independent means, probably inherited from his merchant father. Khajenuri was an early sympathizer of Mossadeq and the nationalist cause but after Mossadeq's fall he withdrew from any kind of political activity. He probably came into the group through his association with Kalali and Hedayati in labor affairs. The future was provided by the Shah. He apparently regarded the group as competent but Within two years Mansur's dowreh became formalized as "the Progressive Center," with the purpose of conducting research into Iran's social and economic problems. It had expanded to some 200 people, engineers, professors and government employees in the 35 to 50 age group, mostly educated abroad and from well-to-do families. The majority had professional or personal ties with Mansur or with Hoveyda. It was not clear at the time that the organization had any future. pliable enough to serve him as a political vehicle. The two political parties he had promoted had foundered through apathy and he badly needed a new vehicle to push the new programs which he had begun. By mid-1963, the Shah had made it clear that he was backing the Progressive Center. Members of the Center had started to talk of its political future and in December 1963 when it converted itself to the Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, no one was very surprised. The Shah's direct interest was represented by two cabinet ministers whom he ordered to join the new party. Minister of Roads Nosratollah Moinian, later to become Chief of the Shah's Special Office, and Minister of Labor Ataollah Khosrovani, who stayed in the cabinet for another three and a half years—he had an eight year tenure in all. Khosrovani later became Secretary General of the Iran Novin Party and left the cabinet finally after a dispute with Prime Minister Hoveyda. He retained the Shah's confidence, however, and in mid-1974 he was secretly assigned by the Shah to restudy completely the Iran Novin Party with a view to reorganizing it. The report which he coauthored was probably in part responsible for the Shah's decision to dissolve the Party in 1975. Three men in the present cabinet have served since Mansur's day, although not members of the original dowreh, Minister of Interior Jamshid Amuzegar, Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mansur Ruhani and Minister of Culture and Art Mehrdad Pahlbod. In March 1965 Mansur was appointed Prime Minister. The Iran Novin now numbered several hundred; all of Mansur's original dowrth were on its Central Committee. Six of the eight original members of the dowrth who remained after Mansur's assassination subsequently served as cabinet ministers, the seventh was appointed to the Senate by the Shah and the last served as Mayor of Tehran before finally retiring to private life. In mid-1975, Hoveyda, Hedayati and Kalali were still in the cabinet, the latter two as Ministers of State. The average age of Mansur's cabinet in 1964 was about 46 years, five or six years older than immediately preceding cabinets. Hoveyda's first cabinets were about the same average age but slowly started to increase to the present average age of about 51.* The Shah at 16 is now the old man," in all respects. With some exceptions all the cabinet ministers in the last 10 years have had graduate level training, most of them abroad. ** Until mid-1967 the majority of the cabinet was educated in France but in the course of a major re-shuffle in October 1967 the American-educated came to the fore, with France remaining a close second. In the last two years, those with a mostly Iranian higher education have become more numerous and the French-educated run second, the US has moved to third place. It is not clear at this point whether or not this situation represents deliberate "Iranization," a theme that the Shah and his officials are increasingly emphasizing, or the availability of a growing pool of Iranian educated talent. The Shah takes an active part in making cabinet appointments and changes. The reasons for changes are not always clear; some are for incompetency or ill-health, but others reflect the Shah's interest in cutting down empire builders who might become too influential or represent his attempt to keep various cabinet members at odds with each other in order to avoid dangerous coalitions. Some changes reflected personal conflicts and squabbling within the Iran Novin Party. At one time a major point of contention was between members of the Progressive Center closely associated with Mansur and the newer members of the Iran Novin Party. The replacement of Minister of Health Manuchehr Shahqoli by Anushirvan Puyan is said to have resulted from the latter's support of a national government health scheme proposed by Princess Ashraf. Shahqoli was a major proponent of the existing private health care system. The Turkish cabinet has shown a similar pattern. From 1961 to 1965, the average age of a cabinet member was about 51. In late 1965, the Justice Party came into power with a substantial parliamentary majority after several years of unstable coalitions. The average age of the JP cabinets was 46. Four years later it had climbed back to nearly 51. (Aram Nigogosian, "Changes in the Social Background of the Turkish Political Elites: An Examination of Ministerial Recruitment and Circulation from 1961-1970," Paper presented at the 7th Annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, 7-11 November 1973, Milwaukee. The exceptions are Mehrdad Pahibod and Hushang Ansari. Information, on their educational attainments is so scanty and conflicting as to suggest an attempt at obfuscation. The reasons for the length of tenure of some of the cabinet members is not obvious, for others it is clearer. Minister of Culture Pahlbod obviously owes his position and tenure to his brother-in-law, the Shah. He is married to Shams, the Shah's older sister. Minister of Interior Jamshid Amuzegar has long been considered a favorite of the Shah. He served in the cabinet as early as 1958 and never joined a political party until 1975 when he, and every other politician, joined the Shah's new "Resurgence party." He soon emerged as leader of one of the two wings of the party which appeared at the Shah's behest. His appointment as Minister of Interior in early 1974 was officially explained as motivated by the Shah's desire to have a non-politician in charge of the ministry concerned with the 1975 elections. Predictably, it was also said that the transfer was to remove him from the positions of influence which he had attained in other cabinet posts and to build up a rival in the person of the new Minister of Finance Hushang Ansari. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Mansur Ruhani appears to have established his position by his ability to get things done. He is considered a Hoveyda man who is also well-liked by the Shah, an unbeatable combination at present. He survived several policy disputes with cabinet colleagues, the most recent in early 1974 with then Minister of Cooperatives Abdol Azim Valian. Ruhani, the Minister of Agriculture, apparently was pushing for large-scale agricultural enterprises, such as agro-business ventures, to develop Iranian agriculture while Valian was arguing for more emphasis on rural cooperatives. Valian apparently lost this argument and was given a new job as Governor General of Khorassan Province. Ruhani prevailed in a similar disagreement in 1970 with the Director of the Plan Organization Mehdi Sami'i. Ruhani, then Minister of Water and Power, wanted his ministry to control all development of water resources including underground water and all related activity, such as land development, water and power, design of farms, water distribution, road building, etc. Sami'i felt the individual farmer should have jurisdiction over things directly affecting him. That same year Sami'i was transferred to the Central Bank. Additionally, in the April 1974 cabinet reorganization Ruhani appears to have picked up some additional responsibility for water resources. The presumption is strong then that the Shah's preferred path for agricultural development lies in the direction of large-scale

operations rather than in the development of the small individual farmer.* The Ministers of War and of Foreign Affairs are probably more figureheads than the others. The Shah takes a direct hand in the affairs of these two ministries and he may not even consult to any extent with the responsible ministers before he makes decisions. The Minister of War has always been a senior general, six have held the post in the 22 years since Mossadeq's overthrow. The early ones had political influence and were from the military elite families who rose to positions of power under Reza Shah. Two of them had served with him in the Cossack Brigade. The later ones appear to have no particular influence and their cabinet position seems to be just one more military assignment in their total career. The Minister of War is likely to be the oldest member of the cabinet, the average age of the six is about 60 years. Nine different men have held the post of Foreign Minister in the last 22 years, and three of these have been in the last decade. Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah's former son-in-law and at present Ambassador to the United States, had the longest tenure, nearly four years. An Iranian Foreign Office Undersecretary recently commented that the Shah often makes a foreign policy statement without any previous Ministry input. At that point the Ministry's only job is to devise ways of implementing the decision. Other information tends to bear out that this is the way much of Iran's foreign policy is made, and Ambassadors are usually careful to refer back to the Shah for instructions. Whether or not the Shah intervenes as deeply in other ministries is not clear. It seems safe to assume Iranian oil affairs are under his direct control. It also seems safe to assume that those ministers who have served for long periods of time owe their tenure in some measure to their ability to interpret and carry out the Shah's programs without making a false step. One non-governmental Iranian source, speculating on the sources of the Shah's policy ideas, finally wondered if the Shah did not rely on a secret group of hired foreign advisers. This would enable the Shah to make policy without relying on any particular group of Iranians and enhance the Shah's image as a talented leader and statesman. The source was not prepared to accept that the Shah was a genius in so many unrelated fields; there was no known group to do policy planning and individual advisers did not take credit among their colleagues for having suggested plans to the Shah. Foreign input, therefore, was the only explanation the source could think of. This ingenious explanation is interesting primarily as illustrating the difficulty which even a well-educated and presumably knowledgeable Iranian has in explaining rationally the sources of Iranian policy. The Cabinet, then, must be considered as primarily an implementer of the Shah's policy rather than a policy-making body itself. Although individual cabinet officers probably do contribute elements which go into the Shah's thinking, it would be as individuals that they have the ear of the Shah and not as cabinet members. IV. PARLIAMENT The first session of the lower house of parliament, the Majlis (majlis-e-showra-ye-melli, National Consultative Assembly) opened in October 1906. Since that time there have been 23 sessions of the Majlis. Until 1956 the Majlis was elected for two years but since that time the term has been four years. A. History and Composition With minor exceptions the Majlis has never operated under conditions which would be considered normal in a parliamentary government. In the first 17 years of its existence—1906 to 1923—the Majlis was in session six and one-half years. Only the fourth Majlis ended normally in 1923. For the next 18 years—the fifth through the 13th Majlis—parliament acted as a rubber stamp for Reza Shah. Elections followed one after the other in a near normal sequence but there was no significant opposition. After the Russo-British invasion in the summer of 1941 and the abdication of Reza Shah, electoral campaigns became primarily contests between vested interests in each constituency, with the government, usually the prime minister, exerting influence wherever possible through the Ministry of the Interior. During the period of the Soviet and British occupation these two powers had a strong influence in the choice of deputies from areas under their control. From about 1946 until 1961 the Magis sessions were marked by warning factions attempting to protect and promote personal interests. The few constructive measures that did manage to get passed usually died in the implementation. The outstanding exception—nationalization of the British-controlled oil industry—was so popular and easily understood that implementation was almost immediate. The result, however, was an economic crisis that was to have an effect for many years. It was not until 1963, 40 years after his father brought the Majlis under control, that Mohammad Reza Shah finally was able to have elected a parliament which he could control in 1963. In the last decade, the 21st, 22nd and 23rd sessions have played for Mohammad Reza Shah. The newly elected 24th Majlis will play the same role. The differing aims of the two royal dictators produced tame parliaments of different coloration. In both cases the primary requirement for a deputy was that he support the Shah's program. Any other qualification was irrelevant. Under Reza Shah agricultural reform had low priority. He therefore did not come into conflict with the traditional large landowners, except insofar as they were influential in the dynasty he overthrew, and the Majlis was landlord dominated. Indeed, new families who arose with Reza Shah solidified their positions by becoming landowners themselves. Had Reza Shah attempted to dispossess the landlords their opposition on the local level such as have before the work of centralization which he was attempting. A keystone of the present Shah's White Revolution was land reform which meant that landlord influence in the Majlis had to go. In retrospect it appears that Mohammad Reza's success was due as much to the decline in the power and influence of the landlord system as to his own determination. The landlords had been overtaken by history, Mohammad Reza Shah gave them the push which formalized their demise. Parliament was traditionally dominated by landlords and disproportionately by members of the top 40 families. From the first through the 21st Majlis (1906-1967)* each of these 40 families average four deputies each. Figure 23 is a breakdown for the first 23 Majlis sessions according to claimed occupation. The information is unavailable for the last two assemblies. One category that certainly has disappeared formally is the landlords who by definition no longer exist. Another characteristic of the parliamentary representation is the progressively higher level of education. Figure 24 indicates the educational sophistication of Majlis members from the first through the 20th legislative periods. The figures in this table refer only to modern as opposed to traditional, religious-oriented educational levels. One of the noticeable trends over the last half-century of Iranian legislative politics has been the increasing percentage of deputies who have modern as opposed to traditional educations. In the early Majises, an average of nearly 60 percent of the deputies were trained in the traditional manner. Today, less than ten percent come from such a background. Another trend has been the increasing percentage of deputies who have received their formal education abroad. One-third of the deputies of the 21st Majlis (1963-1967), for example, had received their higher education outside of Iran. During the first Constitutional Period which included the first five Majhises (1906-1926), the average proportion of deputies holding college degrees was 18 percent. During the second period (1926-1941) which includes the 6th through the 13th Majhises, the percentage dropped slightly to 14 percent. But over the third Constitutional Period covering the 14th through 20th Majhises (1941-1963) the percentage of deputies with kaccatae create degrees and beyond increased to 36 percent. Comprehensive information is not available for recent deputies but a sampling of the information which is available suggests that the trend continues upward. The Iranian political elite then is an increasingly well-educated group. In terms of the basic issues of class and change, this reflects the fact that increasing numbers of the intelligentsia are being absorbed into the elite. In the summer of 1960 elections were held on schedule for the 20th Majlis. Election-rigging was so widespread and obvious that the Shah annulled these elections. A few months later new elections were carried out. There were not free from regularities either, but parliament assembled for business. Little was done. The country was in economic trouble but parliament, dominated by the landlords with 99 out of 176 seats, was unable to act. In this, however, they were no worse than the government as a whole.

SECRET Figure 23. Majlis Deputies According to Occupation

*Not available. Source: Iran Almanac, 1972, p. 115. 1—Landlords 2—Businessmen 3—Religious Men 4—Government Employees 5—Employees of Private Institutions 6—Workers 7—Unknown Figure 24. Modern Education* Levels of Majlis Deputies During Twenty Legislative Periods, 1906–1963 (In Percent)

*This is the secular education system as opposed to the traditional religious education that centered on the maktab and madressahs. Many of the Deputies, especially those members of the earlier Majlises, had received traditional education. Source: Zuhrah Shaji'i, The Representatives of the National Consultative Assembly During the Twenty-one Legislative Periods. (Tehran, 1965), p. 226. In Persian. SECRET Amini was appointed Prime Minister in May 1961 but he apparently accepted the job only on condition that parliament be dissolved. This the Shah did immediately and for more than two years “executive decrees” substituted for legislation. There is no doubt that this interim was illegal. Article 48 of the Constitution requires that whenever the Shah dissolves parliament new elections must be held within one month and parliament must meet again within three months. What few complaints were raised were ignored. The executive decrees were presumably ratified in later years when parliament again was in session. Although Amini had wanted the Majlis prorogued in order to have a free hand it was the Shah who made maximum use of the long recess; the White Revolution was announced and land reform in particular got underway. In January 1963 the Shah asked for a national referendum on his programs and received an overwhelming endorsement. A massive and carefully staged “Congress of the Movement of Free Women and Free Men of Iran,” was held at the end of August 1963 and endorsed a slate of candidates to stand for election to the Majlis. The slate was ostensibly selected by the convention’s steering committee but the list was actually drawn up by several task forces and was personally approved by the Shah before it was passed to the convention. There was little doubt in anyone’s mind that this was the list to be elected. B. The New Look Elections to the 21st Majlis were held on 17 September 1963 and nearly all on the approved list were elected. A few last minute substitutions were made by the government when the approved candidate turned out to be completely unsuitable. The Consulate in Isfahan reported five such cases in its area; one approved candidate died before the election, another choice was so widely ridiculed (he was a farmer and candymaker) that he was replaced, another was found to have a Communist-tinged background. The reason for some replacements was not clear. At least one of the new choices was not “elected” until four days after the elections took place, apparently the length of time it took to tidy up the records. Reaction to the choices was mixed. There was puzzlement as to the identity of many of the candidates. At least two provincial governors-general protested personally to the Shah that the foisting of so many unknowns on their local communities would cause trouble. On the other hand there was satisfaction that so many of the old notorious parliamentarians had disappeared; only some 18 veterans of previous parliaments showed up in the new one. Some oddities were elected, a national wrestling champion, with nothing else to recommend him, and a movie and TV actor who specialized in country bumpkin parts; he was probably the most authentic peasant in the widely-heralded peasants’ parliament. The new parliament suggested a break with the past. Eighty percent of the new deputies were between 30 and 50 years of age, 81 percent were serving for the first time, 69 percent were or had been government employees and 67 percent had university degrees. Most of the new deputies had a modest technical competence in their professional fields of specialization—mediocre was the most frequent term the Embassy applied to them in its reports. The Shah’s new deal for women was symbolized by the election of six of them over strong objections from the clergy. The women, three of whom were in the Majlis until 1975, were all from upper or near upper class and two were from top 40 families and related to the Royal family as well. (In the 1975 elections none of the original women deputies were re-elected but at least one made it into the Senate. Overall, more women were elected than previously, five from Tehran alone.) Other major identifiable groups were labor, civil servants and a mixed bag of professional/technical/business types. Little is known of the criteria for selection. A substantial number appear to be updated versions of the traditional types, suggesting that the same local interests which normally rigged the elections still have enough influence to get their candidates recommended to the Shah. The Shah had succeeded in his major objective of obtaining a parliament which looked new, could be expected on general principles to support his programs and which contained no one with an independent following or the likelihood of developing one. The next two Majlis sessions, the 22nd (1967-1971), and the 23rd (1971-1975) were much the same. Some of the more obviously unsuitable deputies were eliminated but many remained until the 1975 upset. SECRET 45

SECRET The Shah chose 1975 as the time for another major change in political alignments. Just as the elections for the 21st, Aflajiv were preceded by the Shah's encouragement of a new political structure, so the elections for the 24th, Aflajiv were preceded by the formation of a new party, the National Resurgence Party of Iran (Rastakhiz-e-Mellat-e-Iran).* In the former case the Shah was experimenting with the idea of a loyal opposition, in the latter case he is experimenting with the idea of a mass party to which all will pledge allegiance. Differing views on the implementation of the Shah's policies will be represented by two wings within the party, one led by Minister of Finance Hoshang Aswari, the other by Minister of Interior Jamshid Amuzegar. Hoveyda remains as a supra-factional Secretary General. The elections to the 24th Majlis produced a large crop of new faces to support the new party and the Shah's reforms. He has effectively broken up any independent power base which any deputy might have been building by reason of his longevity and re-emphasized that he is the only source of power and influence that counts on a national scale. The Shah has added two new points to his 12 point reform program, sale of shares in private and government-owned industries to the workers and light against inflation, and these apparently will be the major tasks of the new Majlis. C. Elections—True or False? Iranian elections have nearly always been rigged. There was no consistent pattern in this rigging, at least until Mohammad Reza became dominant in the early 1960s. In any constituency the deputies elected usually represented the choice of the most powerful faction or persons in the area. This could be the major landlord or group of landowners, tribal chief or military commander. The government or the Court might carry weight in some constituencies and these two factors were frequently in conflict in the elections. A great deal of horsetrading was done both within constituencies and on a national level. In the Majlis itself deputies formed groups—generally called fractions—to support and protect local causes or promote the political fortunes of individual leaders. These fractions were usually fluid and short-lived. The elections did produce parliaments representative of the major interests in each constituency but not, of course, representative of the population, which at any rate had neither the ability nor the organization to articulate their interests. After 1963, the Court, in the person of the Shah, emerged as the major power center rather than as one of several. The Court and the government were one rather than in conflict as often the case in the past. The two political parties claimed to represent popular interests; in actual fact they appeared responsive to most of the local special interests which formerly exerted power without the intermediary of the party. There were free to do so only as long as they supported the Shah's reform program. Information on the elections held in mid-1975 is still insufficient to be certain how, if at all, the situation has changed. "Safe" candidates were still pre-selected by virtue of the fact that local election commissions were given the initial job of choosing who would stand for election. It is hard to imagine that traditional forces did not frequently have an influential voice. In some areas prominent personalities who were not recommended by local boards complained bitterly to party headquarters and were told that local recommendations were not binding on the party's executive committee that made the final choices. In one case, at least, a candidate not recommended by the local board was a winner.** An additional safeguard was provided by the screening of the proposed candidates in Tehran by SAVAK and a security committee. SAVAK, it is reported, listed the candidates in order of their desirability. How close the actual results followed SAVAK's recommendation is impossible to say, lacking the SAVAK report. Once the candidates were approved, however, a free, unmanipulated choice apparently was permitted. Reports of electoral irregularities have been few. To what extent competing candidates in a constituency represented traditional competing interests may never be clear, given the lack of information of local political dynamics. In some constituencies, predominantly dominated by large landlords, they not only re-regained their influence. ^{4} *Reporting both official and unofficial in the process to permit being dogmatic on this point but the conclusion is from an examination of many of the individuals who are elected. See Annex B. **Mrs. Qods Monir Jahanbani, wife of General Hossein Jahanbani, won one of the six seats from Shiraz. She is the mother-in-law of Prince Gholam Reza. The Jahanbani family always close to the Coum ranks as one of the top 40. Parliament acts primarily as a rubber stamp for the Shah. Yet it does debate, often acrimoniously, change, amend, logroll and engage in all the other politicking that marks more independent parliaments. Sometimes a deputy will, usually by accident, take a stance which collides with the Shah's wishes; his error is soon pointed out. Majlis activity revolves mostly around details, of more or less importance, of how to best carry out the Shah's programs. The programs themselves are never questioned. Even though the basic charade is recognized by all, membership in the Majlis is sought. It provided some precise locality, it is really bring up one to Tehran where the action is and, with proper attention to the right people, can provide the deputy with entree to other government or business posts when he is no longer in parliament. V. THE SHAH'S ARMY An essential pillar of the Shah's position is his armed forces. As commander-in-chief he directly oversees the military establishment and it gets priority in funds and materiel. This has produced a large well-equipped armed forces who support rather than challenge the M�main. It is basically a conscript force of something less than half a million men: Army Air Force 270,000 Navy 65,000 Gendarmerie 18,000 Other ^{{*}} 75,000 26,000 Total 454,000 *Imperial Household Staff, Infantry Guards Division and Joint Staff. The total military budget in 1974-75 is estimated at between 3.4 to 5.0 billion. Military officers (there are 300 generals), because of the key role they play in maintaining the stability of the regime, have received special attention from the Pahlavi Shahs. But this was not the case before they came to power. During the 150 year rule of the Qajars an organized military structure scarcely was conceivable. Although the presumption of military prowess was inherent in the patrimonial system by which the Qajars governed, the actual power available in the form of armed units was very small. The retainers of the Shah were expected to provide on demand the manpower necessary for any contemplated military action. In the SECRET latter part of the Qajar reign organized units existed mostly on paper. The officers "ate" (the Persian terms) the funds provided for troops maintenance and the soldiers eked on a living as streetswepers, peddlers, servants or beggars. Military engagements were primarily a matter of individual combat with the participants coming and going as they saw fit. Mostly they went. Disastrous defeats in the 19th century by the Russians and the Ottoman Turks who had somewhat more sophisticated organizations never seemed to disabute the Qajar Shahs of the notion that only their presence on the battlefield was necessary to secure victory. The formation of the Russian officered and trained Persian Cossack Brigade (later a Division) in 1878 marked a new departure in Iranian military history but it appears that Nasr-ed-Din Shah esteemed it more for its ceremonial appearance than for its military capabilities.* The Iranians' experience with their armed forces has created a long-standing distrust and dislike between the military and the civilian population. Together with the tax-collectors, the military represented an intrusion by the central government in which the bulk of the population came off second best. Although today's army is more professional and less corrupt the traditional picture remains strong in the public mind. Some of the old style still remains—favoritism, special privileges and corruption—and it will be a long time before the military is accepted as a part of rather than apart from the population as a whole. Reza Shah's policies required a modern, professional army; this he set about organizing as a first priority. It is from this beginning that today's army arose. Nearly all of the military men who entered the elite with Reza Shah had been associated with him in his cossack days or in the campaigns against the tribes in the 1920s. A number of these old comrades of Reza Shah remained to serve Mohammad Reza Shah and until recently played significant roles in Iranian political life. Some of their sons still serve. More and more, however, it appears that the social class from which the officers are being drawn is changing. Elite families were once heavily represented in the officer corps; such representation could help protect

Figure 25. The Shah reviews his officers the family and its interests. From the scanty evidence available, it appears that more and more men from the middle, and even the lower, classes, are coming into the officer corps. In 1974, a source of the US military attache gave his view of the changes: “The social composition of the officer corps is significantly changed from what it was a decade ago... in the past it was a mark of great honor and prestige to serve as an officer in the Iranian army. It was taken for granted that sons of military officers would follow in the same career as their fathers and prominent families avidly sought positions for their sons to serve as military officers. The entire officer corps was then made up of representatives of socially elite, wealthy and prominent families. This situation no longer exists in Iran. Now the sons of prominent families shun military service... careers in industry and business are now much more socially acceptable than they were previously... the material rewards offered by these fields are much greater than those offered in the military.” ^{*} DIIR 6846 0128 74, 11 July Conf. GDS. But almost a decade earlier, at the time when the attache's commentator saw elite families still prominent in the military, another observer was already detecting a change; a participant in a colloquium in France on the role of the military in the Third World noted: "The officer cadres have more and more a tendency to differ from the social classes from which they were previously recruited and that is a tendency as important as it is with us because it influences the mentality of the army. The conservative aristocracy after more than a century in the highest military posts is switching to industry and commerce, yielding place to officers eager for a renaissance and for social justice." The striking similarity of views separated time by eight years, of the two observers, one as Iranian field grade officer, the other a French observer, suggests that important changes are indeed underway. Unfortunately, neither commentator buttresses his arguments with the specific detail necessary to document the changes, nor is such information available in official US reporting. The one overriding fact of Iranian military life is the supreme authority of the Shah. He is not only the commander on paper of the Iranian armed forces but in actual fact exerts this authority. His direction extends not only to policy but to responsibilities which in other systems are delegated to subordinates. He personally approves officer promotions down to the field grade level, makes decisions on the acquisition of major weapons systems and other military hardware, sees to the disposition of troops and in general functions as the commanding officer. Certainly he must look to his senior officers for information and advice. His method of operation provides for multiple, and preferably competing sources, but, as in other spheres, the military commanders' function is to carry out the Shah's wishes. The Shah has been most solicitous of his armed forces, especially his officers, providing subsidized housing, relieving them of income tax and providing tuition-free education for children, all of this adding up to substantial fringe benefits. In return he demands complete personal loyalty, compliance with his military directives and professional competence. Political generals—once a major thorn in the Shah's side—have been all but eliminated. The Shah Abdol Hossein Hejazi 1961-1965 Bahram Ariana 1966-1969 has always been sensitive to the attempt of any military officer to build an independent following, but he has had to turn to strong military men in times of high tension, notably General Ali Razmara in 1951 and General Fazlollah Zahedi in 1953. Both served him as prime ministers, he quarreled with both and both were eliminated, Razmara by assassination and Zahedi by being exiled to Europe as Ambassador-at-Large. Again, in 1961, the Shah found it necessary to eliminate three strong and corrupt generals who had built considerable personal followings, National Police Chief Alavi-Moqadam, the Chief of Intelligence for the Joint Commanders Staff Haj Ali Kia, and SAVAK Chief Teimur Bakhtiar. Alavi-Moqadam and Kia retired, the latter becoming more wealthy as a businessman than as a general. Bakhtiar, with greater political ambitions, was exiled to Europe, went in active opposition against the Shah and was assassinated in Iraq in 1970. Long and faithful service to the Shah has not been a sure road to security. It is not always easy to distinguish between personal ambition and professional missteps as reasons for the Shah's dismissal of any particular officer. In the last 14 years there have been four chiefs of the Supreme Commanders Staff (SCS). They are tabulated below together with the most likely reason for their dismissal: Feridun Jam* 1969-1971 Feridun Jam* 1969-1971 Gholam Reza Ashari 1971- Illness. Urged strong military action toward Iraq, Shah dimgreed. Wanted more authority than Shah prepared to grant. The Commanders of the ground forces show a similar pattern: The Commanders of the ground forces show a similar pattern: Ross Azimi 1961-Sep 1966 Illness. Esatollah Zarghami Sep 1966-May 1969 Abrupt replacement interpreted as sign of Shah's dissatisfaction, no specific reason. Fathollah Minbashian** May 1969-Nov 1972 Ignored difficulties arising from modernization of armed forces. Gholam Ali Oveisi** Nov 1972 Other high-ranking officers have been fired for clear professional lapsees: General Palizban, Chief of Counterintelligence, SCS Failure to detect Soviet espionage ring in Army. Lt. Gen. Farokhna, Commander, Gendarmerie Corruption. ^{*} A former brother-in-law of the Shah. **Classmates of the Shah at the military academy.

SECRET On the basis of these examples it seems clear that the major reason for dismissal has been crossing the Shah. Inevitably, the Tehran rumor mill has it that in nearly every case of such dismissal the Shah has been worried about an overly ambitious officer. This could well have been a contingent reason in some instances. There is little solid evidence that any had succeeded or even tried to build a political following, but several because of their competence, leadership ability or popularity in the armed forces, did have a potential. From the Shah's point of view it would make sense to eliminate an officer who had shown too much independence and who was in a position to create a personal power base. The degree of the Shah's displeasure is indicated to some extent by the subsequent fate of those dismissed. Leaving aside those retired for illness, both of whom were given ceremonial positions, Ariana was retired without a new job, but did receive an elaborate retirement party hosted by the Army; Jam was appointed Ambassador to Spain; and Minbashian retired without ceremony. The derelictions of Palizban and Farokhnia are more clear. Palizban learned of his dismissal when the Shah refused to see him as a routine meeting; Farokhnia was jailed. A last case is instructive. General Hassan Pakravan succeeded General Bakhtiar as Chief of SAVAK. A scholar and gentleman in the French style, and a hard drinker, he was a soft-liner in his approach to dissidents. During the 1963 riots, Pakravan's soft approach failed and the demonstrations got out of hand. The Shah called in Police Chief Nassiri who put down the riots with brute force. Pakravan was subsequently removed from SAVAK and made Minister of Information and finally was Ambassador to France for many years. He now has an honorary position as counsellor to the Royal Court. In this case the failure of Pakravan's policy, although extremely serious, called for a milder punishment because the Shah himself had initially concurred in it. But even a series of troops can be forgiven. In 1965, an attempt was made by a conscript member of the Imperial Guard to assess the Shah and he narrowly escaped death. The 19th National, Pakistan emerged from the doghouse and was served by Srinastin from Kermanshah. This would have required the Shah's approval. So, while Palizban was punished for a serious professional�nessing by an subsequently rewarded for his long and devoted service, the Shah and the unlikely possibility that he might become an avid [?] of the Shah was foreclosed. Commander of the Guard, and responsible for the Shah's security, went to the Shah in tears and offered to resign only to be told that he was blameless and should stay on. Hashemi-Nezhad remained in the post several more years before he was appointed to the ceremonial post of Chief of the Shah's military household. A few officers have long tenure in their positions. Some reasons can be adduced but they explain only in part. Gen. Mohammad Khatami, CG IIAF, 1958-1975 Gen. Hassan Tufanian, Chief Military Industries Organization, 1967- Gen. Nematollah Nassiri, Chief, SAVAK 1965 Khatami and Nassiri both had connections with traditionally influential families, probably not a key element in maintaining a relationship with the Shah, but certainly an element which helped them to attain their positions. Khatami and Tufanian were pilots, as is the Shah. Khatami and Nassiri played important roles in the overthrow of Mossadeq and the Shah seems to take that into account. Farokhnia, however, also played a role in the same episode and it did not save him. The Shah may have faced a discrimination here. Farokhnia's corruption was turned up as a result of an investigation by the Imperial Inspection Organization headed by Gen. Fardust. Farokhnia's support of the Shah in 1953 might have been expected to have won him lenient treatment. Fardust's standing with the Shah, however, and the support the Shah has given to the anti-corruption campaign outweighed the earlier service. Khatami was a brother-in-law of the Shah, but Jam has also been, and Nassiri married one of the Shah's ex-mistresses, as had Jam. A fuller explanation of the Shah's treatment of his officers must be sought in the functioning of the patrimonial system. The Shah, as the source of power, rewards and punishes as he sees fit and a rationale is not necessary. An officer in disfavor may be completely in limbo or gently eased into retirement. Since one's fate cannot be predicted, care in avoiding a misstep and the ability to interpret the Shah's wishes accurately become virtues. The system might have been expected to produce nothing but mediocre “yes-men.” This does not seem to be the case. The top command in recent years has generally received good marks for competence from their American counterparts. The senior officers in the Iranian armed forces are a career-oriented, increasingly well-trained group. Most have some military training in the US, with France a close second. All speak either French or English, many both. The social origins, although information is fragmentary, seems to be increasingly middle and even lower class; but a few are still from traditional elite families or have connections with such families. The pattern is likely to be similar in the future. Although the Shah probably aims at "Iranization"—all officers trained only in Iran and by Iranians—it will be many years before he can accomplish this. American training will continue to be predominant so long as political factors make it possible. If the apparent trend toward generally lower class or lower middle class origin for officers continues, there may be some impact on the attitudes of lower and middle grade officers. The surveillance maintained by the security services is likely to work well enough to weed out genuine troublemakers early in their careers. By the time the officer's reach the higher ranks they are likely to become so institutionalized that they fit into their proper place in the Shah's system. Unlike many developing countries, in Iran the military is not the exclusive possessor of modern skills, management expertise and foreign exposure. There is less of an impetus, then, for the officer corps as a body to develop the feeling that only the military can "save the country." Any successor to the Shah will need military support but the military does not seem likely to play a political role as long as the Shah lives. VI. THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY "If you see us mourning it is because we want to show our sincerity toward Imam Husain because we know him as an Imam who fought against tyranny and oppression by God's order. We cry today because we don't want to give up to tyranny. We beat our heads and our chests because we don't want to go under the pressure of dictatorship or accept coercion... we have been crying for 1,000 years; it doesn't matter if we cry for another 10 million in order to bring justice against tyranny. (A leading clergyman in the Tehran bazaar) The Shah considers himself to be religious and claims to be under divine protection. He makes the SECRET. pilgrimages to the holy places and has contributed expensive gifts to Mecca and to shrines in Iraq and Iran. He considers that religion should work in the interests of his reforms, however, and fiercely rejects, as did his father, clerical claims to secular power. Consequently, the Moslem clergy in Iran are among some of the Shah's fiercest critics. Deprived of any official forum for their grievances, the clergy attack the Shah and his regime through sermons, publications and religious observances. A popular and emotional theme is to compare the Shah implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, with the tyrant Yazid who, in the 7th century A.D. was responsible for the murder of the Imam Hossein.* This incident of Shah** religious history is the core of popular Islam as practiced in Iran and it is kept fresh in the memory by the depiction every year in hundreds of locations by dramatic performances depicting in detail the massacre of the Imam Hossein and his family.** Religious opposition has not been directed solely at the present Shah, although the clergy has particular reasons for detesting the Pahlavis. Ever since Shah Islam was established as the state religion in the 16th century the ulama (the Shah clergy) opposed each succeeding monarch. Their opposition has a theological basis, for in essence Shah Islam considers all temporal rulers as�climate. Legitimate guidance in humans affairs can come only from the mojtaheds, religious leaders who are the representatives on earth of the Imam—God's spokesman—and the sole source of authority. Each Shah is required to follow the teachings of a mojtahed. Applying this doctrine to the Shah and other governmental officials, the clergy's view is that the state should ultimately be no more than their executive arm. Other factors have served to strengthen the clergy's hand. The major Shiah centers are in Iraq and thus beyond the immediate reach of the government in Tehran; the clergy has had control of large sums of money, derived from religious tithes that is not subject The emotional impact of these performances is intense, even among some of the more sophisticated and can be compared to the impact that a depiction of the Civilization had on traditional Christmas.

to government control; and until recent times, the clergy had almost exclusive control of law courts and education. The clergy, itself fiercely xenophobic, has also been prominently identified with popular anti-foreign causes. The mojatieds had been held in high regard by most Iranians, if not the most influential, and have developed close ties with the guilds and bazaar merchants, groups that have also felt themselves to be victims of the political elite. The ulama reached the peak of their influence in the 19th and early 20th centuries. They were instrumental in persuading the Shah to launch the second Russo-Iranian war in 1827, and in 1872 they forced Nasr ed-Din Shah to cancel a concession to the British and dismiss the reform-minded prime minister who negotiated it. Late in the century they led a successful mass movement against another British concession, and in 1906 they formed an unlikely coalition with political radicals to force a constitution on a reluctant Shah. More recently, religious leaders were prominent in agitation against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951-53, and they have been constant and virulent critics of the Shah's reform programs on the grounds that such reforms violated religious principles. Bloody riots in the summer of 1963 resulted from the government's attempts to silence a clerical critic. For the last decade several incidents have involved religious leaders and students. The most recent anti-government demonstration in early June 1975 at the religious city of Qom resulted in the arrest of 270 persons. Detailed information on the clergy is not available. There are perhaps 100,000 clergymen ranging from the mullah, the lowest clerical post, to the majiahed. There are, in addition, para-religious personnel, such as prayer writers, chanters and Koran readers. A few years ago, annual income for property controlled by the clergy was estimated at 30 million, and this was in addition to aims for which no estimate is available. One prominent majiahed distributed about 200,000 a month to clergymen dependent on him, to support religious residents, and to provide food for the poor. Probably no more than 10 percent of the clergy receives government support and can be counted as outright supporters of the Shah. They are probably the least influential of the clergy and are considered by many to be no better than government employees. Probably 50 percent are in outright opposition to the government and are wholly dependent on their popular following for support; this includes nearly every religious leader of any stature. The remaining 40 percent qualify as fence-sitters, maintaining a popular following but avoiding overt attacks on the government. Every monarch has had to come to terms with the religious leaders. Until the Pahlavi period, the clergy generally were able to exert great pressure on government. Reza Shah, in his drive to centralize power and modernize Iran, would brook no opposition and moved directly and forcefully to eliminate the political power of the majaheds. Mohammed Reza Shah, of necessity, has followed much the same course. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose arrest touched off serious riots in 1963, was forced into exile in Turkey and later into Iraq. Other clerics have been held under house arrest, and at least one is reported to have died in prison. As in other cases, the Shah holds out the promise of rewards for cooperation together with the near certainty of harsh punishment for opposition. On the whole, the clergy seem to have bent less than other elements of Iranian society. For the Shiah clergy there is no reform in religion or religious dogma but only purification, adaptation or reformulation. The mojiaheds, still have the right of individual interpretation; this has permitted the clergy to meet some of the challenges of modernity. Four times between 1926 and 1941 the Shariah (Moslem legal code) was modified and the civil code of 1928 represented a compromise between Shariah and European law. The family protection law in 1967 finally was acceptable after religious leaders were consulted. The enfranchisement of women was strongly opposed by the clergy and, although the government originally capitulated to clerical pressure it subsequently went ahead, ignoring clerical protests. The religious community, however, is no longer given even the pretense of consultation and those in authority who are charged with making and implementing programs are so secularized as to consider religion irrelevant to their needs. The theological and philosophical basis of religious opposition to the regime, if it remained on that plane, would be harmless to the government. But in the present situation this theoretical underpinning translates itself into several concrete assertions: a. The Shah is establishing a totally secular society, thus destroying Islam. c. In addition, he is surrounded by Bahais whose major interest is also in destroying Islam. **The fact that the two major Bahai centers are in Israel and the United States adds to their mistrust. b. He is supported in this by the United States and the Zionists, both of whom also want to destroy Islam. The bulk of the clergy, and most of their devout following, would probably subscribe to these positions. They do apparently differ on how to meet the challenge. The clergy are not a homogeneous mass, and several tendencies can be identified. For the present, four groups, not necessarily mutually exclusive, can be looked at, the traditionalists and the modernizers, the silent and the violent. By far the largest group of clergy are traditionalists. In their training and outlook they are medieval men. Although their mojahes have the right of interpretation the scope of individual initiative and judgment is still bounded by the precepts established by the early theologians. Their studies, which may commence as early as six years of age and continue until death, include the Koran and its commentaries of the 8th to 12th centuries; traditions of the prophets; religious law, which includes all aspects of man's relationship to society and the government; early Greek philosophy as filtered through the Arab and Persian mind and Arabic language and literature. A course of study may also include traditional mathematics based on Euclid and Ptolemy. The students still sit at the feet of their teachers and memorization is the rule. The best of the traditionalists are deeply learned men, esteemed not only for their learning but also for their piety and their superior ability "to enjoin what is good and to forbid what is evil." But their intellectual world, which once encompassed all a Moslem needed to know, is now only a sliver of the world they actually live in and this realization is coming slowly to some. The modernizers, and there are few, do not reject tradition nor traditional studies. Rather they attempt to re-state traditional doctrine and beliefs in modern terms which will appeal to rather than repel the growing numbers of educated, primarily urban, Iranians who are no longer attracted by the traditional approach. The graduates of the Tehran University Theological School are somewhat apart. The school was founded by Reza Shah in an attempt to break the monopoly of the traditional religious establishment. He only partly succeeded. Graduates of the school are for the most part not accepted as true clergymen and in fact few become clerics or preachers. They go into government service as teachers of religion, Arabic, literature, or occasionally into other professions. At one time the chief of protocol for SAVAK was a graduate of this school. A policy being followed by some prominent mullahs is that of “silence,” in relation to secular authorities. It is summed up in a phrase attributed to one of them; “Our duty is to advise, not to fight.” This policy would avoid confrontation with the authorities in the interests of preserving the religious institutions and its leaders. Both traditionalists and modernists are found in this group. It is likely that many of those religious leaders seen as fence-sitters or as silent opponents of the regime are in fact adhering to this policy. The violent may be only a small proportion of today's clergy (including theological students) but they present a danger out of proportion to their size. Religiously based terrorism is a well-established feature of the Moslem world. The medieval assassins had their headquarters only a few miles from Tehran and in the decade from 1946 to 1956 the Fedayan Islam was responsible for at least three assassinations and three attempts, including one on the Shah. In 1956 the leadership of the Fedayan was executed by the security forces but groups still identifying with the Fedayan continued for many years. The violent strain in Shiah Islam is represented today by the so-called Islamic-Marxists, an unlikely coalition as the Shah and government spokesmen often point out. This combination apparently came about, however, as a result of several things; a deliberate attempt by some anti-government ideologists to construct a philosophy that could be subscribed to by any oppositionist; the intense frustration of many of the religious elements who saw in all the Shah's actions the intention to destroy religion; and the willingness of the communist-derived

The Shah Figure 26. . . . as he would like to be remembered. (Pilgrimage to Mecca) groups to accept the cooperation of the religious types in the interests of overthrowing the Shah.* The organization known as the Mujahadin-e-Khalq, The “People’s Warriors,” ^{**} has been given the blessings of Aj atollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who for a decade has been carrying on his campaign against the Shah from exile in Iraq. The Mujahadin derives, through several intermediate organizations, from an element of the post-Mossadeq National Front. The spiritual predecessors of the present Mujahadin are Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, a University of Tehran faculty member and Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, a prominent cleric, both deeply religious and longtime This situation has antecedents in the 1951-53 period when the Tudeh Party and Mossadeq's National Front cooperated on occasion in their common struggle against the Shah. Their mutual suspicions of each other, however, made effective cooperation impossible. **In many of the sources Mujahadin is rendered as "struggler." It is used, however, to describe a soldier of a holy war and thus creates the feeling of one who fights for a holy or noble cause. It also echoes the Mujahadin-e-Islam, the Warriors of Islam, an organization created by Ayatollah Kashani in the 1950s to support Mossadeq. . as his enemies see him. ("The Deranged Hangman") Ayatollah Khomeini probably should not be considered the leader of the Mujahadin, but his support has encouraged bazaaris to contribute funds, opponents of the Shah. They were leaders in the organizations which preceded the present Mujahadin. They do not seem to be active leaders of the current organization—they are under constant surveillance—but the orientation and the activities they espoused 10 years ago seem to have come to fruition. The violent action, which they urged but were unable to carry out, has now been made possible by a much more professional approach to the business of revolution. Access to the experience and training of foreign terrorists has probably made the difference. The terrorists are both male and female, generally in their twenties and are usually college students or graduates. The technically trained appear to be prominent among them accounting, perhaps, for the increased sophistication of their bombs. Clerics or religious students do not seem to have themselves participated in bombings or assassinations. and religious students who follow him are available to swell demonstrations against the regime. There seems little possibility of a truce between the regime and the religious community. Those of the clergy who are following a policy of silence—and they are probably the majority—are unlikely to be either willing or able to dissuade the Mujahadin from violence. Even should the security forces wipe out the Mujahadin, religious opposition would remain, although less violent. The secularism of the government and the religious conservatism of the clergy appear irreconcilable and there is no spirit of accommodation on either side. From the point of view of US interests the important aspect of the problem is the hostility of a large influential group which has constant access to masses of population. Xenophobia is always just below the surface in Iran. Although masked by the Iranian tradition of hospitality to individuals, it has always been relatively easy to stir up mob feeling against foreigners as an undifferentiated mass, and when this has happened it has almost always had religious overtones. For many years the Soviet Embassy in Tehran has been cultivating the religious leaders. The reasons have probably been two-fold, first, to win acceptance as friends of Islam and second, to make sure that the religious leaders remain anti-US. In both they have been successful. The Soviet Union has emphasized the continued practice of Islam in the USSR, they have distributed expensive copies of the Koran and of Persian classics printed in the Soviet Union.* An additional consideration for the Soviets might be the desire to defuse or anticipate any anti-Soviet reaction which might accompany a generalized xenophobic upsurge. One Soviet contact with the clergy was careful to point out that a major contribution of the US to the Tehran literary scene was pornography and other decadent literature. The most recent example of exploiting this theme followed the assassinations of Colonels Shaffer and Turner. Personal effects of the two men which had been taken by the assassins were subsequently returned. Planted among the genuine effects were copies of Penthouse and Playboy magazines and nude tearouts from these magazines. Apparently the assassins hoped that the newspapers ^{*} See e.g. CS-311/05293, 28 Apr. 1965 C, Noforn; TDFIR 314/02542-74, 10 Apr. 1974 S. Noforn. would pick up the story and give it widercirculation.* Pornography is not unknown to thePersians but the explicit type popular in Europe andthe US is offensive to the religious minded. The factthat most pornography in Tehran is of Americanorigin gives added weight to the charge that the US istrying to destroy the moral basis of Islam and is beingassisted by the government which permits theimportation of such material. The security authorities are aware of many of the Soviet contacts and monitor them. Apparently the Shah has not been worried however, as no protest seems to have been made. As long as no explicit effort is made by the USSR to utilize the clergy against him, the Shah is unlikely to disturb the friendly relations between the two countries by a protest. VII. AN EMERGING ELITE? Some academic investigators believe they see a new potential elite emerging. One of them has called it the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia,** or a professional middle class. Characteristics of this class are described as follows: a. It rejects the traditional power relationships that dominate Iranian society. b. It has or is acquiring a modern higher education as opposed to the traditional religiously-oriented education. c. The power position of this class depends primarily on the skill or talent its members possess as a result of this education. d. It is exposed to a wider range of outside ideas and influences than has been the case with the traditional middle class. e. It has discarded old values and value systems, in effect, no longer looking to Islam as a guide to life. Its members "they have no interest in a past they were never part of and less interest in the gods of that past." In searching for new values some have turned to Bahaism, others to communist or leftist ideologies. The class includes professionals of all kinds, doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, bureaucrats who possess special skills and modern education, technocrats, managers, clerks and students. Included also are writers and artists who in many respects are the spokesmen for this class. *IIR 1 662 0257 75. 8 July 1975 Conf. Noforn. **James Bill in The Politics of Iran.

SECRET Given a free choice, members of this group would probably support any one of a variety of Western-derived political concepts, democracy, socialism, communism and a few even fascism. Paradoxically, a government organized under any of these philosophies would be less rooted in Iranian culture, history and ethos than is the monarchy. And such a government would probably be run by as small a group of people as now do so. For this class to emerge as a new elite, i.e., to make the decisions and policies and hold the power it would have to become so large and entrenched, and perhaps more importantly, organized, that by sheer weight it would prevail. While the class is growing and will continue to do so, there is some doubt that the other requirements will be met in the near future. As we have seen, the traditional Iranian system does make room for new blood, but only if the latter plays the game. Those who do so are rewarded, those who do not are retired or shift to private life or to jobs which utilize their skills but not their ambitions. Many of the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia have chosen to play the game, opening the way for many of them to move into a traditional elite status. In doing so they have, of course, given up one of the major differences which sets this class apart—rejection of conventional power relationships. Rather than becoming a new elite class, conscious of its differences from other classes, the members of this group might simply move into one or more of the existing classes, some joining the traditional elites, some remaining as a dissident minority and the majority remaining as a politically powerless but modernizing middle class. The center for the production of the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia is the universities. Paradoxically, the Shah’s drive for an expanded modern education at the same time tends to increase the size of the class which is the most potentially dangerous to his system. The examination of the university chancellors which follows illustrates the operation of traditional forces on the educational hierarchy.* *If information were available, valuable insights might be gained by examining the structure and functioning of professional organizations, such as those of lawyers, doctors and teachers. More than a decade ago the leader of a teachers organization parlayed his position into enough influence to end up as a Majlis deputy and finally Minister of Education. The role of such organizations in persuading its members to conform to the system (or perhaps to buck it?) should provide clues to the system-shaking potential of the new class. Figure 27. Universities of Iran

Institutions under Development:

Nearly all of Iran’s 10 universities have been established in the last 30 years, the last one 10 years ago. Seven new ones are in the process of organization. Meanwhile, student enrollment has exploded further crowding the already strained facilities. In the early 1970s only one out of every eight applicants to Tehran, Meshed, Tabriz and Esfahan Universities could be placed. The ratio was even worse at Pahlavi. The problems are more than simply quantitative. Higher education in Iran has been a poor melange of French and Iranian educational practices, Figure 28. Students in Institutes of Higher Learning

*Source: For 1922-1970, James A. Bill, Politics of Iran, p. 58; for 1975, A-28 Tehran, 20 February 1975, p. 2. 56 SECRET characterized by rote learning, stress on theory rather than practical application, single-exam system, European-trained faculties which refuse to modernize, superannuated deans and professors advanced on the basis of longevity rather than merit, and part-time teaching staffs. Attempts at modernization began in the early 1960s. In 1967, educational reform was officially added to the Shah’s “White Revolution.” Even today, however, the universities are graduating many with inferior education or unmarketable degrees. In 1975, while university graduates go unemployed, Iran has an estimated shortage of 700,000 skilled workers. The frustration of the unemployed graduate illustrates the danger inherent to an idle intellectual community. The intelligentsia exposed to foreign concepts is the agent of change. These innovators can improve the domestic system and identify with the progress made. If they are excluded by the system, however, they are innovators all the same, but, from without—advocating all types of reform, believing in a myriad of concepts from religious conservatism to communism, united only in their anti-regime sentiments. Iran’s students have expressed their discontent through demonstrations and violence. These disturbances, whether motivated by grievances against the educational system or government policy in general, are troublesome to the regime. University chancellors, the elite of the educational system are more politicians than administrators. Failure to check student disturbances can have an impact on their position. For example, the chancellor of Tehran University was ousted following the 1963 riots and Jehanshah Saleh was appointed to modernize and control the school. The widespread disturbances of 1967-68 resulted in the “resignation” of the chancellors at Iran’s eight important universities. Later on Fazlollah Reza and Alinaqi Alikhani who followed Saleh as chancellors at Tehran, were removed in the wake of other student demonstrations. There are, however, several chancellors whose terms have bridged periods of serious student unrest. For example, Jahanshah Saleh remained at Tehran University from 1963-1968, and was removed for reasons unconnected with student unrest. Reza Amin at Arya Mehr and Manucher Taslimi at Tabriz from 1968-1972 survived student disturbances. Abbas Jame’i, Farhang Mehr, Nasrollah Moqtader-Mozdehi, Qasem Motemedi, Hushang Nahavandi, and S. Hassan Nasr have all weathered the riots of 1974-75. These troubles started as usual, as protests over academic conditions and took on anti-Shah overtones. In these cases, the chancellors were in stronger political positions with fewer enemies to exploit the campus disruptions. In the last 15 years 26 of the 40 chancellors were government officials before their appointments. Seven had been cabinet ministers and one, Assadollah Alam, had been prime minister. Of the 26 who are no longer chancellors, 18 moved into government positions after their removal. Six who had little or no history of political involvement before becoming chancellors filled important government positions later. Thus, university chancellors are often political personalities, and, as such, involved in the high level infighting of the Iranian system. Their futures hinge on the strength of their political and personal affiliations. Several have been members of influential families, by birth or through marriage. For example:

*Safavian’s advancement in academic circles began after his marriage, in July 1959; he became dean of the medical faculty of National University in December of the same year. He was appointed chancellor in 1974. His predecessor was named Minister of Education. SECRET 57

SECRET Others have won the support of powerful members of the elite. Many of their proteges have served as chancellors, using that office as a stepping stone to further political advancement. The career of Hushang Nahavandi, former Minister of Housing and Development under Prime Ministers Mansur and Hoveyda (1963-1968), illustrates how university appointments can be successfully used to form a political base. In 1968, Nahavandi replaced Assadollah Alam as chancellor of Pahlavi University. Although Nahavandi's career has thus far been largely political, he saw Pahlavi as the "job of his dreams" and used it to earn for himself a reputation of competence and, after three years, the chancellorship of Tehran University. While at Tehran, Nahavandi has succeeded in building a power base, centered on a committee he formed for the study of the Shah-People Revolution. Starting only seven years ago as a minor member of the political elite, he is now regarded as a possible political rival to Prime Minister Hoveyda himself. Even the chancellor with connections, however, remains vulnerable to the shifting power structure, the meddling of others with vested interests in educational developments, and the possibility that one day his status, or that of his patron, may be superseded. At times, university appointments have been used to isolate and politically destroy a potential rival. Such was the fate of Alinaqi Alikhani. As Minister of Economy in Hovedya's cabinet from 1967-1969, Alikhani developed a close working relationship with the Shah, thus threatening the Prime Minister's own position. Hoveyda began in a quiet campaign to reduce Alikhani's influence. In July 1969, while out of the country, Alikhani was appointed chancellor of Tehran University. After failing to cope with serious disturbances in May 1971, he was replaced by Nahavandi. A man who was once considered a strong candidate for the prime ministership was politically destroyed by the problems of running the "Mother University." The high degree of political involvement in university affairs has taken its toll on educational reform. The average tenure of a university chancellor over the last 15 years is only slightly more than two years. A chancellor, faced with the difficult task of creating a modern, quality institution, maintaining this level of excellence in the face of burgeoning student enrollment, and keeping the peace on his campus, often is removed before his efforts can be fully implemented. In addition, while the chancellor may himself be a pawn of the political elite, he is the center of power at the university and often has his own retainers. Thus, it is not uncommon for a new chancellor to place his own proteges in the university's higher-echelon administrative positions. One of Montasseri's first acts when he was appointed to Tabriz University in 1967 was to hire six new deans and forty new instructors. Alikhani replaced the deans of the Faculties of Law, Science, Technology, and Medicine at Tehran. Alam ruled Pahlavi in absentia through his protege, Amir Mottaqi. This provided each with a like-minded staff of unquestionable loyalty, but it disrupted the continuity of the educational reform that the Shah was pushing. Recent trends indicate that either the government has become aware of this problem or that the initial chaos of educational modernization has passed. With the exception of National University, recent chancellors of Iran's major universities have enjoyed tenure well beyond the average and the latest changes, at Arya Mehr and Meshed had no political implications. Although power politics and personal ambitions are a fact of life in university appointment, they have not jeopardized the high standards demanded by the importance and nature of the office. The unqualified are never considered and the ineffective are quickly removed, regardless of their personal status. All the chancellors of the last 15 years have received their doctorates at highly reputable foreign universities and many have expelled in their respective fields. Before 1960, chancellors were graduates of French universities, reflecting the Iranian's preference for French higher education and Iran's own adherence to French educational practices. The changing needs of the society led to the founding of the first American-style universities in the early 1960s: Pahlavi, Arya Mehr, National and Polytechnic. The government's commitment to educational reform was reflected in its selection of chancellors. Saleh, Sheikh-ol Eslam, and Davud Kazemi, all of this period, were graduates of American schools. In 1967, Iran's universities were put under a new ministry—charged with making Figure 29. University Chancellor University Chancellor Term Arya Mehr Hasan Nasr 1972-1975 ^{{*}} Esfahan Qasem Motemedi 1969- Gondishapour Abbas Jamei 1970- Meshed Nasrollah Moidehi 1973-1975 ^{{**}} Pahlavi Farhang Mehr 1971- Tabriz Hamid Zahedi 1972- Tehran Hushang Nahavandi 1971- ^{*} Seeking treatment abroad for illness; replaced by Dr. Karim Fatemi. ^{**} Elected to Senate; replaced by Dr. Jalal Matini. education responsive to the society.* Although the Minister of Science and Higher Education, Majid Rahnema, was French educated, his appointees were overwhelmingly American trained. The few exceptions, Nahavandi, Taslimi and Anushirvan Puyan, proved themselves as modernizers. With the talents of these men and continued government support, there has been marked improvement throughout the university system. It will be years, however, before Iranian universities can meet the standards of their European and American counterparts. In the interim, student frustrations will continue to be expressed in politically threatening demonstrations. Thus, until the university can meet the demands of the regime and the students for educational excellence, it will remain a major area of government concern. Consequently, those of the educational elite will continue to function as an appendage of the political elite, gaining and maintaining their positions through not only professional competence but also personal status, important social connection and acquiring as few powerful enemies as possible. VIII. THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE One group of great importance has been almost entirely neglected in this examination of how the Iranian system works. The economic-industrial elite has been growing in importance ever since Reza Shah started his program of industrialization. After World War II this group become increasingly important. In the last decade—with a booming economy and a forced-draft modernization in all sectors—the business-financial class has burgeoned. Little is known of this group in detail. The names of some of the most prominent are well-known, Habib Sabet, the Elqanian, the Vahabzadeh and the Kashani families are, if not household words, widely known as rich and influential.* The details of their interrelationships, business and family, are obscure as are their relationships with members of other elites. Habib Sabet, sometimes referred to as the richest merchant in Iran, has a business relationship with the Shah's sister, Princess Shams. Other such relationships are undoubtedly present but are not on the record. An unpublished academic study—the only such work available—provides some feel for the scope of the industrial elite.** This group is only a sub-class of a broader economic elite, completely unexamined so far as can be determined, which also includes a financial elite, i.e., the bankers. A feature of Iranian industry is the very few establishments which can be characterized as medium sized. Although the figures are rough, about 97 percent of the industrial establishments employ less than 10 people each, but account for 66 percent of the industrial labor force. Industrial units employing more than 100 people are less than 1 percent of the total but they employ about 16 percent of the labor force and account for at least 44 percent of the total value of industrial output. The Enayat study identifies 56 families in an “inner elite,” 77 families in a “sub-elite” and 87 identified as large industrialists. The inner elite participate in nearly half of the 369 companies examined providing 39 percent of the directors of the largest companies and 28 percent of all company directors. More important, however, they are directors, possess a controlling interest or have an equal partnership in

SECRET the 26 conglomerates, industrial groups, or multiproduct companies which dominate the business scene. A large number of the industrial elite are also members of elite groups controlling other private-sector economic activities. At least 65 percent of the inner elite and 32 percent of the sub-elite are dominant in other fields. Many families from these two groups are among the leading merchants in the Tehran bazaar, including most of the large cotton exporters, those with a virtual monopoly of the lucrative trade in dried fruits and nuts and carpets and the largest importers of iron and steel and of automobiles. In addition, the industrial elite includes the three most important families engaged in mining, seven prominent contractors, some of whom also produce building materials, the owners of a film studio and theater, the owners of the first private department store chain established in Iran and owners or part owners of three private large agro-business ventures. The limited data on the social origins of most of the industrial elite indicates that some started their rise under Reza Shah but that most have developed since World War II. A typical example might be seen in the owner of the largest poultry business in the Tehran area (and probably all of Iran) who started his career 15 years ago vending chickens door-to-door by bicycle. Probably none of the industrialists owe their success to their membership in the political elite but a close relationship has certainly developed between the two elites. The Shah may well be on a collision course with many of the large entrepreneurs, businessmen, merchants and financiers who are the sparkplug of the ^{4} Cotton export is said to be controlled by a very tiny group. private sector. In an attempt to control pricefixing, gouging and manipulation, which have been common at all levels and long the cause of public complaints, the Shah has decreed that prices on hundreds of commodities be fixed, that prices be rolled back to this level and that the slightest non-compliance be dealt with by a jail term. Some of Tehran's wealthiest and most prominent businessmen have been sent to jail, usually for minor offenses. This rather simpleminded approach to Iran's corruption problems, together with the royal decree mandating the sale of stock in private concerns to the workers and the public has created a climate of uncertainty which could seriously affect the industrial development of the future. The Shah's head-on assault against the landlords, 15 years ago, succeeded to a large extent because the landlord system itself had become unprofitable and unviable. Similar tactics against a more productive and essential enterprise could backfire. The man reputed to be Iran's richest merchant has fled the country vowing not to return because of the unrealistic business climate. The threat to turn profiteering cases over to military courts is designed both as a warning—the military courts' chief function appears to be to convict not adjudicate—and perhaps a reflection of the government's suspicion that civil courts might be too open to influence by the accused. The various economic reform measures the Shah is taking to make the market place more responsive to his goals could have a backlash if a substantial portion of the industrial and business leaders feel they are under attack or can no longer make the profit (even though exorbitant) to which they have become accustomed. Giyen Iran's heavy dependence on private business a failure of confidence in the private sector could have wide ranging effects: The structure and functioning of the Iranian elite which has been described has shown a high degree of stability throughout the years. Insecure, cynical and mistrustful, the several elements of the elite have made a virtue of compromise and adaptability which has enabled them to survive change with a minimum loss of the personal influence which its members prize. The present elites have found it expedient to bow to the force majeure of a dominating monarch. Nonetheless, personal political ambition as a motivating factor of elite behavior remains beneath the surface. The demise of the present Shah will present the elites with the opportunity to scramble for the power that has been denied them for so long. No successor to the Shah will be able to control the process unless and until he can establish the same sort of overwhelming position as has Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The elites will, however, have to cope with additional challenges. Claimants to power, even if they have not achieved elite status, have traditionally been accommodated in and become part of the system without disrupting it. The elites will be faced with more numerous and more powerful claimants when the present Shah goes than were their ancestors. The professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia is a growing class whose ranks are swelled by many of the changes which the Shah himself is promoting. Their values, attitudes and view of society are markedly different from that of the traditional elites. Although many of them will be absorbed into the existing structure their very numbers assure them of a significant impact on Iranian society. The industrial/commercial elites, fewer in number but increasingly in control of sectors of the economy that are growing rapidly in importance as a result of the Shah's programs, will demand political power. This new elite would normally be accommodated without great strain; their values and attitudes are not all that different from the traditional system. However, the necessity of survival in a post-Shah Iran could lead to cooperation between some elements of the industrial/commercial elites and the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia, a coalition capable of producing a qualitative change in Iranian society. Iranian society has survived over the centuries by absorbing alien concepts and mores and transmitting them into something uniquely Persian. This resiliency is once more being tested and the outcome, although unpredictable, is likely to owe more to traditional Iran than to foreign influence.

ADDITIONAL DATA ON THE IRANIAN ROYAL FAMILY This annex contains additional detail on the Royal Family. Some of the persons discussed here have been mentioned in the main body of the text, others are considered for the first time. In addition some of those who came into the Royal Family by marriage are examined as illustrations of one of the principal points made in the paper, the importance of family connections in achieving status. The Royal Family's record of marriages and divorces, of infidelities and remarriage and of intra-family feuding is typical of many elite families, as is the utilization of family connections for political and financial profit. The Queen Mother The Shah's mother, Taj ol-Moluk, rules the royal household. Her exact age is not known, perhaps not even to her, but she must be in her eighties. She was the daughter of Bagher Khan Mir Panj, the latter two words constituting a military title roughly equivalent to a general. No more is available on Bagher Khan except that his family came from the Caucasus. Taj ol-Moluk had three sisters and one brother. Little information is available on them. Alamtaj, the third sister, married a Col. Minbashian. Minbashian's brother is married to Princess Shams. Another sister married a medical doctor, Senator Mohsen Hejazi. In 1944, Reza Shah died in exile. Shortly thereafter Taj ol-Moluk, then back in Tehran, took as a lover one Gholam Hossein Sahibidvani. They were finally married in 1948. Sahibidvani was considerably younger than Taj ol-Moluk. He was from one branch of the family of Qavam ol-Molk of Shiraz, the most influential family in Fars Province.* Sahibidvani appears to have had no outstanding characteristics except availability. He had a secondary education and served one term in the Majlis as a deputy from Fars, a job he probably got because of his influence with the Queen Mother. He was not re-elected, perhaps he had had a falling out with Taj ol-Moluk, at any rate he dropped from sight for 15 years, emerged briefly in 1963 when he was described as a newspaper publisher A-1 Taj ol-Moluk, the Shah's mother

SECRET in Shiraz, a member of the city council and a possible candidate for the Majlis again. He was not elected and there is no further record for him. Taj ol-Moluk is little seen outside a small circle of friends. Twenty years ago she was described as "aggressive, assertive and suspicious"; age may have curbed but not erased these traits. Former Queen Soraya commenting on the Queen Mother remarks: "Even in my time her ideas still remained entirely those of the harem world in which she had grown up. This does not mean that she had no influence. On the contrary, I could not help but be struck by the fact that the Tehran Court was fundamentally a woman's court. Although officially the woman had no rights of any kind, in practice they knew a thousand tricks and dodges for getting their own way, and sometimes I had the sensation of living in a thoroughgoing matriarchy, at the head of which was the Dowager Empress." As late as 1971, the Queen Mother was still reported as being a major influence on the Shah, and the Court routine included a four times a week dinner which the Shah attended together with the Queen Mother, other members of the Royal Family and a select group of cronies. The Queen Mother is unlikely to play any sort of an influential role in the future; her day has passed together with the conditions which made her role possible. Nevertheless, she has indelibly marked the character of the Shah and the image which the Court will leave in history. Farideh, the Queen's Mother The Queen's mother, Farideh Diba, will take over the senior role now held by the Queen Mother, when the latter dies. She is a very different personality from Taj ol-Moluk. Although little detailed information is available on her relationships with the various members of the Royal Family, she appears to have escaped the gossip which surrounds almost any Iranian in an influential position. The reputation she acquired early for high character and principles and the good affect she has had on the Empress still appear to be characteristic. Younger, better educated and less domineering, she could further improve the popular image of the Royal Family. A-2 Farideh Diba, Queen Farah's mother Princess Ashraf The Shah's twin sister, Ashraf, has been one of the Shah's most ambitious supporters and one of his major liabilities during most of his career. As in the case with most of the Royal Family, little is known about Ashraf's childhood or the relationships within the family. She is said to have been a favorite of Reza Shah but this is denied by former Queen Soraya, who says that "In reality, Ashraf was neglected by her parents, Reza Shah preferred Shams and spoiled her whenever he could." Ashraf was educated in Tehran at a girl's school operated by the Zoroastrians. She was married in 1937 to Ali Qavam, son of the influential Qavam ol-Molk (see footnote p. 55; they had one son, Shahram, now 35 years old who uses Pahlavi-Nia as a family name. This marriage ended in divorce soon after Reza Shah's abdication. Three years later, in 1949 Ashraf married an Egyptian, Ahamd Shafiq. One son, Shayan (known as "Putzi"), and one daughter, Azadeh, were born before the divorce in 1959. The next year Ashraf married Dr. Mehdi Bushehri, from one of the top 40 families.* Ashraf's husbands have fared well. Shafiq became the director of Pars Airline, which, it is alleged, he used for smuggling activities to and from Switzerland. Bushehri whose official positions include such taxing ones as roving Ambassador, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Arts Festivals, was deeply involved some years ago arranging permission for Aeroflot to operate into Iran, a deal from which he apparently benefited financially. Ashraf has achieved quite a reputation by granting her favors to a long list of personable young men—starting perhaps with Asadollah Alam in 1943—many of whom went on to more prestigious positions. For example, Parviz Rajj is now assistant to Prime Minister Hoveyda. Ashraf thus has scattered throughout the government, men who can provide her with information and influence, for in most cases termination of the relationship appears to have been amicable. Ashraf has always had a reputation for being tough-minded and ruthless. These characteristics were especially noticeable in the days when weakness was the Shah's dominant trait. Thus the US Embassy noted in 1951 that Ashraf had "her father's merciless determination" while "Mohammad Reza received the dream of national progress." "Her motives have been improper and her actions often maladroit. But she has an instinct for decision which is badly needed in the Shah's close entourage. Her forceful character, her sharp insistence for action can push her brother from passivity."** Ashraf and other members of the Royal Family were anathema to Mossadeq and in 1951 he forced the Shah to order them out of the country. Ashraf did not return for two and a half years in early 1954, some eight months after the coup against Mossadeq. Possibly the Shah was content to have her remain in Europe as long as possible as it removed her from her second favorite indoor sport—political intrigue. By the 1960s, the Shah's increasing self-confidence, his willingness to make decisions and the consolidation of his position eliminated much of the importance that Ashraf's politicking once had. There is no doubt that she has always been devoted to the Shah's interests as she construed them—and as she construed them they were also her interests. At one time she apparently tried to build a personal following using the High Council of Women, {}^{*} to the displeasure of the Shah who took steps to block her, and in 1969 she tried to sponsor several women as candidates and otherwise meddle in the elections for the Majlis. On that occasion the Shah arranged for her to stay in Europe until the elections were over. The Shah, perhaps in an attempt to turn her energies in a more constructive direction, has in recent years given her wider official responsibilities. She visited Communist China in 1970 and again in 1975; she has been a prominent member of the UN Human Rights Commission and has headed the Iranian delegation to the UN. Although her political meddling has apparently decreased, her interest in business and commercial activities, often verging on if not completely illegal, remains high. She has never hesitated to use her influence to obtain government contracts for her friends or acquaintances willing to pay her a fee. In recent years, it is said, she no longer demands a payoff from contractors but only comments that she would be happy to be able to rely on them should it ever be necessary. There are conflicting stories about the Shah's attitude toward Ashraf's commercial activities, as well as those of others in the Royal Family. He is probably himself torn between family loyalty and his desire for a corruption-free government. His affection for his twin and the very real problem of keeping any kind of effective surveillance on her activities compounds his problem. A report in the early 1950s remarked that he thought her business ventures were alright as long as

SECRET he didn't use his influence on Ashraf's behalf. At another point, much later, the governor of one of Iran's largest banks told an Embassy officer that he had brought to the Shah's attention some business ventures which put Ashraf in a bad light. The Shah merely shrugged the matter off. The bank governor commented to the Embassy officer that such deals "would land other people in jail for ten years." One of the most damaging aspects of Ashraf's activities has been allegations that she had engaged in drug smuggling. The evidence is, of course, scanty, but the charge is repeated and embellished ad nauseam by oppositionists of all stripes and has become a fixture in the catalog of charges against the Pahlavis. Ashraf's oldest son, Shahram, has followed in his mother's footsteps in some respects. He is widely, and unfavorably, known in Tehran as a wheeler-dealer with holdings in some 20 companies including transportation, night clubs, construction, advertising and distributorships. Some of these apparently provide a cover for some of Ashraf's quasi-legal business ventures. Among knowledgeable Iranians his most flagrant act of irresponsibility was the sale of national art treasures and antiques, notably the gold artifacts from Marlik, a prehistoric archeological site of great significance. In September 1971, an unsuccessful attempt was made to kidnap Shahram. This was just before the 2500th Year celebration of the founding of the Iranian Monarchy and it was generally interpreted as an action by dissidents to disrupt the celebration. The incident was not carried in the local press. Princess Shams Shams is the Shah's elder sister. She has always had a better reputation than Ashraf but she is of no importance politically. She has confined herself to good works like others in the Royal Family, she had substantial business interests. Shams had provided investment funds for years to Tehran's most prominent businessman, Habib Sabet. Her most recent project is a "model city" west of Tehran, where she is building a palace. Several construction companies in which she has an interest are working on this. She was once described by the American Embassy: "of all the Pahlavis below the Shah (Shams) is best loved by the free can people. Her life, in her family and in public affairs, is an example of honesty and recognition of responsibility."* Although this assessment is now three decades old, it appears to remain essentially true today except that Queen Farah has replaced her in the affections of the populace. The only recent comment on her is by Princess Sarvanaz, daughter of her half-brother, Abdor Reza, who described her as "lovable, sweet, harmless and stupid."** Gholam Reza Gholam Reza—the only child of Reza Shah's third wife, Turan Amir Suleimani*** had the same education as the Shah, royal elementary school, Le Rosey in Switzerland, and, upon returning to Tehran, military school. In 1941, Gholam Reza accompanied his father into exile. After his father's death he spent a year at Princeton University. He also apparently spent some time at the American University of Beirut and in California. Now a Brigadier General, Gholam Reza is a professional soldier, and is Supreme Chief, Military Special Inspection of the Supreme Commanders Staff—more of a ceremonial than a working position. Most of his formal military education consisted of a course at the armored school at Fort Knox where his performance and attitude were mediocre. He is also a special adjutant to the Shah, Chief of the National Olympics Committee and Deputy Honorary President of the Equestrian Society. Potentially more important is his role as a member of the Regency Council, together with Prince Abdor Reza and others, which would aid Queen Farah should she become Regent. Gholam Reza has been described as “a nonentity without either character or intellect.” Prior to the birth of the Crown Prince and after the death of the Shah’s only full brother, Ali, Gholam Reza was given many of the ceremonial duties of a Crown Prince. At least twice between 1954 and 1959 there were strong A-3 Prince Ghoiam Rs2a rumors that he might be officially designated Crown Prince. In early 1959 there was a brief move by a grab-bag group of politicians and military types to promote Gholam Keza as Crown Prince, apparently in the expectation that the Shah might soon fall.* The issue became academic with the birth of Crown Prince Reza Cyrus. Gholam Reza does have a coterie of likeminded cronies who do not however, constitute any kind of political force under current conditions. Prince Abdol Reza The only one of the Snah's half-brothers who once gave the promise of being anything but a drone was Abdol Reza, the first son of Reza Shah's fourth wife, Esmat ol-Moluk Dowlatsinahi.** *As an interesting sidelight, nearly all the members of the group were affiliated with Grand Orient Masonic Lodge, an organization which the British apparently had used to promote their interests in Iran. For background see Hamid Algar, "An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 6 no. 1 (October 1970), pp. 276-296. **The Dowlatshahi family derives from a son of Fath Ali Shah who reigned from 1798 to 1834. Descendants served as governors of Kermanshah, and the Dowlatshahis continued to be powerful in Kermanshah into the 20th century, providing deputies for the Majlis and ministers for the cabinet. Abdol Reza was born in 1924, the year before his father deposed the Qajar Dynasty. He was educated in Tehran and in 1941 accompanied his father into exile as did other members of the Royal Family. After World War II, Abdol Reza attended Harvard from which he graduated in 1948 with honors. On returning to Iran, the Shah appointed him to the post of Honorary Chairman of the Seven Year Plan Organization. Whether or not the Shah intended this to be purely a figurehead post is not clear. At any rate, Abdol Reza took the job seriously. His ability did not match his enthusiasm and he immediately fell into a political struggle over control of the economic development plans. Abdol Reza and the few officials who backed him were eased out and the Shah turned to a group of old line politicians known more for their peculation than for their ability. Abdol Reza was completely out of the picture by 1955 and in the last 20 years he has devoted himself primarily to ceremonial functions and to the only official post he holds—Chairman of the Game Council of Iran with responsibility for wildlife conservation. He is designated as a member of the Regency Council but would, of course, exercise this function only if the Shah were to die. Assessments of Abdol Reza are mixed and none are based on recent information. He is generally conceded to be the best educated and most intellectual of the family, a fact which at one point the Embassy believed accounted for the rift between Abdol Reza and the Shah: ... the Shah is more jealous of him than of any of his brothers primarily because the Shah, who likes to appear superior in every field, realizes that Abdol excels him in education and in general culture." At the same time, the Embassy commented that "much of his knowledge appeared superficial and ill-digested." Certainly he never got the opportunity to demonstrate whether he was incompetent or merely inexperienced. In the late fifties, Abdol Reza was on record with many bitter remarks about the Shah; among the mildest was that the Royal Family was “thoroughly rotten” and he was ashamed to be a member of it, that the Shah was unable to surround himself with decent people and that his actions were driving the country to ruin. These assessments, it should be noted, were not uniquely Abdol Reza's but were shared by many Iranians and non-Iranians at the time. The unique

SECRET A-4 The Dowlatshahi - Pahlavi Connection This figure illustrates in a simple form the type and scope of family connections found in Iran.

the labor insurance department. His qualifications for the job were obscure but his niece had in the meantime married into the Royal Family. In 1970 Ali's wife, Sadr, showed up in the Majlis from one of the Khorassan constituencies. Sadr had been active in charitable organizations and, profiting from the Shah's desire to see more women in politics, she had become associated with the Iran Novin Party, moved to the Ministry of Housing and with this experience was the party's choice for the Majlis. Aside from influential connections through her husband she was in her own right related to an influential Khorassan family. Aside from their natural attributes, the Bozorgnia's have been helped in their carriers by the marriage of Danesh's daughter, Rosa, to Prince Ahmad Reza, the Shah's half-brother, thus obtaining access to Court circles. Her brother Hossein (Danesh's son) became Secretary to Prince Ahmad Reza shortly after the marriage and has remained in the job ever since. An assessment of him says: "He is living proof that education abroad need not necessarily move an Iranian toward reform and liberalism. While he undoubtedly recognizes the need for some changes, he is basically interested in his own privileges and can be expected to use his position near the seat of Iranian power to protect them any way he can." Mahmud Reza was born in 1926. Educated at UCLA and the University of Michigan in business administration and industrial management, he devotes his time to his various business interests and to hunting. Once described as a “mild, not overbright nice guy” he is happier among close hunting companions than in social gatherings. In 1954 he married one Mehri Zanganeh whom he divorced about 1957. In 1964 he married Maryam Eqbal, daughter of former prime minister and Chairman of the Board of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Manuchehr Eqbal. They were divorced in 1965. Mahmud Reza apparently has no children. Hamid Reza is the youngest of the Shah's half-brothers, born in 1932. Old assessments—there is nothing recent—depicted him as irresponsible, headstrong and a spendthrift. In the early 1960s the Shah stripped him of his title of Prince, apparently because he had been in touch with exiled General Timur Bakhtiar who was plotting against the Shah. In 1951 he married Minu Dowlatshahi, a cousin, whom he divorced in 1954.* A daughter, Nilufar, was born in 1952. He married Homa Khamnei, of whom there is no further record, in 1955 and divorced her in 1959 after two children, Behzad and Nazok. He seems to be unmarried at present. Princess Fatemeh, born in 1930, is the only daughter of Reza Shah and Esmat ol-Moluk Dowlatshahi. She was educated in Iran and in the United States. In her early years she was spoiled, willful and headstrong, not unlike several others of Reza Shah's brood. When she was 18 there were strong rumors that she would marry Khosrow Khan Qashqai, a union that would have allied one of the most troublesome tribes with the Pahlavi dynasty. This fell through and two years later in 1950, she met an American, Vincent Hillyer, whom she married shortly afterwards in Rome. Hillyer apparently had become acquainted with Prince Mahmud Reza, had gone to Iran as Mahmud's guest where he met Fatemeh. The acquaintance was renewed later in Europe and in the US. The Shah strongly disapproved of the marriage and deprived the princess of her royal privileges for a time. Hillyer apparently made a good impression on the Shah, however, and the ban was lifted and Hillyer received at Court. Fatemeh and Hillyer were divorced in 1959 after two children were born, Keyvan and Darius. Fatemeh had a brief affair with Ardeshir Zahedi and in 1959 married the late General Mohammad Khatami, Chief of the Air Force and a personal pilot to the Shah for many years. The Shah's Queens The Shah's marital life has not been free of difficulties. His first marriage, with Egyptian Princess Fawziah, arranged for reasons of state, did not long endure Reza Shah's abdication. Fawziah, bored by Tehran and Iranian Court life, certainly provincial by Egyptian standards of the time, was uninterested in the public activities expected of the Queen. In the words of a contemporary OSS assessment, "the Shah can get no support and understanding from her in any serious national undertaking." The Shah's extramarital affairs probably did not contribute to the stability of the marriage. Fawziah was enraged at one point when the Shah brought to Court a former mistress who had been exiled to Meshed. His tastes, at any rate, were ecumenical, Iranian, European and A-6 Fawziah, the Shah's first wife American. The Shah's second Queen, Soraya, after her divorce noted that "The European type appealed to him the most," she added that he had too much common sense to marry one of them. The Shah's marriage to Soraya was apparently from genuine affection and the subsequent divorce after eight years was with considerable reluctance and only because she had failed to produce an heir.* Soraya was popular with the Iranians and her departure was an occasion for grief among many lower class women who seemed to identify with her. The Shah's marriage to Farah Diba has been successful from a dynastic point of view, two princes and two princesses, thus assuring the succession, all else being equal. Since her marriage to the Shah on 21 December 1959 Farah Diba has grown in her job and the more pessimistic prediction that “she will soon fall into the clutches of the more infamous people around the Shah and will lose many of her good qualities” has not occurred. On the contrary, although she has apparently aroused the jealousy of others in the Court entourage, she has been able to present a more constructive public image of the monarchy than had A-7 Princess Soraya, the Shah's second wife previously been the case. The increasing role that the Shah has permitted her over the years and especially the act of providing that she became Regent in case of necessity suggests the confidence that the Shah has in her. Farah has not, however, built up a following personally loyal to her. Her influence derives from her position as Queen and from her personal qualities; should she become Regent her ability to influence developments would be limited by her lack of a personal mechanism to get things done. Farah was born in 1938 in Iran, educated in Italian and French schools in Tehran and in 1957, at the age of 19, she went to Paris to study architecture. There she met Princess Shahnaz, the daughter of the Shah and Fawziah, who later introduced her to the Shah. Farah is from a poorer branch of the Diba family, one of the more distinguished families of Azerbaijan Province. While the marriage was not primarily political the Azerbaijan connection is an advantage to

SECRET the Shah as the province has often felt ill-treated by Tehran.* The Diba family has provided diplomats, Majlis deputies, religious leaders and businessmen under both the Qajars and the Pahlavis. Some of the family were close to the throne even before the marriage, even though one Diba, treasurer-general to Reza Shah, had a violent disagreement with his sovereign and the Dibas fell into disfavor with the old Shah. Another family member served in six sessions of the Majlis, from 1923 to 1938, as representative of the Shahsavan tribes of Azerbaijan. Farah's great-grandfather was a poet and a major landowner in Azerbaijan, her grandfather, one of six brothers, had been a diplomat, serving in Czarist Russia and in Holland. Farah's father, Sohrab, died in 1948. He had been educated at St. Cyr, served as an Iranian army officer and later resigned to go into business. Farah's mother, Farideh who is now about 54 years old, is from the Qotbi family, well-known in their home province of Gilan but not prominent nationally. Farideh had two brothers, Brig. Gen. Hossein Qotbi, retired, and Mohammad Ali Qotbi, an architect on whom Farideh and Farah were dependent after the death of Sohrab Diba. Certainly Farah's main accomplishment, at least from the point of view of the Shah, was to provide a Crown Prince and thus increase the possibility that the Pahlavi dynasty will survive. This accomplished, she proceeded to add another prince and two princesses to the dynasty but the Shah soon recognized. Farah's potential as a political asset, something neither of his other wives had been. Starting about 1965, she became more visible publicly. Although the Queen has been expected to take an interest in charitable works, Farah has really worked at it, unlike her predecessors. She also takes an active part in women's affairs, although in this she risks crossing Ashraf who is the recognized leader in such things. The increasing political role she was being permitted was signalled in 1966 when she made an official visit to the eastern provinces of Seistan and Baluchistan. During this trip Farah acted very much in the role of the Shah. The fact that she was accompanied by responsible ministers and not only by protocol and ceremonial functionaries indicates that the Shah intended that she should be a stand-in for him. In the course of this visit to one of the poorest and most backward parts of the country, she ordered the completion of various projects, the initiation of others, donated funds and made inspections, all actions which the Shah normally initiates during such trips. In 1967 parliament, at the request of the Shah, amended the Constitution to permit Farah to act as Regent in case something happened to the Shah before the Crown Prince comes of age in 1980. In the following years, Farah maintained a high degree of visibility, making provincial visits, accompanying the Shah on state visits abroad and acting as sponsor or chairwoman of a wide variety of meetings, committees and symposia. There was a hiatus in her activities in late 1972 and 1973. In November 1972, the Queen left Iran abruptly for Europe accompanied by her youngest son, Ali Reza. This sparked rumors of a rift between the Shah and Farah. Although there were suggestions that Ashraf may have had a hand in the affair it seems more likely that the Shah's dalliance with another woman was the real cause. At any rate, Farah returned. For nearly a year she confined herself to social and humanitarian projects but in mid-1974 she again became politically active when she received a group of governors-general in an audience, the first time this has happened. The extent of Farah's influence on the Shah's thinking and actions cannot be precisely gauged. Farah is more Europeanized than the Shah—she does most of her reading in French and English and does not normally read anything printed in Persian.* She must have had, at least initially, little realization of the difficulties involved in pushing forward modern social programs in the general atmosphere of intrigue which continues to pervade the Iranian bureaucracy. The Queen appears to have raised with the Shah in recent years at least three issues, which may have borne some fruit; 1) that not only the Shah, the Queen and their children should be scrupulously honest and above reproach but that all members of the Royal Family as well as their followers should meet the same high standards. This utopian proposition does nothing to enhance Farah's position with the most powerful members of the Royal Family, whose peccadilloes, malfeasances and misfeasances have been common gossip for decades, 2) she is also said to have urged the necessity of bringing young blood into Iranian economic, political and social institutions, and 3) that merit rather than connections be recognized as the basis of promotion and responsibility. The Shah has subsequently stressed this theme, although whether or not as a direct result of the Queen's position cannot be determined. Finally, the Empress is reported to have urged her husband to give sympathetic consideration to legitimate academic grievances of the students and to take prompt action when possible. This also may have had an effect on subsequent actions of the Shah. The greatest weakness in Farah's position appears to be her lack of a mechanism responsible to her personally which could support her. Her power and influence derives from her position as the wife of the Shah. She has developed alternate channels using personal assistants—as separate from her official staff—to make her wishes known and to get things done but this apparently has not developed into the kind of network and linkages which an ambitious Iranian needs for support. Farah's principal asset seems to be her popularity with the population as a whole, something that probably no other member of the Royal Family except the Shah has achieved. Her candor and directness, her obviously genuine interest in the welfare of the country and her frequent sallies at bureaucrats and sycophants strike a responsive chord. She is, however, shut off from an interchange with a wider segment of the population by her staff, headed by Karim Pasha Bahadori who screens all material destined for her desk and apparently passes on only petitions concerning social and welfare cases. If she became Regent the fact of her popularity would have to be taken into account by any other attenders for power. Whether this popularity would translate into effective support for her as a genuine leader, or whether she would be simply a figurehead for an ambitious politician only the event itself can tell. The Crown Prince Crown Prince Reza Cyrus was born in 1960. Now at age 15 he is getting increasing exposure to the public. He is more frequently mentioned as an individual engaged in individual activities rather than simply a member of the Royal Family. Reza is being educated in the Reza Pahlavi School, which was specially created for the purpose. At the time of its founding, the school was said to have twelve students in addition to the Crown Prince, six boys and six girls all approximately the same age. The names of his classmates seem never to have been announced but the school is headed by Mrs. Homa Khosrowshahi-Zarrabi, a former classmate of Queen Farah. Classes are taught both in Persian and French. Little solid information is available on the Crown Prince personally. He is said to be a mediocre student of average ability. Press stories offer little help in assessing Crown Prince Reza. He is described as "magnanimous," "generous," "protector of the weak," "always obedient" and "possessing an amazing intelligence," all virtues but all also phrases suffering from the same hyperbole that is obligatory when the Iranian press talks about the Royal Family. In 1973, the Crown Prince was exposed to the provinces when he visited Meshed, a trip that did double duty; he attended the finals of the Crown Prince Soccer Tournament and made a religious pilgrimage to the Shi'a Muslim shrine of the Imam Reza. In mid-1974, he again made the papers as an individual when he was noted as having made his first solo aircraft flight; following that, the Shah decreed that "in the interests of the state" the Crown Prince would no longer fly solo but must always be accom-

SECRET panied by a pilot.* In 1975, he was introduced on the international scene when he represented the Shah at the opening of the Suez Canal. In the next few years, Reza will probably be given increasing public exposure and more ceremonial duties to perform. He has not yet been involved in any military-related activities but it seems likely that this too will follow. The Queen announced in mid-October 1974 that all of Reza's education would take place in Iran and that foreign visits would be limited to vacation periods. He will almost certainly receive some military training, perhaps attending the military college, but most of his education will probably continue to be in private. The security problems that will continue to exist suggest that attendance at one of the public universities would be too risky. The Shah's opinion of his son's potential is not known. Mohammad Reza has been careful not to predict too much for his successor; "A king of the future will be able to do a great deal of good if he is willing. On the other hand, we are fixing things so he can do no harm." The Prince would be able to rule as he himself did if he is a "big man," and that was yet to be seen. "If he turns out to be a big man, he will be accepted as a father, but the kind of father we knew in our childhood. You listened to him. If the Crown Prince turns out to be an ordinary person he will find that his father had built a government structure that will allow him to rule in a less completely monarchical fashion."** Pahlavi Forebears To complete the record of the Pahlavis a few more words on the origins of the family are appropriate. Early in his career as a national figure Reza Shah apparently gave some encouragement to a fictitious biography which connected him with the ancient Sassanian dynasty. He did not pursue this line himself but as late as 1948 some of his admirers were still propagating the tale. In actual fact the family cannot be traced earlier than the 19th century when, according to the most common versions, Morad Ali Khan and Abbas Ali Khan, Reza Shah's grandfather and father respectively, were landowners of some stature in the mountain village of Alasht in the Caspian Province of Mazanderan. Both are described as having been colonels in the Seventh Savad Kuh Regiment, designations which are perhaps misleading. In the time of the Qajars local notables were expected to raise levies of troops on demand of the Shah for use in military campaigns. The number of troops provided usually determined the military rank the commander might be given for the duration of the campaign. Rea Shah's father, Abbas Ali Khan, was one of three brothers (see Figure 8); he had at least five wives. His first four wives bore him 32 children of whom seven sons and four daughters survived to adulthood. Three sons left their home village and went to Babolsar on the Caspian. These families are subsequently untraceable. The other four remained in their home village of Alasht and their descendants still reside there. Reza Shah was the only son of his father's fifth wife. The father died in November 1878 when Reza was barely eight months old. His mother Nush Afarin went to Tehran with Reza where she lived with a brother for several years. Nush Afarin subsequently remarried although her new husband's name is not on the record. She had another son who became a medical doctor in the Cossack Division. General Atabai It is possible that Reza's half-brother was General (Dr.) Hadikjan Atabai who was in charge of the Army pharmaceutical department, probably in the 1930s. He is best known as Reza Shah's son-in-law, the husband of Reza's first daughter, Hamdam. Atabai is first found in an OSS report of 1942 where his name is given as Hadikjan. He transferred to the Ministry of Health in 1941 and in the same year he was arrested at the request of the British. Atabai had spent five years studying in Germany and had apparently been recruited by German intelligence. On his return to Iran he is said to have sent back reports to Berlin by concealing them in pharmaceuticals sent via Turkey. Later reporting in the sixties and seventies—when he has already dropped from view—confuses him with a relative, Abol Fath Atabai, who is a Court hanger. A.8 Origins of the Pahlavi Dynasty Many of the men Reza Shah chose to be generals had served with him in the Cossack Brigade. Since there could not have been many M.D.'s serving with the Cossacks, Atabai would be a logical candidate for the son of Nush Afarin and her second husband. This relationship would also account in part for the continued presence at Court of the Atabai family.* Princess Hamdam Princess Haundam is one of the more obscure members of the Royal Family. She was Reza Shah's oldest child, born to his first wife. She is nearly 20 years older than the Shah and, rarely if ever sees foreigners. No personal evaluation of her is possible. Judging from the year of her birth, about 1901, she must have had little formal education. *Abol Fath Atabai, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Court and his son, Kambiz Atabai, a director general of the Ministry of Court. She married at least three times, first to Lt. General, Hadikjan Atabai, before 1924. Hamdam and Atabai had three children, Amir Reza (b. 1924) who in 1942 was reported to be serving with the German SS, a son Cyrus and a daughter Simin who married an American. After divorcing Atabai sometime before 1948, Princess Hamdam married Engineer Behrun. She subsequently declared that marriage invalid, for unspecified reasons, and married a young Tehran lawyer, Amir-Aslani whom she divorced about 1948. There are several Amir-Aslanis but Hamdam's husband cannot be further identified. No subsequent marriages or children are on the record.

ANNEX B SAMPLE OF IRANIAN ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES This annex examines in some detail four Majlis constituencies. Although the choice of constituencies has been governed mostly by the availability of information, they also illustrate the variety and types of influence which play a role in the election of deputies. Information on elections and personalities is generally adequate up to 1963 but inadequate for purposes of this paper since then. Tehran A large percentage of the politically articulate are concentrated in Tehran, and the city plays a major role in the country's politics. Special interest groups are important and electoral results have often been less predictable than in some other constituencies. After 1906 two groups made their weight felt in the selection of the Tehran delegation to the Majlis. These were traditional middle class professional and merchant elements and the religious elements. Their influence arose from their leadership of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Even under Reza Shah's dictatorship a certain number of candidates who had genuine popularity among these two groups were allowed to be elected on the theory that their numbers would be ineffectual and that their being elected would serve as some sort of palliative to complaints of election-rigging. Consequently men such as Mohammad Mossadeq, Ayatollah Modaress and Mohammad Taqi Bahar were frequently elected from Tehran even though the various governments that permitted their election knew these men would play an opposition role. Generally speaking, the number of popular candidates varied inversely with the strength of the central government but in any election a certain number were elected. Four important Tehran families so established themselves in city politics that there was almost invariably a representative of the family in each 76 Tehran delegation. Three of these families, the Emami-Khoy, the Behbehani and the Tabatabai dated their influence back to the 1906 revolution and the fourth, the Massudi, owed its influence to the fact that it published several of the most influential Tehran periodicals. Although each of the first three families rose to prominence because of its role in the revolution, the continued political importance was due less to the fact of public devotion than to a very practical talent for manipulating the bazaaris—the religious oriented, conservative merchants of the Tehran bazaar. Because of the prominent religious position of the first three families the often fanatically religious bazaaris were willing to follow their lead politically and to vote for whomever these families supported. All three families worked through street leaders to mobilize the bazaaris at election time and it was not surprising at one time to find the urbane Jamal Emami participating in a birthday party for Shaban Jafaari, nicknamed "The Brainless," a south Tehran thug who was prominent in the pro-Shah uprising against Mossadeq in 1953. The essentials for election in Tehran have been government and court approval, though not necessarily active support. In no case in the four elections from 1947 through 1956 were candidates elected solely because of government support. Government approval, however, was given reluctantly and with the realization that some of the deputies would be in opposition. A second essential was that the candidate be able to count on the loyalty of a sizeable bloc of votes. He might have them by virtue of his position and influence among the bazaaris, as did the Emamis, Behebanis or Tabatabais; by virtue of the support of a professional society as did Mohammad Derakhshesh who had the backing of his Society of Normal School Graduates in the 18th Majlis; by virtue of the support of one or more political “parties” such as Mozaffar Baqai's Toilers Party, Khalil Maleki's Third Force, the Iran Party, or Pan Iran; or because of purchase, of support from one of the three families or from street leaders. The third essential is an adeptness in log-rolling. Votes must be traded with other political leaders, purchased from them or as was the case with the Massudis, acquired from other political leaders in turn for favorable treatment in family controlled periodicals. The floating uncontrolled vote was a factor in Tehran and every candidate indulged in a considerable amount of old fashioned electioneering, with newspaper ads, pamphlets and loudspeakers. This was true even with relatively well-controlled election. Coalitions of candidates were invariably formed and there was a great deal of pooling of strength. On the basis of the 15th thru the 18th elections, the generalization seems justified that these coalitions were to some extent ideological as well as purely for personal convenience. In the elections for the 16th Majlis (1950), for example, a group of nationalist candidates headed by Mohammad Mossadeq formed an alliance which captured eight of the twelve Tehran seats. The only candidates strong enough to win without the support of this group were the heads of each of the four influential families. The nationalist coalition could deliver the votes of the Iran Party, the Toilers Party, various professional societies, the Kashani and Haerizadeh supporters in the bazaar, and a large group of independents among whom Mossadeq was popular. The central government was a fairly weak one and did not interfere against the nationalist coalition. In this Majlis the eight Tehran deputies plus a few allies from the provinces were able to gain absolute control of the Majlis because of the mobilization of their followers into huge mobs in Tehran. This bloc under the leadership of Mossadeq dominated Iranian politics for nearly three years. The extent to which the traditional Tehran political forces have been superseded during the last ten years is not clear. Recent candidates have been chosen apparently on the basis of socio-economic grouping; guilds, businessmen or independents, all of course pledged to support the Shah's program. This would not, however, have prevented candidates from being supported by or pledged to the interests of traditional forces; only the names would be changed. The New Majlis in Tehran The Tehran delegation to the 21st, the “Reform” Majlis in 1963 showed a completely new set of faces. Deputies beholden to the four families are no longer clearly identifiable, and three new seats were added to the constituency. The Shah, instead of being one of several factors on the Tehran political scene was now, as everywhere else, the only one. He assigned Tehran's Mayor Ahmad Naficy to help him in choosing reliable pro-reform candidates and in making sure that the subsequent voting went satisfactorily.* The deputies which emerged represented the types which the Shah was interested in bringing into his brand of representative government: women, labor, guild members and businessmen. The three women deputies had all been active and well-known in women's societies, female education and charities. Their prominence in these fields was probably the major factor in their being chosen. The Moslem clergy was opposed to them on principle but this, of course, had no effect on the outcome of the elections. The women—all establishment types—campaigned sporadically and mostly for appearance sake and they apparently did not campaign at all among the lower class women who form the bulk of the female population. Characteristics which probably played a role in their selection are set forth below. Jahanbani, Showkat Malek—daughter of a Qajar prince, married to a cousin, another Jahanbani. One of the top 40 families. Parsai, Farokhru—wife of General Shirin-Sokhan. Her father was a journalist and her mother was one of Iran's early suffragettes. Tarbiyat, Hajar—widow of Mirza Mohammad Ali Tarbiyat, a Majlis deputy from Tabriz for six sessions between 1909 and 1940. She was close to the deputy from Kermanshah, Mrs. Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi, an influential women's leader. The labor interest was represented by three men. All had only a primary education but had been active in labor syndicate affairs and apparently had some Naficy was responsible for metropolitan Tehran. Other officials were assigned responsibility for labor, education and the intellectuals. Inasmuch as these are concentrated in Tehran there must have been some conflict with Naficy but how this affected the outcome is not clear. One of Naficy's accomplishments is clear, however. He was also responsible for women's organizations and his wife was elected from Kerman.

SECRET following. Given the role of the security forces in monitoring and directing labor affairs these men were clearly "safe," and were probably personally known to Labor Minister Khosrowani who was responsible for the labor and syndicate vote. Other characteristics follow: Amer-Ahmadi, Ahmad— had been affiliated with the political group organized by former Tehran Mayor Ford and veteran political operator Assadollah Rashidian. Saehi, Heydar had been once associated with the political party of the deceased conservative politician. Seved Zia Tabarabai. He apparently played a significant role in the activities leading to the overthrow of Mossadeq since he was awarded the 28th Medal medal which was given to civilians who were active in that time. He may actually have been a government agent, he had associated with but not joined the Tudeh Party and then switched abruptly to oppose both the Tudeh and Mossadeq. Seyfi, Amir Ali—belonged to Iran Novin workers organization and had been active in labor affairs for many years before. Two men representing guilds, four identified as civil servants and one businessman completed the roster for the 21st Majlis. One-third of the deputies who were elected in 1963 held office until 1975. There was some turnover in each election. In all, the 68 seats which were available during those three elections, were shared by 39 different deputies. One of the three original female deputies served all 12 years. A second served eight years and was then appointed to the senate by the Shah and a third, after serving five years, became Iran's first female Cabinet minister, Minister of Education, which she held until 1974. Two of the three labor representatives served until 1975 and the third one went to the Tehran City Council. In general, information is insufficient to indicate why a deputy was replaced. Nearly all, however, moved on to positions befitting a former Majlis deputy. Several of them served on the Central Committee of Iran Novin. Fifty to sixty percent of the deputies were re-elected each time for the 22nd (1967) and 23rd (1971) Majlis and the proportions of the various groups remained about the same. The mid-1975 elections for the 24th Majlis showed a greater turnover which compared to the situation nation-wide. Only seven out of 27 incumbents were re-elected. One was the 69-year-old speaker of the Majlis Abdollah Riazi, who was first elected in 1963. He has been close to the Shah who apparently likes the right, schoolmasterish control he exerts over the Majlis. The deputy speaker Hossein Khatibi was also re-elected. Two other deputies have served two previous terms and four others have served one term before. One labor member was returned to the Majlis after being absent for eight years. The Tehran delegation now shows six persons identified as workers, five women, five guildsmen, four professionals, four government officials and three business men. Rey Six miles south of Tehran, over separate village but now little more than a suburb of the capital is the town of Rey. It is best known as the site of an important religious shrine, Shah Abdol Azim and of the tomb of Reza Shah. Because of its proximity to Tehran it has usually fallen strongly under the influence of Tehran's political forces. The 1947-1960 period illustrated the functioning of two major influences, a strong prime minister and the clergy. The Shah, still contending for ultimate power, was a secondary influence. During this period, covering five Majlis sessions, two men alternated in the single seat from Rey. Mulah Mashayekhi, a political opportunist who has "shown a devotion to only one calling in life, that of a large scale crook," was a protege of a strong prime minister in two elections and had the benefit of his incumbency and no other acceptable candidates in a third, although he had no roots in the constituency. In two other elections a prominent lawyer, Dr. Mohammad Ali Hedayati, custodian of the religious shrine was elected. His family has held this position for 300 years. Hedayati also was close to the Shah but this was insufficient to win him the seat in those elections when he did not have the Prime Minister's support. As in other constituencies, the deputies from Rey looked different in the “reform” period, 1963 to 1975. 21st Majlis (1963-1967) 22nd Majlis (1967-1971) 23rd Majlis (1971-1975) Hadi Hedayati Hadi Hedayati Fazlollah Motamedi Qassem Mashayekhi Hedayat Eslam-Nia The influence of the government and the Court, now coalesced into the Iran Novin Party, was predominant. The choice of another Hedayati suggests that the party felt it useful to have a familiar name from Rey, even though Hadi was so little esteemed by his law students that they refused to accord him the usual courtesy of rising when he entered the classroom. But he was on the executive committee of the Iran Novin Party and close to the then party leader Hassan Ali Mansur. From the Majlis Hedayati was appointed to the cabinet as Minister of Education, a post which he held for less than a year when he became a Minister of State, a position he still holds. ^{*} He is not to be confused with another Fazlollah Motamedi, a senior civil servant who served as a governor-general and has most recently been an undersecretary in the Ministry of the Interior. The relationship of the many Motamedis is unclear, and the deputy's credentials for the post may be better than the scanty information indicates. In 1967, Fazlollah Motamedi got the nod, for reasons which are unclear. He was, however, a friend of the Minister of Posts, Telephone and Telegraph, Fathollah Sotudeh, which may have been the determining factor.* The relatives or clients of the Alam family who have held seats from Birjand have been determined more on the basis of family politics than on any wider considerations. There are two functions in competition, the Alams and the Khozeimeh-Alams. The situation has been complex and only partially intelligible in the absence of information on local political dynamics. The essentials are set out in the following chart. Rey had two deputies in the 23rd Majlis. Again a familiar name appears, Qassem Mashayekhi, a career civil servant in the Ministry of Information, perhaps related to the former deputy from Rey; he appears to have no other particular qualification. Hedayat Eslami-Nia was another unknown. He apparently has been a minor bureaucrat and has been on the Central Committee of the Iran Novin Party which suggests useful connections somewhere. Birjand An outstanding example of the persistence of traditional forces even in an apparently reformist period is seen in eastern Iran—the fiefdom of the Alam family, centered on Birjand. Although there has been competition within the family for leadership there have been only sporadic efforts—none successful—to challenge the family's control, which goes back at least a century and a half. Birjand Majlis Session Deputy Special Qualifications 9th–17th (1933–1953) Mohammed Ali Monsef Brother-in-law of Amir Assadollah Alam, although he was violently opposed to Mossadeq, family influence was strong enough to get him elected even to the Mossadeqist-dominated 17th Majlis. 18th–20th (1953–1963) Amir Hossein Khozeimeh-Alam Cousin and brother-in-law of Amir Assadollah Alam and Alam's main rival within the family. ^{{*}} The Reform Period 21st–22nd (1963–1971) Abol Fazl Soleimant Protege of Amir Assadollah, son of his elementary school teacher, Sheikh Ahmad Naraqi. Naraqi had also been a deputy from Birjand. ^{{**}} 23rd (1971–1975) Amir Alam-Khozeimeh No background information but clearly a member of the family. 24th (1975–1979) Amir Khozeimeh-Alam Probably identical. ^{*} After this session Khozeimeh-Alam was appointed Senator, a post he still holds. ^{**} Soleimani, after leaving the Majlis, was appointed a director general in the Ministry of Courts.

SECRET Seistan South of the Alam stronghold of Birjand, in another province but still in the Alam orbit is the Seistan constituency. Here also the Alams have generally dictated the choice of deputies. The constituency is a large desert area with scattered villages and some nomadic-Baluchi tribes. A border area, it normally has had a substantial military garrison. This situation normally would mean that a military-tribal coalition chose the deputies, but in this case tribal influence is secondary to that of the Alams, although the latter favor Baluchi chiefs as their candidates. The characteristics of the representatives from this constituency has changed very little over the decades. The Alams seem to take into account local sensibilities; the area as a whole is mostly Baluchi and Majlis Session Deputy Special Qualifications 15th Abdullah Vossug Brother of the then prime minister, Ahmad Qavam. His election probably qold pro qool with Qavam supporting Alams in Tehran; Shah at that time was second to Qavam in political influence. 1917 Ettamad ed-Dowich 16th Amir Hossein Khozeimeh- (See Birjand; he moved to that constituency in the 1953 elections.) 1950 Alan 17th No election 1952 Assadollah Alam elected but resigned in favor of Tafazoli; may have been reward for Tafazoli's aid to Shah during overthrow of Mossadeq.* 180 Jehangir Tafazoli 1953 Baluchi tribal chief, Assadollah Alam protege; 19th Ebrahim Perdebi 1956 Alam elected but he resigned in favor of Riga who is an oil company employee. Baluchi tribal chief. 24th Ebrahim Perdebi 1960)** Amanollah Rigi The Reform Period Little known, a chief of the Narm Baluebis; Relative of Pordeli. 21st Amanollah Rigi (Zahedan): 1963-1967 Mohammad Hossein Narui 22nd (Zahed) 1967-1971 Amanollah Rigi (Zahedan): 23rd Ehrahim Pordebi (Zahedan): 1971-1975*** Amanollah Rigi (Zahedan): 24th Mohammad Hossein Narui: 1975-1979 Esmal Khozeimeh (Zahed: Zahedan): 69 year old son of Samasanod-Dowich, a member of the Alam family and one time deputy governor of Syrian. 24th Mohammad Hossein A protege of Amir Assadollah Alam. 24th Rahbar (Zahed): 24th Khodaddah Rigi (Zahedan): Retired gendarmerie officer. A Rigi Baluebis. He is from the Barakzal Baluehis clan. Replaces Narui. 24th Bahman Barakzal 24th (Zahedan): 24th Ehrahim Pordebi (Zahed: 24th Mohammad Hossein 24th Rahbar (Zahed): *Tafazodi was part of the agent network of Ahmad Aramesh who in turn was associated with the Russian organization, all of whom played an influential role in the overthrow of Mo'sudeq. For background see US Embassy Tehran, Desp 171, Sep 26, 1955. Secret **Constituency divided into two seats: Zahedan and Zahol Districts ***Undergoed to four seats, two each Zahedan and Zahol. so men recognized as Baluchi leaders usually have support of the Alam family. In the last 20 years no complete outsider has been selected. In the city of Zahedan where there are a large number of Zabolis, Kermanis and Yazidis all of whom are in business competition with the Birjandis who also live there, a Birjandi has not been chosen since 1950. The rise by which Tafazoli received his seat in 1953—Assadollah Alam was elected but resigned in favor of Tafazoli—suggests some caution in ramming an outsider down the throats of the electorate in a too obvious manner. A similar maneuver in 1960 enabled Amanollah Rigi to obtain his seat. Why this was necessary is not clear because Rigi was well-known locally. The Alams and the Khozeimeh-Alams may have decided to divide the Seistan representation between them. In the 21st and the 22nd Majlis elections it appears that the Zahedan deputy was the Alam choice and the Zabol deputy was the Khozeimeh-Alam man. In the 23rd and 24th sessions—now with four seats to divide—both families are represented in each constituency.* Given sufficient information it is probable that a similar pattern would emerge in many constituencies, i.e., the persistence of traditional local forces but in a new guise. Few are as obvious as Birjand/Seistan and one might speculate that those areas where a single power has been dominant have been more successful in maintaining power than those areas where shifting coalitions have been the rule. If information were available it might be found that the urban areas show a greater loss of influence on the part of the traditional elites because of the breakdown of the old political machinery and the rise of new sources of power. But these speculations remain to be tested. *Rigi (Zahedan) and Rahbar (Zabol) for the Alams and Barakzai (Zahedan) and Pordeli (Zabol) for Khozeimeh-Alam.

A Comment on Sources A large number of sources, both classified and unclassified, have been used in the preparation of this study. Perhaps a score of the unclassified documents, books, monographs, articles and privately circulated papers have been the most useful. Some of them are mentioned in the footnotes and all are listed in a separate bibliography, available on request. Several hundred official documents spanning more than three decades have been used. Most of them are Foreign Service despatches with CIA field reports and military-produced documents second and third in numbers and importance. None of the reporting, of course, was designed specifically to meet the needs of a study such as that attempted here. Through the thirty-year span the reporting, as might be expected, has varied greatly in quantity and quality, reflecting not only the state of knowledge of the individual officers but also assumptions, mostly unspoken, about the importance of Iran to the United States and equally undefined judgments about the relative value of Iranian institutions. Some of the most valuable reporting grew out of the personal interests of the officers concerned. Mandatory reporting seems to lose its value more quickly. The core data used for this paper is biographic information in the broadest sense. This data is voluminous, but often breaks down at points which are of major importance for elite analysis. The older biographic information seems to be more sensitive to the nuances of family relationships than later reporting. Social background information also tends to be scanty, and information on spouses or on fathers and mothers is rare. The paucity of background information on military officers constitutes a serious gap in view of the potential power of the armed forces to affect domestic politics. A specific effort to create profiles of officers at the general officer, the field grade and the company grade level would be a valuable tool for gaining some appreciation of military attitudes in the post-Shah era.* Honorable mention should be made of several embassy reports of the past which are still worth reading; a series of reports on the Shah between 1951 and 1967 provide an essential background for understanding the monarch and his development. They are well-written, analytical and successfully portray the Shah in the context of his family, politics and traditional society. Although Mohammad Mossadeq has been dismissed with only a mention in this paper, he still exerts a strong influence on many Iranians, including some whom he would have been the first to disavow. A 1952 despatch examines Mossadeq in detail but, more importantly, provides a background for the nationalist appeal which is still valid. In 1959 the Consulate in Meshed prepared a despatch in which it examined about 120 personalities from the Meshed and Khorassan areas. In many respects it is a model of its kind, skillfully weaving together the multiple strands of family, personal and political ambition and intrigue together with provincial and national considerations. Although now 17 years old, this despatch is still valuable for anyone attempting to understand provincial politics. If a similar study were available today there would be a unique opportunity to examine in detail how this very traditional area has responded to the great changes of the last decade.* In biographic reporting one series of CIA field reports stands out. In 1961 several nationalists, supporters of Mossadeq, were interviewed in depth. This resulted in reports which detailed their thinking, their hopes and their aspirations. In retrospect, these reports probably did not receive the consideration they should have. The generally held belief at the time that the nationalists were finished—as in one respect they were—and therefore of little importance led to failure to consider how deep and widespread their concerns were. In an intensified and more virulent form these concerns are now being expressed by the succeeding generation in assassinations, bombings and terrorism. Since the Shah attained his pre-eminent position the Majlis has been considered as simply a rubber stamp for the monarch's policies. It has, therefore, not been examined in the last 15 years with any of the thoroughness which was the case in the 1950s. Information on the present operation of the Majlis, the power that it does have to influence government programs, initiate its own programs and otherwise function as a parliament would provide a basis for comparison with earlier periods. Coverage of Iranian institutions has been spotty, especially in the last decade. Preoccupation with the Shah as the main actor on the Iranian scene has led to a neglect of the other elements of government and society with which the Shah must work or contend. The religious community, even though a principal opponent of the Shah, is little known. Several embassy reports in the late 1950s and early 1960s provided a very useful basis of information for understanding the role and function of the religious leaders. A steady trickle of CIA field reports throughout the years and continuing to the present have provided an invaluable glimpse of Soviet interest in and contacts with the clergy as well as occasional information on religious attitudes toward the government. Lacking, however, is the information which would provide a sense of structure to the religious community; the relative influence of the various religious leaders, areas of society (e.g., bazaar, intellectuals, townspeople) where each has influence, the function and influence of village and small town mullahs and their relationships with civil officials. A 1974 despatch from the Consulate in Tabriz provided a rare glimpse of the function of religion in a small Azerbaijan town during one of the periods of ecclesiastical mourning. The persistence of traditional ceremonies in spite of official discouragement, the participation of local officials (and not on grounds of expediency) and the exclusive use of the local Turkish dialect in the ceremonies (Turkish is illegal as a written language) all give useful indications of local attitudes. There is nothing comparable from other areas, however, and Azerbaijan has its own peculiarities which may not be reflected elsewhere. The scarcity of information on the business-financial-commercial community has been noted in the body of this paper. No reporting has touched on the intricacies of commercial and family relationships, the function of the bazaar, if it still has a function, in the business community, or the social and political attitudes of the business sector.

A. Political and Political-Military Sections 1. Political The work of the Political Section covers the usual functions of assessing political developments and situations, making recommendations regarding political aspects of our actions, programs, and policies, and backstopping the Ambassador and the DCM. The Political Counselor, George Lambrakis, supervises the work of the section and acts as advisor on political affairs to the Ambassador, the DCM, and others in the Embassy. He is the section's primary liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and generally does a fair amount of the reporting on Iran's foreign relations. John Stempel, the deputy head of the Political Section, covers major domestic events, serves as Narcotics Coordinator, and reports occasionally on foreign relations. In addition, he is Consular Coordinator--the Embassy's principal point of advice to and liaison with our consulates in Tabriz, Isfahan and Shiraz. Mrs. Joanna Martin has concentrated her work in the area of foreign relations with some time spent on domestic politics and biographic reporting. Howard Hart also backs up the Counselor in the area of foreign relations, specifically Persian Gulf matters. Waldimir Skotzko has responsibility for labor affairs. There are five full-time secretaries in the Political Section. In addition, a local senior political advisor (Mr. Jaffarbhoy) and the Embassy's senior translator (Mr. Petrossian) are assigned to the Political Section. 2. Political-Military The Political-Military Section is headed by a Counselor, Robert Martin, who monitors from the standpoint of policy considerations the largest U.S. arms sales program in the world. This entails working closely with the chief of

CONFIDENTIAL ARMISH/MAAG and the heads of the three service sections, as well as with General Toufanian, the Vice Minister of War, and other key figures in the Military Industries Organization and the individual Iranian services. The Counselor advises the Ambassador, the DCM, and others in the Embassy on political-military questions, and is responsible for ensuring that policy guidance is implemented by the Mission military elements, especially in the security assistance area. James Higham is also in the Political-Military Section with back-up responsibilities. There is one secretary, who also assists the Political Section as time permits because space limitations require the sharing of an office suite.

CONFIDENTIAL 1. Domestic Affairs The Shah is the unquestioned leader of the modern Iranian state. His almost unchallenged domination of the political scene rests on 2,500 years of monarchial tradition and his own extraordinary skill in exercising his powers for the benefit of the nation (see Tab A 1). He has presided over almost unprecedented economic development over the past decade--which has brought its own problems--and achieved for Iran an impressive international stature which has created popular pride in the country's achievements (see Tab A 2 for review of the Royal Family's place in Iran). For the past twelve years, Amir Abbas Hoveyda has been Iran's prime minister and the Shah's faithful lieutenant. Hoveyda's power rests on his ability to perform the role of government manager and his capacity to anticipate the Shah's wishes and carry them out effectively. He presides over a cabinet of technocrats and has shown himself unusually adept at balancing off the rivalries, anxieties and skills of such powerful potential rivals as Rastakhiz Party SYG Jamshid Amouzegar, Minister of Economy and Finance Houshang Ansary, and others who hold cabinet portfolios. Iran's political evolution has moved more slowly (see Tab A 4). Despite past periods of political importance, Iran's parliament, consisting of the Majles (lower house) and Senate (upper house), has been almost completely dominated by the Shah for over a decade, though he scrupulously observes the letter of the Constitution which requires parliamentary legitimization of legislation. Much of the history of the past 25 years is the Shah's attempt (largely successful) to establish his political power in the face of radical challenges (some of them represented in Parliament, in the past). He has done so by astute political manipulation and by maintaining the absolute loyalty of the military and of the security service, SAVAK. On the way, organized political opposition has either been coopted, dropped out, or been reduced to virtual impotence. Small, dedicated groups of terrorists holding extreme fundamentalist Moslem or radical leftist views are a significant nuisance but not now a serious factor in Iranian politics. Right-wing fundamentalist Moslems and some intellectuals and students remain disaffected to varying degrees. Labor has not been a major political factor in Iran since the Mossadegh period, but wildcat strikes over the past 18 months have shown enhanced economic muscle, if not organizational capacity. While Iran experimented with multiparty politics for many years, there was little political institutionalization. It would appear that the Shah considered Iran's multiparty Parliament an alien concept borrowed from the West. By the 1970s he evidently was disillusioned by what he judged to be weaknesses in the West deriving in part from the multi-party systems which mirrored a similar lack of success in Iran. In March 1975, reverting to a more traditional Iran past, the Shah declared Iran a one-party state and created the Resurgence ("Rastakhiz") Party of the People of Iran (RPPI) (see Tab A 3). It absorbed both parties: the New Iran Party, and (opposition), the Iranian People's Party. The RPPI permits reasonably free debate within party groups and is becoming an instrument for political education, participation, and interest articulation. The RPPI is not a government party in the traditional sense, but performs a watchdog role vis-a-vis the Cabinet, Parliament and ministries. It is currently undergoing a complete reorganization under the new Secretary-General, Jamshid Amouzegar, and his team of energetic young political technocrats, most of whom are American-educated. The Shah's political program is based upon the Shah-People Revolution, originally a reform program launched in 1962 and later expanded to a total of 17 points. The program languished somewhat in the early 70's after the first surge of land reform and the creation of Literacy, Health, and Development Corps modeled on the U.S. Peace Corps. The "Revolution" received renewed impetus in the late 1975 when a worker share-participation scheme, an anti-profiteering campaign, and free education became part of its program. Publication of the Party "ideology" was the non-event of the October 1976 Party Congress, and underscores the very pragmatic, development-oriented character of the regime. There is little prior press censorship, but editors exercise innate caution based on certain understood rules of behavior. Denigration of the Shah, the Monarchy, and policies and programs directly espoused by the Shah are not allowed, but the government is frequently criticized for its failings. The Iranian judicial system is a pragmatic blend of French, British and traditional Moslem law, but crimes related to national security are tried by military courts, which do not observe some of the individual legal protection provided by civil courts. From the Shah down, Iranians have increasingly taken a hard line towards external criticism of the country's human rights situation. Iranian society is in a state of transition, and future projections are difficult, because the formal group basis of politics which underlines most Western countries does not

CONFIDENTIAL yet exist. The modernizing middle class does not yet have significant political consciousness, yet it has the largest stake in continuation of the present regime. A substantial number of reactionary Moslem elements exist but are in political disarray. Intellectuals and students are divided over whether they want in or out of the political system. As Iran encounters increasing difficulty managing economic development, and political participation grows concurrently through development of the Resurgence Party organization, the result is likely to produce some limits on political activity counterbalanced by increased criticism of foreigners. Making the adjustments in attitudes and behavior necessary to run its emerging society will not be an easy process. Oblique accommodation, not confrontation, will remain the quintessential Iranian political style, and at least for the near future personalities will continue to be significantly more important than institutions and doctrines. Should a succession crisis occur within the next 5-7 years, the Regency Council under the Empress' leadership backed by the military would hold the country together initially, but power could dissipate very quickly if the centrifugal forces of change drove various groups and factions to put their own interests ahead of unity and stability. U.S. interests lie in maintaining close relations with Iran to encourage modernizing elements which support policies generally favorable to American interests. As domestic tensions grow, this will require substantial diplomatic finesse, forebearance in the face of occasional hostility, and a willingness to speak frankly and honestly to defuse problems before they become disruptive. While recognizing that the Shah is truly dominant in modern Iran, we must maintain and expand our bridges to other groups in Iranian society so as to become more aware of those trends and forces that will dominate the jockeying for power in post-Shah Iran (see Tab A-3). The degree of U.S. educational influence in the present Iranian government can be shown by the fact that over 60 percent of the present cabinet ministers received all or part of their education in the U.S. (see Tab A 10). CONFIDENTIAL 2. Foreign Affairs Over the past decade Iran has gradually been assuming a more and more independent stance in world affairs. As the Shah has gained confidence, and the economy improved steadily, the Shah has leaned less than before on Western--specifically U.S.--political guidance. He has instead tended to stake out positions which he felt to be in Iran's national interest with less regard than in the past as to whether he is over the past decade Iran has gradually been assuming a more and more independent stance in world affairs. As the Shah has gained confidence, and the economy improved steadily, the Shah has leaned less than before on Western--specifically U.S.--political guidance. He has instead tended to stake out positions which he felt to be in Iran's national interest with less regard than in the past as to whether these coincide with those of the West, the East, or Third World countries. There is nevertheless a limit to how far he has allowed himself to go, in view of Iran's basic need for a continuing Western interest in Iran's independent national survival. U.S.-Iran: The lynchpin of Iran's basic pro-Western policy is its relationship with the U.S. This relationship is increasingly multifaceted. Iran's dependence on the U.S. as the only super-power with the potential to counter Soviet pressure has led Iran over the course of time into a heavy investment in American weaponry, technology, and general way of life. Unstated but clearly understood has been Iran's confidence that the U.S. is far enough away and disinterested enough in its policy not to represent the kind of threat to Iranian sovereignty which other powers that have balanced Soviet pressure in this part of the world came to represent to Iran—notably the British. In the process the Shah has permitted a number of sensitive U.S. intelligence operations and installations in Iran, from which he has derived the benefit of closer intimacy with the U.S. intelligence community. The private as well as governmental sectors of the Iranian economy have mirrored Iranian respect for U.S. know-how and products. Trade with the U.S. tops that with any other single country and students generally go to the U.S. when they leave Iran for technical or other studies. On the other hand, trade with Europe, the Soviet Union, and other parts of the world is not that far behind, and Iran's values are clearly not as Americanized as those of countries sharing U.S. culture from the same West European antecedents. Such factors are useful as background to assessing the current state of U.S.-Iranian relationships. As the most populous, strongest and (with Saudi Arabia) largest country in the Middle East, Iran has aspired over the decades since World War II to a regional role of leadership. While

CONFIDENTIAL handicapped by the non-Semitic origins of its people, the fears engendered by vague memories of Iran's ancient empire, and the rivalry of other budding nationalistic peoples such as Iraq, Iran has sought to carve out its role of leadership with the assistance of Western, particularly U.S., technology. The Nixon doctrine came to mean for Iran U.S. willingness to recognize Iran as a power which would help preserve regional stability in the general interests of the West and which would be assisted in arming itself so that more direct USG intervention would be unnecessary. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Shah has made it abundantly clear he does not count on the U.S. for direct military intervention and has some doubts as to U.S. consistency of policy in political support of Iran against neighboring regimes such as Iraq which have enjoyed consistent Soviet support. This provides one of several different justifications for Iran's arming itself with the most modern and effective weaponry available. With the change of U.S. Administrations questions have arisen in the minds of the Shah and of his advisors as to changes in U.S. policy which might produce certain strains. One relates to continuing defense supply and advisory-technical assistance. The Shah is uncomfortable in the presence of Congressional rumbling about Iran being overly armed and the new Administration's public commitment to smaller defense expenditures, more emphasis on disarmament, and closer scrutiny of arms sales abroad. The Shah is looking for evidence that these concerns will not change basic U.S. arms supply policy toward Iran. An area which has moved more to the forefront over the past six months has been human rights, due partly to U.S. Congressional and press interest and partly to the Carter Administration's having adopted it as a leading issue in international affairs. The Shah and his advisors are concerned lest Iran's differences in that area with the situation existing in the U.S. and many West European countries spill over into (or "link" with) the more basic security and defense relationship. While petroleum resources provide Iran the wherewithal to make its own way economically and in terms of its own social development, the Shah perceives that there is no substitute for the U.S. relationship in security affairs if Iran is not to slide into a "Finlandized" dependency or worse in relation to the Soviet Union. Therefore, U.S. attitudes continue to get very close study even within the context of a purportedly non-aligned foreign policy. Iran-USSR: While Russian pressure or intervention in Iran is an old story, Iran-Soviet relations improved following an understanding reached in 1962 by which the Shah made a statement CONFIDENTIAL that Iran would not permit installation of any foreign missile bases on its territory. Relations between the two countries have steadily improved, marked by a considerable expansion of trade in recent years. Periodic strains have, however, occurred. During 1976 the Soviets tried to pressure Iran on its strong ties with the U.S., particularly in the defense field. Iranian suspicions were aroused that the USSR might support a higher level of opposition activities, particularly Tudeh Party broadcasts from abroad. These strains have appeared to subside since then, perhaps partly owing to Iran's return of a Soviet aviator who tried to defect in a civilian aircraft in September 1976. After considerable soul-searching the Shah decided this case came under the provisions of a bilateral Iran-USSR anti-hijacking treaty. Nevertheless the Shah and most Iranians still harbor fundamental suspicions about the USSR's long-term objectives toward Iran and the Persian Gulf area generally. A new Soviet Ambassador arrived in February this year; Vladimir Vinogradov is one of the USSR's most experienced diplomats in Middle Eastern affairs. Iran-PRC: In August 1971, following a visit by Princess Ashraf to Peking, Iran recognized the PRC as "the sole legal government of China," an act which led to suspension of relations with the Nationalist Chinese. Exchanges of Parliamentary and other good will delegations occur periodically, but there has been little of economic or cultural substance in the relationship. Iran and the PRC both cling to the image of a close mutual relationship as an additional lever against the Soviet Union. In this connection, China has expressed public support for Iran's proposals on (a) an Indian Ocean zone of peace, (b) a nuclear free area in the Middle East, and (c) Persian Gulf mutual security arrangements, all positions of importance to Iran. A new PRC ambassador is expected to arrive in March. Iran-Iraq and Persian Gulf Relations: Iran's longstanding quarrels with Iraq were brought to a considerable degree of mutual accord in 1975 (at Algiers) when in effect Iran agreed to stop supporting the Kurdish insurrection in Iraq in return for Iraq agreeing to the Iranian position on the correct boundary between the two countries in the oil-strategic Shatt-al-Arab region. Subsequently, exchanges of delegations have produced a host of other bilateral agreements so that the relationship today between the two countries can be characterized as wary but no longer openly antagonistic.

CONFIDENTIAL Iran's military occupation of the (uninhabited) Tunbs and Abu Musa islands in the Persian Gulf right after the British withdrawal in 1971 got Iran's relationship with the Arabic Persian Gulf states off to a rocky start. However, the relationship has steadily improved as a result of several factors, including (a) Iran's formal relinquishment of its long-asserted claim to Bahrain, (b) Iran's cooperation with other OPEC countries, including in particular Saudi Arabia, and (c) Iran's settlement of some of the issues with Iraq, mentioned above. Concurrently, however, Iran's military buildup, coupled with Iran's provision of what amounted to an expeditionary force of several thousand troops and some aircraft to Oman in connection with the Dhofar insurgency, have continued to raise suspicions on the Arab side of the Gulf which have operated against the formal conclusion of any mutual security arrangements of the type Iran has been pushing. After an Iranian F-4 "Phantom" was shot down by the South Yemenis (PDRY) on the Dhofar border in November 1976, Saudi Arabia proved to be a useful intermediary in arranging the return of the pilot, of the co-pilot's body, and salvage of the aircraft remains from PDRY territorial waters. The current irritation between Iran and Saudi Arabia over leadership on pricing policies within OPEC might prove to be only a ripple that will soon be forgotten or--if prolonged--could significantly contribute to traditional Arab distrust of the large Iranian neighbor. Meanwhile, the Shah appears to have reconciled himself to the absence of any quick movement toward a formal Gulf security pact and to be hoping for the gradual evolution of satisfactory Gulf security arrangements. It is, of course, a fact that Iranians are adamant on using the terminology "Persian Gulf," while Arabs have grown used in recent years to a rival term, "Arab Gulf." Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Iran supports a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict along the lines of UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. It encourages moderate Arab leadership and maintains close, friendly ties with Jordan's King Hussein, Egypt's Sadat, and Syria's Assad, as well as with several Lebanese leaders. Financial contributions and transfers of weaponry (the latter in Hussein's case) figure in this relationship. In the U.N., the I.L.O. and other international fora Iran will usually try to avoid recording a vote on Arab-Israeli questions, but will vote for the Arab position if a vote cannot be avoided. Iran has, in this connection, criticized or condemned Israeli actions on the West Bank and elsewhere. At the same time, Iran maintains a fruitful private relationship with Israel. Senior representatives are resident in each other's country even though diplomatic CONFIDENTIAL relations do not formally exist. Intelligence information is exchanged regularly, and several Israeli technical assistance projects in agriculture and other fields are underway in Iran. Despite the Arab oil embargo, Iran has never cut its flow of oil to Israel and today provides 50 percent of Israel's oil requirements. Iran-Western Europe: Iran's relationship with the major West European countries has a long history. Due to British control of neighboring countries, and their occupation on two occasions of Iranian territory, the British have more often appeared as a threat than as useful friends in the past. However, there is considerable evidence that the Shah has relegated Britain to a secondary position in world politics and looks pragmatically to economic and military sales advantages in his relationship with the UK today. In the German case, very close relations existed through the late 1920s and 1930s, with Reza Shah himself often suspected of pro-German sympathies by the allies, a factor which directly contributed to his abdication in favor of his son in 1941. This relationship has been partially re-established, as West Germany is an important trading partner of Iran today. French influence in Iran, as in so many other countries in this part of the world, has traditionally been cultural. French was the preferred foreign language in the educational system prior to World War II, and an abiding admiration of things French in the cultural field has been reinvigorated by Empress Farah, who has close ties to France. President Giscard d'Estaing was the last prominent Western chief of state to visit Iran (October 1976). Iran's relations with smaller nations such as Switzerland, The Netherlands, or Sweden have at times been rocky over the issue of human rights. An Iranian expatriate raid on Iran's Geneva mission in 1976 was followed by Swiss expulsion of a Mission member on the basis that he was engaging in illegal intelligence activities. This aroused the Shah's ire to the extent that he not only retaliated by the expulsion of a Swiss diplomat from Tehran but has not returned to Switzerland for his traditional annual skiing vacation since. Similar imbroglios have threatened from time to time over activities such as the Amnesty International meeting held during February 1977 in The Hague, but the Iranian Government has in each case drawn back before the issue reached serious proportions.

CONFIDENTIAL Iran-Communist Countries: Iran broke diplomatic ties with Cuba when Fidel Castro met with an Iranian (Tudeh) communist leader in Europe during 1976, and the past year has involved fewer cultural relations with Eastern European communist countries than in the past. By and large, however, Iran's relationship with these countries has been more impressive in form than in substance. While trade increased dramatically over the past year compared with the low levels of the past with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, the overall effect is still secondary compared to Iran's burgeoning trade with Western European countries and the U.S. In December 1976, Bulgaria did close down a clandestine opposition radio station which had been broadcasting to Iran, and the station has never reopened in Libya as was advertised at the time. The question remains whether this Bulgarian action was self-initiated or in response to Soviet prodding after return of the Soviet pilot to the USSR. Iran-UN: On political matters, Iran has generally maintained a low profile at the UN, often siding with the U.S. on East-West issues such as disarmament and with the Arab world or other Third World countries on issues of particular concern to them. Iran has taken a more active interest in North-South economic problems, though not always in the traditional UN-affiliated bodies such as UNCTAD. The Shah shows a tendency to relate his more active interest in "justice" for less developed nations with moments when he feels under pressure from the West politically or on his oil policy. Meanwhile, Iran takes a reasonably active interest in the various UN bodies. It initiated the creation in 1970 of the UN International Corps of Volunteers (some 500 members at present) and is actively interested in Tehran becoming the headquarters for IFAD. An ESCAPE regional center for Women and Development was established in Tehran in February 1977. CENTO: Iran's ambivalent attitude toward CENTO stems at least in part from Iranian anxiety about being surrounded by Soviet-influenced regimes. While aware that CENTO membership runs counter to its desired image of "independent nationalism," Iran recognizes that CENTO provides at least a formal symbol of Western commitment to Iranian security. Though continuing to soft-pedal CENTO in public (he recently said "CENTO does not exist"), the Shah has apparently concluded privately that on balance, CENTO's utility outweighs its disadvantages. CONFIDENTIAL Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto visits the Shah frequently and regular visits on a high level are exchanged with Turkey, Iran's other regional partner in CENTO. Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey are linked in the tripartite Regional Cooperation for Development, an organization (headquartered in Tehran) which seeks closer economic and cultural ties among the three countries. Iran Relations with Asia and Africa: Since oil quadrupled in price, however, Iran has acquired new leverage in its relations with India and (owing perhaps more than a little to several concessionary oil arrangements) Iran's relations with India have improved. Similarly, Iran's magnanimous offers of assistance to Afghanistan appear to have removed most immediate irritants in that relationship with the exception of the Helmand River Waters Treaty which the Afghans have postponed ratifying since 1973. Iran's continued concern lest Afghanistan fall definitively under Soviet influence is in the context of geopolitical worries about a potentially hostile neighbor. Given Iran's close relationship with Pakistan, the Shah has worried about Afghan stimulation of separatist movements in Baluchistan (which he shares with Pakistan) and Afghan agitation over the Pashtunistan issue on Pakistan's borders further north. In this regard, he has suspected Indian complicity in Afghan efforts. Nevertheless, continued squabbles over Helmand River water only highlights the Shah's longer-term concerns about Afghan policy. India's naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean similarly worry the Shah. Both these concerns figure with some prominence in the Shah's ambitions to create and maintain credibly strong military power. Finally, Iran's increasing attention to the requests for assistance from a variety of African states south of the Sahara can probably be attributed to a more generalized Iranian effort to spread a good image of Iranian generosity in the wake of its oil earnings, as well as propagate an attitude of moderation in as many African leaders as possible. It is in this sense a concrete expression of the Shah's periodic efforts to project himself as a world statesman who can act as a leader of the Third World in dealing with both the West and the East.

SECRET 3. Opposition and Terrorists There is no important organized opposition in Iranian political life today. Over the past decade and a half, the Shah has to a large extent countered and undermined the appeal of his opponents (National Front and Mossadeghist elements) with his own reform program--"The White Revolution." Those who have not been co-opted into the Iranian Establishment have either retreated from political activity into a posture of alienation or left the country. The "Rastakhiz" (Resurgence) Party has been created as a vehicle of constructive criticism, carefully limited so as not to develop into substantial opposition to the national program. For more on the Party, see Tab A 5. On the right, fanatical Muslim clergy constitute a latent opposition force who no longer have major political influence but who retain sufficient following to slow down many government programs which they believe deviate from (seventh century) Safavid dynasty norms. For the past decade these forces have been fighting a losing rear-guard action against the growing tide of secular economic development. Should unforeseen developments (the Shah's death, military disaster, severe recession) lead other segments of the population to challenge the government, the Muslim clergy could undoubtedly drum up a modest, perhaps (depending on the issue) substantial following in the streets. Since the U.S. is closely associated in their minds with the Shah's reforming regime, and the clergy has always opposed foreign influence, the U.S. would come under severe political attack in the event of revived religious nationalism. Student dissidence in Iran is largely ritualized and deals mainly with local, academic-related issues. The Confederation of Iranian Students, with chapters in most Western European countries and the U.S., is the core of the external opposition to the Shah's regime, and has spread its views well enough to disconcert the regime. These groups have links to major Western dissident factions and probably to small coteries of individuals within Iran. The student movement abroad has played a key role in surfacing Human Rights as an issue in Iran's relations with the West. Horrist groups have received extensive publicity in Iran for the assassinations of six Americans and many Iranians over the past five or six years. Over the past four years, the SECRET terrorist movement in Iran has gradually coalesced into two major organizations: the People's Struglers (Mujahiddin-e-Khalq) and the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas (Charikha-ye Feda'i-i-ye Khalq) and probably receive considerable support from outside sources such as Libya (though not to our knowledge directly from the Soviet Union). Both organizations grew from earlier dissident and terrorist activities. While-based on different (Marxist-Moslem) ideological principles, they have cooperated closely over the past two years and share adherence to a common veneer of Marxist ideology (see Tab A 6). The Mujahiddin are the center of conservative-religious armed opposition to the Shah, and can trace themselves back to the religious wing of the old National Front. Despite the death of their key operational leader, Bahram Aram, in a November 1976 police shootout, their infrastructure has apparently not been seriously damaged, and they pose a continuing and dangerous threat to Americans. The Chariks are a quasi-Marxist group with roots in the old Tudeh (communist) Party organization of the 1940s and 1950s. This group has always maintained strong links with Iranian and other radical student organizations in Europe and else-where. Chariks were the first to introduce a true guerrilla organization into Iran in 1970-71, and apparently have continued to maintain links to George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which has trained some Iranian guerrillas. Despite several effective counter-terrorist strikes against them in 1976, the Chariks also retain an operational capability, but they lack the political capacity or infrastructure to influence politics in any conceivable post-coup or post-assassination period.

SECRET 4. Security Organizations Although popular opinion considers SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organization) the all-powerful security agency in Iran, it is merely the first (and most powerful) among several. Security responsibilities are divided among a number of independent agencies whose heads report directly to the Shah on subjects within their mandates. Jurisdictional questions are adjudicated by the Shah after consultations with the responsible agency heads. SAVAK was established in 1957 as an external intelligence and internal security organization with primary responsibility for thwarting anti-regime activities. It has about 6,000 employees and supplies the guidance for the Joint Police-SAVAK Counter-Dissidence Committee, which is the GOI's action arm for controlling terrorism. SAVAK can directly order the arrest of any person accused of security crimes, but in practice police make most arrests. SAVAK prepares the dossiers in national security cases and works closely with--even controls--the Office of the Military Prosecutor, who tries security cases. General Nematollah Nassiri heads SAVAK. The Iranian National Police, with 26,000 employees, concentrates on maintaining public order in urban areas, criminal investigation, and monitoring activities of foreigners. It is headed by General Samad Samadianpur. The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, with a force of over 50,000, is responsible for law and order in the extensive rural areas of Iran. It controls the border guard and policies tribal areas, traditionally trouble spots in Iran. General Abbas Karim Gharabaghi commands the Gendarmerie. J-2 of the Supreme Commander's Staff of the Iranian Army is responsible for military intelligence and counterintelligence and handles all matters of a military nature. It is commanded by Lt. Gen. Nasir Moghadam. Further details available in Section III, Tab A 7. CONFIDENTIAL 6. Narcotics (DEA) The deputy head of the political section serves as narcotics coordinator, and coordinates the work of DEA and the Mission's Narcotics Control Committee. The U.S. has no major bilateral programs in Iran, but DEA provides close liaison with Iranian authorities on international aspects of enforcement, and assists with police training on a limited basis. Iran is a major victim country, with approximately 160,000 licensed addicts and an estimated 350,000 illegal addicts, among them 20-40,000 illegal heroin users. There are distinct, but so far minor, drug problems within the large American community in Iran (the first overdose death of an American occurred on January 20 of this year in Isfahan). A Social Development Center has recently been established in Tehran for counseling in this and other fields. Iran has an active national police Narcotics Program, but the structure and behavioral characteristics of the Iranian bureaucracy have not encouraged cooperation between the police (urban), gendarmerie (rural), and customs (ports of entry and airports). Iran has just recently begun to focus on its own problem and to deal with international aspects of the situation. We supported the candidacy of an Iranian for reporter of the U.N. Commission for Narcotics in Geneva. We have urged the Iranians informally to press Pakistan to take greater enforcement action along its border with Iran. Further details in Part III, Tab A 9.

SCNF IDERRTIAL DISANTMENT OF STATE INFO: AEN DEHABI, ANHAN, ANKARA, BAERAIN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DOHA, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KIVAKT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, USINT BAGHDAD NAHANA, MUSCAT Embassy TEHRAN July 22, 1976 Decision-making in Iran VOL3VOL3.0.11652: GDS - TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IR SUMMARY: Embassy reports over many years have commented on the Shah's style of leadership and on the group of advisors who assist him in his centralized administration of Iranian domestic and foreign policy. His style of leadership has become more decisive as he has gained experience and self-confidence. This is particularly true since about 1961, when he began to formulate his policy for the modernization of Iran, now called the Revolution of the Shah and the People. (See Tehran A-S1 for a comprehensive report on the 12-point revolution, and 75 Tehran telegrams 7657, 1200S, and 12460 on the five principles added since that date.) In this airgram, we analyze how he makes the decisions which are implemented by the Iranian Government and assess the system's effectiveness. The first section dispenses with the extreme views of the Shah's leadership style and mentions limitations on our knowledge of the inner councils of the GOI. The next outlines the methods of decision-making now being used. Following that we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the current decision-making process in Iran. Finally, in recognition of the importance of personalities play in Iran, there are 15 updated biographic sketches in Emelcuro 1. The Shah sets policy guidance on all matters of internal and external affairs and makes all important decisions, but he does not run Iran singlehandedly. He depends on a rather limited group of officials for the judgments E10 Sketches CONFIDENTIAL DCM: JCMiklos(draft) POL: Bolster:mp 7/15/76 2112 ECON: RWhrewin/Ctnylor SRF CONFIDENTIAL upon which he bases his decisions, although through them he draws upon a wide range of Iranian sources of information, which is refined by competition which he fosters so that he will obtain the most accurate data available. He uses this same competition to divide and rule, often playing one group or individual off against another. Perconultition are more important to the decision-making process than are institutions, largely because it is in the degree of trust which the Shah can place in a person which determines his influence. As can be noted from the 15 biographic sketches in Enclosure 1, most of the Shah's close advisors have had long years of association with him, have demonstrated their loyalty to him in some obvious way (they are particularly trusted if they actively opposed Elosnadegh), have a strong record of anti-Communism, and possess a breadth of experiences permitting them to give advice on a range of subjects. There are only two women among the fifteen: Empress Farah and Princesse Ashraf. Institutions are not without importance. The security apparati and the armed forces play major roles. The High Economic Council, the Imperial Commission, and other bodies are institutions which coordinate development policy under the Shah's authority. The Cabinet, under Prime Minister Hoveyda, has not been given a policy-formulating role in the collective sense, but several ministers do make policy recommendations directly to the Shah. Analysis of case studies in Krunkan decision-making made in preparation for this program indicated that in domestic affairs there is another more study of possible options than one would have completed, given the historical structure of the COI, but there are also many situations in which the Shah has made an early decision on the basis of briefings and in not open to modification of his whom unless other alternatives are passed in the line to him. Thus the Shah often sets as a sort of court. There is an additional so that proposals of a viciam different from those which have received example for access to the Shah in order of changing his mind. The top of foreign advisers and foreign ambassadors in this decision-making process do appear to become very nice the other different prospections than there is being in the case people, even though the foreigners are not there from Intermediate in mind. In addition to

CONTRIDENTIAN Jaskopina for access, there is considerable acceo for the payment of commissions, bribes, and kickbacks to people who claim to be able to influence the final decision, but the COI now requires firms to sign affedsvisa listing their legitimate agents and what they receive, and corruption has come under interesting attack in the past year. In the foreign policy field, the Shah keeps his own counsel and often reaches major decisions without even consulting Foreign Minister Salim, and his staff. The Shah does not have to worry about the special-interest groups or about public opinion which promotes him to act decisively. He has succeeded in giving them an early post world role and has made few mistakes, these generally interesting rather from poorly conceived and vague proposals not stuffed out in advance (e.g., Indian Ocean Common Market) than from any actions with harmful results. Leverages of the decision-making system prevalent in Iran are: (1) The centralized nature permits quick decisions to be made (2) the necessary; (2) competition towards rapid responses to (3) system does information as well as "survival of the fittest"; (4) a supplier has to divide and rule; and (4) the Shah and top officials can tap a wide range of information upon which to leave polities. Disadvantages are: (1) The risks of being wrong and the desire to fit in with the Shah's policy directives would be easy "very small"; (2) there is little initiative shown by the other and much evolving of responsibility when anything goes (2) Shams to poor "feedback" to correct errors; (4) those are not available who are responsible are overworked and subject to current stress; and (5) the Shams can focus priority attention on only a few issues at a time. Theอินทรัลเคอีกเคยอดเยี่ยมเริ่มก่อตั้งเมื่อวันที่ 14 ธันวาคม พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดการกิจสิกวงในวันที่ 14 เมษายน พ.ร. (กมม) ที่จะจัดพยัคฆ์ร้ายที่มีความสุขและสุขาขันตรีที่มีความสุขและสุขาขันตรีที่มีความสุขและสุขาข CONFIDENTIAL One problem for the future is that the decision-making process which exists here does not perform well in solving conflicts over alternative uses of resources, nor is it well suited to planning long range economic development and coordinating orders for supplise and equipment from abroad. On the other hand, Iran has made impressive economic gains and its political status in the world has been greatly enhanced in recent years. In sum, the centralized but yet flexible decision-making process which operates here has proved reasonably well suited to the demands of a modernizing country. END SUMMARY I. PARAMETERS It might be assumed from newspaper and newsmagazine accounts of the Shah's leadership style the he runs Iran singlehandedly. This is not so, although he certainly makes all important policy decisions, and is indisputably the head of Iran's authoritarian regime. On the other extreme, many might assume that because Iran is becoming a complex, modern nation, the Shah would no longer be able to involve himself in the day-to-day administration of his country. By this reasoning he would be gradually forced to relinquish more decision-making authority to other members of the Executive. This extreme view is also inaccurate, because the only authority consistently delegated is that needed to implement policies already set by the Shah. Even within that limitation many relatively minor matters must still be referred to the Shah for a final decision. A. Disclaimer No outsider can fully understand the Iranian decision-making process. For a Westerner used to analyzing institutional structures in a government, the highly personal system of government under the Shah presents a complexity which can be highly frustrating. For one thing, it is extremely hard to get facts about anything going on within the high councils of the COI. Newspapers print "facts," but these are often based on misinformation given out by government officials for their own purposes, or official handouts which paint glowing pictures of projects underway or programs anticipated, but which often are expressions more of hopes than of real plans. Therefore people fall back on rumors and information from friends in hopes of learning the truth. Foreign observers are often limited by this same dearth of reliable information. CONFIDENTIAL

Pollsy Guidance II. THE MODERNLY FING MONATION ~ HOW DISCLOSIONS ARE MADE It is the Shah who provides the policy guidance on every major issue in Iran's domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic side, the most comprehensive presentation of the goals he has not for his country is embodied in the "Revolution of the Shah and the People," which is now more generally referred to as the "Great Civilization." The statement did not emerge fully formulated on the scene. It evolved from the land reform program which was implemented in late 1961 when the Shah authorized Prime Minister Ali Amini and his Minister of Agriculture Human Armajand to take all but one village away from major landowners and distribute these excess holdings among the people farming the land. When that revolutionary program was implemented without any effective opposition from landowners concerned, the Shah began to add reforms until the 17-point program of today evolved. While long-range goals for Iran are consistent, many significant domestic programs have been announced in rapid, even arbitrary fashion (e.g. the anti-inflation campaign and before that his decision to establish the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI) in March of 1975—this latter change apparently was made without any prior consultation with GDI officials or even Nepales Parah and took political observers totally by surprise.) People Versus Institutions One might assume that given the guidance of general programs much as those mentioned above, implementation, feedback, and improvement would be carried out by institutions operating under the Shah's direction. There are institutions (SAVAK, the Armed Forces, the Cabinet, the Resurgence Party, and various high councils) but none of these are allowed to become very strong. It is people who are important, not institutions, and indeed many of those important people are found in the institutions. Thus the Shah seeks people who combine knowledge, judgment and loyalty (both to him personally and to the institution of the monarchy). The list of advisers to the Shah contained in Enclosure I shows them in rough order of CONFIDENTIAL importance, based not on their specific functions but on their general influence on the Shah's thinking. It is significant to note that many of the people listed (1) have known the Shah since he was Crown Prince, (2) supported him against Mossadagh, and/or (3) have strong anti-Cousaunist credentials. The list includes five of the seven holders of Iran's highest decoration, the Taj (Crown) First Class. Only two women are listed: Eupress Sarah and the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf. Divido and Rule Because people are more important than institutions, the Shah's leadership is projected through the people he selects to implement the policies which he lays down. An important factor is the degree of trust which he can place in people, because many observers of the Iranian scene have noted, Iranian society is marked by insecurity and lack of trust. The Shah trusts only a very small number of officials, and he maintains control over Iranian officialism by a careful policy of divide and rule. Like President Roosevelt was wont to do, the Shah often assigns over-lapping tasks to officials so that they will report to him individually and he can check on the accuracy and completeness of the facts and opinions reported to him. When a particular official goes to be gaining more influence than the Shah wants him to, he can be cut down to size by giving some of his responsibilities to others or simply placing him in a position of lesser importance. Both of those tactics were used on}{{ The government of Iran is a leading national leadership of the land reform program in the agrarian political power base. the Shak formultakes general ideas and then how The information is not as clear to people. We understand, for example, The Shak was pushing hard for the Administration of civil police, he asked that a task force be created to gather examining police information. This was performed by the Central Bank of India. The information had to be shared early a period of months instead since the date that the General Council was not able to process any adequate issues for administration. As a result the Shak has not been addressed to the Office of Administration for a year, the meeting also became known as the meeting on the new public policy. As Adnan said on this issue the new Administration is being prepared to forward completing the

Shah attempts to keep this competition within bounds to bring out policy options. He often uses foreign advisors to check on this study process: these may be technicians working in Iran whose reports are passed to him, visitors with specialized knowledge, or diplomatic representatives in Tehran who can pass to him information gathered by their foreign offices. Implicit in this study process is the assumption that the Shah will act as a sort of "court of last appeal." A auction which loses out in an earlier round may seek to intercede through officials who have access to the Shah to present another set of arguments which might cause him to decide in that group's favor once the policy recommendation arrives on his desk. Thus foreign consultants are often heard to comment that if they could just get a copy of their report into the Shah's hands the decision might come out the right way. Institutions of Importance Although we have posited that people are more important than institutions, it is instructive to look briefly at a few of the important institutions involved in decision-making in Iran. (The reader who wants to focus on the personalities important in Iran as advisers to the Shah should consult Enclosure 1.) A. SAVAK The National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK) is a combination CIA, FBI, NSA, and National Security Council. It has very broad powers, much like the organization which served Darius as "the eyes and ears of the King." Although the Palace Guard is formally charged with the protection of the Shah and the Royal Family's primary goal too is to provide the Shah with more general protection such as the exposure of groups opposed to the Shah and the GDI, information about the need of the people, and processed intelligence about a wide range of foreign and domestic developments. Although head of SAVAK Nematollah Nassiri ostensibly serves as a Deputy Prime Minister, in fact he reports directly to the Shah and has a virtually unlimited budget to carry out whatever projects the Shah gives him. General Nassiri (see Enclosure 1) is totally loyal to the Shah and stays on despite his growing desire to go into retirement. 7. The Armsad Forces EVAK gives guidance to newspapers as to how news stories are to be played, investigators candidates proposed for any official position (including three desiring to run for Parliament), coordinates many aspects of foreign visits by the Shah and of visits by Chile of State and other important visitors coming to Iran, and conducts the investigation and trial of persons accused of actions against the security of the State. Nassiriz one of the few persons who have consistent and immediate access to the Shah. Thus he can influence a wide range of decisions, drawing on his vast organization to provide facts and recommendations as requested. As Commander in Chief of the Iranian armed forces, the Shah taken a deep interest in all aspects of military preparedness. No is determined to keep Iran supplied with the latest in military equipment so that it cannot fall prey to surprise attack such as that carried out against the Iranian Navy by the British in the [?] n S.S. in 1933. All major policy decisions involving the military are made by the Shah himself, although he must of necessity delegate the operational responsibility for carrying out actions to have ordered. Those actions can be severely limited in practice, however. On several occasions in the past years the US has had to obtain his personal permission before dispatching military holisticors on missions of money within Iran. (Note: The important aspects of military-related decision-making in Iran were covered in Tehran A-154 of July 6, 1973.) C. The Cabinet The Iranian Council of Ministers includes some 26 persons and Gave not complete an effective policy-making body, largely because the Shah does not really want it to function in that way. The Cabinet is primarily a coordinating body for assuring that the GOI is effectively carrying out the Shah's policies. It is an institution for policy implementation, not policy formation, It also has some of the range of interests of government The office is the capital of the government and also the The Financial Council, often based on the and more intangible is often

CONFTDRWNKAI Palmo Minister Koveyda, the longest-tenured Iranian Premier in this country, is an important factor in Iranian decision-making, because he has such a rich background in governmental affairs (also Enclosure 1). Although clearly not in a position to challenge the Shah, he appears to be one of the few persons who are able to express opinions different from the Shah's in fields where he has direct experience. He has also expanded his office at the point where he can cut through the red tape of Persian Bureaucracy and obtain facts and recommendations to lay before the Shah on matters awaiting a decision. D. The Resurgence Party Although descriptions of the Party's functions stress its importance as a channel for the upward flow of expressions of the people's will, it has little impact on decision-makers. There are various study committees within the Party which are supposed to take recommendations for action and which are beginning to tackle such issues as rent control, but the RPPI today is primarily a mechanism for communicating policy guidance from the central government to the public. (For further information see Tehran A-123 of July 8, 1976.) B. Compartimento and Commissions Although most of the Shah's actions to implement his policies are accomplished through individual contacts with government officials, there are two coordinating institutions of importance: The High Economic Council and the Imperial Commission. The Council, chaired by Prime Minister Bovoyda, meets twice a week and is essentially a coordinating body to make sure that all government organizations active in the economic field are informed of its plans. Conversely, it serves the essential function of making the Shah aware of budgetary limitations on programs, limitations which Iran's temporarily declining oil revenues have forced the GCI to consider more carefully in the past year. Its members are: Jamshid Amounegar (Interior), Mansur Rouhani (Agriculture and Natural Resources), Rushang Ansary (Economic Affairs and Finance), Safi Asfia (Minister of State), Abdol-Neid Najidi (Chief of Plan and Budget Organization), Abdol Ghancon Moini (Labor and Social Affairs), Rosa Radaghiani (Co-op and Rural Affairs), Furroka Najshudi (Industry and Mines), Koreidum Nakhavi (Deputy Secretary General, RPPI), and Hassan Ali Tehran (Control Bank). CONFIDENTIAL The imperial Commission was founded in November 1975. Its members are: The Prime Minister (Chairman), Ausary, Asifa, Majidi, Military Intelligence Chief Farust, and Director of the Sharia Special Bureau Moinian. The main task of the Commission is to cut down government spending and to encourage efficiency. It is also expected that the Commission will control corruption and illegal activities by government officials. A High Council for the Eradication of Corruption has also been established, which includes Noveyda, Ansary, and Fardust from the Imperial Commission and has the following additional members: Minister of Interior Amousegar, Minister of Justice Sadeq Ahmadi, and Prosecutor-General Fallah Rastegar. Two other special bodies chaired by the Shah and the Express were inaugurated in early July of this year: the High Council for Rural Research (concerned with social and economic development in Iran's villages) and the Imperial Council for Education (concerned with manpower training and improvement in the quality of education). Decentralization--Pending One of the 17 points of the Shah-People Revolution provides for improved efficiency by government officials, including decentralization of administrative authority. Ministry of Interior officials claim that hundreds of jobs formerly filled by officials in Tehran have been transferred out into the provinces. Governors General have also been given more leasry to oversee development projects in their jurisdictions and to transfer funds from one project to another when convinced that this is necessary. In general, however, decentralization is a slow process which runs contrary to the instincts of many government officials. For one thing, the process is a two-way street: The Center must desire to transfer authority to provincial officials, and these officials must be prepared to seize this authority. In practice, neither is true. All major decisions are still made in Tehran and assignments to jobs outside of the capital are locked upon as brief interludes before a return to the center of power. Provincial officials, for their part, are reluctant to make any decisions which might incur the disapproval of superiors in Tehran. They find it much safer to refer anything other than routine decisions up the line to Tehran. There are only a few exceptions to this rule. Perhaps three or four Governors General take an active part in supervising development activities and are prepared to lobby effectively in Tehran to get the resources they need, and as is so often true in Iran, it is the force of personality which permits these individuals to bend the administrative system to suit their purposes.

Foreign Affairs Contrary to the situation prevailing in decision-making in domestic affinire, foreign policy is a field in which the Shah tends toward the extreme of doing everything for himself. He sees Foreign Minister Khalatbary twice a day, but this is primarily to discuss specific actions which must be taken. Khalatbary and his Ministry officials provide information from Iranian diplomatic posts over-seas, but generally do not make policy suggestions of their own. The Shah decides what action is needed, and Khalatbary directs the implementation. This permits rapid reaction by the Iranian government, unfettered by Parliamentary or public opinion constraints. The Such has personal dealings with many world leaders, and those who meet with his are invariably impressed by the range of his detailed information on their country and its policies. The Small House shown a fine for foreign policy and has projected the among of a world statesman larger than one would expect from a country the mine of Iran. His oil wealth has been an important factor. It has permitted him to buy both "guns and luffors"—the "pum" the maintain a deterrent force respected by his neighbors to the most could, and not, and the "foster" to value living information in Iran and finance a whole waiting welfare program which has given his country the shape of a prosperous, notewh‌ing state playing a world role. The state of high-level foreign visitors through Tehran adopting Ison and oil comp‌lins on a coming home to an enhanced the image. The image of an "involved" man he also projected through an notice role in U.S. affairs: In 1940 Iran replaced Canada as a manager of the International Government for Control and Surveillance in Vietnam (now in quarantine) and it was troops carrying on the U.S. Disengagement Adversor from the Colum Houghta. 2 In this article was developing an Iran, but potentially close which was to the data (General Bank), carry out technical operations (General Bank, the military, Iran Air) and co-ordinates federalism (General Bank of Iran) (National High Council, the Federal Government). CONFIDENTIAL The Cabinet under Hoveyda has developed the institutional capability to make decisions and formalize policies and could do more of this is it were allowed to by the Shah. Having become more closely involved in day-to-day governmental activities since 1983, the Shah is reluctant to relax his control and to delegate decision-making now that he feels many of the goals he has not for his country in the expanded "Revolution of the Shah and the People" are within his reach. Do leaders develop institutions or vice versa? The answer is Iran must be the former. Personal proftige and a reputation for self-confident administration are essential to a leader in Iran, just as they are in many countries. The Plan Supervision is a good example. Under the determined leadership of Intangit it flowered and had a major role in development administration. This changed when the Shah began to exercise personal leadership in day-to-day affairs. Also, Ministries were anxious to regain their authority over development. The Plan and Budget Organization, as it is now called, has never regained its major position, but its importance in coordinating developmental policy within the government under the High Revenue Council is now increasing because budget limitations require a forum for settling resources priorities. Advantages of the Hyton The Shak has the advantage of being able to reach quickly to changing situations, particularly in foreign relations. For example, when the US wanted Iran to provide 50 F-34 aircraft for use in Vietnam in 1972, an affirmative answer came from the Shak twelve minutes after the matter had been raised. A related advantage is that there is fierce competition to meet the Shak's needs rapidly with the best and most complete information available, a process which works to collect capable people who can perform to his demanding standard. The fact that there is competition to keep the Shak well informed means that he accumulated not only a want amount of information but can use conflicting bits of data to question other reports and to try to "keep people honest." He also accumulatedหมายจ่ายinformation about some of his people which can be used to keep them in line—a technique not unknown in our own system.

CONFIDENTIAL Email China 02 Insecurity The "Dynamic tension" which the Shah established in the process of dividing and ruling has many undesirable side effects. Probably the worst one is the avoidance of responsibility. Because Iranian officials have come to expect the Shah to provide all policy guidance, they often avoid taking any initiatives other than those involved in implementing the guidance received. It is more that anyone disagrees with the Sinh. Officials go along with whatever they perceive to be the "Shah"s desire and would general responsibility be that they will not be accused of any wrongdoing in particular programs fail. The concentration of authority and responsibility at the top means that action occurs within the bureaucracy only when Royal attention is focused on a particular subject. The "spotlight effect" results in frantic effort on certain matters which are important to the deal at the moment, while yesterday's priority subject may languish in bureaucratic stagnation awaiting its reemergence into the linelight. The high level of insecurity mentioned earlier causes many to avoid top positions in government. The result is a very thin layer of decision-makers who are delighted down by so many responsibilities that they are unable to give each one their undivided attention. Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Ansay is an example. He is reported to be suffering from an ulcer and experienced heart fibrillation in 1975 for which he sought treatment in the US earlier this year. Minister of Interior Announega's health is holding up well, but he too is overworked. He performs additional duties as Iran's EPMC Representative, claims the council crowding Tehran's expansion and development, and is head of one of the two "rings" of the official single party, the Correspondence Party of the People of Iran. (Anasy heads the office.) Because they are overworned and cannot find enough people to show they can delegate authority, those top officials are forced to make decisions on many matters without adequate study. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL A fundamental fault is the lack of adequate "feedback" within the system. Shortcomings are concealed, rather than identified so they may be corrected. Advisors are reluctant to tell the Shah when some of his ideas may not be workable (the proposal for an Indian Ocean Common Market, for example), and in such cases he does not consult anyone who might identify these shortcomings. The channels of communication to the Shah are crowded with so many matters being referred up the line for decision that negative reports tend to be buried. Thus the decision-making process works rather well to implement clear-cut action programs, but works poorly where there are complex issues which pose large demands on limited resources and necessitate long-range planning. For example, the financial resources available for development in Iran have become so large since the quadrupling of oil prices that the GDI had greatly expanded the goals of its current Five Year Plan. This process was done in rather arbitrary fashion, with little apparent thought being given to action programs in which the target amounts would be spent (Tohram A-130 of July 12, 1976). A related example is the poor coordination of orders for equipment and supplies from foreign suppliers. When money was freely available, ministries engaged in a spending spree which resulted in duplication of orders and a clogging of ports and airports with items which have in many cases deteriorated or been lost in transit. Surcharges and demurrage on waiting unloading is estimated to cost the GDI more than $1 billion per year. Having identified disadvantages and strong points of Iran's decision-making process, we must close with the observation that Iran is registered impressive progress in recent years. Its centralized but flexible (through access to the Shah) style of decision-making seems reasonably well suited to the demands of this modernizing country. HELMS CONFIDENTIAL

THE SHAH'S CLOSEST ADVISERS The ruling monarch of a modernizing country must seek men who combine knowledge, judgment, and loyalty, both to him and to the institution of the monarchy. It is essential to a study of decision-making in Iran that we look at the man who provide both the information and the opinions which assist the Shah in choosing policies and implementing them. In the list given below these advisers are placed in rough order of importance. They are purposely not listed in functional groupings, because an attempt is made to indicate through the names the Shah's primary concerns. Any observer of the Iranian scene could quibble with the arbitrary placement of various names, so it is hoped that such concerns will not obscure the purpose of the listing. The brief paragraph following each name indicates his or her position, suggests the functional area of expertise, explains why he or she has influence on the Shah, and updates biographic information previously submitted. Note that many of those listed (1) have known the Shah since he was Crown Prince, (2) supported him against Mossadegh, or (3) have strong anti-Communist credentials. The list includes five of the seven holders of Iran's highest decoration, the Taj (Crown) First Class. 1. Assadollah Alam Minister of Court since 1966, Alam went to school with the Shah in Switzerland during the period 1932-1936. He joined the Shah's Special Service in 1945 and has had a wide government experience marked by intense loyalty to the Shah. He became guardian of Crown properties in 1950 and was dismissed by Mossadegh because he disagreed early on with Mossadegh's actions to undermine royal authority. He has been Minister of the Interior (1955-1957) and Prime Minister (1952-1964). The Shah called upon him to head the loyalist opposition Mardam (People) Party (1957) and also asked him to become the Pahlavi Foundation's first director, in 1961. Alam gives advice on a wide range of personal and official matters. He says he sees the Shah 30 to 45 minutes each day. How 57, Alam is reported to be ailing and has had to cut down his workday and seek the advice of specialists in Europe and the US. He would be difficult to replace. 2. Namatollah Massiri As chief of SAVAK, the National Security and Intelligence Organization, Massiri is a key advisor who has access to the such [?] financial resources. No feel the need. Massiri has a cigarette of the Shah (then Crown Principal) of the Tehran Military College. He played a key anti-Massadeh role, carrying the Shah's order disillusioned Hassan (August 16, 1963). The Prime Minister honored the order and had massirly oriented, Massiri. In turn, approval is received after the Shah returned from the [?] ation of Right to Early. [?] · [?] (1964) is the first of the 1963-era state of SAVAK in 1966, other serving five years as Director of the national police. He has imported Guard Command from 1961 to 1960. Massiri is a community of security officers, preferring to CONFIDENTIAL crush any opposition activities rather than penetrate them to learn about their goals and methods. He reportedly wants to retire to a villa he owns in Europe, but the Shah has persuaded him to stay on. 3. General Gholam Ali Ovelsi On November 18, 1972, Oveist was moved from his position as Gandamarte Chief to Chief of the Ground Forces. During his seven years with the Gendamarte, Oveist gained a reputation as a hard worker, a tough and demanding supervisor, and an officer of promise. His early military training included graduation from Iran's Military College in 1938, the same year the Shah attended it. After numerous command jobs around Iran, Oveist served in 1954 as a member of the military appeals court handling the cases of military officers accused of being Tudeh (Communist) Party members. The following year he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Imperial Guard Division, rising to Commander of the Division five years later. Oveist has been a team player in his present capacity, without any apparent desire for personal publicity or political influence, when the Kurdish War was going badly at the end of 1974, Oveist was reportedly sent by the Shah to take a critical look at Iranian troops in the border area to see if they could handle military clashes with the Iraqis if Iranian help to the Kurds brought Iran into the conflict. Apparently the report was in the negative, a factor which led the Shah to patch up relations with Iraq during the Algiers Islamic Summit of early March. 4. Amir-Abbas Hoveyda The Prime Minister holds the record for the longest tenure in the history of that office, having been Premier since January 27, 1965. He now serves as Secretary General of the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI), the lineal descendant of the New Iran Party founded by Novayda's predecessor Hassan Ali Mansur, but he has publicly announced he will step down from that position this year. Hoveyda combines a formidable range of experience and ability. He was educated in Damascus and Beirut and can therefore converse in fluent Arabic when the need arises. He studied at the London School of Economics (1936-1937), earned a degree in Political and Social Science from the University of Brussels the following year, and did graduate work at the Sohome before returning to Iran in 1942. During the next two years Hoveyda was a liaison officer to the US Military Mission. His diplomatic career took him to Paris, Stuttgart, and Geneva (1945-1956). He then went to the National Iranian Oil Company in 1958 becoming a board member two years later. In 1965 Hoveyda joined the Missouri CONFIDENTIAL

COMPTIDENT1NL Cabinet as Minister of Finance, Hoveyda's pipe-smoking informality and wealth of government experience make him an excellent official representative of the Shah. Among his accomplishments are successful efforts to give the Shah public credit for nationalizing Iran's oil (even though educated Iranizers have not forgotten Nossadegh's central role) and his campaign to increase the efficiency of government through prodding from his own expanded staff of experts and trouble shooters. The Shah depends on Hoveyda for the implementation of policies but also seeks his advice on a wide range of political matters. 5. General Hassan Toufanian Because arms procurement is central to Iran's defense strategy, Toufanian has a key role. Since 1968 he has headed the Military Industrial Organization (producing arms and "mission"), and since 1971 he has also served as Deputy Minister of War for Armaments. He has been de facto procurement chief since the mid-1960's. His military advice has been sought by the Shah for a longer period of time, however, probably since his involvement with CENTO-Baghdad Pact in its early days. He was named honorary adjutant to the Shah in 1961. A four-star Air Force General, Toufanian is a former pilot and flight instructor. The Shah trusts Toufanian to report on the pros and cons of military items available from various suppliers, including contributions from American sources and his own recommendations. Toufanian has a talent for getting down to the essentials and asks shrewd questions of suppliers' representatives. A frequent visitor to the US, with three children in university or medical training there, Toufanian admits US military technology but he is not wedded to it. There are conflicting reports as to his own personal honesty in past dealings with company representatives, but if he was "on the take" he has concealed it well. Like most Iranian military officers, Toufanian is totally loyal to the Shah. He does not, like many others, allow loyalty to prevent him from expressing original views or stating his feelings quite forcefully. Biographic reports on Toufanian describe him as "exceptionally intelligent and able," but one who "relishes and expects deferential treatment and discreet flattery." He is essentially a one-man operation and does not benefit from much useful Ministry of War staff work. Toufanian conducts the GUI negotiations on military matters with the USSR and handles procurement and arms transfer questions with other nations. His health is not good, and in recent months he has shown some signs of being overburdened. General Massum, the new Deputy Minister for Armaments, is taking over many procurement matters and seems a good bet to replace Toufanian eventually. CONFIDENTIAL 6. General Hossein Fardust In the Special Information Bureau of the Court and Chief of the Imperial Inspectorate, Fardust is a modern-day equivalent of Cyrus's "eyes and ears of the King." As with others in this list, Fardust was a classmate of the Shah at La Resey School in Switzerland, and he also attended the Tehran Officers College with the Shah in 1938. He had headed the SIB since 1959 and has been entrusted by the Shah with the duty of reporting on the activities of high officials, including members of the Royal Family. He supervises preparation of a daily report for the Shah on events of importance, drawing on the resources of the Cabinet and government offices at home and abroad. He served as Deputy Head of SAVAK from 1962 to 1973. During that period there were persistent rumors of a rivalry between Fardust and Nasiri, a rivalry which forced some SAVAK officers to choose sides. When Fardust left the deputy job and became Chief of the Imperial Inspectorate, this rivalry was in a sense channeled into a competition to provide the Shah with the most accurate and useful information. Fardust reportedly has a continuing function at SAVAK. In November 1975 Fardust was given the additional duty of membership in the Imperial Commission, which supervises governmental expenditures and is to control corruption. He was then named to the High Council to Eradicate Corruption. Various Embassy biographic reports describe Fardust as "efficient, humble, mild, unobtrusive, completely loyal, and trusted by the Shah...with a well-organized mind and a determined will." 7. General Gholamreza Azhari The Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff has a more important position after the death of Air Force Commander Khatami, because no one of the present service commanders can match the combined military and personal influence which Khatami had on the Shah. Furthermore, the Shah has been trying for some time to achieve a more integrated military force, and Azhari is well prepared by experience to preside over such a gradual change of policy without seeking enhanced personal prestige and authority as did Azhari's predecessor, General Jam. A DIA bio-graphic data sheet describes Azhari as a "very competent and dynamic infantry officer" with an "excellent professional reputation," but in recent years Azhari seems to have lost much of his drive. Azhari was Vice Chief of the SGS and a somewhat junior contender for the job when named Chief in July 1971 and promoted to full General. With four years of experience under his belt, he is now considered a close military adviser to the Shah, while still remaining a loyal team player.

8 : Nesratollah Noinian In his capacity as Chief of the Shah's Personal Secretariat, a position he has occupied since late 1966, Moinian has frequent access to the Shah. He is the channel for information from government offices at home and abroad for which the Shah has an insatiable appetite. Moinian is both loyal and self-effacing. He puts in 14-16-hour days and has almost no private social life as a result. He has a staff of four assistants and eight secretaries. Our biographic file contains descriptions of him over the years as "able, hard working, humorous, exacting, and an excellent administrator." Moinian has a reputation for complete honesty. Educated in Political Science at Tehran University, he joined the Railway Administration in 1944, then became assistant to the Director of Publications and Broadcasting in 1953, later becoming Director. In that capacity he personally supervised the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign in the 1959 period, when his performance earned the Shah's respect and gave him the direct access he still enjoys. He served as Minister of Information and Tourism in the Alan and Mansur Cabinets (1963-1964) after a brief tenure as Minister of Roads. It was Alan who recommended Moinian to the Shah for his current position. 9. Jamshid Anouzegar In addition to the Minister of Interior portfolio he holds, Amouzagar also represents Iran at OPEC meetings. Thus he combines political savvy (such as successful handling of the June elections) with economic expertise. The Shah likes his forceful, factual delivery of arguments supporting Royal policy initiatives. Amouzagar's strong, self-confident personality and his reputation as a bright technocrat give him a strong position in government councils, and has an impressive network of protagonists in his own and other ministries. He studied law and engineering at Tehran University, then went to the US in 1944, where he studied at Cornell and the University of Washington, receiving an Ph.D. sanitary engineering and Ph.D. in hydrouclics. He respects the US but can also be quite critical of American policies.) Back in Iran he headed the AED miscellaneous engineering department, then went on to become Deputy Minister of Health, Minister of Labor, and Minister of Agriculture. Amouzagar deliberately avoided joining in party politics until 1975, when he had no choice but to join the Shah's new Assurance Party of the People of Iran (RPF). Once in, he took an active part and was named head of the "progressive wing" of the party, which put him in friendly competition with Hashang Assary, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance and head of the other "wing." Mass cheers are Amouzagar's strong potential rivals for the Prime Minister job under Hovayda's laws. He has innovative role of the "rings" is so limited that the RPF came from a special for this competition. It is more likely to take place within the following year the two strive each to be more useful to the Shah than the other. 10. Hushang Aasary The Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance is clearly a key official, all the more so now that Iran's economy is prospering yet needs to have its prioritism constantly repossessed. He is well known as a successful businessman, a self-made man who has also done well because of good connections, and as an efficient bureaucrat. Ansary studied in England during World War II while representing a textile export firm. He moved with the firm to Tokyo, allegedly earned an M.A. in business administration, and was already wealthy by 1951, when he joined the Iranian Embassy there as Press Attache. He later served as commercial representative and then became Economic Counselor at the recommendation of Ambassador Area. (In 1955 he divorced his Japanese wife and married Miriam Panah, who served as private secretary to Aram when he subsequently became Foreign Minister.) Returning to Iran in 1962, Ansary became an Undersecretary in the Ministry of Commerce. Briefly resuming his diplomatic career, Ansary was Ambassador to Pakistan and concurrently to Caylon (1955-1966). He served as Minister of Information for less than a year (1966-1967), during which time he revamped and improved their broadcasts and launched National Iranian Television. From 1957 to 1960 he was Ambassador to the US, where he assiduously cultivated high-level contacts and promoted Iran-US trade and investment. In mid-1960 he became Minister of Economy, then was named to head the combined ministry to April 1974. Ansary, unlike Ansuzgar, joined in party affairs early on, becoming a founding member of the New Iran Party in 1963. He heads the "constructive wing" of the RFI, which took as its main campaign platform the popular issue of control of inflation (which later became a principle of the Revolution of the Shah and the People). Ansary picks bright assistants and likens to their advice. He has been described as "aggressive, ambitious, in a ginsive, and a very hard worker." His future role is clouded by recent heart fibrillations. He is apt to curry favor with the Shah, just as he appreciate Jaddetown flashery from his own subordinates, but he makes sure he also has the facts and figures on whatever matter is being discussed. 11. Ur. Mnischstr Egbal Intense Ioyalty to the Sheh and anti-Communist credentials are two of Equal's primary authorities which give him influence with the Sheh. Now 66 years old, equal has not been politically active in recent years. He seems content to serve to his capacity as Chairman of the Board and Managing Director of the National Committee of the United Kingdom. Although Amourgar, Hoveyda, and even Ansary probably have no other role in the Unit's of policy than Equality, the NCC Chaplain has a wealth of interest and has been an experience with makes his valuable as an author to the book. Associated as a doctor in France (Monopoliar Unforcrity, 1872), which is prepared to Iran to serve in various political positions, becoming

an Undersecretary in the Ministry of Health in 1943. Over the next seven years he served in various Cabinets with different portfolios: Health, Education, Communications, Interior, and PTT. In 1948 Eqbal pushed through the Parliament a bill outlawing the Tudeh (Communist) Party. After a brief tour as Governor General of Azerbaijan (1950-1951), Eqbal became a Senator in 1953 and then Rector of Tehran University in 1955. He removed troops stationed there at the request of his predecessor and paid attention to student grips he thought were reasonable. Eqbal served as Minister of Court in 1956, then was called upon to form the Melliyan (Nationalist) Party the following year as a rival to Alam's Mardam (People's Party). His 1957-1960 term as Prime Minister ended in controversy over the 1960 elections, which were manipulated to receive the desired results, but he believed at the time that he had been sacrificed to improved relations with the USSR. (Nosratollah Moiniان, mentioned earlier in this list, had been active under Eqbal in pushing an anti-Soviet line on Iranian Radio) Eqbal has been described as "a hard worker, vain, publicity-conscious, haughty, honest but shrewd, charming only if he feels he is appreciated" and as having "a good share of Iranian morality." He is of course totally loyal to the Shah and is inclined to be a "yes man." Eqbal's daughter married Princess Ashraf's son Prince Shalhryar Shafiq, but only after she had almost turned him down in favor of another suitor. (This is rumored to have resulted in some friction between Eqbal and Ashraf.) 12. Jajar Sharif-Emam Now in his thirteenth year as President of the Senate, Sharif-Emami, like Eqbal, has a sort of "elder statesman" status based on the variety of governmental positions in which he has served the Shah. He began his government service in the Railway Department and then went on to have training in railway technology and administration in Germany (1930) and in Sweden (1936). In 1938 he switched to the Ministry of Agriculture, where he headed the Irrigation Department for four years before becoming Deputy Director General of the Iranian State Railways. Strange as it may seem in retrospect, Sharif-Emami was imprisoned by the Allies from 1943 to 1945 on charges of pro-Nazi sympathies. For the next five years he was in private business, both in contracting for construction work and as an agent of Krupp, an association which has lasted for many years. Both proved to be lucrative activities. Sharif-Emami became Managing Director of the Plan Organization in 1953, but his tour lasted only two months because he tried to maintain his contacts with National Front members and this was considered incompatible with his official position. Four years later he joined the Eqbal Cabinet as Minister of Mines and Industries, and in August 1960 succeeded Eqbal as Prime Minister. He stayed in office only eight months, then returned to the Senate and was elected President in 1963. Sharif-Emami has been described as a "quiet, intelligent" person who has made dishonest money in business over the years but is not known corruption in direct connection with his official duties. 1967 the Embassy considered him to be "probably the fourth most important man in France." By his own account, Sharif-Emam is sufficiently respected and trusted by the Shah that he can raise delicate issues or give the Shah unpopular advice when necessary. 13. Empress Farun The Empress is not easy to rank in terms of policy influence on the Shah. On the one hand she is the mother of the Crown Prince and three children and has the Shah's blessing to fill special roles such as Regent, patroness of the arts leader in social welfare matters, representative abroad (in solo trips to the USSR in 1970 and China in 1972), and investigator of progress in the development of various areas of Iran. On the other hand, she is still an ex-commoner and a woman. She herself described the limited policy role she can play, when interviewed by Sally Quinn of the Washington Post (May 19, 1975): "I try to talk to him, not as a queen talking to a king, but as a wife talks to her husband. Sometimes," though, I care so much about something, I get so excited that I can't braache. But I have to be careful because if I'm not and I start raising my voice he will think I am blaming him for that's wrong and he'll get angry. So I try to be logical and cool instead of nagging. And sometimes I try to do it through, infissers; try to talk to him through them.... I don't want to trouble him with my problems during the day, so the only time I can talk to him is at lunch or in bed and that's the worst time to talk about your problems. Once in a while I have him alone for five or three minutes in the car. But generally I write to him. If I talk to him he forgets. So I write little notes to him and send them to the office so he will read it with the rest of his papers." How wide range of interests extends to women's rights, proper child care, housing projects, improving medicine (possibly through creation of a version of the Mayo Clinic in Iran), creation of a dialogue between students and their professors, academic exchange ("dispen-Persepolis Conference" of 1975), concern over honesty of government officials and also of members of the Royal Family, and interest in promotion of government officials only by merit. Farah's influence at Court is partially limited by Princess Ashraf, who is considered a rival, both in influence on the Shah and in pursuit of individual status for the future. (See A-10 of January 78, 1975 for a complete account of this rivalry.) Payings it was this sense of competition which prompted Farah to comment to July 1972: "The highest value goes the lennifer one becomes, and the few or less friends are left. It stands, one is surrounded by pertiness."

Faran's warm personality has been a great plus for the Shah's regime, for she is a "humanizer" who shows genuine concern for her subjects, whereas he tends to rather stiff and formal in his contacts with the public. She is often described as "charming, dignified but warm, unprotentious and direct." Born in 1938 to a well-to-do family with ties to the previous dynasty, Faran was educated at French schools in Tehran and then studied architecture in Paris 1957-1959. The Shah's daughter by his first marriage, Princess Shahnaz, arranged to have Farah meet the Shah in Paris after he had divorced his second wife, Soraya. In December 1959 they were married. She was named Regent in 1967 and as such would head the Regency Council which is to assist Crown Prince Raza in her should assume the throne before the age of twenty. That same year she was crowned Empress in the same ceremony in which the Shah was formally crowned. Both shops were startling breaks with the past because they elevated a woman to previously unattained importance and showed a determination to give a meaning to women's rights in Iran. 16. Princ33 Ashraf The Shah's twin sister has been an important influence on him, but it is generally believed that as he has become more sure of himself he has limited her influence on political and policy matters, channeling her energies into women's affairs, literacy concerns, and social services. Ashraf was a strong-killed child who was reportedly her father's favorite because she had the teernity to stand up to him. When Roza Sinh was exiled from Iran to Mauritius in 1941, Princess Ashraf accompanied him on the first six months of his enforcement stay there. Her struck-gilled nature has caused many Iranians to say that he she been born a male, she would have easily dominated her brother. She is removed to have been in favor of replacement of her twin brother by another brother, Aliroza, in 1954, the year he died in a plane crash. Princess Ashraf has long been surrounded by intrigue and limited to many unethical business ventures. Her activities caused Hossadgh to criticize her openly in 1951, and he enginered the media in 1952. She remained in Europe until early 1954, reportedly running up large gambling debts during that period. Her second husband, Ahmad Shafiq, was an Egyptian businessman through whom she became involved in various business dealings. She was instrumental in having him named a Director of the National Commerce Company. In 1961 she divorced Shafiq and married Wadil Kushri. The official him became the Acroftel contact from in Iran, and Business also makes it a normal reservations for conferences held here. Ashraf allegedly believes the families from the buckling industry in Iran are other business interests. She was denied several points when alleging that she was stopped in commercial use. The [?] atar 1850 for possessing large quantities of drugs in her beaches and has not been allegedly barred from amending the US for a short time. The 1850 witness Ashraf engineered the cause of the High Council as a known target. action and Funded the European House's Organization as her own vehicle for leadership in the women's rights field. She has championed this cause both in 1990 and through all activities oversee. The Princess also heads the Imperial Social Services organization. The Sheth has often called on Princess Asraf to represent him on foreign visits. She has no to several visits to the USSR (June 1991), China (April 1991), India (September 1993), Pakistan (January 1975), India (June 1976), and most recently with several African countries during January to February 1976. Asraf normally hands the Indian delegation on the U.S. government during its least part of each session. She has visited the US frequently, not only in the business, but on various private design when she has used several altives. Asraf apparently got on with the sheth to first when, Princess Fascia of Egypt, but she quarrelled to apply with Savona in the years before that marriage cycles in divorce. She also engaged to a [?] with Requiem Foran, some impacts of which she received in Beijing August 199 of January 20, 1975. 16. 1960 [?] 1 [?] 2 [?] The event of the event followed to the US was how an Iranian of only an American figure to, with a significant count of others, high criticism, and a flair for a person can rise to mention. After attending the American University or which (192-1945) arrived over to the US and carried a SS doghouse in agriculture and policy. However, two in the States. While there he answered himself to the American life and both were John as working in a steel mill in Gary, Indiana, picking great in collection, and intending on the Astra Railroad. In the same period to Iran and exiled for the Fural Improvements Commission of the US Operations Mission in Iran, he resigned to 1952, allegedly under the name from Hassagah. He had to stay very rapidly after his nation. Can. Fazalilla Amadi, federal law 1963 counter-camp to which the Shah returned over message. He was armed at 1971. Returned to the Shah in October 1962, beginning a close relationship with the Iran and the Ministry of Court. In 1957 he moved the Shah's daughter Shamer (by his Egyptian wife, Fawleah), who was only 10 as the time. In 1950 he took his bride to Washington, where he tried unsuccessfully to convince radical Iranian atmosphere that they should return from demonstrating interest the Shah. Two years later he left and became Archaeologist to the UK. His marriage was already coming across in Washington, but the formal divorce did not occur until 1964. In 1967 he returned on Reform to lessen foreign misfortune. His four-year term in that position was worked by an impressive leadership in the which arrived the Storage Mining episode. Finally in order to counteract his playby the Astra Railroad from the 1967 to the general extremely hard and achieved a reputation in a loss with important knowledge. Astra clearly and the Shah's arm and the police operations public to the foreign policy area, a strong which moved to maintain the relations with Prime Ministerใหrovi. However, while it clear that Astra

CONFIDENTIAL member of his Cabinet and should normally report to the Shah through him, which caused Zahedi to stage in 1971 that the Shah would have to choose between the two. Hoveyda won, and Zahedi said he would not serve in Tehran so long as Hoveyda remained in office. Another factor in his departure from the Foreign Ministry was unhappiness about Princess Asraf's 1971 trip to China, which he felt was an intrusion on his turf. When Ashraf returned, she reported to the Shah in writing on her trip and did not even send Zahedi a copy of the report. Ambassador to the US since April 1973, Zahedi has continued his highly active approach to foreign affairs. An inveterate party giver, Zahedi invites all the great and near-great in Washington and makes a particular point of culivating members of Congress. He has visited almost every state and is known as a super-salesman for his country. He carefully arranges programs for important American visitors traveling to Iran and ensures that they are entertained and shown around Iran at Government expense. Zahedi's layfish parties have resulted in some image problems for Iran, but the Shah apparently feels that Zahedi's contacts are worth the cost. Zahedi believes he has good support with young Iranians and may plan to exploit this ability in the future, but his track record does not show that he has been particularly effective in this area. (During his first tour in Washington Zahedi told several students that his rise to the position of Ambassador showed how much opportunity there was for the young in Iran. One of the students replied, "Yes, but the Shah has only one daughter.") There are continuing rumors that Zahedi may return to become Court Minister when Alam retires, or perhaps to become Foreign Minister again. As head of Iran's most important diplomatic mission, Zahedi seems prepared to wait for a call to a higher position. Some have described Zahedi as "an unprincipled political opportunist." He has shown that with total devotion and loyalty to the Shah, even a man of only average intelligence can rise to the highest levels of GOI service. 16. \underline{\text{Others with Influence}} Supplementing the foregoing list are other names that deserve a brief mention. Some of them are in the security area. Nasser Noghadam, head of J-2 and Director of Iranian Military Intelligence since April 1973, is influential. He was brought into SAVAK by Fardust in 1964. Abdol 'Ali Badreh-Loristant, Chief of Gen. Abbas Gharabaghi of the Gendarmerie also has an important, but limited, role. In economic matters, Hushang Ram is influential, and sufficiently trusted that he runs the Bank Omran, the Pahlavi Foundation's financial institution. Various court cronies such as Jemshid Alam, Jamshid Khabir, Dr. Yahya Adl (former personal physician), and Dr. Abdol Karim Ayadi (now the Shah's physician) are rumored to have limited influences on the Shah's thinking, but Ayadi is believed by some to CONFIDENTIAL be empowered by the Shah to carry out various sensitive communications roles when the Shah travels outside Iran. Dr. Sayed Hassan Enami, the Imam Jamah or religious leader of Tehran Moslam, probably provides advice on religious matters. Although an "establishment" type, Enami has impressed Embassy officers who have met him as a man of independent views which he is willing to express in private conversations. Finally, one should include other members of the Royal Family who have developed functional interests at the Shah's urging: His sister, Princess Shams (the Red Lion and Sun Society); half-brother Abdul Reza (environmental affairs); half-brother Gholam Reza (sports and military affairs); and daughter Shahnaz, who was named in January 1976 to supervise developmental affairs in the provinces of Gilan and Hazandaran in northern Iran.

CONFIDENTIAL The Royal Family The image projected by the Royal Family reflects to some degree on the Shah, yet probably only a few of its members influence his decisions. The attached airgram, \underline{\text{The Iranian Imperial Family}} , treats the principal relationships and important political dynamics within the family. In the intervening two years since this study was completed, there have been only two significant changes. Empress Farah has emerged as a public figure in her own right, and the very positive public perceptions of her role and attitudes has probably strengthened the regime. In September 1975, the Empress politely but publicly disagreed with the Shah for the first time at the Ramsar Educational Conference. Since then, she has continued to speak out (usually in support of the Shah's position), mostly on issues related to education, women's rights, housing and social welfare. The Shah has encouraged this, and his confidence in her has evidently grown. There is a populist strain in Farah's personality which, while dignified, has made her the best-loved member of the Pahlavi clan. For example, upon hearing that a municipality had paved several streets in anticipation of her visit, she pointedly remarked in June 1976 that she might have to visit several villages and suburbs a day if that was to be the result. Crown Prince Reza, the Shah's long-awaited male heir, has also begun to move toward center stage. In the past year he was the official host for the visit of Morocco's Crown Prince and paid a state visit to Egypt as part of Iran's rapprochement with Cairo. He is readily accepted as the Shah's son, and is especially popular in the provinces, but there seems to be little serious interest in his potential as the Shah's successor. Publicly he is ascribed qualities well beyond the normal 16-year old, but private comments describe him in terms ranging from mediocre to modestly above average student. There have been many rumors about Reza's future education, but the Shah has insisted repeatedly that the Crown Prince would be educated in Iran at least through high school. Betting now favors his remaining in Iran for university work, partly because of potential problems with the Iranian student community abroad if he were to leave the country for his college education. Apart from the Empress and Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, no other member of the family is known to have the Shah's confidence on policy matters, though several are relatively close to the Shah and apparently trusted by him. His older sister, Princess Shams, is said to be a favorite and, like her, the Shah's half-sister Princess Patemeh is mildly active in organized charitable, educational and cultural activities. Prince Qolam Reza is the only brother given an active role. He is a Brigadier General, heads the Iranian Olympic Committee, and often stands in for the Shah in ceremonies both at home and abroad. He is conscientious but does not command wide respect. Most highly regarded of the Shah's siblings is Prince Abdol Reza. Age 50, he has maintained a good image among the younger elite. Considered a leading candidate to succeed the Shah before the birth of the Crown Prince, he has since stayed completely clear of political activity, devoting most of his energies to his interest in conservation and his love of big game hunting. Several members of the Royal Family are thought to be, in varying degrees, corrupt, immoral, and largely uninterested in Iran and the Iranian people. Their expensive lifestyles influence peddling, and involvements in both government and private business have tended to encourage the popular conception. Two of Princess Ashraf's sons, Princes Sharyar and Shahram, have reportedly been deeply involved in defense contracting and corporate organizational politics on behalf of various members of the Pahlavi clan. The attached chart lists the Pahlavi family structure as known.

202000 50000000000000000000000000 No. 11302；G07 2024 The Transhuman Empowerment Emotivity 23 JANUARY 1975 SHOPPING: Their report change the potentially non-violation of the current non-applicable condition of the Network Service. The Improve, Policies Annual and the General Practice. It does address the [?] , and the effects of the flow of relations with the United States and his expressed plan now the outcome of this action. The report also continues the negativeɑnging of Improve, Policies Annual and the General Practice as for the use of a possible power struggle between them to post-World War II. Finally, the report provides the development of Green Police Base and the probable observations of his effects. NO SUMMARY. 1. The Bals N. Qualityés ind Chorecentribaux Though outwarly and by education, the monthly Westernized, the first in by language and culture, a German and in fact his considerate was known for leading the country in largely due to the first that he in a complete position, the politicalian. Though he structure [?] with his great interest in work, he does so not in a truly outstanding position, equally at home in either culture, but as a National who has become the art of social responsibility. In a result, he has a great private decisions and information write by Teachers are in reality Russian terms even though he real-time is the same in the most. In the process of forming Yara India the media work has readily prompted the cross-cultural potential. attributions of a divinely chosen monarch, with its national symbolism and the mythical cremations it holds for most Iranians—including many from the dedicated clans—and used them as an effective tool in governing the nation. Indeed, he firmly believes that he was personally chosen by God to lend Iran into a golden age. With a combination of single-minded decontamination and private intelligence, the Shah has raised Iran to a state of power and respect unknown since before this. From this it is evident that the institution of monarchy still fits the mode of Iran and is an effective unifying and developing force. However, it remains true for the Shah, as it has for many autocratic relations, that absolute rule requires an all-of-a-posture and concise loneliness. This, combined with his traditional foreign manipulative form of rule and his increasing insistence that his decisions are invisible, has made it difficult for the Shah to find advisors when he trusts, even more rare are advisors who tell him unpleasant truths and identify errors made—it is generally agreed that only the Empress, Princess Ashraf and Count Kinnator Alon can disapprove with the Shah with impunity. On the other hand, he maintains at least six separate and competing information services reporting directly to him as well as numerous personal contacts in all elements of society. He is always aware, however, that any of these sources may plant their reports to suit their own interests and he alone must be the final arbiter of which reports are worthy of further consideration. He believes this intensely and believes also that such leadership is necessary for the national, good, At the same time he has found that the nation has often been able to meet or exceed policy goals which he had approved in the face of concerns from many of his Western-related advisors, that a certain goal was unattainable. This has increased the Shala self-confidence and convinced his that Area often needs a touch of calculated boldness to continue to progress. Encouraged by a decade of progress, the British war Revolution" to stimulate national recognition and create a sense of national purpose, inhibiting a kind of pride-ful pragmatism, the British nationalism by claiming uniquely Iranian solutions to Irama problems. His car ego has kept pace with the growth of Iranian influence

Intensely proud of his growing reputation as an international politician, the think has brought to publicize Iranian achievements in international forms and media, setting forth his own views and philosophy and lecturing other nations on their Elections. A similar attitude, fired by his oil-price victories and his concern with a greater Iranian place in the sun, has led him to a significant jump in his international political objectives. He seems to foresee the diminution of power in the West and its flow to the Eastern oil producers. He believes that economic changes initiated by OPEC are bringing about a new world economic situation in which the producers of raw materials have the right to higher prices, and world wealth and power will be redistributed in their favor. In assessing the Shah's ambitions public statements it is well to remember that regardless of his settings inflated rhetoric he has always acted in a cautious fashion. In Iran, whose words are often more important than reality, a statement of intentions can serve the same purpose as an actual program, at least in the short run, regardless of one's capacity to realize the intentions. It is in this spirit that Iran has announced enormous aid and trade deals, many of which, on closer inspection, turn out to be little more than agreements in principle with only an embroidery organization to administer a foreign aid program which is expected to disburse by March 21, 1975, an estimated 2.6 billion of the 9 billion of Iranian aid funds pledged in 1974. During the past year the Nanh again displayed this cautious and pregnantic approach when he stood firm against the oil-consuming Nest because he was sure that the balance had tipped irrevocably in his favor. Similarly, his reaction to the original Soviet intran- silence on natural gas prices was to ask for only about half of what I run might have demanded its recognition of a situation in which the Russians held all the cards. However, when a situation seems to threaten his own or the nation's prestige, the Black sometimes over-remote. He has demonstrated these possibilities in response to such-Iranian demonstrations in Holland to use of the term "Arabian Gulf," and to critical statements by Secretary Simon and other U.S. officials. We would expect to see this tendency continue and perhaps be reinforced as Iran's influence grows. Relation: With U. A.: The Shah appreciates part U.S. assistance and the fact that we have never capitalized Iran. He considers us a necessary ally. Nevertheless, as he has grown in confidence and as Iran began to approach its present regional power status, the tradition of access to many areas of Iranian civilization society which we formerly enjoyed has been somewhat restricted. This should not be taken as a symptom of warranting U.S.-Iran relations or as a shift on the part of the Shah away from the U.S. Our relationship is based on a perguntable perception of parallel interests, and in areas where our interests are in fact parallel our relations should continue to be close, although it may become more difficult to gather information. Some diminution of access may have resulted simply because Iranians are doing business with no many countries now that they have lost time for Americans. We have observed a consequent, tendency toward taciturnity and heightened semitivities among officials which may be partly ascribed to fear of SAVAK or, among certain elements, to distrust of our cooperation with the regime. But in the main the semitivity appears to result from the success of our policy in firm over the past twenty years which has sought to help Iran and its ruler become more strong and self-reliant. As Iran became secure, wealthy and confident enough to differentiate between its interests and those of its patron, it caused to be always in the Iranian interest to parent Americans to know how much of its position is those and how much is fact, and the policy consideration tend to reinforce the traditional Persian merchant Roy secrecy. In the military sphere, too, the Shah is attempting to reduce his dependence on the U.S. by diversifying his arms sources where he can without affecting the efficiency of the armed forces which are his ultimate power base. But he realizes that many of the sophisticated weapons he wants and the adjuvacy capacity to train his troops to use them are available now. But from the U.S. in addition, at the present time U.S. influence [?] virtually all levels of the Iranian military structure so that a withdrawal or even a sharp reduction of that presence would adversely affect Iranian combat readiness. Consequently, the character of the U.S.-Iran military relationship is not likely to change dramatically in the foreseeable future.

The Shah believes that in order to the United States of a stable Iran is so great that he must follow a course that to achieve his goals, his own policies looked at his order of policy. In this regard we should recall that the Iranian approach to international politics is a reasonable one in which policies and relationships are shaped to the extent they have achieved their objectives. The Shah probably is not able to his gratitude to the U.S. for past services to obligate him to follow U.S. policies in all cases in Iran's current interest to do so. The creation of a cabinet- level Joint Commission on Cooperation between the two countries, the close and expanding contacts between our two private sectors, and the continuing U.S.-Iranian military relationship indicate that the Shah remains firmly committed to his alliance with the United States. But in a period when our relationship has changed from that of "patron-client" to a more equal one in which our interests do not always coincide, it would be well to remember the Shah's thoroughly Persian pragmatism and not assume he will always act as to think he should. c. Plans for the Future: We have often reported that the Shah is intellec- tually committed to a broadening of democratic practices. This commitment, however, does not mean he wants to import European or American style democracy which he considers permissive, inefficient and not suited to Iranian needs. In recognizing a need for greater popular participation in national affairs, he appears to be pulled in two directions. On the one hand, the individualism of the Iranian character and the Shah's belief in the divine right of imperial rule demand a strong ruler who can lead from above and minimize the stresses of Iran's parliamentary system. His unfortunate experience with a more democratic Iran during the early Mossadegh era (1951-1953) strengthened this opinion. It has also led to continuing repression of those dissident students, academics, and intellectuals with whom his regime has not found favor. In his present reliance on force in dealing with those who oppose him and his program for national development before first searching for an acceptable compromise, the Shah is departing from the otherwise Persian character of his rule. This is disturbing because it does not fit the consistent pattern of compromise which the Shah has followed throughout his reign and it is not in keeping with the mores of a society which regards physical force as a last resort. Such a policy carries resentment and, if not moderated, it risks an equally un-Iranian and equally forceful future response. On the other hand, he seems to be aware that simply increasing his government's services to the people will not insure personal support for his regime and that increased popular participation is necessary. Through freer election procedures, a critique of his White Revolution by academics, intellectuals and others, and the creation of a variety of local government and political party infrastructures he appears to be trying to stimulate participation in political life within well- defined limits. These limits are so narrow, however, that Mardom Party leader Hassan Arsan was recently forced out merely because he was sufficiently active in his criticism of the ruling Iran Novin Party that he upset the Shah. We believe the Shah is striving to create a workable system which will incorporate both participation and control, a typically Persian compromise. He seems to be reaching toward a two-tiered structure in which he would remain above politics and would continue to make the decisions which direct national policy and define national life. In the lower tier lively competition would be allowed to determine how and by whom imperial directives would be interpreted and administered. Ideally the Shah would exercise much less control over minute decisions than he does now. But in fact the temptation to intervene at all levels would remain great and the extent of imperial control would depend upon the power and inclina- tions of the incumbent monarch. Such a system, in combination with continuing economic growth, could be flexible enough to ensure the survival of the Pahlavi Dynasty following the death of the present Shah, whether in the hands of the Crown Prince Queen Farah or, (less likely in our opinion), as a result of a takeover by the tough-minded twin sister of the Shah, Princess Ashraf. Recently, the Shah has noted that he has written his "political will." Little is known about the nature of that document save that powers have been distributed to a chosen few and the Shah hopes that it will enable his successor or successors to guide Iran as he would have. It is probable, as he has stated publicly, that he might abdicate at some future time in favor of his son, retaining the status of a sort of elder statesman and prince who would, in effect, help the new Shah learn to be a king. 134 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 135

The Shah believes that his value to the United States of a stable Iran is so great that he need not strive but to pursue his own goals. His character is locked in his order of values. We who would should recall that the Iranian approach to international politics is a reasonable one in which politics and state- ships are simply the means that have enabled their realization. The Shah prefers it is not able to his gratitude to the U.S. for past services to obligate him to follow U.S. policies in all cases or to Iran's current interest to do so. The creation of a cabinet- level Joint Commission on Cooperation between the two countries, the close and expanding contacts between our two private sectors, and the continuing U.S.-Iranian military relationship indicate that the Shah remains firmly committed to his alliance with the United States. But in a period when our relationship has changed from that of "patron-client" to a more equal one in which our interests do not always coincide, it would be well to remember the Shah's thoroughly Persian pragmatism and not assume he will always act as we think he should. c. Plans for the Future: We have often reported that the Shah is intellec- tually committed to a broadening of democratic practices. This commitment, however, does not mean he wants to import European or American style democracy which he considers permissive, inefficient and not suited to Iranian needs. In recognizing a need for greater popular participation in national affairs, he appears to be pulled in two directions. On the one hand, the individualism of the Iranian character and the Shah's belief in the divine right of imperial rule demand a strong ruler who can lead from above and minimize the stresses of Iran's parliamentary system. His unfortunate experience with a more democratic Iran during the early Mossadegh era (1951-1953) strengthened this opinion. It has also led to continuing repression of those dissident students, academics, and intellectuals with whom his regime has not found favor. In his present reliance on force in dealing with those who oppose him and his program for national development before first searching for an acceptable compromise, the Shah is departing from the otherwise Persian character of his rule. This is disturbing because it does not fit the consistent pattern of compromise which the Shah has followed throughout his reign and it is not in keeping with the mores of a society which regards physical force as a last resort. Such a policy carries resentment and, if not moderated, it risks an equally un-Iranian and equally forceful future response. On the other hand, he seems to be aware that simply increasing his government's services to the people will not insure personal support for his regime and that increased popular participation is necessary. Through freer election procedures, a critique of his White Revolution by academics, intellectuals and others, and the creation of a variety of local government and political party infrastructures he appears to be trying to stimulate participation in political life within well- defined limits. These limits are so narrow, however, that Mardom Party leader Hassan Arami was recently forced out merely because he was sufficiently active in his criticism of the ruling Iran Novin Party that he upset the Shah. We believe the Shah is striving to create a workable system which will incorporate both participation and control, a typically Persian compromise. He seems to be reaching toward a two-tiered structure in which he would remain above politics and would continue to make the decisions which direct national policy and define national life. In the lower tier lively competition would be allowed to determine how and by whom imperial directives would be interpreted and administered. Ideally the Shah would exercise much less control over minute decisions than he does now. But in fact the temptation to intervene at all levels would remain great and the extent of imperial control would depend upon the power and inclina- tions of the incumbent monarch. Such a system, in combination with continuing economic growth, could be flexible enough to ensure the survival of the Pahlavi Dynasty following the death of the present Shah, whether in the hands of the Crown Prince Queen Farah or, (less likely in our opinion), as a result of a takeover by the tough-minded twin sister of the Shah, Princess Ashraf. Recently, the Shah has noted that he has written his "political will." Little is known about the nature of that document save that powers have been distributed to a chosen few and the Shah hopes that it will enable his successor or successors to guide Iran as he would have. It is probable, as he has stated publicly, that he might abdicate at some future time in favor of his son, retaining the status of a sort of elder statesman and prince who would, in effect, help the new Shah learn to be a king. 134 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 135

Two of the most significant problems he faces in precaution for the succession are institutional: the general opinion with which politics are viewed in Iran and the prevailing Iranian concept of authority as a constraint to be challenged and circumvented more possible. It is to in successful in becoming about meaning. But� favor-level political participation, he or his successor will likely find the authority of the�rons challenged by those newly established for when limited participation will not be enough. Some say the shall's removal from the score would cause such an up-selling of anti-regime feeling that chance would result. No believe, however, that given a reasonably transquil succession in which the array paraquated stability, the fact of Iran's economic development in which he may have a strike would make dissolution lease likely. In any case, it will require doit handling to increase political participation and yet maintain the essentially unchallenged character of the monarchy. II. Материнск Парад; Still the Shah's greatest family asset and the humanitarian of the Pathway Dynasty, Empower Farah has developed from an uncertain young woman who also principal tasks were patroness of the art, well-known and child-bearing into an enormously popular national figure concerned with many aspects of their national reassurance, although she still lacks significant influence in the making of policy. She continues to take a s [?] sive interest in the activities of her 24 charitable organizations which, though not so well funded as those of Princes Anwar, overshadow and garner more publicity than her rival's. The Shah has long made two of her warm unprotentious boaring and her natural rapport with people by standing her on visits to remote and low-decelled regions of the nation such as Baluchistan and Khadimistan. No has also demonstrated his faith in her abilities by making her Regent, entrusting her with the creation of the Crown Prince, and founding her alone on state visits to the Soviet Union (1970) and China (1972). Yet in 1973, Farah's other scored to want The publicity devoted to her and her [?] able activities was significantly reduced—who endo one visit to Switzerland which received no coverage at all—who Adral's publicity grew. By June 1974, however, Puth appeared to have returned to favor. For public appear- ances increased and no longer were of an exclusively humanitarian nature. They began once again to take on distinctly political overtones, as with her recent seven- day trip to Iran's central desert region. This trip, and all of the publicity she reserves, appear designed to present Sarah to the Iranian people as a concerned, wins and capable leader fit to direct the destinies of the nation and command the loyalty of the population should the most arrizo. In this we judge that the Shah and the GOI have been only partially successful. She is exceptionally popular and widely accepted, even by many among Iran's conservative religious hierarchy, but primarily as the honest and because wife of the Shah who can be of help primarily because she can also not yet shown herself to be a strong leader. In a male-dominated society which respects and demands strength in its leaders, thoro would be formidable obstacles to obtaining widespread acceptance of Sarah as an oppress or Regent in her own right. As Farah has grown into her political role, she has recognized the isolation of leadership. In 1972 she observed, "The higher one gets the longer one becomes and the fewer real friends are left." Instead, one is surrounded by pettiness." Her statuses also often reveal a high degree of personal nationalism and a tinge of the traditional Inmanh nup [?] forigness. In 1971 she remarked, "We will not allow the errors committed by the West to be repeated here, One day perhaps we may even serve us an example to the West. Iran has a unique opportunity and attoments from certain quarters to arrest Iran's progress will be frustrated." Easily the most liberal of the imperial family and generally regarded as the spokesman for the common man at Court, Farah shares the flesh's disdain for carping Iranian intellectuals who dwell on remaining special ills while overlooking the progress that is being made. While the Impress lives in an intensely competitive political million, an idealistic, human spirit seems to motivate how actions ("an long as harmony has not been created between politics and humanism, nations of the world are unlikely to achieve happiness, harmony and peace"). This rather idealistic gent�ness, which is one

of Sarah's great strength in her relations with people, how work to her disadvantage as ever become [?] and Races a challenge face her exhibitions dishon-l. Preliminary Analysis. Theма has not been manipulative enough to create a circle of industrial Court "supporters" as Ashraf has come, a fact which could give Ashraf an edge in them should ever be a confrontation between them (discussed below). III. � Since the beginning of the present Bank's reign, Princess Ashraf has been a power to be recorded with at Court, Strepsvilled, impetuous and determined, she helped to establish her royal brother's backbone during his early, uncertain years on the throne. Her palace intrigues with the Queen Mother against all three of the Shah's vices and against her half-brother Andorra were once notorious, but during the decide of the sixties, as the Shah found himself and grew in confidence, he curtailed her political and personal activities which had helped to brimrich the Pahlavi name. Much of Ashraf's energies have since been channeled into feminist and human rights causeon. She has led the Iranian delegation to the United Nations several times and served as Chairman of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Additionally, through the Imperial Organization of Social Services (ICSS), which is in constant competition with Esgress Farah's charitable organizations, and through her support of the Literacy Corps and the Iranian Women's Organization, Ashraf exprede considerable time and treasure on domestic welfare and development matters. Funds to support her good works come in the main from the Pahlavi Foundation and from the National Lottery administered by the ICSS. Ashraf is also occasionally given an important role in international political matters. For example, the Shah sent her on ice-breaking missions to India and China, both of which resulted in improved relations between these countries and Iran, paving the way for visits by the Shah or the Express. Despite the good they have done, Ashrafi's charitable endovers have done little to brigation her image with the Indian people, partire's because of her overlooking large-scale business practices. Although the fish almost certainly has not predicted more than a million's questionable dealings, he has been either unwilling or unable to grow them. Battery, Iran's particular contribution driven, he occasionally has smoked down on the unethical business activities of Ashrafi's son, Primeو shahram, who has withdrawn from the threatened activities by transferring them temporarily or permanently to his mother. As long as the Shah IIvesa, Asmail life style are of little importance except as an ongoing embarrassment to the Zahliath Dynasty. However, if he should die before the Crown Itinerant reaches his majority (October 31, 1820) or is ready to take on the responsibilities of monarchy, Ashra's urge for power, her delight in intrigue and her rivalry with Farah are likely to emerge to the detriment of a stable succession. Farah Voxtua Ashraf: The machinations at Court are so complex and convoluted that one cannot predict who would side with the Empress and who with Ameston in a power struggle. The most that can be done is to attempt to narrow a few who might have reason to support one or the other of them. a. Those Who Might Support Askcraft Over the years askrnal has made friends (as well as enemies) among those who might arpt to a role as behind-the-acoues power broksns in a post-Shah situation. Prime Minister Hovoyda, who is known to feel that Farah's frequent interventions in favor of local development projects interfere with his own programs and powers, and who attempts to provoke institutions of a political nature from reaching the [?] , may be inclined toward Ashraf, Hovovet. He could also influence against Ashraf by his brother, Faridaum Hovoyda, who, in his capacity as Prinism Responsible at the United Nations, has fallen about of the Trimede more than once. In any case, Farah Minister Hovoyda has a cautious man and any support he might be able to give to either side would be tendered only after a careful assessment of the probable results of the content. Pastin Radji, a

clever "graduate" of ASHRAF's stable of young men, is one of the principal advisors to Prime Minister Loveyda. He might be inclined to urge his present boss to support Ashraf. Justin Shenli-Swart, President of the Senate and former Prime Minister, and Tobin Zai, influential senator and Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Minors, are said to be involved with Ashrafi in a worker of business ventures and probably would be inclined to support her to protect their own interests. General Nonmetallic Nasiri, head of SAVAK, is thought to be close to Asarul with their relationship stemming from the Mozudagol period when both took firm action in support of the Shah. Karim Pasha Ehabodori, Chief of the Empress personal office, leads a group of courtiers said to have been placed under Farah by Novyda and Ashraf more to keep watch over the Queen and control the flow of information to her than to assist her in her duties. Prominent among her friends are the Rashidian family who have far-lmag investments in banking and land development and who have been influential "airangers" for over 40 years. Ali Bozai, wealthy industrialist, would be likely to support Ashraf in return for the protection which she offered him when he was accused of a huge corrupt land transaction in Khumistan. b. These Who Might Support Farms The Express has shown no signs of building up a Court circle of important public and contacts who could sustain her against the opposition of Actual and her supporters. Farah's cargo priorors and contacts, such as Mill Anti-Aggression, through closely loyal, are not the most to function an forward behind the throws or purvoyors of in [?] . While this would tend to place Farah at an initial [?] advantage, who is likely to benefit from the support of a number of high-level figures who, for a variety of reasons, would probably emose Ashraf. Chief among these in the rich and powerful Count Minister Assadallah Alam. Alan has been professional of animal in the past for profiting from the distribution of Crown lands and once withdrew from a tractor import deal with Ashraf then he found that she was involved in a number of other deals. It recently as 1970 he was prevented by Ashraf from extending his authority into the preserve of then Minister of Science and Higher Education Hajid Rahnova, an Ashraf man. Nanoucherh Azjali, NCC Managing Director and a former Prime Minister, has been willing to work with Ashraf but they back to the Ejhal chose Finance Mashhad Rena, the Shahi brother, rather than Ashraf's son. Shachran as husband for his daughter. In addition to Mahmud Raza, who has not been noriven for winning Azbal's daughter, the Shah's brother, Abdorrama, was the object of Ashraf's intrigues in the 1850s. Assuming neither tries for the throne himself, and there are no indications that either is thinking along these lines, they might be likely to support Farah in order to frustrate Ashraf. Many co-opted National Front supporters such as Minister of Commerce Forcodum Mahdavi would probably favor Farah. Ashraf was cried by the late National Front leader Mohammed Hossandeh and she epitomizes the social ills which were the object of the National Front crusade twenty years ago. Farah, on the other hand, can be seen as representative of a humanized version of the reforms which caused many National Fronters to see merit in the Shah's regime and become co-opted in the first place. We believe the military, too, would support the Regency although the emergence of a strongman is always possible, even if a military strongman should emerge, and especially if he came from the upper schelons of the military establishment (such as General Khatani), he would be likely to want to solidify his own position by ruling through a member of the Imperial Family, at least in the early stages. Farah would be the logical choice not only because of her legitimacy but because she would be expected to prove raro amenable to control from behind the scenes than the headstrong Ashraf. c. Probable Outcomes: In the 21st analysis we believe that Farah would emerge the victor, if only in name. Ashraf would

have an initial advantage but the Anxess has certain advantages which we doubt Aghra? could overcome short o2 violence. The Empress's greatest asset is legitimacy. She is the mother of the Crown Prince and the constitutional Regent. An orderly transfer of power to her would help to maintain Iran's political stability even though her presumably weak hand at the Persian heim would have contributing potentialities. Given the likelihood of continued rapid Iranian economic growth for the remainder of the Shah's reign, the major internal power centers other than the Court (i.e., the business/industrial complex, the Iran Novi Party and the military) would probably see their interest in the continuance of stability and thus give their support to Farah. Farah is genuinely popular among the Iranian people, the only member of the Pahlavi family who could make such a claim. Ashraf, on the other hand, is the most controversial and least popular of her time. She is 19 years older than Farah and may have lost much of her best for power by the time her twin brother died. Indeed, she may not survive him at all. From yet another point of view, time is working against the Princess, Crown Prince Reza will reach his majority in six years and the Shak appears to be in good health. If Prince Reza becomes Shah, and particularly if he ascends the thrown through the voluntary abdication of his father, Ashrafi's chances of mounting a successful power play would be greatly reduced. With the passage of time, the possibility that Farah rather than Crown Prince Roma would reign after the Shah is diminishing. It Farah should become Regent, however, her own humane proclivity is probably would lend to a limited reassurance of competing organs of government such as the Hailes, to the growth of some local tribalism and increased influence for traditional provincial families and religious figures. Overall stability would probably be preserved but a period of relaxation of the strict political controls imposed on the nation by the present Shah would make it less likely IV. The Crown Prince:IV. The Crown Prince: that Prince�inn would be accorded the unquestioning obedience given his father when he accords the Pahlavi throne. Iran's future king is a fourteen year old boy who, despite the official praises lavished upon him, appears to be of average talents and normal wholesont interests. Almost from birth Prince Reza has born the object of a studied campaign to portray him to the Iranian people as their future leader. From early youth he has lived in his own house on the grounds of Snadabad Palace, separated from his parents and brothers and sisters, and attended by a governance. Beginning with his sixth year the birthday of the Crown Prince has increasingly become an occasion of national celebration. He made his first public appearance at age seven during the Shah's 1967 Coronation but the effort to gain acceptance for him as the nation's future leader was accelerated with the 2500th Anniversary Celebrations in 1971. More recently he has made the pilgrimage alone to the Shrine of the Iman Reza in Mashad and taken part in naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf—activities which are apparently intended to connote a more manly and mature image than his earlier association almost exclusively with social welfare activities. The primary foreign influence and philosophy in Prince Reza's education have been French, although he studies English as well. Largely for security reasons, the Shah has decided that his heix will complete his education in Iran, emphasizing military training and economics and supplementing his education through foreign travel. The Prince has traveled to Switzerland and France a number of times and in 1973 made an eleventh day trip to the United States. The Crown Prince is increasingly portrayed in Iranian media as a younger version of his awesome father, but it is too soon to say which of his father's strengths and weaknesses he has actually intorcerated. The present Shah took two decades to develop into the firm ruler of today. He undoubtedly hopes that the educational program he has planned, the early exposure to affairs of state and his own continuing tuotage, as well as

the stable and prosperous nation to hopes to bequeat to his son, will enable Prince Bara to rule with authority from the beginning of his reign. As long as his father lives and advises from behind the scene the now Shah should have the uncontented opportunity to improve his position and establish the habit of obedience among his subordination. Given continued economic growth of the nation, it seems unlikely that any of the major elements in the Imperial Empire power structure will feel an immediate need to challenge the new monarch. Sconor or later, however, gives the additional Persian attitude toward authority, he will be challenged, and he must then show himself to be a firm and deter- mined ruler or see his power erode. The Succession Problem The succession problem in Iran is of more than passing importance because of the overwhelming personal role of the present Shah. No matter who succeeds the present monarch, he or she cannot hope to exercise the same degree of personal domination and control over as many facets of Iranian life--political, economic and social--as the present Shah has done for the past 20 years. Neither the Empress nor the Crown Prince nor any other individual on the horizon today will have the Shah's unique position and good fortune in having brought back Iran from the brink of disaster after World War II, then rescuing the country from economic disintegration under Mossadegh, and finally supervising an economic development program and social revolution--the "White Revolution"--which, thanks to the oil price increases of the mid-70s, has produced an economically growing, independent nation that is internationally respected. Given the Shah's dominant position and the prevailing social tensions brought on by rapid economic development, the timing of the Shah's departure from the scene will have considerable influence on what happens next. There are institutions in Iran, such as the parliament (Majles) which have on occasion played an important part in the country's history. The army and the growing middle class may be expected to play roles ranging from important to predominant depending upon the why and how of transition. There are also centrifugal forces such as religious radicals and a substantial number of moslem Shiite clergy; left wing radicals, including terrorists; and potential factions within the Court and the Royal Family. Should the transition to a successor to the Shah occur within the next five years, the chances of an early power struggle would be substantially greater than if the Shah remains at the center of the political stage for another 10 to 15 years or more. The greatest problem facing U.S.-Iran relations during the succession period would be the extent to which our mutual perceptions of self interest would be shared by a successor regime. The closeness of U.S. ties to the Pahlavi dynasty could quickly become a principal issue in any factional or ideological struggle for power in the wake of the Shah's demise. The Short Term: Should the Shah die or be killed before the Crown Prince becomes 20 (October 31, 1980), Empress Farah would take over as Regent in accordance with the Constitution. She would

govern with the aid of a Regency Council composed of the Prime Minister, the heads of the Majles and the Senate; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and four persons selected by the Regent. Unless there were complicating elements, the security forces and the rest of Iran's modernizing elite would rally behind the legitimate succession. Government policy would remain essentially the same, but the style of rule would combine tradition with a stronger tendency to democratic consultation and coalition building. If the Regent and the new Shah were unable to build a political coalition around an effective leader, a period of chaos would most likely follow, permitting extremist elements such as leftist radicals or fundamentalist Moslems to disrupt politics and force intervention by the military and security services, either on behalf of the dynasty or a new strong man in the Reza Shah tradition. Successful evolution of the Iranian political system will depend on how tightly Iran's middle class and technocrats stick together and whether institutional support could be developed for policies continuing along present lines. Key factors here would be the emergence of the Resurgence Party (Iran's single political party) and the ability of the leadership to rally a positive majority in the Majles and Senate. A less likely, but possible, evolution would involve the Shah's violent death under circumstances which would disable or kill the Empress and/or the Crown Prince. Under such circumstances, the Shah would probably be succeeded by a strong man who either starts his own dynasty or abolishes the monarchy and takes a title such as President of the Republic. To mobilize public support, the new Chief of State might be driven to extreme nationalistic appeals, including the removal of foreign presences in Iran. If he also moved to weaken Iran's ties with the West and edge toward a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR, opposition within Iran would probably lead to violence and the new government would be faced with retrenching or, in extremes, appealing for Soviet "help." The Long Term: If the Shah's disappearance is delayed from 10 to 15 years, the transition to a "Post-Shah" Iran should be easier and the possibility of either a bitter prolonged power rivalry and/or extended fumbling will be reduced. Given reasonable economic SECRET - NOFORN progress and political development, in another decade or two the political-economic-social structure will have had time to evolve further and those with a vested interest in stability will have grown even stronger. The rapidly growing middle class will be more dominant, though it will want a greater share of power and direction, than in the earlier time frame. Moreover, the possibility of intrigue and maneuver on the part of the Court, especially Princess Ashraf, should be substantially reduced. The new Shah will have had some experience--and hopefully a certain maturity--which will make him less subject to manipulation and more aware of the emerging limits on the monarch's role at a time when the pressures for shared power and participation will be very strong. Another ten years of political evolution is likely to reduce even further the influence of fundamen-talist Moslems in Iranian public life. Caveats: An important element in the power game which will follow the Shah's departure will be the influence of foreign powers. For the present, the U.S.S.R. seems prepared to play a waiting game, but once the Shah goes, the Soviets may devote substantial energy and resources to exploit every sign of confusion, uncertainty and divided counsel. We would hope that the U.S. would be able to use its influence in such ways and at such times as to counter the Soviet efforts and allow moderate domestic forces to exploit the possibilities of maintaining relative stability under conditions of natural advantage. Although the Shah has been an overwhelming figure in Iran, it would be a mistake to assume that chaos will inevitably follow his demise. There are institutional forces and solid personalities within the present government establishment who could give strength to a smooth transition. Moreover, to the degree that the Shah is able to ease domestic social tension by opening up more or less acceptable channels for dissent-perhaps through the Resurgence Party or more lenient interpretation of basic security legislation for those who are not involved in terrorist violence--the system itself will be more capable of making the adjustments which will be required in post-Shah Iran. The above assumes no fundamental changes in U.S.-Iran relations prior to the Shah's departure. If we should find ourselves at severe loggerheads over arms sales, human rights, or energy and economic development policy to the extent that this significantly weakens or changes traditionally close ties between our two countries, it may also alter Iranian

perceptions of where Iran's future interests lie. This in turn, under a successor government, might raise questions regarding our continued use of intelligence, and how it can access Iran's ports, airports, and other resources. The future of Iran-U.S. trade. In this situation, our ability to affect success and transition arrangements would not be as great as it is now. 20230101000 PRODUCE FOR CHANGING Amendability PLAN FOR CHANGING E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION ACTION: INFO: Beachstate WA.LDC: Amendability: A: 2024 E.N.C.A: 2024 E.N.C.A: C3700 E.N.C.A.E.N.C: STUDENT, TENOR STUDENT SECRET: TENOR 6776 POL3 E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: USIS CRU XGDM-1 AMB TAGS: PRINT, FGOV, RFOR, IN DCM SUBJECT: Iran's Modernizing Country: A Political Assessment ECON2 1. Below in summary of Dehrum's A-108 being printed to your post and wider list of additives POLM OR2 USIS CRU 3. Iran's rapid economic expansion has not produced a concomitant growth in political participation. Many groups, while reintending enough bias with politician to protect their interests, have held trials from deepen political activity because of uncertainty or opinion about the current political cycle. The fish completely dominates present Iran's politics, but evident and emerging groups will have to be successfully employed SHIR TABR 7.1/10 FOR: 2024/01/01 14/1j

In the political process of Iran is to continue developing its political stability. The composition of Army's site is considering, and many grounds which Initially support the model — both women, military relations, and the existing and new intellectual rights for those in relation to the challenge, it is currently to a management order which diluted all its with the two or one point considers. So, then as we are now even opposites to the present government. Religious conservatives are dissatisfied with any separate of modernization, yet remain only actively technologies. Vaccinets got publicity and are a decision treatment, but have only marginal impact on Iran's political dynamics. However, the GOI has recently been limiting their down with much success. Time students and intellectuals, particularly those children, oppose the region, but they are not organized to win internal public support. An long no economic condition remain relative to the other or a legitimate moderator result to the future. The students are unlikely to significant results in the political evolution. 4. Pension [?] 4. Pension [?] pension [?] pension [?] The Kaffar and the declining, and the far-left sense Party to to the application of the complete of playing an involvement in the through-way function, operating to the related business, are the most important of the general characteristics of the national government of the country. The authorities' leadership, the birth, the government, and the party are they want to change traditional values by decentralizing both government and Party administration, but implementation is glacial. The success of this process will be one measure of the Iranian political system's ability to adjust to marching a modernizing society. 5. Internally, Iran has begun to try and affect its external environment after decades of being acted upon. The Soviet Union remains Public Enemy No. 1, and the U.S. is Iran's primary big power supporter. However, recurrent Iranian nationalism has made the GOL more critical of its relationships with friends and the temptation to blame emergent illness of industrial and economic development on foreign inadequacies is growing with some success. Iran is attempting to better its relations with its neighbors and to play a leading role in Persian Gulf affairs.

6. Excluding radical accidents such as the Sish's sudden departure, Iran will experience increasing difficulties managing economic growth coupled with greater political participation by developing Party groups which B are likely to criticize the GUN more. This will probably result in some limits on political activity counterbalanced by more intense criticism of foreigners. Iran will make the adjustments in attitudes necessary to run into emerging society, but the process will not be easy. Oliga� acornmodation, not confrontation, will remain the quintessential Iranian political style, and over the next 5-10 years the Shah will either himself begin to share political responsibility with other, never groups or be forced to, as his inner circle begins to retire or die. Should a accession orrisin come within the next 6-7 years, the Bagancy Council would probably hold the country and the monarchy together in a new way could quickly come up for much. The annual legal force of change drove millions to cut their own interests and of the unity and stability. 7. Ansuring the expected evolution, U.S. interests do not result in more information where the following are going to be used: of undermining development, within the country and critical�li mmlomil mmlom, and the Save of occasional hostility, and a willingness to Thank for the ability and honesty to defuse problems before they clam up what is essentially both an internal and external evolution generally favorable to American interests.

Department of State INFO: Amembassies ABU DHABI, ANNAN, ANKARA, BAKRAIN, CAHO, COLOMB, DACCA, DAMASCUS, DOHA, ISLAHNEAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KUWAIT, LONDON, MANANA, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, NEW OZELIL, TEL AVTY, USINT TACHDAL PARIS Embassy TEIRIN July 8, 1975 XGE3-1 DINT, PGOV, PICR, IR Iran's Modernizing Mecharchy: A Political Assessor SUMMARY: Iran's rapid economic expansion has not produced a concomitant growth in political participation. Many groups, while maintaining enough ties with politicians to protect their interests, have held back from deeper political activity because of uncertainty or cynicism about the current political system. The Shah completely dominates present Iranian politics, but consistent and emerging groups will have to be successfully engaged in the political process if Iran is to continue developing in relative stability. The composition of Iran's elite is changing, and many groups which basically support the regime—businessmen, military officers, middle classes officials, and many intellectuals -- might find their loyalties seriously challenged, particularly in a succession crisis which diluted elite unity between two or more power contenders. There is no strong overt opposition to the present government. Religious conservatives are dissatisfied with many respects of modernization, yet remain only potentially troublesome. Terrorists get publicity and are serious irritant, but have SECRET 7/5/76 5197 DCM: JCM:1115 (Alexit) only marginal impact on Irani's political dynamics. However, the GDP has recently been hunting than down which more increase. Some students and intellectuals, particularly those abroad, oppose the regime, but they are not organized to gain informal public support. An long-term economic conditions remain pain-timely good and the fish or a legitimate successor remain in power, these child [?] are unlikely to significantly affect Iranian political evolution. Persim politics still depends overwhelmingly on personalities and on the influence of family and friends. Despite recent economic development, there has been little institutionalization. The Wajles' power has declined, and the now Resurgence Party is not yet organizationally capable of playing an influential role although its leaders, operating through the Political Bureau, are having some impact. Technological importances of modern society conflict with traditional Iranian patterns of paternalistic authoritarian leadership. The Shah, the government, and the Party say they want to change traditional values by decentralizing both government and Party administration, but implementation in glacial. The success of this process will be one measure of the Iranian political system's ability to adjust to managing a modernizing society. Externally, Iran has begun to try and affect its external environment after decades of being acted upon. The Soviet Union remains Public Enemy No. 1, and the U.S. is Iran's primary big power supporter. However, resurgent Iranian nationalism has made the GDP more critical of its relationships with friends, and the temptation to blame emergent ills of industrial and economic development on foreign inadequacies is growing. Iran is attempting with some success to better its relations with its neighbors and to play leading role in Persian Gulf affairs. ExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExExcluding radical accidents such as the Shah's sudden departure, Iran will experience increasing difficulties managing economic growth coupled with greater political participation by developing Party groups which are likely to criticize the GOL more. This will probably result in some limits on political activity counterbalanced by more intono criticism of foreigners. Iran will make the adjustments in attitudes necessary to run its emerging society, but the process will not be easy. Cbiguo accommodates, not confrontation, will remain the quintessential Iranian political style, and over the next 5-10 years the Shah will either himself begin to share political responsibility with

other, newer groups or to forced to, as his inner circle begins to rotate or cho. Should a discussion which occur within the past 6-7 years, the Legacy Council would probably hold the country and the community together initially, but never could quickly come up for parts if the centrally forces of change drove various groups to put their own interests ahead of unity and stability. Assuming the expected evolution, U.S. interests lie in maintaining close relations with Iran supportive of modernizing developments. This will require substantial diplomatic fitness, forassurance in the face of economical hostility, and a willingness to speak frankly and honestly to defense problems before they threaten to disrupt what he essentially both an internal and external evolution generally favorable to American interests. AND SUMMARY. What follows is an overview of where Iran seems headed and some of the factors which will shape its future. It draws together a number of threads from past reporting and references (NAVAL) to Embassy reporting are included in the text for those who wish to explore individual aspects in greater detail. This political assessment looks first at Iran's discernible internal dynamics and its external relations, then at its likely future evolution and finally makes some general judgments on where U.S. interests lie. I. INTERNAL POLITICS - PROSPERITY AT THE EXERCISE OF PARTICIPATION Iran's rapid economic development over the past several years has not been accompanied by parallel advances in political participation. As a result, Iran depends very heavily on one man -- the Shah -- for political leadership and guidance. Nevertheless, forces are at work which may eventually create a different political balance in the country. Development has not yet progressed far enough to lay down with even reasonable certainty a moderately long-term prediction of the path Iranian political development is likely to take over the next five to 15 years without major cravets -- as the Shah lives, as if the army remains a political, if the Resurgence Party becomes an effective political device, etc. Even Iranian analysts retreat from certainty when pressed to delicate future trends. Western observators are at a double disadvantage -- indicators are confused and Western values, while often accepted on the surface in Iran, do not seem wholly appropriate for an analysis of this modernizing monarchy. There is no doubt the Shah is in full command of the Iranian political process (Tobran's A-10 of January 23, 1875 and A-233 of November 30, 1875). Whether our concepts or not the view that he deliberately dissatisfied the Iran Hovain Party, Iran's first man party since the Tudok (Communist) Party, because it was becoming too strong, it is clear that changing Iran into a community state in April 1875 and consulting the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (1875) brought the Shah into a more active political role. He can be influenced but unlike the Massaged period of 1841-1853 with the subservient National Front can ending in 1853, there are no independent forces presently on the horizon which can challenge him (Tobran's A-71 of April 11, 1875 and A-233 of November 30, 1875). The Shah's formula for Iran's future is well known: Iran will continue its oil-revenue-based development and divorphi. The Resurgence Party will express the will of the people and, along with the Majlis (Parliament), will gradually shape the nation's future. When the Croan Prince received a suitable age probably in his late 20's, the Shah has said he will abdicate in his favor and guide him until he is able to rule with the necessary force and vigor. This scenario is based on the Shah's belief that he has effectively centralized power around the institution of the monarchy and has only to turn it carefully to his son. In the Shah's view, the monarchy represents a basic stabilizing influence necessary to hold Iran together while ISSNians are tutored in the proper participatory role. The most obvious alternative to this scenario is the possibility that the Shan night leave the scans by either accident or design ever the most three to five years before the Crown Prince reached his majority. Unless the She's derive occurred under exceptional or mysterious circumstances, the Regency Council hosted by Haynes Farah would probably emerge not only in law but in fact as the ruling body, at least for the short term. Evolution beyond this point would depend upon factors which have not yet stabilized themselves. Situation is difficult because major internal strains have arisen in Iranian society largely as a result of the successful development process purchased when the mid-1980s and swiftly accelerated by the oil price increases of 1978-1979. Iranian society, which had accurately begun to stimulate politically the results of earlier growth, now finds itself dealing with a number of evolving factors whose strength and direction of impact is unclear.

--- a changing elite working within a conservative bureaucracy attempting to manage an increasingly complex development process. -- move demands for political and economic participation by groups -- students, businessman, worker, middle class fom- themaries, and even in some cases, conservative religious elements (Tehran's A-43 of March 11, 1975 and A-239 of November 30, 1975). --- somewhat slower economic growth than anticipated for the immediate future, including an anticipated budget deficit of $2.1 billion for the present Ironland year, March 21, 1976 to March 21, 1977 (Nobron's A-35 of May 4, 1976 and A-99 of May 26, 1976). -- greater involvement in foreign affairs, partly by Iran's own choice, and partly through circumstances. More than most countries, Iran finds itself facing a wide range of future possibilities that are difficult to narrow down in advance. Internal Situation-Group Influence A number of plus factors support more stable options within a changing institutional framework: Military elites are, or have become, basically political supportants of the present regime (Tahram's A-90, MINDS, of May 6, 1976). The present generation of military leadership came to power at the pleasure of the Shah as a reward for intense loyalty. It is counted among the strongest hackers of the present nonarchival system and would undoubtedly provide the linchpin for holding the Regency Council together in the event of a premature succession crisis. Points of concern exist, however: The younger generation of officers, more technically qualified, "modernized," and from a rich broader strata of society than the artistic or upper claze seems who have stabilized the officer corps since Reza Shah's time, are less tied to the monarchy. In military affairs, as in many other aspects of Iran's evolving society, complexity makes it impossible for the Shah to control even small decisions as he used to do. The Shah's increasing acquisitions of modern society are beginning to create strains which are almost certain to grow. A modern army requires discretionary decision-making power to make mplean manyan synthesis function effectively. When their in not granted, discrepancy exists; there is no additional, direct, the only group. The military group one unquestionably loyal but but there are several sociological companies why not will of the officer corps might remain so, predictability is the key factor eventually because the group in a together-born interval civilian groups or claimants to the throne. Most beginners have enjoyed unprecedented prosperity in the rest five or six years, and this every hour established details economic development. The price control campaign of the past year have distinguished their enthusiasm for the regime, but they are not agreed on how things should be changed. A number of younger individuals are their futures primarily in economic endeavors and do not seek personal fulfillment in political activity as readily as their older brothers did (Tehran's A-40 of March 11, 1978). Tribal of Iran, always a prime source of separatist or decentralizism tendencies in Iran, approach to finding as a distinctive influence in politics. Recent economic expansion has enticed many tribal figures into developmental activities linked with Iran's modernizing sector. Tribal leaders have gone into business, and many, if not most, tribal members have greater links to more stationary urban and rural people than had been believed. The only significant tribal group to pace even a potential threat to the government is the Kurds, and for various reasons they do not seem in a position to do so (Tahmir A-5 of February 29, 1978). The longer Iran is at pace with itself and tribunal and women become integrated into the modern economic and social Republic of Iran, the less tribes nor no one likely to pace distinct political problems for this or any future regime. Iran's middle class — small shopkeepers, government officials, professional, etc. — all have a substantial state in Iran's present prosperity. Accept for some dissatisfied individuals this group is probably the backbone of the nonarchival system as it functions today. Occasionally disgruntled at their lack of civil liberation, those individuals at least implicitly accept the tradeoff of prosperity and economic well-being in exchange for the curtailment of criticism. Among this group are many former National Frontiers who have accepted the Shah-People Revolution as aimed at the betterment of life for Iranians. In fact, one of the Shah's major achievements of the past 12-15 years has been to win former nationalists into supporting positions. Perhaps the best example of this is former Minister of Commerce Ferodum Rahavi, who is now

Minister of State for Party Affairs. As in the case of business and particularly military officials, support of this group is contingent on performances by the region -- its loyalty does based on "What have you done for me Intolly?" While it would take disorder or repression of an extravagance high order to turn many toward terrorism or open opposition more criticism can be expected within existing institution and limits is Iran's economic choices become clearer and more feel relatively disadvantaged. Labor plays almost no independent political role in Iran. The country's unicord are run under firm government supervision, and organized labor has been one of the substantial beneficial aides of the economic book. Laborers, however, do not always share leadership's enthusiasm for the country's economic stride or current ecotide policies. As inflation has taken away at buying power, particularly over the past 15 months, there have been occasional, unpublicized wildent strikes or other form of protest against the price/vago squacco. In part, the GDP's price control campaign was an attempt to meet these concerns, but it has not eliminated the problem, and several firms have experienced labor demonstrations over wage questions. The GDP also heavily subsidizes basic consumer staples -- ton, rice, sugar, etc. In addition to being costly, this program acts as a score disincentive to agricultural development by leaping prices artificially low. While prosperity and expansion continues, however, an overwhelming percentage of the labor force will find it in its own interest to support, at least tocilly, the status quo. In a succession crisis, particularly one which fortified a period of rapid inflation, laborers could well break ranks with labor leadership and form more which could be directed against the government. The Dissatisfied There are two categories of people which can be considered "out" groups -- religious conservatives and terrorists -- plus a third group -- students and intellectuals -- which is significantly divided on whether it wants "in" or "out." Tropologist groups are the only organized entities actively opposing the thin's regime. While they gain substantial publicity and serve as scapegoats for infringements on western concepts of civil rights, they also, for the pressut, on the outnants of the Iranian system (Tehkhn A-211 of November 23 1975). The two national tourist organizations (possibly two branches of the same organizational) have not gained even minimal support from "the people." In fact, most of the recent successful police operations against them have resulted from citizen assistance to the police. With the unvoiling of evidence that the terrorists are supported by outside forces (Tehran's A-100 of May 97, 1975 and 5035 of May 13, 1975) coupled with the successful roundup of several terrorist groups from December 1975 - present, the Iranian government has approximately put a severe crisp in both the terrorists' image and organization. Never numerous (between 250-300 in-country activists are estimated to be still at large, plus an unknown number of sympathizers, or-haps 1-2,000), the terrorists are not most a force in waiting for a serious governmental mistake or a distinct worsening of Iran's economic and political circumstances. While they remain a danger to military and security forces and diplomats, especially Americans, their impact on Iranian internal politics has been minimal. They have succeeded in earning Iran a modest bad press abroad through their anti-Shah activities. A more complex problem for the regions is the group of religious conservatives, both clergy and laity, which attacks the shack from the right of the political spectrum for yielding to "evil" modernizing influences. Such is made of Iran's development, its now elite and the ubiquity of change. However, a sizable minority, perhaps even a slight majority of Iranians, particularly in the rural areas, have neither changed their attitudes nor are inclined to accept "modern" (Western) moves. They reject part of what the Shah has done (such as giving women the vote) as against the will of God and harmful to the true faith of Islam. University students of this persuasion are the chief recruiting targets for the "People's Strugglers," (Ujnhishdin-e-khaliq), the terrorist group closest to right wing Hoslems. More important, respectable Roman merchants, ordinary famous and plus Honors in all areas, but especially those favoring traditional lifestyles, feel themselves alienated from the regime. Two recent events have undemocored this -- the Shah's decision to change Iran's calendar from the Islamic calendar to one based on the beginning of the Persian Empire (the year in Iran in now 2005 rather than 1955); and the death of Ayatollah Shaurabadi, a popular religious figure in Iran. (Sehrant's 5385 of May 19, 1970). There are widespread under-currents of discontent with the calendar change, despite the

Fish's awareness that religious celebrations would remain in the same dates, and conservative sultans are using this evidence of the Fish's "gedissum" to criticize the regime now. The death of the Aynollah, eventually laid to sight during Boston families (Tehran's A-301 of May 27, 1970), has overacted the issue of alleged foreign support for anti-regina Irulian religious groups and leaders. Should a situation of collapsing public order and loss decisive leadership than presently exists more about, the millions and their followers, including wealthy merchants both in Tehran and the provinces, constitute a loosely organized force that could coalesse around an issue or an incident to offer a real challenge. This force is only, potential, and not well organized -- its motivation would depend on circumstances. The regime has made some gestures toward this group which have failed to oppose it, and the GOI clearly recognizes the situation's sensitivity -- contacts with religious figures by foreigners is discouraged and SAVAK exerts a great deal of effort non-believing religions' activities of even those millions friendly to the regime. There is probably less information available to foreigners about the dynamics of this sociological structure than about any other. Intellectuals -- students, and faculty -- fit into the Iranian system in several ways, some extravulsary confusing. University students within Iran constitute a pressure group on university-related issues of interest to them. Within the country, student activities is encouraged only within the bottom of the Resurgence Party. About 8,000 students have seriously participated in the price control campaign, in effect which has some attractive features from the government's point of view: It places the students at odds with merchants and the business community wills improving at least slightly the student image vis-a-vis the average citizen. Unofficial student activities, including standard riots and demonstrations, have continued over the past year (Tehran's 17492 of December 19, 1875), but there has been a noticeable dlocking recently as the school year ended. Perceptive Iranian educators believe this relaxation is largely fortuitous and that the Iranian government has not yet really developed an effective style for leading student dissent. The GGI has alternated between how expression of riots on one hand and object surrender to student deans in the other. This has greatly increased faculty opinion without much impact on student behavior, except to encourage the more balliées to promote their deans. The 1975 Roman Conference and continuing meetings began to deal with this and many other problems of rapid educational expansion (4/1/17 of September 55, 1978), but no operational decisions for administrators has yet emerged. Activities by Iranian students abroad have been a major initiation to the region. Iranian Student Association activities and demonstrations in the U.S., India, Britain and France, have contributed significantly to such bad years as Iran has received. The Sinh's own reaction to these activities has been pumilomut at the ingratitude of those individuals, many of whom studied or are studying on government schoolships. No cannot understand why they are not more grateful for what he has done for Iran. Difficulties in the Shah's relationship to student and faculty intellectuals date back to his return to power in 1853. Many of the rising middle class, including university people, supported Hossadeq; royalist support was heaviest among traditional groups, aristocrats and landowners, and royalist rhetoric appealed to them, not to the modernisms. In the intervening years, the Shah has changed his basic appeal, captured the modernizing revolution, and appealed to the emerging cities through the mechanism of the Shah-People Revolution (A-31 of February 24, 1975). His rhetoric even now does not appeal to many students and some teachers and a basic residue of suspicion remains. However, even earlier many intellectuals supported the monarchy, and many more have come to do so since 1833. The Resurgence Party has been designed, at least in part, to draw on the skills of university men and women and encourage their participation in Party groups (Inconons) and elsewhere within the Party's organization structure. The government has succeeded somewhat -- the ranks of the RPPI and key government ministries are sprinkled with acc-demics; since most professors in Iran hold at least two jobs, many have simply included Party activities as one of their "outside" efforts. Fluid Institutionallation Another difficulty in describing, explaining, and predicting the present Iranian sociopolitical constellation is that little political institutionalization has taken place. That which has occurred is so heavily based on personnel relations that it is difficult to gauge and project the relative power of groups without an extensive knowledge of family ties, historic amenities, and the Shah's current predilections.

Even when, much from one subject to another change. Creation of the Registrative Party has since the institution building which took place even several years in the Indian Party with no reported ayesin. Although the State has made it clear he fully supports EU21 organization building efforts (Tehran's death of May 8, 1973), the actual mechanism of putting the Federal resolution in place will take at least a year. However, those sentiments to be widespread opinion about the PPPI's ability to play an effective role, to establish political options for the government, and to direct development (Tehran's A-820 of November 20, 1975). Results on which to judge this conclusion have been skinny but initially encouraging (Tehran's A-13 of March 11, 1970), but Iran is a long way from having a disciplined single party organization with objective political influence. The power/influence of the Majles has declined somewhat. This is hardly surprising, since 244 of 268 deputies and 27 of 60 senators were new in September 1975. Newcomers have spent the past year learning their job and feeling their way into relationships with the government and the RPO. The Majles's remains, however, Iran's chief political legitimising body. Nelzbar the RPVI nor the Majles have yet developed a distinctive political style. The Majles remains a potential ream for groups to criticulate their demands, but for the moment, most political activity is taking place in the RPVI. Party leaders are making such-called provincial trips to stimulate organization, and hold town meetings to listen to citizen complaints. The national and provincial governments have responded to citizen demands (as transmitted through the Party) in many lossor cases. The Shah himself encourages government responsiveness to the "will of the people" as expressed through the RPVI and the Majles, but there has been no major issue yet on which the public "will" has differed in any degree from what the Shah wants to do. The Party and the Majiles do not now -- but might in the future -- constitute organizations which would challenge the British's outlook and policies. His informal political control over both groups is thus far giving him the best of both variables -- control over general policy on those things important to him, yet encouragement of representative institution-building. For most Iranians, however, the crucial evolutionary period will case if popular preferences which differ from the British -- for example, on allocation of resources for defense -- find institutional expression sufficiently potential enough to either prevail against or allow the royal will. The Majiles, particularly, could play an important legitimizing role in a succession crisis. the national government itself is dedicated by Eun's most commitment, publication, Anti-Arson Noroya, its best best for 11 years the loyal, dedicated Prime minister of the�th. Noroya understands his poor is extremely proportional to the degree he attempts an independence, institutional and the minister's role. Here, he is the chief implementor of royal ideas, not a political creator. European handics the Eijloes superbly; he has his own part of private advice which permits him to manage a cabinet which contains at least two of his principal rivals -- Interair Minister Anomagur and Finance Minister Anony -- and he is Decrease-General at the Resurgence Party (though he has said he will give up this post at the October Party Congress). Historically the central ministries have been strong since Nein Shah reunified Iran in the late 1920's. Now, to manage modern complexity, the government has embarked on a decem-tralization program to move both ministry personnel and many resource allocation decisions out of Tehran to the provinces. This process is just beginning and, similarly with respect to Party organization, it will take several years to break official's habits of locking to Tohsan for everything. There have been encouraging starts in some of the major provincial centers — in Yara Province, for example, many of the cities are already decentralized (Tehran's A-200 of December 17, 1975). In Iqaban, only one or two ministries have fall local support offices, and in most other provinces, governmental personnel have not yet accumulated either the basic concept or the behavioral attitudes necessary to make decentralization work. Government and Party leaders believe RPRI organizing efforts in the provinces will aid the decentralization process -- as the Party knows develop units, they will approach local governments and a "pull" toward decentralization from the bottom as well as a push from the top may begin. This is likely to be a long term effort extending three to five years at a minimum, but at least a mechanism is being put into place. The next major step will be the election of village and local councils in October, 1970. Separate RPRI local organizations are being established over the next six months, but it is not clear whether or how much of an overlap in membership with the village and rural councils there will be. For the next year or two at a minimum, significant government decisions even in the local economic system are likely to be directed, if not taken, by government and Party organs in Tehran. For the foreseeable future, the central government will make all major decisions under the Shah's direction.

This would most likely be the case ever as a succession problem arises prontively. Any successor regimes will first move to assert control over governmental origins at the center and in key provincial areas. A succession situation which developed over the next five to seven years would almost certainly halt and probably dismantle the decentralization effort, at least until the new government assumed full political control of the country. II. IRAN AND ITS ETERNAL ENVIRONMENT While Iran has been developing and changing from within, relationships with its external environment have been undergoing important changes, too. For most of the last hundred years until the late 60's, Iran has either been, or felt itself, the only one of the most important. From 1900 until the immediate post-World War II period, the British and the Russians emancized extensive influence in Korea. At the time of the 1910-1947 Asarbaijan crisis, the United States replaced Britain as Iran's most dependable great power support. Since the late 1940's, the U.S. has been Iran's principal ally and supporter vis-a-vis the USSK. Iranian and U.S. vicars have remained very close on all major and most minor issues, with the exception of oil nationalization during the Mass�ad period and oil pricing during the current era (1973-present). History has convinced the Shah and most Iranians that Iran's greatest threat comes from the Soviet Union. Despite the normalization of commercial and political relations with the USSR, which began in 1959, that country is still considered Iran's major enemy. The nationals for Iran's extremely close ties, early dependence upon, and current military supply relationships with, the U.S. follow naturally. Beginning in the late 1960's, however, the Shah has been much more active in trying to shape Iran's external environment. This has been accompanied, particularly since the 1975 oil price hikes, by a general increase in Persian national pride which has made itself felt both on the international scene and upon foreigners' resident in Iran. While Iranians still fear they may be manipulated by foreign powers (CIA control of Iran remains an article of faith among Iranian radicals abroad and, unfortunately, many others in Iran), the Shah is much more willing to assert Iranian influence in the international area, and his follow citizens accept with pleasure such evidence of Iran's growing prestige. Iren has consistently taken the position within GMC that additional price increases in petroleum should maintain producers buying power by establishing a relationship between raw material prices and costs of industrial goods. The GOI emphasises a consistent preference for revising the world economic order to provide a better deal for primary producers. While not approaching the radical have-not rhetoric of the more militant numbers of the Group of 77, Iran is prepared to press firmly for an economic reordering in forums such as CISO and UNCTAD. Other evidence of Iran's growing self-confidence in foreign affairs have been the approccesment with Iraq in March, 1975 (after which Iran ceased supporting Kurdish rebels there); and Iran's proposals for some form of Persian Gulf security arrangement (Tهران's 2389 LINDIS of April 5, 1976) among the littoral states. Iran has taken an almost proprietary interest in Gulf politics, providing troops for Oman to combat a communist threat (Tهران's 4420 LINDIS of May 3, 1976) and expressing extreme sensitivity over Arab trifling with the name "Persian Gulf" as well as meddling by "others" (Tهران's 3715 of April 13, 1975; 4199 of April 26, 1976; and 2686 of March 15, 1975). The Shah, who completely dominated the conduct of Iranian foreign relations, has also turned his attention to improving his ties with regional neighbors through increased regional cooperation. Iran has participated actively in recent CENTO and RCD meetings and has exchanged or is exchanging state visits at various levels with Pakistan, Turkey, India and Afghanistan. The Shah has claimed some credit for the recent Pakistan-India rapprochement as a result of his discussions with both parties. Iran reannins committed to a relatively moderate line on the Arab-Israeli dispute, but has moved closer to its Moslem brethren over the issue of a desirability of a Palestinian household. Iran's misgivings/uncertainty about its newborn center around Soviet penetration of the area, real or imagined. The Shah is concerned about Afghan-istan's future after Daoud leaves the scene, and there is a general Iranian government perception that the Soviet would like to dismantle parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to create an independent Baluchistan (to provide a Russian outlet to the Indian Ocean). Many of the efforts underway to improve relations with Asian countries occur in strictly bilateral fashion which may have undesirable side-effects. Closer contact with India, for example, can occasionally cause concern in Iran's relations with Pakistan. Bilateral policies are generally not placed into a well-designed multilateral framework (Fahran's 2003

of June 14, 1963). The commenders to the Indian Court of the United States proposed and the International Law that the United States good will form a combined�� with the law of the State trip to the United States, now Revised, Singapore, and Africa. It has been a long-elemently spoiled out and its basis on the outcome determination both additional states of the Indian Court will to future find their economic complexity. When all that was done, it is difficult to see how reconcile further solutions would then read to occupation in promoting security in that vast area, as the Shah fortunes. The Middle State March for Your Law has been provided by Iran and co-sponsored by Egypt, but it is as vague in formation and has not gotten beyond the discussion stage. It is not even clear which activities would be included in the geographical term "Middle State." Despite the approvision of these unilateral initiatives, an underlying trend is discernible: From has begun to give more attention to its relations with areas in South and East Asia. And Indian Ocean Market proposal in one example. Another is Iran's stated intention to have a "blue water" navy which will extend the country's strategic interests out into the Indian Ocean. (Transfer of Iran's naval headquarters from Khorrazhair eastward to Damir Abha in 1973 and its intention to build a major naval base at Cheh Bahar are signs of this development.) It appears that the Shah's intent in empowering greater interest in South and East Asia is to project an image of greater strategic scope. He may feel that the rest of the world tends to think of Iran as a country on the fringe of the biddie fact rather than as a country which has other broad strategic interests as well. Along with the new Iranian activism in foreign affairs have come stagnation in Iran's relations with the U.S. (Tehran's 1924 of November 18, 1978, and 5701 of June 10, 1975). For-haps the only major point on which the U.S. and Iran now [?] it is the decontrollability of higher oil prices, but there are a number of lessen irritants in our bilateral relations-brings which reflect the Shah's (and Iran's) increasing desire to shape its relations with the U.S. in its own way: 1) Iran scorning one and-one control over military sales; the Shah wants to aid when he visits; 2) lubial expectations about U.S. Iran Joint Commission activations have not been fulfilled and 3) Recruit U.S. policy toward Angola has produced doubts in the Shah's mind that the U.S. will be, or can to, as firm an ally as it has been in the past. It may younger representatives have proceed the U.S. Congress toward a more ques-taking risk of U.S.-Iran ties; the Shah has reciprocated. With the loss to driving or have been impact on its environment, commercial funnels to Europe remain important. The country's nor economic network has had to an inflow of foreign technicians and Incubators from the U.S., Europe, and East Asia which have strengthened Iran's sense of nationalism and creased non-human selection. So far this inflow has been reasonably isolated from domestic politics, but while most Iranians are proud that their country can employ foreign help, they are increasingly identifying the foreign presence with many of the growing urban ills which boost cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz. Should a crisis of authority develop, the foreign community, of which the U.S. contingent is the largest, would probably become a target for increased zero-problem and attacks, particularly from right wing Hoslam groups and emsgant leftist factions (Tehran 1124 of Novosbor 10, 1975). XX. FUTURE ENVIRONTH: KIDKING THE TXGXR Change is occurring in Iranian society at all levels, largely due to rapid economic growth in the past two to five years. The development to widespread; not only in Tehran, but important provincial towns such as Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz. Other cities such as Ahaz, Kermanash and Khasad as well are feeling the press of sociological change. For many years the Shah has managed to generally side-hurd on these developments and direct their main lines of advance. As the society has grown increasingly complex as the result of successful industrialization and agricultural exploitation, the Iranian bureaucracy and political machinions of government appear increasingly pressed to report the twin challenge of effective authoritative control and the drive for expanded political participation. However, as has happened historically in many societies, expectations have arisen even faster than prospects for fulfillment, creating a dangerous situation for the guardians of political legitimacy. Thus far, problems have been manageable in the context of initial rapid growth, but economic indicators suggest that the period of geometric growth is coming to a close. However, the impact and expectations of the recent past continue. This year's budget will be in deficit, and while the region has opted for continued growth even at the cost of deficit financing, the budgetary pinch is already being felt in both public and private sectors. Projects once approved in a rush are now getting a careful second look and some, perhaps many, are being shelved. Whether this causes serious discount

or only minor grabbing probably depends on the degree of production in growth and how well it is managed. Two major factors suggest both trouble and opportunity ahead for societal management: The "Philadelphia team," these intimates around the Shah who have held various key positions even the past 30 years, is growing older. This increases the possibility of slippage in control. Court Minister Alan and Imperial Secretariat Director Nonmetallic Reduction, for example, have been reported in 11 health at various times in the recent year. The Shah's Chief of Staff, General Author, is old, and reports circulate from time to time that NAVA Chief Nonmetallic Reduction, and the "Philadelphia team," these intimates around the Shah who have held various key positions even the past 30 years, is growing older. This increases the possibility of slippage in control. Court Minister Alan and Imperial Secretariat Director Nonmetallic Reduction, for example, have been reported in 11 health at various times in the recent year. The Shah's Chief of Staff, General Author, is old, and reports circulate from time to time that NAVA Chief Nonmetallic Reduction has asked to retrieve. Prime Minister Novoyda has already indicated he will give up his post as Secretary General of the RPF at the October Party Congress. There is a strong chance that age, health and fatigue will probably remove many of these men from their key positions before five years have passed. This offers an opportunity to develop new blood, but also the danger of disorganization. Senior rolements will be relatively inexperienced in the subtleties of excrivising imperial power and may not share their predecessors' absolute loyalty to the royal family. A diminution, at least temporary, of administrative and control competence is clearly to be expected. The second major problem is the lack of an adequate institutional framework for further political development which could absorb some of the pressures likely to build up even under the best of circumstances. The Shah deserves credit for sensing this problem and attempting to build, through the Resurgence Party and decentralized governmental administration, an administrative/political framework to both manage change and increase popular participation. Unpredictable factors such as the Shah's survivability always exist. The most likely path of development, in the absence of such eccentric factors, depends upon elements more amenable to Iranian influence. Assuming that the present governmental structure continues in being, the government's successful implementation of its economic development proposals will basically beyond on its ability to manage its programs well. Eitchess and bottlenecks will develop in administrative arrangements. The GDP and private industry will circumvent some of these; others will be the focus for political criticism. Controversy over resources allocation is likely to grow. As one is in want of, of meeting this negative impact, the GOI is likely to blame foreigners for their failure to correctly import Western techniques and methods. This is already taking into account these are charges of communist intrigues with domestic opponents of the regime; connotations that foreigners are polluting Iran's culture; and increasing expressions of belief that Western technology is ineffective and not worth the social price being paid for its presence. To some degree this is natural: foreign companies are showing less willingness to invest indiscriminately in Iran, and normal frictions between relatively new trading partners -- misunderstandings, late payment for goods, inadequate performance of contract -- are already growing. Iran has been shocked by rapidly escalating prices of U.S. goods, particularly military hardware, but also other manufactures. The inevitable criticism of foreigners means the reorientation of Persian values that must take place if Iran is to operate its modern industrial structure will have at least a modest anti-foreign anicus. Projecting several years of relative peace and stability ahead, Iran is likely to ruddle through synthesis between traditional Persian society and the values and attitudes necessary to operate a modern state with at least minimum efficiency. In the process, the Shah will almost certainly try to reduce criticism by limiting or strongly influencing emerging political participation and alienating many younger activists who are now seriously beginning to participate within the system. This could set the stage for a return to the pre-1963 situation when the Shah faced threats from both the left — ex-Tudeh Party supporters and radical modernizers — and from the right — traditional landlords/businesses and religious conservatives. More likely, however, is that the newly emerging middle class — businessmen, academics, civil servants, and even many skilled laborers — will achieve some, perhaps significant, influence and control over policy through control of the governmental bureaucracy, the Party apparatus, and economic allocation machinery. The political interplay will be fairly intense: The traditional love/hate relationship between ruler and ruled will show both cooperative and conflictual aspects, but direct confrontation is not the Iranian political style. For example, the intellectual who expresses deep hostility to the government's violation of western norms of civil rights (Tehran's A-56 of March 15, 1976) will have no hesitation about taking an important advisory or operational job in the government or Party. Unless the Shah inexplicably loses his ability to wheel and coal within the Iranian system, he will undoubtedly try to

manipulate others as they try to manipulate him. In the process, an his control over an increasingly complex society through older trusted advisers begins to slip, he will be forced to turn to now men who will thus acquire access and influence. Both the fish and his liousmen are may choose to open up the political process, either formally or informally or they may have it forced upon them while attempting to deal with the emerging groups in Iran's Great Civilization. The Resurgence Party Political Bureau, composed of 30 individuals, including 15 ministers, is already showing signs of developing influence along these lines through an essentially collaborative relationship with the Throns. Islamic philosophy stresses that events happen "Inshall" if God wills. Iran's history shows the country has been more often victim than predator. This has bred a fatalistic attitude toward accomplishing established goals plus a disinclination to accept responsibility for difficult decisions/actions which has led to paternalistic authoritarianism as a basic leadership style. This ancient pattern of behavior is being challenged at all levels by Iran's move into the industrial future. No solution will please everyone -- Iran's own internal values are much too rich and divergent for that. Reconciling such differences while developing the minimal administrative and organizational values necessary to make the system work effectively to command the political loyalty of its subjects will not be easy. It will take leadership, time, favorable circumstances and political vision, not only from the Shah, but from Iran's emerging elites who will man the machinery. IV. EFFECT ON U.S. INTERESTS What role will the U.S. play in Iran's future? As a modernized society, we have much to contribute, but Iran is becoming increasingly soundive to taking advice and may not always want our assistance. For example, U.S. insistence on additional safeguards on nuclear energy plants beyond USA standards is already chasing business into French and German hands, besides irritating Iran. What is seen in Iran as unnecessary press criticism of Iran on human rights questions has irritated Iran's government (Tehran 619 of June 13, 1973). There is considerable feeling in Iran that segments of U.S. public and press opinion have been taken in by radical foreign-inspired criticisms of the Shah's regime. Greater congressional concern with human rights problems, occupied with increasingly restrictive policies on military sales, have raised doubts about the reliability of the long-term U.S. None of these quotientous pose a specific and moment threat to the close and comprehensive relations between Iran and the U.S. built up over the past 20 years, but they are problems which need to be treated rather than closed over. Iran's strategic location outside important air routes, its oil resources, and the Shah's basically moderate and (in U.S. areas) constructive polision in the region will make Iran important to the U.S. American support against Iran's perceived principal energy takes the relationship equally vital, it's not more so, to Iran's present government and probably to any future government except an extreme radical one such as Libya's present regime (very unlikely, but not impossible). The tone of U.S.-Iran relations may change over time, but except in the remote case of a left-radical takeover, the geopolitical basis for close ties between the two countries will remain. As the U.S. is Iran's most important ally and competitor, we may expect to receive a substantial amount of plans when things go wrong -- even if we are not at fault. Our relations with Iran will require the utmost diplomatic sincerity. The Shah has immense power, a reasonable development plan for his country, and considerable international prestige. He regards the U.S. as his most important supporter, and we should therefore be willing to speak frankly with him about mutual problems. We must, however, maintain and expand our bridges to other groups in Iranian society or we will be at a distinct disadvantage during the jockeying for power that will take place in post-Shah Iran. Our basic goal should be to diffuse problems before they create strains which could threaten an evolution, both within Iran and between our two countries, which is favorable to American strategy, political and economic interests.

Tab A 5 HANDLING CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE REFERENCE NO. A-23 TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE POL-3 AIB DCI ECO1-2 USIS FBI CR-2 CRU SHIR TABR 14rcf FROM: AMBASSY TEHRAN DATE: 22 Feb 1977 11652: GDS TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: THE RESURGENCE PARTY BEGINS PHASE II REF: A) 76 Tehran 10887 B) 76 Tehran A-133, July 22 C) 75 Tehran A-239, Nov. 30 D) 76 Tehran A-123, July 8 E) 75 Tehran 10338 SUMMARY: With the selection of a new Secretary General, and other principal party officials, the Resurgence Part (RPPI) is preparing to increase its organizational activity and reach out for a greater role in Iranian politics. New Secretary General Jamshid Amouzegar has installed people loyal to himself into key positions, and this new team has a distinct activist and modernist flavor. The major challenge facing new Party leadership is translating Shah's desire for greater participation by all Iranians from word to reality. Success will depend upon the Party's ability to cope with three basic problems: a) provide inducements to participation for interested activists who are somewhat disillusioned because the RPPI is not developing a governing party in traditional terms; b) create middle-level party organi- zations to channel chapter views to national leadership and vice versa; and c) smoothly develop the Party's ability to work with government echelons at all levels without either becoming part of the GOI's administrative machinery or losing all influence. END SUMMARY Some two months after the conclusion (Ref A) of the Second Congress of the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI), the Party's new organizational structure is beginning to take shape and the RPPI is beginning "Phase Enclosures: Party Manifesto MemCon SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION: EB EUR INR IO NCA PER PM REP SCI SS SY AGR AID AIR ARMY CIA COM DOD DOT FRB NEW INT LAB NAVY NSA NSC OPIC STR TAR TRSY USIA XMB CLASSIFICATION DRAFTED BY: [illegible] DRAFTING DATE: 2/8 PHONE NO: [illegible] CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: ADCM: G3 Lambrakis [illegible] CLEARANCES: SRF (draft) POL: JMartin FORM CS-322 174 1-72 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN A-23 2 II." The selection of former Interior Minister Jamshid Amouzegar as Secretary General of the RPPI is believed by observers to be a clear sign that the Shah expects the party to play an active political and educational role. In the intervening weeks, new personnel have been selected for key first-level jobs and many more new faces are expected. Some changes have been approved in organizational structure which are intended to expand the Party's role in Iranian grass roots politics. This airgram discusses changes in the RPPI in terms of personnel, organization, doctrine, and political dynamics. New Personnel: New Secretary General Amouzegar is a dynamic, experienced hand in Iranian politics who had been considered one of the leading candidates to replace Prime Minister Hoveyda when the latter retires. His selection as Secretary General makes him for all practical purposes the second man in government behind Hoveyda and, unless he unexpectedly stumbles badly, a good candidate to become his eventual successor. Amouzegar is American-trained and has studied the American party system. As head of the Executive Board of the RPPI for the past year, he was one of the principal architects of the party organizational structure, as well as leader of the Progressive "Wing." He is considered a driving worker by his colleagues, rather than a conciliator. In the weeks since his appointment, he has moved energetically to restaff key Party positions with those both loyal to him and skilled in some phase of Party work. Chief among his lieutenants is new Deputy Secretary General Dariush Homayoun, formerly editor and publisher of the leading farsi newspaper, Ayandegan. Homayoun is believed to be an excellent choice by many party workers who feel he has the public relations sensitivity and conciliatory persuasiveness which complement Amouzegar's more forceful qualities. Married to Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi's sister, Homayoun is well-connected in the upper circles of Iranian society, and has been one of the leading activists on the RPPI Political Bureau. He has increasingly shown himself adept and intelli- gent in handling organizational matters, and is fast becoming RPPI's key organization man since he is directing the restaffing of the Party organs. The third key position, chairman of the RPPI Executive Board goes to Dr. Ahmed Qoreishi, also active for the past year in CONFIDENTIAL 175

Tab A 5 HANDLING: CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE REFERENCE NO: A-23 TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE FROM: EMBASSY TEHRAN DATE: 22 Feb 1977 11652: GDS TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: THE RESURGENCE PARTY BEGINS PHASE II REF: A) 76 Tehran 10887 B) 76 Tehran A-133, July 22 C) 75 Tehran A-239, Nov. 30 D) 76 Tehran A-123, July 8 E) 75 Tehran 10338 SUMMARY: With the selection of a new Secretary General, and other principal party officials, the Resurgence Part (RPPI) is preparing to increase its organizational activity and reach out for a greater role in Iranian politics. New Secretary General Jamshid Amouzegar has installed people loyal to himself into key positions, and this new team has a distinct activist and modernist flavor. The major challenge facing new Party leadership is translating Shah's desire for greater participation by all Iranians from word to reality. Success will depend upon the Party's ability to cope with three basic problems: a) provide inducements to participation for interested activists who are somewhat disillusioned because the RPPI is not developing a governing party in traditional terms; b) create middle-level party organi- zations to channel chapter views to national leadership and vice versa; and c) smoothly develop the Party's ability to work with government echelons at all levels without either becoming part of the GOI's administrative machinery or losing all influence. END SUMMARY Some two months after the conclusion (Ref A) of the Second Congress of the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI), the Party's new organizational structure is beginning to take shape and the RPPI is beginning "Phase Enclosures: Party Manifesto MemCon CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION DRAFTED BY: [illegible] DRAFTING DATE: 2/8 PHONE NO: [illegible] CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: ADCM: G3Lambrakis [illegible] REFERENCES: SRF (draft) POL: JMartin FORM CS-322 174 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN A-23 2 II." The selection of former Interior Minister Jamshid Amouzegar as Secretary General of the RPPI is believed by observers to be a clear sign that the Shah expects the party to play an active political and educational role. In the intervening weeks, new personnel have been selected for key first-level jobs and many more new faces are expected. Some changes have been approved in organizational structure which are intended to expand the Party's role in Iranian grass roots politics. This airgram discusses changes in the RPPI in terms of personnel, organization, doctrine, and political dynamics. New Personnel: New Secretary General Amouzegar is a dynamic, experienced hand in Iranian politics who had been considered one of the leading candidates to replace Prime Minister Hoveyda when the latter retires. His selection as Secretary General makes him for all practical purposes the second man in government behind Hoveyda and, unless he unexpectedly stumbles badly, a good candidate to become his eventual successor. Amouzegar is American-trained and has studied the American party system. As head of the Executive Board of the RPPI for the past year, he was one of the principal architects of the party organizational structure, as well as leader of the Progressive "Wing." He is considered a driving worker by his colleagues, rather than a conciliator. In the weeks since his appointment, he has moved energetically to restaff key Party positions with those both loyal to him and skilled in some phase of Party work. Chief among his lieutenants is new Deputy Secretary General Dariush Homayoun, formerly editor and publisher of the leading farsi newspaper, Ayandegan. Homayoun is believed to be an excellent choice by many party workers who feel he has the public relations sensitivity and conciliatory persuasiveness which complement Amouzegar's more forceful qualities. Married to Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi's sister, Homayoun is well-connected in the upper circles of Iranian society, and has been one of the leading activists on the RPPI Political Bureau. He has increasingly shown himself adept and intelli- gent in handling organizational matters, and is fast becoming RPPI's key organization man since he is directing the restaffing of the Party organs. The third key position, chairman of the RPPI Executive Board goes to Dr. Ahmed Qoreishi, also active for the past year in CONFIDENTIAL 175

the Political Bureau. He is a former Dean of National University's Law School, and a recognized Iranian expert on U.S. politics. He spent 13 years in the U.S. studying and teaching, returning to Iran in 1966. The Qoreishi family is one of the old wealthy landowners of Iran. Qoreishi was a sometime-member of the group which drafted the RPPI manifesto, and has long advocated paying Party organizers for full-time Party work. Amouzegar's replacement as head of the Progressive "Wing" of the RPPI will be Minister of State and Plan and Budget. Director Abdol Majid Majidi, who had been earlier mentioned as a possible candidate for the Secretary Generalship. Majidi is another of the new Party leadership who has traveled widely and taken graduate work in the U.S. (economics, Harvard). He is not expected to make any major innovations in the Progressive Wing, but will continue to keep discussion going and use the Wing as a means of preparing and presenting alternative policies to the Party governing bodies. Although not technically at the level of the three officials mentioned above, new RPPI Teasurer Ali Farshchi may be the most important new appointment from the standpoint of functioning party administration, and eventually in terms of power as well. Farshchi replaced Ahmad Kashefi as treasurer, and also took over direction of the financial affairs branch and the RPPI Secretariat (there replacing Ziaeddin Shadman, who remains special assistant to the Prime Minister). Farshchi is a long-time confidant of Secretary General Amouzegar who has been his undersecretary in the Ministry of Interior since August 1974, and according to close friends, has been instructed by Amouzegar to "get control" of the party apparatus from those who previously held office. He remains Interior undersecretary (for which he received special Cabinet permission) and will be one of the key links between the Party organization and the executive branch of the GOI. Since no information has been submitted on Farshchi previously, the following biographic data is provided: Born in 1925 in Tehran, Farshchi received a law degree from Tehran University in 1950 and a B.A. in Business Administration at the University of Pittsburgh in 1961. He served as an assistant prosecutor in the Ministry of Finance; deputy director of the Ministry of Education's Foreign Relations Department; deputy director of procurement for the Ministry of Finance; Director of Finance for Khorasan Province; Chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of Finance; and senior advisor to the Interior Minister before moving to his present job. He is unmarried and is seldom seen at parties. He has traveled to Europe and the U.S., speaks moderately good English and has been decorated with the Order of the Nomayun. Given the close ties between Farschi and Amouzegar, observers here believe his appointment is a sign that Amouzegar plans to take a very active interest in Party evolution, despite his other commitments. On December 30, 1976, Amouzegar named Dr. Aliasgher Nazeri to be Deputy Secretary. General and Head of the Organization branch, Nazeri has been active in Tehran party affairs and is a specialist in organization and management. He has served as a staff expert in organization and procedure on the High Council for Administration and has been head of the social organization section of the Civil Service and Administrative Affairs Organization. Born in 1939, he graduated from, and later lectured at, U.S. universities in political science and public administration. He has held positions in the agriculture ministry and the state transportation organization, as well as being a counselor in the Prime Minister's office. Little is known about his personal life, but he is expected to take third place behind Dariush Homayoun in the Party's formal hierarchy, but behind the others mentioned above in actual power and influence. At the beginning of February, Party Chief Amouzegar appointed five new deputies. These new officials include: Sadeq Kazemi, a Majlis deputy and former Iran Air director of personnel who will be Assistant Secretary General in charge of Social Affairs; Daoud Qajar Mozaffari, the new Assistant Secretary General in charge of the Supervision and Planning Branch; Khosrow Karim Panahi, designated Assistant Secretary General for Training and Research; Manouchehr Pezeshki, who will be Assistant Secretary General in charge of the Party's Inspectorate; and Zia Modarresi, named Secretary of Party Affairs in the Capital. PARTY ORGANIZATION: In a private meeting with the Acting DCM and the reporting officer, Party Deputy Secretary General Homayoun indicated there would be wholesale personnel changes over the next few months. Virtually all of the Party provincial secretaries will be replaced and most of the Party's central headquarters officers. Primary reason for this is that the Executive Board has now approved a standing Party organization of paid officers rather than the all-volunteer

policy that he had been in effect. Four Party professional secretaries have already resigned and the rest will be replaced within a few months. This necessitates replacing many officers who will not be able, or want, to give up their full-time occupations. Homayoun admitted he had been one of the principal advocates of an all-volunteer Party organization but that a year's experience and "perhaps my new position" had changed his mind. Homayoun projects about 100 paid personnel at Party headquarters in Tehran, plus another 2,600 paid locals in the provinces. This would be supplemented by about 10,000 volunteers throughout the country. Homayoun noted he was having difficulty finding qualified people to take the jobs, but the process was just beginning. In December, the RPPI executive board approved a major change in grass roots Party organization. Henceforth, Party chapters (Kanoons) will have between 50 and 100 people rather than 100 to 200 to permit greater discussion at party meetings. Present Party figures give the RPPI approximately 5.4 million enrolled members in 51 thousand chapters, 3,868 of which are in Tehran. Provincial organizations are still lagging and the Kanoons have been grouped into 450 districts for the time being, roughly along provincial lines, Homayoun and several of Amouzegar's junior associates admit that most Party chapters exist in name only. Neither direction from the top nor organization from the bottom has proved sufficient to bring life to basic Party organization. This is an extremely sensitive point with Party officials and the cause of much soul-searching. Part of the difficulty is that the Party's role in the present Iranian political structure is poorly understood. Homayoun has said in public and privately that the Party is not a governing party which is part of the administration. Many Party members have become disillusioned because explanation of this point in the many recent meetings has seemed to place limits on their personal expectations. Party leaders want the Party's role to evolve as a watchdog on government, a source of ideas for policy makers, and a tool for educating the masses, but many, particularly activists, saw the RPPI as a route to governmental power. Homayoun and others, particularly more rank and file Party members, are frankly puzzled by what sort of inducements the Party can offer to politically-minded individuals to secure their adherence and participation. One such inducement will be tighter administration control over candidates for public office. Homayoun has said in press interviews that Party candidates would be screened with respect to their Party activities as well as interest in public affairs. Other ideas CONFIDENTIAL which may be tried will include putting Party groups and units into contact with policy makers and providing for a supervisory function for local Party organizations with respect to village and rural councils. The proposed division between Party and government is likely to break down or change as the Party experiments with various types of activity. This in turn could create tensions between Party and government which could further handicap political integration. Central Headquarters: The RPPI Executive Board has approved changes in basic Party committees at central headquarters. The Public Affairs Division, headed by Assistant Secretary General Sadiq Kazemi, at least on an interim basis, will continue to be in charge of Party publications, but greater emphasis will be placed on intra-Party exchanges of ideas. The Social Affairs Branch will shift its emphasis from concern with Party policy to providing services to various Party groups--students, union, youth. It probably will be significantly involved in exchange of social ideas between central headquarters and the provinces. It will also, at least initially, keep in touch with administrative departments at all levels to help eliminate bottle necks. The Foreign Relations Branch will focus upon organizational work with Iranians abroad and will handle ties with foreign political parties. A new division, Plans and Research, has been created to take over all research functions of the other branches and specifically those assigned to the educational section. This group will prepare teaching materials to be used in Party education programs. The Administrative Branch will remain in charge of administrative meetings, and chapter membership. It will also supervise elections under the direct control of Party Treasurer and Secretariat Head Farshchi. The present inspectorate will lose many of the functions it was supposed to exercise over governmental subunits and will concentrate on supervising Party administration. In his conversation with Embassy officers, Homayoun privately admitted that the Party's massive attempt to monitor all government performances had been a failure. Future efforts to play the Party's watchdog role will be conducted primarily by

local organs with focus to the governmental units they parallel. For example, a Party local council would follow the evolution of city or rural district administrations; the Party personnel committees would perform similar functions with respect to the Provincial Governor General and his subordinates. Most Party leaders agree with Homavoun's analysis of prior failure, and several go even further, suggesting it will be difficult for local Party groups to perform a serious watchdog function until they are much better organized. The Education Branch will be revitalized and stripped of its research functions (see above) and focus on providing both theoretical lectures and exposure to practical experience at Party seminars. Over the past months, the RPPI has held seminars for all provincial administrators, incoming local council officers (elected in October), professional Party leaders in 16 provinces, and a number of specialized seminars for university professors, labor officials, etc. Amouzegar and Homayoun have used these to impress their conception of the Party upon Party officials. Auxiliary groups have been commissioned by the Executive Board to study educational programs and subjects to be brought up at educational sessions. Other Party Activities: Despite the publicity attending Majidi's election to replace Amouzegar as coordinator of the progressive wing, talk of the wings virtually disappeared from public and private discussions until recently when an announcement was made that wing discussions will be held in public. It is clear that for the next six months, focus will be on central Party activities and efforts to revitalize local Party administration. Homayoun believes it will take at least two years to have a fully functioning effective Party apparatus in place. Other estimates vary from one year to five, depending upon conceptions of "effective." Resurgence Party Congress: RPPI's Second Congress was held in late October and was considered successful because it produced mass participation, elected new Party leadership (see ref A), and legitimized Party organization. Delegates from all provinces were rallied to greater activity by the usual paraphernalia of Party congresses-speeches, committee meetings, etc. The primary rationale for the congress was to elect a new secretary general (which it did) and to approve the new ideological manifesto which had been under development for over a year. It confirmed as permanent the interim Executive Board and Political Bureau. Party Doctrine: Despite much fanfare and considerable effort in preparation, the philosophy of the Iranian revolution has become the major non-event of the past six months. (See a) attachment No. 1 for the Embassy's informal translation of the Party manifesto and (b) Qoreishi-Mills-Stempel MemCon of May 10, 1976 which gives drafting committee.) The manifesto itself discusses the origin of the White Revolution, the central set of specific proposals which the Party supports. The logistics of the Iranian's drive to modernize itself under the monarchy, the need to revitalize mass units, and the intellectual values of the revolution are treated at length. The basic values as listed in the manifesto are 1) elimination of class mentality, in this instance the conflict between peasants and leaders; 2) nationalization of vital resources such as water, forests, and oil; 3) political education to promote faith in the basic social, political and cultural values and stimulate political consciousness to defend the Revolution from plots and propaganda both from within and without; and 4) evolution of democratic participation which seeks true individual freedom within democratic discipline and distinguishes between liberty and unbridled disregard for the law and public good. This philosophy will provide the fundamental basis for the Party's educational political program--which the Executive Board has decreed will be called "national" education, not "political" education--over the next few years. As published, the manifesto offers few if any new insights and leaves open to both the regime and the Party the possibility of attempting various pragmatic approaches to specific issues. This approach combined with the inherent cynicism of Iranians toward national political pronouncements possibly explains why there has been no overwhelming public or academic interest in the manifesto. The Shah himself was interested in this manifesto from the very beginning. He met with the drafting committee at the beginning of its work and near the end to review its progress. One member of the committee told us in confidence that the Shah stressed the need to accommodate conflict within the Party system. The Shah even used the term "a natural dialectic" between the opposing forces to describe the evolution of Iran during his reign. This threw the committee into a tizzy because of its hint of Marxian analysis. The source thought this was one reason why Iranian publishers and book sellers reported a distinct upswing of the works of German dialectic philosopher, Frederick Hegel, over the past year.

This is about as close as Iranians in groups are allowed to get to Karl Mark without running a foul of Iran's anti-communism laws. POLITICAL DYNAMICS: The major question facing the RPPI remains as reported in ref. B: will the Shah permit the Party to play an effective enough role so that Iranians will perceive it as a legitimate and effective channel for political participation? Two sources who have engaged in various discussions with the Shah on Party matters both say the Shah is prepared for the Party to play an effective role and is willing to accept the risk this would entail as long as he perceives Party leaders are a) loyal and b) competent. The Shah told a group of senior academics that he has no desire to turn the RPPI and the country over to a group of second-rate politicians who would be incapable of governing. The Shah feels substantial political education and several years practice will be necessary before people are sufficiently knowledgeable to make a fully democratic system work. In the meantime, he appears to have accepted the views of his American-trained Party leaders that a gradual, incremental approach to political development offers the best hope of success. Such a gradualistic approach offers both benefits and problems. As Homayoun has noted, one major problem will be inducing the always-skeptical Iranian citizen to participate in a party which, at least initially, has no governmental role. Other Party activists urge the Party to begin its watchdog and supervisory function in the local levels where people will be able to deal more actively earlier with issues that interest them directly. This appears to be the approach the new Party leadership is taking. If the government and the Party can avoid stimulating too high-flown expectations, yet still generate participation, this would permit an educational process to go on for several years before the government has to confront major differences between itself and the RPPI at a national level--perhaps over such questions as the relative allocation of development funds between provinces, or the relative division between defense and civilian development spending. Now and for the foreseeable future, government-Party coordination is being carried out through the RPPI Political Bureau, which have both government and Party representation (see ref B and E). New Executive Board Chairman Qoreishi is expected to play a major role in this arena by virtue of his interest in the subject. As and if Party groups develop strength at provincial and local levels, coordination will be carried on between Party and government officials on an ad hoc basis. This is one of the major uncertainties facing the new RPTI leadership then as its organizational activities get underway. Their leaders must find ways to quickly build up middle-level structures to enable them to understand, control, and guide Party activities. Central Party organs are strong, and some progress has been made at the chapter level, but the connecting links have thus far been almost completely absent. A separate but related matter is the increasing governmental emphasis put on decentralization. Party concerns over resource allocation and administration in local areas will be of little importance as long as most decisions are made in Tehran. Over the past several weeks several government ministers, including Interior Minister Moinil, have said their immediate plans call for increasing decentralization of line responsibility to the provinces. Specific measures include transfer of certain budgetary responsibilities to provincial administrations; reassignment of certain ministry offices from Tehran to provincial governmental offices; and granting of greater latitude in hiring and firing of the professional officials. The combination of new hands at the Party helm and greater governmental efforts toward decentralization suggest that the coming six months to a year will continue to feature quiet organizational and educational work. Experiments will undoubtedly be tried in one or several provinces in the areas of Party organization, governmental decentralization, and party-government relations. The number and successes of such efforts will provide some fundamental indicators of the long-term prospects of the RPPI as an institutional feature of the Iranian political scene. MIKLOS

CONFIDENTIAL RO-3 Department of State A-151 FROM : Amembassy TENAN E.O. 11652: GDS (A) A-19 of January 25, 1975; (B) Tehran 2039; (C) A-42 of March 5, 1975; (D) Escudero-Sadr MEMCON of March 11, 1975; (E) A-71 of April 11, 1975; (F) Tehran 4150; (G) Tehran 4312 SUMMARY: This report offers a analysis of the motivations behind the consequences of the Shah's March 2 announcement of the transformation of Iran into a one-party state through creation of the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI). We believe the action stemmed largely from the Shah's desire for greater controls and reduced internal criticism, even though one might consider such a step unnecessary in a period of burgeoning Iranism self-confidence and nationalism. He also wanted to include in the political process more capable of man�ism who felt themselves excluded due to their membership in opposition parties. He addition, the move is in keeping with the Shah's oft-stated characterization of Western-style democracy as primitive, inefficient and unsuited to Iranian cultural and historical experience. There are many indications that the creation of a single party was also a step by the Shah to reduce the growing power of his Prime Minister and, regardless of intentions, this appears to have been one of the results. The RPPI stimulated interest and participation in the June 20 general elections among these the are politically aware, but for the moment the Shah's abrupt vote-face is likely to make little or no difference to the man in the street. Enc locutro; 1. Constitution of Eastobheim Party 2. Executive Board of the RFF CONFIDENTIAL 1 184 21877773775 DCM:JM1K100 GE:GE:GCAVV (AP) Institutional/Security Viewpoint: It seems contrary to the trend of presenting institutional development through evolution of somewhat independent institutions as it signals the Baba's return to active intervention at lower levels. This imbibits the process by which political institutions can learn to function without his guidance. END SUMMARY. We are inclined to accept at face value reported Imperial and COI statements that the multi-party system, as it functioned in Iran, failed to enlist the services of many eligible individuals in Iranian political life. The case party system will eliminate this problem, although it has not yet shown much capacity to motivate public enthusiasm for its activities. In addition, the Sina's distance for even the limited criticism permitted under the multi-party system was a major factor. In his decision to do away with Iran's time opposition. Although he had publicly said he preferred a multi-party arrangement, the Shah had been unable to develop an opposition party which was either convincing or acceptable. His expertise with the Narden Party's last two secretaries-general, Ali Haqi Kani and the late Nasser Ameri, both of whom were primarily dismissed when their criticism irritated the Sina or Prime Minister Noveyda, evidently helped to convince him that a tolerable opposition party could not function in Iran's controlled political environment. Another factor in the Shah's decision may have been his well known view that Western democracy is permissive, inefficient and does not work too well even in those countries where it was invented. Its status democracy as a concept largely aligns to the cultural and political experience of Iran which has only attained greatness under highly centralized authoritarian regents. In this context the Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (EPPI) can be seen as another step in a trend toward increased control of this society. Additional indications of a higher attitude toward those who operate outside of the Iranian establishment include last year's dismissal of journalists with questions about backgrounds, the terrible closure of various small newspapers and misuse, and the "get tough" approach toward the proposed student event which lasted from the beginning of December 1974 until the end of March 1975. It is fact, the student problem and the 1973 anti-Shah plot of journalists and intellectuals may have been catalysts for the Shah's decision, as there are plans for the creation of party committee within each university faculty. For

COA FIDNATION whatever reason the Shah has made it plain that he intends to expand his controls to all areas of Iranian life, denying to intellectuals and others their much-used tactic of what one observer has termed "contentions non-commitment." The RPPI provides a mechanism for challenging political participation as well as a legal basis for the identification of unwanted oppositionists. It emphasizes the Shah's stated determination that those who refuse to accept Iran as he defines it must choose either prison, exile or obscurity. The new party has subsumed the existing four parties into it. This, coupled with frequent newspaper criticism of the old parties for no-te [?] im and squabbling over artificial issues, and of the Iran Novin in particular for failing to rally the people, may alienate some party stivalarts. However, the RPFI will offer positions to many national figures from other parties. Much of its organisation is likely to be based on that of the Iran Novin so that there should be few former approachiks who are not given a role to play. Both as individuals and as members of various organizations, Iranians are flocking to join the RPFI and to declare their faith in Iran's new political trinity of Monarchy, Constitution and the Shah-People Revolution. Still, we doubt that the Shah believes their support is totally sincere or that he expects the RPFI to be any more effective than its predecessors at inspiring the people toward political participation. Following his traditional Persian approach, he seems prepared to insist on form without much regard for substance. Press reports to the contrary, the Shah's announcement was received by most of the Embassy contacts with a wave of cynicism and confusion which has not yet fully subsided. The arbitrary nature of the announcement tended to reinforce the prevailing Iranian mood of skepticism and cynicism about virtually everything connected with politics. To ordinary Iranians we have talked with shopkeepers, small merchants, and others—(as distinct from party activists whose personal interests were involved), the previous political parties were ineffective as a means of political expression and so far they seem to anticipate a similar result from the new party. Internationally, especially among those in the United States and Europe who tended to be critical of the Shah's regime, the reaction has been more negative. Although the abolition of Iran's multi-party system has unnecessarily strengthened his foreign critics, we doubt that the Shah care. He seems to see his own position and that of his nation made so strong by virtue of oil and by his own successful record of leadership that criticism of his internal policies will either be sufied or of no consequence. In this he may be right, although international reaction may increase the difficulties of inducing (continued page 4) CONTRACT N° 1996 Lose For Hoveyda: skilled Iranian expatriates to return to Iran to help alleviate the nation's shortage of trained manpower. It is possible to interpret the creation of the RPPI as a move by the Shah to curb the growing power of Prime Minister Hoveyda. The background for this consideration and its effect on the Shah's role in daily politics were discussed in A-71 of April 11 and A-75 of April 16. More and more it appears that a diminution of Hoveyda's position has been an important result of the formation of the RPPI. If, as seems likely, this slippage was intended by the Shah, it would not be the first time that he has moved against a minister who appeared to be outstripping the limits set for him. Historical Parallels In 1962 All Amini, the last Iranian Prime Minister to enjoy a degree of power independent of the Shah, supported in compromise between the Throne and the National Front which would guarantee them more than one-fifth of the seats in the Majles and at least one cabinet post. Despite its disunity the Front believed that it need only wait to have all of Iran fall into its lap, and the compromise was rejected. The Shah seized upon this to dismiss his Prime Minister, who was known to favor the reduction of the role of the Monarch in Iranian politics, and a series of more pliable successors followed. In 1962-1963 the Shah entrusted his land reform program, which later became the core of the Shah-People Revolution, to the ambitious and capable Hassan Arsanjani. Through skillful use of widely broadcast speeches and frequent rural trips, Arsanjani identified himself with land reform in the minds of the peasantry. He parlayed his swelling popularity into political capital through the formation of the Peasants' Party. At that point the Shah called a halt to Arsanjani's ambitions. Ever a shrewd judge of character, the Shah shipped Arsanjani off to Ross as ambassador with an unlimited expense account. Although he vowed he would return, Arsanjani soon succumbed to the Lardishments of Roman living and ceased to be a factor in Iranian politics. It is by no means certain that the Shah considered Hoveyda a threat. He probably regards Hoveyda as a more useful tool than he did Amini or Arzanjani, which accounts for

CONFITFINAL his record ten and a half years as Prime Minister. However, both the Embassy and SRF have reported evidence that the strength and corruption of Hoveyda's Iran Novin Party were major factors convincing the Shah that the multi-party system was not functioning as he wished and must be replaced. As the RPPI took shape following its inaugural Congress April 30 to May 2, convincing evidence accumulated which pointed to a Hoveyda loss. In his March 2 speech announcing the new party system, the Shah confirmed Hoveyda as Party Secretary General for two years (later increased to four), but the Shah made it clear that Hoveyda would not have the power to appoint his principal Party subordinates. (Hoveyda has stated that he hopes not to remain Secretary General for the full term. It is rumored that he will retain the Prime Ministership but be replaced as Secretary-General by Interior Minister Amouzegar soon after the elections.) The RPPI Congress: The shifting power balance within Iranian party politics was perhaps signalled by the election of Naqrollah Entezam, a long-time associate of Hoverda's powerful rival, Court Minister Assadollah Alam, as Congress Chairman. Further evidence of Hoverda's decline is offered by the events leading to the adoption of the Party's Constitution. Working through the drafting groups, Hoverda obtained a draft constitution which, from the point of view of control of the Party, contrived to have most of the power assigned to the Secretary-General (himself) and to a Committee of Secretaries which he would appoint. The Secretary-General was given broad powers to delimit the authority of other Party units, to control Party finances and appoint and dismiss various Party officials. Moreover, the draft made it plain that his powers were not limited to these areas but included whatever authority was necessary to administer Party affairs. The Committee of Secretaries obviously intended to be a creature of the Secretary-General, was to have virtually all the remaining policy-making, implementary and regulatory powers within the Party hierarchy, including control of lower-level Committees of Secretaries (headed by an Organization Secretary also appointed by the Secretary-General) for each of the rural RPP's area units. During the course of the Party Congress, which was characterized by some of the frankness of the government performance and policies heard in from in recent years. CONFIDENTIAL Interior Minister Jamshid Amouzegar proposed an alter-mate draft which would have reduced the power of the Secretary-General, with a great deal of power remaining within various Party bureaus. In the end the Amouzegar version was adopted with few important changes (see Enclosure 1 for text of final Party Constitution.) It gives power to both the Secretary-General and Party bureaus, particularly the Executive Board, and reflects the system of checks and balances based on personal rivalries which permeates the Iranian political scene. In the final version adopted by the Congress, the proposed system of Committees of Secretaries was abolished and the Secretary-General, still the Party's highest executive official, retains the power to appoint up to three Deputy Secretaries-General and various other RAPID executive officers. He will supervise allocation and expenditures of Party funds, although the Executive Board controls the auditing function. The Secretary-General will appoint a principal Secretaries-General and, through them, will exercise supervision over the Party's entire rural network. As Prime Minister, Hoveyda is also Chairman of the RPPI Political Bureau which must coordinate Party and governmental activities and review "national questions" referred to it by the Executive Board or Hoveyda. However, the Executive Board elects a majority of the Political Bureau. On the other hand, the Executive Board has principal responsibility for implementation of Party resolutions; review and approval of nominees for election to Parliament and to the rural Party councils; approval of by-laws, the agenda of the Party Congress, and the Party budget as proposed by the Secretary-General; and establishment of a supervisory commission whose authority is limited to reporting to the Executive Board on any Party matter. Obviously, in order to assure himself of control of the Party, Hoveyda would have to control the Executive Board as well as the Secretary-Generalship. But Jemshid Amoumegaz, one of Hoveyda's rivals, was elected Executive Board Chairman and Farhang Mehr Channefler of Pahlavi University and generally regarded as a protégee of Court Minister Alam, was named to one of the Deputy Chairman posts. The other Deputy Chairman is Mr. Malmaz Afkuemi, a leading feminist and a stalking house for Princess Ashraf. Interestingly, the two Board Members are Mehdi Ghasemi, Norman member of the Central Committee of the outlawed

Tudoh (Communist) Party and Dr. Housain Tajadod who, according to SRF, has close contacts with the Soviet. Dr. Ahmad Ghoreshi, a member of the Executive Board, has informed us that personality conflicts did not enter into the creation of the RFFI Constitution; rather, the delegates were motivated by a desire to produce the most democratic and workable document possible to ensure that the new Party has a sound popular base. While this is possible, it does not square with our understanding of Iranian politics as a highly personalized competitive affair. Despite his losses, it is too soon to write off Hoveyda, who has several advantages denied his rivals. The Iran Novin Party joined the RPPI on waste, giving the new organization instant expertise based on a host of activists loyal to Hoveyda. In addition, former Iran Novin members in the countryside were in crucial positions for the administrative control of the national elections. This power transfer has not gone unnoticed, however, and the RPPI received instructions, apparently from the Shah, to severely limit the participation of former Iran Novin stalwarts in the Party Congress. In any discussion of Hoveyda's assets, the name Parvis Sabeti keeps coming up. Sabeti has been close to Hoveyda all his adult life and is presently Chief of Department Three in SAVAK, in charge of internal security. Like Hoveyda, Sabeti and his family would support a reduction of Imperial power (see A-75 of April 16) and it was Sabeti's office which, in the past, issued final clearances and recommendations on all candidates for political office, enabling Hoveyda to obtain clearance for several individuals of questionable background whom he has installed in his Cabinet. However, it appears that the Shah entrusted his personal intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Hossein Fardoust, with the clearance task for candidates in the Parliamentary elections, a move perhaps intended to undercut the Prime Minister. It seems that Hoveyda attempted where possible to avoid the new political organization to suit himself but enjoyed only limited success. Hoveyda retains his considerable power base within the Prime Ministry and his status could rise or fall in the coming months, but at least for the time being, regardless of whether or not it was so intended by the Shah, Hoveyda's position vis-a-vis his rivals seem to have worsened. Election: General elections took place June 20, come two months earlier than normal. There were multiple candidates for all seats in Parliament, all of them pre-approved by provincial EPPI Councils, the Executive Board and the security authorities (Tehran 5029). Perhaps heartened by the Shah's personal identification with the new party, the initial response to the election was far larger than usual and over 10,000 people declared themselves candidates for the 268 Majors and 30 Senate seats at issue. Some 841 of these were approved and permitted to campaign but exactly half of the incumbent Majors membership and 11 out of 30 Senators were not accepted as candidates. Though lackluster and bereft of issues by the regime's instruction that oil, foreign policy and the Shah-People Revolution were not subjects for debate, the campaign was more active than anything seen in Iran in recent years. It featured televised statements by candidates (usually limited to career stannations and pledges of good international), posters, car-mounted redics and, in Tehran, the creation of voting blocks based on the Tehran Bus Company or membership in labor unions and guilds. Registration was as nearly mandatory as the government could make it. Prime Minister Hoveydn stated several times that failure to go to the polls would be considered a disservice to the new party and, more importantly, those who did pick up their electoral cards received a stamp in their all-important identity card. Some whose cards lacked the stamp were refused such essential government services as exit views. In the end, more than 6.8 million Iranians registered to vote. However, as the balloting was secret there was no way the GOI could ensure that all registrants voted and the final count, though probably larger than any other voter turnout in Iranian history, was well below half of those regists. For the 244 Majics contacts (out of 268) for which we have data, 201 or 82% of the 1975 [?] received fewer votes than did the victors in the 1971 national election. In many cases the totals were 1 to 1/5 of the vote cast in 1971. In Tehran the lowest winning vote for any of the 27 deputies elected in 1971 was 517,218. The biggest Tehran winner in 1975 could garner only 238,294 votes and the lowest winning vote was 40,835 or somewhat less than 1/12 of the comparable 1971 figure.

CONFIDENTIAL Yet the government announced that 5.1 million people voted for the Engine candidates as compared to 5.9 million in the 1971 elections, and in fact, we believe that more people voted in 1975 than in 1971 although the 5.1 million total is obviously incorrect. In the carefully rigged elections beginning in the mid-sixties, virtually no case voted and the electoral officials simply announced arbitrary totals grossly inflated to suit the prestige of the pre-elected winner. In the 1975 elections, which were perhaps the freest in modern Iranian history, accurate totals were published for individual contests and they fall far short of the Alice in Wonderland figure-dream-up by election officials for past contests. Several disgruntled leopre have complained to us about unfair tactics including the completion by agents for the winning candidate of ballots for illiterate voters, interference by time name agents with voters at the polling place and ballot box stuffing. It is clear that the elections were not totally free; obviously a certain subjective vimping took place when the candidates were selected and a History of Interior official has informed us that more than 10% of the elections were rigged through the infrastructure of Count Hinaldo Am. But reports of prosecutions and immoralism of ballots following improper practices by candidates and electoral officials testify to the government's desire to run a clean show. More significantly, the election results suggest a minimum of pressure from Tehran. Iran Equal, long time Deputy from Conabad and a letter of HECC Naming Director and former Prime Minister Nanzuhair Egal, got only 40 votes and other prominent intolerants ca the parliamentary scene such as Muhammad Ali Rahim, Piniolinh Sadr and Ahmad Rafii alone lost. Those were people of some standing in Tehran but with less affinity for their constitutions and its means unlikely they would have lost had the capital fined the vote. Based on information on recently available, it appears only 40 of the 260 of the 200s in the 1000s and 11 of the 30000 CONFIDENTIAL before patterns, if there are any, can be determined. In any event, changes in the electoral process in no way alter the fact that the Parliament, however constituted, is a rubber stamp body with no influence in any significant area of policy formulation or implementation. The Iranians we talk to realms this and it reinforces the cynicism with which they view politics in general, regardless of whether or not they perceive the recent elections as fair. The Future: It is possible that the RPPI will turn out to be an inefficient political catch-all including every aspect of national life and thereby be meaningless as a political organ. However, we believe the Shah intends that the new party should serve to further extend his political control throughout Iranian society. In either case it is important for the Shah that the new organization not be under the personal control of Hoveyda or any other individual. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a single man could gain control of the RPPI because the Shah, in a typically Persian manner, has created an organization with built-in conflicts: its constitution will not against one-man control and this tendency is reinforced by the inclusion of such high-ranking personal rivals as Hoveyda, Alam, Amouagarr, Minister of Economy and Finance, Amsary and Tehran University Chancellor Nahsvaadi. This divided and competitive leadership may diminish the efficiency of the RPPI by fostering internal factionalism. Indeed, the Shah may have foreseen this when he forecast the formation of party "wings" or factions in his March 2 announcement. Given the nature of Iranian politics it appears unlikely that any wings which may form within the Party will be based on ideological differences. Instead, they will probably be made up of the personal followers of powerful contenders for position within the RPPI itself, just as contending part(s) within Iran's former military party system were composed of the personal supporters of their leaders. This divided situation should make it necessary to refer most disputes to the Shah for reconstituting imperial direction of the Party leadership. ELAGN1FICANCOY The most significant respect of the establishment of the R&D may be that it cannot to signal the reversal of the Shukl's policy of several years standing on becoming less active in the day-to-day activities of Iranian politics. This policy and the rapid pace of Iran's development had aided the evolution of several separate person centers all of which had an interest in maintaining national stability.

CORF ID NTXAL A..151 from TEHRAN 1987.11.08.20 (see Ref E). The Iran Novin Party was one of these but now has been replaced by a larger, less homogenous organization which, at least initially, will remain under the Shah's control and be less independent. This seems likely to reduce the Party's capacity to contribute to stability after the Shah leaves the scene. Initially the creation of a single political party will have little effect on the average Iranians. The former opposition parties were so ineffective that Iran was already a one-party state in all but none. The Shah made, and will continue to make, all important policy decisions. In many ways he has simply regularized the existing situation. In doing so, however, he has stripped away part of the facade of participation in power which is so important to Iran and Iranians. It is difficult to see what advantages he hopes to gain by doing so apart from increasing his own control over the political forces at work in the society. Department of State FROM : Amembassy TEHRAN E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PGOV, PINT, IE XXXX April 11, 1975 The Recent Evolution of Power in Iran (A) A-99 of June 30, 1974: E-10 of June 28, 1975; (C) A-20 of January 4, 1975 SUMMARY: The Iranian structure of power has the development over the last decade of an absurd, firm and autocratic monarch. During several years as the nation has become over, limited centers of power have which the Shah has not chosen on the exercise of continuing day-to-day power, big business and industry, and the capital party system, and one of the military, are examined to continue to develop in states could make a significant and continuity of the power to become by whatever man is interested to reduce the development of the political party, especially in a large, all-party into a small, small, 1. The Shah and the Ramares in Asia During the past decade the Asian population has increased a large-scale-to-life change, a return, deciduous who charts his nation's growth and all levels of activity to ensure that CO271037X11 47772

CONFIDENTIAL that course. As his experience and self assurance have grown, and as requested older advisors such as General Yazdanpanah have gradually left the scene, the Shah has turned less frequently to others for advice on policy matters. Some observers therefore have assumed that he is isolated from reality; this is not the case. He has carefully maintained numerous channels of direct access to himself from a wide range of official and private individuals and through this traditional, personalized network he obtains the information on which to base his decisions. It is at the policy level that the Shah appears to make decisions in isolation, in part because he feels there is no one in the inner circle with his own breadth or depth of knowledge on whom he can consistently rely, but also because it is doubtful that any remain, with the exception of the Express, Princess Ashraf and Court Minister Alam, who are willing to propose a course of action which the Shah may not like or suggest to him that any of his decisions may be ill-advised. Now, largely as a result of the success of the Shah's policies, Iran has developed to a stage of complexity where no single individual, however gifted, can make all the day-to-day decisions required to keep the society moving. As a matter of necessity various limited centers of power or vested interest have evolved which, within their limited areas of operation and in the context of overall policy guidelines previously laid down by the Shah, exercise day-to-day control of their own affairs. Through their often unfettered ability to implement the Shah's broad domestic policies, these groups have acquired a freedom of action which, though limited, amounts to the acquisition of power through implementation. These changes in the internal Iranian power structure are the result of national social evolution; the Shah did not consciously delegate implementing authority to these power centers but neither, until recently, has he opposed their development. In fact, for a time it appeared that he approved, as the evolution of centers capable of independent action seems to fit with what we believe was his intention to create a more remote, conceptualizing, policy-making role for future monarchs, allowing for livelier competition at lower levels. He do not believe that these power centers represent a challenge to the present Shah, although in the case of the Iran Novin Party he may have perceived a potential future threat. In any case, he can intervene among them on specific matters as he chooses, even though he cannot exercise total control over all of them all of the time. Even before the development of independent power centers, Iran's traditionally unresponsive and inefficient bureaucracy constituted COMP IDENTIAL practical restraint on the Shah's capacity to exercise detailed control). This report briefly examines one actual power center, big business and industry, one former power center, the political party system, and one potentially independent power center, the military. a. Big Business and Industry II. Power Centres: Ever since the beginning of the Shah's drive to industrialize Iran in the 1950s, big business and industry have benefitted in a host of ways from government policy designed to encourage the accumulation of private investment capital. In a restrictive political climate many of Iran's brightest and most energetic people have gravitated to the economic sphere where individual initiative, within the loose parameters of national development, was often highly rewarded. This trend has reached the stage where big business and industry have become so large and complex that day-to-day operations cannot be closely monitored by the government and the owners and managers have begun to yield considerable power in their own right. An example of the evolution of the independence of this sector was the Lajevardi-DuPont deal for a $500 million fiber plant in Isfahan. The deal was negotiated and signed without reference to or influence from the Court, which would have been impossible only a few years ago. Businessmen have commented seriously to Embassy officers that it is no longer necessary for them to "own" a minister or senator to get things done—now their names and positions (and wealth) carry the power and prestige to make things happen. In addition big business and industry once supplied large amounts of money to the Iran Novin Party and will probably continue such practices with its successor the Iran Resurgence Party, creating linkages and enlarging the parameters of independent action for both. The most important aspects of Iran's recent development have been economic, with the result that big business and industry have been among the chief beneficiaries of the Shah's policies. For this reason they have been a major pillar of the present regims and, though they usually have tended to avoid politics in the formal sense, they could be expected to give valuable financial support

CONFIDENTIAL to any future regime which offered stability and similar policies. b. The Party System: The Iran Novin Party was not a mass political party in the Western sense nor was it likely to become one. However, it was a mass organization of a kind and size which, with the exception of the outlawed Tudeh Party, had never before existed in Iran. Its primary attraction was as a route to the top for its members, but more importantly, it also offered a vehicle for the expansion of the influence and power of its lenders, particularly Prime Minister Hoveydu. With its nationwide organization tied into local power structures, its contacts with big business, its close relationship with the security organization, its patronage power and its success in filling virtually all significant government positions with Party members, Iran Novin wielded genuine power. It had no influence over foreign policy but during its decade in power and in its role as "guardian" of the Shah-People Revolution it defined the Revolution through implementation of its broad list of goals. Most of the people in high places within the Party structure used their positions to Hoveyda who, during his more than ten years as Prime Minister, built a formidable power base for himself within the Party. He institution-aligned his power base when he became Iran Novin Secretary-General at the Party's January 1975 Congress. He demonstrated it through frequent trips to the provinces where he encouraged ongoing development projects, authorized new ones and received petitions from the people in the manner of the Shams of old. Hoveyda is known to believe that an absolute monarchy in Iran is an anachronism, but he is also a realist who has founded a successful political career on subservience and the careful restriction of his power to a level not displeasing to the Shah.

CONFIDENTIAL has conferred great strength on the Shah in time of trouble; it paid off handsomely, for example, in 1963 when troops stood firm and fired on street mobs protesting land reforms and voting rights for women. However, like the rest of Iran's dynamic evolving society, the military has experienced, and is experiencing, inevitable changes pointing toward possible differences in attitude which may become more significant in the future. FIFTEEN years ago many more government posts were in the hands of seconded or retired military officers than is the case today. Upper class Iranian families, which once saw the military as a route to the top for their sons, do so no longer. Many educated Iranian youth find compulsory military service loathsome and go to great lengths to avoid it, usually without success. Ten years ago all officers promoted beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel were personally approved by the Shah and their promotions were based on some personal connection with HIM. This instilled an intense degree of personal loyalty within the officers, not toward the institution of the monarchy but toward the incumbent himself. As the military expanded it was no longer possible to promote only those with a personal tie to the Shah and promotions are beginning to be made on a merit examination basis, although the Shah still must approve all senior officer promotions. As Iran's military machine continues to grow in size and to acquire more sophisticated equipment, it seems probable that Iran will have to place greater value on the education and learning capacity necessary to operate such equipment than on security clearances even though those most opposed to the present regions are found among the students and educated elite. This need and competition for talent with the private sector will also accelerate the trend to recruit educable young men from poorer, often rural, families who would be less likely to advance through civilian channels and who, along with their close relatives, have benefitted least from the Shah's reforms. One could argue that these lower class recruits would be grateful for the improvement in their status—progress they could not have made without the Shah-People Revolution—but often this has not been the case in similar circumstances in other developing countries. Rather, we CONFIDENTIAL believe that this change is producing a sizeable fraction among the officer corps who, though generally loyal to the institution of monarchy, no longer see their primary loyalty to the present monarch himself. In addition, a smaller number believes that the monarchy itself is out-moded but that there is no practicable alternative for Iran for the moment. We emphasize that this does not mean that the Iranian military are disloyal. On the contrary, we believe they would rally around the Throne in a confrontation with any rival save perhaps one of their own. What it does mean is that the traditional system of personalized controls, rewards and rivalries directed from above is becoming less applicable to control of Iran's increasingly sophisticated and complex military structure, just as in other areas of society. If this trend continues the tendency of the military toward independent action should increase, particularly in uncertain circumstances such as those which would prevail if the Shah were to die with the Crown Prince still a minor. III. Conclusion: With the exception of the introduction of the single party system, we view this evolution of the Iranian power structure as a favorable development for U.S. interests. As long as the Shah lives these power centers are likely to play decidedly subordinate roles on the Iranian stage. Immediately after his passing however, in a situation in which the new Shah will not at first have his father's unquestioned capacity to intervene as he will, the power centers' ability to act may increase dramatically. This will be especially so if they have enjoyed some degree of independence prior to his death. Most Iranians agree with the goals the Shah has set for Iran, though some dispute his methods, and the power centers discussed in this report have benefitted from his policies to a greater extent than most. With the possible exception of the IRP, these centers have a vested interest in the status quo and would be likely to help maintain stability during the transitional period of an untroubled succession. In this regard the creation of the Iran Resurgence Party appears to have been a retrograde step in that the new political organization is likely to be insufficient, overburdened by its own weight, divided against itself and far less independent than the

CONFIDENTIAL Yeo 8 of 8 A-71 from TEHRAN Iran Novin was. Thus, it seems unlikely that the IRP would be able to provide much support for stability once Mohammad Rena Pahlavi is gone. However, given general agreement on the succession of Crown Prince Roma, which seems likely if the Shah carries out his publicly announced plan to abdicate at some point in favor of his son, the continuing evolution of quasi-independent power structures may suggest at least a partial solution to the problem of ensuring a stable succession to an absolute ruler. GOI CABINET MEMBERS Amir Abbas Hoveyda Prime Minister (MA, Brussels; PhD, Paris) * Hushang Ansary Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance (MS: UK, US, Japan) Mansur Ruhani Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Tehran; study, London) Abbas Ali Khalatbary Minister of Foreign Affairs (PhD, Paris) General Reza Azimi Minister of War (Military Academy, Tehran) Amir Qassem Moini Minister of Interior (US; UK) Gholam Reza Kianpur Minister of Justice (LLB, Tehran) Manuchehr Azmoun Minister of Labor (PhD, Germany) * Manuchehr Ganji Minister of Education (study, Kentucky; Cambridge; PhD, Geneva) Ebrahim Faranbaknshian Minister of Roads and Transportation (MA, Wisconsin; PhD, Colorado) * Karim Pasha Bahadori Minister of Information and Tourism (PhD, California) * Qassem Motamedi Minister of Science and Higher Education (MD, Tehran; study, California) * Shoja-eddin Sheikh-ol zadeh Minister of Health and Sanitation (MD, US) * Parviz Hekmat Minister of Energy (MA, USG) * Homayun Jaber-Ansary Minister of Housing and Town Planning (study, US) Karim Motamedi Farrokh Najmabadi Minister of P.T.T. (Tehran) Minister of Industries and Mines (Manchester)

* Mehrdad Pahlbod Minister of Art and Culture (study, California; Switzerland) * Jamshid Amouzegar Minister of State (Washington; Cornell) * Abdol Majid Majidi Minister of State and Head of the Plan and Budget Organization (Harvard; PhD, Paris) Fereidoun Mahdavi Minister of State (PhD, Hamburg) Safi Asfia Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs (Paris) Hadi Hedayati Minister of State (PhD, Paris) Zia-eddin Shadman Minister of State and Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (Tehran) * Mohammad Yaganeh Minister of State for Economic Affairs (PhD, Columbia) Mohammad Nassiri Minister of State (Aix-en Provence; PhD, Paris) * Mrs. Mahnaz Afkhami Minister of State for Women's Affairs (High School, Washington, D.C.; BA, MA, Colorado) * U.S. Trained A-080 COORDINAT/NORCESE TREIS Tab A8 FOL/M-3 Department of State amb amb FROM Assombasby KHEHAN pol-2 DENT PLEASE PASS SECOND, WASED FOR ACTION. PLEASE PASS FOR LESSING ADDRESS FOR KNO; CEUSA, HAVING; CIO, WASED; CEF, WASING; UBEINGER, VALENGER GR; DIA, WASING or-2 XXXX May 6, 1976 usdao defrep maag-2 cru ^{7} 7/4 XXXXXXX E.O. 11052: 403 TAGS: MORG, HOL, IR SUB: Improvisions of the Iranian Military Officer Corp3 BEGIN SUMMARY: The Iranian officer corps does not now page a political threat to the regime. The COI has taken steps through security measures and careful treatment to assure its loyalty. Greater difficulty in rebuilding officers is changing the character of the corps from what it was in the past, and these younger officers could prove to be more troublesome in the future if the economy or political structure is subjected to severe testing. We acknowledge that our understanding of the thought processes of Iranian officers is limited and believe that greater attention should be paid to the acquisition of information on this important subject. We recommend that Forri training for advisors sent to Iran be significantly increased and that orientation programs be redirected to bring into better focus U.S. interests in Iran. We intend to monitor the subject more closely and will report periodically. END SUMMER 1. INTRODUCTION. This report summarizes what we know of the Iranian officer corps with respect to its political orientation and professional qualifications. In part because these subjects are so important to the security of Iran, these are few available statistics or official data on which to base our conclusions. Because of this accessibility and our close association with the GOL, few people in or outside the military speak frankly to us about its strength and weaknesses. Further, our knowledge of personalities in the Iranian officers corps is generally limited to those who speak English and have regular contact with Americans. Despite these reservations, we feel that our sampling is sufficiently adequate to allow us to form a number of family reliable opinions. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LNHOIS Comments, contributions and concurrence were received from DEFREP, ARISE/NAAG, POL, PCON, OR and DAO

2. GOLDEN, "Some think was very proud of the armed forces of Chinese education—and terribly shocked when they failed to offer collective resistance to the British and Soviet columns that invaded the country in 1941. These forces were built up by him for the primary purpose of establishing and maintaining international security in Iran; at first they were accurately adequate, numerically, for that purpose, while later on their evolution numbering constituted a heavy drain on the country's revenues. "For years he kept constant watch over the army: in-spacting its units at Tel [?] ан, visiting garrisons throughout the country, attending manouvers, passing judgment on the competence of its officers, and providing whatever funds he felt it needed. In its secondary role the armed forces were to protect Iran from the aggression of neighboring countries, but not to be thrown into international conflicts. Although he realized that it was short of heavy armament and notarized equipment, he believed it was a modern, efficient force. However, his basis for such a belief was very limited." (Donald N. Wilber, Boca Shah Pahlavi.) Iran's officer corps in the 1920s and 193030s, and to a lessor extent through the early 1950s, was drawn largely from Tehran and the Azerbaijan and Kurdish regions, areas where national consciousness first developed and where national defense seemed a patriotic function and one which could lead to personal advancement. Since around 1955, more officers have been recruited from other areas of the country, although Tehran and the northwest still probably account for a majority of the corps. Similarly, in the earlier period officers tended to come from distinguished families, particularly those clans which had supplied the military leadership in previous generations. (Until the 1920s, military rank could be inherited.) It was common for the powerful families to put at least one son-for "insurance"—in the Army. Thus, there are still some representatives of the well-established old families in the Iranian officers corps. There are, for example, five Jahashtan on the list of generals and one Colonel. Jahashtan until recently lauded the new Harine Brigade. (Fifteen years ago the NAF HJ Jahastan was in the eyes of some foreigners the lending potential coup leader. His father had had close ties to the USSR. SG Jahastan's survival costless to the strength of family ties and competence in overcoming suspicions of dialoyalty.) Officers like Vice Admital Ardalin and Major General Ksalatbury were unobtledly assisted in their careers through family connections, distant cousins though they might have been. 2. CHIOTIS. "From 2011 was very proud of the armed forces of Iberdrola and the British, and terribly shocked when they failed to offer effective maintenance to the British and Soviet bluens that invested the country $1041. These forces were built up by him for the primary purpose of establishing and maintaining a national security in Iran; at first they were neutally adequate, uneventually, for that purpose, while later on their enough matters constituted a heavy division on the country's revenues. "For years he kept constant watch over the army: in- pressing its units at Heizman, visiting garrisons throughout the country, attending manuvers, insisting judgment on the confidence of its officers, and providing whatever funds he felt it needed. In its secondary role the armed forces were to protect from from the aggression of neighboring countries, but not to be thrown into international conflicts. Although he realized that it was short of heavy armament and recorded equipment, he believed it was a modern, efficient force, Homer, his basis for such a belief was very limited." (Donald N. Wilkor, Zara Shah Pahlavi.) Fran's official corps in the 1920s and 1930s, and to a lesser extent through the early 1930s, was drawn largely from Taiwan and the Australian and Turkish regions, areas where national consciousness first developed and where national defense scored a patriotic function and one which could lead to personal advancement. Since around 1955, more officers have been recruited from other areas of the country, although Johnson and the northwest still probably account for a majority of the corps. Similarly, in the earlier period officers ended to come from distinguished families, particularly those clans which had supplied the military leadership in previous generations. (Until the 1930s, military rank could be inherited.) It was common for the powerful families to put at least one son-for "insurance"—in the Army. Thus, there are still some representatives of the well-established old families in the Iranian officers corps. There are, for example, five Julianfans on the list of generals and one Colonel. Julianfans until recently leaded the new Marine Brigade. (Fathers years ago the IAF EG Johnsonian was in the eyes of some foreigners the leading potential corp leader. His father had had close ties to the USSR. EG Jahantani's survival testifies to the strength of family ties and competence in outstanding institutions of disloyalty.) Officers like Vice Admiral Ardalan and Major General Khairthary were [?] .

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/EXDIS Page 4 of 11 A-050 from TEHRAN senior GOI civilian positions as ministers or governors general. More recently technocrats are given such positions . The military now seems to operate in semi-isolation from other elements of the GOI, its function confined almost solely to national defense. From the end of World War II until around 1963 the military was, in fact, a political organization. It was the privileged class, an avenue upwards for the ambitious and a group pampered with special favors to preserve its good will. Those days have passed, the military's place in the life of the country has been downgraded, its prestige and perquisites reduced and there has been an obvious effect on the recruitment of able, aspiring young men. 3. "THE SYSTEM". To progress through the ranks, an officer finds he must conform to certain unwritten rules, i.e., avoid risks; never seek responsibility; if you have responsibilities , never delegate them. In the past the Services were not generously funded and the demands of economy or austerity then established even now continue to dominate. All supplies are carefully protected and mis- takes, particularly those leading to waste, are harshly punished. Experimentation and risk-taking are discouraged, implicitly if not by order. As a result, an officer soon learns that he is better advised to follow orders to the letter than to look for change. The advancement of an officer is dependent on his loyalty, his score on periodic examinations and the purity of his record. With charac- teristic Persian cynicism, many officers believe that pro- motion is directly dependent on "who you know" rather than performance. Those men who test the system or otherwise "push waves" find the odds are against them. There are few rewards for success, while failure is quickly and sometimes severely punished. The Shah, like the American president, is the military commander-in-chief. The distinction is that the Shah actually commands each of the Services. All important decisions in the military and many minor ones, e.g., transfers and promotions of officers, authority to use military equipment for non-military purposes, limitations on social contact with foreigners, etc., are attributed to the Shah. Certainly the major issues are handled by him personally. Realistically, however, there are not enough hours in the day for the Shah himself to handle all details. It is quite probable that many military questions are re- ferred to the Shah's close advisors or taken by staff officers in the Shah's name. Unfortunately, to know little CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/EXDIS Page 5 of 11 A-050 from TEHRAN of this process. It does have the effect, however, of tending to preserve responsibility at the highest possible level. While there are obvious security considerations in maintaining a centralization of authority and vertical lines of communication, that structure and mode of operation makes the overall effectiveness of the Armed Forces and limit the development of officer personnel. Further, because there is a basic distrust between individuals in Iranian society and because officers are unwilling to commit their careers to the actions of others, there is an extreme reluctance to delegate responsibility. (There are some positive signs of change: the new IIAF Commander has told his officers they will not be punished for honest mistakes; he is encouraging initiative and delegation of authority.) As a consequence, an officer does not learn by making mistakes and may arrive at a fairly senior level without having been tried and proven in the way that a modern Western military system screens and perfects personnel. Another consequence of the intensive Iranian individualism is the downgrading of "team" effort and "team" success--counter to the needs of the Services. The three Services are the preserve of regular officers who are expected to remain on active duty essentially for a lifetime. An effect of this has been a slow rate of promotion and, in the IIAF and to a lesser extent the IRAN, an older officer corps than is found in the United States. Twenty years to major is not unusual. Lifetime service tends to produce apathy, poor morale, a certain level of discontent and the retention of many ineffective officers. The IIAF had a purge of ineffective admirals in 1969 and since then has had a younger and more junior leadership; we hear that another purge of captains and commanders is coming. In the IIAF, we understand, the Shah directed that steps be taken to reduce the minimum time in service of general officers from 30 to 23 years. Consistent with this policy, in the past three years there have been a number of senior officers selected for retire- ment. Still, many older officers are retained, because as the tasks of the armed forces multiply, there is a need for experienced leaders who have proved their loyalty 4. INTERSERVICE COMPETITION. Iranian officers can clearly count themselves with foreign counterparts in terms of personal living space. Their performance is frequently as good as or the necessity of training in a foreign country, and of that, together with cultural-social background, creates an attitude, a sort of "fear of ability which may or may not have a background of experience with the technical. This is so much a part of a Westerner's 208 209

upbringing, others are perfectly able to assimilate the new military policies. The pace of learning is slowed by the traditional rote method and consequent difficulties in shifting to Western techniques. Because of the lack of a qualified NCO corps, officers are required to take on secondary tasks which impede their development as managers. A great impediment is the difficulty for competent officers to find expression and outlets for their ability within what we have described as "the system". The bright and dedicated young major may shrink from testing his talents in order to assure the safe path of advancement. Eventually he may find that his talents have atrophied. The Iranian military also suffers from the vices char- acteristic of any peacetime army. Except for clashes in Gilan, along the Iraqi border and, until a decade ago, with tribal groups, the Iranian military has seen no combat since the World War II period. As a consequence, operational readiness does not have the same meaning as it does in the American services. Polishing and rigging for an inspection, a parade or a field exercise generate more adrenalin than the day-to-day business of preparing for eventual combat. Some American advisors have described the Iranian services as "playing soldier" and questioned whether the services were indeed capable of fighting a war. There is an element of truth in this criticism, and the lack of a sense of urgency and of an immediately perceived threat tends to relieve an officer from pressures to develop his skills or increase his knowledge in new directions. With the application of pressure as in Dhofar fighting, Iranian units have performed surprisingly well, though flawed by a lack of experience in tactics and command and control. Creating armed forces capable of maintaining discipline in combat has been a constant preoccupation of the Shah. "How do you get your pilots to fly in the face of heavy Vietnamese AA fire?" he once asked a U.S. visitor. The memory of Iranian military failure in 1911 has provided a strong impetus behind his drive to change the fighting quality of the three Services. The performance of Iranian officers also suffers because of a fundamental weakness in planning. Iranian society, for centuries led by weak governments and subject to unavoidable external forces, has placed little premium on the anticipation and prevention of problems. Personal survival in an insecure society takes precedence over functioning as a small part of an effective organization . These kinds of cultural "defects" in the make-up of the individual officer often seriously affect his job. Although attitudes are changing, more quickly perhaps in the more Westernized IIAF and IIN than the traditional IIGF, it will still take time to correct. The IIAF is clearly the most professional, best organized and best armed of the services. The IIGF dates back to the past and overwhelmed by the complex tasks of a modern army. The IIN has yet to establish a defined national maritime in a country that lacks a sea-faring tradition. This means that the IIAF will probably continue to attract the brightest and most dynamic of the new recruits in a restricted and competitive labor market, thus perpetuating the performance gap between the Services. In general, we believe the Iranian officer can master the sophisticated equipment that his government is pur- chasing, but it will take him a greater period of time to do so, unless the more competent officers to take on the burden of extra responsibilities and require the presence of foreign advisors and technicians in considerable numbers for some time. This prospect raises two political questions: How the officer corps will react to the pro- longed presence of foreigners and how they will view the IIA modernization program if major difficulties develop in the acquisition of complex weapon systems. 5. ADVISORS, SCIENCE ADVISORS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS. In the early days of our military relationship, it seems to have been easier for close friendships to develop between Iranians and their Iranian counterparts. The Iranian Army was in a position of greater dependency and the Americans had a clearer advisory relationship. As the Iranians have become more independent, they have tended to view their advisors more as consultants on call rather than automatically and intimately involved participants. Further, there are restrictions on Iranian officers' acceptance of social invitations or even corresponding with foreigners. Ostensibly these rules are designed to prevent communist subversion, but they probably are also intended to minimize foreign influence in general. For the most part, senior Iranian officers see their advisors as a useful resource, i.e., as skilled officers who can supply or obtain technical information. Advisors are also seen as a means of advancing a proposal which might prove career-threatening or which might require a sufficiently radical departure to require outside support. Frequently the Iranians will keep the advisor informed but feel a lack of confidence in carrying through a proposal. Sometimes they are simply too lazy to do the job that an 210 CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMITED CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMITED 211

upbringing, others are perfectly able to assimilate the new military policies. The pace of learning is slowed by the traditional rote method and consequent difficulties in shifting to Western techniques. Because of the lack of a qualified NCO corps, officers are required to take on secondary tasks which impede their development as managers. A great impediment is the difficulty for competent officers to find expression and outlets for their ability within what we have described as "the system". The bright and dedicated young major may shrink from testing his talents in order to assure the safe path of advancement. Eventually he may find that his talents have atrophied. The Iranian military also suffers from the vices char- acteristic of any peacetime army. Except for clashes in Gilan, along the Iraqi border and, until a decade ago, with tribal groups, the Iranian military has seen no combat since the World War II period. As a consequence, operational readiness does not have the same meaning as it does in the American services. Polishing and rigging for an inspection, a parade or a field exercise generate more adrenalin than the day-to-day business of preparing for eventual combat. Some American advisors have described the Iranian services as "playing soldier" and questioned whether the services were indeed capable of fighting a war. There is an element of truth in this criticism, and the lack of a sense of urgency and of an immediately perceived threat tends to relieve an officer from pressures to develop his skills or increase his knowledge in new directions. With the application of pressure as in Dhofar fighting, Iranian units have performed surprisingly well, though flawed by a lack of experience in tactics and command and control. Creating armed forces capable of maintaining discipline in combat has been a constant preoccupation of the Shah. "How do you get your pilots to fly in the face of heavy Vietnamese AA fire?" he once asked a U.S. visitor. The memory of Iranian military failure in 1911 has provided a strong impetus behind his drive to change the fighting quality of the three Services. The performance of Iranian officers also suffers because of a fundamental weakness in planning. Iranian society, for centuries led by weak governments and subject to unavoidable external forces, has placed little premium on the anticipation and prevention of problems. Personal survival in an insecure society takes precedence over functioning as a small part of an effective organization . These kinds of cultural "defects" in the make-up of the individual officer often seriously affect his job. Although attitudes are changing, more quickly perhaps in the more Westernized IIAF and IIN than the traditional IIGF, it will still take time to change. The IIAF is clearly the most professional, best organized and best armed of the services. The IIGF often acted in the past and even today by the complex rules of a palace play. The IIN has yet to establish a defined external orientation in a country that lacks a sea-faring tradition. This means that the IIAF will probably continue to attract the brightest and most dynamic of the new recruits in a restricted and competitive labor market, thus perpetuating the performance gap between the Services. In general, we believe the Iranian officer can master the sophisticated equipment that his government is pur- chasing, but it will take him a greater period of time to do so, unless the more competent officers to take on the burden of extra responsibilities and require the presence of foreign advisors and technicians in considerable numbers for some time. This prospect raises two political questions: How the officer corps will react to the pro- longed presence of foreigners and how they will view the IAA modernization program if major difficulties develop in the acquisition of complex weapon systems. 5. ADVISORS, SCIENCE, ADVANCEMENTS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS. In the years we looked at CIA activity relationship, it seems to have been easier for close friendships to develop between Iranians and their Iranian counterparts. The Iranian Army was in a position of greater dependency and the Americans had a closer advisory relationship. As the Iranians have become more independent, they have tended to view their advisors less as consultants on call rather than automatically and intimately involved participants. Further, there are restrictions on Iranian officers' acceptance of social invitations or even corresponding with foreigners. Ostensibly these rules are designed to prevent communist subversion, but they probably are also intended to minimize foreign influence in general. For the most part, senior Iranian officers use their advisors as a useful resource, i.e., as skilled officers who can supply or obtain technical information. Advisors are also seen as a means of advancing a proposal which might prove career-threatening or which requires a sufficiently radical departure to require outside support. Frequently the Iranians will keep the advisor informed but feel a lack of confidence in carrying through a proposal. Sometimes they are simply too lazy to do the job that an

impressing can he be considered an unforeseeable. When the advice is of the most important, the unforeseeable risks a special law of law may be required, especially if it means that the form and am the most professional. If an European office is made to the law, the office will be redacted to express this. It is a case for you, the traditional, an official can on the case for you to find the case because he could do it, and to be on the [?] ional risk policy that the military is to take information. When to have a call for help, you have a need for help. When to go to the office? You'll have a call for help, after making a call. You'll be a situation of professional quality. When you are in order to should know something of the information you are looking for, the language, even in a limited way. An ability to express even complex words in English can address the need for the language. When you are in the office, you can address the need for the language. The support is the support of the customer. When you are in the office, you can address the need for the language. The support is the support of the customer. When you are in the office, you can address the need for the language. However, the professional skills and skills of the customer are not required. When you are in the office, you can address the need for the language. However, the professional skills and skills of the customer are not required. When you are in the office, you can address the need for the language. However, the professional skills and skills of the customer are not required. When you are in the office, you can address the need for the language. However, the professional skills and skills of the customer are not required. The psychological collaboration that have grown up in the European sector over the past thirty years of deal-that with Americans have given us a great lead over other countries. We are tired. However, those in general concern for the situation will not be reported efficiency. This is a critical to the rule who has served here as a advisor in the past. It would difficulties develop its own two governments because of restrictions on our military relationships, the institutions towards our advisors on how part of their transition will be probably driven closely by the need by the government, despite more among feelings of cultural friendship and possibly even whether it has an officer Role in the complexities of his own. An avid follow, in the manner of a show in an initial yellow three way to a CONFIDENTIAL/NTPORM/LKO033 5. PAY. PERQUISITES AND CORRUPTION. An Iranian consultant receives the equivalent or mostly comes a day. Clearly, to start from that base it is not possible to pay senior officers a very high salary. The pay of a lieutenant general, for example, is around 2,000 per month. To keep the most senior and promising officers satisfied, the services years ago developed a system of "private" allowances and other obscure forms of compensation. For example, one IAF general was allowed on a colonial to buy land cheaply and later required to sell it to the city at a handsome profit! Every generals and colonials, active and retired, are now prosperous landlords in north Tehran and the Caspian on Lord distributed to them in the fifties. This system has been high-end up and the number of allowances reduced in recent years, but still there are ways of acquiring special compensation for the military. Last year the Shah directed that military pay to raised to a level 10 percent higher than comparable civil service salaries. However, the civil service also has a system of private allowances and special forms of compensation and, according to military officials, it has not been possible to work out an accurate differential. To allow their increases a number of technically qualified officers, especially doctors, neolight in the civilian sector with official coloration, holding officers are frequently rewarded with good jobs in the civilian sector. Because of Eritr's inflammatory processes, we fear some grumbling shout pay. Where is some jealousy in the LIGF and among��count-based MNP personnel towards officers on flying status who can receive up to $1,000 additional pay per month. KIN Middle and junior officers are upset over pay and difference in pay by whom Johnson, the Person Skill and the Cognition-prisoner which are being addressed by the KIN Commander. High points in office are a frequent original and junior officer are hard pressed to find overifications, especially to Johnson. But the already generated options of progression to being improved and at direct or by military time should be an extensive program of construction for military training. Increases on construction is strong, more, from hearing to being utilized for officers when their retirement. There is also a well-structured system of children and communities. Special information are paid for during times such as them. Although the treatment of [?] cannot be said to be limited by Wehreens commands, it does enable the senior center to find more information from, probably at a certain time when the use of the staff of them, who need to keep military personnel happy and the

between uncollective with the civilian sector are factors including to finish military budgets to higher levels. Facts on corruption are very hard to ascertain; rumors channel, in general, because of the superior discipline and controls and the direct threat of punishment, we believe there is very highly relatively less corruption in the military. Some in the civilian sector, Curtain questionable practices have been tolerated in the past, however, although the cost is attributable to the changing towards even tighter controls. For example, the IISN Commander and his Deputy were well known for several weeks in business circles as the reciprocate of bribes; their arrest, conviction and punishment apparently followed the presentation of evidence by a Foreign Farm. Recently we have heard of more interests in the Navy. On the other hand, IAF officers where we said to have accepted or invited bribes have been transferred to other positions without any yet any punishments. Investigations are continuing and have had the effect of creating a great deal of caution and nervousness in the three States. The present GOI attitude toward corruption, however, is not entirely clear, and we suspect that there is a feeling in the Government that house cleaning can be pushed only so far before either weakening military morale and capability, having the Government's negotiation, of inviting trouble from those who might decide to fight back—the latter a rather remote possibility. 7. MEDICAL AND MEDICAL CIVILS. Our knowledge of officers below the third of colorful is limited, in general, we note among these younger officers, a set of attitudes that is assistant different from their seniors. Here frequently they tend to be critical of the traditional mode of doing things in lieu. They also seen sometimes to recent the special position held by foreign advisers, feeling that I am should be independent of such outside influence. This attitude may be based as much on youthful�erences as on political or ideological motivation, but in the proper circumstances it could acquire political content. In general, we do not believe that the young officers were attracted to the military for political reasons. Then has not engaged an enemy in a national cause in three decades and has no hostile attitudes towards neighbors which can whip up influence patriotic feelings. These young men who want to redeem the political system would be willfully to check a place in the military which Is I started to be strictly controlled by the security organizations. The initiative of the new officers in joining the military seems to be economic. As noted, these officials can to the service from income groups that are consistent to the presence of inflation, shortages and other economic imbsences that from is currently exporting. If my of them are attracted to the officer charge by the opportunity to improve their station in 1906. These young men who cannot meet the strict university entrance requirements in ICANC or United Education Oversens and the military offers university-level training: a stable position and the prospect of travel and official structure. But they retain their ties with their origins and will be sensitive to the progress of the GOP's economic and development programs. They also undoubtedly have many ties with their high school eliminates now in the universe, the primary meeting ground for medical thought in ICANC. One of the main topics of the action [?] led thinking of university officials is the regime's economic performance and the kindsidestime recordants regularly have been on inflation, taste and competition. The younger officers, new subjects to each influence and as yet not fully indebted as most members of the political "establishment", could be a problem-group if the transition economy should suffer a sharp attack or is the company should receive a major political shock, e.g., administration of the BHA or dependent in battle. In a situations of political crisis, the younger officers may be more inclined to think for themselves than some of their contributions more bodies have been cost and minds hard. Within the junior officer ranks there is a distinctive group of criticisms—the concept second licentornants—who represent a totality different elements of society in relation to their national array colleagues. These young officers are all college graduates and many have advanced degrees from U.S. or other foreign universities. They serve their two year obligatory military service and then leave the service to pursue christian professional. The traditional institute of most regular officers is the conscripts are professionally incompetent. They and subalternworthy. Like the regular officers, particularly those assigned to engineering and technical branches, the sometimes subalternally fervours of and four the intolerable talents of the concept of the [?] . The caravans officers in turn look when the regulars see intolerable aforations; believe that military training is an intangible part of their life style; and feeling the "old animal" of the regular career, does not appear to be the classification

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS Page 12 of 14 A-090 from TEHRAN with the system (though within constraints.) An interesting point is that many of the conscript officers are assigned as technical and English instructors in the Imperial Iranian Military Academy. This provides an opportunity for them to implant in subtle ways their philosophies in the highly impressionable minds of the cadets. This opportunity is magnified by assignment of large numbers of conscript officers as instructors in the conscript enlisted training centers. 8. POLITICAL ATTITUDES. Gripes in the Iranian military services are not much different from those heard in all armies. There are complaints about pay, and sometimes about favoritism shown to other officers. The IIAF has a particularly sensitive problem in the keen resentment of some of the younger generals at the caution and lack of leadership of the Commanding General. There are complaints about high rents (sometimes blamed on Americans), and about the problems of urbanization in Tehran. But the grievances do not seem to be serious enough to cause concern. Nor do they seem to carry a political message. The cases of military association with subversive groups have been remarkably few in the past six years, particularly in comparison with the influence that the Tudeh Party once had in the Iranian military services. Recently, the security organizations have become concerned about the possible linkage of university-based terrorist groups (right and left-wing varieties) and younger officers. Several arrests of junior officers were reported in March. This is a new development, however, and not yet a proven concern. The control and surveillance of security organizations is thought to be very strict indeed, although probably these groups are not as effective as they are feared. All Iranian military personnel are continually subject to a program of political indoctrination and the ambitious are well aware that a reputation for total loyalty can be a valuable aid in advancement. The Iranian Armed Forces resemble the American military in that they appear to be essentially political institutions . Our close association over 30 years probably has had something to do with the evolution away from political involvement, although this development should be mainly attributed to the success of the regime in neutralizing or winning over most elements of the old opposition. Although occasionally an officer will make some favorable comment about democratic traditions in the United States, almost as frequently comes with words of any lack of discipline and direction. It is rare to hear a critical remark about the Shah's regime or even of any 216 CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS Page 13 of 14 A-090 from TEHRAN decision which can be attributed to him. Iranian officers are extremely loathe to express any criticism of conditions in Iran, especially in the Services. For example, we have rarely heard doubts expressed about the wisdom of large-scale arms purchases, with the exception of a generalized dislike in the IIAF for the Chieftain tank, which is thought too heavy, too complicated and unsuited for the Iranian environment. If the Shah has decided that Iran will have a certain weapons system, Iranian officers may acknowledge some difficulty in assimilating the equipment, but will almost always conclude with an optimistic assertion that the job somehow can be done. We are alert to the development of military opinion that the purchase of large numbers of sophisticated systems could lead to the degradation of the Services as effective forces. Thus far, we have no evidence to support a finding that such opinion is either widely held or seriously discussed in the Services. CONCLUSIONS. In our judgment the Iranian Armed Services have come a long way since officers who were members of the Tudeh Party were believed to be one of the primary threats to the regime. Through a lengthy process of security controls, careful selection, and ample rewards, the IIAF seems to have created an officer corps that poses no active loyalty problem. This process has been facili- tated by the absence of any controversial political issues or economic difficulties which might mobilize military opinion against the regime. The three military Services have their plates full with the absorption of new equipment and perfection of new roles. While it is conceivable that frustration in these tasks could lead some officers to turn against the regime, that scenario is still without supporting evidence. For the moment, it seems that the officer corps has its major task in the conscious and unrelenting struggle against cultural patterns and systemic impediments that stand in the way of the objectives set by the Shah. The big challenge for the regime will be to assure that the young officers become loyal and committed aides in their political role. Careful sorting and generous rewards can be efficacious in a society where individual ambition is so important, but it also seems certain that developments outside the military orbit, especially in the economic sphere, can have decisive influence on the political orientation of the new group. The present situation, while promising, should not be presumed to be stable. Iran is changing rapidly and 217 CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS Page 12 of 14 A-090 from TEHRAN with the system (though within constraints.) An interesting point is that many of the conscript officers are assigned as technical and English instructors in the Imperial Iranian Military Academy. This provides an opportunity for them to implant in subtle ways their philosophies in the highly impressionable minds of the cadets. This opportunity is magnified by assignment of large numbers of conscript officers as instructors in the conscript enlisted training centers. 8. POLITICAL ATTITUDES. Gripes in the Iranian military services are not much different from those heard in all armies. There are complaints about pay, and sometimes about favoritism shown to other officers. The IIAF has a particularly sensitive problem in the keen resentment of some of the younger generals at the caution and lack of leadership of the Commanding General. There are complaints about high rents (sometimes blamed on Americans), and about the problems of urbanization in Tehran. But the grievances do not seem to be serious enough to cause concern. Nor do they seem to carry a political message. The cases of military association with subversive groups have been remarkably few in the past six years, particularly in comparison with the influence that the Tudeh Party once had in the Iranian military services. Recently, the security organizations have become concerned about the possible linkage of university-based terrorist groups (right and left-wing varieties) and younger officers. Several arrests of junior officers were reported in March. This is a new development, however, and not yet a proven concern. The control and surveillance of security organizations is thought to be very strict indeed, although probably these groups are not as effective as they are feared. All Iranian military personnel are continually subject to a program of political indoctrination and the ambitious are well aware that a reputation for total loyalty can be a valuable aid in advancement. The Iranian Armed Forces resemble the American military in that they appear to be essentially political institutions . Our close association over 30 years probably has had something to do with the evolution away from political involvement, although this development should be mainly attributed to the success of the regime in neutralizing or winning over most elements of the old opposition. Although occasionally an officer will make some favorable comment about democratic traditions in the United States, almost as frequently comes with words of any lack of discipline and direction. It is rare to hear a critical remark about the Shah's regime or even of any 216 CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS Page 13 of 14 A-090 from TEHRAN decision which can be attributed to him. Iranian officers are extremely loathe to express any criticism of conditions in Iran, especially in the Services. For example, we have rarely heard doubts expressed about the wisdom of large-scale arms purchases, with the exception of a generalized dislike in the IIAF for the Chieftain tank, which is thought too heavy, too complicated and unsuited for the Iranian environment. If the Shah has decided that Iran will have a certain weapons system, Iranian officers may acknowledge some difficulty in assimilating the equipment, but will almost always conclude with an optimistic assertion that the job somehow can be done. We are alert to the development of military opinion that the purchase of large numbers of sophisticated systems could lead to the degradation of the Services as effective forces. Thus far, we have no evidence to support a finding that such opinion is either widely held or seriously discussed in the Services. CONCLUSIONS. In our judgment the Iranian Armed Services have come a long way since officers who were members of the Tudeh Party were believed to be one of the primary threats to the regime. Through a lengthy process of security controls, careful selection, and ample rewards, the IIAF seems to have created an officer corps that poses no active loyalty problem. This process has been facili- tated by the absence of any controversial political issues or economic difficulties which might mobilize military opinion against the regime. The three military Services have their plates full with the absorption of new equipment and perfection of new roles. While it is conceivable that frustration in these tasks could lead some officers to turn against the regime, that scenario is still without supporting evidence. For the moment, it seems that the officer corps has its major task in the conscious and unconscious struggle against cultural patterns and systemic impediments that stand in the way of the objectives set by the Shah. The big challenge for the regime will be to assure that the young officers become loyal and committed aides in their political role. Careful sorting and generous rewards can be efficacious in a society where individual mobility is so important, but it also seems certain that developments outside the military orbit, especially in the economic sphere, can have decisive influence on the political orientation of the new group. The present situation, while reassuring, should not be presumed to be stable. Iran is changing rapidly and 217 CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LIMDIS

COPI TO ANTAL ANF OH MUS the recent very positive trends could be slowed or arrested by untoward events. As one center general confided to us in discussion his plans for possibly moving to the U.S. after retirement, "You know it's not you know many things could skim here. To have to be proposed for anything to happen." INFLUENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE SHARES. As we emphasized at the interest, our information on the Indian officer corps is much less reliable than we would like it to be. We play a major military role in this country and can expect to maintain our pronounce here for the indefinite future. It is dismaying to realize how little attention we in the United States government have paid to the task of understanding the Iranian officer. With no much invested in this country, we simply cannot afford not to be better informed. Therefore, the Ambassador recommends with full Country Team support that an immediate effort be made to prepare officials more thoroughly for assignment as adviser in Iran. Presently there are now only a small handful of officers among these assigned here who can spread minimal Farsi. We should begin without further delay to assure that at least 25 of the MIAO and TATF officers assigned to Iran each year have language qualifications. Ideally, these officers would be qualified through language aptitude testing and be selected from the junior ranks, e.g., captains and majors, who can expect to have another tour in Iran or in Iranian-related programs in the U.S., during their careers. It would be especially useful to send to language training three officers who are to have advisory posts in the provincial areas where little English is spoken. Further, we suggest that the program of orientation for officers assigned to Iran be rigorously reviewed by DGD officials as to ensure that it conforms to the requirements that the USG faces in this country. We may officers arrive here without real knowledge of Iranian history or customs. We can no longer live with the attitude that a MIAO or TATF adviser should be limited to technical services and remain unaware of the Iranian political process and our relationship to it. We in the Mission are monitoring this subject more closely and with greater regularity Periodic reports will be submitted. NARCOTIC SITUATION REPORT SUMMARY The role of Iran in the field of international narcotics has increased appreciably in the last several years. Most of the hashish smuggled into Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan is trans-shipped to Western Europe by Iranian traffickers utilizing legitimate international truck shipments, which are often accompanied by a "Transport International Routier" (TIR) carnet. Equally important is Iran's inordinately large drug addiction problem. To solve its internal drug addiction situation, Iran must depend upon international and regional cooperation - something which has not been forthcoming in the past. While Iran has had an active anti-narcotics enforcement program within the National Police for the past 20 years, intragovernmental co-operation with other law enforcement agencies has been non-existent. The structure of the Iranian bureaucracy and the rewards system for information and seizures of drugs have not encourage cooperation between the police (urban), Gendarmerie (rural) and Customs (ports of entry and international airports). DEA's operational activity in Iran is very minimal and limited to certain bilateral actions conducted only with specific and prior knowledge of the Iranian National Police Narcotic Administration (INPNA). DEA's liaison program with the INPNA and recently established liaison with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IIG) entails the exchange of information and narcotic intelligence, liaison and providing training and support activities in furtherance of DEA's overall mission. DRUG CONTROL IN IRAN/BACKGROUND 1. Drug Addiction. Iran has an illegal opium addiction population estimated at 400,000; in addition approximately 160,000 opium addicts are presently registered with the Ministry of Health under the opium registering system. The heroin addict population is estimated at 20,000 to 40,000. Abuse of barbiturates, amphetamines and hashish appears to be on the increase but no quantitative figures are available. Most of the opium consumed illicitly is being smuggled into Iran from the neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Some of the opium smuggled into Iran is converted into heroin in clandestine labs situated in the Hamadan/Rezayieh/Tabriz area, Azerbaijan Province in the west and in the Neshed/Nishapour area in the eastern part of Iran. The heroin is then smuggled into Tehran where it is distributed to the addicts. Incidentally, Tehran represents approximately 90% of Iran's heroin addict population. 2. Enforcement. Narcotic law enforcement in Iran is fragmented and lacking unified concerted action. INPNA and IIG-Anti-Smuggling Directorate are the Iranian agencies primarily responsible for drug law enforcement and suppression of illicit traffic. Customs Service, whose jurisdiction is ports of entry, including international airports, for all practical purposes seldom, if ever, exercises its investigative powers in narcotic enforcement. A. INPNA is an investigative division within the Iranian National Police concerned with the criminal enforcement of narcotic drug laws. Its main headquarters is in Tehran with district offices located in various major cities of Iran. The latter offices are directly under the command of the chiefs of respective cities and do not report to INPNA headquarters. There is no line command. INPNA man-power is inadequate - approximately 45 investigators in Tehran - its budget limited and resources lacking. However, it is the only professional narcotic law enforcement agency in Iran. Considering its limitations, it has performed well in the past. B. Anti-Smuggling Directorate of IIG has no narcotic investigative division, even though its jurisdiction encompasses 80% of Iran, including vital border and rural areas. B. Anti-Smuggling Directorate of IIG has no narcotic investigative division, even though its jurisdiction encompasses 80% of Iran, including vital border and rural areas. Throughout Iran there are 118 anti-smuggling units situated primarily on the eastern frontier and southern and northern borders of Iran. Their primary function is interdiction of commercial commodities and smuggling of arms, cigarettes, etc. Narcotic enforcement is minimal and, in reality, represents the lowest priority. These anti-smuggling units are comprised of uniformed officers whose functions are carried out through regular patrolling, performing search and seizure of persons/vehicles, instituting road blocks, etc. C. Customs Service is primarily an administrative organization with uniformed officers stationed at border points of entry and international airports. It is more interested in assessing and collecting duties on imported goods than intercepting narcotic drugs. Control of international vehicular traffic, including the TIR carnet carrying vehicles, is vested with the Customs Service. There is very minimal exchange of information or narcotic intelligence and cooperative coordination of operational activities at the working level between the three enforcement agencies. The existence of reward system inherent in these agencies invariably discourages interdepartmental cooperation and, in fact, encourages bureaucratic red tape. With the exception of the INPNA, the enforcement agencies involved with the suppression of narcotic traffic are not adequately funded and properly trained. 3. Training. DEA Tehran, in support of its objectives to strengthen the INPNA, is actively participating in the formal training of Iranian narcotic police officials. In the past two years, DEA Tehran has provided two incountry training schools for approximately 80 Iranian narcotic police officers. DEA Tehran also trained 18 officers in DEA Headquarters' Advanced Training Program in Washington, D.C. Since the inception of this training, INPNA has adopted conceptual enforcement techniques and has become more effective in conducting enforcement operations. Above all, it has encouraged greater cooperation between DEA and INPNA. This training has contributed toward the development of a centralized narcotic law enforcement agency - the INPNA. Presently, under the auspices of the CCINC, DEA Tehran is conducting an executive observation tour for senior INPNA and IIG officials. This program is considered of paramount importance and is This program is considered of paramount importance and is part of the overall policy for attaining U.S. Government objectives more effectively and realistically. 4. U.S.-Iran Cooperation. The DEA principal enforcement efforts in Iran are comprised of (a) cooperative enforcement and (b) enforcement assistance. These efforts are primarily expressed in terms of the exchange of drug intelligence,

liaison and strengthening of Iranian narcotic enforcement agencies. The latter provides for technical and equipment assistance, formal training of INPNA and IIG officers and cooperative enforcement, which to date has been rather limited by virtue of GOI's refusal to grant DEA greater operational latitude. DEA Tehran continues to seek access to investigations of mutual and international interest and encourages the INPNA in the use of conspiracy statutes, granting of immunity, etc. In conjunction with the recent revisions of the Mission narcotic country action plan, the following objectives have been defined: Diplomatis Initiatives A. The Mission should encourage Iranian participation in funding of regional narcotics control programs. B. The United States Government should support Iran's initiatives within international organizations, specifically, calls and programs for increased police cooperation, greater exchange of timely information, and better government-to-government contact. C. The U.S. should support and encourage through appropriate consultation and offers of expertise, cooperation between Iranian enforcement units, such as customs, police and Gendarmerie with their Afghan and Pakistani counterparts. Training Programs 1. The U.S. should continue to fund executive observation visits to the U.S. for senior Iranian officials when such officials are available. 2. DEA should offer additional police training at least one and possibly two in country schools for the training of police and Gendarmerie officers in narcotics work. 3. The Mission should support the concept of a cadre of narcotics specialists within the Gendarmerie through officers of training, follow-on advance training visits, and specialized management assistance if requested. Operational Efforts 1. Iran has approximately ten million dollars available annually from the sale of legal opium to be used for narcotics control - rehabilitation, addict treatment and law enforcement. The Mission should encourage the Iranian Cabinet Committee for Narcotics Control to earmark funds for the Iranian National Police Narcotics Administration and the Iranian Gendarmerie anti-smuggling unit for additional manpower, facilities, radios and technical equipment. 2. Iran has taken its first tentative steps toward the formation of a pilot task force utilizing personnel from police and Gendarmerie organizations. In discussions with these organizations, the Customs Service and the Iranian prosecutor's office, the Mission should encourage extended use of this concept and urge the Government of Iran to provide equipment, funds and official backing to proceed with major investigations. AMERICAN COMMUNITY REPORT The incidence of drug abuse in the American community has leveled off after a marked increase in the latter part of 1976. Recently, with the continued support and financial backing of the Mission, particularly the Ambassador's office, the Community Development Center in Tehran was inaugurated with the participation and support of the Armish-Maag, American business community and the Tehran American School. This week was the first case of overdose death (heroin/Valium) reported in the American community. The victim, a 15-year old high school student, was a dependent of a Grumman Air-space employee in Isfahan. Peter Dedich i Peter Dedich Jack L. Greene January 31, 1977

The work of DEA includes the responsibilities of providing expertise and assistance to foreign agencies in narcotics and dangerous drug enforcement and control programs, assessing significant drug abuse trends and trafficking patterns, and development of working agreements with representatives of foreign agencies for subsequent use as the foundation of development and implementation of the narcotic country action plan programs. The Special Agent-In-Charge's function is to serve as the principal advisor to the Chief of Mission and the DCM on all narcotic matters, conduct liaison with heads of Iranian narcotic enforcement agencies, as well as chiefs of various sections within the American Mission. The SAIC also has responsibility for liaison with the Persian Gulf countries. The SAIC's work also covers the usual functions of administration of the DEA office Tehran in carrying out all aspects of actions, programs and policies set forth by DEA Headquarters/Region and the Mission. The Special Agent's major duties encompass trend analysis in the illicit narcotic and drug traffic and production in Iran, its implications, particularly in relation to the affect upon the U.S., Iran and its neighboring countries. This officer provides assistance and expertise to Iranian National Police on narcotic and dangerous drug enforcement and control programs; participates and assists in investigations of international illicit trafficking; develops and reports on technical and strategic intelligence. The DEA office has a full-time secretary and a local contract employee (driver). The SAIC Tehran reports to Mr. John Warner, Regional Director, Region 19, Ankara, Turkey. 1. (S) \underline{\text{Threat as perceived by Iran.}} The Shah perceives many threats facing Iran in the years ahead. Primary among these is the threat from the Soviet Union. Historically, Iranians have harbored fears of Russian domination and have viewed Russia as the major threat to their territorial integrity. Recent Iranian-Soviet economic cooperation not-withstanding, the Shah firmly believes that the historic Russian objectives, of dominating Persian Gulf affairs and establishing a land bridge to warm water ports, will continue to guide Soviet policy in the Middle East and South Asia. The Shah knows that military occupation of Iran would be the fastest means for the Soviets to achieve these objectives. But he probably views such action as highly unlikely at the moment because of Soviet preoccupation with more important issues such as European defence, China, and improved relations with the U.S. Further, he counts on the U.S. to assist in a defense against the USSR. What concerns him far more is the indirect threat which the Soviets pose through their assistance, both overt and covert, to those governments -- particularly Iraq's -- and dissident elements in the region which appear intent on undermining Iranian security. The strategic implications on Iran of close political ties among India, Iraq, Afghanistan and the USSR worries the Shah. He perceives a threat of Soviet induced collusion among these countries, intensifying all the other threats to Iranian interests. With signs of declining Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Shah fears that the USSR will now turn with increased vigor to expanding its influence in the Gulf, cementing ties with Afghanistan and Iraq in the north and supporting insurgent attempts to topple conservative governments in the littoral states to the south. This is the primary reason that the Shah has committed Iranian forces in Oman to combat the rebellion backed by the PDRY, a Soviet client. He further is apprehensive over developments in Turkey fearing diminished Turkish availability, which could endanger Iranian security in the long run. However, Pakistan's internal political problems compounded by disidernance in its Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, also raise grave doubts in his mind over Pakistan's ability to hold together. Indeed, the Shah views the latent Baluchi separatist movement in Pakistan as a direct threat to Iranian Baluchistan. The Shah also sees the security of his oil facilities and oil routes to the West as vitally important to Iran. He is extremely sensitive to the vulnerability of his main oil

Tom Tehran A-105 June 20,1472 file Pak�lave foundation SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN ANNEX C ROYAL FAMILY PARTICIPATION IN IRANIAN BUSINESS Royal Family interests range through a wide gamut from cement production to pharmaceutical products. This is not to imply that they are the majority stock holders in these diverse companies. In numerous instances, they are silent partners with minority holdings or have front men hold their shares for them. Some members of the Royal Family have a clear personal interest in the activities of their companies. Prince Abdul Reza, as a large land owner with a very real interest in advanced agriculture, is a partner in Iran John Deere Ltd., which builds, imports, and sells farm machinery. He is also very interested in conservation and wildlife and accordingly is an owner of Iran Safaris, Ltd., a firm which organizes shooting trips. There follows a merely illustrative list of some of the business holdings of the members of the Royal Family other than the Shah. Pahlavi Foundation: This organization owns hotels, restaurants, and share holdings in a wide variety of Iranian companies. Among these latter it is particularly strong in pharmaceuticals (the Daru Pakhsh Welfare Organization), asbestos, and cement. The organization controls about 50% of Iranian cement production. The Foundation produces a rising flow of income much of which is devoted to the charitable purposes for which the Foundation was ostensibly established, but an amount estimated at between 20 and 40 per cent reaches various members of the Royal Family. The Foundation is not efficiently managed since it is widely used as a source of jobs for friends and minor relations of the Royal Family. Since it has the Court behind it, the Foundation enjoys an unfair advantage over its competitors and thus distorts and depresses the development of Iranian business. In this case of much of the resentment expressed by Iranians content the business activities of the Royal Family. CONFIDENTIAL To: American Embassy Tehran TIAL Teller From: USIS Tarin → Subject: Memorandum of Conversation Date: August 31, 1977 Participants: Branch Public Affairs Officer Philip W. Pillsbury Jr. Giuseppe GATTI, IV Grant (P77) Place: Ristorante Da Francisco Toxino Mr. Gatti spent approximately three weeks in Iran in July, 1977 on a project for the IBRD. His observations are the subject of this newson. 1) "Re-education Campe": Mr. Gatti travelled by car with one or two colleagues to Loristan. He was accompanied by an agent of SAVAK. Near Qus an accident had occurred, blocking the road. The agent received permission for them to continue, using an old, unpaved caravansment road as a detour. They soon had jeep escorts, fore and aft. Shortly they came upon what the agent called a "rs-education camp", located at the edge of the salt desert. It attended for seven or eight kilometers and was ringed with three men of hard water. Soldiers armed with machine guns stood at the roadway. Mr. Gatti said that upon reaching his destination he was asked to be a guest of the South colonel in charge of Loristan - he did not get the name. Mr. Gatti said the colonel offered opium, which he turned down. Shortly, the colonel, in an expansive mood, said there were more than 200,000 individuals in these "re-education" camps. Mr. Gatti said the term "political prisoner" was, obviously, never used. The conditions in the camp that he was able to observe made him chiver. 2) Human Resources and Corruptions. Mr. Gatti commented an idea of use for human resources that he was able to observe, and by corruption. Iranians return from education abroad, highly trained, and no longer work. Instead, projects are contracted out to foreign firms. No gave specific impressions on the project for the construction of the Such's tank. It involves 116 architects, most of them foreign, under the so-called direction of the architect of the Imperial Court. parent 3) Military: Mr. Gatti had several discussions with officers, especially those in the navy. (The Italians have a significant stake in Iran's navy, as many Iranians attend the Naval Academy in Leghorn, and Iran purchases ships constructed at La Spezia.) Mr. Gatti was struck by this/nepotism. He said the Sheba's brother controls transportation and favors roads and truck transport over railroads. He received to have a trunk railroad line built between Arak and Iafaham, a project that would save untold amounts in transportation costs. The Shah's sister is in charge of industry; no basic decision are made without her. The Express is in charge of housing and appointed the current Minister of Housing because of their acquaintance in Paris as students. INFO: RMWright - PO: PWP cc: Mr. Ford - POL. Rome

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Gatti said the military support the regime but increasingly resent the huge amounts of money that are going into civilian bureaucrats' pockets, diverted from heaic purchases for the military. Further, they resent their low-comparatively-salaries. Mr. Gatti felt that the military will take an increasingly active role politically and could even engineer a coup after the departure of the present Shah, maintaining his son as a figurehead. 4) French Penetrations Mr. Gatti was impressed by the extent of French penetration culturally, in the education system, and in the ministries. The French, he said, are actively engaged especially in the reorganization of government ministries (contrastually), and are providing means to send Iranian bureaucrats for study in the "Grandees Ecolles". 5) Some "mao-in-the street" attitude a) The Shah and Shabanou are above criticism, but there is increasingly virulent, widespread criticism of the excesses of the royal family. b) The man-in-the-street looks to dictatorship, not democracy, in Iran, even if the dictator is someone other than the Shah. There seems to be little interest in or hope for democracy in Iran. 0) There is deeply-felt, widespread anti-Soviet feeling rather than active expressions of anti-communism. Mr. Gatti mentioned a schism in the Tudish party based on Soviet claims on Iran. cc: American Embassy Rome P2111 RECEIVED 04 OCT 1977 POUCH AND MAIL UNIT EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TEKMAN Dear Aslan: This letter will confirm our understanding of the arrangements you have made for the visit of the U.S. Delegation of six Senators (CODEL Williams/Stevens) January 9 - 11. His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah Aryamahr, will receive the Senators in Audience at noon January 10. This will be followed at one p.m. by a luncheon. The six Senators are: Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman Senator Ted Stevens, Co-Chairman Senator Howard Cannon Senator Abraham Ribicoff Senator Ernest F. Bollings Senator Jacob K. Javits They will be accompanied for the audience and the luncheon by Ambassador Sullivan and myself. With high eastern and warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Jack C. Niklos Deputy Chief of Mission His Excellency Dr. Amir-Aslan Afshar Grand Master of Ceremonies Imperial Court POL/MIL:RAMartin:ag

Dea**dean: This letter will confirm our understanding of the arrangements you have made for the visit of the U.S. Delegation of Representatives (CODEL Sablocki) January 13 - 15. His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah Agyamehr, will receive the Representatives in Audience at noon January 14. This will be followed at one p.m. by a luncheon. The Representatives area: Representative Clement J. Sablocki Representative Dante B. Fascell Representative Jonathan B. Bingham Representative Leo J. Ryan Representative Salen G. Meyner Representative Donald J. Pease Representative John J. Cavanaugh Representative William S. Broomfield Representative Paul Findley Representative Larry Wina, Jr. Representative Shirley M. Pettis Representative Benjamin A. Gilman Representative J. Herbert Burke Representative Christopher Dodd Representative Del Clavason His Excellency Dr. Amir-Aslan Afshar Grand Master of Ceremonies Imperial Court Although no Staff Members are to be included in the earlier events involving the U.S. Senators we believe it most important (from the standpoint of our shared Iranian-U.S. interests) to include the following in the events of January 14: The Sergeant At Arms of the House of Representatives, Mr. Kenneth Harding the Staff Director of the House International Relations Committee, Mr. John J. Brady x Chairman Zablocki's Executive Assistant, Mr. George R. Berdes. Ambassador Sullivan and myself will accompany the group for the Audience and the luncheon. With high esteem and warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Jack C. Miklos Deputy Chief of Mission

NMNNVV ESA555BRA455 CO RUQMHR DE RUENC #9169 2532137 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 102115Z SEP 78 ZFF4 M SECSTATE WASHDC LIMITED OFFICIAL USE OTRUGME/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN_NIACT IMMEDIATE 644% INFO EUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 472% RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 7211 RUHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5933 RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1300 RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY JIODA IMMEDIATE 432 RUD TC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9986 RUT NPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7613 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL 4VIV IMMEDIATE 6344 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 229169 E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PEPR, IR, US SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CALL TO SHAH 3. ADDRESSES MAY USE THE FOREGOING AS APPROPRIATE IN CONTACT WITH GOVERNMENT AND PRESS. CHRISTOPHER ST 1. THE WHITE HOUSE SUNDAY AT 4 P.M. LOCAL TIME RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: QUOTE. THE PRESIDENT CALLED THE SHAH OF IRAN THIS MORNING AND DISCUSSED THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED THE CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S CONTINUED ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST. (NEW PARAGRAPH) THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS DEEP REGRET OVER THE LOSS OF LIFE AND HIS HOPE THAT THE VIOLENCE WOULD SOON BE ENDED. HE FURTHER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MOVEMENT TOWARD POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION WOULD CONTINUE. UNQUOTE. 2. FYI, ON BACKGROUND: WE ARE TELLING THE PRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT CALLED THE SHAH FROM CAMP DAVID BEFORE DEPARTING FOR GETTYSBURG FOR A SIGHTSEEING TRIP WITH PRIME MINISTER PECIN AND PRESIDENT SADAT SUNDAY MORNING, AND THAT THE TELEPHONE CALL LASTED 12-15 MINUTES. 232 49169 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE OFFICIAL-INFORMAL SECRET-SENSITIVE October 10, 1978 The Honorable. William H. Sullivan American Ambassador Tehran Reid 10/23 Dear Mr. Ambassador: The author of the enclosure is updating the CIA psychological profile of the Shah and would like your help with answers to the listed questions and any other thoughts you may wish to volunteer. Should you wish, you may reply through SRF channels or through me. (If the former, I'd be interested in your answers so perhaps you could ask them to pass.) Jerry Post will also be doing the analysis of the Crown Prince and we are setting things up for late October. Sincerely, Henry Précht Enclosure: List of Questions. SECRET-SENSITIVEGDS

In support of our assessment of the Shah's current mental state and likely reaction, it would be helpful if the Ambassador could address himself to the questions: 1. Concerning the Shah's episodes of depression, were they ever so severe as to significantly interfere with his leadership? Did they seem disproportionate to the circumstances or were rather appropriate discouragement or frustration in the face of severe political problems? What happens to his decisionmaking at these times—does he ever become paralyzed with indecision, tend to delegate to others decisions he might otherwise make himself? 2. How does he pull himself out of these downs? What is his decisionmaking like after a down period--is he exaggeratedly decisive? 3. Describe the role of his wife, the degree to which he relies on her. 4. Comments on his time frame would be helpful. In terms of his plan to turn a stable modern Iran over to his son, are there indications from him that he is slipping his schedule, feeling he will have to remain longer in office in order to accomplish his goals? 5. Any suggestions of increased external military support demands during this period of internal stress. 6. Although the Shah has indicated many of his liberalizing policies are responsive to US initiatives, his goals for a more democratic society have been well delineated for many years. Please discuss your views of the balance between Shah's own concepts he hopes to implement and reluctant compliance to external pressure. The Ambassador opened the meeting by noting that we have had a particularly active week. Ambassadors A�herton and Sullivan had an audience with the Shah, during which they discussed the Camp David Framework for Peace. The Shah supports privately the Egyptian-Israeli agreement because His Majesty prefers vastly Sedat's presidency to that of a radical government in Egypt. The Soviets have reacted sharply to the accords causing a great deal of concern to the Arab World. The Tehran International Trade Fair continues. Mr. Nestley reported that more viewers were allowed in this week than last, but security is still tight. American companies report mixed results; some U.S. exhibitors seem to be doing quite well. The Bazaar was partially closed yesterday in protest over Ayatollah Khomeini's house arrest in Iraq. Since the authorities have removed the soldiers from Khomeini's home we expect the Bazaar to resume business as usual. Most tanks have been removed from Tehran's streets. Ali Qoli Ardalan assumes the post of Minister of the Court today. Mr. Ardalan promptly blasted the Royal Family for involvement in private enterprises. This is an indication that the Court Ministry will have diminished significance and the Cabinet increased importance in the new government. The Ambassador then noted that the Ministry of Justice is investigating the petrochemical industry, of which Ardalan's nephew is a prominent member. DBA DAO CONS AMCONSUL ISFAHAN DCM MAAG DEA AMCONSUL SHIRAZ POL OR AMCONSUL TABRIZ POL/MIL ICA NEA/IRN ECON/COMM SY INR/RNA ADMIN ...

The Ambassador, along with the respective Section Chiefs, has called on two ministers this past week: Agriculture and Information. The current leadership in the Ministry of Agriculture is quite impressive and is a big improvement over previous administrations. Mr. Shellenberger noted that the Hal Saunder's interview can probably be shown on local television. ICA is also preparing a "Q&A" style flyer for Iranian students intending to study in the U.S. Mr. Shellenberger also said that ICA is still trying to set up the deKooning exhibit. General Gast attended the 55th military graduation ceremonies yesterday. The Shah also attended. His Majesty expressed concern over the MIG exercises to General Rabii. The Ambassador noted that some Soviets believe the recent trouble in Iran both prevent Iranian interference in Afghanistan and stop the Iranians from aiding Somalia. Rabii also told General Gast that the Iranian military is concerned about their budget since new funds will come from Cabinet authorization. Some discussion of Harry Hutchins and Brown and Root's project problems followed. * Chah Bahri is having supply and personnel problems which will affect their project completion date, as well as their budget. Mr. Lambrakis reported that some foundations (presumably not the Pahlavi Foundation) are under investigation. Mr Lambrakis also said that National University was beset with problems yesterday, concerning examinations. Mr. Greene's recent conversation with General Toufanian yielded some interesting information: it seems the Shah's favorite comment of late is "economize, reduce, and stretch out." General Toufanian also told Mr. Greene that there will probably be no major new FMS cases in the next U.S. fiscal year. ICA reported that it is setting up more student counseling facilities at the Abbasabad Cultural Center. Registration for English courses continues at a high level despite cancellation of the Ezzam Test. Mr. Dedich of tennis and DEA fame will be attending a regional conference in Cairo and will continue on to Frankfurt and Zurich. COUNTRY TEAM MEETING The Ambassador opened the meeting with a discussion of the Embassy's numerous visitors. Codel Solarz has come and gone; Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan and party have left Tehran but are still in country; Under Secretary Cooper and Deputy Assistant Secretary Miklos arrive within the next few days. Ambassador Sullivan then introduced one visitor, Regional Security Supervisor Kelly, who attended the Country Team Meeting. Ambassador Sullivan then discussed some other short topics: Tomorrow is the Shah's birthday; this could turn out to be a volatile day. Ambassador Sullivan recommended that Americans keep a low profile. The Iranian military is somewhat uptight that stricter measure have not been taken to deal with the demonstrations. The Shah disagrees: first because the perpetrators of the disturbances cannot be easily isolated; second because the results of strong-arm tactics are uncertain at best. The Ambassador commented that the situation definitely calls for more leadership. Ambassador Sullivan saw the Shah a couple of times since our last Country Team Meeting. The Shah seemed pre-occupied with recent disturbances, particularly with the NIOC strikes. The Ambassador and Richard Bash will meet with John Orange, the head of the consortium. Hopefully this meeting will yield a better understanding of the nature of the oil strike. Under Secretary Cooper arrives Saturday evening. Mr. Cooper will have a luncheon meeting with Mr. Yeganeh. Messrs. Mills and Taylor will accompany Mr. Cooper during his meeting with Mr. Ansary. The release date on King Hussein's Questions & Answers has been postponed until the finish of the Israeli cabinet session. Mr. Shellenberger will see that our copies are kept from public consumption until then.

CONFIDENTIAL POL will handle our three early November visitors from State: Messrs. Griffin, Clement, and Cohen. Mayor Bradley of Los Angeles has decided not to participate in the Tehran Urban Affairs program. The whole seminar may be postponed. The Ambassador asked Ms. Dearsman about the Tax Bill. Ms. Dearsman explained that the Bill is actually three separate bills. The new law has generated considerable interest in the American community, particularly the provision on hardship areas. Each Section Chief gave a report of major activities in their areas: Mr. Shellenberger reported on his visit to Isfahan with Mr. Curran. The educational system in Isfahan has its share of difficulties; most schools are closed due to demonstrations and top administrators are uneasy. Mr. John Mills received a call from DuPont concerning the possible outcome of the GOI's refusal to provide DuPont with either loans or tariff protection. Mr. Mills also noted that he and Mr. Taylor met with the Minister of Plans. The Minister reported three notable items: 1) The wage increases mean a rise in both this year's and next year's budget; 2) A sixth five-year plan will be produced; 3) The agencies who have made strike settlements above the guidelines will have to roll back their contracts. Mr. Adler noted that the U.S. participation in the Tabas fault survey received no publicity. LT:sw SY AMB/DCM POL POL P/M DEA OR DAO SA E/C ISA/HAN ICA TABRIZ MAAG SHIRAZ CONS NEA/IRN ADMIN INR/RNA The Ambassador began the meeting with a review of the week's events. This has been a very turbulent few days with Sunday, October 29, the worst. There were hordes of uncontrolled demonstrators on the streets; only a few pro-Government demonstrations took place, but these were of a dilettante nature. President Carter received the Crown Prince yesterday and made a strong statement in support of the Shah. If the reception to Dr. Owen's statement is any precedent, we can soon expect a strong reaction to the President's ideas. Ambassadors Parsons and Sullivan continued their talks with the Shah. The Shah has more concrete political views now, but there are no heroes in the Majlis ready to stand up and support the Sharif-Emmami Government. The Prime Minister is getting very tired and depressed, and few people in the Government are making decisions. The economic sector is also full of uncertainties. Under Secretary Cooper visited with Minister for Economic & Financial Affairs Yeganeh. Mr. Yeganeh is in the hospital, having suffered through pneumonia or a heart attack. The strikes continue, the most important of which is the oil strike. The Ambassador has seen Mr. Anasary a couple of times this week. Oil production has decreased significantly, but George Link told Ambassador Sullivan that 90% of the workers are ready to return to the fields. The effectiveness of the other 10%, who are trying to prevent work resumption, has been somewhat undermined by the presence of troops. A Majlis deputy has attacked the new Education Minister, Mr. Ganji, for allegedly sending 321,000,000 rials out of the country. The Ambassador noted that this attack further undermines the possibilities for reopening the universities. Mr. John Mills reported on Under Secretary Cooper's recent visit: Dr. Cooper now has a good idea of what is happening to Iran and the Iranians now have a better view of what is happening to the dollar.

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Shellenberger paid a visit to Tehran University yesterday. He found thousands and thousands of starry-eyed youths attending sit-ins, lining up to pray at the mosque, and chanting slogans and poems. At the University Mr. Shellenberger visited an exhibit consisting of detailed canvases depicting the regime's excesses and privations. Nearly half the women were wearing chadors. Although Mr. Shellenberger and his companion were probably the only two foreigners on campus, he detected no anti-foreign sentiment. General Gast reported that the situation vis-à-vis Iranian military payments to the U.S. is grave. Armish/Maag has been asked to decrease the number of visitors since the Armed Forces are suffering from a budget crunch. They particularly feel the Program Management Reviews are very expensive. Mr. Lambrakis noted that the political difficulties continue. There have been many teach-ins and sit-ins reported, but the Communists are evidently a very small portion of the speakers' list. About six provinces are now governorless. Mr. Dedich reported that the situation in Isfahan has been resolved and that Mr. McGaffey will submit a report soon. Ms. Dearsman said that the President still has not signed the Tax Bill(s), but IRS has Committee print copies. This creates a certain amount of confusion because the filing deadline is only two weeks hence. DIST: Amb/DCM SY POL DEA P/M DAO OR S/A E/C Amconsul Isfahan ICA Amconsul Tabriz MAAG Amconsul Shiraz CONS NEA/IRN ADMIN NEA/INRFRna NNNVV FER192BFA542 DTUEC#1964/13129930 TO FUTURE/AMPEBASIS AEN PHAPI 1645 RIJH/AMENBASIS AMAR 5093 RIUGN/AMERBASIS ANKARA 8000 RIOMAS/AMERBASIS AMINS 9192 RIOMBR/AMENBASIS RING 5511 RIERG/AMENBASIS B170 1624 SUNJON/AMERBASIS COLONIO 7992 RIJNJV/AMERBASIS NACCA 4019 RIELIM/AMERBASIS DAMAIGUS 1014 RIOMDB/AMERBASIS DRA 732 RUSTED/AMERBASIS IRLAMBAD 1009 RUQMB/AMERBASIS JIDA 5020 RUJMT/AMERBASIS KATMANO 0066 RUQNM/AMERBASIS HARTUM 9027 RUQMW/AMERBASIS WAIT 4170 RUQMN/AMERBASIS MANAMA 2359 RUQMB/AMERBASIS MUSCAT 6554 RUSBAE/AMERBASIS NEW DILFI 4104 RUQMG/AMERBASIS NICOSIA 5770 RUDET/AMERBASIS KAFAT 7224 RUPRO/AMERBASIS RONE 0522 RUOMIS/AMERBASIS SANA 2236 RUENTV/AMERBASIS TEL AVIV 8252 RUDBK/AMERBASIS TUMIS 9153 INFO RUQMB/AMERBASIS IPEFAN 7695 RUECR/USINT BAGHDAD 8752 RUEHOL/AMERBASIS POIN 9931 RUSILV/AMERBASIS KARTL 6196 RUSDT/USMISSION USUN NEW 7001 3355 RUSHA/USMISSION USNATO 2681 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIRINGN GE RUSCHOA/ GINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 1692 ST SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 284234/1 TAGS: PINS, IR, US, PINT E.0.11652:GDS LIMDIS SUBJECT: USG VIEW OF SITUATION IN IRA

RFF: RFF: STATE 293191 AND PREVIOUS SITREP 1. EMBASSIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON FOLLOWING INFOR- NATION IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY RIGH LEVEL ON HOW US VIEWS PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN. 2. AS IS APPARENT FROM MEDIA SOURCES, INTERNAL STABILITY IN IRAN CAME UNDER UNUSUALLY SEVERE PRESSURE, NOVEMBER 4-5. EXTENSIVE RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN TEHRAN CAUSED MANY CASUALTIES AND WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY. LATE ON NOVEMBER 5, PRIME MINISTER SHARIF-EMAMI AND HIS GOVERNMENT RESIGNED. 3. EARLY ON NOVEMBER 6, THE SHAN ANNOUNCED IN SPEECH TO THE IRANIAN NATION THAT HE WAS NAMING A MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO TAY OFFICE AT ONCE. HE MADE CLEAR THIS WOULD BE A CARETAKER GOVERNMENT STARTED WITH PREVENTING CHAOS AND ASSERTING THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. THE SHAN TOOK THIS ACTION BECAUSE IT HAD PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE TO GET REPRESENTATIVES OF RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS TO JOIN IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. HE PROMISED TEAT AS SOON AS SECURITY PERMITTED, HE WOULD APPOINT A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND TO HOLD FREE 4. THE SECURITY SITUATION SINCE THEN HAS IMPROVED; ALTHOUGH ISOLATED INCIDENTS CONTINUE. 5. THE USG MAINTAINS ITS STRONG BACKING OF THE SHAR'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE ORDER AND, AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT, TO CONTINUE HIS LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT AROGNAMS FOR THE COUNTRY. THIS WAS REAFFIRMED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS SPOKESMAN ON NOVEMBER 6, IN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "WE SUPPORT THE SHAH IN HIS DECISION. THE SHAH MOVED TO APPOINT A MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT ANOTHER SWILIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE FORMED TO RESTORE THE PUBLIC ORDER ESSENTIAL TO MOVING TOWARD SELECTIONS. FOR SOME TIME PREVIOUS TO HIS DECISION, HE ACTIVELY REPROHIBITED THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ONE THAT WOULD BE JOINED BY MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION. WHEN THOSE PERSONS REFUSED TO JOIN IN A COALITION CAINFT, AND THERE APPEARED TO BE NO ALTERNATIVE, THE SHAH ASKED THE MILITARY TO FORM A CARINFT. THE SHAH HAS EMPHASIZED THAT MILITARY RULE IS ONLY TEMPORARY, AND HE INTENDS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO MOVE THE COUNTRY TOWARD FREE FLECTIONS AND A NEW CIVILIAN-DIRECTED GOVERNMENT. 6. IN OUR ESTIMATION, THE SEAR HAS SHOWN EVERY AWARE-NESS OF THE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AS EXPRESSED BY THEM OVER THE PAST WEEKS AND MONTHS. HE HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO WORKING TOWARD GREATER POPULAR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR THE POPULATION, AND IMPROVED SOCIAL AMENITIES. INCREASINGLY DUALING THE LATE SUMMER AND FALL, HOWEVER WAVES OF DISORDERS AND WORLD STOPPAGES HAVE HAMPERED THE #4000

NNNNVV ESB093BRA544 RR RUQMR DE RUEHC #4364/2 3120940 7NY SSSSS 7ZR R 00307Z NOV 7B FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ARU DUABI 1646 PUEBAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 5994 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6597 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 9493 RUQMBT/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5512 RUEREG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1505 RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 7991 RUMJDE/AMEMBASSY DACCA 6930 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1615 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 7333 RUSRQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2242 RUQMBA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5992 RUMJET/AMEMBASSY ZATHANDU 6967 RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY EHBATOOM 9528 RUQMW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4327 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 2363 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 6555 RUSRAF/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4185 RUQMG/AMEMBASSY NIOSHA 5271 RUDBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7726 PUERO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2623 RUOMAS/AMEMBASSY SANA 2337 RUEHLV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9053 RUQTR/AMEMBASSY UNIS 9154 INFO RUCMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 7896 RUERCR/USIA RAGDAD 8753 RUHEOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9832 RUSELK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 6197 RUEHD/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3356 RUFHNA/MISSION "NATO 2692" RUSNAAA/SCINGER OR VAIPINGEN GE RUSQHA/ CINOPAC HONCLTU HAWAII 1683 N E D C P E FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 284064 LIMITS VERT FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT. WE HOPE THAT THE FORMATION OF THE NEW TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED NO NOVEMBER WILL FACILITATE THE RETURN OF AN ORDER AND AMMORPHE RESENTIAL TO THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT IN ANY SOCIETY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TIME IN THE SITUATION THAT EXISTS IN IRAN, WHERE THE SHAR VAS PLEDGED PUBLICLY TO CORRECT MISTAKES OF THE PAST. TO FIGHT CORRUPTION AND INJUSTICES, AND TO FORM A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT ELECTIONS AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND TEHIR LEADERS CAN WORK IN UNITY TO ACHIEVE THSE GOALS. 7. OBVIOUSLY THERE IS AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC SIDE TO ALL TEIS. THE STRIKES IN THE OIL SECTOR CAUSED SERIOUS PRODUCTION AND EXPORT STORAGE IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, AND IN RECENT DAYS THE OUTPUT WAS AVERAGED NO MORE THAN 25 PERCENT OF NORMAL. WE HOPE THAT ALL THOSE WHO PLAY BY ROLES IN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY WILL JOIN IN RESOLVING THEIR DIFFERENCES SO THAT THE COMMON INTEREST MAY BE ADVANCED. 5. YOU SECULI I UNLESS ON YOUR DESIGN OUR DETERMINATION TO USE OUR FULL INFLUENCE TO EFFECT VITAL WESTERN INTERESTS. AN THIS JCTOR, THIS MEANS FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE SHARES EFFORT TO PULL HIS COUNTRY TOGETHER AND LAY THE BASIS FOR FUTURE STABILITY. VANCE 4064 8. WE ARE CONCERNED LIST THIS INSTABILITY SPREAD TO THE DETRIMENT OF REGIONAL SECURITY. THIS US HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE SHARE'S EXPENSES TO PROVIDE READY LEADERSHIP FOR IRAN IN THIS CRIGIAL PERIOD. WE BELIEVE HIS REGIONS TO PROVIDE POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ARE CONGAGROUS, AND THAT THEY RESERVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL.

) [?] 2514.32×15263 1724 P 155 CCT 78 FECTIE W4EDC 300CT7C CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 275514 ^{1} ∵1116527K/A TACC1 CTPA, IR PROJECT: ALLTS-CHALPERE CHAIRMAN VISITING TECHNIK 1. DAVID C. SCOTT, CHAIRMAN OF ALLIS-CHALNESE AND PATTY WILL BE VISITING TEHRAN NOVEMBER 23-26, STAYING AT MILLION. SCOTT HAS REQUESTED A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN, POSSIBLY LATE AFTERNOON ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 25 (THE ARRIVES TEHRAN THAT DAY AT 2 P.M. FROM ISRAEL). SCOTT WAS AUDIENCE WITH SHAH AT 10:45 A.M. NOVEMBER 25, AND WILL DEPART TEHRAN MORNING 26TH. FYI: ARDESHIR ZAHEDI IS SETTING UP DINNER FOR SCOTT AND MAY HOSE IT HIMSELF. END BYI 9. WOULD ASSOCIATION WORLD WHETHER AND/OR SPOOCH ALGEBRA, THE COTT AT THE FRIEND DUBING HIS VISIT AND SPECIFIC TIMES. THE POSITION OF THE OLD BEEF? VANCE MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES FROM: ECON/COM - Barbara L. Schell SUBJECT: Audience with Shah, David C. Scott. Allis Chalmers DISTRIBUTION: AMB. DCM. POI. ECON. NEA/IRN David C. Scott, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive and President of Allis Chalmers Corp., was received by the Shah on Saturday, November 25, 1978, at 11:00 a.m. The following description was provided by Mr. Don Donner, the Iran representative of Allis Chalmers who accompanied Scott to the palace but was not present during the audience. Mr. Scott found the Shah in very low spirits. He perked up somewhat when Scott complimented his children, and Ambassador Zahedi. Scott offered sympathy to the Shah and indicated that American businessmen generally are firm in their support for him. The Shah bemoaned the fact that he is receiving many expressions of support, but that this support tends to be verbal and of little help to him. Scott (presumably in an effort to demonstrate that he was in a position to offer more than more verbal support) described his recent visit to Argentina, and told the Shah that he had succeeded in obtaining a reversal of a decision to disapprove an application for ExIm loans for an Allis Chalmers project in Argentina because of human rights violations. Scott then went on to describe Allis Chalmers' proposed joint venture for the production of mining equipment in Iran (see Airgram A-154. He indicated that he had sufficient confidence in Iran to wish to proceed immediately with the project. At this point, there was a long period of silence on the part of the Shah during which tears welled up in his eyes, and Scott's discomfort grew. Finally, the Shah asked Scott what he thought had gone wrong in Iran. Scott replied that he was not capable of replying, but that American businessmen supported the monarch. Contrary to usual protocol, Scott rose first, the Shah put his arm around him and thanked him for the gift, something which is apparently not normally done.

CONFIG_INITIAL Following the audience, a Ministry of Court official whom Scott knows commented that the Shah's spirits had been low, and that he had no real friends in whom he could confide. He suggested to Scott, that perhaps it would be beneficial if Zahedi would visit Iran more often, since he is the only one who could play the role of friend and confident, something the Shah sorely needs. Scott was asked to brief Zahedi when he returns to the United States. ECON/COM: BLSchell: ccm 12/4/78 2.1.1335111 2024 1. 1. 15N. 15N. 15N. YOU ALREADY SEEN RESTRICTION IN 1980-1990 FOR THE SON OF THE CONOFT VIA LEGAL, THE ONLY OTHER FUND OF THE CHILD MARRIED THAT REPORT WAS PASSIONED COMPANY IN 1981 AND THE TEAT IT LOOING AS THE STAR OF VACUUM WAS INCREASED AND WOULD LAST A LONG TIME. 3. FRENCH POSITION IS AND IS BEEN FOR NO ONE TIME THAT SHADE IS FINISHED. THEY BEHAVED TO SOON THE TIME OF THE BETTER. WHILE THEY PULL IN WALL STREET FOR THE NAME A REGENCY COCONCIL AND DEPART IN SOON BY EVER since THE THINK THAT ASPECT IS NOT SEENOUSLY RELEVANT. GERMAN AMBASSADOR STEMS SONGVAT NORM OPTIMIZATION. FRYELS IS POSSIBLE IN CONTIEN CENDIENT MIGED EO. SHAK TEMPORARILY WITH DRAKE AND VINTAGE REGENCY CONOOLING. THINGS IT IS EVEN POSITIVE SHAK MIGHT ARE AREA A LITER DAY TO RETURN AS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONAPOR. S. COMMON VIEW AMONG ALL COLLARGUES IS THAT LAW AND ORDER SITUATION IS OUT OF EVERYCHS CONTROL AND THAT PRIMITIVITY VANALLISH IS ON THE RISH THROUGH COUNTRY, WITH VERY HEAVY OVERTONES OF ISNOPHYIA. THERE IS THEREFORE SEVERAL CONSENSUS THAT SITUATION IS FAST APPROACHING ANARCHY. SULLIVAN 5. MI JAPANESE COLLEAGUE HAS JUST ANTIVED AND PRESENTED RIS CREDENTIALS DECEMBER 26. HE AND I HARD CONSULTED TICE, BUT HE HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDALLY RELUCTANT TO EXPOSURE ANY DEFINITIVE VIEWS ON BASIS SOCH SHORT EXPOSURE TO THIS CONFUSING SCENE. [?]

ACTION DE RUEHC #2723 0392250 7NY COCCO 77H 0 0803137 F69 75 FM SECURITATE WASID [?] 73 93 072 TO RUQUING/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3315 INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON JIMENDIATE 7471 BT gt sile CONFIDENTIAL STATE 03723 E.O. 12063 GDS 2/7/83 (CLEMENT, C.) TA St PINT, PROP, IR SUBJECT: (U) ALLEGED TAPE RECORDING OF SHAN SPEAKING TO A-MY OFFICERS KEF: TEHRAN 192 1. OPINIONS OF RESPONSIBLE "VOICE EXPERTS THAT WE ARE AWARE OF CONCERNING AUTHENTICITY OF TAPE ARE CONTRADICTORY AND INCONCLUSIVE. SOME MAINTAIN THAT IT IS AUTHENTIC, OTHER EXPERT CLAIMS THAT IT IS NOT 2. AED DOES NOT INTENDED TO FOR SIDE, MATTER FORTHER AND WILL TARE POSITION. IF ASKED, THAT "EXPERT" DISAGREE AND THAT WE HAVE NO REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT TARE IS AUTHENTIC. VANCE BY O 101237Z FEB 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3909 INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5616 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4327 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3752 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0375 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 02016 C O N F I D E N T I A L T E H R A N 02016 E.O. 12065: RDS-4 2-10-99 (LAMBRAKIS, G. B.) TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: (C) REPORT OF SHAH'S PLAN TO RETURN 4. ONE REASON LOYALISTS CHOOSE TO BELIEVE SUCH A REPORT IS THEIR INCREASING ALARM OVER LAW AND ORDER SITUATION AND THEIR OWN PROSPECTS. EQUAL, WHO PARTICIPATED IN PRO-BAKHTIAR "CONSTITUTIONALIST" DEMONSTRATION YESTERDAY, FEB 10, WAS APPARENTLY SHOCKED THAT GROUP WAS RAZED AND THREATENED BY YOUNG TOUGGS ON DEPARTURE FROM AMJADIEH STADIUM, AND MANY PARKED CARS HAD THEIR TIRES SLASHED. HIS FRIEND AND NEIGHBOR, ONE ENGINEER MALLOUL, HAS JUST FLED WITH HIS FAMILY TO ARAK AFTER HAVING HIS NEW CAR BLOWN UP TWO NIGHTS AGO AND WARNING ISSUED THAT IF HE PERSISTED IN PRO-BAKHTIAR STATEMENTS (HE HAD APPARENTLY WRITTEN LETTER TO A NEWSPAPER), HE AND HIS FAMILY WOULD BE KILLED. WHERE IS FREE SPEECH, EQBAL ASKS. 1 [?] (C - ENTIRE TEXT) A SOURCE MANSOUR EQBAL, WHO IS NOT RPT NOT CONSISTENTLY RELIABLE, BUT WHO HAS GOOD ACCESS TOLD POL COUNSELOR RUMOR IS GOING AROUND LOYALIST CIRCLES THAT SHAR PLANS TO RETURN TO IRAN FEB 14, GEN NESHAT HAS FLOWN TO MOROCCO IN THIS CONNECTION. WE ARE PRETTY SURE THIS IS GARBLE OF REPORT THAT SHAR PLANS TO MOVE TO CAIRO ABOUT THAT DATE. SUMMARY: ANOTHER ERSTWHILE LOYALIST, WHO SUPPORTS AKBTJAR, EXPRESSES ALARM AT DETERIORATING JAW AND ORDER SITUATION AND BELIEVES ONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IS THAT SPAR ANNOUNCE HIS ABDICATION. HE FEARS SEEN'S RETURN TO IRAN IN NEAR FUTURE. HE SUGGESTS POSSIBLE "VIGILANTE ARMED ACTION BY CONSERVATIVES IF TERRORIST GROUPS AND COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHOUT SANCTIONS FROM THE KHOMEINI MOVEMENT. END SUMMARY. . EQBAL HAD THE REPORT VIA DR. HEJAZI THAT SHARIA T-MADARI'S LETTER OF GREETINGS TO KHOMEINI ON LATER'S ARRIVAL OMITTED ANY REFERENCE TO KHOMEINI'S PREPONDERANT POSITION IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OR ANY APPELLATION OF IMAM AS A RESULT, A COLLECTION OF SHARIAT-MADARI'S BOOKS FROM ALL OVER WERE DUMPED ON HIS DOORSTEP RECENTLY. HE CONTINUES TO FEAR FOR HIS LIFE AND KEEPS SILENT. EQUAL PAS BEACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT ONLY MAY DO SAVE IT SITUATION IS FOR SHAR TO ANNOUNCE HIS ABILICATION. HE AN NAME HIS SON AS SUCCESSOR IF HE WISHES. WITHOUT SUCH STEP. NQBAL FEARS DAKHTLAR'S SPIRIT AND POSITION WILL

CONFIDENTIAL ERODE. PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY FOR HIM BUT BEING TERROR- IZED BY THE UNWASHED MOBS WHO HAVE SUFFERED A GREAT DEAL UNDER SHAH'S RULE AND ARE ACTING EMOTIONALLY, AS EQBAL AND HIS FRIENDS SEE IT. IF SITUATION RUNS ON LIKE THIS MUCH LONGEPEOPLE WILL COME OUT ON THE STREETS WITH THEIR WEAPONS—LIKE LEBANON. HE WOULD BE WILLING TELL THIS TO THE SHAH IF HE CAN FIX UP A MEETING SOMEHOW, THROUGH ZAHEDI. (COMMENT: ABDICATION IS MORE FREQUENTLY AND OPENLY BEING MENTIONED BY LOYALISTS WITH EVEN BETTER CREDENTIALS THAN EQBAL, SEE PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING.) 7. EQBAL'S FINAL WORD WAS TO HINT THAT ASSASSINATION OF KHOMEINI IS BEGINNING TO APPEAL TO MANY AS PART OF A SOLUTION. HE EXPRESSED PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING OF GREAT PROBLEMS THAT WOULD CAUSE BUT SUGGESTED EVEN SOME IN THE NON-KHOMEINI RELIGIOUS CIRCLES MIGHT NOT BE AVERSE TO SEEING HIS EXTREMIST VOICE DISAPPEAR FROM THE SCENE. 8. FINALLY, EQBAL REFERRED TO PUBLISHED STATEMENT BY COMMUNIST PARTY ASKING KHOMEINI WHAT THEIR PLACE WAS IN HIS MOVEMENT AND THREATENING TO "FIGHT" IF HIS ANSWER IS NOT SATISFACTORY. WHILE ADMITTING SUCH OPEN ACTIVITY BY THE COMMUNISTS IS BETTER THAN CRYPTO ACTIVISM, EQBAL OPINED IT HEIGHTENS THE FEARS OF MANY CONSERVATIVES AND MIGHT LEAD THEM TO THINK OF VIGILANTE ACTION AS THEIR ONLY DEFENSE. 9. COMMENT: A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANCE NEED NOT BE ATTACHED TO EQBAL AS A SOURCE. HOWEVER, HIS IDEAS HAVE A CERTAIN LOGIC WHICH IS APPEALING TO LOYALISTS AND OTHER CONSERVATIVES AS THEY SEE NO EXIT FROM PRESENT SITUATION WITHOUT A GREAT DEAL OF BLOODSHED. CONTINUING INSECURITY AND TERRORISM MIGHT PROVOKE MANY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW KEEPING THEIR HEADS DOWN TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE EITHER POLITICALLY (IF THAT IS PERMITTED) OR IN TERMS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM ON THE STREETS. THIS IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT, BUT ONE WHICH WE SHOULD NOT DISCOUNT AS INSECURITY BRED BY DISTURBANCES CONTINUES. SULLIVAN December 7, 1978 The Honorable William H. Sullivan Ambassador U.S. Embassy Tetheran, IRAN Dear Mr. Sullivan: In light of recent events in your area, it occurred to us that His Royal Highness might be interested in purchasing a large parcel of land (with home) in this country which is both centrally located, yet remote in its situation on our California Coast. The enclosed brochure fully describes the property. If appropriate, please do inform His Royal Highness of its availability for purchase. Most cordially, Lyhn Grabhorn Associate LYNN GRABHORN ASSOCIATE 1906 MAIN ST. BUS. (805) 772-1231 MORRO BAY, CA. 93442 RES. (805) 927-4108

RANCHO ARROYO GRANDE Arroyo Grande San Luis Obispo County California Encompassing over 9,700 acres near the shores of Lake Lopez and nestled between the Los Padres National Forest and the Pacific Ocean, this magnificent ranch holds a rich heritage of productive ranching since the days of the original Spanish Land Grants. Rancho Arroyo Grande...one of the last great parcels of prime land on the central California coast. Size: 9,750 acres Price: $5,500,000 Terms: Min. 29% down, balance negotiable, or, all cash.

RANCHO ARROYO GRANDE, 9,750 acres, is one of California's land grant ranchos ideally located half way between Los Angeles and San Francisco, a little over 3 freeway hours from each, and about 10 miles inland from beaches, boat harbors, and a number of small communities -- Santa Maria, San Luis Obispo, Avila Beach, Pismo Beach, etc. This is still within the narrow strip of mild coastal climate and good rainfall, before the first range of hills. Present agricultural use includes grazing of up to 1,500 cattle (leased) but with main emphasis on farming of 500 to 2,000 acres of the valley lands in winter grain crops (oats, barley, wheat) and summer bean crops (garbanzo, pink). The climate is excellent for many other crops, such as tomatoes, peppers, other vegetables, flowers, vineyards, almond and walnut groves, apples, some avocado varieties, or citrus, all of which are raised in the vicinity. There are several small all-year streams originating on and flowing thru the property, from which over 1,000 acre feet per year could be taken by riparian right, for irrigation use. This resource has not yet been used. The ranch adjoins on the north Los Padres National Forest, proposed as a wilderness area, and on the west the 4,000 acre Lopez Lake Recreation Area, created in 1969 and developed for varied camping, fishing, boating, swimming, etc., thru an 18 million dollar bond issue. It is the only California recreational lake so near the beaches. Those parts of the ranch adjoining the Lopez area are designated "recreational," and there have been studies and plans toward developing their private Resort Ranch facilities (equestrian, tennis, swimming, boat storage, lodge, cottages, campsites) for a member/owner group numbering up to several hundred or more, who could also share ownership of the undivided and centrally managed farming and ranching operation. These plans are still open to further investigation. The value of RANCHO ARROYO GRANDE was M.A.I. appraised, by a potential buyer, at 4,020,000 in 1972, leading to the 5,500,000 figure for the end of 1978. That amounts to $564/acre. The Department of Agriculture reported in 1977 that California's agricultural lands are averaging 14% per year value increase. The Rancho's manager has lived and worked on the property for many years, and it is probable he would be happy to stay in that capacity.

The ranch entrance is eight miles northeast of the city of Arroyo Grande, fifteen miles southeast of the City of San Luis Obispo, twenty miles north of the City of Santa Maria, and ten miles from the Pacific Ocean at Pismo Beach State Park. Bounded by the 4500 acre Lopez Lake Recreational Park on the west, and by the 193,000 acre Los Padres National Forest on the north and east, the Rancho comprises a uniquely secluded network of valleys, streams, and foothills offering unusual opportunity for recreational development. ACCESS: Access is provided from U.S. Highway 101, via a newly expanded level, high-speed county road. The Rancho is 2½ hours drive from Bakersfield or Fresno, 3 hours from Los Angeles, and 4 hours from San Francisco. A total population of almost 15,000,000 people reside within a four hour drive. LOPEZ LAKE: This major recreational development borders the property for more than 3 miles. The lake created by the $16,000,000 Lopez Dam has a surface area of 940 acres, and a shoreline of 22 miles. Facilities are provided for swimming, water skiing, fishing, boating, camping and riding. The park is set up to accommodate 4,000 persons a day, and visitor days are estimated at 660,000 annually. RANCHO ARROYO GRANDE is the closest privately-held land to the park entrance. It is also the only land in the area which is sufficiently gentle to be practical for extensive recreational development. TOPOGRAPHY: The Rancho is entered from along the shore of Lopez Lake at an elevation of 550 feet above sea level. Approximately 1800 level, cultivated acres lie along the Arroyo Grande, Saucelito, Phoenix and Potrero Creeks -- all year-round streams which run through the property. About 2,000 acres are in the gently rolling foothills and finger valleys which slope away from the creek bottoms. To the north and east are the more rugged mountains containing meadows, streams, and abundant wildlife. The rugged outer perimeters shield the major flatlands from inclement weather and seclude the entire area from its surroundings. The highest point on the property is at 1853 feet, at the entrance into the Los Padres National Forest. CLIMATE: Climate is close to ideal. The property is wholly on the ocean side of the Santa Lucia mountain range, yet it is just inland of the coastal fog belt. The air is clear, clean, and smog-free. Gentle winds are usually present. Noon temperatures are normally below 85 degrees in the summer, and 50 degrees in the winter. Average annual rainfall is 23 inches.

WATER: Four streams run year-round through the property. Arroyo Grande Creek which flows through the main valley is one of the two principal sources of water for Lopez Lake. Rancho Arroyo Grande has full riparian rights to this water. A series of test wells have been drilled into the valley ground water aquifers. Each well produces water in domestic quantities. Numerous large springs flow year-round from the bases of the anticlines and bluff areas. LAND USE: 1400 acres of valley land have been dry farmed in barley and oats. Another 300 acres have been cultivated in Sudan grass. At ranch headquarters, about 30 acres of permanent pasture are irrigated from Arroyo Grande Creek waters. The balance of the property is used for grazing range. At present, the Rancho carries 1500 head of stocker steers through the fall to spring season and 500 head through the summer. (Income from this lease is approximately 50,000 gross in good, wet years, and 25,000 gross in dry years). Additional permanent and semi-permanent pasture is presently being developed. At least 1,000 acres have been proven suitable for Zone 2 varietal wine grapes, or for orchard crops. IMPROVEMENTS: a smaller guest house, two modern homes for employees, extensive barns, corrals, and other outbuildings. The property is completely fenced and cross-fenced, and contains over 50 miles of roads and trails. Electrical power service is provided by PG&E and telephone service by Pacific Telephone. A U.S. Forest Service fire control station with rangers in residence is located on the ranch property. A State of California experimental agricultural range is also maintained on which foresters and agronomists conduct studies for improving agricultural practices. OTHER INFORMATION: The area abounds in doves, quail, deer, and wild turkey. Lopez Lake is planted regularly with trout. Additional fishing ponds could be readily created on the Rancho, along the Arroyo Crande Creek. Southwestern San Luis Obispo County is one of the fastest-developing areas in California. Estimated total employment within 45 minutes drive of the Rancho is 125,000. San Luis Obispo has a population (not counting students) of 32,000. This represents a 10 year increase of 109%, with a more rapid growth expected. Major employment centers include Vandenberg AFB (which was recently approved as the West Coast Launching Center for the new Space Shuttle Program), Calif. Poly State College, and a planned $1 Billion atomic fueled electric generating plant. RANCHO ARROYO GRANDE RAINFALL: \underline{a}\underline{t}\underline{e}\underline{r} SURFACE STREAMS Average 23 inches a year, variation between 15° and 40°. Weekly records for the years '63-'73 recorded. Four creeks...Arroyo Grande, Saucelito, Potrero, and Phoenix...flow thru the main valleys, converging near the SW corner of the ranch and flowing into Lopez Lake. A gauging station located at the point of convergence records flow daily. Over the period 1965 thru 1973, average outflow was 2260 acre feet a year, with lowest year 609 acre feet. STREAMS: Several springs, in Arroyo Grande, Saucelito, and Potrero Valleys are used for stock ponds. WELLS: Seven wells of depths 50 to 100 feet were drilled by a prior owner (Houchin) at locations along Arroyo Grande valley near ranch headquarters. Wells were cased (8" diameter) tested to show 30 to 50 gals a minute capacity, but have not been used. 600 foot 10" dia. test well by Houchin in upper Arroyo Grande Valley in 1960 tested at 120 gal/min, but did not penetrate sandstone layer. Not cased. 300 foot, 8" dia test well in Phoenix valley about 1968 tested at 15 gal/min, did not penetrate sandstone. (Drilled by Floyd V. Wells, Inc., Jim Rouse). HYDROLOGY: Studies by Paul Manera, Hydrologist, in 1966, using electrical resistivity probes, concluded that"from the surface to a depth of 1500 feet are potential water producing materials." Further studies, including the 300 foot test well, were conducted in 1968 with recommendation that a number of shallow wells, 60 to 100 ft., along the Arroyo Grande Creek, could tap its underflow. Home-Stake Production Co. provided Manera with electric logs of deep oil well tests just south of the ranch. For further information, contact Dick Break, Miles and Cullington, S.L.O. RIPARIAN RIGHTS: A legal opinion obtained in 1968 from Rowell, Lamberson Thomas & Hiber, Fresno, indicates that "the entire subject property...is riparian to the streams flowing within it..." and..."the creation of small ponds through which the water continues to flow would be legally proper."

FOREST PADRES 1906 MAIN STREET. MORRO BAY, CALIFORNIA 93442 (805) 772-1231

CONFIDENTIAL MEMO FOR THE FILES SUBJECT: Shah's Travel and DGA Les Janka of the DGA firm called on me March 6 for background in relation to Don Agger's trip to Marakech this week. DGA has in prospect a contract to provide support (real estate, protection, legal services, etc.) for the Shah should be come to the US. Janka asked for my views. Speaking personally, I told him that should the Shah come to the US it would be a disaster for US-Iranian relations, for the Western position in the region and would create a severe security problem for our personnel in Tehran and USG officials in Washington. I was not sure that we would be able to maintain an Embassy in Tehran. I told him of the Iranian attitude toward the Moroccans and the Egyptians and the probability of the PLO-assisted effort to kidnap the Shah. I said in my view the Shah would be ill-advised to come here. His security could not be assured unless he were kept in strict confinement and he would be subject to legal and Congressional harassment. His assets could well be attached. Janka asked whether the US could provide protection, at least initially. I said I presumed that this would be the case but that we had already told the Shah's mother that she must look to private protection agencies. Janka asked if the correct US position was that we would welcome the Shah to the US. I said that had been the position in December-January and it had been made public. I was not in a position to tell Janka the US position now. Janka said suppose the Shah asked Agger whether the US would welcome him. I said I thought that Mr. Agger should reply that all questions relating to the USG should be referred to Ambassador Parker. I said maybe Mr. Newsom would have a different view on this. I told Janka that in my experience very little in Iranian affairs had remained out of the press. It would do the firm no good if the Shah were to come here and there were reprecussions against the USG and its personnel. I could easily imagine that the news might conclude that DGA was responsible for whatever damage was done. Henry Precht NEA/IRN Copies to: P, M, NEA, Amb. Embassy Tehran Amb. Embassy Rabat File

ORIG:O/FADRCCOPIES: DEPARTMENT OF STATE April 18, 1979 TO: P - Mr. Newsom FROM: NEA - Harold H. Saunders SUBJECT: USG Attitude on Visas for the Shah's Family and Immediate Entourage We are receiving numerous requests from influential Americans to provide some kind of legal status in the U.S. or documentation for travel (asylum, parole, or advance parole) for Princess Ashraf and her family and other members of the Shah's entourage (e.g., ex-Ministers Amouzegar, Ansary, General Oveisi, etc.). We have taken the position with the visitors that it would be contrary to our interest in drawing closer to the new government to grant any of these requests. There is no question, on the other hand, that any of these people would be forced to return to Iran. All of them can be sustained here in a voluntary departure status or by extending their visas. They can even come and go from the U.S. if we waive the passport requirement, which this Bureau would be willing to approve. We have heard that the Shah's family has acquired Moroccan passports. We do not think it is our responsibility to provide documentation that will facilitate entry into other countries. A particular question centers on Princess Ashraf, probably regarded in a worse light by Iranians than the Shah himself. Ashraf's unsavory past may possibly render her ineligible for a U.S. visa. We have some indication from a conversation with one of her sons that she may not have abandoned efforts to restore the former regime. As you know, the PGOI is intensely fearful and suspicious of the efforts of pro-Shah elements (allegedly with our support) to mount a counterrevolution. We would not wish to create any grounds that would support these charges. We would appreciate your views as to whether we are responding appropriately to inquiries about asylum, parole, or other U.S. protection for persons from the previous Iranian regime. CONFIDENTIAL Recommendation: That you approve the position outlined in this memorandum. Approve ___ Disapprove ___ Clearance: CA - E. Harper HA - F. Sieverts Drafted:NEA/IRN:ext. 20313:4/17/79

CE'IRN CE'IRN CE'IRN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL With reference to your memorandum on our attitude on documentation for the Shah's family and associates, I would make the following comments. MEMORANDUM TO: NEA - Mr. Saunders Princess Ashraf and members of her family and friends have been stirring up a major effort on the question of documentation. We should respond to all such queries by saying that Princess Ashraf has an attorney who is handling this question and the attorney has been in touch with the Department. For your information, the attorney is William Jackson, who is also attorney for David Rockefeller. He has come to the Department and we have briefed him fully on the documentation question. Questions put by other Iranians should be handled on a case by case basis. We are not adopting a blanket policy on this matter. David D. Newsom Copy to: S - Mr. Raphel CA - Ms. Harper HA - Mr. Sieverts CONF IDENTIALGDS 4/20/85 NNNVV ES8018BRA983 NNNNVV OO RUQMRR DE RUEHSD #47B2 2080102 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 262357Z JUL 79 ZFF4 ZDK DUE LACK OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3712 BT S E C A S T STATE 194782 CHEROKEE, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE LAINGEN - B.0.11652: RDS-3, 7/26/89 (TARNOFF, PETER) FROM THE SECRETARY TAGS: PEPR SUBJECT: SHAH'S DESIRE TO RESIDE IN THE U.S. 1. WE ARE AGAIN CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND TO THE SHAH'S CONTINUING QUERY TO US THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS REGARDING ESTABLISHING RESIDENCE FOR HIMSELF, THE SHAH BANOU, AND HIS FAMILY IN THE U.S. (HE CAN REMAIN IN MEXICO AT LEAST THROUGH OCTOBER.) I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR PERSONAL AND PRIVATE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECT OF SUCH A MOVE ON THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRON (ESPECIALLY THE OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN THE COMPOUND AS WELL AS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRON. 2. WOULD YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION POSED IN PARA 1 BE DIFFERENT IF (A) THE SHAN RENOUNCED HIS CLAIM AND THAT OF HIS HEIRS TO THE THRONE, OR (B) THAT HE AGREED TO FORE- SWEAR POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ANY SORT AND THAT THIS BE CONFIRMED PUBLICLY. 3. WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE KEY TO MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF THE SHAH'S ADMISSION WOULD BE IN BAZARGAN AND THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY IN SUCH A SITUATION TO CONTROL AND COMMAND THE SECURITY FORCES GUARDING OUR PEOPLE AND TO MINIMIZE ANY HOSTILE PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST OUR PEOPLE OR OUR RELATIONS. SINCE THIS QUESTION IS BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN ASHEINGTON, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR NOT SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH ANYONE ELSE ON YOUR STAFF. PLEASE SEND YOUR REPLY NODIS/CHEROKEE, FOR THE SECRETARY. WITH BEST REGARDS. VANCE BT 271

SECRET/NODIS DE RUQMHR #7930/01 209 ** ZNY SSSSSS ZZH 02809142 JUL 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2904 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 07930 NODIS CHEROXEE — FOR THE SECRETARY E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/28/79 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-M TAGS: PEPR SUBJECT: SHAH'S DESIRE TO RESIDE IN THE U.S. REF: STATE 194782 1. YOUR MESSAGE ASKS FOR MY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECT, ON THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN AND ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, OF THE SHAH BEING ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 2. A JUDGMENT ON THAT ISSUE MUST INEVITABLY BE (AND REMAIN) SPECULATIVE, CLOUDED BY THE ENORMOUS UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CURRENT IRANIAN SCENE—WHERE THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST NO PROGRESS TO DATE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE ULTIMATE POWER STRUCTURE. SUBJECT TO THAT RESERVATION, I CONCLUDE THAT FOR THE SHARE TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BY WHICH I MEAN THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS, WOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE TO BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO OUR INTERESTS AND TO THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT THIS SITUATION COULD BEGIN TO CHANGE WITHIN THAT TIME PERIOD TO MAKE THE RISKS MANAGEABLE BY LATE FALL. EVEN THAT JUDGMENT, I MUST CONFESS, IS INEVITABLY SPF CULATIVE AND PRESUPPOSES A GOOD DEAL OF GOOD FORTUNE FOR ALL CONCERNED. MY RATIONALE FOLLOWS. 3 I BELIEVE THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS REPRESENT THE WRONG TIME PERIOD FOR TWO BASIC REASONS: FIRST, THE HIGH DEGREE OF FRUSTRATION (AND THUS THE POTENTIAL FOR A SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS) IN THE CURRENT IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE AND, SECOND, THE STILL SENSITIVE NATURE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. 4. IRAN TODAY REMAINS POLITICALLY ADRIFT, ITS "GOVERN-MENT UNDER BAZARGAN STILL SUBJECT TO THE WHIMS AND ULTIMATE CONTROL OF THE AYATOLLAH AND HIS ENTOURAGE AT QOM. DAY-TO-DAY DECISION MAKING IS DIFFUSED, EXERCISED MORE OFTEN THAN NOT BY REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS SCATTERED IN AND OUT OF THE FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE A PARATUS OF GOVERNMENT. THERE IS GROWING POPULAR FRUSTRATION OVER THE FACT THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS NOT CHANGED THINGS VERY MUCH IN IRAN; INDEED FOR MANY SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION, CONDITIONS ARE WORSE THAN THEY WERE BEFORE. TEHRAN 7930/1 272 CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: STATE28/79 DRFTD: CHARGE:LPLAINGEN APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN CLEAR: NONE DISTR: CHARGE SECRET/NODIS 5. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE, WE REMAIN THE CONVENIENT SCAPE-GOAT, TO THE POINT WERE KHOMEINI THIS PAST WEEK EVEN TARGETED US AS SOMEHOW BEHIND THE BURNING OF HARVESTS IN THE FIELDS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF IRAN. FOR US NOW TO GIVE REFUGE TO THE SHAH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TRIGGER MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OUR EMBASSY. WITH LUCK, THEY MAY STOP AT THAT, WITHOUT A PHYSICAL ASSAULT OF THE KIND WE EXPERIENCED LAST FEBRUARY. BUT THERE COULD BE NO ASSURANCE OF THAT, SINCE IRAN'S REGULAR MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES REMAIN LARGELY DEMORALIZED AND CANNOT YET BE RELIED ON TO APPLY THE FORCE THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED TO PREVENT VICENCE AGAINST US, INDEED THE GOVERNMENT HERE HAS YET TO FIND THE STRENGTH OR MEANS TO REPLACE WITH A UNIFORMED FORCE THE IRREGULAR GUERRILLA FORCE ASSIGNED BY KHOMEINI TO "GUARD". OUR COMPOUND SINCE LAST FEBRUARY. THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST OUR CHANCERY AND PERSONNEL WOULD OF COURSE ALSO BE GREATER WERE THE SHAH TO COME TO THE U.S. NOW, THOUGH THAT IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ALREADY EXISTS. 6. NOR IS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP YET OF THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND SUBSTANCE EASILY TO WEATHER A GESTURE OF THIS KIND TOWARD THE SHAH. I THINK WE ARE MAKING PRO- PRESS IN REMOVING AT LEAST SOME OF WHAT HAS BEEN A DEEPLY FELT SUSPICION AMONG REVOLUTIONARY IRANIANS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET ACCEPTED THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN AND THAT WE ARE CONNIVING WITH THE SHAH, ZIONISM. OR WITH SAVAKIS TO UNDERMINING THE REVOLUTION. -BUT IT IS SLOW GOING, AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT OUR CREDENTIALS HAVE BEEN ENHANCED MUCH AT ALL AS YET WITH KHOMEINI. -GRANTING A SIYLUM TO THE SHAH'NOW WOULD NEGATE MUCH THAT WE HAVE A HIEVED TO DATE, AND I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE A REPEAT IN SOME FASHION, DICTATED BY KHOMEINI, OF A KNEF-JERK TYPE OF POLICY ACTION AGAINST US AS DEMONSTRATED AT THE TIME OF THE JAVITS RESOLUTION. 7. WEAT I AM SAYING IS THAT WE NEED SOME ADDED CUSHION ON BOTH FRONTS--ON THE INTERNAL IRANIAN SCENE AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS--BEFORE WE ACCEPT WHATEVER RISKS #7930 NNN

SECRET/NODIS S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 07930 NODIS CHEROKEE - FOR THE SECRETARY THERE MAY BE FOR OUR INTERESTS IN DOING WHAT I BELIEVE WE EVENTUALLY SHOULD DO--- ALLOW THE SHAH REFUGE IN THE U.S. 8. THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS ARE CRUCIAL AND POSSIBLY HOPEFUL IN BOTH RESPECTS. INTERNALLY, BAZARGAN IS MAKING A NEW AND STRONGER EFFORT TO GET KHOMEINI TO TRANSFER TO HIS PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SOME OF THE AUTHORITY NOW EXERCISED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY AND COURTS AND BY THE LOOSE HIERARCHY OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES THAT STRETCH TO THE STREET LEVEL. GROWING PROBLEMS WITH THE KURDS AND THE ARAB MINORITY IN KUZISTAN SEEM TO BE REMINDING AT LEAST SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS THAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO RESTORE THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY IN TERMS OF BOTH AUTHORITY AND MATERIAL. BUT THE REAL KEY TO STRENGTHENED GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND CONTROL LIES IN THE SUCCESSFUL CARRYING OUT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (A KIND OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS TO BE ELECTED AUGUST 3) WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO RESULT IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY ENDOWED GOVERNMENT IN POWER BY AUTUMN. 9. IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE, IN MY VIEW, THAT WE NOT INJECT OURSELVES IN THAT PROCESS BY ANY PREMATURE GESTURE TOWARD THE SHAR, WITH ALL THE SUSPICIONS ABOUT OUR ATTITUDES AND ABOUT USG INTERPERANCE THAT THIS COULD AROUSE AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT COULD PROVIDE FOR THOSE REVOLUTIONARY HOTHEADS WHO WOULD PROBABLY LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN A CHANCE TO FRUSTRATE THE POLITICAL TIMETABLE AND TAKE A CRACK AT US AT THE SAME TIME. 10. SIMILARLY, I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT BURDEN OUR STILL THIN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP HERE UNTIL IT HAS GAINED ADDED SUBSTANCE AND DEPTH. AGAIN THERE IS PROMISE. DESPITE CONTINUED PROBLEMS ON MANY ISSUES BETWEEN US, WE HAVE SENSED IN RECENT WEEKS A GROWING APPRECIATION, AT LEAST WITHIN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, OF THE IMPORTANCE OF A BETTER U.S. RELATIONSHIP. LAST WEEK'S CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL (IN THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL) OF FUNDS TO PURCHASE THE FOUR SPRUANCE DESTROYERS ORIGINALLY DESTINED FOR IRAN HAS GIVEN US AND THE IRANIANS THE FLEXIBILITY TO BEGIN ALLOWING THE IRANIANS ACCESS TO MORE URGENTLY NEEDED SPARES FOR THEIR AIR FORCE AND OTHER MILITARY FORCES. TREIS WILL HELP REMOVE LINGERING SUSPICIONS IN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE HAVE HAD ULTERIOR POLITICAL MOTIVES IN HOLDING BACK ON SUCH SHIPMENTS. 11. ASSUMING THAT THIS MORE HOPEFUL TREND II OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES AND DEEPENS, AND ASSUMING ALSO THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TIMETABLE HERE RESULTS IN A SOMEWHAT STRONGER GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BY AUTUMN, WITH ENHANCED AUTHORITY OVER IRAN'S SECURITY FORCES, THE RISKS IN A GESTURE ON OUR PART TOWARD THE SHAH COULD BE MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE. I WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT WE COULD DELAY ANY FINAL DECISION UNTIL WE SECRET/NODIS SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOP OVER THE NEXT 60-90 DAYS. IT WOULD HELP MEASURABLY, IN MY VIEW, IF DURING THAT SAME TIME PERIOD WE WERE ABLE TO NAME AN AMBASSADOR, AN ACT THAT IN ITSELF WILL BE SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN. 12. THE JUDGMENT DESCRIBED ABOVE WOULD OF COURSE DIFFER IF THE SHAH WERE PUBLICLY TO RENOUNCE HIS CLAIM AND THAT OF HIS HEIRS TO THE THRONE BEFORE COMING TO THE U.S. SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN THE RISKS TO OUR INTERESTS. (I CONFESS, HOWEVER, TO FINDING IT HARD TO IMAGINE HIS TAXING SUCH ACTION IN THE SHORT TERM FUTURE). ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO NOT SEE THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE SHAH SIMPLY FORESWEARING POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF ANY SORT WOULD HAVE MUCH IMPACT. IT WOULD SCARCFLY BE CREDIBLE HERE. LAINGEN BT 7930

F.1. 12/55: SDS, 7/22/55 (PREDIED, HENRY) AGE: PEPR, IN SUBJECT: POGI SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE SHA 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. IRANIAN CHARGE AGAIN CALLED DEPOFF JULY 30 TO INQUIRE URGENTLY WHETHER THE SHA WAS COMING TO THE US. AGAIN SAID HE HAD SUCH A REPORT FROM / VERY RELIABLE SOURCE AND DR. YAZDI HAD ASSED HIM TO CET IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT TO EXPRESS THE POGI'S CONCERN. DEPOFF DESCRIBED US POSITION AND SAID THAT AGAH WAS SURELY AWARE OF INTENSE PRESERSES ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FROM CONGRESS AND OTHER QUARTERS FOR A CHANGE IN THE USG POSITION. DEPOFF SMIID HE COULD ASSURE AGAIN THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION AND HE KNEW OF NO PLANS FOR THE SHA TO COME TO THE US. DEPOFF ADDED THAT HE ASSUMED THAT AGAIN WAS AWARE THAT THE THREE PAHLAVI CHILDREN WERE IN THE US; AGAIN SAID HE KNEW THAT. VANCE BT 7909 51047 SLTION 71 OF TEHRAN 93247 FOR CHARGED 0.1865: 3DS 9/2/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M KEP, 10 1. BASSITORI NOMINATION ：STAT 199711 AND 199730 1. INAK YOU FOR YOUR GENEROUS MESSAGE AND THAT FROM THE SPORETARY AS WEIL 2. YOUR MESSAGE ASSED FOR MY VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF ASSIING AN AMBASSADOR HERE, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO JIMING AND ACCUPHERICS. MY SHORT ANSWER IS TO SAY THAT I BELIEVE CTR INTERESTS IN IRAN WOULD BE SERVED BY KAPLISH POSSIBLE NOMINATION OF A NEW AMBASSADOR. I REALLY EVER LATER THAN THE TIMETABLE YOU SUGGEST. I COGER ANSWER TAIES ACCOUNT OF YOUR UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE TAKE THIS ACTION MUST BE SUCH AS TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE POLICY ENDS WE SEEN. THIS ATMOSPHERE WILL TELL US A GOOD DEAL ABOUT WHAT WE POGI IS PREPARED TO DO IN WHAT MUST BE A MUTUAL PROCESS OF REBUILDING A RELATIONSHIP. 3. HAVING SAID THAT, ONE MUST NOTE THAT THE PGOI IS ALSC LOCOING FOR SMOKE SIGNALS FROM US. WE ARE THE ONLY MAJGE POWER OR IMPORTANT IRANIAN NEIGHBOR WITHOUT AN AMBASSADOR HERE. IT IS APPARENT FROM QUESTIONS WE GET FROM VIRTREALLY EVERY QUARTER THAT THE TIMING AND PERSON OF THE NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN ATTITUDES TOWARD US AMONG THE PGOI LEADERSHIP. WHATEVER WE MAY THINK ABOUT THE PGOI'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE OUTIER AFFAIR AND THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. MOST OF THESE IRANIANS SEE THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF AN AMBASSADOR AS EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE YET TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE NEW REALITIES OF IRAN. THE VERY ACT OF NAMING AN AMBASSADOR, THEREFORE, WILL BE SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFILIENCE FROM US. 4. THERE IS A SPECIAL INTEREST AMONG TWO OTHER QUARTERS. REGARDING OUR INTENTIONS. THE FIRST INCLUDES A NUMBER OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES WHO WILL READ A GOOD DEAL INTO OUR ACTION ON THIS AND WHO EXPECT AND HEPE WE WILL ACT SOON. THE SECOND INVOLVES THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY WITH INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAN. THAT COMMUNITY IS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE TO OUR INTENTIONS CONCERNING AN AMBASSADOR. VIRTUALLY ALL OUR CONTACTS IN THAT QUARTER INDICATE TO US

S E G A F I AT THE FACT & CAV NOT YET ACTED IS A FACTOR ON THE APGATIVE SIDE IN POLIR BALANCE OF THE PROS AND CONS APPEARING DECISIONS AS TO FUTURE OPERATIONS IN IRAN. 1. THE THESE REASONS I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT ACTION TO NAME AN AMBASSADOR NOT BE LONG DELAYED. ALTHOUGH I THINK THE TIMETABLE SUGGESTED IN YOUR MESSAGE IS TO LONG, IT IS PERBABLY REALISTIC IN TERMS OF THE ATMOLPHERICS. THE BALANCE OF THIS CABLE CONCERNS THAT ASPECT. C. THE NEXT STEVAL MONTHS HERE WILL BE PROCEPLIED WITH AN ELECTORAL PROCESS DESIGNED TO PUT A CONSTITUTIONALLY INCOME GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BY LATE FALL. THE PROCESS PROMISES TO BE MESSY AND THE OUTCOME LESS THAN CERTAIN, BUT BOTH THE POIGI AND THE AYATOLLAH ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS AND, BARRING A MAJOR UPSET, A NEW AND HOPEFULLY STRONGER GOVERNMENT WILL ENSUE. 7. I HAVE NC PRESENT REASON TO THINK ITS ATTITUDE. DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF THE POGI. I HAVE MYSELF BEEN CORDIALLY RECEIVED HERE AT ALL LEVELS. PUBLIC NOISES FROM THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING US HAVE RECENTLY BEEN GENERALLY POSITIVE. WE SENSE THAT BOTH YAZZII AND BAZARGAN INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE THE NEED OF MOVING TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING WITH US. THAT APPLIES EVEN MORE SO TO THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. F. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING OUR COMPOUND ARE STILL UNCERTAIN. IT IS IMPORTANT THIS BE MEGUARIZED BEFORE A NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVES. WE ARE CAREFULLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS CAN BE DONE BY USING THE LEVERAGE THAT THE OPENING OF NORMAL VISA FACILITIES WILL PROVIDE US. 8. TEF ASSUMPTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE ARE *LTF RESPECT TO BT 2247 NN S E C R E T N O UIS S E C R E T SECTION 92 OF 92 TEHRAN 38247 THE ATTITUDES OF THE REGULAR GOVERNMENT MACHINERY. THERE IS ALSO COM. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE AYATCILAR AND HIS ENTOURAGE HAVE BEEN MORE MODERATE IN RECENT WEBS. BUT I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT HIS ATTITUDES REST ON WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTASTE FOR THE U.S. MANY OF THOSE AROUND HIM APPEAR TO BE EVER MORE SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS. THIS ENTOURAGE TENDS TO BE FUNCTIONAL AND SHALL IN ITS APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SINCE THIS CIRCLE HAS IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO AND IMPACT ON THE AYATCILAR'S DAY-TO-DAY STATEMENTS. THERE IS A CONSTANT RISK OF OUTPUNTS FROM THAT QUALITY THAT IS UNPREDICTED AND THAT COULD SET US BACK IN THE TIMETABLE YOU SUGGEST. WE WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO WATCH THIS CLOSELY AS TIME GOES ALONG. 10. THERE IS ALSO THE CONSIDERATION, AFFECTING POTEMINIMING AND ATMOSPHERE, OF OUR POSTURE TOOLS THE SEAT. IN MY VIEW IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE SEAL NOT COME TO THE U.S. BEFORE WE HAVE AN AMBASSADOR IN PLACE. THE ADDED STRENGTH AND DURABILITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT CAN FOLLOW FROM WARNING AN AMBASSADOR WILL HELP COPI WITH THE INVITATELY ADVERSE REACTION TO GESTURES ON OUR PART TOWARD THE SHAN. ESPECIALLY THI IRON THE AVATOLLA. 11. THERE IS FINALLY THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY; I.P., THE CORRESPONDING LEVEL OF IRAN'S REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON. WE NEED NOT ATTACH PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS FACTOR. WE SHOULD APPOINT AN AMBASSALCP EEE WHEN WE CONCLUDE THAT OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE IT, RATHER THAN LINKING IT DIRECTLY TO ACTIONS THE PGOI TALES. AT THE SAME TIME WE CAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAE CLEAR TO THE PGOI THAT THE BUSINESS OF REBUILDING A RELATIONSHIP IS A TWO WAY PROCESS THAT REQUIRES A CON-TINUING INPUT FROM BOTH SIDES. 12 THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SUGGESTED CONSULTATIONS IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER. I AM INCLINED TO LATTER Period. 13. WARM REGARDS. LAINGEN

216/Pol/B/4/14 NNNNVV ESBO25BRA692 OO RUQMR DE RUEHC #4361 2290211 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 162342Z AUG 79 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4110 BT S E C R E T STATE 214861 TAGS: PINT, PEPR, IR, US SUBJECT: INQUIRY FROM PGOI CONCERNING SHAH REF: TEHRAN 9133 E.0.12065: GDS 8/16/95 (PRECHT, HENRY) 1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT 2 AS CHARGE NAAS INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER IN MAY (TEHRAN 4663) THE FOUR PAHLAVI CHILDREN ARE EXPECTED TO ATTEND SCHOOL IN THE U.S. THIS YEAR. THE THREE YOUNGER CHILDREN ARE NOW IN THE COUNTRY. REZA CAME TO THE U.S. LAST WEEKEND FOR A BRIEF STAY IN ORDER TO TAKE THE REQUIRED TOEFL ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY EXAMINATION. HE NEEDED A VISA IN ORDER TO COME HERE AND OBTAINED IT AT OUR EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. 3. REZA DID NOT INQUIRE OR MAKE AN APPLICATION FOR A VISA FOR HIS PARENTS. (FYI: WHILE WE SUGGEST YOU NOT INFORM THE PGOI OF THIS FACT, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE SHAH ACQUIRED A VISA BEFORE HE LEFT IRAN AND IT IS STILL VALID. END FYI.) 4. YOU MAY INFORM THE IRANIANS, AS WE HAVE RECENTLY DONE IN WASHINGTON, THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE USG ATTITUDE TOWARDS A TRIP BY THE SHAH TO THE U.S. CHRISTOPHER BT 4861 NO DIS VZCZC 242 ZZ BUFHC IF HUCMR #1133/21 2941120 ZNY SSSSS ZZH Z 211118Z OCT 79 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4355 BT S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 22 TEHRAN 11133 NODIS CEFROKEE FOR UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM E.O. 12065: RDS02 10/21/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, IR, US SUBJECT: SHAH'S ILLNESS REF: STATE 275001 1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF SCHEDULED APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM THIS MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK (INTRODUCING HENRY PRETCH) TO ADVISE FIM OF MY INSTRUCTIONS AND TO ASZ HIM TO ARRANGE IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN (GEORGE CAVE LEFT TEHRAN OCTOBER 19). AFTER DISCUSSION WITH ENTEZAM, WE WALKED NEXT DOOR WITH HIM TO CALL ON BAZARGAN. FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI JOINED US SHCRTIY THEREAFTER. 3. IN CONVEYING TALKING POINTS CONCERNING OUR HAVING CONCURRED IN MEDICAL JUDGMENT THAT SHAH'S CONDITION REQUIRED ADMISSION SOONEST TO U.S. MEDICAL FACILITIES. I SAIL THAT CUR DECISION WAS MADE ENTRELY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE RECOGNIZED AND LEAST WITH THE PGOI AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT THIS REFLECTED OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHANGE IN IRAN. AND THAT WE WERE ANYCUS TO WORK TOGETHER IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO BUILD A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. 4. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT THE PGOI, WHICH WE ASSUMED ALSO GENUINELY SOUGHT TO BUILD A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WOULD WCF WITH US TO ENSURE THAT THE POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM THE SHAH'S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. WOULD BE MANAGABLE FORFOTH COUNTRIES. I ALSO STRESSED OUR HOPE AND CONFIDENCE THAT THE PGOI WOULD TAKE WHATEVER STEPS WERE NECESSARY TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF OUR COMMUNITY IN IRAN, SHCULI ADVERSE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS OCCUR. 5. THE REACTION FROM OUR THREE INTERLOCUTORS WAS MIXED BUT GENERALLY SUBDUED. REACTION VARIETY FROM: ENTEZAM'S IMMEDIATE EXPRESSION OF CONCERN OVER THIS NEW ORSTACLY TO EFFORTS THAT HE SAID HE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF THE U.S. IN IRAN WERE CARRYING CUT TO TRY TO IMPROVE CUR RELATIONSHIP TO BAZARGAN'S QUIET BUT CONCERNED ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY. TO YAZDI'S (WHO DOMINATED THE DISCUSSION) EMPHASIS ON THE PRCLEMS THAT THIS WOULD CREATE FORTH U.S. IN IRAN. VZCZC 242 281

6. A FAIRLY EXTENDED DISCUSSION CULMINATED IN YAZDI'S SUMMING UP WITH THE FOLLOWING POINTS: A. THE PGOI WOULD STRONGLY PREFER THAT THE SHAH, ASSUMING HIS CONDITION GENUINELY REQUIRED MEDICAL EXAMINATION OUTSIDE MEXICO, SEEK SUCH ASSISTANCE ELSE- WHERE THAN IN THE U.S. YAZDI CONCEDED READILY THAT SUCH FACILITIES WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN MEXICO BUT HE SAID THE PGOI COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE REQUIRED ASSISTANCE COULD NOT BE FOUND IN WESTERN EUROPE. - B. SHOULD THE U.S. NONETHELESS PROCEED TO ADMIT THE SHAN, YAZDI FELT THAT TREATMENT OUTSIDE OF NEW YORK CITY WOULD BE "MARGINALLY BETTER" IN TERMS OF PUBLIC OPINION HERE. AS HE DESCRIBED IT, NEW YORK CITY IS SEEN BY IRANIANS AS A CENTER OF ROCKEFELLER AND ZIONIST INFLUENCE, AND THIS WOULD COMPOUND THE PROBLEM. HE SUGGESTED THE M.I. AND PERSON INSTITUTE IN HOUSTON AS BEING FULLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE KIND OF DIAGNOSIS THAT APPEARED TO BE NEEDED. YAZDI SPEAKS FROM PERSONAL PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH BOTH KETTERING AND ANDERSON INSTITUTES. C. TO HELP THE POI TO REASSURE THE IRANIAN PUBLIC AND KHOMEINI THAT THISWAS NOT SIMPLY A "RUSE" ON THE PART OF THE SHAH TO GAIN ADMISSION TO THE U.S., THE PGOI WOULD HOPE THAT AN IRANIAN DOCTOR WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE MEDICAL FINDINGS. IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER HE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO EXAMINE THE SHAH.) IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, YAZDI SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CAPABLE IRANIAN DOCTORS RESIDENT IN THE U.S. WHO COULD BE SO TASKED RATHER THAN SENDING SOME ONE FROM IRAN. YAZDI ALSO PRESSED US AS TO WHETHER SHAH WOULD REMAIN IN THE U.S. IF DIAGNOSIS SUGGESTED EXTENDED CHEMOTHERAPY OR OTHER TREATMENT. I ANSWERED THAT WECCUIL NOT PROVIDE ANY ASSURANCES ON THAT SCORE AT THIS POINT. D. FINALLY THE PGOI WOULD EXPECT THE USG TO OBTAIN FROM THE SHAH A PRIOR ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD NOT BT #1133 NNN VZC2C 242 VZCZC 243 ZZ RUEHC VZCZC 243 DE RUCMHR #1133/02 2941129 ZNY SSSSS ZZH Z 211118Z OCT 79 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4356 BT S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 11133 PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY WHILE IN THE U.S. NOR WOULD HE ENGAGE IN PRESS INTERVIEWS TO FURTHER HIS POLITICAL INTERESTS. WE SAID THAT HIS ADMISSION INTO THE U.S. COULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET. THAT WE COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES ABOUT CONTACT WITH THE PRESS, BUT THAT WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY EMPHASIZE TO THE SHAH OUR DESIRE THAT HE AVOID ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITY. EITHER WITH THE PRESS OR OTHERWISE. 7. THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, PARTICULARLY FROM YAZDI. THERE PREVAILED A SUSPICION THAT THE SHAH'S CONDITION IS NOT REALLY SUCH AS TO REQUIRE THE MEDICAL FACILITIES NOW SOUGHT. I EMPHASIZED THAT I COULD NOT SPEAK TO HIS CONDITION BEYOND THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT I HAD BUT THAT I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HIS CONDITION WAS NOT OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN AND SERIOUS. I ASSURE THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE WOULD KEEP THE PRIME MINISTER INFORMED ON A PRIVATE BASIS ON THE COURSE OF THIS MATTER. LAINGEN BT #1133 NNNN VZCZC 243

CONFIDENTIAL DE RUQMR #1273 297 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 241357Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4449 INFO RUSBER/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0545 BT C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11273 DEPT FOR NEA AND A/SY/OPS/FO; KARACHI FOR RSS TEHRAN 11273 CHGE:STAT 10/24/79 APPRV CHARGE: LBLAINGEN TRFTD: POL: VL TOM SETH: GO CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL E.O. 12065: ADS 10/24/30 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, IR SUBJECT: THE SHAH IN THE U.S. 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) CLEAR: SY:GOLACINSKI 2. THE REACTION TO THE SHAH'S ARRIVAL IN THE U.S. HAS BEEN MINIMAL. MOST PAPERS, FARSI AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE, CARRIED THE STORY IN A STRAIGHT-FORWARD MANNER USING WIRE SERVICE REPORTS AND STATEMENT BY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN IBRAHIM MOKALLA. MOKALLA WAS QUOTED BY THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES AS SAYING THAT "IT IS OUR (THE POGI'S) UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DEPOSED SHAH HAS GONE TO THE UNITED STATES FOR TREATMENT ONLY AND THAT HE AND HIS WIFE DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF ANY KIND IN THE UNITED STATES." HE DESCRIBED THE SHAH AS SUFFERING FROM "TERMINAL CANCER". THE NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (NIRT) HAS IGNORED THE SUBJECT ENTIRELY. NEITHER NIRT RADIO NOR TELEVISION NEWSCASTS LAST NIGHT (OCTOBER 23) AND TODAY HAVE MENTIONED THE SHAH'S TRAVEL. DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA SY CHRON RF 3. THERE WERE SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS AROUND TEHRAN YESTERDAY, INCLUDING SEVERAL GROUPS WHICH PASSED BY THE EMBASSY BUT WHICH DID NOT ATTEMPT TO STOP HERE. SOME PARTICIPANTS SHOUTED ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND CARRIED BANNERS DENOUNCING THE U.S. AND PRESIDENT CARTER. HOWEVER, THESE EXPRESSIONS OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS APPARENTLY WERE ONLY SECONDARY TO THE MAIN PURPOSE OF AT LEAST SOME OF THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH WAS TO COMMEMORATE THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF KHOMEINI'S ELDEST SON SEVERAL YEARS AGO. (COMMENT: IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED HERE THAT MUSTAFA KHOMEINI WAS POISONED BY SAVAK AND CIA AGENTS. THE ANTI-AMERICAN MANIFESTATIONS THUS SEEM MORE LIKELY CONNECTED WITH POPULAR MYTH REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF MUSTAFA'S DEATH RATHER THAN THE ARRIVAL OF THE SHAH IN THE U.S. END COMMENT.) THERE WERE OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS AS WELL, BUT THESE CONCERNED EDUCATIONAL ISSUES RATHER THAN THE SHAH OR US. 4. A DEMONSTRATION IS PLANNED FOR FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26 AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. THIS ONE HAS BEEN CALLED BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. ONE OF THE MARCH ROUTES TO THE UNIVERSITY WILL PASS BY THE EMBASSY, AND WE ANTICIPATE THAT PARTICIPANTS MAY USE THE OCCASION CONFIDENTIAL TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST THE U.S. AS WELL, PERHAPS INCLUDING SOME EXPRESSIONS OF PROTEST AGAINST THE SHAH'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. ALSO, IT IS CONCEIVABLE, IF NOT LIKELY, THAT WE WILL GET SOME FALL-OUT AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION ENDS AT THE UNIVERSITY FROM PARTICIPANTS WHO MAY TAKE IT UPON THEMSELVES TO COME BACK TO THE EMBASSY. WE WILL BE TAKING THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS, BUT AT THIS MOMENT WE ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT THAT WE MAY COME THROUGH THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN RELATIVELY UNSCATHED. LAINGEN 1273 NNN

0 262208Z OCT 79 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 5160 BT S E C R E T STATE 279880 NODIS CHEROKEE - EYES ONLY FOR LAINGEN E.0. 12065: RDS-2 10/26/99 (TARNOFF, PETER) TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, IR, US SUBJECT: THE SHAH IN THE U.S. REF: STATE 279135 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. IRANIAN EMBASSY REPS DR. FARHANG AND AVA (PRESS OFFICER) MET WITH DEPTOFF OCTOBER 26 TO PURSUE QUESTION OF TWO IRANIAN DOCTORS RESIDENT IN U.S. PROPOSED BY GOI OBTAINING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE STATE OF HEALTH OF THE SHAH. 3. DEPTOFF INFORMED FARHANG AND AVA THAT USG WILLING TO DEAL WITH DOCTORS PROPOSED BY GOI AND HANDED FARHANG SEALED ENVELOPES FOR THE TWO DOCTORS (CONTAINING INFO PREVIOUSLY PASSED TO YAZDI AND NEW YORK HOSPITAL OCTOBER 25 MEDICAL BULLETIN). DEPTOFF TOLD FARHANG THAT IF DOCTORS HAD ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS THEY COULD CONTACT DEPT. MEDICAL DIRECTOR, WHO WOULD ACT AS CHANNEL FOR TRANSMISSION OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS BETWEEN THEM AND DOCTORS IN NEW YORK. 4. MEETING WITH FARHANG WAS FRIENDLY IN TONE. FARHANG MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT ON WHETHER PROCEDURE WOULD FULFILL GOI NEEDS, BUT HIS GENERAL REMARKS WERE POSITIVE AND CENTERED ON THE NECESSITY FOR THE GOI TO BE SEEN TO BE DOING SOMETHING ABOUT THE SHAN BEING IN THE U.S. FARHANG ASKED WHETHER GOI HAD BEEN INFORMED IN TEHRAN AND WAS TOLD EMBASSY HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM MFA AND WOULD AT THE LATEST DISCUSS MATTER WITH FONMIN YAZDI OCTOBER 27. 5. A FARHANG MADE POINT THAT EMOTIONS RUN HIGH AMONG IRANIANS CONCERNING THE SHAN, AND CITED AS EXAMPLE DEMAND BY IRANIAN EMBASSY STAFF HERE THAT EMBASSY BE CLOSED OCTOBER 26 SO THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF EMBASSY AGAINST THE SHAN'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. 6. FARMING AND AVA RAISED PRESS STORIES INDICATING THAT THE SHAN WOULD NEED TREATMENT IN THE U.S. FOR A YEAR. DEPTOFF URGED THAT THEY NOT JUMPTO CONCLUSIONS ON BASIS OF PRESS STORIES. LENGTH OF SHAN'S STAY WOULD BE BASED ON MEDICAL NEEDS, TO BE DETERMINED IN DUE COURSE BY COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERTS. DEPTOFF TOLD FARMING THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT MEDICAL EXPERTS WERE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATION, AND THAT FURTHER TESTS WOULD BE REQUIRED. 7. AVA ASKED ABOUT SHAH'S PASSPORT AND WAS INFORMED THAT PASSPORT REQUIREMENT HAD BEEN WAIVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS. DEPTOFF EXPLAINED THAT SUCH WAIVER WAS NOT UNUSUAL. 8 THE TUD U.S. RESIDENT IRANIAN DOCTORS CONTACTED DEPARTMENT'S MEDICAL DIRECTOR LATER ON OCTOBER 26. THEY REQUESTED TO (A) EXAMINE SHAH, AND (B) REVIEW RELEVANT MEDICAL RECORDS AND PATHOLOGICAL MATERIAL IN ORDER TO MAKE AN AUTHORITATIVE REPORT. IN PARALLEL DISCUSSION WITH DEPTOFF, HOWEVER, IRANIAN EMBASSY OFFICER DID NOT REPEAT NOT REQUEST EXAMINATION OF SHAH, ONLY REVIEW OF MEDICAL RECORDS BY THE DOCTOR. 9. FYI: MEDICAL DIRECTOR IS FORARDING REQUEST FOR MATERIALS IN (B) TO SHAH'S DOCTORS IN NEW YORK BUT, IS NOT REPEAT NOT FORUARDING REQUEST TO EXAMINE THE SHAH, SINCE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY INAPPROPRIATE AS WELL AS BEING WELL BEYOND OUR PROPOSAL IN REFTEL. END FYI. CHRISTOPHER BT#9880

DE RUQMHR #1371 301 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291309Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4503 BT- CON TID EN TIAL TEHRAN 11371 T ANHRAN 11371 E.O. 12065: GIS 10/28/95 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, IR SUBJECT: THE SHAH INTHE U.S. REF: TEHRAN 11323 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. A NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE SHAH'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. HAS BEEN GRADUALLY BUILDING. OVER THE WEEKEND KHOMEINI TWICE MADE CRITICAL REMARKS, ON ONE OCCASION SAYING THAT "THE ENEMIES OF ISLAM... HAD RECENTLY ADMITTED THE SHAH INTO THE U.S." AND ON ANOTHER USING THE SHAH'S PRESENCE AT THE LEAD-IN TO A LONG ATTACK ON OUR PAST RELATIONS WITH IRAN. DURING THE LATER HE SUGGESTED THAT HIS ADMISSION TO THE U.S. MIGHT BE A "PLOT. 3. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, OIL WORKERS WARNED OCTOBER 27 THAT IRAN MIGHT RESORT TO ECONOMIC RETALIATION IF THE U.S. REFUSED TO EXTRADITE THE SHAH. 4. FINALLY, NIRT FINALLY BROKE ITS SILENCE ON THE SUBJECT, FIRST FEATURING A CRITICAL AND VITRIOLIC EDITORIAL COMMENT FROM THE NEWSPAPER JOMHURI-YE-ESLAMI, THEN A REPORT OF DR. MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI'S WARNING DURING THE OCTOBER 26 UNITY RALLY AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY THAT IRAN WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE SHAH'S BEING A GUEST IN THE U.S., AND LASTLY ITS OWN COMMENTARY (FBIS LONDON 2713452 OCT 29) THAT OUTDID IN VENOM ANYTHING WE HAVE SEEN RECENTLY FROM THAT QUARTER. (COMMENT: DURING OCTOBER 27 CALL ON BEHESHTI BY CHARGE AND DEPTOFF PRECHT FORMER SEEMED MUCH LESS CONCERNED WITH THE SHAH'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. PER SE THAN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ROYAL COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES.) 5. WE STILL HAVE THE GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT THE PGOI IS NOT INCLINED TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THE SHAH'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. SO LONG AS IT IS REASONABLY SATISFIED THAT HE WILL BE THERE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME FOR TREATMENT HE CANNOT GET ELSEWHERE AND THAT NEITHER HE NOR HIS ENTOURAGE ARE ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. WHILE TECHNICALLY A GOVERNMENT AGENCY, NIRT HAS FREQUENTLY ACTED IN INDEPENDENCE OF THE REST OF PGOI AND VARIOUS SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR DESPAIR OF BRINGING ITS CHIEF, SADEGH GHOTZADER, UNDER CONTROL. THE PGOI'S PREDISPOSITION NOTWITHSTANDING, IT REMAINS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT IT WILL BE PUSHED INTO A POSTURE IT MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE ADOPT IF REVOLUTIONARY RADICALS, UNSOPHISTICATED CLERGYMEN APPRV: POL:VLTOMSETH CHRGE: STAT 10/23/79 DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH CLEAR: NEA/IRN:HPRECHT; CLEAR: NEA/IRN: HPRECHT; A: BROKEN CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL DISTR: POL-2 CHARGE ICA N RF CHRON SY PARSA KIA SAID THAT PGOI LEADERS WERE WILLING TO HAVE THE SHAH IN MEXICO BUT THE U.S. WAS A DIFFERENT CASE. THE PGOI WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SHAH WOULD USE HIS RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. AS KHOMEINI HAD IN PARIS TO CONTINUE SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS AGAINST THE PGOI. PARSA KIA POINTED OUT THERE ARE 200,000 IRANIANS IN THE U.S. AND THAT THE SHAH HAS LIMITLESS FUNDS AT HIS COMMAND (HE USED THE FIGURE WHICH IS NOW BECOMING COMMON USAGE OF 20 BILLION). PARSA KIA POINTED OUT THAT IRAN WAS A POROUS RUMOR MILL BUT THAT THE PGOI LEADERS HAD NEVER HAD ANY RUMORS THAT THE SHAH HAD CANCER. FOR THIS REASON THEY WERE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE SHAH'S ILLNESS. THEY ALSO DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SHAH HAD TO HAVE HIS MEDICAL CARE IN THE NZCZC 705 5. PARSA KIA SAID THAT THE LEADERS OF THE PGOI, BY WHICH HE PLAINLY MEANT KHOMEINI AND HIS ENTOURAGE, WERE NOT POLITICIANS AND DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE D-IPIOMATIC PROCESS. THEY DID NOT LOOK TO THE FUTURE RESULTS WHICH ANY DECISION MIGHT BEING. PARSA KIA SAID THAT THEY (THE LEADERS IN QOM) WERE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT THE SHAR WAS PERMITTED TO STAY IN THE U.S. IF HE WAS, THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY MOVE. (HE DID NOT SAY HOW, BUT THE INFERENCE WAS TO BREAK RELATIONS.) 7. DURING CONVERSATION, PARSA KIA ALSO POINTED TO SENATOR JACKSON INTERVIEW ON MEET THE PRESS WHICH HE SAID, HAD HIT THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LIKE A BOMBSHELL. (STATE 1144S) YAZDI HAD IMMEDIATELY SENT FOR THE FULL TRANSCRIPT WHICH THEY NOW HAD TO SEE THE CONSENT OF JACKSON'S REMARKS. YAZDI REGARDS JACKSON AS A VERY POWERFUL U.S. LEADER AND WAS WONDERING IF JACKSON'S REMARKS COULD HAVE BEEN INTENDED AS SOME SCRT OF MESSAGE FROM THE USG. EMBOFF ASSURED PARSA KIA IT WAS NOT. LAINGEN NNNN NZCZC 705

AND THE GENERALLY IRRESPONSIBLE CAPTURE THE MOMENTUM ON THE ISSUE OF THE SHAH'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. LAINGEN BT 1371 VZCZC 705 DO RUEHC DE RUCMER #151515 3041347 ZNY CCCCC ZZH D 3113462 OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4574 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11515 EXDIS E.O. 12065: RDS-4 10/31/89 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, IR, US SUBJECT: SHAH IN U.S. 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. DURING EMBASSY POLOFF CALL ON ACTING CHIEF OF MFA FOURTH POLITICAL DIVISION PARSA KIA OCTOBER 31 ON OTHER SUBJECTS, PARSA KIA RAISED SUBJECT OF SHAH IN U.S. AND MADE AN EMOTIONAL, UNOFFICIAL, AND PERSONAL PLEA TO EMBOFF (FOR 45 MINUTES) TO EXPLAIN TO USG WHY SHAH MUST LEAVE U.S. PARSA KIA MADE FOLLOWING POINTS. 3. HE AND DIRECTOR GEENRAL FOR EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS ETESAM WERE WORKING HARD TO TRY TO AVOID A CRISIS IN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. BUT IT WAS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. THEY HAD NOT WANTED THE PGOI TO SEND AN OFFICIAL NOTE ON THE SHAR AND HAD WATERED IT DOWN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. BUT OUTSIDE PRESSURES ON THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WERE TOO STRONG. 4. PGOI LEADERS (I.E., BAZARGAN AND YAZDI) WERE POWERLESS AND DECISIONS ON HOW TO ACT ON THE SHAH'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE MADE BY THEM. THE FORKION MINISTRY WOULD BE ABLE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE DONE TO U.S.-THANIAN RELATIONS IF THE SHAH LEFT IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE IS REINASED FROM THE HOSPITAL; OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE A CRISIS. PARSA IIA POINTED TO HOW DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE BY KHOMEINI ON OTHER FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUES SUCH AS RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, AND INTIMATED, BUT DID NOT DIRECTLY STORE THAT THE SHAH'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE U.S. MIGHT WANT RESULT IN A BREAKING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. با مصر توسط خمینی گرفته می‌شود. او تلویحا "گفت (بطور مستقیم بیان نکرد) که داده‌ه حضور شاه در آمریکا ممکن است منجر به قطع روابط ایران و آمریکا شود. ۵ - پارسا کیبا گفت که رهبران دولت موقت مايلند که‌شاه در مکزیک باشد ولی موضوع آمریکا مسئله دیگری است. دولت موقت معتقد بود که موقعیت شاه در آمریکا مانند موقعیتی است که خمینی در پاریس داشت و از آن استفاده خواهد کرد تا بر عليه دولت موقت توطعه یکند. او همچنین خاطر نشان کرد که ۵۵۰۵۵۲ این‌اندر آمریکا زندگی می‌کنند و همچنین شاه از ثروت بی حسابی بهره‌مند است (عددی که او در مورد این ثروت استفاده کردند ۲ میلیارد بود). پارسا کیا گفت که ایران مرکز شایعات است اما رهبران دولت موقت تا بحال شایعه‌سرطان شاه را نشینده‌اند. به همین دلیل آنها نسبت به بیماری شاه مظنون بودند. آنها همچنین نمی‌فهمیند که چرا شاه باید معالجات طبی خود را در آمریکا ادامه دهد. ۶ - پارساکیا گفت که رهبران دولت موقت) که منظور و به روشنی خمینی و اطرافیانش بودند) سیاستمدار نیستند و اصول دیپلماسی را نمی‌فهمند. آنها به نتایج تصمیماتی که هم‌اکنون میگیرند توجه ندارند. پارسا کیا گفت که آنها) رهبران قم) به دقت منتظر بودند بهبینند که شاه اجازه، اقامت در آمریکا بدست خواهد آورد یا خیر و اگر چنین شد آنها فورا" بیا خواهند خاست. ( او نگفت که این کار را به چه صورت خواهند کرد ولی روش بود که روابط را قطع خواهند کرد. کرد. او گفت که این اظهارات سطح بالا وزارت امور خارجه‌ای ایران را خیلی نگران کرده. یزدی فورا "تقاضا کرد که نسخه‌ای از این مصاحبه را ببیند. یزدی معتقد است که جکسون یکی از رهبران قدرتمند امریکاست. او میخواست بداند که تا اظهارات جکسون پیامی از جانب دولت آمریکاست. مامور سفارت پارساکیا را مطمئناست که چنین چیرنیست. لینگن -۱۷۴-

اسنا للاخو جاسوسي (٨) سعاره دائشجويان مسلمان پيرو خط امام مردم مبارز ایران با دست خالی ولی با نیروی ایمان دولت آمریکای جنایتکار را بزانو در آورد و شاه مخلوع را بیرون کرد و بامید خددا به مبارزاش تا قطع تمام وابستگی ارامه خواهد داد. از پیام امام به اولین گردمعاشی جنبشهای آزادیبخش – تهران ليل ريط 4 دانشجوبان مسلمان يبرو خط امام

15 document consists of 15 pages of 24 copies, series A. 101-3 A-89 DEHATEL 27 T O B STATE AMB INFO AMANA, MANDAD, LONDON, KORAN, MANU LINT, DOM CINCHRICE/CHOLASSA OR USL3 Amedeway TEHRAN Date: Kierak 12th, 2nd AID/DIR CH/MAAO DAO-3 The Current Reorientation of Iran to Military Person A Summary Record of U.S. Efforts to change the policy POUS:POUCH: NOFORN Numergy Political, economic, and military activity subject to a near-crisis in U.S.-Iran relations as the Whiteогбателета, begin with the U.S., lessen his dependence on us, and n.com. military procurement -- and in so doing roved it. The direction of inviting a significant Soviet military intrusion into the area of the picture. A number of trends are in evidence: The Shah was a political benefit, in terms of demonstrating more independence in security from diversification. This is because no continue. He has always increased the level of control his role in the government that is rosening the threat, and the resources to use the threat (which to him is Lesser, rather than to be so) he can have no ultimate responsibility for disasters. Attitude will become more pressure to be in keeping with Levels currently unresty economy. The Whiteoگти by de-mystified interest you and the great leader of the country are to be in the power there from the end of the period. The Whiteo, a little, is both a little more active to close and only have a military relationship with the The received report that the second month that the U.S.Ěmonity Ironically, the state has been a failure of the most of unrest in the world in which we were in a position to provide but that we have made the course of the Agreement of the investment to the country to the extent that he has worth the time and will be to cause them to be "normal" having provided the 1954 amount of "unrest and we" to the end of 313 r22 CHOP 2 Dumagnared of 13 year intervals, et al. Not automatically available, SOLIFierza/1 August 111,1976 The Arabian Sea SA for the (1) DCE's Reshor (1st)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER IRAN Objectives and Setting Objectives Your main objectives in meeting with the Shah will be: -- To explain to the Shah your Middle East peacemaking efforts and your plans on next steps so that he may see how important his aid for Egypt and Jordan is and so that he may understand the effort to split Syria and Iraq. -- To brief the Shah on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations in the Middle East and globally, reassuring him that you are still approaching detente warily. -- To confirm agreement on the Cabinet-level Joint Economic Commission with subordinate working groups, and to agree on an announcement, perhaps during your visit. -- To reaffirm our intention to keep working as closely as possible with Iran in the fields of regional security and military cooperation. To exchange current views on the Shah's efforts to assist and cooperate with friendly regimes in the region and to relate his efforts to ours. -- To convey our views on the world economic situation and especially to explain our concern on oil pricing, in the interest of the international economic stability on which Iran's own well-being depends. Each of these issues is dealt with in detail below with talking points. SECRET GDS 58 SECRET 2 Setting Iran is riding high, with dramatically increased oil revenues, good economic prospects, increased diplomatic options, and an ability to project power externally which Iran has not had for centuries. The Shah is confident of his domestic political position, and believes he has seized the initiative in the Persian Gulf and OPEC. He is trying to show that Iran will use its oil revenues constructively by such initiatives as free primary education and an expanded national health program in Iran, bilateral lending to some LDC's, loans to the IMF and IBRD, and a proposal for a new multilateral development fund. The Iranians have been the target of criticism for the leading role they played in the December 1973 oil price increase, and have not found much support for their development fund proposal. However, this has had little visible effect on Iranian confidence and ambition. Our relations with Iran continue to be very close. We have launched an initiative to expand our bilateral relations in the economic and technological area, with the objective of creating a framework and atmosphere for the discussion of such issues as oil and strategic interests. The Shah has responded positively, expressing particular interest in atomic power, and is anxious to get down to details. AEC Chairman Ray is to go to Iran at the time you are there to talk to COI officials. We also might use this occasion to announce the formation of a bilateral commission on economic cooperation. On the military front, the channels for cooperation are long established and are functioning well, but we may need to deal with the Shah's interest in the production of missiles in Iran and an assurance that we will supply enough technicians to phase in his new U.S. equipment The only clouds on the U.S.-Iran horizon concern oil prices, on which the Iranians are taking a hard line and the Iranian development fund proposal, which we fear could divert funds that would otherwise go to existing international aid institutions. Department of State April 1974 SECRET 59

SECRET Page 5 of 4-99 From Tehran The U.S. in January decided to send a military survey mission to Iran. Meanwhile the Shah sent off a 5 Lieutenant General Husein Safarini, to Europe to survey the capabilities of military equipment there. This action was not announced to us, but the results were not discussed with our military mission. In January the Shah also began campaigning for increased oil revenue from the companies and told the Ambassador that "if oil income fails to grow as anticipated (by certain unilateral Iranian actions) he might have to review Iran's policies, including the military procurement" (Telegram 147). In late February, writing from Paris, the Shah was vacillating; the Shah told the President that "we intended to commit that we were to plan in preparing ourselves to cope with any event by purchasing our military requirements with our limited foreign exchange and to accept the conditions of the companies and the conditions" (Telegram 150). A survey mission under Brig. Gen. Peterson arrived in Tehran on February 15 and after a meeting of one (Shah's delegation on the 16th) the Shah's reply was negative to the survey, which passed on the company and the mission's view (Telegram 150). But if Iran had accepted the proposal, we would have been able to get the Shah to agree that the mission would be a right course and that the companies would be able to continue to provide the equipment. Meanwhile the Shah had already decided to go ahead with the political adventure. The Shah's position on this, as mentioned already in the cable from the embassy. [illegible]

Since two counterbuses (and now so many), have added to the building of the New and his existing overhead lines. Even if we have more today when the general is to do so, this is the price times best [?] ed to the value now and its military requirements as an percent to the national density. That has the same to point as what is about for its defence, that present U.S. balance of general pollution has in Location for possible account to progress and that the cost will be less than the cost due to a public concern (October 1105), the Annunced began [?] rising up to the dangerous effects of the military situation. Lains to the gilding of the 11th of June, the news no more was analyzed the results of "the by the Shell, especially agro-food held to but that very day made the point to the name of, in a release that would be, the Annunced it was the U.S. as during a time of the event, where it would be in place do it Iran Assold to "the" for "policy" but that his con that in that event Iran would suffer most (Hezen 1194). If any indication was needed that the whole mechanism of the Annual Fund was no longer in keeping with the regulations of our responsibility, I think the plan supplied it in a conversation with the American on it, so I was not and that the frequency of the problem of our presentation was the remaining and "there was no need to delay because of the research. I think he said what his privates and public statements were not "built, it would be disliked". He pointually contrasted the price of a 1100, which he said was available for others £500,000, with what he had heard the price of 700 to be very small between £5,000,000 and £5,500,000. The Americaners were more made to clear that if what we might do was not enough, I am not sure to make the own decision regarding the rules of reporting the policy. He referred to the 1952 and 1964 American oil [?] . However emerged from the Patente survey would not include the result of the independent coordination with the Annual Review. The Blackء संसद सत्र और अन्य विमानों के आधार की प्रश्न का विशेष प्रश्न था। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत हैं। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत हैं। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत हैं। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत हैं। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत हैं। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गलत है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएँ गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग्नियों प्रणालियों में प्रत्येकताएं गगल है। प्रातः तक अग To. Bodding Kornen's Growth. After the Peterson mission had departed and while it was preparing its report, the President replied to the Shah's letter and gave the mission status by referred to it. There were also references to the fushhooning Amirul Reside, from ending clear our interest to continued decrease combined, and to Secretary Hellman's role in developing a revolutionary analytical tool for weighing out factors in the decreased by complexion and other things have to be made. This letter will soon be sent every week and will be held since he was the addition very simply as a question of the views that the United States attended to the Defence of these and premiums also to the importance of the U.S. The U.S. of the 1966 U.S. Republic Union cut of the million-million-pound price in 1966. In 1966's finally being available, the study increased the at least 100 million dollars in the U.S. GDP and the U.S. GDP of the year 1966. The point on the right side is the point on the right side. To do something for the [?] signations of the free-time short stories to the children of the 18th century were obtained by the children. It is also a quality of the importance of the art of the 14th, the 19th, the 19th, the 19th, the 19th, the At the time of the Annual Report on May 29, the Exchange still disney have out of the good� of the to be given to the Stahl but a new of the U.S. was the other to the to which it is 8200 miles a day. at a rate of 140000. evangling between 5 and 5 per unit, two Am

Page 8 of 10 The economic portion of the Annual Review was quickly accomplished. The Ambassador pointed out the unreality of certain assumptions, such as a 17.5% increase in oil income, the sizeable budget deficits projected for future years, the increase of the proportion of military expenditures to 7% of GNP, and the mounting burden of debt servicing. The Shah saw a common sense side, talked about a few projects in Europe and other far-fetched hypothetical projects, and quickly reverted to the military threat to Iran's oil wealth. "The Shah agreed that I bring the MAIP economic strategy to the attention of the Prime Minister and of top ODI financial authorities", the Ambassador reported, "and that we keep this subject under constant review and discussion" (Lolman 1954). As a Persian shot, the Shah concluded the discussion by referring to Soviet interest in selling IIG's to Iran (at an earlier point he had actually mentioned the possibility of buying Soviet tanks). Shortly after this session, the Shah departed on a two-week trip to domestic, Yugoslav and Italian cities. Before he left, he said that if the U.S. was not willing to supply the tanks, he would turn to the British, then to the Soviets, and if necessary to the French. He said that he hoped there would be no hard feelings if he did so. A more complete picture of the figures and information on equipment costs, as they were available in early June, was obtained as follows: The cost of one squadron of F-4C's, which the Pentagon estimated, extended to 4.2 million, was at $50 million. Blue Streak had been priced at 4.8 million to 6.2 million. The Sheridan tanks were 678 million, based on a procurement estimate of $52 million. The Hawk battalion was 70 million, based on a $30.5 million. Wilson (anti-aircraft artillery) was priced at 100 million, based on a $50 million. The "shock" of all this was that the total cost of $100 million or more had become a virtual impossibility. The Ambassador reported that the Shah's reaction to Page 9 of 10 the situation, as it had been conveyed to him by General Dufour, was that it was "hopeless". In addition to pricing, he was informed that instead of the 7-40 squadron of 16 planes each, the U.S. proposed to provide him only with two squadrons of 12 planes. He railed at the thought for R&D (research and development) that the U.S. would be unable to equip Iran. The Prime Minister commented that it was almost unbelievable that the Shah would "sleep with the devil" but that in desperation this could occur. The Ambassador issued a sharp warning against the inevitable repercussions if Iran were to turn to the Soviets (Telcon 1683). The Shah returned to Tehran on June 27. On June 29 he summoned the Ambassador and General Jilley by and outlined his strategy. He would like to procure the most "logical" equipment from the U.S. and especially did not wish to procure aircraft from the Soviets, noting that "once a pilot is in the air he is beyond control and can in fact turn against his country." On the other hand, anti-aircraft equipment, which did not provide the same opportunities for pilot defection, might be procured elsewhere, probably from the Soviet Union. The Ambassador warned against inevitable complications that could ensue. At this the Shah emphasized that he must have "liberty of action", and he began to argue that the U.S. could trust Iran, which was standing by us in the matter of Tibet-etc., and that we should understand that by taking an "independent" stance he was really frustrating Communist attempts to undermine the stability of his country. The interview, which was a difficult one, ended with the Shah asking to be informed about any "strings" (i.e., consequences in case he turned to the Soviets) so that he could make alternative arrangements now rather than later. The Shah made it clear that he still hoped to obtain two F-4C squadrons from the U.S., as well as Blue Streak and certain other items. 9. Public Confrontation. In two interviews with American newspapermen, Alfred Friendly of the Washington Post and Cyrus T. Brady of the New York Times, the Shah in early July began to indicate that he had decided to approach the Soviets about arms purchases. He cast this in terms most useful to Iran, and obtained the desired results — but at a price. The element of that price was that if the U.S. could not supply the arms, he also might further isolate himself in so drawing back became more difficult. During the same week we learned that the Soviet Union had in fact been approached. Some of the Shah's closest advisers, including ranking military officers, came to the Ambassador urging that the U.S. should even forward with more attractive offers to head off a calamity. In a recorded exposition of the situation, the Embassy urged that the U.S. should desist from a public reaction, that a special effort should be made with respect to India, so that we could draw a distinction between diversification of military procurement involving resort to various European sources, and resort to the Soviets (Telcon 003). SECRET

The most important thing now became getting into the Shok's head the passage that he could not simply pick what he went for in the U.S., and they had been from others, including the Rusitans as I.d., that there were many limitations as well as political reobservations that he had to take from across, the problem was from into bold relief by the message he had by the Athes, through the Prime Minister Alon on July 5 and At the U.S. patients were improved, the Shah would be willing to "transfer from the Foreign list to the American list". This was despite the that the Ambassador had only three days before stressed the security applications (no, that we could not connect to contact our highly advanced people to know Mr. the Covid-19 would be running out of their mission in the country, " written 031). Alon had as usual been greatly impressed, but it was able that he was not commending the full flavor of the message to his sovereign. When the U.S. could not press the "Isolacy" by the U.S. The Athes had never met that he was not away the Shah was on the same wavelon job, that he seemed unwilling to listen, and was too quick to take of name (when 080). The other have, we received reports that the Eish, having made a basic 10. North America. Up to this point, when the Ambassador had pointed out that security considerations alone would take it inevitable that the U.S. would withheld certain items if Iran resorted to the Russians for military equipment, the other usually had countered (e.g., Tehran 145) that these were "excesses" when, what he considered such warnings to be advanced rationalizations of future political regulation. "In opportunity to drive our points here cause when the President in late July were another letter to the Shah, which was accepted by the Ambassador. In the area in the US, of the security mg/m, which the President had pointed out with most clarity, the Shah once were tried to break it inside by reciting that the U.S. Government could always find "excesses", the Ambassador then upon took a pencil out printed. The 10000 Of course, I have been to the 20th International Conference on Information Technology since the end of 2004; have not only studied but also published a number of the contents we wish to see on the following forward our will have an issue if I have been to the 20th International Conference with the Bovins University and, if you can see a friend at the time, the meeting will be on the other side. In a case of a different question, which v [?] aly improved the Shall and which he must have read with a note of written, it can stated that "If I am should have to be a member of the Committee, I will be a member of the Committee as to the other relationship, but I do feel the important of our military assistance program." (A review by the Shall during the same interview, that the U.S. decided to leave Iran, with "larges packed and with first-class tickets", inscribed how would he need have been to present our first, the full could bring not only an "important" of our program but perhaps its most important, still, while the Shall said he would tollate no Bovist conditions, and he the ouster of one on military mission, with several from OZTO, an even according of Bovies to the time to try, he caused to assume that there could be some pressure from the Shall. He even agreed that by date they will the Soviets be right direct their efforts to build up a bice of comfort for "impossible" states in the Middle East (Yaren 56). A slightly backerriding movement now began to be noted. It was older that a month after the Canadian was such to the Soviet Union, now very Modelling the world's population, the world's own trade is being a great part of the global trade. going to us that the prospect of a Soviet area deal was not nearly no popular as the Shah had predicted, that there were matterings even among the military and that the Sikh's advisers (except perhaps for Prime Minister Novosibir) were urging action. There was trials about a shift of novel procurement to the British (Tehmu 492), which occurred a kind of diversification that was accepted to us and even solitary. According to former Prime Minister Alan, who is perhaps the Sikh's oldest candidate, the renzah had recently reacted that under involved on with the Soviets in military matters was like but "ing together "geolino and find", The President's letter, and the detailed

s 12 of 1-90 from Tehran arguments about security requests, were sinking in further. On top of it, there was a looming fear of a new Soviet settlement in the area with the Cuban missile project. The temperature was down, but the issue was still unresolved (October 500). 11. PROCUREMENT. In early August, the U.S. position was ready to be communicated to the Shah. We were prepared to move ahead with Iranian purchases within the $200 million credit, but our offer to sell major items there, subject to the normal lead times, established as it was, had created the impression that the request for possible military procurement from the U.S. Department of this aspect was left deliberately uncertain. Within this limitation, we were prepared to discuss the full range of military items available. We were prepared to accept the concept of a few proposed to 1st Iran purchases to be made at "old prices" from "new production", i.e., at an early date, but at a significant reduction in price. On the other hand, a price concession was made in voicing R&D charges on the Bank installations. Most of the items expected to provide the $200 million credit (at "old prices") in 500 million francs, which would make the early funding of the 3-4 year period impossible, and proposed to make each tranche dependent on the chance of the Annual Review under the 1964 Memorandum (State 231-2). This latter provision was the most delicate one, especially since the instructions (State 231-2) provided for amendment of that Memorandum to include the phrase, "subject to satisfactory mutual conclusions being reached in the review provided for in (the Annual Review.)" This gave the appearance of the U.S. wishing to transform what had been in effect a provision to renew together annually, into one with teeth in it whereby U.S. economists would be the judge whether Iran was over-extending itself, with some kind of veto power as exclusions would have to be mutually satisfactory. Since we could already, if we chose, interpret the Annual Review provision of the 1964 agreement in that sense, it seemed that the proposed revision was needlessly obtrusive; and the Embassy pleaded (Tehran 570) that "this is a most sensitive aspect involving Iran's sovereign right to determine what it will devote to its defense. Lacking compelling issue of this one point... is unnecessarily provocative... Even if the Shah for tactical reasons were to accept the proposed wording, it could cause deep rancor and sow seed for trouble in the future." The Department (State 23991) agreed that the point could be made orally, thereby avoiding what would undoubtedly have been a major blow-up. The new U.S. position was communicated to the Shah on August 10, by Ambassador Keyes and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Rhoes. In accordance with instructions across the board, among other points, on the continued importance we attach to the Annual Review. It was also made clear that we were concerned that Iran not over-extending itself and that availabilities under the $200 million credit would be affected by the impact of third-country military SECRET purchases. A large number of additional points were made. The Shah seemed reasonable, and he said that while the Soviets had reduced their "in principle" to his request, "we did not wish to consult them," (they) appeared to be less than enthusiastic." He did not given up the idea of procuring the SA-2s from the Russians, although the idea that they could be isolated from sophisticated U.S. equipment. He seemed impressed with arguments that he might be able to do without surface-to-air missiles altogether, nuclear strike on Sa-2s, and he noted that the latter had been quite ineffective in North Vietnam. On the other hand, he seemed determined to buy something from the Soviet Union: he mentioned "some 200-300 guns, armored personnel carriers, and missiles." These, presumably, would not be in the category of what would affect the provision of "major, sophisticated, sensitive" items by the U.S. On a contingent basis, the net package under the $200 million agreement, the number of items was not fixed. The point, of course, was whether and to what extent Iran could still obtain military equipment from the Soviet Union. Another case was whether the $200 million of procurement or naval equipment from Great Britain would be obtained concurrently with the SA-2s. The effect of such a decision on the packages would be. If Iran were to go ahead with a major purchase of SA-2s at this time, there might be a serious risk of a major conventional artillery sale being made to Iran. In this case, it seemed that the Shah was not ready for Iranian procurement of the bulk of its needs from the U.S., as it then seemed anxious to do. But his desire for political reasons, to diversify his procurement, and to have a certain amount of leverage to prevent the U.S. from becoming too dependent on U.S. sources. The point about the military balance, and the effect of the current U.S.-Soviet, etc., of the U.S. was not as long as originally believed. 12. INTELLIGENCE. The U.S. was interested in the Iranian government and the Iranian military. The U.S. was willing to provide some aid to Iran. There was a need for a more open exchange of information. The U.S. was willing to provide some aid to Iran. There was a need for a more open exchange of information. United States in the Middle East at the time of the U.S. 12 13

and I have been to the office for a while since I was a college student. I am not a student who. I am an English student. I am an English student. I am a student who has been to the office for a while since I was a college student. I am not a college student. I am a college student. I am a college student. I The question has often come up similar to a finish with building in the threshold to record to the number for every unit the number is to be used to measure the value. In the case of building in the number for the number of units, the number of units is given by the number of units of the number of units of the number of units of the We are not here there. I am a different man to whom I was born in the case of the U.S. we have been able to determine the way we were born when he would be north to us to maintain our military property at home to the which we who are not going to be so far from the home to the country we are still the public and I have been to the country to the end of the domination) would have been the most important with the U.S. We the U.S. have been the only people who had been born in the United States since the war. We have been born in the United States and economy decisions, he might have been a question from the country to the Country. When I could not act, however, I had the U.S. to go to the country. I am very excited for the building and would either form a team to be a group of the building to be still at hand. I was a publicл com-zionist in the city, and I would not be a small one. The data U.N. is in the public address, and I am a group of the building. I am a member of the U.S. and I am not a member of the U.S. but I am a member of the U.S. and I am a member of the U.S. and The first two lines are in the following form: The first line is "The first line is " The second line is "The second line is " The third line is "The third line is " The fourth line is "The fourth line is " 2023.10.10 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:00, 10:00-10:0:00-10:00, 10:00-10

1. Despite Winds of anti-Americanism in the Shah Remains Our Friend 2. a. Friendship forged during Azerbaijan and Mosadeq crises b. Faithful CUN20 ally c. Iranian Medical team is in Vietnam d. Special facilities 2. New Relationship to Emerging Northier and More Duralist 3. a. Iran is standing in its own feet (which was our goal) b. USAID program are raining out c. Appears almost to be complete turning of our backs d. Transition should be such an to protect our investment (1.6 billion) e. Shah willing to buy but wants favorable treatment on terms 3. Some Military Augmentation is justifiable 4. a. Wealth-bearing oil installations are increasingly vulnerable b. Material recommended is defensive and gap filling (air defense) c. Iran's capability markedly inferior to UAR, Turkey, even Iraq d. Shah wants to cope with regional threats (No Iranian Viet-Nam) e. Objectives: deterrence and self-reliance f. Requirements confirmed by current military judgment 4. Iran's Economic Capability Should Not be Underrated 5. a. Iran is thriving; far different from five years ago b. Land reform program, literacy corps and health corps outstanding c. Abundant credit-worthiness according to IBRD d. Oil income over 500,000,000 annually and rising e. Growing awareness of potential economic difficulties f. Other countries are vying for Iranian business 6. Chain of Adverse Reactions if Our Response is Inadequate 7. Iran will buy elsewhere, breaking US pattern (MIG's 700,000) 8. b. Our capability for influencers, shan will diminish sharply c. Without such influence, economic difficulties more ominous d. It will be the beginning of the end of Armish/IAAG e. Will be road-block for augmentation of our special facilities f. It will be another success for Soviets in ousting US influence 8. 6. Saleable Package is Needed 9. a. Practical program within 400 million ceiling b. Practical third transme - FY 67 10. Reiteration of economic fact of life during annual review "Approach Almost to be Complete Turning of Out Reach" Not only are we terminating AID assistance to Iran, but we are also: 1. Proposing harsher PI-480 terms to Iran (10 years and interest at going to the country borrowing rate); Washington has been unable to provide us with any examples of recent Title IV agree-monc containing comparability hard terms. 2. Applying Interest Equalization Tax and voluntary controls to private U.S. capital flows to Iran: thus treating Iran as a developed country and making private borrowing in U.S. more expensive. 3. Unrestlandship rate of oil offtake. Arsenoc liftings from Saudi Arabia are at a moridily higher rate than Consortium listings from Iran. 4. The Qatarian affair still rankles. Iranian leader-ship persists in its belief that after two years royal assets could have been released if there were real USG determination. 5. The Iranian student problem. Somehow Iranian leader-ship figures that anti-regime activities of Iranian students could be misused. b. Certained large-scale U.S. assistance to Turkey and even to Masser in contrast to AID out-offs in Iran causes Iranian leadership to believe that the US no longer values Iranian friendship.

1. Rest Time Different from 11/10 "Rest Time" A. A. A. ^{†} of Iran's economy greatly improved with en- sides giving evidence of growing awareness of various problems. period delve in high gear with steadily the position of private Iranian and Foreign capital. has enabled Iran's leaders to have clearer tion of the financial resources available and of their alternative uses. 5. I have been to have improved land tenure arrangements in 30 years. I have been provided land to ever a year and is now concentrating on rising and rural living standards. It has been the only year since I was. 6. The program of the Iranian armed forces are brinazn, toadion, iualn, roads, water supply systems and other improvements to thousands of Iranian villages. 7. Hutger, Corps of almost 20,000 drafttoos has been trained and sent into villages to teach reading and writing. 8. Health Corps or drafted doctors and medical personnel has sent 55000 visits to improve health conditions in villages throughout Yunnan. 9. Vocational training provided by the armed forces has given useful skills to recruits which they are now using in villages in all parts of Iran. The policy chosen the I'd like to do noting, for the past two years have to be you are to be here and you are doing so much on 1996 to mention years of the long present it is not for foreign policy or the reason all as well as from other exports to about can afford to become increasingly large men Estimates of the amounts I've could have been aging her creditworthiness range total over the relative figure of 800 million annually over the years on receivable terms. Although the govornacut has planned to be in econمائية projectes requizingөөсөн таслати впливів sons of the larger projects will be many of the other can not be considered by the government would like. The Embassy was between the Iran's economic development project and the subprime of Iran's debt capacity in the next year from the U.S. will be substantial capacity rewarding up to military credits. Conservatively estimated. I need to say at least 30 million annually for the costs in the next several years. IBRD report of December: position to increase aural borrowing on conventional terms. In the case is reinforced by the likely stability of her own and the fact that in normal crop years, food is requirements are only marginal except for sugar

2. Successes to Date: Alliance with National Aspirations 1. 256 million Steel Mill Project (includes machine tool industry and natural gas), with overtones West refused provide. 2. Multi-year barter agreements with USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 3. Shah visit USSR June 1965 and scheduled visits Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary within next five months. Increased high-level visits. 4. Active cultural exchange program: artists, sports teams, films; negotiations on cultural agreement with USSR almost concluded; increasing number of Soviet books in Iran. 5. Iran led Soviet aid recipients in 1965. H. Current Soviet Objectives: Ouster of West 6. Other agreements: civil air; transit; Caspian fisheries; Aras qum. Panluvi harbor, grain silos. 1. Soviet-directed National Voice of Iran (Baku) attacks: American and British Embassies, ARMISH/MAAG, USIB, US Army Radio and Television Stations, CENTO, US-educated Iranians, Oil Consortium. 2. Tudeh-controlled \underline{\text{Peyk-e Iron}} $ (Bulgaria) attacks ARMTEN/HKAG and CELTC. 3. Radio Moscow notes publication Soviet book which portrays its assistance as cause for Iranian economic troubles. O. Final Act: Jettison Irrian Nationalists Long range goal enunciated by Molotov in 1940 remains same: "aren south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is...the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." January21,1972 OFFICIAL-INFORMAL L. Douglas Heck Esquire Minister-Counsellor American Embassy Tehran Deas Doug: Many thanks for your letter of December 18 on Security Assistance Objectives and Program Guidance. We do in the share your views that those included in Seeder's message: 4948 to CINCEUR (DTG0118292Dec71) are outmoded and need up-dating. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum we did on this subject before receiving your letter. These thoughts were incorporated into an NEA paper which covered a number of countries and forwarded by Sisco to Spiers (PM). At present, PM is endeavoring to work out a cleared DOD/State position at which time a new message would be sent out as a follow-up to State 217955 (December 2, 1971). I'm hopeful that it will be possible to send out such a message by the end of the month. Sincerely, Jack C. Milkeet cc: Wolfgang J. Lehmann, Esquire Political Advisor CINCEUR with attachments. SECRET/LIMDIS

SECRET OFFICIAL - INFORMAL John H. Rouse, Jr., Esquire Second Secretary of Embassy American Embassy Tehran, Iran Dear John: Further to Jack's letter to Doug Heck of January 21, 1972, I thought you might like to have a copy of the most recent modifications of United States Security Assistance Objectives and Program Guidance for Iran. Sincerely, Robert L. Dowell, Jr. Enclosure Copy of Guidance for YY74-78 Security Assistance Planning COPY U.S. Security Assistance Objectives --Assist Iran in developing armed forces capable of defending Iran against all but a major external attack by the Soviet Union. --Encourage Iran to play a leading role in providing for the security of the Persian Gulf. --Maintain internal security. --Insure continued availability of essential rights, authorizations and privileges. Security Assistance Program Guidance Continue to plan for FMS cash and commercial salc needed to meet our security assistance objectives. --No FMS credit is being requested since Iran is expected to continue to seek and obtain EX-IM Bank financing for its U.S. military purchases. --Plan for a continuation of MAP grant aid training support including appropriate MAAG cost category immediately below the level of $500,000 for FY73 and beyond.

\underline{\text{3HXHET}} \underline{\text{THIS}} \wave{\text{current consists of}} \wave{\text{page}} , No. \underline{\text{of}} \underline{\text{6}} Copies, \underline{\text{Seried}} A. THE MILITARY PROBLEM General Significance Our military relationship with Iran (credit sales of military equipment and military advisory assistance) is a key element in the strength of our position and influence in Iran. We have been the primary supplier of the Shah's military requirements throughout the postwar period, especially since 1955, and remain so in spite of his recent purchases from the U.K., and the Soviet Union (transport equipment and antiaircraft weapons from the latter). The Chief of ARNISH/MAAG is for the Shah a highly valued, objective and informed advisor on equipment, manpower, and organization. Our military role has had still added significance since concessionary economic assistance and the UEAI mission were terminated in 1967. The Shah has said over and over again that what he wants principally from the US is for us to sell him the sophisticated equipment he needs for his defense. Problem The Shah's appetites for equivalent keeps us constantly uneasy. We are concerned with the economic burden created by his military establishment, its impact in terms of skilled manpower absorption and availability, and its real military effectiveness. In the earlier period, especially when we were providing economic aid to bolster the Iranian economy, we sought to limit the military program so that economic development would not be retarded. We wrote this concept into the military program beginning with the memorandum on military assistance of 1962 and it has become enshrined in a joint annual economic review to assess the economic impact of anticipated military purchases. Our AIF and Budget Bureau people still attach considerable significance to this concept. But, now that the Shah is purchasing (on credit terms) his military equipment (and our earlier sizable grant component has stopped entirely), he is becoming less tolerant of such foreign restraints. On our side, recent Congressional reservations regarding foreign purchases of US military equipment in general and the consequent strictures which are placed annually on the amount of government-backed credit have become the more important limiting factors. The high cost of US commercial credit makes resort to it very expensive but there was some of it in last year's credit arrangement. GROUP 3 iomgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified. CECTET Beginning in 1964 we have tried to find an approach, if not a solution, to this problem in developing with the Iranians tentatively agreed long-range programs of military equipment acquisitions. US Administrations, and especially Congress, have, however, been most reluctant to make advance commitments regarding military sales to foreign governments. And on the Iranian side, the packages have tended to come apart almost as soon as they were agreed, as the Shah became conscious of a new, previously unforeseen need. The steeply rising prices of military vehicles and the occasional need to conclude purchases before production of a given item cases, have also constituted pressures tending to enlarge our annual agreed programs. Other countries do not ensure our reluctance to sell Iran greater quantities of military equipment. The Soviet Union has kept constant pressure on the Shan to buy amount anything he wants (MIG aircraft, missiles, tanks) at attractive prices and terms (generally, credit at 2%). The Western European countries and the MIG appear ready to sell without restraint their military products, although their credit terms are not so attractive as the US. In general, it has been the country Team view that our most effective restaurants on excavation places lies in the careful technical advice and professional permission of the ARDISH/HAAG. Toward this end we have made some progress to setting the Iranians to think of the whole complex of continuing the construction of the purchase of weapons systems and, particularly, to be combined of the visiting factor of trained operating and administrative parameters, to diversification of Iranian purchases, i.e., from Wassar's, to acceptable and possibly politically desirable, but the practices limitations and problems are substantial and we could be expected to see much further enlargement in purchases made from our own. We have sought to make the point in Washington that, when the discussion here, the Shah has finally made it. We do not believe certain military equipment, he will get it—from others if we are not willing and able to provide it. In recent years we have found also that it is no use trying to persuade him not to buy equipment on the land that he is overestimating the threat. For example, our government about the weakness of his Arab neighbor are brushed off as it is not the Shah rejoins by citing the erratic quality of their leadership, the possibility of their combating against him, etc. Current Situation The Flash's concentration on the security problems he feels he must assume with the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1968 has brought a still greater sense of urgency to current military "requirements." In 1968 we worked out with him an "illustrative list" BECPET

of long-range military needs which whittled down his considerably greater demands to a 600,000.00 level. It was understood that this would be financed in 100 million annual branches, subject, of course, to the annual economic review and to Congressional action on the military assistance program and its financing. Difficulty immediately arose with last year's, the seventh (the series started in 1964), tranche. The sub of the problem was the Shah's insistence that an additional two P-4 squadrons be moved into this tranche to insure delivery by the end of 1971. There's a squadrons cost 135.3 million as current prices and the cost threatened to mount to 143 million unless a clear commitment to purchase could be given. After considerable pulling and hauling, the problem was not by a "dependable undertaking" by the COI to buy the P-4s and a US Government approval of "incremental funding," i.e., postponement of 53.7 million of the P-4s' cost to the eighth, PY 1970 tranche. It was understood that the COI assumed the risk involved if US credit was not "forthcoming" to FY 1970, but the department had to fight hard to gain DOD and Congressional acceptance of the concept of incremental funding. It should be noted that in FY 1969 the COI also purchased from the US for cash an additional 66 million of military items (primarily spare parts, ammunition, maintenance and technical services). We are not yet down to the wire on the eighth tranche, and General Twitchell continues to discuss additional proposed purchases. But, the GOI has already indicated its desire to spend up the negotiations for the next 100 million credit and Plan Org. Director, Nehul Sami, want to Washington in early September to do some credit soundings. (Generally, the annual package is to credit terms have been finally agreed by late spring). The shape of the general difficulty can be gathered from the following: (a) 53.7 million is already obligated to cover the Y-lis. (b) 27 million for the financing of the aircraft warning system (Peace Ruby) is needed. (d) 153 mm. howitzera at 6 million are required. (e) 400 M-47 tanks require "retrofitting." We persuaded the Shah to do this instead of purchasing additional new and more expensive tanks. The cost will be a minimum of 25 million. (1) The Shah continues interested in 234 Sheridan tanks with Shilleagh missiles. Suppliers say (we have not always found such statements fully justified) Sheridan production may lapse if the Iranian order is not placed before Jamary, 1970. Total cost of this weapons system is about 105 million. (g) A study we did of requirements for defense of the Persian Gulf concluded that a surveillance capability would be sufficient. But even if aircraft in inventory or scheduled for procurement are used and no new ships are purchased (clear Indian acceptance of tais view is not yet forthcoming), three radar installations and three variable depth sonar installations would cost in the neighborhood of 15 million. (h) Although four years ago we seemed to persuade the Shah temporarily that air defense could be adequately handled by interعتor aircraft without the purchase of point defense weapons (he was gaining of the lash system at the time), this decision has come unstuck. The recent confrontation with Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab river seems to have convinced the Shah that the airfields are too vulnerable to surprise attack. Consequently, conditional contracts have been signed for Britain's ariesites (about 94 million) and Ocelltones for airspace activities (about 10 million). We have recently been announced to discuss the Bank system with him again in this connection. Although we have not altogether given up the effort to re-convince the Shah that aircraft will do the job, this project of doing so is not appear bright, though the large use to try to get him to concentrate on problems of manager and real effectiveness. Obviously, all this, however, cannot fit into a 100 million package. We may be more aware as to postpone some of these items. He may you? for an increase in the 100 million ceiling on credit, or some of the 10 million total items might be bought from suppliers other than U.S. He will have to buy some of them from us for cash. The Shah appears to be courting on an oil deal, involving sale to the US of some of the Consortium's usual liftings, to cover the 47 retrofession and a chastian tank. The GM representative here is working on the cost to build here to fit elsewhere in the import quotes when the subject by the USD to importers, not to originating countries. We do not too sanguine regarding the pre-pacts. There is strong opposition in the various agencies as well as in Congress to expanding the annual credits made available for Iran above the 100 million level. Quite possibly, the limited size of total government-supported credit to its authorized by Congress for military sales to foreign governments would make it infeasible. However, past experience has shown that if the President decides that a credit sale SBCREP

DOAE of a particular size should be made, ways have been found to put together an acceptable credit. Amore of this, the Shah will certainly seek to involve the President in this problem in October, although the President has made it known he prefers to keep his conversations with hands of state on higher level and less specific policy matters. RELIGIOUS CIRCLES Summary The Shah of Iran maintains a posture of public piety and champions Islamic causes even though Iranians, the vast majority of whom belong to the Shia sect of Islam, are not greatly attracted by pan-Islamic sentiments. The Iranian clergy no longer have major political influence -- though they retain a sufficient following to apply an occasional "brake" to government programs. They have been, for the past decade, fighting a rear-guard and losing action against the growing tide of a secular state overly fascinated by the West, modernization and material progress. Should unforeseen developments, such as a severe economic recession or the weakening of the government (as the result of the Shah's death or a military debacle) lead other segments of the population to challenge the government, the Muslim clergy could undoubtedly drum up some following. In that case, since the US is Christian and is associated with the reform regime and since the clergy has traditionally opposed foreign influence, we would probably come under political attack. Back:ground The Shia sect of Islam, to which 90% Iranian Muslims belong whether or not it was intended to bind Iranians together against the rest of the Muslim world, has contributed in no small way to the development of Iran's distinctive national consciousness. Iranians as a whole are not brought attracted by pan-Islamic sentiments and tend to vice the war with Israel, for instance, as largely an Arab -- not Muslim -- problem. Although the secular reforms of both Reza Shah and the present Shah have antagonized the conservative, traditionalist, religious opinion in Iran, both leaders have been careful to pay deference to Islamic teachings and to contend such teachings both support and demand their reform programs. Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals not automatically classified

Clergy Weakened by Reform Since the advent of Peza Shah, the Iranian religious community has found itself confronted with one change after another -- each one with the most the clever's monopoly over education, community and family relations, law, public mores and morals -- and thereby diminishing its overall popular and political influence. Peza Shah's official and emotional reforms seriously cut back on religious influence. The present case, in carrying reforms further into the fields of education, community and family relations, and women's rights has now directly counter to tradition and nationalism, the clear, which exercise to consider the influence of the state life, particularly in the rural and its temporal role in the future. The present case has been passed, the presence of the proposed literature collection, the health of the people, the compensation of the clergy, the authorities on the clergy, the religious opposition to the current "perhaps algorithmic -- after the new Religious Corps which would place the love of the New Age the field of religious education for the development of a last-ditch state. Since 1903, However when the policies of the United States were limited, the widespread rise in the regime, the clergy has been a strong [?] [?] , and the sentiment into political life has been a clear cut leader of the Social Justice paramount leader died. Marcellan Khomeini, arrested and exiled to Iraq in 1951 as a result of his anti-government activities, aspires for the Mankindسے غیرسواسرا فورس, but his close cooperation with the Government of Iraq in anti-Sikh propaganda and activity has ruled out any chance of reconciliation with the present Shah and his reduced his appeal to many Iranian Muslims who might otherwise share some of his basically literal ideas. Residual_t_el_t_s_Pe_r_nt_ent_ The residual religious resequement against the retic remains bitter and deep, but a process of "de-escalation" between dissenting religious circles and the government has been underway. Reactionary and opportunistic as many of the clergy have often been in their choice of tactics, the clergy as a whole is not yet isolated from the mainstream of Iranian popular opinion. The government has therefore had higher threats, royal government control of the leading Sola marine in Iran (at Mashad), and control and censorship of all public activities to prevent politically-minded religious leaders from developing any sizeable political following. It is generally recognized that the clergy is heavily penetrated by SAVAK, which further reduces its influence. While keeping a tight rein on dissident mullahs, the government endeavors to keep its�recoo mended to the taller ones. It has so far failed, however, to produce a pro-government leader who can command widespread, let alone universal, respect and trust. P In any case, the millions have been unable to stop the course of development and reform or to find common cause of more than a temporary nature with any other major political force. The work is arrangement with the government will, include probably continue as long as economic progress is set out. Should even so, between, such as a marked half-way, the economy or an apparent weakening of the government's firm hand, lead other segments of the population to trail-come the government the contributed millions will be the main source of source of income for the especially among the bazaaris and lower classes. Even in those circumstances, it is unlikely that they will ever return to a historic role such as that of 1892, when they led the attack against the Belgian Tobacco Concession, or of 1907, when they played a key role in the Constitutional Revolution, or of 1932, when they rallied behind the government in the break with the British. Other Religions Movements Iran was Zoroastrian before it became Muslim and today the calendar and many customs such as the New Ruz holidays are carry-overs from Zoroastrianism. In the last year the pie- and the five discussed forms of trials with more summary than in previous years leading some observers to specialize on the regime of the and the useful to re-emphasize their Zoroastrian beginnings. The Bahrain -- with perhaps 10,000 followers in Iran -- religion is not in favor officially although one of the Shah's intrates. Dr. Ayadi, is a Bahrain, as are other prominent Iranians.

CONFIDENTIAL Armenians are not trusted by the regime especially the security services because of their ties with Russia. The Jewish, Baha'is, and the Armenian communities encounter discrimination in the hiring practices of the GOT, but they are free to practice their religions. Effect on U.S. Image As far as the US policy is concerned, the resurgence --, however unlikely -- of influence by the mullahs would adversely affect our image here, since we are Christian, closely identified in the public eye with the reformist regime and with Israel. Conservative religious leaders lay much of the blame for Iran's secularization, for its liberalization of social mores, and for its close relations with Israel, to American influence. Moreover, the nationalistic clergy has traditionally opposed foreign influence in Iran. Thus, in the unlikely event the clergy were to return to a position of significant political influence in the next few years, we could expect to come under attack. CONFIDENTIAL POLITICAL OPPOSITION - Extremists and National Front Summary In Iran effective organized opposition to the Shah -- communist and non-communist -- has practically ceased to exist. Persistent suppression and efficient penetration, internal ideological disputes and the Iran-USSR rapprochement, and significant social reform and economic progress managed by the regime, have cowed, demoralized or persuaded most opposition elements. Hard-core opponents do remain and pose a latent threat in time of crisis. They have little popular following, no known following within the security forces, no viable alternatives to offer nor any known leaders of stature -- and they remain under close SAVAK surveillance. Nevertheless, they have undoubtedly provided recruits for the subversive/terrorist activities which have assumed increasing importance over the past four years -- though still far from a threat to Iranian stability. The main anti-regime activity takes place outside of Iran where the Tudeh Party with Soviet support. Odom agents and other oppositionists recruit and organize Iranian students abroad, martial anti-Shah pro-paganda and try to embarrass the Shan on his visits overseas. These groups have little influence today within Iran, except among a relatively small number of university students. There is no permissible way in Iran to express opposition to the monarch, the monarchy or to policies and programs sponsored by the Shah. Opposition political parties and groups have been disbanded and denoralized, their membership covered or acquired by the regime. The Tudeh (Peoples' Communist Party has been illegal since 1949 and firmly suppressed since it reached the peak of its popularity in 1952-53. Many of the political leaders of the loose National Front political coalition who supported Nossadegh, have Group3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals not automatically declassified CON [?] May 1972

undergone periods of arrest and remain under close surveillance, and all of them have come to recognize the limits of allowable activity. Reactionary elements led by the clergy and bitterly opposed to such reforms as land distribution and women's rights, were vigorously suppressed when they last led demonstrations in 1963. While kept well under control since then, the clergy still commands sufficient respect to be able occasionally to put the brake on certain GOI programs (e.g. the plans for a Religious Corps). Student, labor, political, religious and other potentially troublesome groups are thoroughly penetrated by the security services. The Soviet-Iran rapprochement and an ideological split into Moscow and Peking factions has further weakened the subversive communist effort; the land and social reform programs of the White Revolution and the Shah's independent nationalism in foreign affairs have met many of the demands of the progressive, nationalist, intellectual elements in Iran; the soaring economy has offered an opportunity for constructive involvement and material reward which for many has proven to be a satisfactory substitute for fuller political participation. A large number of former Tudeh and Nationalist Front supporters have been welcomed back to the fold and are now found even at top levels of the government. In short, effective organized opposition has ceased to exist in Iran, and intractable opponents have been driven underground or outside the country. But some hard-core oppositionists -- however fragmented -- remain. There are liberal intellectuals, both young and old, who would limit the power of the monarch (some would even abolish the monarchy) and resent the suppression of non-conformist political activities and ideas. There are also elements of the conservative bazaarism and Muslim clergy who would turn back the clock economically and socially -- some well known and still commanding sufficient loyalties to apply the occasional "brake" to GOI programs. There are, finally, elements, particularly among the young, who accept Marxian tenets and would set Iran on the course of "popular socialism". Groups of young men are occasionally apprehended and tried for communist anti-state activities. In 1969, more than 20 men in all were convicted of forming communist groupings to overthrow the government. In 1971 dissident activity produced the now infamous "Siakal Incident" -- an attack by an armed band on a gendarmerie post at Siakal, a small village in the Alborz mountains some 35 kilometers south-east of Rasht. Two gendarmes were killed and another wounded before the group fled into the mountains, soon to be pursued by a superior government force (including units of the Iranian Army) which succeeded in killing or capturing most of the group -- whose total number has been put at 150 to 175. Thirteen of those taken prisoner were subsequently tried and executed; and the captured reportedly included two Palestinian Arabs and others trained in Communist China. Approximately 50 of the dissidents, however, escaped capture and subsequent anti-government violence has sometimes been officially blamed on the Siakal Group. There is a growing suspicion, however, the Group as such may no longer exist but is used as a label for the GOI to pin on other terrorists. (The Siakal incident received wide domestic publicity, but only some weeks after the incident.) And in January 1972, the GOI announced that 120 individuals would be brought to trial on charges of murder, bank robbery, bombings, illegal possession of arms and explosives, attempted kidnapping, air piracy, propagation of communism and anti-state activities. Accusations that the prisoners' guilt was predetermined, complaints that the prisoners were tortured, the closing of the trials to the public, and the severity of the sentences (of 32 sentenced to death, nincen are known to have been executed, ten had their sentences commuted to life in prison, and nothing further has been heard of the other three) brought some strong criticism from Western intellectuals and media -- criticisms such as has furnished sores of the state's image, both at home and abroad, particularly Western Europe. We assume the Government crackdown represented by these arrests and trials has set back terrorist operations and has forced subversive groups to regroup and retrain. Once this is completed, however, it is expected that urban guerrilla activity will resume on a scale similar to that before the crack-down. The major anti-regime effort takes place outside the country, mainly in Europe. The top Tudeh Party leadership has been outside of Iran for years, enjoying support from the Soviet Union, organizing Iranian students abroad, and operating a clandestine radio station which broadcasts into Iran from Bulgaria or Leipzig. East Germany, other anti-Shah radio stations broadcast from Iraq and Baku, in the USSR. The East German station is reported to be currently undergoing extreme reorganization. A small Tudeh splinter group formed in 1965 identifies with Communist China, and that country has succeeded in gaining considerable influence among Iranian students in Europe. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Also visible abroad but less active, are elements of the old National Front. Perhaps the most visible and articulate irritant, and certainly the most widely publicized, is the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), a dissident student organization with a wide following among young Iranians in Europe and enjoying support from continental intellectuals. It is leftist oriented, received broad support (some say direction) from Tudeh Party elements, and has been instrumental in leading demonstrations against the Shah and his policies. The real impact of these groups has been in picturing the Shah to fairly wide groups abroad as a tyrant, in bringing unfavorable publicity to bear abroad on trials in Iran, and in embarrassing the Shah and his hosts by demonstrating during his visits overseas. It is worth noting, finally, the activities of a different kind of dissenter, the late General Teimur Bakhtiar, a former SAVAK chief who carried on a personal vendetta against the regime after his exile by the Shah. He passed the first few years of his exile directing anti-Shah student activities from his residence in Switzerland and then went to Iraq, presumably to become more directly involved in anti-Shah and anti-Iranian operations. (His arrest in Beirut for possession of arms and the Lebanese refusal to extradite him to Iran led to the break in relations between Iran and Lebanon.) General Bakhtiar was assassinated in Iraq in mid-1970, presumably by SAVAK agents. CONFIDENTIAL Introduction and Summary MINORITY GROUPS Iran has important minority populations -- tribal, religious and linguistic -- which have created serious divisive problems for the country in the past. The large tribal groups traditionally resisted rule by the central government and became essentially autonomous during the periods of weak central authority. Even in the 20th century, tribal allegiances and pressures significantly affected the fortunes of Iranian governments. In recent years, however, minority groups have been effectively controlled by central government pressures, and by programs for increased integration -- with the promise of greater reward from participation in a prosperous economy. Iran's Kurdish population, situated along the sensitive Iran-Iraq frontier, is carefully watched by the GOI lest their ethnic loyalties involve them in the Iraqi-Kurdish dispute. The sporadic fire-fights which have erupted in the last year on the Iran-Iraq border have generally been south of the Kurdish areas and not due to ethnic or tribal flareups. Southern Iran's Arabic speaking population, living in Khuzistan along the Iraqi border and the Persian Gulf, presents a potential security problem since they are conscious of their Arab character and minority status, listen to radio Baghdad, and live in the vulnerable oil heartland of Iran. Iraqi and progressive Arab efforts to develop active dissidence among this population, however, have achieved few visible results -- and Iran's security sensitivities toward the Arab population are undergoing a gradual and minor decline. Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals not automatically declassified

Kurds The Kurds, Iran's largest ethnic minority, number more than 1,000,000 living for the most part in West Azerbaijan, Kurdestan and Kermanshah, which border areas of Iraq and Turkey also largely inhabited by Kurds. Although independent-minded, the Iranian Kurds have not in recent years mounted any extensive resistance to government control. The Mahabad Republic, an "independent" Kurdish state set up in 1945 by the USSR, attracted little local support, extended only about 50 miles in each direction from Mahabad and folded as soon as Soviet troops were withdrawn from Iran. Nonetheless, until the 1958 Qassem coup in Iraq, Iranian forces thereafter occupied many Kurdish areas as they might have occupied enemy territory. This coup and the subsequent Kurdish revolt there helped persuade the GOI to change its tactics to emphasize regional development programs designed to attract Kurdish allegiance. Such a carrot and stick policy has preserved internal security among Iranian Kurds and has provided some measure of progress in softening attitudes toward the central government. There are indications, however, that some Iranian Kurds living near Iraq retain their Kurdish identity above their Persian identity, and that some identify closely with Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his struggle to gain autonomy within Iraq. It is likely, therefore, that the Government of Iran is not anxious to see put into operation the agreement reached between the Ba'ath Regime and Iraq's Kurds on March 11, 1970. If fully implemented, that agreement would provide for an important degree of Kurdish autonomy within Iraq -- and not only would Iraq's Kurds no longer provide the internal opposition to Iraq's government that they do now, but Kurdish autonomy in Iraq could stir up among some Iranian Kurds a similar desire for autonomy. Iran has evolved a policy of aiding Mulla Mustafa Barzani -- even though it was he who, with Soviet backing in 1945 helped form the Mahabad Republic. Iran, with Israeli assistance and perhaps guidance has helped supply and arm Barzani's men, and has offered a haven in time of retreat -- the extent of assistance varying with Iran's relations with Iraq, Nasser, and other Arab radicals. The Iraqis on their side have encouraged their loyal Kurds -- such as Jalal Talabani -- to recruit men and stir-up trouble in Iran. Although the potential for trouble has required a relatively large Iranian Gendarmerie commitment in the Kurdish border regions, there is little likelihood the actual security problem in the Kurdish areas will become serious. CONFIDENTIAL May 1972 Đứctiari Something between 300,000 - 500,000 Bakhtiari tribes-men speaking a Persian dialect and practicing Shia Islam, still inhabit the mountainous areas west of Isfahan, most now engaged in farming but many still nomadic. Located where they could control the main road south from Tehran and within striking distance of the capital, the Bakhtiari's had significant political influence up through the early 20th century. Bakhtiari armed support helped gain the Constitutionalists their victory over the Qajars, and many Bakhtiaris are still identified among the quiet Constitutionalist opposition. Although their military power was finally broken down by Reza Shah, wealthy Bakhtiari families have remained prominent to the present. Among prominent Bakhtiari is the [?] Bakhtiari, the Shah's second wife; and General Teimur Bakhtiari, former SAVAK Chief, later public enemy No. 1 in exile until he was assassinated in Iraq in August 1970. Qashqai Composed of perhaps 200,000 Turkic speaking members, the Qashqai tribes inhabit the areas around and to the west of Shiraz. They are traditionally at odds with the Bakhtiariis, yet like them, the Qashqai's political importance today is largely historical and there is little chance they will ever emerge again as an important independent political force. In 1946 a Qashqai-led rebellion forced the resignation from the government of three Tudeh Party members. In the early 50's Qashqai tribal leaders supported Nossadegh; and after his fall the tribes were brought to heel and the principal leaders exiled. As late as 1963 the killing of a land reform official in Fars province brought severe punitive measures against the Qashqai which appeared to write finis to any remaining spirit of tribal independence. The GOI remains moderately concerned, however, over the suspected anti-regime activities of certain Qashqais now in exile in Europe. Arab's An estimated 400,0000 Arab-speakers live mostly in the provinces of Khuzistan and Fars and along the Persian Gulf. Many differ from the Persian majority by their Sunni CONFIDENTIAL May 1972

CONFIDENTIAL religious adherence, as well as their language, and have families and other ties with Iraq or the Arab countries on the south-side of the Gulf. This population has been for some time the target of Arab-expansionist propaganda, originally Nasser-inspired but more recently from Iraq. The extremeness of Iraqi propaganda against the Shah and the GOI -- the lack of any Iraqi figure with Nasser's appeal and stature -- the worsening reputation of the Ba'athists even among other Arabs -- and the severity of Iraq's treatment of Iranian Moslems (even though Shia) recently expelled from Iraq, all have worked in favor of Iran's efforts to counter separatist tendencies among its Arab population. This, plus the passage of time without serious incidents, helps account for a gradual decline in Iranian concern about security problems from its Arab population. Other ^{1} Important Ethnic Groups Closely related to the Bakhtiaris, the Lar tribes are almost as extensive and almost occupy adjoining territory to the west of the Bakhtiari area. They have been politically inactive for a long time. In the extreme south-east of Iran some 500,000 Baluchis live in the relatively primitive and isolated province in Sistan and Baluchistan, employed primarily in livestock raising. The GOI has done little to assist in developing this region through reviving concern since the Indo-Pak war with foreign efforts to stimulate Baluchi nationalism could lead the GOI to pay more attention to this area. Around 300,000 Turkomans, of Mongol origin and speaking a Turkic dialect, occupy areas of Gorgan and the northeast frontier area of Iran. Among the religious minorities, the Sunni Moslems amounting to about 10% of the population are most important. Although there is some strong feeling between the Sunni and Shia Moslem communities, religious strife is unusual as the Sunnis usually live in separate communities among ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkomans. Other notable religious and ethnic minorities include some 75,000 Jews, living mainly in Tehran and Isfahan, who have a long history in Iran but have stayed almost entirely out of political life; around 100,000 Christian Armenians, living in the northwest near former Armenia and in large cities (especially Tehran and Isfahan); and some CONFIDENTIAL 70,000 Assyrians, Nestorian Christians living for the most part around Lake Rezaiyeh in northwest Iran. The Bahais, largely composed in Iran of converts from Judaism, have been suppressed by the GOI -- perhaps as a mop to the Mullas who view Bahaiism as a Moslem heresy, and perhaps also because of alleged political activity by Bahais.

THE WHITE HOUSE 7210440 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON WASHINGTON NEA/IR SECRET July 25, 1972 SECRET JCM RLD TWO MEMORANDUM FOR: June 15, 1972 F1121 -COPIES TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE J J SUBJECT: Follow-up on the President's Talk with the EEA (ACTION) PH (ACTION) The President has considered the memorandum of the Secretary's/PC of Defense of July 5, 1972, "Follow-up on the President's Talk with the Shah of Iran," and has approved the following course of action: 1. F-14 and F-15 aircraft. Briefings should be offered as soon as possible to Iran by service team on the capabilities of the aircraft and the training and logistics requirements associated with them. In order to allow sufficient grounds for comparison of the two aircraft, these initial briefings should be supplemented by appropriately spaced progress reports by service teams as each aircraft moves toward the operationally effective stage. The President has told the Shah that the US is willing in principle to sell these aircraft as soon as we are satisfied as to their operational effectiveness. 2. Laser-guided bombs. Briefings should be offered to the Iranians as soon as possible by a US Air Force team. It is understood that weapons deliveries could commence seven months after the Iranians place a formal order. The President has told the Shah that the US is prepared to provide this equipment to Iran. 3. Uniformed technicians. Requirements should be obtained promptly from the Embassy and the MAAG in Tehran, and team compositions, terms of reference and costs should be worked out with the Government of Iran as quickly as possible. The President has informed the Shah that the US will assign in Iran an increased number of uniformed military technicians from the US services to work with the Iranian military services. 4. [?] Dist to MEMORANDUM FOR: PH -Action S THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE J J SUBJECT: Follow-up on the President's Talk with the EEA (ACTION) PH (ACTION) The President has considered the memorandum of the Secretary's/PC of Defense of July 5, 1972, "Follow-up on the President's Talk with the Shah of Iran," and has approved the following course of action: 1. F-14 and F-15 aircraft. Briefings should be offered as soon as possible by a US Air Force team on the conditions of the operationally effective stage. The President has told the Shah that the US is willing in principle to sell these aircraft as soon as we are satisfied as to their operational effectiveness. 2. Laser-guided bombs. Briefings should be offered to the Iranians as soon as possible by a US Air Force team. It is understood that weapons deliveries could commence seven months after the Iranians place a formal order. The President has told the Shah that the US is prepared to provide this equipment to Iran. 3. Uniformed technicians. Requirements should be obtained promptly from the Embassy and the MAAG in Tehran, and team compositions, terms of reference and costs should be worked out with the Government of Iran as quickly as possible. The President has informed the Shah that the US will assign in Iran an increased number of uniformed military technicians from the US services to work with the Iranian military services. 4. [?] SUBJECT: Follow-up on the President's Talk with the Shah of Iran C During the President's talks with the Shah of Iran in Tehran on May 30-31, the President was forthcoming in response to the Shah's general request for continued US support in meeting Iran's needs for military equipment. The President made the specific commitments described below which now require follow-up: 1. The US is willing in principle to sell F-14 and F-15 aircraft to Iran as soon as we are satisfied as to their operational effectiveness. 2. The US is prepared to provide laser-guided bombs to Iran. 3. The US will assign in Iran an increased number of uniformed military technicians from the US services in accordance with the so-called "blue-suiter" approach to work with the Iranian services. NEA RF Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET The Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of State, should proceed to implement the above as promptly as possible. The President has also reiterated that, in general, decisions on the acquisition of military equipment should be left primarily to the government of Iran. If the Government of Iran has decided to buy certain equipment, the purchase of US equipment should be encouraged tactfully where appropriate, and technical advice on the capabilities of the equipment in question should be provided. Henry A. Kissinger SECRET July 26, 1972 SECRET OFFICIAL - INFORMAL The Honorable L. Douglas Heck Minister-Counselor American Embassy Tehran, Iran Dear Doug We now have what I consider a very satisfactory memorandum from Dr. Kissinger which gives everyone his marching orders as to what should be done in following up the President's talk with the Shah (copy enclosed). On the basis of this we shall be getting out to you shortly some operational telegrams implementing Presidential decisions. Already in the mill is my response to your query about military personnel. Hopefully you will receive it before this letter, but the thrust of it is to support fully the Ambassador's comments to Hoveyda that we have no intention of getting into the online operational business but will be as responsive as possible to requests for training personnel. The next message will probably deal with briefing teams on the F-14 and F-15 which can probably be gotten together and sent out to Iran by October if desired. I believe that the last paragraph of the enclosed memorandum pretty much gives us carte blanche to whistle up any other kind of briefing team you all think desirable--so, please don't hesitate. Keep the flag flying. As ever, warmest regards. Sincerely, Enclosure: i.cyc.memo.fr.Dr.Kissinger dtd.25July72 Jack C. Miklos SECRET

Dann Bill. Am. Helms as had me to write him my views about Iron upon leaving. The verbosity attached to the result. I wanted to have a copy although I have not provided me to any one else. I hope you and Marilla enjoyed your leave. I command Date to you—he is quick, lest, pleasant, a nearly well-informed, and very hard-working. All best, John [?] F.A.P.ASST UNITED STATES The honorable Dated Hel. American. Teuren. Dear Mr. Thomas, Within the money of some of the actions of the author, the call airfront been to bring the thank [?] to the Secretary of the Washington, B.C. Eas the fire is the change of these couveries can have told me that this sent the particular person (even though they know that he could not read the report) gave them a feeling of the most and most of which is not lost. It was because of the most my thoughts about Iran upon leaving in the other place, not it would be delivered in the read the letter has helped me think through a thoroughly, and has made writing it a very good feel free to show to with no one a question. Relationship with, and respect for Bill Lelfin's copy. At the outset, I should declare bies. As the forenood a my perspective. I have had a need our special face to be when I first came to spend the time I have my Iranian friends at my own place and the U.S. The name was not even the first of my life. As a result, my and the two have been the most well-paid. I am very old, the most ill-luckily. I am aware that there is more completely or exactly four-and-a-hours in the °20's and a half-hour in the °30's.

ROCKET great deal of help and many facilities for our espionage and intelligence work. I am very aware that Iran has permitted us to do electronic monitoring of neighboring countries and that there is a close working relationship between SRE and SAVAK. This is not enough for me to come to a conclusion about the extent of the risk to Iran and the actual value of the activities concerned. In the absence of more information, my natural and professional skepticism asserts itself. My perspective on the issues discussed in this letter is over a period of ten to fifteen years, since I would like to be in a senior position in this Embassy at the end of that time. I am thus much concerned with the later results of our present actions and perceptions. This perspective leads me to try to understand the Shah's method of government in order to make an informed guess as to what is likely to become of it and him. There is a consensus among most Iranologists that the Shah in his early years tried to behave like a constitutional monarch and to implement the democratic ideals which he is said to have acquired at Le Rosey. Whether or not this is true (and I must say that Le Rosey seems to me a most unlikely place for anyone to acquire democratic ideas), it is clear that in the early 50's, especially after the Hossad's episode, the Shah determined to rule as well as reign. It also seems clear that his choice of a system to carry out this rule was based on a traditionally pessimistic idea of the Iranian character which the Shah may have been particularly ready to accept (this acceptance is implied in several places in Mission for My Country because of the readiness to change sides it will of the Irritant people and their leaders during the Hossad's period. A standard statement in books about Iran regardless of when they were written -- James Horier and Sir Percy Sykes in the 19th century, Morgan Shuster in the 1920's and 30's, Human Jacobs in the 1950's, and Harvin Zonis in the 1960's -- is that Hosien Iran's history of repeated national humiliation and subjugation, broken for a long time only by the Safavids, have engrained in the Iranian personality certain very marked negative characteristics. Since I am going to dwell on these at great length here, I emphasize now that they in no way constitute the whole story about Iranians. Inside the circles within which Iranians feel at ease, there is great loyalty and warmth of friendship. In addition, Iranians have the aesthetic sensitivity, record for language and skillful use of intelligence and perception which are to be expected in any people with as rich and old a culture and civilization as theirs. Furthermore, as I mention later, Iranians are well aware of these negative characteristics and their bad effects and are now bestowing to try to nullify them. SEUKEI Under foreign occupation (Arabs, Honolls, Turks) or manipulation (British, Russians), Iranians preserved their sense of nationhood through their culture, particularly their language in poetry such as Ferdomsi's Shahmanah, and their self-respect in cloistered and concealed private lives behind the high walls which are still typical of Iranian domestic architecture. The world outside was justifiably seen as hostile. Furthermore, foreign domination always creates a sense of "every man for himself" among those dominated, and centuries of it has made this feeling a normal part of every Iranian's public or working life. In this environment, mutual suspicion, distrust, rivalries, and an intense selfish individualism characterize the working relationships of Iranians with one another. (Harvin Zonis: The Political Elite of Iran is a detailed documentation of this). The psychological strain of living in such an atmosphere has traditionally been tempered by elaborate forms of courtesy which are used routinely in the working day, especially between subordinate and superior, and in the support provided by private life. This support comes from extremely close and intimate relations between the members of a very extended family and with old friends. Iranians with such ties to one another may spend most of the Fridays of their adult lives with one another. These are the people whom each Iranian sees as fully human -- they can be trusted, confided in, relaxed with. The rest of the world must be treated cynically, exploited and manipulated to one's own advantage if possible, and submitted to with calculation when necessary. Having himself accepted this view of his people's character, the Shah chose a governing system which would make use of these qualities. I don't know whether the Shah in actuality consciously borrowed this system from the Achaemenides with which he so often identifies his regime, but the system lie chose in fact very much resembles the method which Herodotus tells us that Cyrus and Darius used to control and govern their empires. The system is simple and crude, but complicated in use, rather as primitive languages are said by linolists to have the most complex grammars. Every important organ of government is managed by a few men who must be kept in a state of intense rivalry and distrust of one another. All power cores from the Shah, the power which individuals may have must be subsidiary and derived from him. Therefore each rival seeks greater access to the Shah than the others. Those competing at the top apply the same rules to control their subordinates, and so the system and the atmosphere it creates is consistent to the very bottom of every organization in the government. This atmosphere of intrigue and constant personal competition insures that no one will be seen as autonomous by others and that no one will become one of a figure in his own right to attract personal followers. Public recognition of the from the Sikh we only be only be acclaimed by the press. Financial first order and Avogondar received from the Shah

1. The first of the first of the first of the first of the first the parrot's peace's life's Institute. In my own area of interest, I can be seen very clearly in the U.S., the man made the top group, which was an American American. Fifth and first, he is a social relation to the South through its loyalty, disinterested against the other the lossand days and by his will [?] to session as Friday minister and take the rate for the South's undermined to inviting the world press to view that it's released electorates, to the same by feathers' cleamsness to the shines of only parades' all advisers, as they're rivalries spread out and down through the organization certify the composition of the central competition. The Sikh has shownҡed protection from war to still, least perfect, in operation this system. He must keep the securities of one than a hundred personal lives and etc. sift the relationships with one or more in mind. He has to ensure that not only can but organizations be in control competition so that cooperation between non act competing in the same ministry will not create him, if the same time, if the non and [?] The Sikh has shown the protection from war to still, least perfect, in operation this system. He must keep the securities of one than a hundred personal lives and etc. sift the relationships with one or more in mind. He has to ensure that not only can but organizations be in control competition so that cooperation between non act competing in the same ministry will not create him, if the same time, if the non and [?] relations must be automated so that while distribution has auction, and policy short-term, to of their complete rate, they no other costs long and hard to achieve the common goals the Sikh has set the country. This is the system through which the this is governed all affricate level a stable action and a relative economic level. There is not even space in a letter like this to don't the auxiliary services to this system provide the skillful use of measured does of expression. The employ- ment of a complete success of information in the text and the current presentation of the content's level. In any case, there are families to you and are common to will-made a totaling complex evidence in the world. If� [?] in the text of this letter is to be said the press sures exerted by one measurement of economic development on this event, the reference of twenty years of resulting to the health and relation such as and to request some steps the most take in right to work factors. The following are the contents of the report and are not in the report's footnotes. The report was written by Dr. John Smith, the project director of the project. The report was written by Dr. John Smith, the project director of the project. SECKEI This is a test image that shows a person in the park. The person is 18 years old. He is a student. This is a test image that shows a person in the park. The person is 18 years old. He is a student. This is a test image that shows a person in the park. The person is 18 years old. He is a student. This is a test image that shows a person in the park. The person is 18 years old. He is a student. In the twelfth and the first century, the first group of fronting a court was once co-printed and separated by the second of the first by the second of the first. In the capacity to establish the court the court in the second of the first system. As I have of a description and the way this is the case of the Shah's unusual skill for its execution for the first time and the tralizing system. In the second of the first system of the first case of the first, their equal control and exercise of the resources of the first to the state that the relatively few otherwise come up as of the first period pushed ahead vigorously of the law and of the order of the court. In the second of the second The Shah's political central sport, answer, requires not necessary at all levels be in a state, not only of social background and competition, but also of intense personal rivalry. Money and Lament which should go to matters of assistance are the most important in should be future. Since power had been to the end, the capitalist of the capitalist of power and�� at the very end of the time to the description be made here. Thus this is the result of the result further excepted in the reference to the result of the result of the reference to the reference to the totalities in the reference to the development of the system in the use of power for all power in the fish, at has not yet been provided to the status of the capitalist to the status of the capitalist of power, for the use of the status of the capitalist to the status of the fish's past lion. According to this old information on the project, the documents for the time, including where to be located, are the same as in the document. of information provided in the project's instructions to be�aged into writing, according to the complete instruction required to be applied to the documents and to the information provided in the project's instructions.

SECKEI The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog. to set up, then, the first wills to be received to be instrument by which he has achieved as the result the result of the control, and above all continuous, and in the case of the first wills to be received of using this system has been used to set the translation of sharply negative changes, and the translation of the brain not sonality which brandans the results of the information, as well as in their effects, to be received to be received by the greater, and the greater, and the greater form of administration to the require for a reason more of the than not critical, to that knowledge could bring: it will be so as to be capable of the information the achievement of the man quits. In this there is�t chicn to anintnts in iran. Whover ars- In this there is chivins clger to anintnts in iran. Whover ars- ully or suddenly as is enyind alive, reouicil achieve is onl to force political cheng. eror. This change could be disrooged until the Shaft's death in which case these would probably be a late period of confusion and disorder within which a case treatment, is fustie to accept the continuation of the Shaft's system, to work out a new one. Alternatively, the system might quietly evoke for a long parties. This kind of erosion militate focus unite the forl conid the reconner to recognize at first (for examples, see below) when the contribution of this control system finally did be in chas to the new one which only and nocini- tantly to correct it, to be by dissoce to sllk's would be uncoor- able to the reach to the time from the dissoce, this resection would make his look to the little fartier on all the one's come of natural, non-violent chance. But as our close identification which his, these drawers as the fish are clams to the whies to chicn the- ence this to anintnts for the attest of the nowelies from his efforts to racist shah. He had also to n the one to the in P.S. underer eile this in coast to the one to the one to the the to the out of position, and the one to the one to the [?] The first of the first two of the first two of the first two of the The price is currently also known to recognize and at the cost to create a cost to make a cost for them. There are and a cost to create a total cost of a position in which the services are provided. The cost to make a cost to create a total cost of a position in which the services are provided is used to be true for the second year. The cost to make a cost to create a total cost of a position in which the services are provided is to be true for the second year. The cost to make a cost to create a total cost of a position in which the services are provided is to be true for the second year. The cost to make a cost to create a total cost of a position in which the services are provided is to be true for the second year.

SECRET 1 Difficulty to read. To use the text here to show realized the need to read the text. The text is not clear. This is portability true without error in the text. Please read the text in the text content and the text in the text content is not clear. The text is not clear. The final law was found to have been a result of the presentation in which actuarial force of the work of the subject was strong leaders such as Most Ph. D. Steuer and the other of the work of the other than the other than the comprehensiveخفف فهو خفف فهو خفف فهو خفف فهو The HOC is not another when we are the subsequent. A central question with which the officials are writing to they to recognize to most their fresh�ng to the time to the and up to the events with the concertion, he how to use the material to the content and which the Consorties has always had without running into the month of the political control systems. The solution expressly emerges if to the other side of the subsidiary companies organized on before hours to the high-level of the members of the HOC are part in the Sun's twelfth-century history of the strains and pressures which this will create are obvious. Tits will's to compare to the positive and effective way is making itself felt in other parts of the cover. There will be many opportunities, which should be considered for the future for you and this Embassy to show that the potential value of the support these efforts. That is easy. To you also should know that the time to help the Arabans understand that the original cost is the U.S. GDP and the U.S. GDP is still close, and the structures dislocely can lead up to this positive and effective way will inevitably entail, are for preference to the major impossibility which will reach certainly and eventually the new Sinh cider entities on these pressures or leases that are being set up to alterations of neoterrorism and evacuation. So 79+1 (92) stopped at the was said to improve our interests in the SECRET The most important is the policy of the Government. The government has to be a This is a real and very important. Given the time you sent a group position now, every year share of the group will visit the com Guitar Section as they are generated in the form

SECRET their caliphate to service actions under Inasim law, suffer Irutality from hessands to order to May Vision to strive on, or find themselves trapped per an a.v.v. to be a because of the will not give the permission to leave the market for a life in the exile of his wife in an Iranian past. It is the situation to beلانterror that, or the man has not had concessions to the U.S. of the same workout out for her of the, those, in most cases, no to consent to lessen policy the Lohidite Street is on do luhion. The most same thing that these women are off the scale on that mixed level is the one difficult to from the clockwork. It is however, a classics elephant in America and international diplomatic police that is nation-owned as maintains respect for itself by international and national international trade and not its relative, such as the other. The world is, now, and attractiveness of the citizen cannot be over Sinai as this. Insisting on this principle here will be the only present for us -- many Irutains were deeply thenesses to pay to determine on exercise the our full consular rights during the arrest and tell the China to keep up, even though the girl herself was obviously directly that. It will also serve as a reminder to Irutains of our national stand as a result of the rights of our citizens and the responsibilities of the national government to the land that these standards hold true for all regardless of the nature of other governments with which they may have good and friendly relations. Furthermore, this America gives problem to a potential the both in our relations with the S.A. as well. To enjoy one of the suicides of location-up wives will turn out, after the lack, to be a Senator's daughter or a Supreme Court justice's niece. As a result, I succeed this problem he put to the shall. As far as I saw, it has never been discussed with him by any U.S. Ambassador in recent years. I turn the argument just made. Would convince and not avoid him and this is the kind of problem which he can solve by a simple directive. I could go on indefinitely but the time I have available for writing this letter and getting to speed is running out. There are a few final points, some of which require to be made to this letter which I want to present in no particular order here. I hope that you will continue your need policy of occurring a reporting of the chips is they fall without resulting adherence to any particular Embassy party line. Our difficult question is the reportion of numbers which I know we recently hope up in connection with the Shall's allowed second marriage to Gina Aed. The test here, I think, is whether the men is widely believed to be transients Iranians to the point that they are concerned we do not be in the most host of these numbers can be confirmed from a time, but the reason to a color of the first who can't to us to a comfortable fact which might be reported. First, like to live the treatment consistent ha, "public" trials of allowed subsamples and termovysts. It is crisis, conducted by military covers. SECRET not only for the first time, but also for the second time, for the second time, for the The last point of this letter is perhaps the most important. In my three and a half years I have seen the same effect. The point con-duct of our activities in from abscapely responses that signify more a long period of so-called a life cycle. I hope very much that you will not be in need of your help years more to provide one to the end of development related to with no time to have so far in the life of a cult years after.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER IRAN Objectives and Setting Objectives Your main objectives in meeting with the Shah will be: -- To explain to the Shah your Middle East peacemaking efforts and your plans on next steps so that he may see how important his aid for Egypt and Jordan is and so that he may understand the effort to split Syria and Iraq. -- To brief the Shah on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations in the Middle East and globally, reassuring him that you are still approaching detente warily. -- To confirm agreement on the Cabinet-level Joint Economic Commission with subordinate working groups, and to agree on an announcement, perhaps during your visit. -- To reaffirm our intention to keep working as closely as possible with Iran in the fields of regional security and military cooperation. To exchange current views on the Shah's efforts to assist and cooperate with friendly regimes in the region and to relate his efforts to ours. -- To convey our views on the world economic situation and especially to explain our concern on oil pricing, in the interest of the international economic stability on which Iran's own well-being depends. Each of these issues is dealt with in detail below with talking points. SECRET GDS Setting Iran is riding high, with dramatically increased oil revenues, good economic prospects, increased diplomatic options, and an ability to project power externally which Iran has not had for centuries. The Shah is confident of his domestic political position, and believes he is seized the initiative in the Persian Gulf and OPEC. He is trying to show that Iran will use its oil revenues constructively by such initiatives as free primary education and an expanded national health program in Iran, bilateral lending to some LDC's, loans to the IMP and IBRD, and a proposal for a new multilateral development fund. The Iranians have been the target of criticism for the leading role they played in the December 1973 oil price increase, and have not found much support for their development fund proposal. However, this has had little visible effect on Iranian confidence and ambition. Our relations with Iran continue to be very close. We have launched an initiative to expand our bilateral relations in the economic and technological area, with the objective of creating a framework and atmosphere for the discussion of such issues as oil and strategic interests. The Shas has responded positively, expressing particular interest in atomic power, and is anxious to get down to details. AEC Chairman Ray is to go to Iran at the time you are there to talk to COI officials. We also might use this occasion to announce the formation of a bilateral commission on economic cooperation. On the military front, the channels for cooperation are long established and are functioning well, but we may need to deal with the Shah's interest in the production of missiles in Iran and an assurance that we will supply enough technicians to phase in his new U.S. equipment. The only clouds on the U.S.-Iran horizon concern oil prices, on which the Iranians are taking a hard line and the Iranian development fund proposal, which we fear could divert funds that would otherwise go to existing international aid institutions. Department of State April 1974 SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS Arab-Israeli Situation The Shah feels the U.S. should make every effort to bring about an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli situation. He is on record as opposing the Judaization of Jerusalem and supporting Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and restoring the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. He will want a briefing on what we are doing now, and how we see the prospects for a settlement. Your Talking Points Analysis/Background -- Explain the status of Syria-Israel disengagement negotiations and plans for return to the Geneva Conference. The importance of this agreement is that it would break Syria away from the radicals and buy time for further Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and perhaps some move on the Jordan-Israel front. -- We are walking a narrow line with the USSR, involving the Soviets enough to keep them from being obstructionist while maintaining control over the substance of negotiations ourselves. We believe the Shah will understand this strategy. DEPARTMENT OF STAT BRIEFING PAPER -- President Sadat is engaged in a major shift in policy which can help reduce Soviet influence throughout the Middle East. The Israelis recognize this. -- We greatly appreciate Iran's support for our efforts. Department of State April 1974 SECRET GDS ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS U.S.-Soviet Relations Analysis/Background The Shah takes a close interest in our detente with the USSR and the possibility that it might free Soviet resources for the Middle East. He also follows the progress of CSCE, MBFR, and SALT negotiations, and is concerned that we may be lowering our guard and leaving our allies in a more vulnerable position. He feels the U.S. should accept nothing less than equivalence in MIRV's. The Shah believes Soviet activity in the Middle East indicates a continuing use of proxics such as Iraq and South Yemen to accomplish Soviet foreign policy goals and will be interested in our assessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Your Talking Points -- We will continue to be wary of Soviet intentions in our negotiations on detente and CSCE. We will not relax our guard. -- It is too early to say what numbers and other arrangements will emerge from SALT and MBFR negotiations, which involve many complex technical questions. -- In the Middle East, the Soviets are trying very hard to maintain at least a semblance of involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Since they recognize their recent setback in that area, we want to look carefully at what can be done in other areas like the Gulf and South Arabia to blunt any new Soviet efforts there. Our objective since October has been to structure the diplomatic situation so as to reduce their influence. SECRET GDS

SECRET -- Our enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean is intended to signal our continuing concern about Soviet activities and intentions in the region. Intensified Bilateral Cooperation Analysis/Background Your Talking Points: Ambassador Helms has discussed your proposals for intensified cooperation with the Shan in detail. The Shah has responded with enthusiasm. A number of details remain to be discussed and decisions taken. -- We welcome the Shah's agreement on the formation of a Joint Economic Commission and his appointment of Minister of Economy Ansary as the Iranian co-chairman. Our co-chairman will be the Secretary of the Treasury, with the Secretary of Commerce as alternate. The two co-chairman should coordinate soon on the timing of the first Commission meeting. What are the Shah's views? -- If the Shah agrees, the agreement on forming the Joint Economic Commission could be announced during your visit. (A draft announcement is attached.) -- We will be discussing with Mr. Ansary details of cooperation, including what working groups need to be formed to give substance to its various elements. Our view is that we should be careful to select areas for concentration where special attention is needed and where it can produce progress. We want to avoid simple discussion groups. -- The Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, accompanied by a number of experts, is prepared to come to Tehran in the very near future to discuss how we can best cooperate in the nuclear field. Teams in other fields will follow as needs and terms of reference are defined. Specific topics which have already been discussed by the Shah and Ambassador Helms should be seen as starting points - not limits on the fields in which we are prepared to explore possibilities for cooperation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER -- Several items of interest to the Shah, e.g., the manufacture of military missiles in Iran and the provision of larger numbers of U.S. military technicians to advise the Iranian armed forces, pose serious technical and domestic political or legislative problems. However, we are prepared to discuss them in detail in technical channels and to do our best to meet his needs. We welcome the Shah's proposals on the form which intensified political and security discussions would take, i.e., regular meetings in a bilateral context at the Foreign Minister and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Department of State April 1974 ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS Regional Security Analysis/Background The Shah remains concerned by the potential for instability - and Soviet exploitation of it - in neighboring countries. He is concerned about radical movements in the Persian Gulf; Iraqi hostility toward Iran; and separatist activity in Pakistan's frontier provinces near his borders. He recognizes the need for, and has been seeking, improved relations and cooperation with the more moderate Arab governments, in order to help them prevent the kind of radicalization that could threaten Iran's Persian Gulf life-line to the outside world. Establishing this cooperation is not easy because of longstanding Arab wariness toward Iran. However, the Shah recently has stepped up his military aid to Oman's efforts to suppress the South-Yemen-supported Dhofar rebellion, and his government has agreed to provide economic assistance to Egypt. To the east, it has continued to cooperate with the Government of Pakistan while at the same time improving its relations in recent months with India and Afghanistan. While making progress in improving cooperation with some Arab governments Iran has had great difficulty in getting anywhere with Saudi Arabia, and sees Iraq as a Soviet satellite that is unremittingly hostile toward Iran. The Shah is determined to do what he can to keep Baghdad off balance, and in this regard he continues to assist Barzani's Kurdish movement. Your Talking Points -- We continue to see eye-to-eye on regional security issues. The US continues to support strongly Iran's efforts to strengthen itself and to work cooperatively with its moderate Arab neighbors. SECRET GDS

We are pleased that Iran's stepped-up military efforts in Oman seem to be going well, and we applaud its recent moves to start a program of economic assistance in Egypt. This should reinforce our own economic and diplomatic activity in Egypt, which is designed to maintain the momentum of President Sadat's recent shift away from Soviet influence. -- We hope the Shah will not be discouraged in his efforts to increase Saudi-Iranian cooperation. We know this is not easy to accomplish, but a collaborative Iranian-Saudi relationship is essential to future stability and progress in the Gulf. -- We hope it will be possible for Iran to do even more for Jordan, which has a central role in our Middle East strategy, and for smaller countries like North Yemen and some of the sheikhdoms. -- There have been reports that Iraq is interested in strengthening its ties with Western countries. We would be interested in the Shah's view on this and what implications it might have for how we should deal with Iraq. You may also want to elicit his views on the Kurdish situation. -- We appreciate Iran's efforts to provide Pakistan with modest military help. This contributes to regional stability by enhancing Pakistan's sense of security and self-confidence. A moderate amount of assistance is not likely to give India legitimate cause for concern, and in any case India has strong economic reasons for staying friendly toward Iran. We were pleased to learn that the Shah responded favorably to our proposal that Iran undertake and finance a tank upgrading program for Pakistan. -- The Afghan regime seems to have been relatively quiet in recent months on the Pushtunistan's issue, but we recognize that the Soviet influence there remains great and that the potential for trouble remains. We would be concerned by any Afghan SECRET adventurism on this issue, though we do not see this as likely in the near future. We welcome Iran's efforts to improve its relations with Afghanistan.

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS Military Cooperation Our military cooperation with Iran has expanded considerably since President Nixon's visit in May 1972. In addition to large sales of military equipment and the continuation of our military advisory mission, we have provided over 500 military technicians on a reimbursable basis to help Iran phase in its new U.S. equipment. We believe that our present bilateral channels of military cooperation are working well, and that no new mechanisms are needed. Basically, the Iranians are satisfied with our military cooperation, but the Shah may seek reassurance that we will continue to support his arms acquisitions with U.S. military technicians. He may express interest in manufacturing small missiles in Iran. Your Talking Points Analysis/Background -- We will do everything we can to support Iran's U.S. military acquisitions with technical expertise. We will advise His Majesty if and when difficulties should arise in expanding the size of our Technical Advisory Field Teams in Iran. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER -- Because of the complexity of the missile question, we would prefer that it con-inue to be discussed through bilateral military channels. Department of StateApril 1974 SECRET GDS ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS International Economic Issues Analysis/Background The Iranians, who played a leading role in the December 1973 oil price increase, have since taken a number of steps to justify their position and mitigate its effects on LDC's. They have put forward a revisionist view of the world economy, claiming that the disproportionate prosperity of the West was made possible by cheap oil, and that raw materials exporters deserve higher prices for their products. Iran has announced that it will lend 700 million to the IMF and 200 million annually to the IBRD to help cushion the effects of higher oil prices on the LDCs, and has also proposed a new international development fund to aid LDC's. The Shah continues to believe strongly that oil prices must stay up. Internally, the GOI has greatly expanded its economic development plan, and announced free primary education and an expanded national health program. A Foreign Ministry spokesman criticized that part of your April 15 UNGA speech which suggested that OPEC countries were to blame for high oil prices (the Iranians blame high prices to the consumer on taxes and oil company profits). However, the Shah took a positive interest in your remarks on fertilizers, since he believes that oil should be used more for petrochemicals and less for fuel. Iran can not expand its oil production much further. Your Talking Points Our interdependent world economy is delicately balanced, and sudden demands from any source are unsettling. We hope that oil producing states will observe moderation in their pricing policies, and will not push their demands at the expense of others. SECRETGDS

-- We are pleased that Iran has accepted the responsibility of assisting LDC's affected by increased oil prices. However, we continue to believe that the most effective assistance would be a moderation of present prices. -- Iran's proposal for a new development fund is constructive, and we hope that oil-producing countries will develop a means for recycling oil revenues to LDC's which is systematic and objective. We also hope that the oil producers will increase their support for such established institutions as the IBRD and IMF. Our own ability to contribute to a new fund is restrained by our commitments to existing institutions and by congressional authorizations. Tehran, Iran CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO: AMBASSADOR CLAUDE G. ROSS FROM: AMBASSADOR HELMS SUBJECT: Post Memorandum for Inspectors Iran-US relations are excellent. We enjoy a preeminent position in Iran and play a significant role in its foreign policy calculations. We have virtually parallel views on all issues of regional or international significance, a single exception concerns the supply and price of oil. Our purpose is to ensure that this position is maintained and enhanced. In pursuing this objective we seek a fair share of Iran's dynamic foreign trade, participation in its ambitious economic development plans, and continued access to sites for irreplaceable intelligence and communications activities. We also seek to ensure that Iran continues to play a responsible and constructive role in regional affairs. Pursuit of these goals requires substantial staff. Tehran is now the largest diplomatic mission in NEA. In addition to the traditional diplomatic mission structure, we have a major military presence in the form of our MAAG, GENMISH and Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT). We also have a Peace Corps (195 volunteers), a large and active Iran-American Society, representatives from the Department of Agriculture, the Drug Enforcement Agency, imminent establishment of a regional Internal Revenue Service Office, and some 20 separate units associated primarily with our military and intelligence activities in Iran. In organizational terms, we have no important problem. The authority and responsibility of the Ambassador for all official US activity in Iran are understood and CONFIDENTIAL

recognized. Subordinate military units operate under the coordinating authorities of the MAAG Chief who is the senior military representative in Iran. He reports to and takes policy guidance from the Ambassador as do all other agency representatives. Vertical and horizontal communications are maintained by daily meetings of section chiefs with the Ambassador, weekly meetings of the country team, and ad hoc meetings of all other US agencies and representatives in country. Although there is no major issue of significance other than oil which may be disruptive in our relations with Iran or the continued pursuit of our objectives, there are several questions worth mentioning. They are discussed below. 1. POLICY FORMULATION As noted, the most potentially disruptive issue in US-Iran relations relates to our differing perceptions and attitudes toward the supply and price of oil. Following OPEC's dramatic decision in December 1973 to quadruple the price of oil overnight, this Embassy has consistently and repeatedly urged that the USG enter into a dialogue with producer countries in which our position is set out rationally, objectively, and in full recognition of their own legitimate concerns and interests. We regret that this exchange has not yet occurred, nor have we been provided with an adequate rationale for pressing the case in discussions with the GOI. In recognition of Iran's enhanced importance we have launched new initiatives to broaden and deepen our relations, primarily through increased trade, investment, and technological and scientific exchange. It was intended that this occur under the aegis of a newly formed Joint Economic Commission. Results to date have been somewhat uneven because there has not been full follow-through on all of our initial proposals. In raising this matter we simply want to note that it remains one of continuing interest and concern. We are not in-different to the problems Washington has in coordinating and implementing such a major new effort nor to the progress that has been achieved in certain areas such as nuclear energy. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL -3- 2. EXECUTIVE/MANAGEMENT By and large we feel the Mission is well staffed with qualified personnel in place or en route. A continuing problem, however, is the timely assignment of personnel to ensure that there is appropriate overlap between an incumbent and his replacement. This is particularly critical in areas of key substantive and operational responsibility where many invaluable contacts and insights are irretrievably lost in the absence of adequate overlap. We would urge a more rational and orderly program of personnel assignment and transfer. Another area of management concern relates to our budget and budget-making process. In the recent past we have had sharp and unexpected increases in our cost of operation, in the local cost-of-living, in local wage scales and in the cost of housing. We have also had to shift our personnel virtually overnight to provide for new unforeseen requirements. Our present budget and financial system provides for little or no latitude in solving these problems in a timely, effective or efficient manner. We often find ourselves in something of a "Catch-22" situation in which we are told funds are not available because they have not been budgeted. On the other hand, we are told that requests for additional funds should not be included in our budget because we have not provided supporting documentation. It is frequently impossible to satisfy both requirements simultaneously. 3. POLITICAL FUNCTIONS The Government here is highly structured and authoritarian. All major decisions are made at the top. The Monarch rules as well as reigns. Political activity in the Western sense is nascent and carefully circumscribed. Thus in this restrictive, and not very well informed society, political contact and the exercise of influence is frequently confined to the most senior levels. Uninhibited dissidence and criticism is neither tolerated nor encouraged. Foreign contact with dissidents or identification with their point of view is not only discouraged

CONFIDENTIAL but if pursued vigorously could probably result in one's being PNG'ed. Accordingly, political reporting officers must exercise great care and prudence in developing contacts and information of interest and value to us. Because relationships in Iran are highly personalized, successful political officers must have especially well developed talents of empathy, personality, and judgment. In the recent past political reporting from this post has suffered not only because of the inherent difficulties of the environment but also from staffing deficiencies. In large measure this latter shortcoming has been rectified, and we now look forward to considerable improvement in the quality and quantity of our political reporting. 4. INVESTMENT MATTERS There are no problems of significance in this area. 5. TRADE PROMOTION Tehran is the testing ground for new approaches to trade promotion through the implementation of a Country Commercial Program and the operation of a Trade Center. Both are relatively new and we are still in the process of evaluating their effectiveness in furthering our trade objectives. Given the tremendous increase in Iran's import demand and ability to pay, it is difficult to establish an objective cost-benefit analysis of our trade promotion efforts. In terms of activity, however, there is no question that all employees engaged in this work are fully occupied servicing an ever-rising volume of visitors and inquiries locally and from the United States. We are not entirely satisfied that our present facilities are either adequate or appropriate in providing all of the services we believe desirable. Specifically, we require additional office space for an enlarged economic commercial staff and we feel strongly that our Trade Center and commercial office activity ought to be located in one building. This view has been conveyed to Washington but no satisfactory response has been received. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL -5- 6. ENTRY OF ALIEKS TO THE UNITED STATES Our Consul has prepared a memorandum which discusses in some detail the problems we face in our consular activities. He is prepared to discuss these fully with you. Our comment here will be restricted to noting that one of our problems relates to the ever-rising volume of non-immigrant applicants, the difficulties in establishing the bona fides of these applicants and the physical problems of dealing with such large numbers, particularly in the high student-visa season. We have taken a number of remedial steps but there remain procedural and physical problems requiring Washington's attention and decision. 7. INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE By and large we are well staffed in this area. Intelligence reporting is reviewed for consistency and quality at Counselor or more senior levels, as appropriate. One area of continuing concern relates to information about the political orientation and activities of the Iranian military. Although we have massive contact with Iran's armed forces through our MAAG and Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT), we have yet to obtain the quantity or quality of information we think desirable. We are attempting to rectify this through a more systematic end-of-tour debriefing program of selected MAAG and TAFT officers. 8. POST ADMINISTRATION Under this general heading I would like to draw your attention to two questions which are interrelated with the problems of budget and fiscal management noted under another heading. The first concerns staff morale. This is not only a large 'Mission but it is in a large and somewhat impersonal metropolitan city. For all of its size, however, it is still deficient in certain areas. Housing, transportation, and services are perhaps the most significant. We have attempted to ease these problems within our financial and personnel means. Nevertheless, there are shortfalls. This is particularly true with respect to housing. Cost and availability CONFIDENTIAL

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN Inspection OF INSPECTION OF ANGER Report Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service OCTOBER 1974 on THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN Inspection Report SECRET Department of State Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service October 1974 INSPECTORS Claude G. Ross Howard L. Chernoff Robert M. Klein Michael F. Basso R. Bartlett Moon LIMITED DISTRIBUTION This Department of State Inspection Report is intended solely for the use of the Department or of an agency receiving portions of the Report under cover of an official transmittal memorandum. At Foreign Service posts the Report may be shown, at the discretion of the principal officer, to representatives of other United States executive departments if they are directly concerned. No secondary distribution outside the Department of State or by other agencies may be made, in whole or in part, without prior authorization in writing obtained through the Inspector General, Foreign Service, Department of State. Classification approved by SECRET GDS Claude G. Ross

SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS OVERVIEW (Buff pages) ..... ii I. POLICY AND RESOURCES .....1 II. MANAGEMENT ..... 7 II. MANAGEMENT ..... 7 Appendix I - Resources Table Appendix II - Resource Implications of Recommendations CHECKLIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS (Available separately) MEMORANDA (Available separately): Tehran USIS Peace Corps Economic/Commercial Affairs International Educational and Cultural Exchange Consular Operations Personnel Buildings and Grounds General Services Extended Review of GSO Operations Budget and Fiscal Security U.S. Employees' Association American School Association Tabriz Continuation of Consulate at Tabriz Consulate Buildings and Grounds Consular Operations Personnel Equipment and Utilization of Space Security

SECRET THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN OVERVIEW Geography and oil make Iran important to US interests. Under the Shah, who sees the US playing a vital role in his efforts to modernize his country and make it militarily and industrially strong and self-reliant, Iran offers a favorable environment for the pursuit of US policy objectives. It has become an increasingly stable, dynamic state whose growing economic strength and rising oil income have enabled what was once a tutelary relationship with the US to evolve toward equality. Though this has brought an independence of view that could make for differences, US and Iranian geopolitical interests and positions on most significant regional and international issues are generally parallel. The US enjoys a preeminent position in Iran, and there is close and mutually beneficial cooperation over a broad spectrum of political, economic, military and cultural matters. With the notable exception of our divergent views on oil prices and supply there are no major differences in US-Iranian relations. There are, however, problems and concerns which the makers and managers of US policy toward Iran have to confront. One is the degree to which the US relationship with Iran is dependent on one man and the uncertainty about what consequences the Shah's demise or removal would have for Iran's stability, external conduct and attitude toward the U.S. Another is the possible effects of the impingement of certain aspects of our relations with Iran on US policies in other areas, especially the Persian Gulf. The military buildup of Iran, for which US arms sales and technical advisors are largely responsible, is resulting in an imbalance between Iran and its Persian Gulf neighbors. This development could adversely affect the future of the Saudi-Iranian cooperation that we seek to promote as essential to Persian Gulf security. It might also encourage heavier Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union for arms support, increasing the likelihood of an arms race in the area. In any case Iraq's perception of US-military support arrangements with Iran is complicating our efforts to improve our own relations with Bagdad. A third focus of concern lies in the very scope and complexity of our relationship with Iran and the resultant problem of how to ensure that we are aware of all that is happening and that we understand its implications for U.S. interests. In the light of these problems and concerns two things appear to be desirable. One is a study of our long-range policy toward Iran, including an appraisal of the ultimate effects of our present policy, to provide the perspective and conceptual framework for decision-making. The other is a dependable high-level mechanism to oversee and orchestrate the component elements of our close and extraordinarily multifaceted involvement with Iran. SECRET The Country Directories and the US Embassy are working together effectively in the conduct of our overall relations with Iran. They are stable with capable people and the quality of the leadership is high. Resources in the field are generally well utilized by senior management. A difficult operational process in Iran -- how to ascertain what is going on below the surface of its closed society and among sensitive groups like the military and the opponents of the regime -- is receiving special attention from the Ambassador and senior managers throughout the mission. Reducing the cultural and inter-community frictions likely to result from the influx into Iran during the next few years of thousands of American employees of private U.S. contractors will require improved orientation programs for these employees and their families, preferably before they leave the United States. The Country that is the most should step up its efforts to keep the attention of the U.S. contractors involved focused on this potentially serious problem as well as to explore ways in which the Department's resources might be used to assist in the orientation process. An increase in U.S. Government resources in Iran and shifting some of those already there are necessary to provide adequate support for our policy objectives. This includes the construction of additional Chancery office space and a new Trade Center pavilion on the Embassy compound, relocating the Khorrahan Consulate in the Beijing, receiving a Consulate in the People's Republic of China for the new officer positions for the Japanese and its constituent posts. In addition, the time is to prepare for careful studies of some of our programs in Iran, U.S. and the Peace Corps, to determine how they may be made more responsive to U.S. interests at less cost to U.S. taxpayers. As a result of the findings and conclusions discussed in the Impact report, the reported a number of recommendations to the Department and to our posts in Iran in the report which follows. Six of these limit attention here as being of major importance: A. That N.A. instruct its Interdepartmental Group to undertake a long-range policy study with respect to our B. That NCA explores the question of ensuring adequate high level monitoring and coordination of U.S. involvement in Iran. As one possibility it might wish to consider the flexibility of the Assistant Secretary's convening the NCA Interdepartmental Group to handle the task. in Darussil, Verban convolte a proposal "Il ha in l'esercito e exce ne perlo e e s'il est re s'il est re s'il est re s'il est re s'il est re s'il est re

D. That the Iran Country Directorate study the question of ensuring that American employees of private contractors in Iran and their families receive adequate and timely orientation on the problems of living in Iran. The Country Directorate should seek to devise arrangements and alerting company executives to the desirability of such orientation program and for providing to the extent possible appropriate Departmental advice and assistance. One expense to explore might be the possibility of using FSI resources, perhaps on a reimbursable basis. E. That NEA urge USIA to undertake a reappraisal of the USIA program in Iran with a view to determining whether its resources are being utilized to the best effect and, if not, what changes could usefully be made. P. That NIA urge the Peace Corps to undertake (a) a review and respirational of its programs in Iran with a view to determining what changes may be desirable to make the programs more responsive to Iranian needs and more effective in meeting the U.S. Corps objectives and (b) a review of the level of support given by the GOI to the Peace Corps programs to ascertain whether, in the light of the GOI's vastly increased financial resources and its support arrangements for UN volunteers, an approach should be made to the GOI on the question of substantially increasing its contribution to the programs. In addition, the following recommendations carry resource implications: G. That A/BF support FEO's FY 1976 budget request for funds for the construction in Tehran of two annexes to the Embassy Chancory. H. That FBO step up its exploration with the Department of Commerce and the Congress of a funding formula which would permit construction of a Commercial Trade Center Division on the Embassy compound in FY 1976. J. That M/FRM, PER, and NEA provide, in addition, two officer positions, one for Isfahan and one for Shiraz, as soon as possible after the opening of those posts. I. That M/FRM, PER, and NEA approve the Embassy Tehran request for a Market Research Officer position and a DOD-funded Personnel Officer position. SECRET 1 Policy and Resources Guides to Existing Policy Toward Iran There is no approved document that provides a definitive statement of U.S. policy toward Iran. In March, 1973, the Country Directorate drafted a PARA Review, classified as a process which contained a proposed comprehensive statement of U.S. interests, objectives, policy issues and alternatives, and recommended policies. This PARA was informally endorsed at the Bureau level but was never put through the approval process and hence has received no official sanction. On the specific issue of arms policy the Country Directorate made available to the inspection team two NSC memoranda entitled "Follow-up on the President's Talks with the Shah of Iran" and dated June 15, 1972, and July 25, 1972, respectively. Addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defense, they approved selling of arms and equipment to Iran and the provision of related military technical assistance. US InterestData Iran's strategic location, relative strength among Persian Gulf states, natural resources and burgeoning domestic market, make it an area of vital importance to the United States now and for the foreseeable future. We need a stable, secure, independent and friendly Iran that is both able and willing to play a responsible and constructive role in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf. We need continuing access to the Turkish-Iranian air corridor between Europe and the Orient for our military and commercial aircraft and success to Iranian ports for our naval and merchant ships. We need continued use of Iranian territory for special military and intelligence facilities which, because of geographic considerations, to say nothing of political coefficient, could not be relocated elsewhere to equal effect. US economic interests are major. Pueled by dramatically increased oil resources, the market in Iran for US goods and services is rapidly leading. In the last two years more than 711 in costs have been signed. Similarly, the US private investment which is increasing rapidly is several billion dollars. Iran is a principal source of oil and natural gas for the European OECD countries and Japan and an increasingly important one for us. We have a strong interest in reliable access to Iranian oil and minerals at fair prices for our friends and ourselves. U.S. U.S. Resists in Iran have expanded and prospered in residents in part because of the Shah's perception of the

usefulness of the United States to his country. In the event of the Shah's death or removal, a successor regime may not necessarily see things in the same way. Moreover, the closeness of US-Iranian relations could become an exploitable issue for radical, anti-regime elements. The US has, therefore, a fundamental interest in long-run political stability in Iran under governments reasonably friendly to the United States and not likely to act against us. For the same reasons the US also has an interest in the cultivation and perpetuation of a friendly attitude toward the US among the Iranian people. US Objectives The US objectives that flow from these interests might be formulated as follows: Contribute to and strengthen Iran's ability and willingness to play a responsible stabilizing role in international affairs, particularly in the Persian Gulf. Ensure close and cooperative bilateral relations with continuing friendly access to decision makers who can affect US interests. Retain unimpeded access to the Turkish-Iranian air corridor and to Iranian ports. Ensure maintenance and unimpeded use of our special military and intelligence facilities on Iranian territory. Ensure access to the Iranian market for US goods and services and maintenance of a hospitable climate for US private investments. Ensure reliable access to Iranian oil and minerals at tolerable prices for ourselves and other OECD members. Encourage Iran to recycle its expanded oil revenues in such a way as to minimize the disrupting effect of higher oil prices on the balance of payments of consumer countries including the US. Contribute to long run domestic political stability in Iran and to the growth of a favorable attitude toward the US among the Iranian people. The environment in Iran is in the main a favorable one for the pursuit of these policy objectives; the Shah has strong views regarding what he wants Iran to achieve during his lifetime, and to a certain point, at least, these objectives are complementary to ours. Whether or not Iran reaches the "world power" status that figures in none of the Shanghai's more grandiose aspirations, his essential goal is a stable, modernized society, industrially and militarily strong. Most importantly, it is clear that the Shah looks to the US to play a key role in helping Iran move toward this goal, particularly in the military field. Because of the above, we have been largely successful in satisfying most of our policy objectives. Iran has been increasingly strong, self-reliant dynamic state that is frontline to the United States and in most respects helpful to our interests. With its new strength has come an independence view that may give rise to some differences, but our geopolitics interest are generally parallel as are our views or most of regional or international significance. It is an relative to are excellent, and we enjoy a prominent position in Iran. The relationship is not, however, without policy problems and concerns. Policy Problems and Concerns The only significant difference on policy matters between the United States and Iran arises from our respect, which toward oil prices and supply. The Shah and his government, though moderate by OPEC standards in the discussion, providing the December 1975 price increase and aware of US attempts to remain could not to existing price levels. Our differences over oil is not yet had much impact on other sectors of our bilateral relations. However delay in resolving the issues increases the concern within the Executive Branch of the US Congress, some of whose members have begun to voice dissatisfaction over the lack of progress in persuading oil producing nations including Iran to lower prices. Moreover Iranian criticism of Saudi Arabia's position on this issue complicates our efforts to encourage Saudi Arabia to follow constructive oil policies. A basic long-range problem affecting our Iranian policy is the dependency, already included to, of our close relationship with Iran on the attitudes and perceptions of one man-the Shah. The realities of the Iranian political system are such that in the final analysis the only views that count are those of the Shah, who makes all the important decisions, and our policy is necessarily quared to this phenomenon. In a closed society like Iran, little is known of what the populace is thinking, and there is no way of predicting what consequences the Shah's death or removal would have for Iran's stability, external behavior or attitude toward the U.S. Fortunately, our close relationship with Iran has existed for more than two decades, and a generation or more of Iranians have grown up accustomed to dealing with us and to depending on us. There is reason to hope that some of our relationship has become institutionalized to the point where it transcends

the Shah. Nevertheless it must be expected that in post-Shah Iran out-ownship will be the question is how much and in what respect. The sales and managers of US policy toward Iran are confronted with an element of fragility and uncertainty that must be taken into account in their calculations. Certain aspects of our relations with Iran impinge on US policies toward other areas, raising concerns about their possible long range effects. For example, US military sales and technical advisors have been largely responsible for Iran's becoming the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Given Iran's general political orientation and our close association, this is in most respects a positive development from the standpoint of US interests. However, Iran's arms buildup is produced in a military imbalance between Iran and other Persian Gulf states, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Saudi Arabia there is increasingly the risk of a reaction that could jeopardize our good relations with that country as well as make impossible the Iranian-Saudi cooperation that we seek to encourage as the basis for preserving security and stability in the Gulf. In the case of Iraq, the long history of tension and mutual interference between Baghdad and Tehran might prompt the future to itch more heavily on the USSR for countervailing support, thus setting the stage for an arms race in the area. Certainly our efforts to improve our own relations with Iraq are being complicated by our military supply arrangements with Iran which Iraq inevitably looks at in the context of its recent border incidents and Iran's assistance to the Kurdish rebels. The dimensions and complexity of our relationship with Iran, which is developing at an accelerated pace, create a special concern for US policy makers and managers: how to stay on top of the situation so that our responses to problems that emerge or new proposals that are made, especially requests from the Shah, can be determined in the knowledge of all their likely consequences, including the effects on Iran's internal progress and stability, the demands on US material and human resources, and the effects on US policy objectives in other areas. In the military field alone we are involved with Iran to an extraordinary degree. Since the 1972 Presidential directive on arms policy which left it primarily to the Government of Iran to decide what military equipment it would purchase, the Shah has turned to us for a wide array of weapons, equipment and related technical expertise. His interest encompasses not only major weapons systems but also sophisticated intelligence, radar, and command and control systems. The Shah is also interested in having Iran manufacture selected US military items, including certain missiles, and develop greater repair facilities for its existing defense inventory. Some of the Shah's requests may be overly ambitious at this stage of Iran's development and inadvisable or difficult for us to accede to. They will require careful handling to avoid their becoming irritants in our relations. 86 SECRET Since the beginning of 1972 we have sold Iran over $7 billion in weapons and equipment with deliveries extinguishing into 1978. We are supplying on a reimbursable basis. Technical assistance teams (TAPT), distinct from our advisory mission (ARMISH/MAAG), to provide the technical expertise to ease the integration of this new material into the Iranian armed forces. Large numbers of American civilian defense contractor personnel will also assist in the phasing-in of the new equipment and facilities. There are already about 1500 such civilian employees working in Iran, and the number is expected to climb to as high as 12,000 (plus perhaps as many as 30,000 dependents) by 1978, raising the project of a multitude of problems in cultural adjustment and inter-community relations. In addition to these military ties we have an intimate association with Iran in various intelligence and security arrangements. Private American companies are establishing joint ventures with Iranian companies in numerous commercial and industrial enterprises. Recently we agreed to provide enriched uranium for two nuclear power reactors to help the Shah get a nuclear power industry underway. Other transfers of American technological and industrial skills to Iran are likely to follow before long. The problems and concerns inherent in our policy toward Iran for up the need for a dependable mechanism to monitor and coordinate the component elements of our extraordinarily multifaceted and close relationship with Iran. Their ramifications and their implications for US interests both in Iran and elsewhere must be understood if we are to be in a position to make sound policy and operational decisions. In addition there is a need for a study of US terms policies towards Iran to provide the necessary perspective for making policy decisions. Two of the principal recommendations set forth in Section II, Management are related to these concerns. Robources Resources devoted to support of US policy objectives in Iran as listed in the Resource Table attached as appendix I are not entirely adequate. Some of the levels require upward adjustment if they are to be fully responsive to policy needs. There is an urgent requirement for the addition of two wings to the existing Chancellery building. These will provide badly needed space for the Consular Section, which has outgrown its present quarters, and for the overcrowded Economic Section and the Defense Attaches among others. In addition, funding is required for the construction of a Commercial pavilion within the Embassy compound to bring

SECRET together in one location the commercial office activities and the Trade Center. (See Inspectors' memoranda on Economic/ Commercial Affairs and on Buildings and Grounds.) The growing US involvement with Iran over a broad spectrum of activities is resulting in a large influx of Americans in a number of provincial localities where the Shah is expanding defense facilities and emphasizing industrial development. To give proper service and protection to these scattered American communities and to meet growing commercial and reporting responsibilities in these areas the decision has been taken to reopen a Consulate at Isfahan and to move the existing Consulate at Khorramshahr to Shiraz. Because of budgetary limitations, present plans call for initial staffing of the two posts to be accomplished by transferring one Khorramshahr officer position to Isfahan and two to Shiraz. While this arrangement will serve to get the new posts in operation, it would not be adequate to handle the foreseeable workloads for Isfahan and Shiraz. Provision should be made to provide two additional officers, one for each post, as quickly as possible. (See Inspector's Memorandum on Personnel). An important US objective in Iran is to enlarge the US share of the Iranian market. The Embassy's ability to pursue this objective would be significantly strengthened by the assignment of a Market Research Officer to the Economic/Commercial Section, (See Inspector's Memoranda on Economic Commercial Affairs and on Personnel.) The Consulate at Tabriz, the value of which was covered in the last Inspection Report in 1972, represents a resource which makes an essential contribution and the continuation of which is fully justified. Moreover it should be carefully staffed with a view to ensuring that its potential is fully realized. (See Inspector's Memorandum on Continuation of Consulate at Tabriz.) Review of other US activities in Iran reveals a question as to whether existing USIS and Peace Corps programs in Iran are making the best use of the resources at their disposal. This is the subject of recommendations set forth in Section II on Management. SECRET # S.P.C.C.H.T II. Management (Recommendations I - 6) Policy Formulation The multiplication of US-Iranian ties in the military, intelligence, commercial and cultural fields over the past several years has been accompanied by an almost continuous process of policy examination. The Embassy and the Country Directorate under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary for NEA participate actively in this process. They are sensitive to our policy needs in Iran and appreciate the importance of maintaining a close adjustment of resources to policy. In addition to the Embassy and the Country Directorate, S/P, PM, EB and SCI in the Department of State and several offices in the Department of Defense contribute to the process of policy formulation. Though the basic decision establishing our arms policy was taken by the President following his meeting with the Shah in 1972, the Country Directorate assisted in elaborating operational policies for application of the directive to Iran. Coordination with PM and Defense is close. The Ambassador personally makes a significant input in the continuous process of policy formulation through his conduct of relations with the Shah and the Government of Iran and through his analysis and recommendations to Washington in telegrams and during consultative visits. The Country Directorate plays an important role in coordinating the various inputs in the policy formulation process. The new Director gives evidence of the same sensitivity to policy issues and the need for timely decisions on policy questions as his predecessor. Illustrative of the Country Directorate's initiative in this regard was the preparation of a revised contingency plan covering the questions of the Shah's demise or removal and the kind of policy choices that might face the US in such an eventuality. The draft is currently under study by the Embassy for its comment and contributions. Another example of close Embassy Country Directorate cooperation on policy formulation is the series of exchanges between them on proposals for developing the Joint Commission on Cooperation with Iran. Some of the most important decisions affecting our relations with Iran have been made at the level of the President, National Security Advisor and Secretary. The Bureau and Country Directorate are active in the initial stages of this process, but tend to receive little information concerning the decisions once made. Apart from this, communication and coordination among the participants in the formulation of policy have been good, enabling the conduct of our relations with Iran to proceed in a manner that appears to respond well to our shorter term requirements. However, some of the Washington participants in this process are uneasy, given the

SECRET magnitude of our steadily growing involvement with Iran in the military and intelligence field, over the longer term effects of our efforts. They feel the lack of a long-range policy which would provide a framework within which to examine and evaluate the policy implications of the decisions they are called upon to make. Recommendation to Department 1. That NEA instruct its Interdepartmental Group to undertake a long-range policy study with respect to our relations with Iran. Policy Execution Policy is executed skillfully and effectively. There is excellent coordination between the Country Directorate and the Embassy in the overall conduct of relations with Iran, The Embassy and the Country Directorate are staffed by competent people and have able leadership. Coordination with State by other departments and agencies engaged in policy execution in Washington is in general good but there is room for improvement. Treasury has a tendency to act unilaterally and without consultation, particularly on international petroleum matters. Our military sales program in Iran requires close liaison between State and DOD, but sometimes consultation is less than satisfactory with DOD communications going out to ARMISH/MAAG without appropriate State clearance. The Ambassador is able to see the Shah promptly whenever he requests an audience; in addition he is occasionally summoned by the Palace to meet with the Shah. The Ambassador also has easy access to the influential Minister of the Court, the Prime Minister and other key civil and military officials. He has a broad acquaintance among other senior Government officials, parliamentarians, business leaders, educators and other members of the intelligentsia. The Deputy Chief of Mission has entered as needed to ministerial and subcabinet level officials as well as senior military officers, and the Political and Economic Counselors are well plugged in at appropriate levels in Government and in the private sector. Mission contacts on the whole are very good and cover a broad range of the Iranian scene. In present day Iran the Government is still highly authoritarian with all major decisions being made at the top important substantive questions and bilateral matters are dealt with at the level of the Ambassador and the Shah or Court Minister, tending to bypass the Foreign Ministry. Inevitably with contacts and negotiations being carried out at that level many of the pertinent communications are highly classified and receive very limited distribution. The Ambassador makes a point, however, of assuring that all of his collaborators in the Mission who have a need to know are kept informed. [?] The Chief of ARMISH/MAAG, as the senior US military officer in Iran, exercises informal but effective control over all the more than twenty US military units operating in Iran with the exception of the DAO. He acts as the Ambassador's point of contact with US military activities in the country on the one hand he is the channel for keeping the Ambassador informed and on the other hand for conveying the Ambassador's directives to the US military. Coordination is close and prompt, with the Embassy's Political/Military Affairs officer playing a key role in the process. The Chief of ARMISH/MAAG not only sees the senior Iranian military officers on a regular basis, but he also meets with the Shah at frequent intervals. Those meetings are invariably reviewed with the Ambassador before and after they occur. The only other US official who meets with the Shah on occasion is the head of SRP. The Ambassador is kept fully informed of these meetings also, both before and after the fact. As in the foregoing case, the matters to be raised are carefully screened with the Ambassador. The SRP Chief also has certain coordinating and supervisory functions with respect to the operations of the U.S. intelligence facilities in Iran except for several where such functions are handled by the DATT. The Ambassador is kept fully in the picture concerning these intelligence operations as well. Policy execution and the conduct of relations with Iran generally would be facilitated by the creation of some kind of high level mechanism to monitor and coordinate the whole range of US involvement in Iran in the political, economic, military, intelligence and technological fields with a view toward providing policy makers and managers the clearest possible picture of the ramifications of our various relationships and their implications for US policy in Iran and elsewhere. Recommendation to Department 2. That NEA explores the question of ensuring adequate high level monitoring and coordination of US involvement in Iran. As one possibility it might wish to consider the feasibility of the Assistant Secretary's convening the NEA Inter-departmental Group to handle the task. The Use of Resources to Accomplish Objectives The Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission provide vigorous and effective overall direction to the management of the Mission's resources. They also encourage a close and cooperative working relationship between the Embassy and the Consulates in Tabriz and Khorramshahr. The latter receive good support and guidance from the Embassy, and Embassy officers recognize that frequent visits to the constituent posts are desirable. Political reporting is generally of high quality and timely. There are, however, gaps in the Embassy's coverage of certain key elements that are particularly difficult

of access in Iran such as the military, religious leaders and political opponents of the regime. As noted below, senior management is assisting the Political Section in seeking ways to resolve the problem. There is also a recognized need for more analytical reporting, and in recent months the Political Section has undertaken the preparation of a series of reports designed to remedy that situation. Both the political and Economic/Commercial Sections suffer from the very high incidence of official and private visitors who take up the time of their staffs. The Economic/Commercial Section performs with a very high degree of effectiveness in meeting the dramatically increased demands for economic reporting, commercial services and business counseling of visitors as well as in handling policy questions involving petroleum and related matters. The Section-and indeed the Mission as a whole--is well alerted to the importance of opportunities for US exports, turnkey projects and technical assistance. Consular activities are capably managed. The Consular Section is looking for ways to make the present visa operations less labor-intensive. Also the workload on its hard-pressed staff could be eased by moving the obtention of Iranian exit visas to the Administrative Section. General Services work has been marred by relaxed supervision and by insufficient controls over the activities of both local and American subordinate personnel. Budget and Fiscal activities are effectively planned and executed, although a long-standing, American complement position vacancy has left the B&F Section short-handed. Personnel management is competent, and the personnel unit is aware of the need for improved welcoming activities and house-hunting assistance in order to bring newcomers rapidly into productive activity. Shared administrative support services are fairly apportioned and widely appreciated. Security operations, including the activities of the Marine Security Guard, are in good order. The Communications and Records Section is effectively accomplishing its mission. Suffering extremely cramped quarters, the post is generally making the best use possible of the space available while waiting for urgently needed new office construction. Some measures which might improve this space utilization are recommended in the Memorandum on Consular Operations. A capable Iranian staff gives good support to the post's management. Senior management at the post is seeking ways of applying resources to the best advantage in several problem areas in the political and intelligence fields. Iranian society is essentially closed, and it resists penetration beyond a certain point by outsiders. The Ambassador and his principal advisors are keenly aware of gaps in the political information collection effort and of how comparatively little is known about what goes on below the surface. Foreign contact with dissidents is not only discouraged but can, if pursued, bring adverse reaction from SAVAK, the omnipresent Iranian Security Service. One focus of continuing concern relates to information about the political orientation and activities of the Iranian military, a very sensitive area. Although there is extensive contact with the Iranian armed forces through our ARMISH/MAAG and Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAPT), information of the quality and quantity desired has yet to be obtained. This is obviously a matter that has to be handled with the utmost circumspection and discretion. At the direction of the Ambassador and, with the cooperation of the Chief of ARMISH/MAAG, a more systematic end-of-your briefing program of selected MAAG and TAFT officers has been initiated. It is too soon to know how effective this will prove, but meanwhile the Embassy is actively searching for other approaches to the problem. Another important area that deserves scrutiny for ways to apply post-resources more effectively is that of youth. What public disdience there is comes from youth, and the post has recognized that its contacts with youth leave something to be desired. The Embassy's Youth Committee proposed early this year the institution of a "youth think tank" composed of junior officers to brainstorm the problem of what should be done to get closer to Iranian youth. More pressing matters prevented the group from meeting in March, and it has not yet assembled. There would appear to be considerable merit in this idea which should not be allowed to drop without a trial. The prospect of thousands of American employees of private contractors and their families arriving in Iran over the next few years has prompted the Country Directorate and the Embassy to give thought to ways of softening the impact and lessening the inter-community frictions that are likely to result and that, if ignored, could generate anti-American sentiment. Many of the newcomers will never have been abroad before and will face difficult problems of adjustment and cross cultural communication. Opening of Consulates in Isfahan and Shiraz is intended to help ease this situation, but the problem is one that the companies themselves should be addressing in the U.S., before their employees are sent to Iran. A few companies are consulting the Country Directorate or the Embassy about employee orientation and are receiving advice and assistance. However, the matter is potentially serious enough to warrant a more comprehensive and systematic approach. In the programs of two US Government agencies there may be room for improvement in the way resources are being used. Some USIS activities may not be in phase with the changing realities in Iran and the opportunities they present. At a time when the Shah is emphasizing decentralization and provincial development, USIS is continuing to devote its attention and resources almost exclusively to the capital. There is reason to believe some of its activities in Iran have reached the point of diminishing returns as regards their relevance and usefulness. Or, the other hand new possibilities for effective action, such

as the establishment of a Bi-National Center in Tabriz, appear to be arising elsewhere. A careful reappraisal of the UBS program in Iran would seem to be desirable. The Peace Corps program in Iran could also benefit from a similar review. Some of its activities seem to be marginal and some of its volunteers underemployed. A study of the adequacy of local support arrangements in the light of the GOI's vastly increased financial resources would also appear to be indicated. Recommendation to Post 3. That the post convoke the proposed "think tank" of junior officers to examine the problem of what could be done to establish more effective contact with Iranian youth and to make recommendations on the future course of the Embassy Youth Committee. Recommendations to Department 4. That the Country Directorate study the question of ensuring that American employees of private contractors in Iran and their families receive adequate and timely orientation on the problems of living in Iran. The Country Directorate should seek to devise arrangements for alerting company executives to the desirability of such an orientation program and for providing to the extent possible appropriate Departmental advice and assistance. One avenue to explore might be the possibility of using FSI resources, perhaps on a reimbursable basis. 515 program in Iran with a view to determining whether its resources are being utilized to the best effect and, if not, what changes could usefully be made. 6. That NEA urge the Peace Corps to undertake (a) a review and reappraisal of its programs in Iran with a view to determining what changes may be desirable to make the programs more responsive to Iranian needs and more effective in meeting Peace Corps objectives and (b) a review of the level of support given by the GOI to the Peace Corps programs to ascertain whether, in the light of the GOI's vastly increased financial resources and its support arrangements for UN volunteers, an approach should be made to the GOI on the question of substantially increasing its contribution to the program. APPENDIX I RESERVES STONE PT-73 PT-74 PT-75 PT-76 Program 41 22 1,269 1,456 1,692 Issued 28 134 1,732 2,149 2,636 Representation - - 22 25 28 FBO (excludes construction of Embassy additions) - - 129 182 180 FSI - - 9 11 13 Total State 69 156 3,161 3,823 4,399 NARNE GUARDS 24 - 90 95 100 UETS - - - - - General Operations 1 - - - - Personal Contributions 14 81 1,222 1,279 1,440 IMS 4 - 1 2 1 Total BETS 42 8 5 6 7 COUNCE 14 82 1,228 1,297 1,448 PLACE CORPS 1 4 122 185 - E:455 PCV's 277 210 842 261 1,216 PCT's 83 8 - - - TOTAL PEACE CORPS 87 - - - - 174 10 562 451 1,216 AGG CULTURE Attache IMS (Reimb. by GOI) 1 2 47 52 116 (4) 7 - 196 227 186 (3) Total Agriculture 8 2 245 289 322

(1) Page 3 RESOURCES TABLES U.S. Government Resources, Iran U.S. Government Resources, Iran Current Authorized Component Appropriated to the (Kincast the-overment) Actual American Local Actual 72 72 6 6 170 170 8,106 8,106 1,400 1,400 729 729 100 100 10,505 10,505 17,116 16,477 15,601 15,601 (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) Total US Government Resources GII Total US Government Resources GII ཤཱིནྟཾ 334

RESTATE JENLIET Repayment 5 Position No. 55 Main Consultant Section to Admin Section - Construct two annexes to chancery in FY 1976. - Construct new Commercial Trade Pavilion in FY 1976 - Construct replacement buildings for staff apartments and Marine House POST Tehran - Relocate Consulate in Shiraz -1 FSD/K Market Research - 1 DOD-Funded FSD/R Assistant Personnel Officer K - Transfer two Officer Positions to Shiraz - Transfer one officer Position to Isfahan - Open New Consulate in -1 PSO Position for PSO Position for Shiraz - Construct Residence quarters for Vice Consult South Wing of Consulate building. - Sell "Point-Four" Compound Tab.18 SECRET SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA: NEW POLICY PERSPECTIVES Summary The context for U.S. policy in South Asia and the Persian Gulf has changed in important ways since 1971, when events altered local and world power balances. India and Iran have emerged as the predominant political/military actors within their respective sub-regions; the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf have acquired economic and financial power disproportionate to their size and state of development; the U.S. need for Persian Gulf oil has grown; Gulf politics has become linked to the Arab-Israeli situation; South Asia and the Persian Gulf are interacting more intensely than at any time since decolonization; and there are faint signs of regionalism. The great power context has changed since the U.S. rapprochement with China and the British withdrawal from the Gulf. U.S. relations with India deteriorated, but our military relationship with the Gulf states has intensified; the USSR has treaty relations with India and Iraq, and the superpowers are increasing their military involvement in the Indian Ocean. Since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, new alignments within the Arab world and U.S. disengagement diplomacy have weakened the Soviet position in the Middle East. A limited community of interests has developed among China, Iran, and the U.S. in this region. Trends in the area suggest that these new geopolitical patterns will continue for some years into the future, with potential friction between Iran and Arab states in the Gulf and between India and Iran, in addition to the longer-standing frictions within South Asia and the Arabian Peninsula, and between Iran and Iraq. Political instability in both sub-regions could attract intervention by the larger regional states and by great powers. Iran, India, and possibly Pakistan may achieve a modest but GDS---DECLAS SECRET Dec. 31, 1982

important arms production capability, and arms transfers within the area may become more significant. The future policy environment will bear some resemblance to a two-pillar system, with each pillar in geopolitical alignment with a different super-power. However, there are complicating factors: the economic power of Arab oil producers, our need for Saudi Arabian oil, and the effect of our involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Except for oil prices and production levels, trends in the area seem to be more favorable to our geopolitical interests than Soviet interests. Our basic interests in the area are stability, limiting Soviet influence while avoiding a confrontation with the USSR, and access to Persian Gulf oil and gas. In addition, we want access to air and sea routes and ports, and to investment and trade opportunities, and we want to encourage the oil producers to use their excess revenues responsibly. In South Asia, we desire that no outside power have disproportionate influence. We accept Indian primacy and are prepared to live with the present degree of Soviet influence in India, and we maintain a ban on the transfer of lethal defense equipment to India and Pakistan. In the Persian Gulf, we want to check Soviet and radical Arab influence while protecting our access to the region and its oil. We encourage regional cooperation for security, led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, and sell large amounts of defense equipment and services to friendly states. In the Indian Ocean, we maintain a small naval force at Bahrain and make periodic visits with forces from our Pacific Fleet, and we are expanding the facility at Diego Garcia to support more sustained operations. Toward South and Southwest Asia as a whole, our policy is one of avoiding direct military involvement, though we have security treaties with Pakistan and Iran which could be activated by a Soviet threat. The most serious threat to our interests is political instability, which could lead to local conflict, the fall of friendly regimes, and great power confrontation. Related to this is the threat to traditional regimes from Iraq and South Yemen. The escalation of local conflict is a danger even where governments are stable. Our interests could SECRET SECRET also be threatened by a failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, by resource diplomacy, and by the hostile use of new financial power. The Soviet threat to our interests is indirect, except in local situations which might invite Soviet intervention in support of friendly political forces. After considering alternate strategies, we conclude that we need seek no involvement with South Asia beyond economic and technical assistance to contribute to internal stability and promote commercial access. We should avoid doing anything that would place us in confrontation with India, such as the resumption of lethal weapons transfers to Pakistan. Pakistan can not match India even with our help, and our support for Pakistan would simply drive India closer to the USSR and give it additional motivation to develop an effective nuclear weapons capability. For similar reasons, we should look benignly on any improvement in India-China relations. China's greater stake in Pakistan will make it the primary non-regional geopolitical actor there; our interests do not require a matching level of political-military activity in Pakistan. In the Persian Gulf, our support for Iran as the dominant power must be tempered by our need for good relations with Saudi Arabia. Since Iran is capable of defending itself against any regional threat, we should limit our future military sales and assistance to Iran to systems which do not add a significant new military capability to the Gulf, and should make this clear to the Saudis and the Soviets. We should continue offering expanded economic/technological relations to the oil producers, and should encourage their support of moderate Arab states. We should give diplomatic support to the settlement of regional disputes, and should continue working for an Arab-Israeli peace. In the region as a whole, we should avoid more active military involvement and further political/ military commitments. As long as geopolitical trends in the area continue in their presently favorable direction, we should stand back from regional diplomatic maneuverings, while encouraging oil producers to assist less fortunate states, especially in South SECRET

IBCNET Asia and the Arab world. We should give our blessings to regional economic integration, while recognizing that it is not likely to lead to political or military integration. We should not make sharp changes in our naval presence in the Indian Ocean except in direct response to overt Soviet moves. In the longer term, we should do what we can to minimize Iran-India frictions, since a conflict between the two would endanger the stability of the whole area and invite U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The U.S. and the U.S. are not the same thing as the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. are different from the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. are different from the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. are different from the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. are different SECRET IRAN REACHES FOR POWER: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY SUMMARY The Shah and his nation regained their long-lost self confidence in the 1960's. This coincided with an increase in the resources for national power within Iran, and changes in the external environment which offered opportunities for the expansion of Iranian influence. Between 1965 and 1971, Iran moved decisively to make itself the dominant political-military actor in the Persian Gulf, to replace the British, and to deter the incursion of other outsiders. Since 1971, Iran has expanded its foreign policy horizons, using its oil and financial bargaining power and its preeminent position in the Gulf to become a diplomatic force in the Arab world and South Asia. Iran's leading role in the oil price increase of December 1973 was intended not only to support its regional ambitions, but to make Iran a factor in world politics and economics, a leader of the Fourth World, and a state whose vicals must be taken seriously by the great powers. For the United States, the new Iranian role creates both immediate and potential problems in oil pricing and production levels, possible interventirmn an arms race in the Persian Gulf, and Saudi resentment. At the same time, many of Iran's recent moves have been supportive of our diplomacy in the Near East and South Asia, and Iran has generally supported moderate forces in the region. In the broader geopolitical sense, there is a limited but important community of interests among China, Iran, and the United States in South and Southwest Asia, where all three desire to limit Soviet influenza. Iran is the keystone in this arch of "containment". Given present trends in the area, prospects are good for the continuation of this arch, but it could be endangered by Iranian adventurism. The task for U.S. policy is to restrain Iran's reach to those goals which are both achievable without U.S. military involvement and consonant with U.S. interests in other area states. GDS--DECLASSE SECRET Dec. 31, 1982

A History of Humiliation After the Safavid Revival and the Conqueror Nadir Shah, Iran entered a period of decline from which it did not emerge completely until a decade ago. Foreign troops marched across its landscape, foreign officials determined government decisions, large parts of Iran's territory were lost, ethnic groups were manipulated by outsiders, and the country was divided into spheres of influence. After the failure of the constitutionalists to gain decisive control of Iran, Reza Khan brought a new dictatorship from the throne, reasserted central government control over the tribes and the provinces, and started the economic and military modernization that could free Iran from external interference. But he was removed from the throne by the British and Russians in 1941, and Iran again became a zone rather than a country, its armed forces defeated within hours, its territory occupied and used as a transit route to Russia. Only U.S. and U.N. pressure and wily Iranian diplomacy removed foreign troops from Iran in 1946. The reaction to these humiliations was inevitable. The nationalist movement gained strength, and seized on the privileged position of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as the symbol of foreign exploitation of Iran, The National Front, heavily influenced by Communists, challenged the Shah's control of the Government and Iran's military forces, and nearly won. Put back on the throne with American assistance, the Shah began at last to assert his political authority, breaking the left with his U.S. trained military and security forces. But the memories were bitter; western control of the world oil industry had nearly bankrupted Iran after the 1951 nationalization, the Shah's survival depended on foreign support, and Iran's integrity depended on the presence of U.S. personnel and security agreements. Accepting the temporary need for U.S. military and economic assistance to build a self-sufficient Iran, the Shah sought to concentrate power, and looked for ways to free Iran of its dependence on foreigners. SECRET The turning point came in the early 1960's. Having broken the left, the Shah challenged the right with land reform and social modernization, and won in a bloody confrontation in 1963. A growing world economy increased the demand for Iranian oil, and the 1954 consortium agreement increased Iran's return on its oil exports, giving Iran the means to finance both economic development and military modernization. The stage was set for a more decisive Iranian external policy. Changes in Iran's External Environment The Shah had feared radical Arab nationalism at least since the Iraqi coup of 1958, and was disturbed by Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni civil war after the 1962 revolution. The failure of the U.S. to support Pakistan in its 1965 war with India convinced the Shah that he could not rely on U.S. military support in a regional conflict. These events gave him more than adequate motivation to build up his military forces, diversify his sources of supply, and defuse threats where possible. In 1966 the U.S. agreed to sell P-4s to Iran, introducing a new level of weaponry into the Persian Gulf, and giving Iran a dominant military position after deliveries began in 1968. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war further demonstrated the need for a superior military force in a potentially hostile Arab environment. The most important changes involved the great powers who had long inhibited Iranian foreign policy. Iran's 1962 declaration that it would not allow foreign missile bases in Iran was enough to allow a normalization of relations with the USSR, freeing Iranian forces from the Soviet border. The Shah anticipated the British withdrawal from the Gulf and redirected his diplomatic and military activity to establish a pre-eminent position there, giving up Iran's claim to Bahrain as unfeasible, but negotiating for the acquisition of Abu Musa and the Tunis. The growth of Iran's vital oil revenues and an attack on an oil tanker in the Bab-al-Mandeb further convinced the Shah that he must protect his oil lifeline out of the Gulf.

SECRET The Nixon Doctrine, first revealed in 1969, reinforced the Shah's belief in military self-reliance, and the detente that came later appeared to him to release Soviet energies for interference in the Middle East. All signs pointed to a continuing need for a military force superior to any other in the area, and the conviction that Iran could not count on external support. At the same time, Iran worked to defuse the Soviet threat through barter deals, exchanging Iranian gas for Soviet military and economic aid, encouraging a stable Iran-USSR relationship. 1971 and after Major changes since 1971 have increased Iran's potential power and opened new diplomatic options. As the British withdrew from the Persian Gulf, Iran occupied three islands and made clear its view that non-Gulf states should stay out. By propounding the doctrine that the littoral states were responsible for Gulf security, Iran reinforced its own dominant position. While Iran's proposal for a Persian Gulf security pact has made little progress, its position on Gulf security has been endorsed by the U.S., and Iranian forces are now operating in Oman as the first concrete example of Gulf security cooperation. The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 broke Pakistan as a serious rival to India and forced Iran to turn its military and diplomatic attention eastward, first by extending an umbrella over Pakistan, planning military installations in the southeast, and declaring an Indian Ocean role for itself, and later by a rapprochement with India. The death of Nasser, the new diplomacy of Sadat, the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt, and the new alignments within the Arab world that preceded the October war attracted Iranian interest and greater support for the Arab cause. The war itself showed the vulnerability of Israel and the new effectiveness of the Arabs, and Iran moved quickly to adjust to the need alignment. Iran also reacted promptly to great power realignments, normalizing relations with China and other Communist states. Soviet treaties with Egypt, India, and Iraq, and the Afghan Coup, caused a renewal of Iranian fears of encirclement, but subsequent events in Egypt reduced Iranian concerns in that direction, and Iranian concerns about Soviet influence in India and Afghanistan have declined. President Nixon's visit to Iran in May 1972 gave Iran a psychological boost, reminding the USSR of U.S. support for Iran, and leading to a less restrictive U.S. arms sales policy. The massive arms deals which followed signaled to all the Iranian intention to maintain military superiority in any situation, and a scorched-earth speech by the Shah suggested that Iran would not hesitate to defend itself vigorously against a Soviet attack. Oil Power Iran had not forgotten its resentment of foreign interference and western control over the world oil industry. Taking advantage of its greatly improved bargaining position, based on its political stability, economic success, and regional importance, Iran in 1973 achieved the final step in its seizure of complete control over its oil industry, reducing the consortium to a purchaser. New horizons opened up as a result of oil demand and price trends, the Arab oil embargo, and the increased unity of OPEC. The oil price increase of December 1973, in which Iran played a leading role, was not only an attempt to become rich and escape the poverty syndrome forever; it was also a challenge to the developed world's monopoly of economic and political power. Iran, which had already achieved an important regional role, saw a chance to become a factor in world politics, a leader of the emerging Fourth World, and a state whose views must be taken into account by the great powers. With this new wealth and power has come an unprecedented opportunity for Iran to influence its external environment. Using its oil and money, Iran has entered into major economic agreements with India, Pakistan, Egypt, and Syria, and lesser ones with

SECRET Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, and other states. Through these deals Iran has supported Arab moderates like Sadat, Hussain, and Hassan, encouraged a split between Syria and Iraq, helped defuse Indian concerns about Iranian support for Pakistan, and reminded Pakistan that it must be careful in seeking options to Iran, while gaining access to needed raw materials, consumer goods, and skilled manpower. Iran is also giving military assistance, not only to Oman, but to Jordan and Yemen. Iran has become, for the first time since the ancient empires, an important political factor in both the Near East and South Asia. The most threatening of Iran's potential enemies - Iraq and South Yemen - have been isolated, and Iranian rivalry with India has been put on ice. At the same time, Iran has given Egypt, Syria, and India options to dependence on the USSR, and has contributed to a weakening of the Soviet position in the region. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S Some aspects of Iran's new confidence and assertiveness create immediate and potential problems for the U.S., most obviously the oil price issue. The Iranians will fight hard to preserve the increase in income and bargaining power that new oil prices have given them more than any other oil exporter, they have both domestic and foreign uses for the money. Iran might well reduce production rather than accept a decline in oil prices, and a large reduction could be damaging to the United States. Iran's military superiority in the Persian Gulf, its concern about radical Arab forces, and the political fragility of some Arabian Peninsula states has created an Iranian propensity to intervene which could result in a confrontation damaging to our relations with the Arabs. The arms race in the Gulf, sparked as much by Iranian acquisitions as by any other factor, could lead to the rapid escalation of local conflicts, increased great power involvement in the Gulf, and new generations of weaponry in the Arab-Israeli complex. Iran's military power - and its superior attitudes - may cause growing Saudi resentment, and Saudi pressure on us to restrain Iran. SECRET SECRET At the same time, many of Iran's recent moves have been supportive of our diplomacy in the Near East and South Asia. Iranian assistance to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria helps shore up their positions against radical Arabs and separate Syria from Iraq. Iranian assistance to India gives it an option to the USSR - one we can provide only to a limited extent - and Iran's assistance to Pakistan helps one of our allies. Generally, Iran has used its money and oil to support moderate forces in the region, and has contributed to the isolation of radicals. In the broader geopolitical sense, there has developed since 1971 a limited but important community of interests among China, Iran, and the United States, with Pakistan a link in the chain. There has been talk of a Peking-Islamabad-Tehran axis, and Soviet criticism of Chinese support for CENTO, along with the usual Soviet criticism of U.S. and British use of Iran as their pawn in the area. While the "axis" is hardly formal or without frictions, China, Iran, and the U.S. clearly share interests in limiting Soviet influence in the region, and in the survival of Pakistan. It is also clear that Iran is the key-stone in this arch of "containment"; without it, the U.S., Pakistani, and even Chinese positions would be weakened. Given present trends in the region, the prospects are good for the continued existence of this alignment, to the advantage of the U.S. and the disadvantage of the USSR. However, the arch could be endangered by Iranian adventurism, which could lead to a destructive local conflict with the Arabs or with India, drawing in the Soviets on the other side and thereby strengthening the Soviet position. The task for U.S. policy toward Iran is to restrain Iranian proclivities toward intervention, particularly in situations which could draw in the U.S. and the USSR, and to establish more firmly a practice of Iran-U.S. consultation before such moves. Trends in the region are going in our direction, and Iran is an important factor in this; we should not enjangur this situation by giving Iran a blank check. SECRET NEA/IRN:MAGMichaud:ml 6/24/74 ext.20639

CONFIDENTIAL Chief Inspector Herbert F. Propp Ambassador Helms Post Memorandum for Inspectors Part I - General Conduct of Relations with Iran Despite a few soft spots discussed below, relations between the United States and Iran remain excellent. For more than two decades we have enjoyed a special relationship based on our shared attitude toward communism and the USSR, a mutual aversion to instability in the Middle East, and the recognition that close and cooperative ties serve the interests of both countries. The Shah regards the United States as a strong and relatively disinterested power which provides Iran with strategic protection from the Soviet Union, with highly sophisticated weapons and the expertise to use and maintain them, and with the economic, technical and professional skills needed in the development of his country. Our interests in Iran include its continuance as a stable and friendly country which plays a responsible role in the region, allows us overflight rights and essential intelligence and military facilities on its territory, and gives us continuing access to its markets and its oil and mineral resources. The Mission's efforts are directed toward ensuring that this mutually advantageous relationship is maintained and enhanced. The substantial growth in our trade relationship, our greatly increased participation in Iran's internal development and military modernization, and the dramatic rise in the number of Americans living in this country have required an expansion of the Lability and related elements into what is now the largest and most complex Mission in NEA. In addition to the traditional diplomatic and consular structure, we have a major military presence in the form of our Department of Defense representative, MMAG and Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT), a Peace Corps contingent (which will be phased out this summer), a large and active Iran-America Society, representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, Drug CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Enforcement Agency and Internal Revenue Service, and some 20 other separate units associated primarily with our intelligence and military activities in Iran. Organizationally, we have no important problems. The authority and responsibility of the Ambassador for all official American activities in Iran are understood and accepted by every subordinate element. His control over the diverse military units operating in Iran was strengthened last year by the creation of the position of Senior Defense Representative who has coordinating authority over the entire military establishment. The Defense Representative reports directly to and takes policy guidance from the Ambassador, as do all other agencies representatives. The Ambassador meets daily with section chiefs, weekly with the country team, and whenever required with all other U.S. agencies and representatives in the Mission in order to maintain essential communications and coordination. The work of the constituent posts, including the new consulates at Isfahan and Shiraz, is guided and supervised by a consular coordinator working closely with the DCM. Officers of the consulates are periodically brought to Tehran for consultations and conferences, and Embassy officers from various sections pay visits to provincial posts to advise and assist them. Good telephone connections with all consulates make it possible to maintain a constant two-way flow of information between them and the Embassy. Relations between the Embassy and the Government of Iran reflect the excellent relationship between our two countries. I have a close and friendly relationship with the Shah and senior GOI officials, and the Shah is accessible as well to certain other designated members of the Mission. Other officers of the Mission have good access to Iranian government officials and to important leaders in the private sector. These contacts, however, are not always as useful as we would like because Iranian government and society are highly structured and authoritarian and all major decisions are made at the top. Often even relatively senior officials are not well informed about policies and plans and have little influence on them. We also have difficulty developing sources of information about dissidence and even about attitudes among the military because of Iranian sensitivities and the GOI's disapproval of foreign contacts with these groups. CONFIDENTIAL

Part II - Issues and Problems In addition to the obvious differences between the U.S. and Iran over the price of oil and the quantity taken by the U.S., several other problems and potential problems have arisen which must be carefully handled to prevent their cumulative effect from damaging the essentially sound relationship between our countries and the atmosphere in which we conduct these relations. In the political/military sphere, Congressional restrictions on the transfer to third countries of military equipment supplied or licensed by the U.S. to an increase in the total air traffic in the country is an evolving regional role subject to pressure from its friends to transfer surplus military equipment to them as a form of aid. Iranians see our rules on transfers as a limitation on their ability to play the role in the which they feel entitled by virtue of the country's wealth, power and level of development. While these regulations are designed to ensure that U.S. arms are not used contrary to U.S. interests and must be enforced, there is considerable room for improvement in the manner and speed with which we respond to Iranian requests. Iran's cash-flow problems have led to a much harder look by the GOI at the cost of defense equipment and services purchased from us. As prices continue to escalate far beyond contract levels, the Shah and the GOI begin to lose confidence in our veracity and our reliability as the principal source of military supply. The rapid expansion in the size and geographic spread of the American community in Iran (now estimated at 25,000 and expected to more than double by 1980) at a time of rising Iranian pride and self-assertiveness poses a potential threat of increased inter-cultural friction and incidents. An informal poll of Iranian attitudes toward the increasing foreign presence was conducted by the Embassy recently to try to gain some insights which could help in minimizing potential difficulties. There are several nagging problems in the economic and commercial area which Mr. Brewth and Wise are prepared to discuss. The first is the potential to be a decision agreement with the GOI on repayment of Iran's lend-lease debt of $35 million, despite high-level intervention by the Embassy going back several years. Comprehensive criticism of Iran CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL for not paying this debt can be expected to increase, and we understand that future Ex-Im Bank activity in Iran may be linked to this debt. Activities of the U.S.-Iranian Joint Commission have not progressed as fast or as smoothly as we had hoped because of (a) the slowdown in Iranian financial commitments for approved joint projects; (b) U.S. unwillingness to pay part of the cost of many projects and the total cost of some others; and (c) questions about the status of the highway advisory team now in Iran and of future U.S. technical assistance teams operating under USIRJC auspices. A third problem concerns the status of our Trade Center and its director. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to adhere to the view that the Center should not be an integral part of the Embassy and that its director should not have diplomatic status, and we and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance have been unable thus far to get the MFA to back down. Unless we can obtain a continuation of the Trade Center's current status or something closely resembling it, there will be serious repercussions on U.S.-Iranian commercial relations. Mr. Provencher wishes to discuss several administrative problems with you and your team but I would like to highlight one here which has plagued the Embassy for almost 20 years. As the Mission has grown, the Chancery building has become totally inadequate to meet our office needs. Plans for expansion of the Chancery have been approved for a number of years but no real action has been taken. In July 1975 the FBO advised us that construction would begin during FY-1977, but that seems unlikely in view of the current freeze on construction of new buildings. Meanwhile, the efficiency and security of a number of Mission elements are hampered by their having to occupy inconvenient and make-shift quarters. ADCM:Hmills:1 CONFIDENTIAL

UEVNI JOINT ENFORCE FORM SECURITY INFORMATION PAGE DATE DATE/DATE PLEASE/SERVICE DATE DATE DATE UNIT JAMAL CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY DATE TIME MONTH TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 NOV 76 MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS FROM: CARMISH MAAG TEHRAN IRAN//ARPPP// TO: USCINCEUR VATHINGEN GE//ECJ4/7// INFO: SECDEF WASH DC//ASD:ISA(SA)/DSAA(NESA)// JCS WASH DC//J-5// SECRET NO FOR N WORKING PAPERS SUBJECT: MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION (MSAP) FY 79-83 A. HVM, PART I, CHAPTER D (CHG 9, 1 APR 76) (U) B. DAND/DSAA/ISA LTR, 19 DEC 75, SUBJ: MASM, PART I, CHAPTER D (U) C. USCINCEUR 311325Z AUG 76 (U) D. HQ USAF 212100Z SEP 76 (C) E. SECDEF 210100Z OCT 76 (C) F. SECDEF 160140Z NOV 76 (U) G. USCINCEUR 181027Z NOV 76 (U) 1. (S) STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. IRAN'S PRIMARY IMPORTANCE LIES IN ITS KEY LOCATION BORDERING THE SOVIET UNION, ITS EMERGING ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE AREA OF THE PERSIAN GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL, AND ITS POSITION AS ONE OF THE MAJOR WORLD OIL PRODUCERS AND PURCHASER OF US PRODUCTION DISTR: ARAG FILE AMEMB (Nr. Martin) DEFREP ARAF ARAA ARNA ARPPP COMEBACK ARACM ARCS DRAFTER TITLE NAME TITLE OFFICIAL SYMBOL PHONE & DATE JOIN SPENCER, MAJ, USAF ARPPP, 840079, 28 NOV 76 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TYPED NAME TITLE OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE A. L. RICHARDS, COL, USA, ARCS SIGNATURE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET DD10000 JOINT MESSAGE FORM GPO:1034-034-078

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

JOINT MESSAGEFORM SECURITY CLASSIFICATION\SECURITIES OFFICE NAME DRAFTATION\nMELASENTIME PRINTED\nALJ. EMP. CLASS CIG FOR MESSAGE CENTRE COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE ONLY DATE - TIME MONTH VR 05 of 51 PP PP SSSS NOV 76 �OORT MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS FROM: WORKING PAPERS AND SHIPPING FACILITIES ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE SOUTH, REFINEMENT OF IRAN'S AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS VITAL FOR ITS NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMY. THEREFORE, A RADAR NETWORK WITH AN UPGRADED COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL OF ALL AIR DEFENSE AND TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IS PLANNED. F-16 AND F-18 AIRCRAFT ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE COUNTERAIR, INTERDICTION, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND NAVAL AIR COVER. AWACS (E-3A) AIRCRAFT ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY AND ASSIST IN ATTAINING/MAINTAINING AIR SUPERIORITY. AMSTS ARE REQUIRED TO IMPROVE THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSE TIME FOR LOGISTIC AND AIRLIFT SUPPORT. P-3 AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED FOR AIRBORNE SEA SURVEILLANCE, PATROL AND ANTI SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE ARABIAN SEA, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. C. BECAUSE OF THE RUGGED TERRAIN IN IRAN AND THE INADEQUATE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK, PROJECTIONS FOR IMPERIAL IRANIAN GROUND FORCE (IIGF) EQUIPMENT REFLECTS THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL AND IMPROVED GROUND MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED WEAPONS. THE IIGF MUST MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TYPED NAME: TITLE OF FICE'S SYMHL AND PHONE SIGNATURE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION DD,173 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE GOLD JOINT MESSAGE FORM SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PAGE DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME PRICE QUINGLE LMP CLASS CIC FOR MESSAGE CENTER COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY ACI INFO 06 OF 31 PP PP SSSS DATE TIME MONTH TR NOV 76 FROM:WORKING PAPERS COUNTRY'S BORDERS AND THE STRATEGIC OIL FACILITIES ON TERRAIN NEXT TO THE IRAQI BORDER AGAINST THE THREAT POSED BY LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET BUILT TANKS AND ARTILLERY. ARMY AVIATION MUST CONDUCT AERIAL RECONN-AISSANCE, FIRE SUPPORT, ANTITANK WARFARE, LOGISTICS RESUPPLY, MEDICAL EVACUATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL, TROOP AIRLIFT, AND SUPPORT ARTILLERY IN COMBAT. D. ALL OF IRAN'S OIL IS EXPORTED THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF, AND MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S IMPORTS ARRIVE THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF, THEREFORE, IRAN'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VIABILITY REQUIRES SECURE ACCESS TO AND FROM THE PERSIAN GULF. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERN DEEP WATER NAVY IS OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO IRAN TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FREE COMMERCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. THE HELICOPTER SUPPORT SHIP, ASW HELICOPTERS, AND DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WILL PROVIDE IRAN WITH AN ANTISURFACE AND AN ASW CAPABILITY FOR PROTECTION OF THE SEA LANES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE GULF OF OMAN, AND THE ARABIAN SEA, LOGISTICS SHIPS WILL GIVE THE IIN AN UNDERWAY LOGISTICS CAPABILITY FOR MORE DISTANT AND HIGHER ENDURANCE OPERATIONS. LSTS WILL FACILITATE RESUPPLY OF COASTAL SITES AND MATERIDED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TYPEED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE SIGNATURE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET FOR N REPLACE 2 PREVIOUS EDITION WHICH WILL IT USLD.

JOINT MESSAGE FORM QQ：1574-610-076 JOINT MESSAGE FORM SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET MANUFACTURE PAGE DRAFTER OR RELEASERTIME ACT PRECIOR ACT LAF CLASS CIC JOH MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY 08 OF 31 PP PP SSSS DATE - TIME MONTH TR BOOK MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS NOV 76 FROM: 7 TO: PROGRESS TOWARD SELF-RELIANCE IS INDICATED BY PHASE-OUT OF SOME TAFT POSITIONS, AS WELL AS BY AN OVERALL PROJECTED DECREASE IN TAFT PERSONNEL. NO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN OEM SUPPORT IS PROJECTED BECAUSE OF THE ADVANCED EQUIPMENT PROPOSED FOR THE IIA DEFENSE STRUCTURE. A COMPETENT DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT SHOULD RESULT FROM THE PROJECTED PURCHASES AND SHOULD SUPPORT US OBJECTIVES STATED IN PARA 2. AT THE PRESENT TIME, AIR DEFENSE RELATED ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT APPEAR TO HAVE THE HIGHEST RELATIVE PRIORITY; HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENT OF AN OVERALL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IS THE PRIME OBJECTIVE OF THE GOI AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE INCORPORATED AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. WORKING PAPERS \ DISTR: DRAFTER TYPE OF NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TYPEED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE SIGNATURE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION NOFORN [?] 0：1874-4000

IRAN I. Significance of Iran to United States Global Policy and Regional Objectives. A broad bipartisan United States consensus that Iran is of special importance to us in the protection and furtherance of key United States national interests has existed for nearly 30 years. Our relationship at first was narrowly based on geopolitical factors, but now encompasses most areas of inter-governmental and private sector concerns. There are currently before us a number of issues which could cause serious friction, but the following national interests remain unchanged. -- Deterrence of Soviet ambitions: A mutual interest in deterring the expansion of Soviet power and influence, particularly in the Middle East, has been and remains the bedrock of the relationship. Iran's proping equity to the Soviet Union, historical experience of Soviet expansion and strong anti-communist leadership has led to views which dovetail with our global policies first anunciated by President Truman. We have both gained great benefits in connection with this shared interest. The United States was, and is, the only western country capable of providing an ultimately meaningful deterrent to protect Iran. In the first two decades of the postwar era, Iran was essentially a recipient of United States assistance and advice and, except for its membership in CENTO and the provision of various intelligence and military facilities to us, played a clearly backseat role. This situation has changed. Today, as a growing regional power, Iran has the financial strength and is rapidly developing its military capabilities and influence to do much more itself. It can play an important independent role in the Middle East, South Asia and the Indian Ocean to advance regional stability and to counter activities and policies of the USSR or regional radical forces. SECRET SECRET Access to Iran's unique geopolitical position: We have no fully satisfactory alternative to two of the uses we make of Iranian territory. United States intelligence monitoring operations there provide crucial information on Soviet military operations, particularly missile development, and Soviet adherence to SALT. United States overflight rights provide us with the most direct and satisfactory air link between Europe and countries to the east of Iran. In addition landing rights have been important for our air surveillance of the Indian Ocean and the Soviet border areas. Provision of petroleum for the United States and its allies: Even though Iran has been a prime mover for higher oil prices and has ignored our representations on this matter, it provides an important amount of petroleum for the United States and crucial supplies for our allies: over eight percent of United States petroleum imports; over 16 percent of those for western Europe; almost 24 percent for Japan; and almost 70 percent for Israel. Despite the inherent tension in this buyer-seller relationship, Iran has been a dependable and secure source of petroleum. Iran did not join the 1973-74 Arab embargo of petroleum sales and continued to permit shipments to Israel. Iranian leaders have frequently reiterated that Iran will not join politically motivated embargoes. -- Furtherance of regional stability and development: United States policy for the last several years has been to assist and encourage Iran to become a regional power which would assume limited security responsibilities and play a generally more active role supportive of our mutual interests. Iran has accepted this role--for it was consistent with the Shah's view of Iran's key position in the area--and has used its military power (in Oman), its financial strength (loans to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan and Syria) and its general influence to help resolve regional disputes (resumption of India-Pakistan relations and resumption of Afghan-Pakistan dialogue.) Iran is the only regional power which has been able to develop close and confidential relations both with the Arab confrontation states and with Israel. Iranian leader-ship has remained in close touch with United States negotiators, has counseled moderation, has encouraged Sadat SECRET

and Asad to take steps toward peace, and at a key point of the Sinai II negotiations (under which Israel gave up oil fields in occupied Egyptian territory) reiterated Iran's policy of remaining a reliable oil supplier to Israel. Finally, as the strongest power in the Persian Gulf, Iran is seeking a collective security arrangement with other Gulf countries, although traditional suspicions are likely to prevent its realization in the near future. While we recognize some potentially negative features for our interests, on balance Iranian-Gulf Arab security arrangements would probably be a plus for us. -- Maintenance of beneficial economic, commercial and cultural relations: In 1975 the United States edged out Germany as the largest supplier of civilian goods and services to Iran's burgeoning market. United States non-military sales to Iran in the 1975-1980 period should total over 20 billion, which would result in a balance-of-payments surplus for the United States of 8-10 billion. (Military sales will approximately double this surplus.) United States firms continue to move into various joint undertakings in Iran and investment totals roughly 500,000,000. The Ex-IM Bank exposure (loans and guarantees) in Iran is about 1 billion. The United States - Iranian Join Economic Commission has opened potentially useful cooperative links in such diverse areas as nuclear and other forms of energy, agriculture, housing, manpower training, transportation and science. Cultural ties are extensive, including some 20,000 Iranian students studying in this country and over 50 United States universities with ties to Iranian institutions. II. Iranian Political and Economic Situation Political: Two related facts dominate the political scene: the unquestioned pre-eminence of the Shah, who makes all major and many minor decisions, and Iran's political stability. All indications point toward a continuation of both of these for at least the years immediately ahead. SECRET SECRET The Shah, who has 35 years of experience on the throne, has the loyalty of the broad mass of the populace, particularly in the rural areas, and the full cooperation of the armed forces and the intelligence/security apparatus, as well as the support of an extremely able group of civilian technocrats. Undoubtedly a number of Iranian intellectuals and technocrats are political, having opted out of the political system, or are passively resistant to the Shah's authoritarian rule. Many religious leaders and their followers also do not accept the present monarchy or its reform policies. However, organized open opposition to the Shah's leadership and policies is restricted to small terrorist organizations. The active terrorists, who come from the extreme right and left, probably number under one thousand and have the intermittent support of another one-two thousand. The terrorist carry out clandestine propaganda and assassinations (the latter including six Americans in the past three years). The terrorists do not appear to have attracted much support for their political goals, which include the overthrow of the monarchy. Government activities concentrate on wide-ranging economic and social development programs; the strengthening of Iran's armed forces; and a reform program known as the Shah-People Revolution. The latter, which has been underway since 1962, started with a large scale land reform program. Newer activities have to do with areas such as illiteracy, health, government corruption, local courts and public participation in the ownership of private industry. A potentially important decentralization of administrative power from Tehran is also now underway. An assessment of Iran's longer-term (5-10 years) political stability is by its very nature more difficult. For thirty years, especially in the last fifteen, a very traditional society has been going through as massive as a social and economic change as in any country in the world. The results of these changes--an exponential increase in the number of educated Iranians, including thousands educated in the United States and western Europe; large-scale urbanization; a modern SECRET

economic infrastructure side by side with a more traditional backward agricultural sector; and rising expectations in all sectors of national life -- will become apparent and potentially more disruptive and destabilizing. During this period, much of course depends on the Shah's longevity. The dissolution of existing parties and the formation in 1975 of a single political party--more accurately, a broad political movement--are a recognition by the Shah that a degree of political participation is necessary and some decentralization of decision making will be required. The massive economic and social development projects also represent an effort to meet rising demands of the people. Economic Although important strides have been taken in the last decade to broaden the economic base, the Iranian economy remains overwhelmingly dependent upon petroleum and natural gas production. Together, they contribute 85% of the Iranian Government's revenues and 98-99% of foreign exchange earnings. The general outlook for the economy is good. Foreign exchange reserves at fiscal year's end will be roughly 7 billion and import earnings will remain at the 20-2 Iran's sixth development plan will cover the years 1978-1983. The Government intends that by the end of that period Iran will have laid the industrial basis for sustained and diversified economic development in the face of declining oil export revenues (the result of a desire to conserve limited oil reserves and increase the domestic use of petroleum in the manufacture of fertilizers, petrochemicals, and other oil-derived products). SECRET SECRET Iran's ability to achieve its goals will continue to be hampered by a serious shortage of trained manpower at all levels, but particularly in the skilled and semi-skilled worker and middle-to-lower management levels. The current development plan (1973-1978) is likely to be only some 60% realized when it terminates; a sizeable portion of the shortfall is probably traceable to manpower shortages and transportation bottlenecks. Iranian leaders are in a race to establish a strong diversified economy responsive to people's needs and a new political base before the country's oil reserves are seriously depleted in the early 1990's. It is no easy task and success cannot be taken for granted. III. \underline{\text{Current State of United States Relations and Policy}} United States - Iranian relations are excellent. They rest on thirty years of close cooperation and the broad overlapping of our national interests in most areas of mutual concern, reflected \underline{\text{inter alia}} in the 1959 United States-Iranian Agreement of Cooperation and Iran's membership in the Central Treaty Organization created under our aegis. A noteworthy shift, however, has occurred in the balance of the relationship during the past decade. Initially there was a very one-sided reliance of Iran on the United States; a tutcary relationship existed throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s. As Iran's economy boomed, political stability grew, military strength expanded and petroleum income doubled and tripled, that balance has been changing. Iran is increasingly independent, assertive and insistent that its viewpoint be considered by the United States and others. With the exception of oil prices, this shifting balance has not caused serious disagreements, but it has introduced some malaise into the relationship on both sides. The centerpiece of Iranian foreign policy under the Shah or any likely successor will continue to be fear of Soviet expansion at Iran's expense. The Shah knows he cannot replace the United States as the ultimate deterrent against this threat. SECRET

SECRET Nevertheless, as a new Administration assumes power, the Shah will carefully assess our actions on our bilateral relations, but also in the larger context of whether they signal significant shifts in United States regional policies and in our determination to counter--as he sees it--continuing expansion of Soviet influence and power in the area and the world. He has expressed strong concerns over the last year or two as to whether the United States will remain a reliable ally and has long-term staying ability. These concerns have been compounded by growing public and Congressional criticism of Iranian arms purchases and of alleged Iranian practices in the field of human rights, which the Shah considers unjustified. The Shah will be sensitive to the style and manner in which we handle the various issues between us and to attempts to bend Iran in our direction on these differences. If he concludes, rightly or wrongly, that his concerns presage shifts in the United States-Iranian relationship in areas he perceives as important to Iranian interests, he is capable of making adjustments in his policies which could be detrimental to our interests, however self-defeating this might appear. IV. Major Issues Sales of military equipment: Using oil income to develop a large military force equipped with the most modern arms is a high priority Iranian goal and one particularly close to the Shah's heart: For him, continued access to United States military equipment, technology, and services is of paramount importance. Although Iran buys some equipment from other countries, a very large percentage of its purchases comes from the United States (over $10 billion since 1970). Iran prefers United States sources and is accustomed to favorable United States responses to most ~ though not all ~ of its requests. In recent years, that normally favorable United States response has been based on the United States policy that, "in general, decisions on the acquisition of military equipment should be left to the government of Iran." There are currently three large Iranian requests under study by State and Defense and awaiting Executive Branch decision: 140 F-16's (a purchase of 160 has already been approved); 7 E-3 AWACS's; and 250 F-18L's. If the requests are approved, they must next be submitted to Congress. SECRET SECRET Iran seems to understand that no decision will be coming on these until a/or January 20. The Shah's ambitious military development plans, his traditional access to the equipment he wants from United States sources, and our policy of not attempting for the most part to gainsay Iran's military needs have made our military relationship with Iran a leading target of arms control advocates in Congress. A significant change in this policy of forthcomingness would, however, entail a definite risk that the Shah would counter with actions against our military and intelligence assets in Iran and very probably on our economy. A country's interests as well. Moreover, a policy of curtailment of military sales would in some specific cases cost an invidious comparison between what we were doing for Iran and what the Soviet says doing for their client Iran. The question would also rise as to whether a policy of greater military sales restraint does not pose inherent contradictions in our long-standing policy of building up Iran as a bulwark against easy Soviet expansion into the area. Petroleum Prices: For the past three years, Iran has been leading advocate of higher oil prices. Even though it has been increased by 5-10 percent at the population meeting, we can expect Iran to seek further increases. It has regularly replied negatively and often sharply to United States appeals for no increases, arguing that allied that other prices are necessary to create economic incentives for the industrial countries to begin to develop alternative sources of energy as world oil reserves decline. We have taken this up frequently with the Shah but in the face of determined opposition to our point of view, we have not sought to use what leverage we have -- such as denying or delaying arms sales -- judging that such actions would not achieve the intended outcomes and would be counter-reductive in other areas. This is one issue on which the Shah will single-mindedly follow his own interests, which he sees as an amortization of current income while that is possible. In that connection, it is noteworthy that Iran's off-take will begin dropping significantly in the late 1980's. SECRET

Human Rights: The human rights situation in Iran is very broadly perceived in the United States, even among individuals and groups friendly to Iran, as unsatisfactory. This consensus, taken together with legislative provisions, could reduce our flexibility in dealing with Iran and create frictions in the relationship. Another more recent aspect of the problem is the allegation that SAVAK, Iran's security organization, is exercising surveillance over Iranian students in the United States and carrying out a variety of illegal activities. Iried to the state in the first instance that this matter is described as domestic affair, but also that the great strides made in racial and economic rights in Iran are insufficiently appreciated abroad and that the treatment of the political opposition is grooply exaggerated and misunderstood. In the United States. Longer Term Issues In the longer term, Iran's assertive independence and imperial, authoritarian system could lead to increasing divergencies in our respective policies and so raise other issues. Among the questions which will have to be monitored carefully are: (1) will Iran's increasing Arab ties bring about a weakening of the Iran-Israeli relationship; (2) will Iran's increasing military power tempt it to intervene unilaterally in the affairs of other Persian Gulf states; (3) will Iranian arms acquisition in fact prompt an arms race in the area; and (4) will Iran take an increasingly strident position in DC-LDC, North-South issues. V. Human Rights Considerations Iran is an authoritarian state and also one which follows special legal procedures in connection with crimes involving state security. Both facts have led to international criticisms but it is on the Iranian handling of those charged with state security crimes that most criticisms are concentrated. There have been reports on human rights in Iran from Amnesty International and from two observers from the International Commission of Jurists. SECRET Allegations related to the legal system have generally covered the following subjects: the authority of SAVAK officials to function as military magistrates with regard to certain detenues; the number of people picked up following alleged state security incidents; the claim that some of those charged with state security crimes are held several months without formal charges having been made or access to countless provided; the detention of an unknown number of "political prisoners"; the alleged use of torture or other harsh treatment against such people; the fact that all such cases are tried in military security is charge and sometimes without the source of the fact that the agent or appeal free SAVAK and military court decisions is limited. The Government of Iran has disputed many of these charges and defended its use of special procedures in security cases. The general line followed has been that crimes against national security are sufficiently serious and their perशtors sufficiently ruthless co warrant special procedures. Noted as relevant in this have been Iran's traditionally highly centralized state authority, its historic concern with communism and other opposition movements, and current terrorist activities. The Government of Iran has also noted favorable outside comments about its regular court and penal systems, but has added that, when it is the regime itself that is threatened, it does not believe its normal civil and criminal courts should be used. VI. Congressional Attitudes toward Iran We believe that bipartisan consensus on the importance of Iran to our national interests continues on the Hill, particularly in the Senate. But increasing concern has been expressed over the last year or more over Iran's role in higher oil prices, the extent of Iran's military purchases, possible irresponsible military action in the future--especially post-Shah--, and Iran's observance of human rights. This concern could urge as opposition to specific arms sales proposals from the liberal side of both Houses. It is most likely to produce real debate over the F-18L request, if and when it is submitted to Congress. SECRET

Drafted: NEA/IRN/CWNaa/MLGreuna/RWBualesimrc 1/3/77 x20574 Clearances: NEA = Mr. Atherton PH = Mr. Koeno H = Mr. Flaton D/HA = Mr. Hill NEA/RA = Mr. Holly SECRET THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20605 Intelligence Community Staff Jack C. M.klos, Esquire Chargeé d'Affaires, a.i. American Embassy Tehran, Iran Deà lr. Miklos: Ambassador Little, in his letter of August 9, 1976, informed Ambassador Helms of the conduct of FOCUS Iran, describing its nature and scope and inviting participation of the Mission. I am pleased to advise you that FOCUS Iran now completed, and I include the original copy of the final report for your information and use. The FOCUS Iran report is a comprehensive one. We noted during the conduct of the review that, and this is elected in the report, Washington interest in Embassy Iran was exceptionally high. Since the interests of policymakers and analysts are so vast and varied, we believe that a limited prioritized list of items of national intelligence interest could be helpful to you. Ambassador Little will provide you such a list in the near future. You will note criticism of the reluctance of the MAAG to provide available information to Intelligence Community representatives in Tehran so that this information can get into national intelligence channels. I am told that the situation is now much improved; however, we do plan to discuss this with appropriate officials in the Department of Defense. This situation varies from one mission to another, but this is the fourth occasion in which the problem has surfaced in FOCUS reviews.

Since its beginning two years ago, we continue to find FOCUS helpful to those of us here in Washington concerned with reporting from abroad. We hope to extend the value of these efforts to overseas missions which have such a key role in the overall national intelligence process. FOCUS Iran has been helpful to us; we hope it can be helpful to you and your country team. I invite your comments on this FOCUS report either now or after you receive the follow-on package from Ambassador Little. SECRET If you see any way in which we can strengthen our support of your Embassy, please let us know. Sincerely, E. H. Knoche Acting Director Enclosure:FOCUS Iran FOCUS:ran Attached are the findings of an interagency review of reporting by the various elements of the Intelligence Community and the department's and agencies in Iran. The reviews of reporting from overseas missions are conducted by the Human Resources Committee with a view to enhancing the effective management, coordination, and action of reporting programs in both the field and washing the level. The 2000s review is in two parts. Part I assesses the substance of reporting, i.e., its adequacy, appropriateness and timeliness, and its responsiveness to the information needs of Washington policy officers and the intelligence Community. The Reporting Assessment is written by the National Intelligence Officer concerned on the basis of an interagency seminar in which intelligence analysts and policy officers participate. For those aspects the process is to be finished in consensus is to be reached, provision is made for dissenting views to be recorded. Part II, the Action Review, (1) examines reporting processes and opportunities identified by or arising out of the Reporting Assessment and (2) develops agreed or recommended follow up action. Its objectives in so doing are to suggest ways of improving coordination at the Washington level and provide information and findings designed to assist Ambassadors in the overall supervision of field reporting programs and resources. The Action Review is based upon an Assessments Subcommittee discussion of written comments provided by Washington reporting managers, and an examination of the Reporting Assessment against the

SECRET background of past activities of field reporting elements, the reporting environment involved, the adequacy of reporting guidelines, and related matters affecting the utilization, management, and coordination of field reporting programs. The Human Resources Committee would welcome comments or suggestions regarding the FOCUS program. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20608 National Intelligence Officers 4 November 1976 MEOFANDUM FOR: Ambassador Edward S. Little, Chairman Human Resources Committee FROM : David H. Blee National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East SUBJECT : Part I. Reporting Assessment -- FOCUS Iran 1. Introduction. An interagency seminar was convened on 14 October 1976 under my chairmanship to consider the substance of reporting from our Mission in Iran -- its adequacy, appropriateness, timeliness, and responsiveness to the information needs of Washington policy officers and the Intelligence Community. Over forty persons participated, representing several bureaus in State, the NSC Staff, USIA, DOD/ISA, various offices of CIA and DIA, the military services, NSA, Treasury, and the Intelligence Community Staff. A list of participating offices is at Tab A. The seminar discussion, which forms a principal basis for this report, lasted some three hours and followed fairly closely the extensive agenda found at Tab B. Ambassador Helms has been invited to participate in the FOCUS exercise, and Lt. Colonel Patrick, my assistant, will discuss FOCUS further with the Mission in Tehran in the near future. Ambassador Helms' comments and suggestions will be considered most carefully, especially in the next phase of the FOCUS Review. 2. General Comments. No attempt has been made to summarize the discussion of all the agenda and other topics; instead, I have chosen to highlight selected issues, particularly some that suggest a need for followup activity either in the Mission or here in Washington. In discussing information topics and current and prospective reporting, we have tried to consider in at least a general way the priority of the information concerns and their impact on the US and its programs.

3. Generally speaking, reporting from the Mission on most topics is very satisfactory. Many of the information and analysis problems which do exist stem from the nature of the Iranian power structure. Since the Shah is close to being an absolute monarch, it is important to ask what he really thinks, as distinct from what he states for the benefit of particular audiences. Reports of discussions that Ambassador Helms and other high-ranking American officials have with the Shah are helpful in this regard, particularly when they include subjective comments by the reporter. 4. Regional Concerns. Reporting on Iran's relations with most of its neighbors has been good, not only from Mission Tehran, but also from the U.S. Missions in the other countries. For example, reporting on RadioIranian relations has been excellent, although expanded coverage of relations and discussions about economic concerns and mutual security arrangements would be useful. There has been extensive reporting on Iran's relations with Oman, and quite adequate coverage of relations with the countries of Asia. As a longer range issue, on-going Mission assessment and analysis on this subject of Iranian concerns in the Indian Ocean was would be welcome. 5. Two special concerns are Israel and Iraq. The concerns is of similar participants is that Mission reporting from Tehran provides an accurate view of Israeli-Iranian relations. This relationship will continue to be an important subject and one on which information is most readily obtained from the Iranian side. 6. Our problems in assessing Iranian-Iraqi relations are complicated by the absence of an Embassy in Baghdad; this necessitates relying on very heavy upon reporting from the Mission in Iran. There was excellent coverage during the period of the Iraqi-Kurdish fighting, but current reporting is sparse even regarding the Iranian side of the equation. It was not [?] that we could compensate for our existing technical collection limitations and our need to reissue the human resource area on information provided by SAVAK by increased Mission analyses of Iraqi-Iranian relationships. A more basic concern, voiced by a number of reporting users, with that Washington does not have a clear perception of the Shah's long-range objectives. For example, why is he acquiring such a vast array of sophisticated military hardware? The Shah states that adequate defenses against Communist-equipped Iraq are merely precautionary, yet the placement of new bases suggests other interests. In 1985 when oil revenues from Iranian production have peaked and his oil rich neighbors are just across the Gulf, what does the Shah intend to do with his accumulated weaponry? Will he still claim and demonstrate concern for the stability of the area? Or will he have destabilizing objectives? Expanded country-team efforts to assess the Shah's long-range objectives and to identify long-term trends in the Persian Gulf region are needed as well as a parallel stress on analysis among the Washington community. 8. Other foreign relations. The Mission has given high priority to watching the development of relationships with the Soviets and has done a fine job in reporting on this subject. On Iranian foreign relations reporting in general, we're expected by participants included: (1) a need for Washington's support to agree to a common regularly updated priority listing of Mission reporting requirements; (2) the value of reporting on reactions from a diversity of sources including middle-level environmental employees in international relations; and (3) the requirement for full Mission reporting of Iranian economic, scientific and defense relations with France, the UK, and all the EEC countries. State and other agencies following international narcotics matters also urged increased reporting on narcotics trafficking by all appropriate elements of the Embassy. 9. R. R. 10. Domestic Situation. Not only do we need further reflections on what is behind the Shah's words and actions, but also additional information and field analysis is needed as to how decisions are formed and who is fundamental in implementing them. In this regard, it is particularly to start to know what subjects are withheld from the Shah and the degree to which reports to him are doctored by his subordinates. To what extent do such practices warp his perspective, isolate him, and imperil his regime? It should be noted that several recent Embassy airgrams -- on decision making, the 15 top people around the Shah, and the top military officials -- represent the kind of reporting that is particularly helpful. However, State analysts were among those who stated that they do not have adequate information and field analysis regarding succession to the throne. What are the mechanics? Who will be the leading actors? How will the Shah's pet projects -- including the economic development programs -- be affected by his departure?

11. The biographic reporting program needs to be re-emphasized. What is particularly needed is not just biographic data, but biographic analysis and intelligence. Such reporting should concentrate on potentially important leaders, including senior military officers and the key members of the royal family. Some better way to tap the experience of U.S. Security Assistance Officials and to acquire existing reporting containing information on and impressions of Iranian military officials is one suggestion for alleviating this weakness. Additionally, an effort must be made in Washington to share and disseminate within the Intelligence Community available biographic analyses. 12. Reporting on terrorism has been good, although we remain dependent on information provided by SAVAK. There is a continuing need for more first hand information about opposition elements. While it is a politically difficult and sensitive matter for Embassy officials to meet with identified opponents of the Shah, the Mission should have the widest possible range of contacts. 13. A batter understanding is needed of how ordinary Iranians perceive their situations. For example, when the anti-corruption and anti-inflation campaigns began, the Mission provided good reporting of the effects of these drives on Iranian businessmen. Such reporting has diminished; periodic updates are needed. Similarly, we need more first hand information on the grassroots impact of the economic development plans. Have there been tangible economic gains at the village level? 14. Other matters discussed include the need to obtain a better understanding of SAVAK, its internal functioning, political reliability, and influence on the Shah. Related to information about SAVAK are questions concerning its methods and the human rights situation in Iran. Reporting from the Mission has been quite good, but even better coverage is needed in view of continuing Congressional interest. 15. Economic Concerns. There is, of course, a wide array of economic reporting from the Mission, much of it very helpful. The obvious bottlenecks to economic development are being covered well (e.g., needs for skilled manpower, ports, etc.). More in depth reporting on the industry-wide development of key industrial sectors (e.g., steel, petrochemicals, copper) would be appreciated. The competition between the military and the civilian sectors for scarce skilled manpower and the impact of such competition on both military preparedness and the civilian economy requires special reporting emphasis. Qualitative aspects of manpower and the efficacy of training efforts also require expanded investigation. 16. The Iranians share information with us regarding future alternatives to oil as an energy source. Regarding oil pricing strategies, CIA/DDO reporting is especially useful, as it provides data going beyond the comments of Iranian officials. A Treasury representative advised that more information from the National Iranian Oil Company planners and technicians would be useful, particularly on plans and strategies for the oil industry. Similarly, data is needed on the development of natural gas reserves and on prospects for further exports. There has been good reporting regarding the barriering of oil to the U.S. for goods, but bordering arrangements with the U.K. (and others) have not been so adequately reported. Oil sales and transshipment data involving Israel has been less adequately reported since the 1973 war but it is still needed in Washington. 17. Military and S&T. Considerable concern was expressed during the seminar discussions by military analysts about the lack of reliable information within the Intelligence Community about the capabilities of the Iranian armed forces. Basic OS and TOE&D data is simply not available. Moreover, appraisals of the military threat and prevailing regional balance of forces are also lacking despite the substantial US military presence in Iran. There has been some good Defense Attache Office reporting on military training, and additional data from U.S. companies training Iranians on equipment provided (e.g., on helicopters) has been instructive. Better data is needed on Iranian construction of ports and bases. Unfortunately, Security Assistance Organization training reports, trip reports regarding visits to Iranian bases, and similar data are not now routinely reaching the intelligence analysts in Washington. 18. Excellent reports have been received about Iran's nuclear development plans. Any indications that the Iranians are proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons would of course be particularly important. 19. Most information now available about military coproduction or possible third-country transfers of hardware is that provided by the companies themselves or filed with the Munitions Control Board. We have inadequate information to allow independent judgments on such matters. It is particularly difficult to assess the possible transfer of sophisticated U.S. technology licensed to Iran. The Mission should continue to monitor reporting on military production to be sure it does not fall between the military and economic reporting sections. 20. Considerations for the Future. A number of suggestions for increasing reporting coverage were raised by seminar participants. I recommend that they be considered further by the HRC Staff, in consultation with appropriate Washington collection managers. -- An additional Embassy officer (possibly a political/ military officer) would be helpful in assuring a more systematic Mission effort to keep track of significant dealings with the Iranian Government by U.S. contractors and other businesses. This

officer also might take the lead in the drafting of periodic country-team assessments of the significance of the full range of U.S. activities in Iran and their impact on the Government of Iran, on the Iranian citizenry, and on U.S. foreign policy objectives. -- The potential of the Security Assistance Organization needs to be more fully utilized. Reports of contacts with Iranians, training reports, trip reports, and the like should routinely be more available to the DAO and through that notice to the Washington community. -- Exchange students, teachers, missionaries, etc. who live for a time in Iran should be debriefed periodically on a selected basis for information acquired via their normal activities. Perhaps the political/military officer mentioned above might do that in Tehran; CIA/DC could follow up in the United States. A full list of U.S. businesses known to be doing substantial business in Iran should be made available both to the Mission and to interested analysts in Washington. Analysts could then be encouraged to use such a regularly revised list as a key to the preparation of tailored requirements for CIA/DCD collection activity in the United States. The list also would facilitate efforts by the Mission to keep track of U.S. businesses in Iran. 21. Prioritized Information Needs. I will be available to work with your Human Resources Committee to develop a list of specific prioritized information needs requiring Mission attention in the mid-term future. David H. Blee National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East PARTICIPANTS IN SEMKAR NAME CU N.L PM S/NM 1\pm3 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY defend intelligence utrigor DC AH NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Other DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ISAICSArmyNavyAir Force TREASURY CIA DDI/OCR iDDI/OCR DDI/OSR DDI/OPR DDI/OER DDI/FD DDI/FBIS DDS4T/NED DDO/NE DDO/Plans INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

FOCUS IRAN - AGENDA 1. Evaluation of the substance of reporting on the following significant issues: A. REGIONAL CONCERNS 1. Progress toward achievement of an Iranian-sponsored mutual security part of the Persian Gulf littoral states. Will such a pact ultimately exclude the US from the region or imperial the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf? 2. Status of Iranian relations with Saudi Arabia. Does Iran expect subversion and/or overthrow of the governments of Saudi Arabia or Kuwait within the foreseeable future? If threatened, would the Arab regimes head the Shah's harmonions or accept Iranian aid? 3. Effort: by the Government of Iran to pressure Bahrain into altering its position on a ling MIDEASTFOR in 1977. 4. Indications that the Shah intends to alter the Iranian presence in main -- either withdrawing his forces or moving to make their presence permanent. What is the extent and nature of Iran's bilateral security ties with Oman; do they include policing the Strait of Hormuz and future joint military cooperation? Is there a common policy concerning "innocent passage" for vessels entering and leaving the Gulf? Does Iran seek to establish a permanent operational base in Oman in order to project its power into either the Indian Ocean or Red Sea? 5. Maintenance of the Iran-Iraq accord of March 1975. Are there any indications that Tehran is reviving the Kurdish war or permitting guerrilla operations in Iraqi Kurdistan to be staged from Iran? Is Talabani's Kurdish National Union having any success in recruiting either Iraqi Kurdish refugees or Iranian Kurds? 6. Status of Iraqi-backed subversionary efforts in Iran. Is Baghdad providing support for terrorist operations by fedayeen elements operating inside Iran? What is the nature and extent of Iraqi support being provided to Iranian terrorist groups? Is Baghdad promoting dissidence among the Baluch tribesmen or Arab inhabitants of Khuzistan? 7. Status of Iranian relations with Pakistan and India. Is Iran still committed to the maintenance of the present state of Pakistan? Has Tehran altered its policy of abstaining from any direct involvement in Pakistan's Baluchistan problem? Has Baluchi unrest seeped into southeastern Iran? 8. Status of Iranian participation in CENTO, the RCD and other regional cooperation efforts. 9. Extent and nature of bilateral irritants between Iran and Afghanistan. Have there been any significant changes in Iran's aid program for Kabul? Has such aid had any success in either moderating Afghani policies toward Pakistan or diluting Soviet influence in Afghanistan? SECRET MFORN 10. Progress toward implementation of the envisioned Iran-South Africa-Australia defense triangle in the Indian Ocean. Are contracts being implemented to effect the concept? Has Iran taken additional steps to gain access to the ex-British base on Gan Island? B. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION 1. Changes in Iran's policy of maintaining discreet but good relations with Israel in political, economic and military matters. Is Iran maintaining its liaison with Israel relative to technical and military intelligence? What is the current level and price of oil shipments to Israel? Is Iranian oil continuing to be transshipped through the Israeli pipeline? 2. Status of Iran's relationships both with Arab moderates and more radical elements -- including the PLO. 'Have there been significant changes in Tehran's associations with the Arab world, and what would be the likely regional effects of such changes? Do Iranian-Arab aid and trade patterns and joint ventures presage an increase in economic interdependence within the region? 3. Expansion of Irano-Egyptian ties and their impact on Tehran's relations with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel and the US. What is the status of Iranian military training programs for Egyptian personnel? What is Iran receiving in return for such training? C. SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIPS 1. Status of Iranian relations with the USSR. Has there been any noticeable increase in Soviet influence? Have the amounts or terms of communist economic and military assistance changed? Are there outstanding border disagreements? Are overflight rights for the USSR being continued? Are the terms of the natural gas exchange agreement being observed by both parties? 2. Status of relations with the US. Have there been any changes in the pattern of Iranian investments of surplus oil revenues in the US and other Western nations? Has Tehran undertaken any actions to restrict its domestic market for US goods and services? 3. Status of US nationals in Iran. Has the growing number of US military and contractor personnel impacted adversely on Iranian attitudes toward the US? Are there any indications that the Government of Iran intends to take any actions that might alter the existing MAAG agreement or jeopardize US communications, AEDS or covert facilities? Does Iran contemplate withdrawing its extension of rights to the US for temporary deployment of US Navy P-3s to Bandar Abbas? 4. Moves toward the development of a more independent foreign policy. What sentiment is there for assuming a neutral posture in world affairs? Are there plans for reducing Iranian dependency upon the US or for curtailing US influence in Iran? SEC KFORN

SECRET NOFORN D. DOMESTIC CONCERNS 1. Level of internal disillusion. Are the terrorists having any success in attracting adherents? Do the government's press policies impact on the terrorists' public image? How successful is SAVAK's anti-terrorism campaign; does the Shah appear satisfied with SAVAK's efforts? Has the murder of US nationals given rise to any manifestations of anti-Americanism among the general populace? 2. Suppression of infiltration efforts by communist and other radical groups. what are the major anti-regime elements and from whom do they receive backing -- Iraq, Libya, USSR, Cuba, FIO? 3. Status of the Shah's anti-corruption and anti-inflation campaigns. Have new regulations been effected to implement the Shah's policies? Are they enforceable and likely to stop existing corruption and profiteering? 4. Indications of improved (or worsened) income distribution in Iran. Have there been tangible economic gains at the village level? What is the political impact of growing economic awareness among the populace? E. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 1. Status of the current development plan, including both industrial and agricultural efforts. What is the impact of labor, port and other infra-structural problems on development efforts? Are the government's remedial actions having any effect? Are cutbacks in investment goals for developmental projects likely? 2. Lack of a trained/trainable manpower base. Can Iran sustain a high rate of economic growth with its limited technological base? Are the Iranian people accepting the influx of foreigners needed to implement development plans? 3. Development of cost effective alternatives to oil as an energy source. What is the status of plans for the development of a national petrochemical industry as an alternative to oil production? Is the planned installation of atomic energy reactors proceeding on schedule? What are Iran's plans for stockpiling and for carrying out cooperative nuclear programs with other countries? 4. Oil pricing strategies. What are Iran's plans for protecting its oil income from the effects of world inflation and rising commodity costs? Are there any indications that the government may radically alter its agreement with the consortium? 5. Changes in current foreign investment strategies. Who are the key financial experts and what is their influence on government policies? Have there been any significant changes in the relationship between the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance? SEC NOFORN 6. New directions being considered relative to military coproduction and third-country transfers. What are Iran's plans for participating in the development of regional arms industries in conjunction either with Arab states, Turkey or Pakistan? Have there been changes to Iran's indigenous R&D technological development strategies? F. INTERNAL POWER STRUCTURE 1. The Shah's ability to strengthen his power base. Have there been any changes in the personality patterns of the Shah; what are their implications for his political behavior? What is the nature of the Iranian elite and what is its impact on the regime? 2. Identification of top military officers that would most likely play key roles in any transference of power if the Shah were to be killed. What are the political views and what government and royal family members are they close to? 3. Shah's relationship with and plans for the Rastakhiz party. Is the party able to exercise discipline over its members? Are changes in the party leadership forthcoming? Will changes in the leadership impact on either the party's policies or influence? 4. Current strength and disposition of the Tudeh party. Who are the key Tudeh leaders and from where do they operate? What are the principal sources of aid for the party? Are there links between the Tudeh and active terrorist groups operating within Iran? To what extent are Tudeh recruitment efforts successful among Iranian students abroad? G. MILITARY AFFAIRS 1. Expansion and modernization of existing military forces. What steps are being taken to maintain and strengthen Iran's forces vis-a-vis Iraq? Have changes in the mobilization base impacting on the armed forces' adequacy and responsiveness occurred? Have combat deficiencies noted during the Dhofar campaign led to any reappraisal of military needs and objectives? 2. Changes in top level military leadership ranks. Have any changes affecting Iran's basic western orientation occurred? Is there evidence of collus between top military leaders and foreign contractors? 3. Indications of an Iranian decision to undertake nuclear weapons development. Are there any signs that Iran plans to violate the provisions of the Nucle Non-Proliferation Treaty? 4. Expansion of port facilities and military installations in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. What military steps are being taken to exercise control over the entrance to the Persian Gulf? Are any changes in attitude anticipated relative to Iran's occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tumb islands?

SEC1 NOFORN II. Identification of current reporting strengths and deficiencies: II. Identification of current reporting strengths and deficiencies: A. Within the Mission. B. External to the Mission. III. Mission assessment of the support provided it by the Intelligence Community. IV. Conclusions and recommendations for future reporting. SFCFET 27 December 1976 FOCUS Iran Part II: Action Review I. \underline{\text{INTRODUCTION}} : The Assessments Subcommittee reviewed the Reporting Assessment (Part I) in its meeting on 30 November 1976. Represented were the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Middle East, the Department of State, CIA, DIA, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Intelligence Community Staff. Part II summarizes the general conclusions, observations and recommendations of the Assessments Subcommittee and includes agency comments about issues which emerged during the course of the Review. The Subcommittee was advised that comments from Embassy Tehran on possible areas of interest to the Mission had not been received and are therefore not reflected in the Review. The Assistant National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East visited the Embassy, however, and discussed a draft of the Reporting Assessment informally with Mission Officers. No outstanding reporting problems or issues were identified at that time. II. CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION: A. Concurrence in Reporting Assessment. The Subcommittee concurs in the Reporting Assessment's judgment that reporting from Embassy Tehran on most topics is satisfactory and that many of the information and analysis problems which do exist stem from the nature of the Iranian power structure.

[?] B. The Shah as a Source of Information. In discussing key information from Iran, Department of State analysts observe: "The Shah has ruled for 35 years. In view of our long-standing close ties, his consistency (beneath all the stagecraft) and his candor (within the Persian context), we know quite a bit about his aims and tactics. He is likely to see it in his interest to keep us an courant in the future. Given the nature of his state, we will remain largely dependent on his soliloquies and on the ability of our Ambassador and others to pose penetrating questions. Realistically, we should not expect to get significantly more information from him than we are receiving now." The CIA suggests that: "It would be useful to have alternate sources of information about the Shah. Of only slightly lesser importance are similar comments on the individuals close to the throne--those who advise the Shah, execute his will on vital matters, protect his life, bring him information, etc." C. "Memcon" Reporting. Department of State representatives suggest that "The Embassy should be encouraged to continue the flow of memoranda of conversation (memcons) and informal ambiance reportage". The Subcommittee underscores the value of such less formally structured reporting to Washington policy officers. It notes, however, that experience in this and other FOCUS Reviews demonstrates that Foreign Service memcons are normally not made available to interested analysts outside of the Department of State. The State member agreed to raise this issue with responsible officials in the Department of State and request their assistance in seeking a resolution of this difficulty. D. Information from Nonofficial Americans in Iran. Paragraph 20 of the Reporting Assessment urges increased efforts on the part of the Mission to obtain information about Iranian developments from the many American exchange students, teachers, missionaries and businessmen in Iran. The Department of State member observes that the Mission already maintains contact with nonofficial Americans in Iran. Other Subcommittee members who note that there are special restrictions on (operational) intelligence contacts with missionaries and certain categories of exchange students. They believe that concerns about overt and social and normal Embassy interactions with American citizens, especially businessmen, can be overdrawn. The Subcommittee believes that the Ambassador is in the best position to weigh the opportunities and potential risks involved in collection efforts in this normally difficult and sensitive area. [?] E. Identities of American Businessmen. The Subcommittee agrees that a list of U.S. businessmen known to be doing substantial business in Iran might be useful to the Mission and certainly would be useful in Washington. Analysts could use such a list as a guide in preparing more precisely stated requirements for the efforts of CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DCD) in the United States. The Department of State member notes in this respect that "Section 36 (A) (7) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires the President to include in his quarterly reports to Congress, an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens present in each foreign country at the end of each quarter for assignment in implementation of sales under the Foreign Military Sales Program and commercial exports license or approved by the Office of Munitions Control". F. Military Reporting. The Subcommittee believes that the Reporting Assessment overstates the need for additional order of battle information. CIA notes that "basic OR and TO&E data are not available for certain units, such as the Imperial Guards Division." DIA points out that during the past 18 months some 130 reports had been received on military order of battle (10.8 percent of all DIA intelligence reports from DAO Iran). CIA analysts, however, have asked for additional information on overall capabilities of armed forces and military contingency planning as well as force development planning in the 1973-1978 time frame. The NIO, who attended the Part II discussions, agreed that it is not that basic data are not available but that there are important gaps, a point that is concurred in by DIA and CIA. DIA holdings support the need for more data on Iranian military bases but reflect inadequately stated requirements for information on these installations. In responding to requests for improved biographic reporting, DIA states: "Biographic reporting received on Iran amounted to 6 percent of total reporting (vs. about 12 percent for overall DIA biographic report receipts). It should be recognized that our analytical resources are limited and that biographics remain a relatively low priority for DoD, other targets considered. There is, however, close and continuing coordination between DIA biographic analysts and the CIA Office of Central Reference (OCR), which has authority to task the Defense Attache System through DIA. We appreciate the need for improvement in analysis by the field collectors with respect to biographic reporting. We will, therefore, highlight this need in our 15 December 1975 DlAgram to collectors in which we will ask for the reason why a particular biographic report is being prepared, and request judgmental information on the where of influence and authority exercised by the key military leaders reported on."

SECRET G. Security Assistance Organization Information. The Subcommittee believes that this major official U.S. organization in Iran is in possession of extensive information about the Iranian armed forces, military bases and personalities--acquired during the normal course of its business--which has not been readily available to intelligence analysts in Washington who could use it. DIA states that it has addressed this continuing information problem with both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Attacks Office in Tehran and notable improvements in the working relationship between the MAAG and the DAO in Tehran have occurred in recent months. This is the fourth FOCUS Review, however, in which the Subcommittee has called attention to this issue. It recommends that the Intelligence Community Staff pursue the matter on a priority basis with the appropriate authorities in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. H. Additional Staffing. The Reporting Assessment suggests the need for the assignment of an additional reporting officer to Embassy Tehran. Department of State officials do not share the justification as stated in the Assessment. Treasury notes that the economic section is tent and fully utilized, but overextended. The Committee does not concur in the suggestion. It believes that Washington collection managers and the Chiefs of Mission concerned are best qualified to determine the extent to which judgments and findings contained in this or other FOCUS reports provide useful contributions to management decisions with regard to staffing for which they are responsible. I. Follow on Guidance. The Subcommittee recommends that the Human Resources Committee working closely with the National Intelligence Officer and Washington policy officers draw up a prioritized list of national information needs for transmittal to the Mission. David J. Carpenter (Department of State) Chairman, Assessments Subcommittee SECRET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Human Resources Committee HRC-C-77-04317 MAY 1977 Office of the Chairman The Honorable William H. Sullivan American Ambassador Tehran Dear Mr. Ambassador: Biel In transmitting the FOCUS Iran Review to Charge d'Affaires Jack Miklos in January, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence indicated that a limited prioritized list of items of national intelligence interest would be provided to the Embassy. Attached is the promised list developed by the Human Resources Committee with the advice of the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Since the list is concise, no order of prioritization is indicated. This guidance is being provided to you separately from the FOCUS Review, and it may appear rather skeletal in form. We hope, however, it will be of some use to you as a coordinated interagency expression of the most important Washington information needs. More detailed guidance is provided on a regular basis through departmental channels. As we gain experience in the FOCUS Program, we are hopeful that these assessments of human source reporting and the reporting guidance which flows from them will simplify and facilitate the work of the overseas missions. I would welcome any comments that you may have on any of these matters. Sincerely. Ambassador Edward S. Little Attachment: Guidance Package SECRET 664986 Extradition at the 17th C.C.C. Extreme acostimation on Date Impossible to Determine

GUIDANCE: IRAN The following is a list of general topics of interest to the intelligence and foreign affairs communities. I. Political A. \underline{\text{Internal}} 1. Long-range objectives and policies of the Shah and his key advisors, both civilian and military. 2. How and by whom major political, national security and economic decisions are made. 3. The role SAVAK plays in the government. 4. The Government of Iran's involvement in human rights violations. B. External 1. Sources of foreign military threat to Iran. 2. The balance of forces in the region as it affects Iran. 3. Relations with the Soviet Union and the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iraq. II. Economic A. Economic development programs, especially the National Iranian Oil Company strategy and sales policies. B. Plans being formulated for nuclear development. III. Military capabilities of the Royal Iranian Armed Forces. \(P_{1}=1 INDICATE CO L L EET CN A G E TO 2233 3 0512152 APR 77 POL/M:RAMartin (draft)

Part I - Policy Assessments A. US Interests in Iran 1. The United States and Iran were drawn together at the end of World War II through a mutual interest in containing Soviet expansionist policies. (Northwestern Iran was occupied by the Soviet Union at that time.) US-Iran relations have been animated by this shared interest ever since, and a number of cooperative arrangements were made to promote the achievement and maintenance of this common goal. At a time when we were in a position to do so we placed a security shield around Iran through a bilateral commitment to come to Iran's defense if it were attacked by the USSR or its communist allies. We also associated ourselves with the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) in part for the same purpose. Concurrently, we undertook an extensive program of economic, technical and military assistance to enable Iran to defend its own interests and develop its resources in an environment of internal stability and economic and social reform. Many of these programs achieved their purpose and were terminated. The only arrangement of major significance still continuing is in the military assistance field, with the US providing arms and technical support now paid for fully by Iran. On its part, strategically-placed Iran provides us the sites for valuable and not easily replaceable intelligence and SECRET Classification communications, as well as assumed overflight rights through our only safe and available East-West air corridor in this part of the world. 2. In the meantime the quality and nature of the relationship has evolved, although its underlying purpose remains essentially the same. As Iran developed, began to prosper, and to gain confidence in its own capabilities, the US expected and asked Iran to play a more active role in the regional and international arenas. In large measure the Iran has been responsive within/ framework of what the Shah, Iran's principal policymaker, sees as a "special relationship" comparable in some respects and for much the same reasons to the US relationship with NATO and Israel. At our request Iran participated in the four-power commission in Vietnam and provided our South Vietnamese ally with military equipment. More recently it sent a military contingent for truce supervision duties on the Golan Heights. At our behest it has provided financial assistance to Egypt and a number of other needy countries in which we have a shared interest. Iran has been a major contributor to IFAD and was responsible for providing the final increment which met US conditions for participating. Iran has also played a moderating supportive role in regional affairs, conciliating local disputes and helping Oman put down a communist-supported insurgency in Oman's SECRET Clarification

southern region. In sum, commensurate with its ability and influence, it has played a constructive and helpful role in matters of direct US concern. Over the foreseeable future principal US interests in Iran are as follows: (a) Maintaining a stable, independent non-communist and cooperative Iran which has the strength and will to resist potential Soviet aggressiveness, whether direct or indirect, and to continue its role for stability in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and South Asia; (b) Safeguarding a reliable source of petroleum to the West, Japan, and Israel at as low a price as possible (a priority consideration for NEA area-wide policy), bearing in mind the limited leverage we possess on Iranian price positions; (c) Fostering greater Iranian support for the Carter Administration's emphasis on improved human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and restraint with respect to conventional arms transfers; (d) Maintaining US access to the Iranian portion of the vital Turkish-Iranian air corridor (and access to Iranian ports for US vessels) in support of our shared security interests; (e) Maintaining use of Iranian territory for special intelligence and communications facilities which could not be relocated elsewhere without a significant loss of effectiveness (f) Maintaining access on favorable terms for American goods and services to the rapidly growing Iranian market, as well as continuing US-Iranian financial cooperation; B. Overview 1. Two of Iran's basic policies most directly shaped by its proximity to the Soviet Union and its assessment of Soviet intentions are its military modernization program and repression of internal communist activity. These are also two policies most likely to be brought into question by the new Administration's emphasis on limiting transfer of conventional arms and on human rights. Lack of agreement in either area is certain to influence adversely the measure of success we have in furthering our other interests in Iran and, to some degree, in the region. (g) Maintaining an effective and cooperative dialogue with Iran on a host of multilateral economic and political questions such as North-South economic cooperation, Arab-Israel relations, arms control, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf issues, and Law of the Sea; (h) Encouraging greater Iranian cooperation in our worldwide anti-narcotics efforts. 2. Our aging security commitment to Iran is no longer credible. With US encouragement Iran has seen its only SECRET Classification

viable alternative as military self-sufficiency--although it has no illusions that it would ever be in a position singlehandedly to deter direct Soviet aggression. Thus it has embarked on a large-scale and expensive military modernization program and the acquisition of highly sophisticated weapons systems, principally from the United States. It measures its need against its assessment of potential threat from its neighbor, particularly the USSR and Iraq, and the kind of military establishment it requires to defend its borders and their approaches from any direction. 3. The question of what may moderate Iran's military build-up is key. The Shah has already indicated that if the US cuts off arms supplies he will turn elsewhere. Recent significant purchases from other countries, including the Soviet Union, lend substance to his determination. Full success in curtailing Iran's arms acquisition program, therefore, can only be achieved by a general moratorium of arms transfers to the area by all arms suppliers. In our judgment unilateral efforts will not achieve such a purpose. 4. Between the extremes of a total cut-off and unlimited supply, however, we believe there is room for maneuver. The outcome will be influenced by how effectively and persuasively we can move toward reaching SECRET OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H) (Form 175 F 413(H)al January 1975 Depth of State 160) I would agreement with Iran on the use of the amount and future threats and on which is required to put them. In any respects this consideration purposes to build to the US-Israeli model. It would involve not only a possible examination of the regional political military environment but also a methodical examination of Iran's financial and human resources, its infrastructure and its absorptive capacity. Such a course of action would require dedication of technically will of personnel not presently committed at either the Washington or Tehran ends. It would also ensure a capability and willingness on the Iranian side not yet rested fully. However, in the absence of such an effort, unilateral UG decisions to cut back supply to Iran would be interpreted in a lowering of the interest in the use of the U.S. and, with the latter 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 21. 2. 2. 2.

tradition although it has been in the vanguard of certain human rights, such as religious freedom, cherished in the West. Land reform, mass education, women's rights, and other social and economic reforms have only recently (in the 1960's and 1970's) been introduced against exten- sive conservative opposition. There seems little doubt these that even/ine limited advances would not have been achieved in the absence of the strong and determined leadership of the Shah and his father before him. Within these same few decades the Shah has been challenged by both the communist-supported Left and the land-owning, conservative Moslem Right, and on several occasions brought to the verge of collapse which would have probably entailed a reversal of Iran's pro-Western orientation. 6. Most recently, Iran has had to contend with small but dedicated and loosely-knit congeries of Marxist- Moslem oppositionists who have resorted to terrorism and violence in attempts to overthrow the present order. There is evidence of outside support for these efforts. The regime has responded vigorously, although not always efficiently. Its successes have been mainly at the popular political and economic level by pre-empting the programs and policies any conceivable opposition might advocate and co-opting many potential oppositionists into legitimate activity. What remains is an opposition with few policy aims beyond a generalized desire to supplant the present leadership in power--a posture that does not evoke any wide popular support in Iran. The regime's attitude toward this opposition, which it con- siders to be mainly communist-oriented and/or inspired, is harsh and regulated by laws akin to those that were being advocated in the United States in the 1950's. Further, its civil court system is clogged and subject to much criticism for its inefficiencies. This situation, married to a mish-mash of Napoleonic and Islamic codes, results in the design of a judicial procedure to deal with security issues alien to Western (at least Anglo- Saxon) concepts of due process. There are probably about 3,500 "political prisoners" in Iran although Amnesty International and similar groups have claimed that there are up to 200,000. Among these the large majority have engaged in or conspired in acts of violence. What we confront, therefore, in advocating the adoption of human rights policies more attuned with our own concepts, is a fundamental difference in legal and attitudinal postures not unique to the present regime and deeply imbedded in the Iranian tradition. The present government is not indifferent to our concerns or unalterably opposed to change. We have seen a modicum of improvement in this area, and we believe we can expect more if we proceed SECRET Classification OPTIONAL FORM 152a(M) (Formerly FS-413(H)) January 1975 Dept. of State 162 SECRET Classification OPTIONAL FORM 152a(M) (Formerly FS-413(H)) January 1975 Dept. of State 163 50152.201

tradition although it has been in the vanguard of certain human rights, such as religious freedom, cherished in the West. Land reform, mass education, women's rights, and other social and economic reforms have only recently (in the 1960's and 1970's) been introduced against exten- sive conservative opposition. There seems little doubt these that even/ine limited advances would not have been achieved in the absence of the strong and determined leadership of the Shah and his father before him. Within these same few decades the Shah has been challenged by both the communist-supported Left and the land-owning, conservative Moslem Right, and on several occasions brought to the verge of collapse which would have probably entailed a reversal of Iran's pro-Western orientation. 6. Most recently, Iran has had to contend with small but dedicated and loosely-knit congeries of Marxist- Moslem oppositionists who have resorted to terrorism and violence in attempts to overthrow the present order. There is evidence of outside support for these efforts. The regime has responded vigorously, although not always efficiently. Its successes have been mainly at the popular political and economic level by pre-empting the programs and policies any conceivable opposition might advocate and co-opting many potential oppositionists into legitimate activity. What remains is an opposition with few policy aims beyond a generalized desire to supplant the present leadership in power--a posture that does not evoke any wide popular support in Iran. The regime's attitude toward this opposition, which it con- siders to be mainly communist-oriented and/or inspired, is harsh and regulated by laws akin to those that were being advocated in the United States in the 1950's. Further, its civil court system is clogged and subject to much criticism for its inefficiencies. This situation, married to a mish-mash of Napoleonic and Islamic codes, results in the design of a judicial procedure to deal with security issues alien to Western (at least Anglo- Saxon) concepts of due process. There are probably about 3,500 "political prisoners" in Iran although Amnesty International and similar groups have claimed that there are up to 200,000. Among these the large majority have engaged in or conspired in acts of violence. What we confront, therefore, in advocating the adoption of human rights policies more attuned with our own concepts, is a fundamental difference in legal and attitudinal postures not unique to the present regime and deeply imbedded in the Iranian tradition. The present government is not indifferent to our concerns or unalterably opposed to change. We have seen a modicum of improvement in this area, and we believe we can expect more if we proceed SECRET Classification OPTIONAL FORM 152a(M) (Formerly FS-413(H)) January 1975 Dept. of State 162 SECRET Classification OPTIONAL FORM 152a(M) (Formerly FS-413(H)) January 1975 Dept. of State 163 50152-201

quietly with persistence and patience in a non-confrontational manner. 7. Another area of difference concerns oil prices. Iran has consistently argued that (a) oil price rises have not contributed as much to the West's (or even LDC) economic woes as Western commentators say; (b) oil is a resource to be conserved and higher prices encourage development of alternative energy sources; while (c) Iran is justified in raising the price of its main export in view of rising prices for Western goods, both military and non-military. This is a position which Western arq- ments have not succeeded in eroding. Developments over the next few years (such as the present two-tier quarrel in OPEC) could conceivably lead to some chipping away of Iranian resolve. However, the Shah has taken the position that oil policy is an economic matter, not to be affected by political considerations. (He therefore refused to join in the 1973 Arab embargo and continues to be the major supplier of oil to Israel.) We can, and should, continue to present our viewpoint on oil prices (and supplies) on a regular basis, resting a continuing con- native dialogue with the [?] so that over time we might wrote those of their arguments for which we have effective counter-arguments. We should continue to study the world question of the total of since it is not at all conditions the people in the time of the un [?] their all good peace in life, on those days would otherwise occur on the open market. But on this issue as on others to have little to gain enough to lose by direct confrontation. It will no more effective to argue in friendly terms. B. Our evidence indicates that, in this sincerely convinced of the case for nuclear nonproliferation in Iran's case, it the same time, he is committed to a heavy investment in peaceful nuclear energy development and concerned to the current cigarette fuel on the future, Iran has already been excited about in South Africa, Zaire, and offshore for diversified sources of which is, it is not the same as it is to continue to be interested in our enrichment plants and similar technology, gauging the area of the area of the area with the UPG on worldwide nuclear or by the device of US cooperation it gains on its own common for assured supplies of fuel. 9. The US will be (strainally) the most export to Iran of non-military (as well as all) goods and services. The dip in 1976 to an average of 2.3 billion of non-military US exports to Iran 100,000 total to rise through the coming years to approximately its 1975 plateau of about 3.2 billion. The would expect it to remain around 3 billion over the next few years. 0

19. In relationship to economic and political questions Iran will probably continue to be torn between (a) caution to avoid collision with LDC interests on the one hand and (b) sensitivity to maintaining good relations with the major developed countries. In North-South Forums Iran is likely to support the LDC point of view, but its enthusiasm will vary from issue to issue. IFAD is another instrument which will be important to Iranian policy (particularly if IFAD headquarters end up in Tehran) while its role in older international bodies or groupings such as UNCTAD, GATT, and even the G-77 will continue more passive. 1. Iranian students in the US remain probably the largest contingent from any foreign country and can be expected to rise in number beyond the estimated 30,000 now there. This will not change the Iranian Government's jaundiced view of radical Iranian opposition activities in the US and Western Europe, but the issue should remain reasonably contained as long as both Iran and we keep it in the larger perspective of our overall relationship. 12. There are some additional policy aims of the USG in Iran such as winning Iranian cooperation for an effective program against opium production in neighboring countries, getting Iranian votes in UN bodies for a variety of USG positions, etc. However, these, along with the more major interests already mentioned, are mutually interdependent and derive from an overall climate of friendship and cooperation as it continues to be perceived by the Shah. C. Objectivos, Courseas of Action, and Issues 1. Our objectives are those outlined in Part A as US interests. Principal courses of action in support of these interests or objectives are as follows: (a) Continue the sale of conventional arms to Iran, attempting through closer technical consultation between the US and Iranian defense establishments to convince Iranian policymakers of their own interest in being more selective and drawing out the pace of arms modernization for more effective absorption. Emphasize our mutual interest in a strong, secure Iran through close consultations between the two governments, including adequate exposure of the Shah to the President and the Secretary of State, as well as frequent contacts at several levels involving high officials in Washington as well as the Ambassador and his staff in Tehran. Note at the same time the USG's basic commitment to a lower level of armaments throughout the world to which we hope and expect Iran will make its contribution. The chances of our achieving such a reduction of armaments will be enhanced to the extent that we can: (1) convince Iran of our continuing reliability as a supplier of needed arms SECRET Classification

support (including the U.S.) for lowering the level of arms transition, and (1) help to prove the security situation in the region and it is, through such possible developments as a core ratio of real armament (associated perhaps with an annual tax account) or a more meaningful Indian-Pakistani requirement. (Note in this application of a siebed at 100 a. m. of the Indian Ocean would not in it be a [?] ed Indian cooper about the future internal support here such as in this or Iraq.) The ARMS/UNA. System, even if parent down in numbers, should constitute the world's leading ship to the large numbers of U.S. and private technical personnel assisting Iran's military normalization through pressure paid for entirely by the Iranland. An increase in the personnel of the Embassy/SOP/UN, Section should help give direction to this effort. (b) Evince continuing US concern for human rights in Iran both in terms of Iran's image as a do not fully of the US and for Iran's own future stability in which the US is interested. Avoid ex cathedra demunications, or excessive USG support for critics of Iran's human rights situation, but work persistently with Iranian policymakers and the bureaucracy to identify areas in which liberalization of Iranian law or practice will not BICRIWT U162-1120100 Long run. (2) will be to make cause to us and to find a dialogue with others in the point of view, particularly if it is not to be a drop of focus on the use of the to the use of the focus of using with us), try to demonstrate, to allow to that to possible, that 'trashans or good, the shares of the total of the size of any form us (balancing rises up costs for military equipment and services are used to more to the price of non-Military imports), the choice to acquire, however, that there are limits to how to do the use of the U.S. and the U.S. continues to show no political discrimination in whom it qualifies for, to control on Israel or the legal), and (3) Iranian price is not significantly out of line with that children in the world. (d) Continue our dialogue with Iran to maintain GOI commitment to and assistance on non-proliferation matter, it should be in our interest to help assure Iran of a reliable supply of fuel for its growing peace- ful nuclear energy program. In return we should be able to call on Iran for assistance in disusing others from pursuing nuclear proliferation, as Iran has been useful in the past (e.g., with Pakistan). (a) Continue our intelligence cooperation with SECRET Cisaoatocn

I can so as to provide a continually improved joint product and demonstrate our continuing interest in Iran's security at a time when we shall be urging smaller, more selective purchases of arms. (f) Continue our strong support of private, non-military US commercial exports to Iran through our Embassy commercial officers, the US Trade Center, and special trade fairs or exhibits in support of our worldwide commercial programs. Continue a steady level of economic and financial reporting to keep up with changing trends in Iranian economic behavior or perceptions (e.g., US companies interested in possible barter agreements utilizing oil). Maintain our interest in Iranian agricultural production through Department of Agriculture representatives here, noting that continuing improvement in Iranian agricultural production assists the process of social as well as economic development, and thus political stability. (g) Continue an effective USIS cultural and information program as another means of assisting Iran's development, demonstrating undiminished US interest in Iran's future, and continuing to build ties with Iran's opinion leaders in education, information, and related fields which in the long run should markedly assist Iran's transition to a more democratic environment. SECRET Classification (h) also support greater people-to-people con- through the stream of Iranian visitors to the US The large number of Iranian students studying there. Adequate starting of the Embassy's visa services is required. (i) By the same token, adequate manning of American services and protection of US citizens are necessary to support the large American presence in Iran and avoid unnecessarily strain in people-to-people relations. (j) through more frequent exchanges with Iranian officials, in a variety of ministries and organizations, as well as the MPA, seek to win increasing Iranian support in international fora on both economic and political issues of continuing concern to the USG. A greater degree of Embassy officer time than in the past has been and will continue to be allocated to this task. (x) Maintain an adequate anti-narcotics program in Iran, through the agency of resident and visiting DEA agents, so as to continue gaining Iranian cooperation in limiting the production of opium in neighboring countries and the transit of drugs to the US, as well as minimizing drug problems among the American community. 2. Issues. (a) The most critical issue in our bilateral relationship is an early Washington decision as to the SECRW Clo OPTIONAL FGTO1500 (From: FGTO1500) Date: 2023-01-01

to the other. The view of the type of plan of the plan will be the same as the plan of the additional clock on the map. The plan of the day is really along the line of the order by discussion of the plan events of the year. (b) a role is will be the extent to which to the time when the United States announcement is expected to taking a more gradualist approach to a common response in the world. We believe the COR will put up with, and even corporate in, USG efforts to tobacco both efforts to and its performance, but US efforts in this line must always be perceived as those of a growing market, changing, if less on common side, and bear no risk no reschableness to Iranian memories of capitalistry and colonial policy use on Iran by Western governments in the past. (c) Early Washington attention to the question of accusing adequate, reliable nuclear fuel supply for countries like Iran which are embarking on ambitious nuclear energy development programs is a worthwhile goal in itself and should have the valuable side effect of ensuring active Iranian support for our worldwide nuclear homproliferation efforts. (d) Finally, a relatively minor issue is I'm a student in the school of science, which has been a significant part of my education. I am a student in the school of science, which has been a significant part of my education. I am a student in the school of science, which has been a significant part of my education. I am a student in the school of science, which has been a significant part of my education. I am a student in the school of science, which has been a significant

CONFIDENTIAL. Tehran A-124 Page two Background. Twice in this century attempts to emulate Western forms of representative government, multi-political parties, freedom of speech, and the right to dissent have been tried and failed in Iran. These are concepts that are essentially alien in this ancient monarchy. Loyalties and interests are traditionally in order of priority to family, tribe and only distantly to the monarch and the nation. Cooperation, group efforts, and working within institutions are not part of the Persian heritage and their absence accounts in substantial measure for past failures of Western political values to take root and grow. Dissent and opposition have been seen generally as attempts to over- throw the established regime and to frustrate its objectives. Nevertheless the notion is gaining strength that Iran is not an island unto itself and that it must accommodate to outside ideas and influences. One response has been to invite "constructive criticism" but keep it within manageable boundaries. Some intellectuals and conservatives had not found this a sufficiently adequate or satisfying outlet however. A kernel of the old fanatical religious groups have continued in being and the Shah's regime has constantly felt itself under challenge from those who still believe that the 17th century Safavid dynasty reached the apogee of social organization and development. Religious opposition to the government has continued and even grown as the pace of modernization has increased since 1963 at the time of White Revolution. Terrorist groups, probably under the aegis of Mujahidin-e-Khalq (People's Strugglers), began recruiting impressionable youths from deeply religious Muslim back- grounds. Most of these younger people began by being aghast at the Shah's reform program, particularly land reform (peasant habits changed slowly) and giving women the vote. The GOI has kept a close eye on the leading radical imams, moving to discredit some, simply watching others. In the same period, 1963-1975, left-leaning members of the National Front, many of whom had been Tudeh (communist) Party members discarded an active interest in politics. Some became coopted, impressed by the Shah's revolutionary reform efforts. At least two became ministers. Most, how- ever, simply dropped out of politics and became apolitical. Several remained university teachers, some went into business (and became well off as Iran's wealth grew rapidly in the late 60's and 70's). Many remained privately critical of the Shah, cynical about government, and unwilling to participate in regime-sponsored activities such as the Resurgence Party. Not a few came to accept the country's development, but centered their criticism on the lack of CONFIDENTIAL DEPT ASS TO: SECRETARY WASHDC INFO: AMBASSY JIDDA " ISLAMABAD " AMMAN LONDON FROM: AMBASSY TEHRAN DATE: July 25, 1977 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINT, IGOV, IR SUBJECT: STRAINS IN THE WIND: INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION IN IRAN REF: A) TEHRAN'S A-23 of 22 FEB 1977 (NOTAL), B) TEHRAN'S A-116 of 11 JULY 1977 (NOTAL), C) TEHRAN 5337 AND 5513 (NOTAL), D) TEHRAN 1964 (NOTAL), E) TEHRAN 5223 (NOTAL) POL3 AMB DCM ECON2 PM USIS OR2 CKU SHIR TABR ISBa Stirrings of Dissent Summary. Criticism of the regime in foreign newspapers and magazines which circulate freely here has long been tolerated although hardly welcome. This has not been true with respect to criticism from internal sources. In the past two years, however, official attitudes appear to have become increasingly relaxed on this score. Indeed much of the impetus has come from the Shah himself and government sponsored groups and commissions have been formed to examine and criticize government policy and performance. Lately criticism has also come from groups not associated with terrorist organizations and outside officially sponsored channels. While fairly carefully phrased they call for the Shah to reign and not rule and for a revival of intellectual freedom of expression. Whether more is to come and what the govern- ment will do about it remains to be seen. But the door of liberalization seems to be ajar. While welcome and consonant with our renewed emphasis on human rights, we believe that we should avoid any pronouncements which could be construed as endorsing the substance of the criticism. End Summary. Attachments: 1. Letter to Shah CONFIDENTIAL 2. Letter to Prime Minister 3. [illegible] Contributors: DCM JChiklos: POL MWhitney: S[illegible] 174 175

CONFIDENTIAL. Tehran A-124 Page two TO: SECRETARY WASHDC INFO: AMBASSY JIDDA " ISLAMABAD " AMMAN " LONDON FROM: AMBASSY TEHRAN DATE: July 25, 1977 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINT, IGOV, IR SUBJECT: STRAINS IN THE MIND: INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION IN IRAN REF: A) TEHRAN'S A-23 of 22 FEB 1977 (NOTAL), B) TEHRAN'S A-116 of 11 JULY 1977 (NOTAL), C) TEHRAN 5337 AND 5513 (NOTAL), D) TEHRAN 1964 (NOTAL), E) TEHRAN 5223 (NOTAL) Stirrings of Dissent Summary. Criticism of the regime in foreign newspapers and magazines which circulate freely here has long been tolerated although hardly welcome. This has not been true with respect to criticism from internal sources. In the past two years, however, official attitudes appear to have become increasingly relaxed on this score. Indeed much of the impetus has come from the Shah himself and government sponsored groups and commissions have been formed to examine and criticize government policy and performance. Lately criticism has also come from groups not associated with terrorist organizations and outside officially sponsored channels. While fairly carefully phrased they call for the Shah to reign and not rule and for a revival of intellectual freedom of expression. Whether more is to come and what the government will do about it remains to be seen. But the door of liberalization seems to be ajar. While welcome and consonant with our renewed emphasis on human rights, we believe that we should avoid any pronouncements which could be construed as endorsing the substance of the criticism. End Summary. Attachments: 1. Letter to Shah CONFIDENTIAL 2. Letter to Prime Minister Contributors: DCM JChiklos: POL MWhitney: S[illegible] 174 Background. Twice in this century attempts to emulate Western forms of representative government, multi-political parties, freedom of speech, and the right to dissent have been tried and failed in Iran. These are concepts that are essentially alien in this ancient monarchy. Loyalties and interests are traditionally in order of priority to family, tribe and only distantly to the monarch and the nation. Cooperation, group efforts, and working within institutions are not part of the Persian heritage and their absence accounts in substantial measure for past failures of Western political values to take root and grow. Dissent and opposition have been seen generally as attempts to over- throw the established regime and to frustrate its objectives. Nevertheless the notion is gaining strength that Iran is not an island unto itself and that it must accommodate to outside ideas and influences. One response has been to invite "constructive criticism" but keep it within manageable boundaries. Some intellectuals and conservatives had not found this a sufficiently adequate or satisfying outlet however. A kernel of the old fanatical religious groups have continued in being and the Shah's regime has constantly felt itself under challenge from those who still believe that the 17th century Safavid dynasty reached the apogee of social organization and development. Religious opposition to the government has continued and even grown as the pace of modernization has increased since 1963 at the time of White Revolution. Terrorist groups, probably under the aegis of Mujahidin-e-Khalq (People's Strugglers), began recruiting impressionable youths from deeply religious Muslim back- grounds. Most of these younger people began by being aghast at the Shah's reform program, particularly land reform (peasant habits changed slowly) and giving women the vote. The GOI has kept a close eye on the leading radical imams, moving to discredit some, simply watching others. In the same period, 1963-1975, left-leaning members of the National Front, many of whom had been Tudeh (communist) Party members discarded an active interest in politics. Some became coopted, impressed by the Shah's revolutionary reform efforts. At least two became ministers. Most, how- ever, simply dropped out of politics and became apolitical. Several remained university teachers, some went into business (and became well off as Iran's wealth grew rapidly in the late 60's and 70's). Many remained privately critical of the Shah, cynical about government, and unwilling to participate in regime-sponsored activities such as the Resurgence Party. Not a few came to accept the country's development, but centered their criticism on the lack of CONFIDENTIAL 175

121121 Do current with Iran's growth? Interest is its human rights issue, which began in the 1940s and 1960s, due to the realization that people received critical support of government's ability to respond to external challenges. Moreover, it was becoming a problem to the government to coordinate and support the development of Iran's more than a bit cooperation of the two. In more of Iran's middle class was going to be required in more, the Arab and the government, and the public at the latest, began to look for ways to improve the active support of the new clings. Criticism was the Resurgeon Party, provincial and city councils and the Wills was tolerated to the point where good and part منفرد were immediately are not, wondering what good it has done. It's anybody listening? To make this process more credible, the COI resourced and spot-ligated activities of the body's created to examine the government—the Imperial people, the Imperial Inspectorial Organization (IQ) on the Study Group of Iran's Problems. Each group has been given a separate and sometimes overlapping condition. The Reporting Council, also to focus on overcoming economic development, tradizing waste and eliminating corruption the IO to confier the progress of the Administrative Revolution and since June 7 to conduct unannounced spot inspections of all COI ministries and offices; and the Study Group to debate and evaluate COI problems and policies and to forward their criticisms and reports to the State. (Ref. 8 describes the evolution of these groups.) To inaugurate the new campaign in June and July, the Imperial Commission meetings were televised nationally. Committee reports and ministerial testing are revealing "deficiencies and shortcomings" in the national economic development plan received extensive comment and coverage. Comments were primarily directed at the power, textbook, event, labor and hospital shortages and passed little short of a sensation-ministers were being attacked and forced to defend their policies or to promise change. At a similar meeting of the Commission, the U.S. official were gladly qualified about 301 mismanagement and building an accounting to summary prepared by a Study CONTINENTAL Group member who is also a USFS local employee, many of the members expressed a profound distrust or antipathy toward the COI. Several times during an off-the-record question-and-answer session with the Prime Minister, the integrity of the government was directly impugned and its performance ridiculed. For the past two months, the IIG has been recast as the COI's "watchdog" agency to adjudicate citizen complaints, to conduct independent investigations and to prepare reports for the Shah. It is the most powerful and effective of the three groups—and has the full confidence and support of the Shah. The only question remaining is whether the Shah and the Prime Minister will live up to their promises and be able to convince a skeptical public that they mean business. Sources close to the Prime Minister assert that this carefully orchestrated campaign to open up and permit more criticism of the government was initiated with the Shah's blessing and the Prime Minister's recent actions lend credence to those reports. Speaking to the press on July 5 and to the I.C. on July 12, Hoveyda said every Iranian has the right to criticize and differ in all national affairs except where "the essence of Iran's nationhood is concerned" (i.e., the Shah, the Constitution, and the Shah-People Revolution). He stated what has become the government's position: "There is no reason why a country that has, thanks to the Shah's leadership, reached a position of strength from one of weakness should be afraid of criticism." How this will eventually work out in practice is not yet certain--following a Kayhan editorial of June 7 criticising censorship as bad for Iran, the Prime Minister is reported to have telephoned Kayhan's editors and stormily accused them of going too far too fast when they echoed his own criticism of present censorship arrangements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the GOI is adopting a more tolerant basic position regarding opposition to government policies than it has in some time. There has even been stray talk of allowing a second political party, but so far it remains just that--stray talk. Stirring of Opposition Other signals emanating from the GOI--the Military Court Reform Bill (see Ref C), and counterattacks against international charges of torture in Iran (Ref D) have led some formerly apathetic individuals and groups to return ever so tentatively to the political arena. This has been reinforced by their belief that the danger of repression is less because Iran wants to open up a bit, and the new U.S. human rights policy has pressured countries in general and Iran in particular to exercise police controls with more restrain on dissidence. CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL TIAL The most visible evidence of this "reawakening" are two letters which have been circulating privately, one addressed to the Shah, the editor to Price Minister Loveyda. The Elabasy has obtained control in the and has translated them informally (cratehnices one and two). The letter to the Shah is probably as articulate a statement of the liberal aspirations of the oppositionists as is available, and was written by twelve individuals, three of whom signed the letter. All three were senior National Frontiers, one an ex-minister of justice. Several individuals close to this circle say there are others who are considering ways to break their silence. One prominent ex-Fronter, the grandson of Prime Minister Mossadq, has indicated privately to friends that many of the "old circle" remain, and if there were a "true" liberalization, there would be more such activity. Most of those involved with the letter to the Shah have been in opposition to the government, either tacitly or openly, since Mossadq's time. This led Resurgence Party Deputy Secretary General Darius Homayoun to refer publicly to "political fossils" who criticize outside the accepted channels with the same old shopworn ideas. The second letter, addressed to the Prime Minister, was signed by 40 intellectuals who form the Writer's Guild of Iran. According to F.Y.I., a local political review (see attachment three) it was actually part of a series begun some months ago. According to two sources in Tehran, it represents a line of thought that has been prevalent in oppositionist circles for several years, one that has even been played by the clandestine radio Peike Iran off and on in the past. According to one of the signers of the letter, all 40 signed "because the government wouldn't dare jail all of us in the present climate on human rights." The list of signers is a reasonable Who's Who of older intellectual dissidents, many of whom have been or are connected with the arts or teaching. Dr. Gholam Hossein Saedi the subject of U.S. human rights inquiries was a prominent author who spent time in jail. Ali Asghar Haj-seyd-Javadi is a prominent anti-communist intellectual who was very annoyed when clandestine radio Peike Iran picked up one of his articles two years ago and rebroadcast it. Several others on the list have back-grounds ranging from near-Tudeh to National Front. To date, the GOI has not reacted openly except to denigrate such offerings without mentioning names or otherwise giving them publicity. Those who wrote the letters and otherwise identified themselves with the sentiments contained in them are waiting to see what the government will eventually do. Their hope is to stimulate more criticism, perhaps heading even closer to the edge of directly criticising the "untouchables"--Constitution, Shan, and Shah-People Revolution. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Religious Loread Activities of religious groups over the past six months have shown a [?] . though less is known in detail about them. Right along musties have tried to interest foreign human rights groups in the fate of those charged with killing A. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. Activities of religious groups over the past six months have shown a [?] . though less is known in detail about them. Right along musties have tried to interest foreign human rights groups in the fate of those charged with killing A. Signs of challenge to the regime from this quarter are mainly secondary and low key--increased use of the \underline{\text{chadour}} among college-educated women as a sign of opposition to government, resistance to women's rights legislation (almost amounting to pressure group lobbying) and the spread of unflattering jokes about the Shah. Religious restiveness has been reinforced by the revival of Islamic political fortunes in neighboring political arenas--Pakistan, where the religious opposition to Rhutto led to a military takeover; Turkey, where religious factions appear to hold at least some balance of power in the new, divided parliament; and Saudi Arabia, where the Shah perceives the fanatical Islamic right as one of the serious problems for any reigning Saudi monarch. The Shah and the government have taken discreet steps to keep this type of potential opposition under control. In addition to normal surveillance of religious factions, the Shah finally paid a visit to Inam Reza's shrine at Mashad in May to meet with religious leaders and urge, in his public speech, that faithful muslims not be misled into terrorism by subversive groups. In their trips to various provinces, the Prime Minister and Empress Farah have devoted time and public utterance to placating the faithful and trying to draw them (and their religion) into a supportive relationship to the government. A perceptive younger member of the Empress Special Bureau claims the royal family watches the religious situation very carefully, and that many rural development efforts are geared to drawing more of the religious fundamentalists into the modern sector through greater participation in secular projects. What Will the Government Do? Both the GOI and the Resurgence Party are assimilating this upsurge of criticism and the "ted" expression which has been

brought on by a combination of the GOT's own policies and circumstances. Over the short term, there appear to be three editions, or a combination of approaches: 1) the government will be held to meet the pressure, try to bring there oppositionist actions under the Resurgence Party umbrella. By calling for critics to become active in the Party or present their criticism to Party units, the GOI could attempt to encompass the nascent opposition entirely within the present political system. This will not be wholly possible, since there are other organizations--the Imperial Commission, the Group for the Study of Iran's Problems, and the Imperial Inspectorate, for example--which play roles in this area. Having identified some critics through letter signatures, these individuals may get the call to play the Party Game. Some may need, most probably will not--this could eventually bring them into conflict with the system itself as they try to justify their refusal to participate by attacking the system and the Shah personally. 2) Both government and Shah may simply continue to relax and allow more criticism as the price of opening up the political system. This could only be done if it is perceived that this type of opposition is safely manageable in security terms, and that the system is stable enough to afford what the Shah calls the "luxury of dissent". Any hint of foreign support for or even public sympathy with opposition groups from any quarter would probably bring a sharp, if perhaps sophisticated, crackdown. In practice, the GOI will probably use all three-tolerance to bring criticism out, attempts to direct it toward the Party, and some form of limiting control to keep it from destabilizing the developing Iranian political system. The degree to which repression may be applied will depend upon the content of the critic's message. If oppositionist criticism remains focused rather narrowly, as it has for 7-10 years, on a critique of present facts of life, it may be supportable at a fairly high level of vituperation. If 3) The government may simply repress such criticism or limit it a prior on grounds of state security. This seems an unlikely choice--it would defeat the purpose of opening up the political system. Undoubtedly, however, the Shah would take this course if criticism got out of hand--or exceeded the permissible and attacked on a regular and sustained basis, the Shah as an institution, the Constitution, or the Shah-People Reforms. Noveyda's current posture suggests that criticism which calls these fundamentals into question will not be allowed, or subject the critics to the force of harassment and limitation. However, it may over the forbidden zone--Shah, Shah-People Kovslodov, or constitution--then the regime will face no need to be in back. In some sense, of course, that is still to be said with one of the three "fortifications", and to this degree, tenor of the criticism will be important. The Shah himself might not, at least prior to the time to such difficulty acquiring an criticism of the balance between Monarch and Constitution if it were done in a constructive spirit. Out and out, muchraking over his own personal role, or radical leftist suggestions of a "people's republic" for Iran, a la Tudch times are likely to get as short as one would expect in a modernizing monarchy which is nonetheless still a real monarchy. U.S. Attitudes The U.S. is not directly involved in this process of increased criticism, nor should it be. Critics of the COI may use symbols with which many Americans might sympathize. The U.S. may also come under fire from those caustic of our traditionally close ties with Iran under the Pahlavi Dynasty. In both cases, we should treat the process of criticism as a purely internal Iranian matter. At discreet moments and in the right place privately, it will do no harm and some positive good to express our approval of the opening up process and reinforce the thinking that has led to it. On the other hand, the U.S. should avoid the temptation to make public pronouncements on the subject which might be misinterpreted by either critics or supporters of the present regime, or both. Given the differences in culture and political perception between elites and ordinary individuals in both countries, as well as the long history in Iran of connection between foreign intrigue and dissidence, the lower the U.S. profile, the better.

ر فرانسه (میتواند قدر ی بیشتریپیرونموده و نسبت به یکسری مسائل مهم سیاسی ازوی سئولاتی شود. در آخرین جلسه بنی صدموافقت نموده که بعنوان مشاورات تصاددی قابل اطمینان این کمپانی فعالیت نمایدوییشنهای حقوق ماهیانه ۱۵۵۵/۱۵۵۵ دلار رانیپذیرفت. سئوال : آیابنی صدمیدانست که طرف مقابل وی یک مامورسیا است؟ جواب : قرار نبود هگه به بنى صدر رأين مرحله گته شود که طرف مقابل سياه مباشدلذابه وي گهته نشده بود، امایک مسئله بود که میتواند به وی این برداشت راداده باشد که عبارت است از نحوه پیشنهاد ماهیانه ۱/۵۵۵ دلار که بدون این که ترتیبات معمولی تجارتی انجام پذیرفته باشد مورد پیشنهاد وهم چنین توافق قرار گرفت و این میتوانسد بیانگراین حداقل باشد که این مسئله به این ساد گیھا نیست. مسئله دوم این که نسبت بدو مینه، سموالات راجع به مسائل اقتصادي سعواآلاتی مطرح شده بود در رابطه با مسائل سیاسی که تاحصود زیادی ربطی به مسائل اقتصادی نداشته است و این مسئله هم میتوانسته است به وی برداشت دیگری بهده. یک نگته قابل ذکرهم این که تابعال پولی به ايشان پرداخته نگردیده است. ويليام فاستمر نام فرد ملاقات كندهګ: البته این اسم حقيقي وي نبود ه ولي پاسپورت و دیگر مسائل شناسایی وي جايان اسم بوده است، اسم رموزوی درتلكرهای ماکاسکلون (۱) مسی باشد (۲) (1) - لازم بتوضیح است که نام رمز این جاسوس سیادراسنیاد راترفوردمی باشد، وآهرن این مسعله رااشتباه کرده است. (۲) - نوارضبط صوت این گفتگودردست میباشد. (۵)

IS FULLY AWARE THAT A SIGNIFICATIV ELEMENT TO REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FASH AHEAD. BLICITY THAT ACCOMPANIES HIS POSITION IN TRAPPINGS OF POWER (I.E., BODYGUA, DS ASSIGME THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HE, IN REALITY A BUREAUCH AT THAN A REVOLUTIONARY. AL-SPOKEN INTELLECTUAL, HE NEVERTHELESS NOW THAT HE IS ENSCONSED IN TEHRAN. HE A PAUNCH, WEARS CAREFULLY FITTED TAILORED EXPENSIVE APPEARING NEW GOLD WRIST WATCH. TO HAVE A RAG-TAG GROUP OF STUDENTS IN DAYS IN PARIS, TODAY HE CAN MEET SUCH ICE DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS. HIS HIS REST AND TO MEET ONLY CAREFULLY ABOVE IS NOT TO SAY THAT SUBJ HAS LOST IT IS TO NOTE THAT WITH EACH PASSING ENTRENCHMENT IN THE BUREAU UCRACY OF THE ED AND IS NOW FACING THE CHALLENGE OF SMOOTHLY. IME PLOTTER HE COULD SEE HIS WAY CLEAR IN THE REGIME IF EITHER HE FEELS IT IS VOLUTIONAR OBJECTIVES OR THAT IT WOULD. DO SO. OBLY HAS NO FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AT THE MIND THAT HE COULD BE EXILED WITH E FINANCIAL SUPPORT AT THAT TIME. OBABLY HAS NO FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AT THE MIND THAT HE COULD BE EXILED WITH E FINANCIAL SUPPORT AT THAT TIME. ASPECTS XHMEINI HE DOES NOT REGARD HIM (7) ALTHOUGH (AND TEHRAIV, HE HAS GIN WISH TO NOTE THAT HI POINT OF VIEW.) (2) DISCLOSURE WOULD PROBABLY END STB I WE VILLE NOT OVERLOOK T ( (3) EXPERIENCE TENDENCY OF NEWSPAPER I U INDELIABLE HIS DECISION THAT L/J IS CONCERNED NOT ABOUT TO COOPERATE (A) ALTHOUGH SI E IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS O ANTS NOTHING TO DO WITH HERWISE 5. ON THE ASSUME T TINES, THE FOLLOWING 5 ROACHES: ARE THAT CLIQUES ARE DEVELOPING WITHIN THE Y AWARE THAT HE MUST BE CAUTIOUS IN DEALING. FOR EXAMPLE, HE STATED THAT ALL MEMBERS COUNCIL ARE NOT EQUALLY COMPETENT BUT THAT IS WITH THEM. THIS UNCERTAINTY WILL PROBABLY DOORS OPEN. LITICAL AMBITION. HE PROBABLY STARTED HIS USE IT AS A POWER BASE FOR FUTURE POLITICAL PRESSED FOR TIME AT BUSY PERIODS IN PARIS OUT OF HIS WAY TO MEET US. CP COMMENT: VALABILITY REMAINS A PROBLEM FROM OUR ENTENCHED IN THE PRESENT REGIME, SUBJ AT THE MOMENT. OF A CLANDESTINE RELATIONSHIP WITH US POLITICAL CAREER. IT IS CERTAIN THAT POINT VER THE YEARS TENDS TO EMPHASIZE THE LISHERS TO BE SELF-SEEING AND OFTEN TO START UP A NEWSPAPER MAY INDICATE WITH HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE AND IS HUS ALONG THE LINES WE ENVISION. •S COMMENTS AGAINST U.S. FIRMS MEDDLING IRAN MAY HAVE BEEN A SIGNAL THAT HE HE USG, IS INCLUDED TO THINK ON THAT OUR INTEREST IN RECPUIING L/MMARIZES R'S THOUGHTS ON TWO POSSIBLE

COVINT $ PIT FOOD'S 7 SEPT ASES SENT OF SDLUPE/I QASR GIVE THE STS SOLURE/I OCCUPIES WITH NEW REGIME (I.E OF PEVJITION RY COUNCIL, MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS, SOO OF NATION IZED BANKS AND PUBLISHER). IT WOULD SEEM COOPERATION. IN INDIVIDUAL WITH THE ACCESS HE ENJOYS SHOULD TO RE PLAYING HIS GAME CAUTIOUSLY WITH AN EYE TO THE DAY KHOMEINI PASSES FROM THE SCENE. 2. NOT SURPRISELY, L/ PRESENTS A SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN TEHR N THAN THE DID IN PARIS BEFORE HIS RETURN. IN HE WAS A FLOTTER AND WAS DEVOTING ALL OF HIS TIME TO ACTING PLANS ON HIS TO OUST THE REGIME IN POWER AT THAT TIME FROM THE OUTSIDE WITH OTHER INTELLECTUALS WHO LOOKED HIM AND RESPECTED HIM HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE ANY SACRIFICE AS HE HIS GROUPS OBJECTIVES ALERT INTELLIGENT AND AROUND THE LOCATION WITH LITTLE REST HE APPEARED TO BE BOLD ATTEMPT. 3. CN THE BASIS OF GIN THREE MEETINGS IN TEHRAN, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SUBJECT PRECIABLY, HAS CHANGED SINCE ACCEPTING POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY, THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED GOVT. HE TILL WORKS ACCOUNT THE CICK, BUT IN A DIFFERENT MANNER. WHEREAS IN PARIS HE WAS A REVOLUTIONARY WORKING ON THE OUTSIDE, HE NOW FINDS HIMSELF DEALING WITH THE FINE POINTS OF RUNNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF A COUNTY. HE TASY NOW IS TO WORK TO PRESERVE THE TATIS OVO AND TO TRENGGEN IIS FOUNDATION. L/I CONTINUES TO

TALCTO TAFCTALTECH.INTL EYEAT LPOA I TLL TTE (NOT NEEDED FRANTECH) REPORTED AT BRIEF CAP MEET 9 SEPT - ELITE COLLEGE AT ASSUALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO DECLARATION OF I'll try see I'll today or sometime I'll go and our minimum objective is met in Consultant position is explicitly will plan depart for FRANKFURT I ARTIVIAG FRANKFURT 1232 HOURS LOCAL. I'll NOT MET BUT POSSIBLE LITY REPAIRING OF THIS TOIP. RUTHERFORD DEPARTURE WILL BE USE, HE MAY BE REGULATED TO RETURN VIA OFFICER AVOID EXCESSIVE DELAY IN SECURITIES WNINTEL DYSAUL.PGP IN SDLUR. FOLLOW IS [?] TO�TOAD'S REPORT OF 5 SEPT SUL (DR/1) NETTING. 1. RUTH FELG TET WITH SOLURE/I (L/I) GO T IRO TIME LIVE. (OR HOUR AND NINE IS RESIDENCE. APPROX 14:00 TO HIS FAMILY AND FOLLOWS ESEENT GOOD PART OF EVENING ONE OF FRIEND WHO STATED HIS NAME IN SHA-OAR (PRINC), STUDIED US NAMES AMIN- ISTRATION UCLA AND RETURNED TO IRAN FOLD MONTHS ACT. HE AND L/I ARE FACI S SE VILLAGE CHAMEDAN) AND LONG TIE FAMILY FRIEND because I/I IAKTTEN HIS TO JOIN MEETING IN PRIVI TO ROOM, HAO TO PLACE EAPNAEIS IN ECONOMIC MATTERS POST OF TIME. DURING (QUOTE EVENING, I WAS DETERMINED THAT SHANDAR FILD BUG ADMIN AND POPIS GO INQ BUSINESS.) 2. UPDRIVING AT HOUSE FOR MEETING NIT ED SEVED ALY ON CROSSITE SICK OF STREET AND PRESURED THEM TO E /15 ECUARDS. SPON TURNING TO PING BELL, FIVE OF THE ARMED GUARDIANS FUCHED UP TO RUTHERFORD AS ASKED WHAT HE WANTED. SOUTUNAT LI ONE OF THE MEN RECOGNIZED RUTHERFORD FROM FIRST MEETING. I TAR CONFIRM VALLVI WAS EXPICTING A VISITOR. THE LATER WAS COPTED UP TO NINE SECOND FLOOD, PACT ENT. 3. WITH SHANDAR PRESENT DISCUSSED FOREIGN CHANCE OUT IRAN. L/I ST. T. THAT ANY RESTRICTIONS PLACED FORGELIGN CHANCE WILL BE TO MAKE SUSTAIN THAT THE REAL OR A INED AUS LOOPHOLES ENCOLAGED AND TOLERATED DURING THE REVENOUS TIME WILL NOT BE DESIGNATED TO OCCUR UNDER THE RELITIONARY CO STATED THAT AT ME NOVENT THERE ARE NO MAJOR CHARGE CONTEMP -A-VIS THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS. 4. ON TAQ1F QUESTIONS, L/1 STATED THAT THE ELS NO LOVE AT THIS POINT TO REVISE THE TARIFF SCHEDULES C PORTED UPANDS. FURMEO THE INTENTION OF THE NEW RE WILL

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 494677 S E C R E T CONTINGENCIES INITIAL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WILL BE VIA LPKNIGHT.) 2. FOR INITIAL TEHRAN MEETING, RUTHERFORD WILL WEAR CASUAL CLOTHING CONSISTING OF LIGHT TAN TROUSERS, SHIRT (WITHOUT TIE) AND JACKET IF WEATHER DICTATES. RUTHERFORD IS CIRCA 6FT 1 INCH, WITH SLIM APPEARANCE. HE IS 63, OF ERECT POSTURE, BLUE EYES AND IS GREYING ON TEE TEMPLES. HE WILL BE CARRYING BRIGHT ORANGE LOFTEANSA FLIGHT SCHEDULE IN LEFT HAND. (RUTHERFORD HAS BEEN GIVEN PAQUIN'S PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION). 3. WILL ADVISE RUTHERFORD TRAVEL PROGRESS AS/WHEN RECEIVE HOWEVER, NOTE BEST CURRENT ESTIMATE OF RUTHERFORD ARRIVAL TEHRAN IS 19 AUGUST. 4. FILE: 201-959289. RVV 14AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET SECRET 2 (51) S E C R E T 1420342 AUG 79 STAFF CITE DIRECTOR 494683. S E C R E T 1420342 AUG 79 STAFF TO: TEHRAN INFO FRANTECH, DIRTECH ATHTECH. WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN TECHS SDLURF REF: DIRECTOR 494677 1. IDEN: "CARVER ASSOCIATES", DON MEADS' CONSULTANTS FIRM. 2. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 14AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET BT 5579

S E C R E T 110752Z AUG 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN 53895 TO: IMMEDIATE FRANTECH INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR ROUTINE BONN, GERMANY, DIRTECH. VNTEL RYBAT AJAJA LPGAMIN TECHS SDLURE REF:TEHRAN53894 IDEN A - 82-40-01, 82-00-91, 82-50-91, 82-90-51. DENB - 1106 RPT 1106 OR 1135 RPT 1135 IDEN C - GEORGE JOHNSON. IDEND-MR [?] AHERN RVW 11AUG99 DRV D9C.1. SECRET E C R E T 1410F8Z AUG 70 STAFF CITI TIRACOTOR 494677 (TO) TEHRAN INFO FRANTECH, DISTECE, ATHTECF. NIPAT LPGAMIN TECH SDEUR [Unabel] T73P4Y 53P04 1. EYI: RUTHTAFORD WILL INDICATE HIS FIRM TO ABOUT AN AVAIL FIANCE VIA TRENLIGHT (IDEN) VEHICLE WILL TURN IN FORM LOS. NO CAREFUL, EOS WILL ADVISE STATION WHEN APPROPRIATE. IN ORDER TO SOLVE INFRASTRUCTURE ON SOMETHING IT INNERARY, FLIGHTS AND TOTAL RESPONSIBILITIES. THIS AFRADEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FAMILY RAFIDE COMBO INVESTMENT FOR THE FORT� FORT IDL, IT'S MOST CASES. SEVERAL TILLS TO I�ENIGAR, COFF ALSO KELLE LESSON CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS HAUL. FELEN ARRANGE, NO OVRO KOTLOVING COOLINGOIRE: A DELAY IN ATHENS ACILE PROCHING IRAN/INDIA VISAS 2) A COMPUTY TO CONTACT AMFLEENJOL IP PENKAN STATION OR 2007 REASON TO ABCER MISSION (CFFLICARDE IN 2PLT AND RETAIN ONLY). C. NHOCSST19Y 3P CONTACTING ATENS ADT NOEL LET STATIONS 2

S E C R E T 2500162 JUL 79 STAFF CITE DIRECTOR 491983. TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN. WNINTEL PIBAT AJAJA SDLURF REF DIRECTOR 481971 1. IDEN A -- VERNON CASSIN. IDEN B -- WILLIAM A. FOSTER. 2. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 24 JUL 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET SEP 2017 BT 9824 S E C F E T 110752Z AUG 79 STAFF CITE THEAD 53994 TC: IMMEDIATE FRANTECH INFO IMMEDIATE E ISECTOS NOUTIRE 1000 UNTEAT YAT AIA A LFCAN TECH SOLID PEF: DISFCTOP 492219 1. CONTACT AFRANCE.COM AT CONTACT AFRANCE.COM. A. POTHEEFOED CALLS ANY OF IDEA A MUEFERS I EIOPE 1300 ETC. ALY DAY OF WEEK, AND ASKS FOR EITHER OF IDEA S EXTENSIONS (CALL S FICULY NOT RE MADE FROM HOTEL ROOMS). GIVES NAME AS IDEA C, ASYS FOR ITE C. PERSON ANSWERING WILL SAY IDEA D OUT OF OFFICE, EXPECTED TO BE THE AT OBTAIN HOUR. HOUR GIVEN IDENTIFIES DAY OF MEETING, I.1., C O SLOCK NEANG TANE DAY, TVO O'CLOCK MEANS FOLLOWING DAY. . STREET SIGNS NO LONGER POSTED IF AREA OF INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL. KUTHEFFORT SHOULD THE EFECFPT PROCEED AS FOLIONO TO PICKUP STLEAVE HOTEL, THEN LEFT (ALONG FORMER APYALGEP), VALVE WEST TO TICK CORNER, THEN LEFT AND VALK SOUTH (LONG EAST SIDE OF FORTHEART APOVA WILL DRIVE NORTH ON ANLP ABAD TO LAPP PICKUP, USECULIFT YELLOW 4-DOOR PEYKAN. IF FUTHERFOED PEACKEST NEXT COULDS (CITY /FORT A'D KESCHAVARZ, FOREVERLY BOLELEVATELIZALETH II), HE SHOULD LATT TOT FOR PICKUP. C. FUT HEARFOJD SHOULD LEAVE NOTAL AT PRECITELY (A) OF COMPT ND PRIOR TO THE CHECK WITH TELEX OF PRETTOR. 2. PLC ADVISE FUTHERFONE THAT CASUAL CLOTHING IS SENT FOR STREET PIC WIP. ACT ASK HIM DESCRIBE WHAT NC WILL VIP. SULL ALP APPEFCIATI PHYSICAL ESCIPITION. 3. PECOCOVISING TWIT STTHEFOOD ITINESPARY IS TST/IING, SOCOUTT THAT ME GET PESSTVATION OUT OF TEMP ASAP, CIVIL CALLS TO GO THERE DAYS NOVE THAN NINNA STITATED STAY I'LL YA. BEACCH IS THAT AIRLINES EOGAIE SOLI C'S I ORN FILICITE FOP FURAL ALLE IN ADVANCED EVU 11 AM 99 EPU ESC 1. TE OF F T

PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 481971 S E C R E T TDY TO MEADS' OFFICES NEAR PHILADELPEIA IN ORDER TO BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH MEADS, THE NATURE OF HIS FIRM'S WORA AND THE BACKGROUND OF PERSONALITIES AND PLACES WHICH CONSTITUTE THE COVER STORY. (AT PRESENT WE ARE DEBATING VALUE OF HAVING ROTHERFORD ACTUALLY TRAVEL TO INDIA ON NOTIONAL MISSION AND RETURN WITHOUT HAVING COMPLETED IT VIA TEHRAN WITH APPROPRIATE EXPLANATIONS -- IN THIS WAY RUTHERFORD WOULD HAVE RECENT PASSPORT ENTRIES ADDING TO AUTHENTICITY OF HIS COVER LEGEND. ADDITIONALLY HE WOULD HAVE AN AGENDA FOR HIS OSTENSIBLE JOB IN INDIA.) 6. RUTHERFORD SCHEDULED TO PICK UP ALIAS U.S.-REGULAR PASSPORT IN NAME OF IDFN B 9 AUGUST 79. WHILE AT HCS HE WILL ASSE BE FURNISHED WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION IN FORM OF CREDIT CARD(S), POCKET LITTER, IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATE, FTC. PROPOSE ALSO THAT RUTHERFORD TRAVEL IRAN/INDIA VIA ATHENS (WHICH HE KNOWS WELL) IN ORDER TO PICK UP NECESSARY BUSINESSMAN'S VISAS AS OPPOSED TO OBTAINING THEM IN WASHINGTON. WE PLAN FOR RUTHERFORD TO BE IN TEHRAN FOR TWO WEEKS AT THE MOST, THE CONTROLLING FACTOR BEING HOW TO BALANCE GETTING AS MUCP AUDIENCE WITH L/1 WHILE AVOIDING AROUSING HIS SUSPICION THAT RUTHERFORD IS HANGING AROUND. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT GO PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN IRAN WILL BE OCCUPIED BY COVER JOB WHICH WE FEEL LEAVES AMPLE TIME FOR THE MEETINGS WITH SDLURE/1. 7. SUGGEST RUTHERFORD AVOID GOING NEAR U.S. EMBASSY BUT DEFER TO STATION FOR COMMON PROCEDURES. CLOSE RUTHERFORD/STATION PLANNING WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THIS CASE SINCE IT DIFFICULT TO ANTICIPATE PACE AT WHICH IT MIGHT EVOLVE FROM REACQUAINTANCE STAGE TO REESTABLISEMENT OF SOLID CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP. RUTHERFORD'S INTUITION WILL BE KEY TO HOW HARD HE DECIDES TO PUSH; AND FOR HOW AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVES. NOTE THAT PREVIOUS PLANNING FOR THIS CASE HAS BEEN PASSED ON ASSUMPTION THAT L/1 NOT RECRUITABLE IN CLASSIC SENSE, AND THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS MODIFIED ONE OF PERSUADING L/1 TO BE A DISCREET CONFIDENT OF A TRUSTED FRIEND IN THE U.S. EMBASSY WHO INTERESTED IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. CERTAIN IMPORTANT DECISIONS, SICK AS FOWL/1 WOULD CONTACT (OR BE CONTACTED BY) EMBASSY OFFICER, AND TIMING OF SUCH CONTACT IN RELATION TO RUTHERFORD DEPARTURE FROM IRAN, WILL REQUIRE PARTICULARLY CLOSE JOINT PLANNING. 8. SOLICIT STATION COMMENTS ON PLANNING OUTLINED APOV2 AND BT 49614 PAGE 4 DIRECTOR 481971 S E C R E T WHETHER TIMING OF PROPOSED RUTHERFORD TRAVEL TO IRAN IS CONVENIENT TO STATION. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. 9. FILE: 201-959289. RVV 24 JUL 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET BT 9815

S E C R E T 2423492 JUL 79 STAFF CITE DIRECTOR 481971. SECTION 1 OF 2. TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN. WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDLURE. REF: DIRECTOR 459158 1. FOLLOWING IS UPDATE ON PLANNING FOR SLOPE OPERATION AND TRAVEL OF GUY W. RUTHERFORD (IDEN A) TO TEHRAN TO MAKE APPROACH TO SDLURE/1. WE TENTATIVELY PLAN TO SCHEDULE RUTHERFORD TRAVEL TO IRAN IN SECOND OR THIRD WEEK IN AUGUST. TO REFRESH STATION MEMORY ON THIS LONG DELAYED OPERATION, SDLURE/4 WAS ORIGINALLY APPROACHED BY RUTHERFORD IN PARIS (JANUARY 79) DURING WHICH TIME FORMER WAS ACTIVE WITH KHOMEINI ENTOURAGE. RUTHERFORD MET WITESDLURE/1 TWICE AND ALTHOUGH THE MEETINGS WERE COMPLICATED BY THE PRESENCE OF STUDENTS, JOURNALISTS AND ASSORTED HANGERS-ON. RUTHERFORD SEEMS TO HAVE MANAGED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM. SDLURE/1 WAS TOLD. WITHOUT SPECIFICATIONS OR ACTUAL NAMES BEING MENTIONED. TEAT RUTHERFORD WAS EUROPEAN-BASED U.S. BUSINESSMAN WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN BOTH THE U.S. BUSINESS AND OFFICIAL WORLDS. HE WAS APPARENTLY SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN RUTHERFORD TO AGREE TO LATER'S REQUEST TO MEET HIM PRIVATELY IF/WHEN HE TRAVELLED VIA IRAN ON A FUTURE BUSINESS TRIP TO THE FAR EAST. RUTHERFORD MENTIONED HE EXPECTED THIS TRAVEL TO TAKE PLACE IN EARLY SPRING 1979. 2. DUE TO MANIFOLD DELAYS CAUSED BY UNFOLDING OF THE IRAN SITUATION ITSELF, SDLURE/1'S OWN TRAVELS, AND THE QUESTION OF RUTHERFORD'S COVER FOR TRAVEL TO IRAN, NO CONTACT WAS MADE BETWEEN THE TWO UNTIL JUNE 12, 79. THIS WAS A TELEPHONE CALL MADE BY RUTHERFORD (OSTENSIBLY FROM BRUSSELS), SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS REPORTED PER REF. (DURING THIS CALL RUTHERFORD SAID HE EXPECTED TO TRAVEL TO IRAN EN ROUTE EUROPE FROM A TRIP TO INDIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND ASKED IF HE COULD SEE L/1 AT THAT TIME. L/1 AGREED TO THIS AND RUTHERFORD PROMISED TO CALL HIM NEAR THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL WITH A PRECISE ETA.) 132222 THE REQUIREMENT FOR SATURITIGHI COVER FOR RUTHERFORD ASIA IS IN TEHRAN IS PREDICTED ON THE THAT OF ARREST WHICH FAISIC FOREIGN JEJINESSEN AND DIPLOMATS. TO PROVIDE RUTHERFORD WITH OVER VICE FI COULD LIVE TO THE FULL, HOS RECENTLY DECIDED TO TRACE THE PREVIOUS DEVISID FACILITY COVER WITH A LIVE CONTRATE SOTF ARRANGEMENT THIS COVER HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO STV OUTHIRD TICROUGH AND PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR HIS PREMIAL AND ACTIVITIES IF PRE NEEDS THEM IN A VARIETY OF SITUATIONS: A. IF RE AROUSE L/1'S SUSPICION; IF HE IS ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY A TOTAL KOMITEH; IF HF IS QUESTIONED OR HARASSED BY ANYONE IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISITS TO VARIOUS MINISTRIES, HIS HOTEL OR IN THE STREET. THE COVER, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW BELOW, IS VILLY PACKSTOPED AND INCLUDES A 24-HOUR EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR RUTHERFORD'S USE. 4. THE MIGEANIOS FOR THE CORPORATE COVER ARRANGEMENT WERE WORLD OUT IN FARLY JULY WITH MR. DON MEADS, A PROMINENT U.S. BUSINESSMAN WHO EAS ASSISTED RTACTION IN THIS CAPACITY FOR SEVERAL YEARS. MEADS' BUSINESS BACKGROUND IS VARIED AND INCLUDES SOME INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES WHICH ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE TYPE OF BUSINESS WHICH MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO PGOI; E.G. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION, AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT, SEWING MACHINES, ETC. BY USING TEIS TYPE OF COVER AS BELIEVE RUTHERFORD WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH A FONA FIDE EXPLORATORY BUSINESS MISSION IN ADDITION TO ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVE OF DEVELOPING L/1 AND TURNING HIM OVIS TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER. MEADS HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE RUTHERFORD WITH AN ACTUAL ASSIGNMENT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE RUTHERFORD TO VISIT MINISTRIES AND BANKS, MAKE CONTACTS, AND WRITE REPORTS (AND TELEX THEM TO MEADS' HEAD OFFICE IN PENNSYLVANIA). RUTHERFORD WILL ALSO BE ABLE TO CABLE MEADS FOR EXTRA FUNDS IF HE RUNS SHORT, OVIATING NEED FOR STATION ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA. 5. RUTHERFORD WILL CARRY A LETTER APPOINTING EIM AS A CONSULTANT TO MEADS' COMPANY, CARVER ASSOCIATES. TEIS WILL INCLUDE TRAVEL ATTEOIZATION AND DESCRIPTION OF NATURE AND DURATION OF JOP IF IS DOING IN IRAN AND/OR INDIA. IT WILL CONTAIN ENOUGH INFORMATION FOR RUTHERFORD TO BE ABLE TO GET ENTRY VISAS; E.G., INCLUDES STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL INDEMNIFICATION FROM PARENT COMPANY TO POST GOVERNMENT. DURING WEEK 23 JULY RUTHERFORD WILL

SECRET JUN 79 STAFF 0708252 JUN 8 CITE TEHRAN 53365 (GLEGOROFF ACTING) TO: DIRECTOR. WHINTEL RYBAT SOLURE SROITER REF: A. DIRECTOR 446752 B. TEHRAN 53260 1. DROTTER/4 CONFIRMS THAT SDLURE/1 STAYS WITH HIS FAMILY IN TEIPAN. PHONE NUMBER IS 850-806 RPT 850-806. R/4 SAID L/1 HAD HAD DINNER WITH R/4'S COUSIN 31 MAY AND HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF YAZDI AND GHOBTZADEW. HE ALIGNS HIMSELF AGAINST THEM NOW. R/4 SAID L/1 IS VERY AMBITIOUS FELLOW, WHO STILL THINKS OF HIMSELF AS MINISTERIAL, IF NOT PRESIDENTIAL, CALIBRE. 2. AS IT HAPPENED, R/4 BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF L/1 AT OUR 2 JUNE MEETING. R/4 URGED US AGAIN TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM, IF WE HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO FOLLOWING THE INITIAL ROUND IN PARIS 3. FILE: 201-063527 AND 201-959289. RVW 7 JUN 79 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET

S E C R E T 311400Z OCT 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN 54636 TO: DIRECTOR. WNINTEL SDTIRAMP SDPLOD 1. SDTRAMP/1 SAID AT 29 OCTOBER MEETING THAT NASSER MINACHI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, HAS ASKED HIS HELP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF AMIR ENTEZAM'S PROPOSED NEWSPAPER. T/I HAS ATTENDED ONE PLANNING SESSION, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROJECT IS STILL IN THE EMBRYONIC STAGE. DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN REGARDING CIRCULATION, EDITORIAL CONTENT, LANGUAGES IN WHICH THE PAPER IS TO BE PUBLISHED, AND PRINTING LOCALE (I.E., TEHRAN OR SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE). 2. T/1 OPINED THAT THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, EVEN ASSUMING IT GETS OFF THE GROUND. 3. WILL MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS ACTIVITY AND ADVISE AS APPROPRIATE. 4. FILE: 201-867764. RVW 310CT99 DRV D9.C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET 1. NO PHUBLE" MULESUUN 2. PROPOSED EXTENSION OF A'S VISIT RAISES QUESTIONS OF HIS SAFETY AND OF SDPLOD/1'S (P/1'S) EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RTACTION MANIPULATION OF THE REVOLUTION. KNOWING NO MORE THAN WE DO ABOUT A'S PROFILE HERE DURING HIS PCS TOURS, MUST DEFER TO HIM AND HQS FOR CONSIDERATION OF PERSONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A SERIES OF OPERATIONAL CONTACTS. REGARDING POSSIBLE POLITICAL FALLOUT, WE THINK THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS INVOLVED, AND THE CHARGE ADVISES THAT HE IS CONCERNED. WE ASSUME THAT A'S PROLONGED PRESENCE COULD NOT BE CONCEALED FROM THE IRANIANS, AND THAT NO INNOCIOUS PRETEXT SUCH AS TOURISM WOULD BE CREDIBLE. AT LEAST SOME OF THE PROPOSED CONTACTS WOULD THEREFORE PRESUMABLY HAVE TO BE DECLARED TO P/1 AND COMPANY. ^{*} IN ORDER PERMIT EVALUATION OF THE RISKS AND BENEFITS ^{US} IDENTIFY THEM FOR US, AND INDICATE

CITE TEHRAN 54636 TO: DIRECTOR. UN INTEL SD TRAMP SD PLOD 1. SDRAMP/1 SAID AT 29 OCTOBER MEETING THAT NASSER MINACHI, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, HAS ASKED HIS HELP WITH THE PRODUCTION OF AMIR ENTEZAM'S PROPOSED NEWSPAPER. T/1 HAS ATTENDED ONE PLANNING SESSION, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PROJECT IS STILL IN THE EMERYONIC STAGE. DECISIONS HAVE NOT YET WHEN TAKEN REGARDING CIRCULATION, EDITORIAL CONTENT, LANGUAGES IN WHICH THE PAPER IS TO BE PUBLISHED, AND PRINTING LOCALE (I.E., TEHRAN OR SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE). 2. T/I OPINED THAT THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE REVOLUTION, EVEN TURNING IT GETS OFF THE GROUND. 3. WILL MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THIS ACTIVITY AND ADVISE AS APPROPRIATE. 4. FILE: 201-867764. RVW 310CTS9 DRV DS.C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET PAGE2 DIRECTOR 543216 S E C R E T HUSAYN/YAZDI TALKS HELD IN HAVANA, IRAQ WOULD STILL LIKE TO SETTLE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. THEIR CON- CERN IS THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE IN FULL CONTROL AND HUSAYN DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS. 3. APPRECIATE STOCKHOLM COOPFRATION ON SDPLOD/1 CASE. 4. FILE 201-962354. RVW 290CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET. SECRET 3945

SECRETS 311613Z OCT 79 STAFF CITE DIRECTOR 543216. TO: STOCK2OLM INFO TEHRAN. WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDPLOD 1. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 HE WAS PLANNING TO DEPART TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 25 OCTOBER. HE WAS GOING TO PICK UP HIS WIFE IN STOCKHOLM THEN PROCEED TO OSLO TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS. WHILE IN TEHRAN, SDPLOD/1 WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND ASKED US FOR ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE MAY HAVE WHICH BEARS ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AT FARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND PASSING FOLLOWING REPORT TO SDPLOD/1, EMPHASIZING THAT REPORT FORWARDED BY ADLESICK IN REPLY TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY SDPLOD/1 IN TEHRAN. 2. TEXT OF REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT IRANIAN POLICY WAS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE ITS CLAIM TO BAFRAYN ISLAND THE IRAQI VIEW WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS DETAILING THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAYN. "PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IRAN WAS ACTIVELY PURSUING ITS CLAIM TO BAFRAYN, IRAQI LEADER SADAM HUSAYN HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI IN HAVANA DURING THE COURSE OF THE NON-aligned CONFERENCE. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAS SOME PROBLEM IN DETERMINING THE PROPER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PGOI. SADAM FUSAYN HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. AT THE MOMENT THE IRAQIS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE PGOI, AS THEY INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT MUCH AND REAL POWER LIES IN THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WHICH IS HOSTILE TO IRAQ. "DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PURSUE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE SECRET OCT 79 STAFF CITE: TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTING) NI ACT DIRECTOR , PARIS. WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY EYES ONLY FOR COS , PARIS AND MR. GEORGE CAVE TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR. REF: DIRECTOR, 536769 1. ACOS CALLED SDPLOD/] AT OFFICE ON AFTERNOON OF2] OCTOBER AND TOLD HIM THAT MR.GEORGE CAVE WANT TO DISCUSS REF MATTER WITH HIM TOMORROW STOKHOLM.SDPLOD/] SAID THAT HIS PLANS HAD---CHANGED AGAINAND HE WOULD BE STAYING IN TEHRAN UNTIL THUS-DAY,25OCTOBER. ACOS TOLDSDPLOD/] THAT MR.CAVE WOULD TRY TO COME-TEHRAN BEFORE 25 OCTOBER FOR MEETING. SDPLOD/] REPLIED THAT MEETING IN TEHRAN WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO HIM. ACOS TOLD SDPLOD/] THAT IN CASE MR. CAVE COULD NOT MEET IN TEHRAN BEFORE 25 OCT, WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM TO KEEP TRACK OF HIS SCHEDU-LE 2. SDPLOD/OFFICE NUMBER IS 666-885RPT 666-885. RESIDENCE PHONE NOT AVAILABLE. RVW 2] OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. a SECRET SECRET /ETX] /EOT JAUMOTTE

PLOD-19 ENTEZAM 666-885 Mr. Cave wishes discuss matter reveal at meeting with change. Mr. Cave will be in Stock hotm when E. arrives 2200t. S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF CITE:TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTING) TO : IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR. NIACT PARIS, DIRECTOR. WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY EYES ONLY FOR COS PARIS AND MR. GEORGE CAVE REF: A.DIRECTOR 536767 B.TEHRAN 54539 ]. SINCE REF B. HAVE LEARNED THAT SDPLOD/] TOOK PART INMEETING which CHARGE AND MR. HENRY PRECHT HAD WITH PRIMENISTER BAZARGAN - AND FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI TO PASS MESSAGE ON RN OUT STAY$ HEALTH AND IMMINENT ARRIVAL IN UNITED STATES. SDPLOD/] 'S REACTION WAS THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT EFFORTS OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES. 2. YAZDI WAS SOMEWHAT SCEPITICAL OF NECESSITY FOR TREATMENT IN NEW YORK OR EVEN UNITED STATES AND MADE SUGGESTIONS BASED ON HIS OWN PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE. 3. SINCE SDPLOD/NOM FULLY APPRISED OF RN OUT STAY'PLANS, IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO ADVISE HIM THAT MR. CAVE HAS IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE FOR HIM.PLS ADVISE WHETHER HOS STILL WANTS STATION TO ALERT SDPLOD/ THAT MR. CAVE WANTS TO MEET HIM IN EUROP AS POSSIBLE RVW 2]OCT 99DRVD9C.]. ALL SECRET/ S E C R E T

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF CITE: TEHRAN (JAUMOTTE ACTION) TO : IMMEDIATE PARIS, DIRECTOR. NIACT DIRECTOR ,PARIS WNINTEL RYBAT PL RN OUT STAY REF : A.DIRECTOR 536766B.PARIS ]37]5 ]. CHARGE AND MR.HENRY PRECHT MET SDPLOD/] MORNING OF 2] OCT ON PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED CALL. SDPLOD/] TOLD CHARGE THAT HE STILL PLANS TO DEPART FOR STOCKHOLM ON 22 OCTOBER. CHARGE DID NOT DISC-USS RN OUT STAY WITH SDPLOD/]. RVW2]OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET S E C R E T SECRET 201022 OCT 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN 54536 (JAUMOTTE ACTING) TO: PARIS, LONDON INFO DIRECTOR. WNINTEL R RYBAT SD PLOO REFS: A. PARIS 13694 (NOT SENT LONDON) B. TEHRAN 54526 C. TEHRAN 54527 (NIT 10,778) D. TEHRAN 54528 (NIT 10,779) E. TEHRAN 54502 1. REFS B-E BEING RELAYED LONDON PARIS AS REQUESTED REF A. 2. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 200CT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET SECRET

S E C P E T 192350 OCT 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN 54533 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.VNTEL FEF: DIRECTOR 536170 KP. CAVE DEPARTED TEHRAN FOR PARIS FRIDAY NOENING, 19 OCTOROEP. RVW 19OCT99 DRV D9C.3. ALL SECRET SECRET S E C R E T 191800Z OCT 79 STAFF CITE PARIS 13694 TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR. WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD 1. PLEASE RELAY ALL SDPLOD/1 TRAFFIC PARIS AND LONDON FOR ADLE SICK INFO. 2. NO FILE. RVW 19 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. SECRET

190 ct79 04 07z SEC RE 182250Z OCT 79 STAFF CITE DIRECTOR 535235. TO: LORITY TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON. RYBAT SDPRETEXT HRAN 54511 WE AGREE THERE NO REASON TO DISCLOSE TO GNGRAPHES'S TRAVEL IRAN OR OUR EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO PGOI'S IN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW RECENT WEL EXCHANGE WITH GNGRAPH ON IRANIAN SITUATION, BELIEVE WOULD TDY LONDON BRIEFLY ENROUTE HQS FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS RECENT GNGRAPH PAPER ON IRAN AS POINT OF DEPARTURE. REQUESTS COS/COM CONCURRENCE. 2. CONCUR NO CONTACT WITH SDPRETEXT THIS TRIP. 3. WOULD APPRECIATE ACCOUNT OF ANY DISCUSSIONS HELD AR WITH SDPLOD/1 ON RESUMPTION SOME FORM INTEL RELATIONSHIP. 4. NO FILE. RVW 18OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET. R E T. 1. THERE IS SPLIT IN THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. THE SPLIT IS PRIMARILY OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE BASIC ECONOMIC POLICY WAS DRAWN UP BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM .THE POLICY WAS BASICALLY A FREE MONEY POLICY CALLING FOR A TWO PRONGED PROGRAM OF (a) MAKING MONEY AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY ON SOFT TERMS SO THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY COULD CONTINUE AND (b) PROVIDE EXTENSIVE FUNDS FOR LABOR INTENSIVE PROJECTS SO AS TO LOWER THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE.ALI MOINFAR MINISTER OF OIL OPPOSED THIS PLAN WITH A PLAN OF HIS OWN CALLING FOR A POLICY OF TIGHT MONEY.THE CABINET VOTED FOR THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN WITH [2 CABINET MEMBERS APPROVING OF IT.HOWEVER,MOINFAR WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE GOVERNMENT TO GO SLOW. THERE HAS BEEN SOME CHANGES IN THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN AS A RESULT OF MOINFAR S ACTION MUT THESE ARE MINOR IN NATURE AND THE AMIR-ENTEZAM PLAN IS NOW READY FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

REPORT CLASS SECRETE--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NO CONTRACT--OR CON COUNTRY:IRAN SUBJECT: SOURCE: I. THE REFERENDUM FOR THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE HELD IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MAJLIS ELECTIONS WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REFERENDUM. PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN HAS DECIDED THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT A MAJORITY OF CLERICS FROM GETTING ELECTED TO THE MAJLIS. IN MID OCTOBER, THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING HIMSELF, FOREIGN MINISTER EBRAHIM YAZDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM CONFFERED WITH AYATULLAH KHOMEINI ON THIS SUBJECT. THEY WISHED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CONVINCING KHOMEINI THAT THE MAJLIS MUST HAVE A SECULAR MAJORITY. THEY ALSO WANTED TO PREVENT HIM FROM GIVING HIS SUPPORT TO LARGE NUMBER OF CLERICS AS THEY BELIEVE THAT ANYONE PUBLICLY SUPPORTED BY KHOMEINI WILL WIN. 2.DESPITE THE NEED TO BROADEN ITS BASE PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS,THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF BUILDING INSTITUTIONS THAT COULD STRENGTHEN IT.SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ,SLOW PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN REORGANIZING THE MILITARY AND THIS SHOULD BE OF SOME HELP TO THE GOVERNMENT.HOWEVER,EFFORTS TO BRING THE PASDARAN UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF THE ARMY HAVE FAILED.THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL STILL CONTROLS THE PASDARAN. S C R E T OCT 79 CITE: TEHRAN TO: DIRECTOR INFO AMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TEL AVIV. WNINTEL SDPLOD INTEL SUPDATA:SDPLOD/]. DIRECTOR SEE TEHRAN .... WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT DISSEM.NO LIAISON.NO FILE. NO INDEX.OBTAINED BY ADLESICK.FIELD REPORT NO.NIT--]0,779.CL BY 0]5356. PAOUn

REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN NO CONTRACT OR CON COUNTRY: IRAN SUBJECT: EFFECT OF KURDISH FIGHTING ON IRANIAN RELATION WITH IRAQ. ]. DURING THE PAST WEEK, THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN DETERIORATED CONSIDERABLY IRANIAN MILITARY TOOK OVER 100 CASUALTIES DURING THE PAST WEEK : PRIMINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN IS TRYING TO DEVISE SOME WAY OFENDING THE FIGHTING A HURRY AS HIS GOVERNMENT, S VIEW IS THAT THE ONLY LASTING SETTLEMENT TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM MUST COME FROM THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA AND THIS CANNOT BE STARTED UNTIL THE SITUATION RETURNS TO NORMAL. 2.DURING HIS VISIT TO HAVANA FOR THE NON-ALIGEND CONFERENCE. FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN. DURING THIS CONVERSATION, YAZDI ASSURED HUSAYN THAT IRAN WAS ENGAGING IN NO AGITATION AMONG THE SHI; A COMMUNITY IN IRAQ, ADDITIONALLY IRAN HAD NO DESIGNS ON BAHRAIN. NOR WOULD THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION BE EXPORTED TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AT THE TIME YAZDI AND HUSAYN AGREED TO MEET LATER, EITHER IN TEIRA-N OR BAGHDAD. YAZDI TOLD HUSAYN THAT THEY COULD THEN DISCUSS THE CONTINUATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT WERE THE BASIS OF THE MARCH BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. 3. UPON RETURN TO IRAN. YAZDI WAS PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE NEWSPAPER JUMHURI ISLAMI FOR HAVING GONFERRED WITH HUSAYN IN HAVANA-A. GIVEN THE CURRENT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN YAZDI IS AFRAID THAT ANY PUBLIC OVERTURE TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL MEET WITH SEVERE CRITICISM IN IRAN. THEBAZARGAN GOVERNMENT HAD CONSIDERED HAVING MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAN DID NOT INTEND TO EXPORT THE REVOLUTION AND NAS DOING NOTING AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ. THE COMPLICATION IS THAT THE LEADER OF SHI, A COMMUNITY IN IRAQ IS INDEPENDENT OF KHOMEINI AND IF HE CHOSE TO IGNORE OR QUESTION KHOMEINI, S STATEMENT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. 4. ACQ: ]8OCTOBER ]979 5.FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN. SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAM ABAD, JIDDA, KARACHE, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEWDEHLI, TELAVIV. REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHOD-S INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACT ION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 18 oct 99 DRV D9C. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTION CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. S E C R E T PAGE 2 53#4-，54526 SECRET GAVE HIM HIS HOME PHONE NUMBER IN U.S. P/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL FROM EUROPE IF ANYTHING COMES UP. HE MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION WHICH ADLESICK WILL DISCUSS WHEN RETURNS TO HOS. P/1 ASKED IF WE HAD ANY PROBLEM WITH CONTINUING THE CONTACT THROUGH HIM. ADLESICK SAID NO, WE WERE DISPOSED TO PROCEED AT A PACE SET BY THEM. 3. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET BT#4526

CITE TEHRAN 54526 TO:TO: DIRECTOR. WNINTEL R RYBAT (SD PLOD) REFS: A. TEHRAN 54527 i B. TEHRAN 54528 1. ADLESICK MET WITH SDPLOD/1 ALONE FOR ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS AFTERNOON OF 18 OCTOBER. WILL BE REPORTING INTEL SEPARATELY. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT AFTER BRIEFINGS ON 15 OCTOBER, HE, YAZDI AND BAZARGAN HAD MET AND DISCUSSED BRIEFINGS. WHILE BRIEFINGS INTERESTING THEY WERE NOT PRECISELY WHAT BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 THEIR WANTS AT THE MOMENT WERE BASICALLY FOR TACTICAL INFORMATION ON KURDISH SITUATION AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ON WHO SUPPORTING KURDS AND WHY. THIS LED TO LONG DISCUSSION IN WHICH ADLESICK APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY DISABUSED SDPLOD/1 OF ANY ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQIS IN SUPPORTING IRANIAN KURDISH INSURRECTION. P/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD HOPED THAT ADLESICK WOULD HAVE MADE A POSITIVE SUGGESTION ON HOW THEY COULD EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM THE KURDISH PROBLEM. WHILE IT MAY SEEM INCREDIBLE, WHAT THEY REALLY WANT IS FOR US TO DEVISE SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS. ADLESICK SUGGESTED THAT THEY SEEK TO DEAL WITH KURDISH SITUATION THROUGH VEHICLE OF OLD TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT. TURKS WORRY ABOUT ANY UNSETTLED CONDITION IN KURDISTAN AND WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME CHANCE TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH IRANIANS. P/1 ASKED IF USG COULD PROVIDE ANY INCENTIVES TO TURKEY AND IRAQ TO HELP SETTLE KURDISH PROBLEM. POINTED OUT TO P/1 THAT USG DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY THOUGHT USG WOULD ENCOURAGE IRANIAN TURKISH COOPERATION ON KURDISH PROBLEM. EMPHASIZED TO P/1 THAT WHILE THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ SUPPORTING KURDS, LAST THING THAT IRAQ WOULD WANT TO SEE WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH REPUBLIC FORMED ON IRANIAN SOIL. 2. WITH REGARD TO LIAISON, SULOD/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE CONTACT TO BE WITH HIM FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ADLESICK SECRET 181150Z OCT 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN 54511 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, LONDON. WNINTEL RYBAT SDPRETEXT 1. WISH RAISE WITH HQS QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS WISE FOR ADLESICK TO STOP BY IN LONDON ON THIS TRIP. DO NOT THINK WE WANT TO REVEAL MEETINGS WITH YAZDI AND \underline{\text{SDPLOD/1}} TO \underline{\text{GNGRRPP}} AT THIS TIME. DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY MERIT IN SEEING THEM IN SITUATION WHERE WE ARE NOT GOING TO BENEFIT MUCH, AS BELIEVE IF DO MEET WITH THEM IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONCEAL FACT THAT ADLESICK HAD MADE TRIP TO TEHRAN. 2. ADDITIONALLY THERE SEEMS TO BE NO PRESSING REASON TO SEE (SDPRETEXT) AT THIS TIME. SINCE HE HAS NOT CONTACTED ADLESICK, THERE IS PROBABLY NOTHING NEW ON SDJANUS/32 ALL WE COULD GET FROM HIM IS CURRENT RUMOR MILL AMONG IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN ENGLAND. 3. PLEASE ADVISE HQS VIEWS. 4. FILE: 201-215177. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 54502 SE CREI ARGUMENTS THAN HE WAS TO YAZDI'S. WHAT STRUCK CHARGE WAS THAT BY END OF MEETING YAZDI HAD DROPPED POSTLE ATTITUDE EVINCED IN PERCENT MEETINGS AND EVEN INDICATED SOME PROGRESS IN SETTING OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, HE WENT SO FAR AS TO ADMIT THAT SOME OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS MAY BE CAUSED BY LACK OF COORDINATION ON IRANIAN SIDE. 5. AT END OF MEETING. ADLESICK POINTED OUT IC BOTH YAZDI AND SDPLOD/1 THAT KIND OF TACTICAL INFORMATION THAT THEY WANTED ON IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WAS IN GREAT PART COLLECTABLE BY TECHNICAL MEANS AND URGED THEM TO MAKE USE OF THEIR CAPABILITIES. 6. FILE: 201-962054. RVW.17 OCT 59 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET. SECRET SECRET SECRET SECRET 170751Z OCT 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN 54502 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR. MINIEL EYEAT 1. CHARGE, MR. RON SMITH AND ALESICK MLT WIIH YAZDI AND SDPLOD/1 FOR TWO HOURS AFTERNOON OF 16 OCTOBER. SUBSTANCE OF MEETING BEING REPORTED BY CHARGE VIA STATE CHANNELS. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT CHAMRAN UNABLE TO ATTEND MEETING BECAUSE HE WAS DETAINED IN KURDISTAN. THEY EXPECTED HIM BACK IN TEHRAN. MOMENTARILY. ALESICK PLANNING TO STAY COUPLE OF DAYS IN HOPE CHAMRAN SHOWS UP. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 THEY CONTINUE MUCH INTERESTED IN REESTABLISHING LIAISON. 2. CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE CONVERSATION DEALT WITH ISAG AND KURDISH PROBLEM. YAZDI HAS FAIRLY UNSHAKEABLE BELIEF THAT ISRAEL AM UNITED STATES HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH IRAQIS IN SUP- 2. CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE CONVERSATION DEALT WITH ISAG AND KURDISH PROBLEM. YAZDI HAS FAIRLY UNSHAKEABLE BELIEF THAT ISRAEL AM UNITED STATES HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH IRAQIS IN SUP- PORTING KURDISH INSURRECTION. WE WERE ABLE TO POINT OUT HOW HIGHLY UNLIKELY THIS IS, BUT FACT THAT YAZDI FOUGHT IT UP & SERIOUS IRANIAN CONSIDERATION INDICATES TECHNOLOGIES OF PARANCIA ABROAD IN EAZERGAN GOVERNMENT. 3. MR. Smith gave very good brief on Soviet energy problems. FROM DISCUSSION WITH YAZDI, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE UNAWARE OF CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR CANCELING GAS CONTRACT WITH SOVIETS. BELIEVE THAT THIS BRIEFING TOGETHER WITH ADLESICK BRIEFING HAS GIVEN THEM FACTUAL INFORMATION TO MULL OVER WHEN CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF TACTICS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT. AT ONE POINT IN THIS DISCUSSION, YAZDI RATHER NAIVELY SAID THAT HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND SOME OF OUR POINTS IN LIGHT OF SOVIET OVERLISES TO HIM WHICH HARD BEEN VERY FRIENDLY RECENTLY. WE POINTED OUT THAT IN THE CENT SITUATION, THE SOVIETS HAD LITTLE IN THE WAY OF ALTERATIONS BUT TO BE FRIENDLY FOR THE TIME BEING. THE CRONCH WOULD COME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BECAME A NET OIL IMPORTER. 4. SDPLOD/1 IS DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE UTIIL 20 CCTCEER. DUE THE COURSE OF MEETING HE SEEDEN MORE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF CITE TEHRAN TO : PRIORIORTY DIRECTOR WNINTEL RYBAT FGI SDPLOD REF: TEHRAN ].IDEN : 66-68-85 RPT 66-68-85. 2. NO FILE . RVW ]OCT 99 DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET SE C R E T PAQUIN S E C R E T CITE TEHRAN TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR WNINTEL RYBAT FGI SDPLOD REF: DIRECTOR 5277]5 ].SDPLOD/] TOLD CHARGE THAT, FOR SECURITY,HE STAYS OVER NIGHT AT DIFFERENT PLACES SAID HE CAN USUALLY BE REACHED AT IDEN UNIT - ABOUT 900 HOURS. 2. ADLESICK AND BRIEFING OFFICER WILL BE MET. SHOULD THERE BE ANY DIFFICULTY AT AIRPORT, ADLESSICK SHOULD CONTACT EMBASSY. PREFERABLY BEFORE CALLING SDPLOD/]. NUMBERS ARE 8] -00-9],82-50-9] AND 82-90-5]. CHARGE'S EXTENSION, FOR USE DURING OFFICE HOURS, IS 600OR 602 MARINE SECURITY GUARD IS 2]4. 3. PLS ADVISE IT INTERARY. 4. NO FILE. RVW ]OCT 99DRV D9C.]. ALL SECRET SECRET PAQUIN

12 $10CK1nLM 26286 S E C 1E I 4. PER STA E INSTRU TI(NS DICM HAS MEETING WITH 01 11402 HOURS TO DAY (5 OCT) BEFORE LATTER LEAD E BRIEFED DCM ON ABOVE TO AVOID CROSSING WIP.S AN DV RENT IAUX PIAS. 5. FILE: 01-96275. FWW 25 OCT 99 DFV DSC.. E C R E T 0510AAZ OCT 79 STAFF TE STOC HOLM 26286 PRIORITYDIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN. INTE RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDP OD EIL: DIRECTOR 525381 1. PASSED. IBEX MATERIAL WITH REF CAVEAT 5 OCTOBER. SDPLOD/1 NS SIAY. TEHRAN THROUGH 17 OCT. THEN RETURN STOCKHOLM TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN OSLO AND HELSINKI. THIRTY OF FORTY DAYS AFTER AT, HE WILL RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR ELECTIONS AND FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT. HE NOT SURE HOW LONG HE WILL BE ASSIGNED STOCKHOM AND ASSERTED HE INDIFFERENT TO ASSIGNMENT. SINCE HE UST A SOLDIER IN SERVICE OF HIS GOVERNMENT. 2. DPLOD/I TOOK OPPORTUNITY SPONTIANEOUSLY TO RAISE GOI ISSAT FACTION WITH STATE OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. NEW REGIMES HAD BEEN IN POWER 8-9 MONTHS AND U. HAD TAKEN NO WILLIAVES TO SOLVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS ALTHOUGH, ACCORDING TO DPLOD/I, WE UNDERSTOOD THESE PROBLEMS AND HAD THE SOLUTIONS TO KEM. THIS LEFT REGIME WITH IMPRESSION THAT U.S. PLAYING WAIT-AND-S/E GAME WITH OBJECTIVE OF INTERFERRING IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS IN FUTURE. GIVEN THE PAST, IT WAS UP TO US TO MAKE PROPOSALS AND MOST OF THE "SACRIFICES." SDPLOD/I SAID "THEY DISLIKED THE RUSSIANS, BUT SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN TO SEE GOI" 100 TIMES, HAD BEEN KICKED OUT 102 TIMES" BUT PERSISTED IN OFFERING HELP AND SOLUTIONS". ASKED WHAT "PROBLEMS" HE REFRERED TO, SDPLOD/I MEANT ONED ONLY "SPARE PARTS" AND "BLOCKED FUNDS". 34 SANDAGGER MADE NO. COMMENT DURING THIS MONOLOGUE, WHICH DELIVERED POLITELY BUT FIRMLY, EXCEPT TO DENY, OF COURSE, THAT U.S. HAD ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERRING IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS. SDPLOD SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE, BUT LACK OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES LEGAL GOI WITH BAD IMPRESSION FUELED BY PAST AND CURRENT CRICISM OF REGIME, INCLUDING RECENT REMARKS BY CHARGE IN TEHRARE ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS. SDPLOD/I SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SPEAKING FRANKLY AND WANTED ME TO CONVEY HIS REMARKS TO USG.

003410 LL ESA383BRA200 OO RUQMHR DE RUFHRS #3025 3031452 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 301446Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1535 INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1410 RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 087 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5551 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 4679 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 328 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1642 BT SECRET ALGIERS 3025 EXDIS RABAT FOR DAS CONSTABLE E.O. 12065: GDS 10/30/89 (HAYNES, ULRIC, JR.) OR-M TAGS: PDIP, OVIP, AG, US SUBJ: 25TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF ALGERIAN REVOLUTION REF: A. STATE 281872, B. MONROVIA 8576, C. TRIPOLI 1709, D. STATE 282984 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. DEPENDING ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOA PRESIDENT BENJEDID AND/OR FONMIN BENYAHIA, FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE CONTACTS FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND LEADING MEMBERS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS TO BE PRESENT FOR CELEBRATIONS (REF A, PARA 11): A) SPAIN - SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOS MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY (I.E., SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT) PEREZ-LLORCA AND GOS MFA DIRGEN FOR AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST AGUIRRE-BENGOA; B) FRANCE - FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA IS EXPLORING POSSIBLE INTEREST OF SEGGEN OF QUAI DE LEUSS IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS; C) LIBYA - IF GOL PRESIDENT GADHAFI DOES ATTEND CELEBRATIONS, LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SHOWED CAUTIOUS INTEREST IN PROPOSING HE MEET WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI (REFTEL C); D) IRAN - IRANIAN CHARGE IN ALGERIA INFORMED ME TODAY HE CABELING TEHRAN TO DETERMINE POSSIBLE INTEREST OF PM BAZARGAN OR OTHER MEMBERS OF GOI DELEGATION IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS (REFTEL D). 3. THE ABOVE REFLECTS LIVELY INTEREST ON PART OF ALL CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTLY IN ALGIERS (COA OFFICIALS, DIPLOMATS, PRESS) IN FACT THAT USG HAS FIELDDED A HIGH-POWERED DELEGATION BY VIRTUE OF ITS HAVING DR. BRZEZINSKI AS HIT HEAD. ONCE IN ALGIERS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI AND OTHERS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WILL CERTAINLY ABOUND. DELEGATION AND OTHERS SHOULD NOTE THAT ALL LOCAL OBSERVERS CONSIDER DR. BRZEZINSKI AS MAJOR USG PROPONENT OF POLICY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO MOROCCO. HAYNES ET #3025 CHARGE FILE COPY DUMMY CHRON [Handwritten signature and annotations: "Return", "POL", "EM"] VZCZC 266 CC RUEHC DE RUQMHR #1151 2957904 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 220904Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4369 BT SECRET TEHRAN 11151 FOR UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM NODIS CHEROKEE E.O. 12265: PTS-2 10/22/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, IR, US SUBJECT: GEORGE CAVE VISIT TO TEHRAN RFF: TEHRAN 11133 1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. AS REFTEL INDICATES, ENTEZAM WAS AMONG GROUP THAT I BRIEFED ON SHAH'S ILLNESS AND PLANNED TRIP TO U.S. ENTEZAM UNDERSTANDS AS WELL AS ANYONE IN FGOI THE NEED FOR KEEPING POLITICAL REACTION UNDER CONTROL. 3. SINCE GEORGE CAVE HAD ALREADY DEPARTED TEHRAN WHEN WE MADE OUR REPRESENTATIONS YESTERDAY I ASSUME HE WOULD NOT RETURN. NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY NEED FOR HIM TO RETURN. I NOW UNDERSTAND THAT AGENCY HAS INSTRUCTED HIM TO RETURN FROM PARIS AND THAT HE WILL BE ARRIVING TOMORROW MORNING. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT, ASSUMING THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS IN WHICH YOU HAVE CONCURRED THAT WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN OUR HAND HERE. HOWEVER I DO WANT TO SAY THAT FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT AND IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ENTEZAM (WHO HAS NOW DELAYED HIS DEPARTURE FOR STOCKHOLM UNTIL LATE THIS WEEK) HIS PRESENCE WOULD NOT SEEM NECESSARY. LAINGEN FT #1151 NNNN VZCZC 266

ALONGING IS AUGUST REVOLUTIONARY INNOCTIVITY. THE TALZI BUT IT THIS WAS AN UNPARSONABLE REHON. 2175 RATT. YAZDI ATTEMPTED TO LEARN ANALOGY. 2175 SITUATION AND THAT OF ANDREY YOUNG IN U.S. 2175 RESPONDED THAT ANALOGY WAS HIGHLY IMPERFECT. IN SKED ABOUT NAZI'S WHEREABOUTS, YAZDI SAID HE AS ALIVE AND WELL IN TEHRAN. a. A GREAT DEAL OF CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO UREDESTAN. YAZDI WAS CONVINCED THERE IS MAJOR FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR KURDISH INSURRECTION. SSSCRIBING SITUATION THERE AS SERIOUS. PGOI HAS INFORMATION WHICH THEY CONSIDER RELIABLE INDICATING THAT U.S. AND ISREAL THERE COOPERATING WITH IRAQ IN NOMENTING KURDISH INSURRECTION. CHARGE SPEAK CONSIDERABLE THE IN POINTING OUT THAT U.S. HAD LITTLE TO GAIN BY AIDING KURDISH EARLES. U.S. INTEREST IS IN STABILITY. AND INSTGRITY OF IRAQ. ESSENTIAL U.S. INTEREST IN IRAQ IS THAT OIL FLOWS; ANY SITUATION IN-HAN WHICH TERTEN THAT FLOWS WOULD INVIMICAL TO U.S. INTREATS. 10. WE ALSO TRIED TO GET HIM TO CONSIDER THE LESSURDITY OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQ. NOTING THAT (AND OF SUPPORT NEEDED BY KURDS DID NOT PROUIRE ISRAEL. INVOLVEMENT. MOREOVER, IRAQ COULD NOT RISK EXPOSURE OF DEALING WITH ISRAEL. YAZDI SEEMED TO THINK THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT SUPPORT THAT ON ITS OWN. WE POINTED OUT THAT IRAQ PROBABLY VERY CONCERNED OVER EXTENSION OF S3IA NATIONALISM AND COULD WELL CONSIDER SUPPORT TO THE KURDS AS WEAKENING PGOI. YAZDI SAID THAT ADEQUATE ASTIGANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN TO SALAM HUSAYN WITH REGARD TO THE SHIA MAJORITY IN IPA. YAZDI INDICATED THAT IF THAT INTERRETRINCE CONLIVED, IRAN WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER RELATION AMONG THE IRAQI SALA COMMUNITY. 11. THIS AND OTHER COMMENTS BY YAZDI REFLECTED CASINO PAUL PARANOVA: 8.3. IN DISCUSSING U.S. POLICY COULD IRAN, HE SPECULATED THAT SOME GROUP WITHIN USG RELATIVELY CIA, MIGHT BE INVOILED IN THYING TO OVERTHROVE THE POLICY WITHOUT INNOCENT OF SENIOR USE OF POLICIAL IDENTIFICATION IN THE PAST. THE YATTI AND ANNIEN EUTERAM SPEED PLEASE. I'M HIGHly PONDED BY SMITH AND CAVE. YAZDI STEMET KILLY IN A STONE IN THE NEITH ON SOVIET INFINESI LAMS. IN A NEUMARY OF THE EFFECT OF THE ABRODA OF THE CAS CONTRIBUTION SOVIET ENERGY PLANS. IN THE WHY WERE ACTIVELY TRAYING TO PAISEN CORRENT OF HAS FROM THE STONE PER 1000000000000. WAS ALSO SOUND THE AND THE POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES SEND BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE NET NORTERS OF OIL SOMETIME IN THE 1991-93 TIME FRAME. IACE IRAM WAS THE MOST LIKELY PLACE FOR THE SOVIETS TRY TO FIND CIL ON FAVORABLE TERMS. YAZDI INDICATED IRON ABOUT THAT KIND OF PRESSURES COULD BE EXPECTED. INMENTED THAT RECENT SOVIET OVERTUNS HAD BEEN TREY ENDLY. WITH RISK AT SOVIETS MIGHT TO VERN FACET WITH KEDDRAL INNOVATION, POSITION TAKEN AT AMERICAN LIES THAT OF EARTHALLY INTHERSTEX INPROVIDING ACTUAL INFORMATION THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES SEQUANT ANTI-VIRON CONCLUSIONS. WE POINTED OUT TO AZEI AT THE SOULS HAVE A VERY EFFICIULT TIME IN YING FOR OIL IN THE CURRENCY AS THIS WOULD CERTIFICCONOMIC FEVELLE. CURRENTLY AND PERCENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAYINGS COMES FROM OIL: THIS LOSING IS INCOME IS GOING TO BE A SERIOUS BLOWING TO THE ZIEN NOMIC PLANNING WHAT MAKES IT MORE SERIOUS IS THAT THE IS WILL COME RELATIVELY SOON. INITIALLY WE EXPECT VINTES MOLE SERE TO PURCHASE OIL ON SOFT TERMS AND IIL PROBABLY PUT PERSE THE ON-IRAN TO AGREE TO SUCH A FANGMENT. YAZDI IS GONE IT HIGHLY DELICIELY TEAN AN NOULL AGREE TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. . LURING CVS. MISSION OF OIL, SUBJECT OF FORTH AIRMA, NASAR NAZIE WAS RAISED BY CHARGE. PLAINED THAT NAZIE HAD MADE A SEAIONS TRAIN

216/POL/A15/16 [?] 41：40.71 [?] 1 T C30000000000 ( ) 12132620001 79 GM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4332 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL CHANGE: STAT 10/13/7 APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAI CRFTD: GAVE: FM CONTRENTIALSECTION510 CLEAR: NONE ROGR CHANNEL R: CHARGE E.O. 12065: RDS-4 18/13/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M TAGS: PINR, I SUBJECT: SPIENTING CF YAZDI AND ENTZAZ 1. (C-ENTIA). 2. AFTERNOON OF 15 OCTOBER, CHARGE ACCOMPANIED BY RON SMITH AND GEORGE CAVE, MFT FOR TWO HOURS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SCHEDEN, ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM. DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN WAS TO HAVE ATTENDED, BUT WAS ABSENT IN THE DESTAN. B. CHANGE INITIALLY CALLED YAZDI'S ATTENTION TO A PARTICULARLY INTEMPERATE COMMENTARY PUBLISHED BY NEED RADIO ON OCTOBER 15. YAZDI AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE STICLE AND PRESS TREATMENT WAS A THEME THROUGH GETTING. YAZDI INSISTED THAT THERE IS AN ORGANIZED ANTI-IRANIAN CONSPIRACY IN THE U.S. PRESS. YAZDI SAID THAT WHEN IN NEW YORK IS HAD INVITED NUMBERS US REFRACTIVES OF THE U.S. MEDIA TO A MEETING. HE DID NOT KALE CLEAR EXACTLY NOT ATTENDED THE MEETING, OR WHEN IT TOO PLACE. IT NOTED NO MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUCH A YAZDI PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HIS NEW YORK VISIT. I YAZDI ASKED WHAT USG REACTION HAD BEEN TO HIS TINGS WITH SECRETARY VANCE AND OTHER SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS. YAZDI WAS TOLD THAT FROM U.S. POINT OF FILM THE MEETINGS HAD NOT GONE WELL. WE HAD EXPECTED GREAT THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE LAID THE BASIS FOR IMPROVING IRANIAN-U.S. RELATIONS. BUY THE STAND TAKEN BY YAZDI DUEING THE VANCE MEETING IMDI-CATED TO US THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE AN EVEN SLOWER PROCESS TEAN ME HAD ANTICIPATED. ISSUES HAD BEEN PORTRAYED AS RIGGER THAN LIFE. IN PURSUING THIS DISCUSSION, YAZDI SEEMED MORE TEMPERATE THAN IN RECENT MEETINGS. WHEN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN RESOLVING MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUES, HE CONCEDED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEM WAS DUE TO LACK OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATION ON SOCIOPOLOGY. BUT HE WAS VOCAL IN EMPHASIZING THAT HE HAD NOT TO SER PRACTICAL EVIDENCE OF A GENUINE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. HE CAN BE SUPPORATELY TROUBLED TO HEAR OF PROBLEMS IN THE SOCIETY AREA THE 1974 MOUN. HE CLAIMED NOTHING THE EMBASSY NOR THE MOUND HAD TOLD HIM OF HIS CREATIVITY. EMPHASIZED USES READINGS TO RESOLVE ALL CUTS PAINING HOSPICES: YALL I INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ME (1874-1877) MASSAGE, MOND) WORKING GROUP TO THE CONFIDENTIAL THAT DEPUTY, PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI HAD REPEATED ARAFAT'S (GHARIS ON THE THREE AMBASSADORS. ENTEZAM APPEARED SUITALLY EMBARRASSED AND SAID "BUT WE HAVE ALREADY CORRECTED THAT STORY. HAVEN'T YOU SEEN IT IN TODAY'S PRESS? ENTEZAM CONTINUED THAT IN A TALK WITH PATARGAN AND TASATABAI, HE HAD OBTAINED AGREEMENT THAT IN IMMEDIATE RETRACTION OF THE STORY WOULD BE PRINTED IN PARS AND THEN PICKED UP BY ALL IRANIAN PRESS. (COMMENT: NO RETRACTION HAS BEEN CARRIED IN ANY OF THE PRESS TO DATE). 12. STUDENTS: ENTEZAM SAID THERE WERE ABOUT 3200 IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SWEDEN AND 30-40,000 IN EUROPE. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE STUDENTS IN SWEDEN WERE LEARNING ONLY JEWISH RATHER THAN A WORLD LANGUAGE AND OBSERVED HE WOULD PREFER STUDENTS TO LEARN A WORLD LANGUAGE. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT THE US EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION HAD ALSO TIGHTENED ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS GRADES AND LANGUAGE ABILITY AND WAS CHECKING TO ASSURE THE INSTITUTIONS WERE PROPERLY CERTIFIED. WE HOPE THE PGOI APPRECIATES WHY OUR REFUSAL RATE OF STUDENTS IS HIGH. WE ARE TRYING TO ASSURE THAT ONLY PROPERLY QUALIFIED STUDENTS ARE ADMITTED TO THE US. ENTEZAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND THAT INDEED IRANIAN EMBASSYS ABROAD WERE IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO ASSURE IRANIAN STUDENTS DO NOT BECOME PERPETUAL STUDENTS". 13. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THE CHARGE AGAIN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ENTEZAM WOULD HELP PGOI UNDERSTAND THAT USJ WAS TAKING ACTION TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE HOPED THAT ENTEZAM COULD DO SOMETHING TO REDUCE THE PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST THE US IN THE PRESS. ENTEZAM REPLIED THAT HE SINCERELY THOUGHT THAT THE US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP SHOULD IMPROVE AND REQUESTED AGAIN THAT THE US TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO OUR MUTUAL PROBLEMS. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY THE CHARGE, ENTEZAM SAID THAT HOURI DOES DISTRUST THE US. EN TRUSTS BAZARGAN, ENTEZAM AND YAZDI, AND THAT IS "WHY WE ARE HERE." ENTEZAM INTIMATED THAT IF THEY ARE ABLE TO PRODUCE RESULTS BY SOLVING THESE US-IRANIAN ISSUES THIS WILL HELP THEIR POSITION. ENTEZAM SAID THAT CHARGE MIGHT ASK YAZDI TO SET UP AN APPOINTMENT TO GO AND SEE KHOMEINI. CONFIDENTIAL

PASS ATTACK ON US AS A COUNTRY TO ENTEZAM'S " [19] IN THE PIGS OF THE CHILDREN IN THE CHICAGO, THE CHICAGO CONGRESS, AND THE CHICAGO CONGRESS, AND THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO, AND THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO, IN THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS OF THE CHICAGO CONGRESS F. ECONOMIC ISSUES: DURING CONVERSATION, ENTIRE 2AM MAY 2018, THE CHAMBERLS, BUREAU OF THE CHAMBERLS, MAY 2018, THE CHAMBERLS, MAY 2018, THE CH CLEARANCE OF OFFICIAL CALLS: DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, CHARGE EXPLAINED TO ENTARAY THE BACKGROUND OF HIS TALKS WITH SABASHIAN ON THE EXECUTIONS OF THE CHURCH SENATORS. HE STATED THAT WHILE HE FELT THE TALLOWS WITH SABASHIAN HAD BEEN PERCEITABLE AND INTERRECOGNIZED, HE REGURED EXECUTION ISSUE HAD BEEN MADE A PUBLIC ONE. INTALZAM REPLIED THAT HE HOPED IN FUTURE THAT CHARGE WOULD LIMIT SUBSTANTIES CLILLS LIKE THIS TO BAZARGAN, YAZDI OR CHAMRAN. IF HE WANTED TO SEE OTHER POIGI OFFICIALS SHOULD FIRST CLEAR THE TALKS DIRECTLY WITH YAZDI. HE ARE IN A MINORITY" ENTARAY SAID. MANY OF THE OTHER SOCIAL LEALERS SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE DELICATE BALANCE THAT IRAN SHOULD MAINTAIN BETWEEN THE US AND OSSR. THEY MAY WELL EXAGGERATE WHAT IS SAID IN MEETINGS AND GO POLICY LIKE SABASHIAN. IF YAZDI CR ENTARAY WERE CONSULTED FIRST THIS COULD GIVE THEM A CHANCE TO BRIEF THE OFFICIALS TO BE VISITED AHEAD OF TIME. HE AND YAZDI DID NOT WANT TO LOCK THE CHARGE'S ACCESS TO PEOPLE BUT TO ASSURE THAT NO PROBLEMS AROSE. CHARGE DEMURRED POLITELY POINTING OUT THAT ALL HIS REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS GO TENOR THE PROTOCOL OFFICE. HE POINTED OUT THAT EMBASSY FILT IS SHOULD HAVE MUCH MORE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS, ESPECIALLY THE ISLAMIC LEALERS. ENTARAY ACQUIRED BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE CHANGE NOT DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN SUCH MEETINGS. IT YOU GO DEEPLY INTO A DISCUSSION THE RESULTS WILL DISTURBVE EVERYTHING. "BE LIKE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HE SAID. HE NEVER VOLUNTEERS ANY OPINIONS. INDEED HE NEVER EVEN COMMENTS WHEN HIS GOVERNMENT IS ATTACKED BY THE IMAM AND YAZDI. HE SIMPLY FORGETS ALL ABOUT SUCH STATEMENTS. (ENTARAY S. EMED TO INCLUDE ALL POIGI LEALERS WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF GLAMAR ON HIS LIST OF WHOLE WHO'S SHOULD BE CHANGED WITH YAZDI.)

CONFIDENTIAL TOCKHOLM, PLAYING A "WAITING GAME". CHARGE THEN WENT OVER QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES, POINTING OUT THAT ALTHOUGH DR. YAZDI IN NEW YORK HAD CHARGED WE WERE DELAYING DELIVERIES, MUCH OF THE DELAY LAY IN PGOI'S FAILURE ASSIGN FREIGHT FORWARDERS. ENTEZAM STATED IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ONE OF THE MAIN UNSOLVED PROBLEMS WAS THE DELIVERY OF CLASSIFIED SPARE PARTS. CHARGED REPLIED THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA CAUSED BY OUR REGULATIONS AND BY THE NEED NO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE STILL HAVING MAJOR PROBLEMS SIMPLY GETTING ACCESS TO THE F-14'S. WE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES ON CASE BY CASH BASIS. SWEEPING THIS EXPLANATION ASIDE, ENTEZAM STATED THAT FOR US IF LOOK LIKE YOU ARE JUST WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION FOR AN NEW PILOT AGAINST THE COUNTRY. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS NOT TRUE, BUT THAT IN GENERAL THE IRANIAN PEOPLE BELIEVED IT. IF THE US WANTS TO PROVE IT IS SINGER, IT SHOULD COM TO THE PGOI WITH OFFERS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING CASES. THE PGOI CONSIDERS THAT THE USG IMPOSED THESE MILITARY CONTRACTS ON THE FORMER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. IF THE USG IS NOW SINGLE IN ITS DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS IT WILL SIMPLY CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS. 6. CHARGE'S REPLY OUTLINED THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE RECENTLY TO BE FORTHCOMING ON FMS SUPSTIONS (NOW AND THE TRUST FUND, BRIEFINGS, INFORMATION, ETC.). HE GOLD OF RECOGNIZED THE SUSPICIONS OF SOME IRANIANS THAT USED WAS DELAYING. THERE WAS A CERTAIN IRONY, HOWEVER THAT THE US IS PRESENTLY BEING CRITICIZED IN THE US BECAUSE OF A US PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE US IS BEARING SPARE PARTS AND EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AT A TIME WHEN THE IS FIGHTING GOING ON IN KINDFSTAN. WHILE CONVERSATION RETURNED SLIVERAL TIMES OF THE TACH TIME CHARGES EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT NO HAD ICON ANSWERED WITH ENTEZAM'S REQUESTS THAT THE US BE FORTHCOMING. SPECIFICALLY DE ASSED FOR A LETT 2023 [?] 1 [?] 1 [?] 2 216/POL/A/2/TEHRAN 10377/1 12771 ANY OCCSC ZZ (1)11325200179 CLASS CONFIDENTIAL EMBASSY TEHRAN 0 EHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4857 CH GE: STAT 10/15/79 APPRV: CHARGE: LBALING RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 001S CRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO CLEAR: NONE B O N F I D N N T I A I S C T I O N 21 OF TEHRAN 10977 DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA ECON CONS CHRON RF 01015 .0. 12065: GDS 10/15/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P TAGS: PINT, IR, MASS SUBJECT: CHART'S TALK WITH AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM REF: STOCKKOLN 4124 (C - ENTIRE TENT). 2. SUMMARY: CHARGE CALLED ON IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIRMENTAZAM OCTOBER 13 FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION OF US IRANIAN RELATIONS. DURING DISCUSSIONS, ENTARAM POINTED TO SUSPICION OF IRANIANS THAT US IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME WITH PGOI IN UCODS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALL. HE ASKED THAT US TALE THE INITIATIVE TO OFFICE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS SUCH AS CLASSIFIED MILITARY PARTS AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS. ENTARAM SUGGESTED THAT CHARGE CLEAN ALL CALLS ON PGOI OFFICIALS AND OTHERS ENOUGH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI SO THAT YAZDI WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROPERLY BRIEF THE OFFICIALS. CHARGED DEMORRED GENTLY, POINTING OUT THAT ALL CALLS ON PGOI OFFICIALS, ARE ALREADY REQUESTED THROUGH OFFICE OF CHILD OF PROTOCOL, AT END OF CONVERSATION, ENTARAM POINTED OUT THAT KHOMEINI "TRUSTS US" (HIMSELF, YAZDI, YAZAIAN) BUT INTERREL IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO THIS OUP IF THE US COULD HELP THEM PRODUCE SOLUTIONS FOR -IRANIAN PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY. 1. CHARGE'S CALL ON AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM OCTOBER 13 AS HELD AT PRIME MINISTER'S FORMER OFFICE (HE HAS JUST MOVER TO HOVEYDA'S OFFICE) INDICATING ENTAZAMS CONTINUING CLOSNESS TO PM BAZARGAN. ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING NAS COL AT OUTSET BUT WARMED UP CONSIDERABLY BY END. ENZAZAM THROUGHOUT WAS UNCOMPROMISING IN PRESENTING PGOI'S WINS AND COULD NOT BE SAID FROM THE CONVICTION US MUST TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION IF US-IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE TO BE IMPROVED. ENTEZAM PLAINLY CONSIDERS HIMSELF AHT OF A SMALL ELITE GROUP OF MODERNISTS (BAZARGAN, ZDI CHAMRAN) WHO ARE TRUSTED BY KHOMEINI AND WHO ARE INGLING TO PROTECT IRAN AND TOE US AGAINST CONSERVAL MAJORITY. MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUES: CHARGE OPENED THE CONVERSATION EXPRESSING OUR APPRECIATION FOR HELPFUL TALKS IZAM HAD HELD WITH EMBASSY STOCKHOLM. HE WENT ON TO RECENT EVENTS IN US-IRANIAN RELATIONS, EMPRISING WANTED TO MOVE AFFAD IN ITS RELATIONS WITH NANT WAS NOT, AS ENTABAM HAD STATED TO OUR DCM

In addition we have informed MOND officials in Tehran that we are prepared to participate in a continuing working group here to ensure fullest possible understanding of the FMS cases. We understand the PGOI is also considering establishing in the U.S. an Iranian military purchasing mission to facilitate understanding of and procurement under the FMS program. The USG would welcome this. At the same time the MOND was informed that we were prepared to sell urgently needed Iranian Air Force so are parts against new money from the PGOI totalling $5.5 million. The MOND was informed that similar arrangements could be made for the Navy, the ground forces and Army Aviation. Additional details on this arrangement for urgently needed spare parts had been provided by letter of July 30 to Brigadier General Emanian. For some reason, the PGOI had not completed arrangements for all necessary freight forwarding agents as of the end of September. As of October 9, however, the Arya Shipping line had been designated by the Iranian Navy and Army to carry their spare parts and other bulk shipments. These shipments should start moving soon. Contract arrangements for shipment of Iranian Air Force parts are only now being completed by the PGOI. When this is done spare parts under both the emergency program and those in the Trust Fund financed pipeline can move. FMS helicopter spare parts are currently being prepared for shipment based on arrangements worked out in late September by General Safari. These parts are expected to reach McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey later this month for pick-up by IIAF aircraft. Bell Helicopter has about 90,000 pounds of FMS related spares for delivery to McGuire under this arrangement. Bell Helicopter also has about 110,000 pounds of commercial spares for delivery and is trying to work out charter flight for these spares. Earlier, Bell Helicopter had shipped at its own expense a quantity of spares by one C-130 and one DC-8. During the meetings with Dr. Yazdi in New York on October 4, U.S. military representatives reviewed these and other matters. General Safari was informed that a list of all material in the pipeline and a list of closed FMS cases had earlier been provided to the PGOI. U.S. representatives reiterated our invitation to MOND officials to travel to Denver, if they wished, to review each and every FMS case file.

US posture throughout regarding the Trust Fund has been to work to ensure that its solvency could be assured at all times as the Provisional Government of Iran (PGOI) scale down its procurement and looks toward a new military procurement program from the U.S. at a reduced level. This effort was made in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding with Iranian authorities of February 3, 1979, that provided for major revisions in the purchase of military materiel from the U.S. Involved were agreed cancellations, terminations, and reductions of several major programs -- all designed to meet the interests of both governments in assuring the solvency of the Trust Fund. Insolvency of the Trust Fund would have caused termination of the entire Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for Iran, with the risk of very substantial termination liability costs for Iran. A i. A major element in that approach was the diversion to U.S. procurement of the Spruance class destroyers (CG-993's), resulting in July in sufficient funds being placed in the Trust Fund to ensure its continued solvency. As part of this continuing effort to ensure fullest possible U.S.-Iran understanding on the status of the Trust Fund and all FMS cases therein, the total FMS community'in the was involved during the month of August in a case by case study of the financial status of the entire Trust Fund. Meetings were held in Washington and Denver (August 22-28) to review the results of this study. PGOI was invited to send representatives but declined. ARMISH/MAAG representatives participated in this meeting returning to Tehran in early September with a representative from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). This team then reviewed the Trust Fund and Memorandum of Understanding of February, 1979, with PGOI authorities (MOND, MFA and services). In early August (letter to Col. Kamkar of August 4) the PGOI was informed that non-sensitive FMS items in the pipeline and financed by the Trust Fund were ready to move, subject to shipping arrangements being arranged by the PGOI. Dear Mr. Ambassador: When we talked the other day you asked me for a piece of paper describing the status of spare parts deliveries as we see it. A piece of paper of this kind is attached. I hope it will be useful. I appreciated the opportunity to talk frankly about some of the problems in United States-Iranian relations. As the Secretary indicated to Dr. Yazdin in New York, our purpose is to work closely with your government in every way possible to build a relationship based on the new realities in Iran. With warm regards. Sincerely, Bruce Laingen Charge d'Affaires a.i. Enclosure His Excellency Amir Entezam, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Iran. cc: A/MAAG and DAO

7. ENTEZAM REFERRED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTRUST OF THE SOVIET UNION BY LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IS THE MOST ACTIVE IN TEHRAN, VISITING GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS DAILY WITH OFFERS OF ANY AND ALL KINDS OF ASSISTANCE. HE IS CONSISTENTLY REBUFFED BUT CONSISTENTLY SURFACES TO TRY AGAIN. SOVIET ACTIVITY IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO US POSTURE, ENTEZAM SAID, WHICH IN THE EYES OF MANY TOP IRANIANS, IS COMPLETELY PASSIVE. IN RESPONSE, DCM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE NOT TO TAKE US AT ITS WORD THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND MUTUAL INTEREST. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT ENTEZAM MIGHT CALL ON CHARGE LAINGEN WHEN NEXT IN TEHRAN TO DISCUSS US POLICY. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND NOTED HE WILL BE IN TEHRAN OCTOBER 9-17. 8. ENTEZAM LEFT FOR PARSI OCTOBER 6. A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE THERE WILL BE TO SET UP AN IRANIAN "NEWSPAPER" TO BE PUBLISHED IN GERMAN, FRENCH AND ENGLISH. FOR DISTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT ERUPOE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE SIMILAR TO AN OPERATION NOW CARRIED OUT IN WASHINGTON -- THE VOICE OF IRAN -- AND THE PURPOSE WAS TO DESCRIBE THE GOALS, METHODS, POLICIES AND PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION. 9. ENTEZAM WILL RETURN TO STOCKHOLM OCTOBER 18 AND WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN OSLO AND HELSINKI SHORTLY THEREAFTER. KENNEDY-MINOTT BT 4164 5. AS FOR NAZIH, ENTEZAM SAID HE IS "SAFE" IN HIDING. EXCELLENT LAWYER AND MANAGER BUT INDISCREET IN HIS COMMENTS. SEVERAL REMARKS IN A SPEECH BY NAZIH A MONTH AGO, EXPRESSING ANGER AND CASTING SUSPICIONS FOR SLOW ECONOMIC PROGRESS, SPELLED HIS DOOM IN OIL MONOPOLY. ENTEZAM SAID HE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF NAZIH "BELIEVE HE CAN BE SAVED." 4164 NNV ESA244E1B574 DO RUQNHR DE RUDKFMQ #4164/2 2821216 ZNY SSSSS ZZH 0 391139Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7953 INFO RUQNHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 261 ST SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4164 EXDIS 6. ENTEZAM'S FOCUS NEVER DEVIATED FAR FROM US-IRANIAN RELATIONS. HE DESCRIBED THE SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NE AND OTHER FOREIGN-EDUCATED, FOREIGN-TEAVLED IRANIANS WERE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF US FAILURE TO CONVEY THOSE SIGNALS WHICH WOULD INDICATE US ACCEPTANCE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND A WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE REVOLUTION ON BASIS OF EQUALITY AND RESPECT. ENTEZAM SAID THE US KNOWS EXACTLY HOW TO RESPOND TO CURRENT IRANIAN NEEDS --- AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS, AN UNBLOCKING OF IRANIAN FUNDS IN US, RAW MATERIALS FOR IRANIAN INDUSTRIES, ECT. WHILE US OFFICIALS IN TE BAN AND IN WASHINGTON MOUTH ENCOURAGING WORDS, THEY FAIL TO TAKE THE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THEM. THE SUSPICION GROWS AMONG THOSE WHO KNOW THE US BEST THAT WASHINGTON IS PLAYING A WAITING GAME. IF THAT IS THE STRATEGY, IT WILL FAIL, ENTEZAM SAID. IRAN HAS ITS SHARE OF DIFFICULTIES, THERE ARE ADMITTEDLY SERIOUS DIFFERENCES ON HOW FAR AND FAST TO PROCEED WITH THE REVOLUTION, EUT ALL ARE UNITED IN THE SENSE THAT "THE KING YOU SUPPORTED" OR ANY OTHER KING WILL NEVER BE ALLOWED TO GOVERN. THE US WILL PAY A HIGH PRICE FOR THIS WAITING GAME. ENTEZAM SHRUGGED OFF SUGGESTIONS THAT US LAWS AND NOT US POLICY WERE DELAYING SHIPMENTS TO IRAN, E.G., OF HELICOPTER SPARE PARTS. HE SAID THAT US SUCCESSFULLY FOUND WAYS TO PROVIDE WHAT THE SHAH WANTED, WHEN HE WANTED IT. THE US COULD EASILY -- "IN A MOMENT" -- FIND WAYS TO ASSIST TEHRAN NOW.

INNV 5A945EDA1115600 BUCNH NE RUDKFC #4164/1 239121 INY SSSSS ZZH 10 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7949 1 FO RU3 X HR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 260 S E C A E T S E C T I O N 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4154 E.O. 12255: RDS-4 12/9/99 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M IACS: PINT, PGOV, IN SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH ENTEZAM REF: (A) STATE 258415, (B) TEHRAN 1460 1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT) FILE COPY DUMMY CHRON 2. DON CALLED ON ENTEZAM TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, AS SUGGESTED REFTEL, ON OCTOBER 5. ENTEZAM'S WILLINGNESS TO DESCRIBE SPECIFIC CHANGES, SUCH AS NEW CABINET PERSONALITIES, HOWEVER, WAS CONSISTENTLY PUT ASIDE IN HIS DETERMINATION TO DISCUSS US-IRANIAN RELATIONS GENERALLY. HE LAVENTED AT LENGTH THE FAILURE OF U.S. TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH WOULD IMMEDIATELY IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF BAZARGAN AND THOSE AROUND HIM, LIKE ENTEZEN, WHO "DESPITE REBUFFS FROM US" ARE STILL DETERMINEDLY PRO-WEST, AND BEGIN TO SOFTEN THE ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, "THE LEADER WITH WHOM YOU (THE US) MUST GET ALONG." 3. IT WAS CLEAR AT AN EARLY POINT THAT ENTEZAM'S HEART AND MIND WERE NOT AND WOULD NOT BE FOCUSED ON DESCRIBING NEW CABINET MEMBERS. HE DID SAY THAT, LOOKED AT AS A WHOLE, CABINET CHANGES WOULD HARDLY AFFECT THE BASIC POLITICAL THRUST OF BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT OR DEVELOPMENTS IR IRAN. IF ANYTHING, NEW PERSONALITIES WOULD STRENGTHEN DETERMINATION TO CLEAN UP THE PAST AND GET ON WITH TASK OF CONVERTING IRAN IN NEXT SEVERAL YEARS INTO TRUE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. SEVERAL NEW MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY YADOLLAH SAHABI AND HIS SON, EZZATULLAH SAHABI, ARE CONSIDERED "VERY RELIGIOUS," AND HOPEFULLY, WILL HELP TO EASE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECULAR FIGURES AND CLERICS. 4. IN BRIEF TENNS, ENTEZAM RESPONDED TO NEW CARDNET NAMES AS FOLLOWS: -- CHAMRAN-BRILLIANT ENGINEER, ABSOLUTELY DEDICATED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT LEADER. SPENT 15 YEARS IN US, WORKED ON SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAMS AT BELL LABORATORIES UNTIL US "KICKED HIM OUT" FOR HIS POLITICAL VIEWS. CHAMRAN WILL BE ONE OF GREATEST LEADERS OF REVOLUTION. DESPITE HARSH TREATMENT EY US, CHAMRAN WANTS TO MAINTAIN OPEN DOOR TO US. "IT WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR YOUR COUNTRY TO IGNORE CHAMRAN AND IRAN'S (DEFENSE) NEEDS." --FOROUHAR - EXCELLENT LAWYER, ABOUT 50, WAS A LEADER OF THE IRANIAN NATION MOVEMENT. --SEPAHBODI - MID-40'S, MEMBER OF FREEDOM PARTY "AS I AM." (ENTEZAM PROBABLY REFERRING HERE TO LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN - LMI.) --EZZATULLAH SAHAEI - ENGINEER, GRADUATE OF UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN, ABOUT 52. RESISTANCE MOVEMENT MEMBER WITH ENTEZAM. --BANIASSADI - EARLY 40'S GRADUATE OF US COLLEGE. --HABIBI - FREEDOM PARTY MEMBER, RESIDENCE IN FRANCE, ABOUT 48. --YADOLLAH SAHAPI - ABOUT 74, "VERY RELIGIOUS," FATHER OF EZZATULAH SAHAEI NNVV ESBO15DKC913 PP RUQMR DE RUDKFMQ #3538/2 2441015 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 010920Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7631 INFO RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4347 RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6852 RUDKSNO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5773 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2746 RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2735 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 257 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2922 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1421 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5300 BT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 STO CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3638 9. ENTEZAM WILL ARRIVE IN COPENEAGEN ON SEPTEMBER 4 FOR FOUR DAYS, DURING WHICH HE WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS. HE WILL SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEED TO OSLO, HELSINKI AND REYKJAVIK FOR SAME PURPOSE. 10. THROUGH CONVERSATION, ENTEZAM WAS EXTREMELY WARM, OPEN AND FRIENDLY YET VERY SERIOUS WHEN DISCUSSING CURRENT EVENTS IN IRAN. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US WOULD NEVER AGAIN ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO INSULATED FROM THE TRUTH FOR SUCH A LONG PERIOD AS 25 YEARS. HE SAID THE US COULD HAVE KNOWN THE TRUE FEELINGS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE BUT CERTAIN AMONG YOU DIDN'T WISH TO KNOW THE TRUTH. 1. ENTEZAM AND HIS WIFE, A FORMER STUDENT AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY, SPOKE WARMLY ABOUT THEIR RESIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA. ANVAR ENTEZAM IS A PETITE, BEAUTIFUL WOMAN WITH A FIN SENSE OF HUMOR AND AN OPEN AND AFFECTIONATE MANNER. SHE SPEAKS COLLOQUIAL AMERICAN ENGLISH AND IS A VERY CHIC DRESSER. THE ENTEZAM HAVE THREE CHILDREN, AGES 9, 7 AND 2. KENNEDY-MINOTT BT 3638

ENTEZAM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH DCM WHEN LATTER WAS CHARGE, AND WOULD, OF COURSE, WISH TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS. 8. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED SOME DISTASTE FOR SWEDISH MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY KURDISH SITUATION, AND OF ITS DESCRIPTION OF HIM. AS INDICATED REFTEL, SWEDISH PRESS HAS LAMBASTED ENTEZAM AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF KHOMEINI'S FANATICISM WHICH HAS LED TO BARBARIC CRUSHING OF KURDS. ENTEZAM SAID HE WAS UNHAPPY AS WELL WITH SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENT ON GOI'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL EFFORT AGAINST THE KURDS. BT 3638 SIGNALS, I.E., IRANIANS WITH TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS. HE SAID THERE WERE MANY MORE IRANIANS IN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY STUDENTS, THAN OFFICIAL STATISTICS INDICATED BECAUSE DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME MANY, IF NOT MOST, STUDENTS FEARED EXPOSURE TO IRANIAN EMBASSIES. HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT MANY IRANIAN STUDENTS ALSO HAD BEEN SAVAK AGENTS. THROUGH DISCUSSION GROUPS, SEMINARS AND PRESS CONFERENCES, ENTEZAM SAID, HE WOULD MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO REACH THESE IRANIANS. THE GOI, HOWEVER, WOULD BE UNABLE TO SUBSIDIZE THEIR RETURN TO IRAN OR PROMISE THEM "PROGRAMS" OR EMPLOYMENT WHEN THEY RETURNED. HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD RETURN OUT OF THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITH AND A SENSE OF NATIONALISM AND PRIDE. ENTEZAM ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE BETWEEN 3,000-3,500 IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SWEDEN, A CONSIDERABLY HIGHER FIGURE THAN HAS BEEN MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY. ENTEZAM DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN IRANIANS AND IRANIAN STUDENTS OF KURDISH ORIGIN IN SWEDEN. NOR DID HE MENTION THAT 200 KURDS HAD MARCHED ON HIS EMBASSY ON AUGUST 25 AND THAT THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF HIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN OCCUPIED THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK BY GROUP OF KURDISH STUDENTS ENGAGED IN HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST THE "CRUSHING" OF THE KURDS. 5. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY WAS CERTAIN THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MIXED UP "INDIRECTLY, NEVER DIRECTLY," WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S CURRENT REBELLION, WHICH HE THOUGHT THE ARMY WOULD SOON CRUSH. HE SAID THAT "KHOMEINI'S "CALL TO ARMS" WAS A NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT ACT AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE RESPONSE OF ALL TRUE IRANIANS. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS CAPABLE OF ERADICATING MARSIXT, LENINIST AND MAOIST THOUGHT AS WOULD BE SEEN AS EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE. WHEN ASKED HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE FOR SITUATION TO STABILIZE, HE SAID BETWEEN SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR. 6. ENTEZAM SAID THAT WHILE IRAN'S NEEDS ARE GREAT, THERE IS NO NEED FOR MORE ARMS SO MUCH AS A NEED FOR SPARE PARTS, PARTICULARLY FOR HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT. HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 HELICOPTERS GROUNDED BECAUSE OF IMPROPER MAINTENANCE AND UNAVILABILITY OF SPARE PARTS. RE TERMED THIS PARTICULAR NEED AS "VITAL." HE EXPLAINED THAT THE SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES FOR HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT WERE OVERLOADED WITH SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT BUT THAT THERE WAS A PAUCITY OF BASIC REQUIRED EARWARE. HE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WOULD HELP GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO US OFFICIALS AND AMBASSADOR ASSURED HIM THAT HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON. 7. ENTEZAM AND AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT A MASSIVE EFFORT WAS REQUIRED NOW TO EDUCATE BOTH IRANIANS AND AMERICANS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S RESPECTIVE PORBLEMS AND ABOUT EVENTS IN IRAN. AMBASSADOR ASSURED ENTEZAM OF HIS DESIRE TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIM.

001347 NNNNVV ESB016EIA309 PP RUQMR DE RUDKFMQ #3638/1 2440945 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 010920Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7630 INFO RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4046 RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6851 RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5772 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2745 RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2734 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 255 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2921 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1420 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5299 BT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3633 E.O. 12065: XDS-1 9/1/99 (KENNEDY-MINOTT, RODNEY) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, IR, SW SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH NEW AMBASSADOR OF IRAN REF: STOCKHOLM 3629 (NOTAL) 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ABBASS AMIR ENTEZAM, IRAN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN (AND THE OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES) CALLED ON AMBASSADOR AUGUST 30, LESS THAN 48 HOURS AFTER PRESENTING CREDENTIALS TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION, ENTEZAM COVERED THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS DIPLOMATIC MISSION, THE KURDISH REBELLION, US-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND HIS DISTASTE FOR THE SWEDISH MEDIA. END SUMMARY. 3. ABASS AMIR ENTEZAM, FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT AND LEADER OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, PRESENTED CREDENTIALS AS IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ON AUGUST 23 TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF. ON AUGUST 30, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, ENTEZAM PAID COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR AT RESIDENCE. IT WAS AN AMIABLE, OPENLY FRIENDLY MEETING, DURING WHICH ENTEZAM VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION ON THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS MISSION, US-IRANIAN RELATIONS, THE KURDISH PROBLEM, AND THE SWEDISH MEDIA. 4. SPEAKING IN A SERIOUS, NO-NONSENSE VEIN, ENTEZAM SAID A PRINCIPAL TASK FACING HIM IS TO UNDERTAKE EXTENSIVE TRAVEL THROUGHOUT EUROPE (THE IMPRESSION HE LEFT WAS ALL OF EUROPE) TO CONTACT AND EDUCATE TWO PRIMARY GROUPS OF IRANIANS ABOUT THE "REALITIES" AND "TRUTH" OF THE REVOLUTION: STUDENTS AND PROFES- POL CHARGE' ECON RF CHRON. JT UNCLAS CHANNEL CHECK RYRYRY ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 1234567890 BT #2250 [Handwritten: 666810] NNNNVV ESA513BRA209 OO RUQMR DE RUEHC #8664 2322247 ZNY SSSSS ZZH 0 202227Z AUG 79 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4159 INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2545 BT S E C R E T STATE 218664 NODIS CN 826 CHG CHRON [Handwritten: Return to BL] NODIS E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 8/20/99 (PRECHT, HENRY) TAGS: PINR, IR SUBJECT: BRIEFING 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. BRIEFING OFFICER ROBERT CLAYTON AMES WILL ARRIVE ON AF-168 AUGUST 21 AT 10:00 P.M. FROM PARIS. HE WILL HAVE A COURIER LETTER IN ORDER TO PROTECT BRIEFING MATERIALS IN HIS POSSESSION. AMES'S PASSPORT X135101 ISSUED JUNE 1, 1978, IN WASHINGTON. PLEASE MEET AND ASSIST. 3. IF FEASIBLE SUGGEST YOU CONDUCT REHEARSAL OF BRIEFING WITH AMES BEFORE GOING TO MEETING WITH IRANIANS. CHRISTOPHER BT #8664 [Handwritten: 3:00, who to?, -Miski first]

FLPKLLLTL A669E1E951 00 RUQMHR DE RUDKFMQ #3328 226141 ZNY SSSSSS ZZH 0 141342Z AUG 79 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC INNEDIATE 7444 INFO RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 2252 BT ROGER CHANNEL S E C R E T S T O C K H O L M 3328 EO 12065: XDS-4 8/14/99 (CANNEY, PAUL) OR-M TAGS: PINT, IR SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING REF: A) STATE 208779, B) CANNEY-PRECHT TELCON 1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT. 2. AS INDICATED REF B, ENTEZAM VILL RE IN TEHRAN AUGUST 18-22. HE DEPARTS STOCKHOLM AUGUST 15 FOR BONN "TO HELP SOLVE THE STUDENT PROBLEM" AND DEPARTS FRANKFURT AUGUST 17 FOR TEHRAN. 3. DCM CONVEYED PRECHT MESSAGE. EUTERAN SAID IT WOULD SITHER CALL DR. YAZDI BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR IRAN OR IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL THERE RE INTELLIGENCE REIETING. ENTERAN UNDER-STANDS THAT THE BRIEFING MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD IT BEEN SCHEDULED FOR FIFORD AFTER SIFT 10. ENTEZAM SAID CHARGE LAINGEN WOULD HE CONTACTED AFTER HIS CONVERSATION WITH YAZDI TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS. PT #3323 CN 586 ROGER SUBJECT: INBILLIOINCE BRIFTING (5 - ENTIRE TEXT) 1. IS ASEING OUR CHARGE IN STOCKFOLM TO INFORM M THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE BRIEFING ANY FIER SEPTEMBER 12. THE CHARGE WILL ASK ENTEZAM FACT DR. YAZDI AND HAVE YAZDI CONTACT YOU SO THAT ACT DAY FOR THE BRIEFING CAN BE SET. WE ARE ING THIS PROCEDURE TO ASSURE THAT ENTEZAM AND YAZDI LLY COORDINATED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE HOLD NOT AT THIS TIME RAISE THE SUBJECT OF A VITE DR. YAZDI OR THE PRIME MINISTER. IT THE IS RAISED WITH YOU, YOU SHOULD ASK WHO WILL BE IZED TO ATTEND AND SAY THAT YOU WILL BE BACK IN AFTER FURTHER COMMUNICATION WITH WASHINGTON. IS POSSIBLE TEAT GEORGE CAVER IS MAKE ANOTHER STOCKHOLD INOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ENTEZAM DEFERRED APPROVAL FOR SUCH A T [?] IP PENDING ADDI- VIEW IN THE DEPARTMENT. COOPER

OF EIGHT 50-WATT TRANSMITTERS AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN TO BROADCAST "SUBVERSIVE" MATERIAL. MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION HAD LOCATED THEM AND CONFISCATED ALL GEAR. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS WERE A PROBLEM. IN ONE CASE, PGOI GAVE PERMISSION FOR OVERFLIGHT OF MADANZARAN AT 21,000 OF EIGHT 50-WATT TRANSMITTERS AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN TO BROADCAST "SUBVERSIVE" MATERIAL. MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION HAD LOCATED THEM AND CONFISCATED ALL GEAR. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS WERE A PROBLEM. IN ONE CASE, PGOI GAVE PERMISSION FOR OVERFLIGHT OF MADANZARAN AT 21,000 FEET. PLANE CAME IN AT 4000 AND EN ROUTE TO PERSISTANT GULF DROPPED AT LEAST ONE LARGE PACKET TO DISSISTENT KURDS. PGOI HAS IN HAND REQUESTS FOR BALUCHISTAN OVERFLIGHTS WHICH IT HAS NOT APPROVED. ENTEZAM SAID PGOI IS NOW CONVINCED GEORGE HABBASH WAS IN KHUZISTAN THREE TIMES AND HAS BEEN FINANCING ARABS THERE. 14. ENTEZAM SAID REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS CURRENTLY BT 6991 NNNVV ESB012BRA384 OO RUQMR DE RUEHC #6391/03 2210223 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 090031Z AUG 79 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3943 INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2501 BT S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 03 STATE 206891/03 NODIS REVIEWING TWO ALTERNATE ECONOMIC PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF COUNTRY. ENTEZAM SAID PLAN HE HIMSELF HAD ORGANIZED CALLS FOR MORE DEEP-CUTTING MEASURES TO PUT TWO TO THREE MILLION BACK TO WORK. ALTERNATIVE PLAN CALLS FOR LESS STRINGENT ACTIONS TO GET 500,000 TO A MILLION OFF UNEMPLOYMENT ROLLS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT ON DETAILS. 15. BIO NOPE: IN CONVERSATION, FOLLOWING EMERGED: ENTEZAM GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN ENGINEERING IN 1955, THEN WORKED AS A CONSULTING ENGINEER UNTIL HE WENT TO PARIS FOR ELEVEN MONTHS IN 1963. FROM 1964-86 HE STUDIED AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, WHERE HE GOT AN M.A. IN ECONOMICS. HE WORKED IN US FROM 1955 UNTIL MARCH 1969, WHEN HE RETURNED TO TEHRAN AS A CONSULTING ENGINEER. HE SET UP HIS OWN FIRM IN 1971 WHICH HE HAS JUST DISBANDED. HE SOLD ALL HIS HOLDINGS EXCEPT THOSE IN SMALL FOOD PROCESSING OPERATION (FOR WHICH THE FEDAYAN ACCUSE HIM OF BEING A CAPITALIST). HE IS MARRIED, HAS ONE OTHER DAUGHTER ABOUT COLLEGE AGE, AND TWO YOUNGER SONS, ABOUT FOUR AND SIX. HIS WIFE WAS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT COMING TO STOCKHOLM, BUT HAS BEEN UNDERGOING SOME HOMESICKNESS RECENTLY. VANCE BT #6891

HAS SAID HE WOULD NOT. ENTEZAM THOUGHT THAT BAZARGAN WOULD BE A RELUCTANT CANDIDATE, BUT WOULD BE FORCED TO RUN, AND WOULD BE THE BEST CHOICE. FEDAYAN AND LEFT ARE NO REAL PROBLEM IF PGOI CAN ACT SERIOUSLY -- I.E., TAKE DECISIVE STEPS WHEN IT MUST. ENTEZAM WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH EXTERNAL SUPPORT BEING GIVEN BY SOVIETS, LIBYANS, AND IRAQIS TO VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS, PARTICU-LARLY KURDS AND KHUZISTAN ARABS. EXCEPT FOR EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM. ENTEZAM BELIEVES MOST ARE HAPPY WITH NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND EVEN KURDS BECAME WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WHEN PGOI MOVED ARMY FORWARD. 10. ENTEZAM DESCRIBED RESULTS OF RECENT SHUFFLE IN POI. HE SAID FIVE WHO WERE MOVED INTO PGOI FROM REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ARE NOW KNOWN, THOSE WHO WENT FROM GOVERNMENT TO COUNCIL ARE NOT. HE DECLINED TO GIVE NAMES FOR SECURITY REASONS. COUNCIL HAS STABILIZED WITH 25 MEMBERS AND WILL STAY THIS WAY. (NOTE: THIS IS MORE THAN OTHERS HAVE CLAIMED.) COMMUNICATION IS MUCH BETTER BETWEEN COUNCIL AND PGOI SINCE SHIFT. AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI BECAME DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER AND TOOK OVER REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS (PASDARAN) FROM DR. CHAMRAN, WHO BECOMES DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AS WELL AS A DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER. OTHER DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER IS AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI. ALSO GOING TO DEP. MIN. OF INTERIOR IS AYATOLLAH MAHDAVI-KANI, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF COMMITTEES AND FULFILLS SAME ROLE IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THIS HAS WORKED BETTER THAN ENTEZAM THOUGHT IT WOULD. 11. FIFTH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER GIVEN PGOI JOB IS ABDOL HASSAN BANI-SADR, WHO WAS ASKED TO BECOME DEP. ECON MIN IN CHARGE OF BANKING SYSTEM. HE REFUSED TITLE, BUT HAS GRUDGINGLY TAKEN ON JOB. ENTEZAM WAS ABSOLUTELY ACID ABOUT BANI-SADR, DESCRIBING HIM AS MENACE WHO WANTS TO TALK AND COMPLAIN, BUT DOES NOT WANT RESPONSIBILITY. HE HAD SIMILAR BUT LESS HARSH WORDS FOR HIS OLD ACQUAINTANCE SADEQ GHOTBZADEH OF NATIONAL RADIO/TV (NIRT), WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS SOLID KHOMEINI LOYALIST BUT ONE WHO IS "NOT AMENABLE" TO NECESSARY PGOI DIRECTION. 2. IN ADDITION TO CHAMRAN, ABDOLFAZL BAZARGAN (PM'S NEPHEW) AND SADEQ TABATABAI ARE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS. ABBAS SAMII IS NOW HEAD OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND FOREIGN MINISTER IAZDI'S YOUNGER BROTHER IS VICEMINISTER OF HEALTH. 13. ON SUBJECT OF EXTERNAL THREATS, ENTEZAM SAID PGOI HAD EVIDENCE OF SOVIET HANKY-PANKY, INCLUDING PLACEMENT NNVV ESB011BRA333 OO RUQMR DE RUEHC #6991/02 2210221 ZNY SSSSSS ZZH 0 090031Z AUG 79 ZFF5 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3942 INFO RUEADW// WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2520 BT S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 205391/02 NODIS A MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS MEN ON IT AND WILL BE EXPECTED TO FINISH DELIBERATIONS WITHIN A MONTH. ENTEZAM SAID CURRENT PLAN IS TO HAVE REFERENDUM ON CONSTITUTION IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND JOINT PRESIDENTIAL/PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS A MONTH OR SIX WEEKS LATER. KHOMEINI IS A GOOD MAN WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN "AKHOUNDISM" -- CLERICAL DOMINANCE OF EVERYTHING -- BUT HE IS UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM RADICALS AROUND HIM TO OUST THOSE WHO ARE MERELY "GOOD MOSLEMS" AND REPLACE THEM WITH CLERICS. ENTEZAM IS RESIGNED TO FACT THAT CLERICAL TYPES WILL PROBABLY WIN MORE THAN HALF OF SEATS IN NEW PARLIAMENT AND CAUTIONED US AND OTHERS THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH CLERICS FOR FOUR YEARS. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED HOPE (BUT WITH DOUBT IN HIS VOICE) THAT MODERATES COULD CONTINUE TO DOMINATE GOVERNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS. HE SEES THIS AS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL TO RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN MIDDLE CLASS AND GETTING ECONOMY GOING. 8. IN REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTION ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S EMERGENCE, ENTEZAM PASSED MATTER OFF, SAYING BAKHTIAR WAS "PROBABLY TRYING TO PROMOTE THE BOOK HE'S WRITING." HE SAW BAKHTIAR AS NO THREAT TO THE PGOI. NATIONAL FRONT AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT SIMPLY CAN'T COMPETE WITH RELIGIOUS PARTIES AT POLLS, AND THEY ARE NOT PRONE TO VIOLENCE. KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY UNDER AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI WILL EMERGE AS STRONGEST GROUP. THIS BOTHERS ENTEZAM, SINCE BEHESHTI AND AYATOLLAHS RAFSANJANI AND MOUSAVVI ARE PRINCIPAL AMONG THOSE URGING KHOMEINI TO TURN TO CLERICS FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR KHOMEINI TO MOVE TO TEHRAN. WHERE PGOI COULD SEE HIM MORE THAN THREE HOURS EVERY WEEK. 9. ☐N QUESTION OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, ENTEZAM SAID TALEQANI AND BEHESHTI WILL RUN, EVEN THOUGH TALEQANI

REVOLUTION TO KEY FIGURES AND DEAL WITH PROBLEMS THAT EMERGE IN ALL COUNTRIES. ONLY AMBASSADORS APPOINTED TO DATE ARE EITHER "RELIGIOUS FANATICS" OR CAREER MEN WHO ARE NOT CLOSE TO REVOLUTION. HE PICKED SWEDEN AS BASE BECAUSE THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO REPEAT NO PROBLEMS IN SWEDISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS, AND THIS GIVES HIM ROOM TO MOVE AROUND. 7. ENTEZAM WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN IRANIAN POLITICS. RECENT SHIFT OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCILMEN TO PGOI AND VICE VERSA WAS CASE WHERE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL "GOT MORE THAN IT GAVE, VIS-A-VIS PGOI. NEWLY ELECTED COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS BT 6891 TOUCH WITH PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY EVERY 15 - 20 DAYS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PUSH FOR A MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI; C) EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE LATER IN FALL, PERHAPS WEEN NEW PERMANENT ADMINISTRATION IS IN PLACE. ENTEZAM MADE PITCH FOR SOMEONE LIKE RICHARD COTTAM OR RAMSAY CLARK TO BE US AMBASSADOR. 4. ENTEZAM SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL THINGS US COULD DO TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SINCERITY TOWARD NEW REGIME. THESE WOULD HELP PGOI DEAL WITH THOSE BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHO REMAINED DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF US PAST: A) PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ANY INTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI WITH OUTSIDE SUPPORT; B) BE AS HELPFUL IN ARRANGING FOR SPARE PARTS FOR IRANIAN MILITARY; C) CANCEL "PENALTY CLAUSES" TOTALING DOLS 1.3 BILLIONS DOLLARS (SIC); D) ASSIST IRANIAN INDUSTRIES TO GET FAW MATERIALS -- SOME US COMPANIES HAD REFUSED TO SEND MATERIALS AND TECHNICIANS; AND E) OPEN UP US VISA PROCESSING OPERATION IN TEHRAN -- THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS WANTED TO GO TO THE US. ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY WANTS MORE STUDENTS TO GO TO THE US AND OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES. HE CITED EXAMPLE OF INDIA, WHICH TOOK 5000 IRANIAN STUDENTS THIS YEAR INSTEAD OF NORMAL 1500, AND HOPED US COULD FOLLOW THAT EXAMPLE. 5. STEMPEL SAID HE WOULD REPORT ENTEZAM'S SUGGESTIONS AND URGED PGOI TO CONTACT EMBASSY ON PROBLEMS OF MILITARY SPARES AND COMPANY NEEDS. IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE NO HOLDUPS EXCEPT PERHAPS IN SOME CASES WHERE BILLS HAD NOT BEEN PAID. ON QUESTION OF TECHNI- CIANS, STEMPEL NOTED THAT REVOLUTIONARY COURT ACTIVITIES AGAINST FOREIGNERS--HOLDING PEOPLE IN JAIL AND IN COUNTRY--GOT AROUND US BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND DID NOT HELP CONTEXT. ON QUESTION OF ISSUING VISAS, ENTEZAM WAS TOLD THAT NEW US FACILITY WOULD BE READY TOWARD END OF AUGUST, BUT THAT SECURITY SITUATION HAD TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE IT COULD BE FULLY OPENED. THIS MEANT PRESENT EMBASSY GUARDS HAD TO GO AND BE REPLACED BY UNIFORMED POLICE OR ARMY OUTSIDE US COMPOUND. ENTEZAM TOOK NOTE, AND SAID EE WOULD WORK TO RESOLVE SITUATION "COMPLETELY TO YOUR SATISFACTION" ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO TEHRAN IN A WEEK TO TEN DAYS. STEMPEL URGED HIM TO CONSULT CHARGE LAINGEN UPON ENTEZAM'S RETURN TO TEHRAN. 6. ENTEZAM INDICATED HE IS SERVING AS PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL SUPER AMBASSADOR FOR EUROPE TO EXPLAIN

NODIS NNNVV ESB010BRA391 OO RTOQMRR DE RUEHC #6391/01 2213220 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 090031Z AUG 79 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMRR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3941 INFO RUBADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2499 BT SEC R E T SECTION 31 OF 03 STATE 206891/31 NODIS E.O.12065: KDS-4, 8/7/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, IR SUBJECT: TALKS WITH AMIR ENTEZAM SUMMARY: ENTEZAM HAD SUGGESTIONS FOR GRADUALLY IMPROVING IRAN-US TIES. HE IS SERVING AS KIND OF "SUPER AMBASSADOR" FOR NEW PGOI IN EUROPE. ENTEZAM IS CONCERNED ABOUT RADICAL RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT AND ON KHOMEINI. CONSIDERABLE FRICTION EXISTS BETWEEN HIGHLY RELIGIOUS RADICALS AROUND KHOMEINI AND MERELY "GOOD MOSLEMS" IN LIBERATION MOVEMENT WHO ARE RUNNING GOVERNMENT. ENTEZAM SLOUGHED OFF RECENT BAKHTIAR REEMERGENCE AS NO MAJOR EVENT. SECURITY AGAINST LEFTISTS WILL BE NO PROBLEM IF PGOI CAN ACT "SERIOUSLY." ENTEZAM COMMENTED ON ELECTIONS, PGOI ORGANIZATION, EXTERNAL THREATS TO PGOI, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. MAJOR NEW ECONOMIC PROPOSALS FOR RECOVERY PROGRAM NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BIO NOTES. END SUMMARY. 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. ON AUGUST 5, FSO STEMPEL FLEW TO SWEDEN TO ELICIT VIEWS OF IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTEZAM ON PRESENT IRANIAN SITUATION. ABOUT FOUR AND A HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD OVER TWO DAYS. FOLLOWING CABLE REPORTS HIGHLIGHT OF THESE TALKS, ARRANGED BY SUBJECT MATTER. 3. AFTER STEMPEL OPENED CONVERSATION WITH ASSURANCES OF US GOOD WILL TOWARD POOL, BRIEF DISCUSSION OF US TIES FOLLOWED. MAJOR POINTS MADE BY ENTEZAM WERE: A) NORMALIZATION SHOULD PROCEED SLOWLY TO EASE SUSPICIONS OF THOSE ILL-DISPOSED TO THE US; B) IN TERMS OF CONTACTS WITH NEW POOL, PROBABLY BEST THING TO DO IS TO KEEP IN 6. ON TIMING, WI WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH WEEK OF AUGUST 20, ASSUMING BRIEFER COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE HERE ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. CHARGE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON BEGINNING AUGUST 27, IF PRESENT PLANS CONFIRMED. ALTERNATIVE TO THESE DATES MIGHT BE WEEK BEGINNING SEPT 10. 7. I AM A FIT CURIOUS ABOUT RAISING THIS ISSUE WITH PM BAZARGAN DUEING COURTESY CALL AUGUST 11. INFSS I CAN BE SURE THAT ENTEZAM WILL BY THAT TIME HAVE INFORMED PM OF HIS EXCHANGE WITH STEMPEL AND CAVE. REFIEL IS NOT S E C R E T TETRAK 3946 S E C R E T TEHRAN 8946 CLEAR WHETHER BAZARGAN (AND OTHERS MENTIONED) IS BEING INFORMED OF THE PROPOSED EXERCISE NOW OR WILL BE ONLY AFTER FIRST SESSION IN TEHRAN. I CAN DO SOME PROBING LURING CONVERSATION BUT ANY CLARIFICATION FROM DEPT WOULD HELP. LAINGENBT S E C R E T TEHRAN 8346

216/Pol/B/S/14 ROGER CHANNEL C 091225Z AUG 79 FM AMEMBASSY T TEHRAN 10 SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3122 BT S E C R E T TEHRAN 08946 CHRGR: STATE S/9 A FR/ CH/LBLAI/GEN CH/LAINGEN/BJ CJAR: PCI:VITC4SETH DISTR: CH3 ROGER CHANNEL SPECIAL ENCRYPTION B.C. 12065: XIS-4 S/7/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.) (R-M TAGS: PGOV, PINS SUBJ: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH PGOI REF: STATE 206729 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT: ACTION CABLE) 2. EXCHANGE BETWEEN ENTEZAM AND FSO STEMPEL IS VERY MUCH WHAT WE EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ENTEZAM'S EARLIER APPROACH TO BOTH NAAS (TEHRAN 05481) AND ME (TEHRAN 07299). I THINK WE WILL WANT TO FEEL OUR WAY RATHER CAREFULLY ON THIS EXERCISE, MAKING FIRST BRIEFING FULL ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE OUR BONA FIDES BUT RECOGNIZING ALSO THAT SOME DISCRETION IN FIRST ROUND IS APPROPRIATELY IN WHAT IS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUSINESS THAT INVOLVES A CAST OF CHARACTERS AND A SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ABOUT WHICH OUR INFORMATION IS STILL LIMITED. 8. WE THINK THE EMPHASIS IN ANY INITIAL BRIEFINGS AS TO POSSIBLE INTERNAL THREATS TO THE PGOI SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO SUCH THREATS. DRAWING THE LINE SUFFICIENTLY SO AS TO KEEP US OUT OF INTERNAL MACHINATIONS, WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE PGOI, WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT IT MUST BE A CONTINUING EFFORT. 4. WHILE PROBABLY DIFFICULT AT THE OUTSET, WE SHOULD TRY TO SEE THIS EXERCISE EVOLVE IN WAY THAT WILL BRING SOME INTELLIGENCE RETURN TO US AS WELL; E.G., ON PGOI POLICY TOWARD IRAQ, IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS IN AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE PGOI, THE TUDEH, ETC. 8. WE AGREE WITH CAVE'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO ENTEZAM'S IDEA OF HAVING A PERMANENT CONTACT IN TEHRAN TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. HAVING BRIEFER COME FROM WASHINGTON WILL HELP OUR COVER ARRANGEMENTS HERE. HOWEVER WE COULD REEXAMINE THIS WHEN WE SEE HOW THE EXERCISE DEVELOPS. 4. CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT CONCERNED WITH QUESTION OF DATES. ENTEZAM RULED OUT WEEK OF AUGUST 27, SINCE HE MUST PRESENT CREDENTIALS IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 28. MATTER WAS LEFT THAT USG WOULD GET BACK TO ENTEZAM THROUGH US CHARGES IN STOCKHOLM WHETHER BRIEFING COULD BE WEEK OF AUGUST 28 OR IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. ENTEZAM SAID US WOULD BE PRESENT IN TEHRAN FOR FIRST BRIEFING, OUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR SUBSEQUENT ONES. IN RESPONSE TO USG CONCERN FOR SECURITY, ENTEZAM SAID RECIPIENTS OF INFORMATION AROUND DE LIMITED TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, ENTEZAM FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI, AND ONE OTHER WHOM ENTEZAM WOULD NAME LATER WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL. CAVE UNDERLINED FACT THAT MUCH SENSITIVE MATERIAL COULD NOT BE REDUCED TO PAPER BUT COULD ONLY BE PROVIDED ORALLY. ENTEZAM HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS. 5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REACTION TO THIS EXCHANGE AND ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE AS TO HOW WE PROCEED. WOULD YOU WISH TO PAUSE SCHEDULING ON BRIEFING AND MODALITIES WITH PRIME MINISTER WHEN YOU SEE HIM AUGUST 11? VANCE BT

D 823497 A11C 79 PM SECSTATE WASPOC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 30AA PT S F C R F T STATE 206720 ROGER CHANNEL SPECIAL ENCPYPTION E.0.12065 XDS-4, P/7/00 (STFMDEL, JOHN D.) PCCU, PINS SHEJECT: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH POOT SUMMARY: PGOI VERY MUCH WISHES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE THREATS TO PGOI. VENUE WILL BE TEHRAN. DATE REMAIN TO BE SET. END SUMMARY. 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. DURING DISCUSSIONS (SEPTEMBER, NODUS) BETWEEN IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN ENTEZAM AND ESO STEMPEL IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 5, AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED STRONG CONTINUING POOL INTEREST IN EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH US DECARDING POSSIBLE INTERNAL THREATS TO POOL WITH EVIDACION ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT. ENTEZAM DHT SUCH DISCUSSION AT TOP OF HIS LIST OF SUGGESTIONS FOR US ACTIONS WHICH WOULD GRADUALLY LEAD TO IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. US SAID DECISION TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN PERSONALLY APPROVED BY KHOMEINI. 3. FOLLOWING DAY STEMPEL INTRODUCED FORMER TEHRAN CFR OFFICER GEORGE CAVE TO ENTEZAM FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING WHAT BRIEFING WOULD INVOLVE AND MODALITIES. CAVE OUTLINED SENSITIVE NATURE OF MATERIAL AND NEED IF CLOSEST CONFIDENCE. ENTEZAM SAID ROOT WISHED TO HAVE SUCH EXCHANGES IN TEHRAN WHERE THEY WOULD BE CLOSED TO SCENE OF ACTION. CAVE SAID USEG WOULD SEND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING OFFICER TO TEHRAN. US CHARGE IN TEHRAN WOULD COORDINATE EVENT. ENTEZAM SAID BE HOPED THIS WOULD BE CONTINUING BUSINESS. AND CAVE SAID USE SAW IT AS SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT BE DONE EVERY THREE TO SIX MONTH, WITH SPOT INFORMATION BEING PASSED IF PARTYHOLAPLY IMPORTANT. ENTEZAM ASKED IF THERE COULD BE A CONTACT IN TEHRAN TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR PASS. CAVE SAID THAT WAS SUBJECT FOR FURTHER THERMAL WAS NO ONE THERE NOW. (NOTE: CAVE WAS INTRODUCED AS SENIOR BRIEFING OFFICER FROM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. TERM CIA WAS NEVER USED.) NNNVV ESBOO2BRA447 DE RUEHC #0710 2141517 EZZ SSSSS ZNY 021439Z AUG 79 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5209 INFO RUQMBR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3832 BT CN 120 S E C R E T S T A T E 200710 E.0. 12065:GDS 8/1/95 (PRECHT, HENRI) TAGS: PEPR, IR, SW SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM REF: STOCKHOLM 3147 1 [?] (S - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. STEMPEL WILL ARRIVE SUNDAY, AUGUST 5 VIA NORTHWEST FLIGHT NO. 30 AT 9:15 A.M., AND WILL DEPART ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 7. PLEASE MEET AND LODGE, AND ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM PREFERABLY LATE ON SUNDAY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW-UP MEETING ON MONDAY. CHRISTOPHER BT #0710

ANDGOI POLICY. THE PEOPLE OF IRAN HAVE LONG SUSPECTED AND FEARED SOVIET ENCROACEMENT AND SIMILAR WARNINGS HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO MOSCOW. 3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, ENTEZAM SAID HE PLANS TO BE AN ACTIVE AMBASSADOR, NOT ONLY IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES TO WHICH HE WILL BE ACCREDITED, BUT AS A ROVING AMBASSADOR THROUGHOUT EUROPE. HE IMPLIED THAT, AS A FORMER HIGH OFFICIAL OF GOI, HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY TEHRAN TO KEEP A CLOSE WATCH OVER IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH ALL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ( AS WELL AS IRANIAN AMBASSADORS IN THESE CAPITALS). THE PURPOSE, HE SAID, WAS TO LIFT THIS PARTICULAR POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN FROM THE SHOULDERS OF THE DAZARCHAN GOVERNMENT. HE MENTIONED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE MOST PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO VISIT WEST GERMANY SOON TO CLEAR UP A SMALL PROBLEM." IN SWEDEN, HE PLANS TO MEET REGULARLY WITH COUNTRY-MEN HERE (MOST ARE IN THE STUDENT COMMUNITY) TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT ALL IRANIANS, INCLUDING THOSE IN COMMUNIST PARTY, CAN WORK FOR THE GOOD OFIRAN. THUS FAR HE HAS MET WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED IRANIAN STUDENTS TO REQUEST THEIR COOPERATION AND TO EXPLAIN WHY IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO SUSPEND FOR A PERIOD THE GOI'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR STUDIES. ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD WEED OUT THE "PROFESSIONAL" STUDENTS AS WELL AS THE ACADEMICALLY POOR STUDENTS AND WILL EVENTUALLY PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE WITH GOOD RECORDS. 4. ENTEZAM RECALLED HIS TIME IN NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN THE EARLY '50'S. A GOOD FRIEND OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AT THAT TIME IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS POLITICAL OFFICER RICHARD COTTAM (PHONETIC, ENTEZAM NOT SURE OF SPELLING). HE SAID COTTAM WAS ONE OF THE PEW AMERICAN DIPLOMATS WHO UNDERSTOOD AT THE TIME THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE US INSISTENCE ON PUTTING THE SHAN IN POWER. ENTEZAM SAID COTTAM MAINTAINED HIS INTEREST IN IRAN, HAD MET KHOMEINY IN PARIS LAST OCTOBER AND HAD VISITED TEHRAN IN NOVEMBER. HE THOUGHT COTTAM WAS NOW TEACHING AT AN EAST COAST UNIVERSITY (POSSIBLY PRINCETON OR PENNSILVANIA), AND HE REMARKED ON WHAT A WISE STEP WOULD BE TAKEN, IN HIS VIEW, IF THE US WERE TO APPOINT COTTAM AS THE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO IRAN. 5. IN WELCOMING ENTEZAM TO STOCKHOLM, CHARGE ASSURED HIM OF THE EMBASSY'S INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH HIS MISSION, EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL WHENEVER APPROPRIATE. ENTEZAM SAID HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THIS EARLY CONTACT AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PASS TO HIM WHATEVER "NEW INFORMATION OF MUTUAL INTEREST" MIGHT BECOME AVAILABLE. 6. COMMENT: CHARGE LAINGEN'S DESCRIPTION OF ENTEZAM AS A CHARMING INTELLIGENT, AND HIGHLY ARTICULATE REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IS COMPLETELY ACCURATE. ENTEZAM IS INDEED ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US AND SEEMS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN HELPING TO RESTORE GOOD US-GOI BILATERAL RELATIONS. EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH ENTEZAM AS FREQUENTLY AS POSSIBLE. CANNEY NNNNNV ES8005E1A235 OO RUQMER DE RUDKPMQ #3159 2131430 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R #11358Z AUG 79 PM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7343 INFO RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 250 RUBKPNO/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 6802 RUBKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4013 RUBKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5726 RUBISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 2712 BT KO 12065: GBS 8/1/85 (CANNEY PAUL F) OR-M TAGS: PEPR IR SW SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH IRANIAN AMBASSADOR AMIR ENTEZAM REF: TEHRAN 8089 (NOTAL), B) STATE 198660 (NOTAL), C) STOCKHOLM 3147 (NOTAL) 1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. CHARGE MET WITH AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM AFTERNOON JULY 31 IN ENTEZAM'S OFFICE. THE FORMER BEPUTI PRIME MINISTER IN IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT ARRIVED IN STOCKHOLM IN LATE JULY AND WILL BE ACCREDITED TO THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES (RESIDENT IN STOCKHOLM). HE IS SCHEDULED TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS TO KING CARL XVI GUSTAF ON AUGUST 28. ENTEZAM RECALLED HIS STUDENT DAYS AT BERKELEY, HIS GENUINE ADMIRATION FOR MANY AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION OVER US POLICY IN IRAN OVER PAST 25 YEARS, AND HIS DETERMINATION NOW TO HELP REBUILD GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE EMPHASIZED REPEATEBY THAT RAPPROCEMENT COULD ONLY COME ABOUT ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT, NO US INTERFERENCE IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NO DISTURBANCE OF IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE. HE SAID US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY CONFUSED POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN TODAY. DESPITE THE DAY TO DAY BACK AND FORTH, THE IRANIANS ARE BUILDING, ALBEIT PAINFULLY SLOWLY, AN ISLAMIC MODEL WHICH, SEVERAL YEARS HENCE, OTHER COUNTRIES WILL WISH TO DUPLICATE IRAN WISHES GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND OTHERS, BUT THEY WILL BE DEVELOPED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR IRAN, ITS ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. IF THE US HAS NOT LEARNED A LESSON FROM THE REVOLUTION AND ATTEMPTS ARE MADE NOW OR LATER TO REKINDLE THE KINDS OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH EXISTED UNDER THE SHAN, THE ENMITI TOWARD THE US MANIFESTED OVER THE PAST HIX MONTHS WILL BECOME A PERMANENT FEATURE OF IRANIAN PUBLIC OPINION

2. SPONSOR PE LEFT THAN FOR HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT AS AMBALSADDER IN STOCKHOLM, AMIS TOLLAH TOLD OUT CHAPING THAT IT WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO THE WITH US OFFICIALS ONCE HE WAS OUTSIDE OF IRAN. AS OLD OF MEH THE MEMORED OF THE POOL INTERNAL CIRCLE WHILE HE WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, ENTFIZAM COULD, IF HE WAS KILLING, IMPROVE OUR INDUSTRIALING OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE. 3. IF YOU PRECISE NO ORALFECTION, NOOTD YOU FIVE IN RALLY OBSERVATIVITY TO MEET WITH DIM AND TO PAISSE THE ALLOWING POINTS DISQUALITY 1 - The AMBASSADOR THE TREND NOT A FOLD IN CHINA AND NO WORLD IN MILLION NO SMOKING THORAT MOLTIPIE AND IT SOON WITH THE CHAMBERING. IT IS A MARINE COOLING MOLTIPIE ON TELLATTIY SHOP NOTHING IT COOLS IN HARDEN AND DISCOLLED NNNFAYMCVV ESA257BRA466 RR RUQMHR DE RUEHC #6468 2001153 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 191014Z JUL 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5068 INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3538 19 Jul 191152 C O N F I D E N T I A L S T A T E 186468 E.O. 12065:E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/9/99 (MCAFEE, WILLIAM) TAGS:PINR, IR, SW SUBJECT: (U) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN, ABAS AMIR-ENTEZAM REF: A) STOCKHOLM 2492, B) TEHRAN 6550 1. (C) THE DEPARTMENT HAS LITTLE TO ADD TO REFTEL B. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO STOCKHOLM, HOWEVER, THAT AMIR- ENTEZAM ALWAYS MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, FOR WHOM HE SAYS HE HAS MUCH RESPECT. HE ALSO CLAIMS TO HAVE FRIENDS ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES. 2. (LOU) THE DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, OR PHOTOGRAPHS, THAT BECOME AVAILABLE ON AMIR-ENTEZAM DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT TO STOCKHOLM. EVALUATIVE COMMENTS ON HIS PERFORMANCE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. VANCE 6468 NNEXO

DE RUQMHR #8089 212 ** ZNY CCCCC 2ZH O 310423Z JUL 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2971 INFO RUDIFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLA 2011 BT CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL CH3GE: STATE 7/31 APPRV: CHG: LBLAINGEN DRFTD: CHG:LBLAINGEN/BJH CLEAR: NONE DISTR: CHG POL RF CHRON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 28289 E.O. 12065: TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, IR SUEJ: NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN REF: TEHRAN 7315 (NOTAL), STATE 198050 FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT TO THE DEPT OF CABLE SENT JULY 15 1. I HAVE SENT YOU A LETTER TELLING YOU ABOUT IRAN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN (WHO WILL ALSO BE ACCREDITED TO THE OTHER FOUR SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES). HOWEVER THE POUCH SERVICE FROM HERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY SLOW TO YOUR PART OF THE WORLD AND SO I OUGHT TO ALERT YOU TO HIS ARRIVAL THERE THIS PAST WEEK. 2. ABBAS AMIR ENTEZAM, WHO WAS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HERE AND ALSO GOVERNMENT SPOKES-MAN, IS A CHARMING MAN, URBANE AND WESTERN IN STYLE AND HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE U.S., BUT HE HAS ALSO BEEN AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY INNER CIRCLE. JUST WHY HE HAS LEFT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR TO US AND ANYTHING YOU CAN PICK UP ON THAT SUBJECT FROM HIM WOULD BE USEFUL. HE IS ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH US, SO I AM SURE HE WILL SEEK YOU OUT AT AN EARLY DATE. WE COMMEND HIM WARMLY. LAINGEN NNNNN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 8089 Dear Mr. Ambassador: Thank you again for sharing time in your busy schedule to permit me to see you before your departure. Your kindness was a further indication to me of what I believe continues to be a good reservoir of friendship toward my country in Iran. I have written to each of our Ambassadors in Scandinavia telling them of your appointment and your impending arrival there. I know they will welcome seeing you. Again, my best wishes for your success in your new assignment. I look forward very much to seeing you on your first visit back to Tehran. With warm regards, Sincerely yours, L. Bruce Laingen Charge d'Affaires a.i. His Excellency Abbas Amir Entezam, Deputy Prime Minister, Tehran.

CONFIDENTIAL Having said all that, we confess to being without real intelligence as to his departure. He will we meeting and talking with you, and we would welcome anything you can tell us about his views and composure from that distance. Indeed, anything that he might have to offer on the inner circles of the leadership here and their inter-relationship will be of interest to us. With warm regards, Sincerely yours, L. Bruce Laingen Charge d'Affaires a.i. cc: Hon. Richard A. Ericson, Jr. Hon. Louis A. Lerner Hon. Warren D. Manshel Hon. Rozanne L. Ridgway Tehran, Iran July 10, 1979 CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL - INFORMAL The Honorable Rodney Kennedy-Minott American Ambassador Stockholm, Sweden Dear Mr. Ambassador: You will soon have an Iranian colleague in the person of Abbas Amir Entezam, formerly Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman here, who has been named by his government to be Ambassador to Sweden with accreditation to Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland, as well. Lucky man! I am sending copies of this letter to each of your colleagues in these other four countries. We will send you separately some biographic information about Entezam. Briefly, he is an unusually polished and urbane and westernized Iranian, very much in the inner circle of the revolution here in Iran, but hardly a revolutionary in style or appearance. He has spent considerable time in our country and knows and likes the United States very much. You will like him. One of the more frequently posed questions on the diplomatic circuit here currently is, "Why is Entezam leaving?" We don't have a very good answer to that yet. We has said to some of us here that he might be in a better position to answer that in Stockholm than here. The assumption is that his departure is to some degree at least a product of intrigue and maneuvering within the inner circles of the revolution and it has resulted in his feeling more comfortable outside Iran at the moment. He tells us that he intends to continue to be actively involved and interested in what goes on here, albeit at a distance. CONFIDENTIAL

POLY PM AMIA TETZM TULA SOANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES- STRONALLY WHPN E SAK LIM FOR TO SHARE ON BOTH IRANIAN I ITEMATIONS TOWARD IRAN. BUSINESS OF TELLING THE DIARSTIC POLITICS. BUT SIRING WHETHER THERE IS ON THE IRAQ REQUEST. DISNEY LIS GONGERN OVER IRAQI (AAS (AUFA)) AND THAT BAZAFIAN IS OCCASION WITH SULLIVAN. IN THE VIEW GEAR THAT HIS CON�TIN S OF THE DATED LEADERSHIP AND IMPREZED THAT HE SAW AS A THE POOL AND THE U.S. 1. THE RESPONSE TO GENERAL REPORTING AVAILABLE HERE. i. THE REPORTING SECTION THERE ON SEVERAL INFORMATION THE ILOUR INTEREST IN IRAN REPORTS OF ESCALATING I ADDEND THAT I WOULD WE ARE IN A FOUNDATION TOWN OF LAMINGH LAPARTON FOR SIOLOOLM ALCUR CONTACT FONT MIGHT XS. 95 SUGGESTED SPOERMAN SPORISMAN (NAVARSOAITS). LUI THE SOCIETY OF VOCAL IS ONLY A PALEABLE IN THE CHANGING ON THIS OVERVIEW. A POSITIONING RESPONSES WOULD BE IN THE CHANGING ON ASSESSMENT OF THE INNOVATION FOR THE DEMONSTRATION THAT VID FOR YOUR STUDY INTEREST IN BEAUTIFULTY IN COLLECTION ASSESSING THAT WHAT IS GOOD WAS

1.0000 10. INTERZAM INTIMATED THAT HIS DEPARTMENT NOT NECESSARILY MEAN AN END TO THE CHANGING COMMISSION THOUGHT HIMSELF BETWEEN THE POOL AND THE USS. IT MAY ACIXR, " HE SAID, " FOR US TO TALK FRANZ, THERE THAN IT IS LIKE OR WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON. MOREOVER, HE WOULD RETTAT REGULAR INTERVALS - EVERY TWO MONTHS OF SO-TO IRAN. IN I ASKED HIM ABOUT IRAN'S PLANS FOR AN INASSURCDER TO ARHINGTON, HE SAID THAT IF WOULD NOT BE AT THE OF MONTHS OF AND THEN IIMMATED THAT HE HIMSELF MIGHT BE INCOMITE. INFEZAM ALSO FINISHED ME FOR INFORMATION OF IT WAS GOING ON IN INSIGNING COUNTRIES, FESPICIALE CHAYHIM A VERY GYNAMATIC IN THE OF COURTESYMENT OF THIS ANGRING THAILAND THE PGOI. THE PM AND THE CABINET HAI APPROACHED IN CHILTON HUNDREDS OF TIMES," HE SAID, BUT SAIL TWO WEEKS SABILLED IN THE POI AND DECIDED TO TALE A FIRM STAND, NOTHING DAL SEEN ACCOMPLISHED. HE SAID THAT THE POI WANT TO RETURN CONDITIONS TO NORMAL JUST AS QUICKLY AS NOSSIS AND RELICITED THAT "WITHIN A WEEK OR TWO" THEY ACCOUNTED UPON IN RECENT MEETING WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY LEAD. THE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. ENTEZAM SAIT. I FOR TO MY QUESTION THAT PM RATTERING BETTERS IS JOB THROUGH THE WORLD OF JOURNEY. THE FIM AS THE IDEAL FOR THE JOB THE HAS. TIDUAL WHO RECOGNIZES THE IMPRACTICAL

EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON REGARDING THE TIGHTENING COMMODITIES MARKET AND THE NEED TO ACT PROMPTLY IS MAJOR PURCHASES WERE CONTEMPLATED. S. MOVING ON TO THE ISSUE OF TREATMENT OF MINORITIES I REMINDED ENTEZAM OF THE GREAT INTEREST IN THE U.S. PARTICULARLY IN THE CONGRESS, IN THIS SUBJECT. I ASKED HIM ABOUT HAI AND DANIELPOUR (REF B), NOTING THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY WASHINGTON TO CHECK THE ACCURACY OF REPORTS THAT THEY WERE CURRENTLY ON TRIAL. ENTEZAM WAS COMPLETELY IGNORANT OF THE FACT THAT THEY HAD EVEN BEEN ARRESTED, BUT PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND LET US KNOW THE RESULTS OF HIS INQUIRY. 7. I THEN SOLICITED ENTEZAM'S VIEWS ON HOW THINGS WERE GOING DOMESTICALLY FOR THE PGOI WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SERIES OF MEETINGS THAT HAD BEEN HELD IN QOM LAST WEEK BETWEEN THE CABINET AND KHOMEINI AND KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ENTEZAM SAID THAT THE PGOI CONTINUES TO HAVE MANY PROBLEMS, MOST OF WHICH WERE CAUSED BY "IDEA-LISTIC PEOPLE WHO WANT TO HELP." HE SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE THESE, AND THAT "WE--AND YOU--MUST BE PATIENT." THE PGOI, HE CONTINUED, HAS HAD DIFFICULTY ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY BUT IS INEVITABLY HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR WHATEVER HAPPENS. MANY PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT LEAVE THE PGOI ALONE TO GET ON WITH THE JOB OF RUNNING THE NATION'S AFFAIRS EVEN THOUGH THESE SAME PEOPLE DID NOT HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO RUN THINGS THEMSELVES. ENTEZAM SAID THAT THE PGOI HAS TRIED TO CONVINCE THESE PEOPLE TO STOP INTERFERING, AN EFFORT, HE CLAIMED, WHICH HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI. HE THEN CHARGED THAT THE LEFT HAS PURPOSELY TRIED TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION AND THAT IT HAD BEEN SUPPORTED IN THIS BY THE SOVIETS. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED WHO WOULD SHARE ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN WITH THE PGOI. 8. I COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT IRAN FREQUENTLY APPEAR TO BE LOOKING FOR TROUBLE IN THAT A NUMBER OF POLITICALLY PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS HAD MADE STATEMENTS WHICH OTHERS COULD ONLY REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE. ENTEZAM SIGHED AND SAID THAT ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION HAD BEEN TO LEAD EVERYONE TO THINK THAT HE COULD SPEAK ON THALP OF THE NATION. HE SAID THERE HAD EVEN BEEN DIFFICULTY IN THIS REGARD WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IT WAS IRAN'S POLICY TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY ITS NEICHERS, BUT THAT VERY DAY NEW PGOI SPOKESMAN SADEGH TABATARAIE, ENTEZAM SAID, HAD MADE A STATEMENT THAT WAS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO THE PGOI'S POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ. THE SAME PROBLEM EXISTED AT SADEGH GHOTBZADEH'S NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (NIRT). NIRT'S BUDGET IS PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE PGOI HAS NO CONTROL OVER PROGRAMING, HE SAID. 2. ENTEZAM SAID THAT VERY SHORTLY AFTER THE REVOLUTION IN FEBRUARY THE PGOI CONCLUDED THAT EVERYONE, WHETHER IT BE THE ANAM HIMSELF, THE COMMITTEES, THE GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION OR THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, WAS WORKING AGAINST SECRET CUR RELATIONS INTO PERSPECTIVE. ON THE SUBJECT OF AN AMBASSADOR, I SUGGESTED (AS I HAD WITH YAZDI) THAT FOR THE MOMENT "THE LESS SAID, THE BETTER;" THAT OUR POSITION REMAINED AS THE DEPT. SPOKESMAN HAD EXPRESSED IT, BUT NOTED UNOFFICIALLY THAT WE OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT INSIST ON SENDING SOMEONE THE IRANIANS DID NOT WANT. I ADDED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AWHILE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE TO EVERYONE'S SATISFACTION. I WISH HIM WELL IN STOCKHOLM. 4. TURNING TO BUSINESS MATTERS, I THANKED ENTEZAM FOR HIS EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE SUCH MATTERS AS THE DISPOSITION OF THE U.S. ARMY COMMISSIONARY STOCKS AND THE RETURN OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, BUT NOTED THAT WE HAVE CONTINUED TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES OWNING TO THE DIVIDED AUTHORITY IN ACTUAL CONTROL OF THE MATERIAL AND PROPERTY IN QUESTION. ENTEZAM SEEMED SURPRISED THAT THE MATTER OF COMMISSION STOCKS HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED. HE REITERATED THE PGOI'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE MOST OF THEM, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE ABOUT IT. WHEN I NOTED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ORDERLY DISPOSAL OF ALL ISSUES LEFT OVER FROM THE PREVIOUS ERA OF MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. SO THAT WE COULD GET ON IN DETERMINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RELATIONSHIP IRAN NOW WANTS IN THIS AREA, ENTEZAM SAID THE PGOI HAS PROCEEDS CAUTIOUS-LY BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT AND PRESSURES ON THE PGOI, PARTICULARLY FROM THE LEFT, TO ACT PREGIPITOUSLY. 5. I ALSO RAISED GTE WITH HIM, AGAIN POINTING OUT THE NEED TO COMPROMISE IN CASES WHERE THE COMPANIES ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. I NOTED THAT OTHER COMPANIES ARE MATCHING NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE INVOLVING GTE AND WILL BE INFLUENCED IN A MAJOR WAY BY THEIR PERCEPTION OF IRAN'S WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE. ENTEZAM SEEMED RELATIVELY INFAMILIAR WITH THE CASE, BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING MINISTER OF PTT. ESLAMI LATER THE SAME DAY, AND WOULD CONVEY MY VIEWS TO HIM. I ALSO NOTED THE RETURN OF DUPONT EXECUTIVES, WHICH PROMPTED ENTEZAM TO ASSURE ME THAT FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS IN IRANIAN ENTERPRISES THAT ARE NATIONALIZED IN BE ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED. FINALLY, IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, I NOTED THE RECENT BRIEFING PROVIDED TO THE IRANIAN

CHRGE: STATE 7/3/79 UQMR #7264/01 189 ** SSSSS 72 312142 JUL 79 EMBASSY TEHRAN O RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUQMEI/AMEMBASSY ASU DHABI HUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD UQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN EQMOD/AMEMBASSY DCHA USBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD UQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA USBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL UQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT UDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON UQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA UEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW UOMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT SUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS UEKJCS/JCS WASH DC RUSNAAA/USCINGBUR VAIHINGEN GE RUDXTMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM BT SECRET SECERON TEHRAN 07064 EXDIS TALITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 1.0.12065: XDS-4 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, PINR, SHUM, SOCI, IR, IZ, UR, EINV, BDIS SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM REF: (A) TEHRAN 6941, (B) STATE 175106, (C) TEHRAN 5421 (D) BAGHDAD 1213 APPRV: CHARGE:L5LAI RFTD: POI: VLTOMSET DISTR: CHG CHON 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY: TURING A MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM JULY 7 I REITERATED OUR DESIRE TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. I ALSO RAISED A NUMBER OF BUSINESS ITEMS, INCLUDING OUTSTANDING MILITARY ISSUES, THE GTE CASE, AND TREATMENT OF MINORITIES. ENTEZAM REVIEWED THE PROBLEMS THE POGIOH HAS HAD IN ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE INFORMAL PARALLEL SYSTEM OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. HE ASSED ONCE AGAIN THAT WE SHARE INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES BOTH WITHIN IRAN AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT BE OF IMPORTANCE TO IRANIAN SECURITY. END SUMMARY. 3. I BEGAN MY PRESENTATION USING THE SAME APPROACH ON U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS THAT I HAD EARLIER WITH YAZDI (REF A). I THANKED ENTEZAM SPECIFICALLY FOR THE THINGS HE HAD DONE TO FACILITATE MOVING TOWARD A MORE NORMAL, MUTUALLY BENE-FICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE POST-REVISIONARY PERIOD. I MENTIONED, IN THIS REGARD, HIS JUNE 21 PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WE SAW AS HELPFUL IN PUTTING SECRET TEHRAN Excellency: As you may know, I have come to Tehran to succeed Charlie Naas as Charge d'Affaires ad interim at this Embassy pending the arrival of a new Ambassador from my country. TEHRAN 7/064/1 Charlie Naas has told me of the courtesy you showed to him and, through him, to this Embassy on a variety of occasions over the past several months. My Government has asked that I convey specifically our appreciation for the comments you made about the United States-Iranian relations in a media broadcast of June 21. As I mentioned to the Foreign Minister yesterday, a comment such as yours, as well as the Foreign Minister's statement of June 27, help greatly in developing a better understanding among our two peoples and governments in the difficult but important task of rebuilding a new relationship that reflects the new realities in Iran. Sincerely yours, I am sure that you are very much pre-occupied with preparations to take up your new assignment in Scandinavia. Please permit me to express my congratulations on your assignment and my best wishes for your continued success in it. L. Bruce Laingen Charge d'Affaires a.i. His Excellency Abbas Amir Entezam, Deputy Prime Minister, Tehran.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6550 GOVERNMENT IN OFFICIAL MATTERS. WHILE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE CABINET, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A MOVE THAT HE MAY INDEED WELCOME AND PERHAPS EVEN ENCOURAGED. LAINGEN BT #6550 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6550 [Page 3] CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6550 DE RUCMER #6550, 175 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 241131Z JUN 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUDKZMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 7006 INSC RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2217 RUDPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0003 RUDHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0006 RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0005 RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0001 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 06550 L.O. 12063: GDS 6/24/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P TAGS: PDIE, PINR,IR, SW SUBJ: NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN REF: STOCKHOLM 2492 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. ABBAS AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS SERVED AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC AND REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF MEHDI BAZARGAN SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR. HE HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESS RELATIONS (SERVING AS THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN) AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE PRIME MINISTRY. 3. AMIR-ENTEZAM IS ABOUT 46 YEARS OLD. HE GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN THE MID-50'S WITH A DEGREE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. HE SUBSEQUENTLY ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS WHERE HE WAS GRANTED A MASTER'S DEGREE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY WHERE HE RECEIVED A DEGREE IN STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING. WHILE IN THE U.S. HE REPORTEDLY MARRIED AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AND FOLLOWING HIS GRADUATION WORKED FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN THE SAN FRANCISCO AREA. WHEN HE RETURNED TO IRAN HE FIRST WORKED FOR A PRIVATE CONSULTING FIRM BUT LATER FOUNDED HIS OWN BUSINESS WHICH ENGAGES IN THE IMPORT OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT. 4. AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS BEEN ONE OF THE STRONGEST ADVOCATES FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. IN THE BAZARGAN CABINET. BECAUSE OF HIS PRO-AMERICAN POSITION, HE HAS OCCASIONALLY BEEN ATTACKED AS AN AMERICAN STOOGES, BUT IN GENERAL HE HAS NOT BEEN HIT BY THESE ACCUSATIONS. AS RECENTLY AS JUNE 21 IN A PRESS INTERVIEW HE SPOKE IN A REASONED MANNER ON THE NEED FOR IRAN TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE U.S. 5. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, AMIR-ENTEZAM HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY DISCOURAGED BY THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERN- MENT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS AUTHORITY. HE RECENTLY TOLD OUR PREVIOUS CHARGE THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN MISLED TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN THE SITUATION HERE TO NORMAL IN THE SPACE OF A FEW MONTHS. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CONTINUING INTER- FERENCE OF POLITICALLY POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6550 [Handwritten signature and annotations in top right corner, including: CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL CHGGE: STATE 6/24 APPRV: CHG: LBLAINGEN DRFTD: POL: VLTOMSETH/BJL CLEAR: NONE DISTR: POL-2 RF ] [Handwritten initials "JCL" and "WL" in right margin] [Page 3]

CONFIDENTIAL DE RUQMR #6378 170 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 191131Z JUN 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2117 INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 7143 BT C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06373 LIMDIS E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, IR, IZ SUBJ: IRANO-IRAQI RELATIONS REF: A. TEHRAN 6292, B. BAGHDAD 1308 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE) 2. DURING JUNE 18 FAREWELL CALL DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED CHARGE WHAT INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAQI IN- TENTIONS TOWARD IRAN. AFTER REMARKING THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHO CAST THE FIRST STONE, CHARGE OUTLINED THE KINDS OF CONCERNS EITHER ENGENDERED OR EXACERBATED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION ( REFTELS) AND SPECULATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A "PRICKLY HEDGE" ALONG IRAQ'S BORDER WITH IRAN A LA ONE-TIME BRITISH POLICY ON THE DURAND LINE. ENTEZAM HAD LITTLE TO SAY BUT DID INDICATE GENUINE SURPRISE WHEN THE CHARGE MEN- TIONED THE INFLAMATORY NATURE OF RECENT IRANIAN ARABIC LANGUAGE SERVICE BROADCASTS. HE MADE A WRITTEN NOTE TO HIMSELF AND CONCEIVABLY WILL ATTEMPT TO INTERJECT SOME MODERATION. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT HIS PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS, BUT DRAW ATTENTION TO THE MATTER FOR THE LIGHT IT SHEDS ON THE LACK OF COORDINATION EVEN WITHIN THE RELATIVELY CONFINED CIRCLE OF THE PGOI. WE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT SADEGH GHOTBZADEH, THE CONTRO- VERSIAL HEAD OF THE RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION, MAY HAVE BEEN MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT THE KNOW- LEDGE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. NAAS BT #6378 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6378 CLASS: CONFIDE CHRGD: STATE 3/ APPRV: CH3:CWA ERFTD: POL:VLT CLEAR: NOAF DISTR: POL 3 7 CONFIDENTIAL DURING THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION WHICH TANGLED OVER A VARIETY OF TOPICS COVERED IN SEPARATE E-TEAM RPT COMING BACK TO THE FRUSTRATIONS HE, AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS IN THE PGOI AS WELL, HAS EXPERIENCED IN DEALING WITH THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAN. SEVERAL TIMES HE NOTED THE PROPENSITY OF PEOPLE NOT IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY BUT WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CLOUT TO MAKE OFF-THE-CUFF STATEMENTS THAT MAKE THE PGOI'S TASKS ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT. "AFTER MANY YEARS OF DICTATOR- SHIP," HE SAID, "THESE PEOPLE ARE FREE. THEY THINK THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO SAY WHATEVER THEY WANT. EVERYONE WANTS TO BE A LEADER." AT ANOTHER POINT I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS APPOINTMENT TO SWEDEN AND HE REPLIED, "IT MAY BE EASIER FOR US TO TALK TO ONE ANOTHER IN STOCKHOLM. WE ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN A FEW MONTHS TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS. BUT THESE PEOPLE KEEP INTERFERING. I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS. WE NEED YOUR HELP IN THIS REGARD. BE PATIENT, EVEN IF IT TAKES ONE OR TWO YEARS. WHILE ENTEZAM APPEARS GENUINE IN HIS EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL TOWARD THE U.S. AND SEEMS TO COMPROMISE AT EVERY IRANIANS IN POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE THESE DAYS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH US, HE HAS BEEN WORN DOWN BY HIS EXPERIENCE AS DEPUTY PM. HIS DESPAIR WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS WAS ONLY MODERATELY SHAVENED BY REMINDERS (AS MUCH TO HIMSELF AS TO ME) THAT IRAN, AFTER ALL, HAS EXPERIENCED A VERY TRAUMATIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME AND PATIENCE TO SET THINGS BACK IN ORDER. NAAS CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN #378 2

CONFIDENTIAL DE RUQMR #6378 170 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 191131Z JUN 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2117 INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 7143 BT C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06373 LIMDIS E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, IR, IZ SUBJ: IRANO-IRAQI RELATIONS REF: A. TEHRAN 6292, B. BAGHDAD 1308 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE) 2. DURING JUNE 18 FAREWELL CALL DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED CHARGE WHAT INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAQI IN- TENTIONS TOWARD IRAN. AFTER REMARKING THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHO CAST THE FIRST STONE, CHARGE OUTLINED THE KINDS OF CONCERNS EITHER ENGENDERED OR EXACERBATED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION ( REFTELS) AND SPECULATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A "PRICKLY HEDGE" ALONG IRAQ'S BORDER WITH IRAN A LA ONE-TIME BRITISH POLICY ON THE DURAND LINE. ENTEZAM HAD LITTLE TO SAY BUT DID INDICATE GENUINE SURPRISE WHEN THE CHARGE MEN- TIONED THE INFLAMMATORY NATURE OF RECENT IRANIAN ARABIC LANGUAGE SERVICE BROADCASTS. HE MADE A WRITTEN NOTE TO HIMSELF AND CONCEIVABLY WILL ATTEMPT TO INTERJECT SOME MODERATION. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT HIS PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS, BUT DRAW ATTENTION TO THE MATTER FOR THE LIGHT IT SHEDS ON THE LACK OF COORDINATION EVEN WITHIN THE RELATIVELY CONFINED CIRCLE OF THE PGOI. WE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT SADEGH GHOTEZADEH, THE CONTRO- VERSIAL HEAD OF THE RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION, MAY HAVE BEEN MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT THE KNOW- LEDGE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. NAAS BT #6378 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6378 CLASS: CONFIDE CHRGD: STATE 3/ APPRV: CHS:CWA ERFTD: POL:VLT CLEAR: NOAF DISTR: POL 3 7 CONFIDENTIAL DURING THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION WHICH TANGLED OVER A VARIETY OF TOPICS COVERED IN SEPARATE EXTEAM BRIEF COMING BACK TO THE FRUSTRATIONS HE, AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS IN THE PGOI AS WELL, HAS EXPERIENCED IN DEALING WITH THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAN. SEVERAL TIMES HE NOTED THE PROPENSITY OF PEOPLE NOT IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY BUT WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CLOUT TO MAKE OFF-THE-CUFF STATEMENTS THAT MAKE THE PGOI'S TASKS ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT. "AFTER MANY YEARS OF DICTATOR- SHIP," HE SAID, "THESE PEOPLE ARE FREE. THEY THINK THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO SAY WHATEVER THEY WANT. EVERYONE WANTS TO BE A LEADER." AT ANOTHER POINT I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS APPOINTMENT TO SWEDEN AND HE REPLIED, "IT MAY BE EASIER FOR US TO TALK TO ONE ANOTHER IN STOCKHOLM. WE ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN A FEW MONTHS TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS. BUT THESE PEOPLE KEEP INTERFERING. I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS. WE NEED YOUR HELP IN THIS REGARD. BE PATIENT, EVEN IF IT TAKES ONE OR TWO YEARS." WHILE ENTEZAM APPEARS GENUINE IN HIS EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL TOWARD THE U.S. AND SEEMS TO COMPROMISE AT EVERY IRANIANS IN POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE THESE DAYS DO THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH US, HE HAS BEEN WORN DOWN BY HIS EXPERIENCE AS DEPUTY PM. HIS DESPAIR WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS WAS ONLY MODERATELY SHAVENED BY REMINDERS (AS MUCH TO HIMSELF AS TO ME) THAT IRAN, AFTER ALL, HAS EXPERIENCED A VERY TRAUMATIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME AND PATIENCE TO SET THINGS BACK IN ORDER. NAAS CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN #6378 2

CCNFITY TIAL UCMH#6379 170** NY OCCCCZZH 111342 JUN 79 EV EMBASSY TEHRAN ○ SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 211 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05379 LIMDIS N.O.12065: GDS 6/19/95 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IR SUBJ: U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS REF: STATE 153316 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE SUMMARY: IN FAREWELL CALL ON DEPUTI PM ENTRAM I MINIFIED WITH HIM THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-THAN NATIONS. HE EXPRESSED POI'S DESIRE NOR NORMALIZATION BUT APPEARED TO BE QUITE FRUSTRATED BY THE OBSTACLES POSSED TO THIS BY THE PARALLEL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENTS HERE. END SUMMARY. ACCOMPANIED BY POLCOUNG I PAIL A FAREWELL CALL ON DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM JUNE 19. I PROVIDED HIM WITH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFETEL (WHICH HE HAD MARLISER REPUSTED). HE TOO CAREFUL NOTES AND SAID THAT THE DATA WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HE INTENDED TO GOLD WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE SAID THAT HE ALSO INTENDED TO GET RAT. AT THAT TIME THE PGOI'S LESIR FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT HE AND THE SESSION OF HIS HOLDS CHES IN THE POLO LOOK FORWARD TO IM-FECVED RELATIONS. THEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ALTHUSH SUL RECOGNIZED THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME. IT MAY TAY WE STRENGTHEN MONTHS. HE SLIED. "BUT WE KNOW THAT WE HAVE MAY INTERESTS IN COMMON. I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO FURTHER SHIP NORMALIZATION PROCESS. MOVING THAT WE HAVE NO MAJOR POLICY DIFFERENCES, I FOUND OUT THAT THERE ARE GAIN IN THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT LIVER CURE FLEXIBILITY IN SUCH MEASURES AS CONTRASTS. NONFILL-LESS. I ASSURE I'M OF OUR BASIC GOODWILL. 4. A SHORT DISCUSSION OF A SOURPILOS PRESS ARTICLE. ENDED WHICH ENTEZAM FUNDLY BY SAYING THAT IS OVERHIND CONCERN IS THE RELATIONS IF BY BENJAMIN THE PIOT AND PHOEIT, NOT WHAT THE PAPERS MAY SAY TO BE COVELY. IN THIS ROGANE REASLED IF I COULD TELL TO BE RECEIVED FOR AN AMBASSADOR. I FOUND IN THIS INDUSTRY BY THE FOOT REJECTION OF A BASSADECK CULTURE OR GATHER TO IN WASHINGTON THAT NO HAVE TO BE HOPED OUT. THOUS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY LAMBASSADAR TO BE RECEIVED FOR A SHORT DISCUSSION OF A SOURPILOS PRESS ARTICLE. CONCERN IS THE RELATIONS IF BY BENJAMIN THE PIOT AND PHOEIT, NOT WHAT THE PAPERS MAY SAY TO BE COVELY. IN THIS ROGANE REASLED IF I COULD TELL TO BE RECEIVED FOR AN AMBASSADOR. I FOUND IN THIS INDUSTRY BY THE FOOT REJECTION OF A BASSADECK CULTURE OR GATHER TO IN WASHINGTON THAT NO HAVE TO BE HOPED OUT. THOUS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY LAMBASSADAR TO BE RECEIVED FOR AN AMBASSADOR. IN ANY EVENT, I ARE THE INNOVING CONFIRMATION PROCESS IS RELATIVELY LARGE AND NEVER THE POOT SHOULD BE PATIENT. I SUGGEELI THAT NO HAVE TO BE HOPED OUT. THOUS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY LAMBASSADAR TO BE RECEIVED FOR A SHORT DISCUSSION OF A SOURPILOS PRESS ARTICLE. INNVL ESA375TIA330 NUSMHR LA RUGNI 0833 1541310 DAY SSSSS SZZH V 0311552 JUN 79 E C R L T TRIPOLI 2893 10. 12965: XDS-1 6/3/99 (NOOPER, JAMES R.) OR-P ATS: PEPR, PINS, LY, IR PROJECT: (S) PGOI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES (10) POST WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING COPY OF ANY PAPER ON LIBYAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN PREPARED FOR TRANSMITTAL TO ENTEZAM. SINCE LIBYA APPEARS LIKELY TO RESURFACE IN IRAMH'S FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH ENTEZAM, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING DEP PM'S OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING JALLUD VISIT TO IRAN AND LIBYAN COMMENTS WE STATUS OF IRAM HUSA SADR.

ACTION REQUESTED: IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT IN WISE OF SHARING INFORMATION ON FLO, IRAQI AND LYBIAN UNIVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN IS OUT-WEIGHED BY POTENTIAL PARIS OF CLOSER COOPERATION WITH PGOI, REQUEST THAT PAPER BE PREPARED WHICH WE CAN GIVE TO ENTERTAM. HAS S X C R M T/LIMBIS TRAP 5431 E/AMCONSUL MAERAN 3272 \[ E/ASINT BAGNOA 7209 ONBA/AMEMBASSY DIITUT 2211 JES/AMEMBASSY CAIRO BAPB QMED/AMCONSUL MAERAN 3272 NQNOD/AMEMBASSY DOFA 2274 JOMRA/ EMBASSY JITDA 2105 QMK/AMEMBASSY MAIT 2957 CHNO/AMEMBASSY CSCW 2125 QMT/AMEMBASSY MSCRT 2025 DEHTV/AMEMBASSY RIL AVIV 2025 MQMT/AMEMBASSY IPIOLI 2025 I C H T T T E T R N 541 0.13365: TIS 8 0.0.1.1.8-PAS: PINS, PINT, TRJ J: FOOL REQUIRE FON INFORMATION ON SURVEYPSIVALHIVITIES (S - ENTIRE TIXT; ACTIF ^{8} TOFING MEETING WITH CHART MANY SOUP OF AMIGO TO ZAY AISEI ONCH AGAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S DESIGN TO SENT ATELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH US. AS YOU FILL TOCALL. HAD EARLIER PROVIDED FIN WITH A PAIR OF ANY ANISTAN. ING MAY 24 MEETING ENTEZAM HAD SAID WAS THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN USEFUL, BUT THAT POI WAS REALLY MOST INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS. ON MY 25 HE WENT FURTHER, SAYING IFAT POI WAS CONVERNE TO NOT POSSIBLE MEDIING BY IRAQIS IN KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. WILL AS ACTIVITIES OF FIQ AND LYBIANS. INTRAM SAID IF POI HAD INFORMATION THAT GOVERN AGAIN WAS RECENTLY ASSIST SEVERAL RULE COUNTRIES. PERHAPS FOR THAN ONCH, USUALLY WITH A VICW TO CAUSING TROUBLE FOR IRAN. HE RED THAT THE FILO OFFICE IN ARMAZ ALSO GIVES THE POI IN CONCERN. THEN, SHAKING HIS HEAD, HE SAID THAT HIS VERNNTN COULD DO NOTHING ABOUT IT FOR THE MOMENT CAUSE IT WAS KLOOMING PRICE THAT IT IS OPENED. CHARGE TOLD INDOVE THAT, QUITE FRANCE, SOUTHERN ANY INFORMATION WILL NOT PROVIDE A GOLGA OF GRAND NAGEN. ENTREZANLY SLIQUY BEIGNED THAT HE HAD SEPARATED INFORMATION ON ARPANISTAN ONLY WITH BENZIGAN AND THE TOMATENATE THE PAPER WAS THEN DESTROYED. COMMENT: THIS THAT IN FACT THE INTO COTT SOMEHOW WHOLE DISRILOW SINCE VOTAIN NAZEI AT LEAST A NEW THAT WE HAD FIRED IN ALONE CHARGE CALLS ON IN MAY 27. CHARGE 2 MIGR. HAVE ON THE SIND INHIBITES THIS INSTITUTE TO THE IN.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4677 CHG: STATE APPRV: CHG: C PRETD: CHG: C CLEAR: NON DISTR: NON To: Mr. Shellenberger 1243 MAY 79 FROM: TEHRAN POSTAL WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1265 P I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 04677 ... 1206: SLS 4/5/79 (NAAS, J.W.) OR-M L: FIST, IR SUBJ: REZA AMINI REF: STATE 112437 1. (C RATING TEXT: THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE) 2. AT END OF MEETING WITH PRIMIN BAZARGAN (DEP PRIMIN AMIR ENTEZAM AND ACTG POL COUNSELOR STEMPEL ALSO PRE- SENT) I RAISED CASE OF REZA AMINI AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBED OUR FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM. AMIR ENTEZAM TURNED TO THE PRIMIN AND IN FARSI SAID TO HIM "THIS IS THE PROBLEM I TOLD YOU ABOUT AND WE ARE WORKING ON IT." WITHOUT IN- TERUPTIONS FROM PRIMIN, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID TO ME "WE WILL PASS THIS APPROACH TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND EXPECT TO HAVE SOMETHING ON IT SHORTLY." 3. A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE KOMITEH STRUCTURE TOLD ACTING POL COUNSELOR MAY 4 AND MAY 6 THAT HE BELIEVED WAY WAS NOW CLEAR FOR FAVORABLE ACTION ON AMINI CASE. WE HOPE SO. NAAS BT #4677 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4677 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5000 MORE THAN ONE STATE OF IRAN'S WORDS. CHARGE REPORTED THAT THIS SOUL, HE LIED SOME PROBLEM CONNECTED WITH SHIPPING MIGHT BE FORWARDED INJUNCTION AGAINST SHIPPING GOODS TO IRAN. CHARGE NOTED THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPRESENTED AT HEARING AND OPINED THAT IF IT HAD, INJUNCTION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. CHARGE THOUGHT COMPROMISE WAS BEING WORKED OUT, BUT ADVISED THAT HE DIDN'T FEEL A GOOD LAWYER TO ADVISE ON IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY TO CONTRACTS TO AVOID SUCH DIFFICULTIES. THE 2200 TON SHIP THAT WAS DISCOVERED IN 160 AREA CONTAINING MILLIONS OF SPARE PARTS IS BEING SENT AT LARGE EXPENSE; IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS 117 PIPES IT WOULD LIKE TO PICK THEM UP. CHARGE SUGGESTED IRANIAN MILITARY COORDINATE THIS WITH EMBASSY MILITARY OFFICE IN PROPER MANNER. ENTEZAM CONFIRMED THAT PROBLEMS CONCERNING U.S. AND STILL BASICALLY IN DUTY PRIMIN INTERIOR BAZARGAN'S FAIL- URE, BUT THAT IT WAS TO FOLLOW UP IN CASE OF AN INVI- TIAL AND APPROPRIATE FOR PURPOSES OF SOCIAL CONTROL POSSIBLE. ALL TELL STUDENTS HAD COMPLAINED THAT 10000 WERE STILL IN JAILS. 90% OPEN AND INHUMANE. THIS TO BE ALL PLACED BACK TO BE 100. INDIVIDUALS HAD BEEN TOLD TO LEAVE COUNTRY. BUT DID NOT FEEL THAT WAS A GOOD SOLUTION. HE ASKED THAT OFFICIALLY TO BE MADE, ORDERED TO BE TAKEN IN MANNER OF 400000 AND THAT IT BE EXTENDED TO ALL PRISONERS, AND CALLED HIS OFFICE TO INFORM WHAT FURTHER ACTION WAS. CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5000

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4677 CHG: STATE APPRV: CHG: C PRETD: CHG: C / .JH CLEAR: NON DISTR: NON To: Mr. Shellenberger 1. (C PAPER TEXT: THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE) 2. AT END OF MEETING WITH PRIMIN BAZARGAN (DEP PRIMIN AMIR ENTEZAM AND ACTG POL COUNSELOR STEMPEL ALSO PRE- SENT) I RAISED CASE OF REZA AMINI AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBED OUR FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM. AMIR ENTEZAM TURNED TO THE PRIMIN AND IN FARSI SAID TO HIM "THIS IS THE PROBLEM I TOLD YOU ABOUT AND WE ARE WORKING ON IT." WITHOUT IN- STRUCTIONS FROM PRIMIN, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID TO ME "WE WILL PASS THIS APPROACH TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND EXPECT TO HAVE SOMETHING ON IT SHORTLY." 3. A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE KOMITEH STRUCTURE TOLD ACTING POL COUNSELOR MAY 4 AND MAY 6 THAT HE BELIEVED WAY WAS NOW CLEAR FOR FAVORABLE ACTION ON AMINI CASE. WE HOPE SO. NAAS BT #4677 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4677 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4677 MORE THAN ONE STATE OF IRAN'S WORDS. SHARIF REPORTED THAT THIS SOUL. HE LIED SOME PROBLEM CONNECTED WITH SHIPPING MIGHT FORWARDING INJUNCTION AGAINST SHIPPING GOODS TO IRAN. SHARIF NOTED THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPRESENTED AT HEARING AND OPINED THAT IF IT HAD, INJUNCTION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. SHARIF THOUGHT COMPROMISE WAS BEING WORKED OUT, BUT ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD EMPLOY A GOOD LAWYER TO ADVISE ON IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY TO CONTRACTS TO AVOID SUCH DIFFICULTIES. THE 2200 TONS SALT THAT WAS DISCOVERED IN AND AROUND THE VILLAGE KILLING MANY OF SPARE PARTS IS BEING SENT AT LALAS AIRFIELD. IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS 11 TONS IT WOULD LIKE TO PICK THEM UP. SHARIF SUGGESTED IRANIAN MILITARY COORDINATE THIS WITH EMBASSY MILITARY OFFICE IN PROPERLY DEVELOP- MENT. ENTEZAM CONFIRMED THAT PROBLEMS CONCERNING U.S. AND STILL BASICALLY IN DUTY PRIMIN INTERIOR SADDI'S FAIL- URE, BUT THAT IT WAS TO FOLLOW UP IN CASE OF AN INVI- TIAL AND APPROPRIATE THE APPROPRIATELY STOP SOCIAL COMMU- NIST. ALL TELL STUDENTS HAD COMPLAINED THAT 20000 WERE STILL IN JAILS. 90% OPEN AND INHUMANE. THIS TO WAS ALL BEING DONE TO BE DONE. INDIVIDUALS HAD BEEN TOLD TO BE RELEASED. 15000 OF 20000 ALLOWED OUT- SIDE PRISONS. WE ASKED THE OFFICIALS TO BE MORE OPEN ABOUT THE NUMBER OF 40000 AND THAT 10000 TO BE RELEASED WITH IN 30 DAYS, AND GAVE HIS OFFICE 15 DAYS TO WORK FURTHER- MORE. CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4677

R 1213202 AFR 7W SM EMBASSY CHRAN TO INCSTATE WASHDC 200 US CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 23221 CESGEI STATE AFPBY: CHC:AFPBY: NAAS DEFRD: POL: JSTEMPDI CLARIC: MAAG:PSAC 7.0.122651 GDS 4/16/99 (STEMPEL, J.OR-K) TARS: FGOV, MILI, PINS, IR DURS: MEATING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER RATZLAX DISTR: POL GEG CHECK XIAAS [?] 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: ENTEZAM ADMITTED REGIME WAS HAVING INTERNAL PROBLEMS, UNOED US AND OTHERS NOT TO INTERVENE. LAID REVIEW OF U.S. CONTRACTS WOULD HOPEFULLY BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. NOTED PRIOR to RELICOFTER FORCE IS VIRTUALLY OUT OF SPARES. REPLACEMENTS ARE A PROBLEM DUE TO DIFFICULTIES IN U.S. RE MENTIONED PROJECTED A MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF PRI SPARES LODGFD IN TEXAS. HE TOOK A DIM VINE OF COMMITTEES HARRASSMENT OF IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY (IAS). END SUMMARY. 3. CHARGE AND ACTING POL CHIEF CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM APRIL 15 TO DISCUSS NUMBER OF SMALL PRO- LEMS. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST WERE DISCUSSED: 4. VYTRZAM INDICATED ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MADE MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS, BUT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT BY IMPORTS' EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO NAME MEMBERS, NOTING THIS INFO IS STILL CONFIDENTIAL. WHEN CHARGE TRIED TO DRAW HIM OUT ON STATUS OF REVOLUTION, VYTRZAM DIVERTED DISCUSS- ION IS U.S. CONTRACTS, AND SAID MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GEN RIANI IS READING COMMITTEE WHICH IS DRAWING UP NEW THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR PGOI ARMED FORCES AND REVIEW- ING ALL CONTRACTS. ENTRENAM SAID PROCESS SHOULD BE FINISHED, SCEPFULLY, IN ONE OR TWO WEEKS. THEN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HALT MORE ABOUT U.S.-IRAN TIES AND PUTS OF U.S. CON- THASTS. MEANWHILE, PGOI WAS EAVING QUOTE SOME INTERNAL TITIOLITIES, UNUOUE AND ENTEZAM SAID HE HOPED U.S. WAS NOT INVOLVED; PGOI DID NOT WANT ANY INTERVENTION FROM FORTRAN POWERS. CHARGE CUT SHORT WHAT SOUNDED LIKE CANNED REMARKS (PERHAPS FOR BENDEPT OF OTHER IRANIAN READING AT A DISSELLING CORNER OF ROOM) WITH PLAT STATEMENT THAT U.S. WAS NOT INTERVENING AND HAD NOT INTERVENED IN RECENT IRAN- IAN EVENTS. AFTER CONVERSATION GRADUALLY BASED AWAY FROM EXPRESSIONS OF FORMAL POSITIONS, ENTEZAM VOLUNTURED THAT BE AND PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN HAD MET WITH SOVIETS, SHIT- ISH AND CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES TO STRESS IRAN'S INDEPEND- ENT POLICIES AND DESIRE TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS. EMB- OPS PLAYED LIGHTLY ON THE ME OF THOSE WHO SPREAD DISINFOR- NATION TO DISTURGE GOOD U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS AND ENTEZAM AND APPROXIMATION OF POINT. 5. ENTEZAM THEN SAID PGOI DID HAVE REAL PROLIM: ITS HELICOPTERS GERE OUT OF SPARES, AND THIS WOULD NOT GIVE CONFIDENTIAL OWN IMPRESSION THAT THE CHARGES ARE MISTAKEN. AS A SENIOR ADVISER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY DR. AMINI IS REQUIRED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE NEWS WORLD; HE IS NOT THE TYPE OF PERSON TO "CONSPIRE." ENTEZAM NODDED AND TOOK NOTES BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT. 6. COMMENT: THIS CASE IS BEYOND ENTEZAM'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WE FEAR. CHARGE HAS ASKED FOR A MEETING ASAP WITH DEPUTY PM YAZDI, WHO IS MORE INVOLVED IN KOMITAY AFFAIRS. POL COUNSELOR HAS ALSO ARRANGED ANOTHER MEETING WITH KHOMEINI INTIMATE DR. BEHESHTI FOR NEXT FRIDAY (APRIL 13) WHEN THE ISSUE WILL AGAIN BE RAISED, IF AMINI IS STILL UNDER DETENTION. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL STATE CHG:CWNAAS POL:GBLAMBRAKIS NONE POL, CONS, ICA AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE USICA WASHDC, IMMEDIATE LIMDIS E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/9/99 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR SUBJ: ARREST OF USICA NATIONAL EMPLOYEE 2. IN MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM APRIL 7, CHARGE RAISED THE ARREST OF USICA EMPLOYEE DR. REZA AMINI. HE SAID THERE IS PERCEPTION OF A PATTERN IN THIS ARREST, ALONG WITH ARRESTS OF SOME OTHER IRANIANS WHO WORK FOR AMERICAN FIRMS. 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 3. ENTEZAM WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH OTHER ARRESTS MENTIONED (IRANIANS WORKING FOR AIU AND MOTOROLA, SEPTEL) BUT SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE OF AMINI. SPECIFIC INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT AMINI AND FIVE OTHERS HAD BEEN MEETING TO CONSPIRE AGAINST THE REVOLUTION. THESE CHARGES ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION. THERE IS NO ANTI-AMERICAN PATTERN INTENDED, AMIR ENTEZAM SAID. 4. CHARGE SAID HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR NO SUCH PATTERN INTENDED, BUT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER REPORTS ON AMINI CASE AS WELL AS OTHERS. AMIR ENTEZAM SAID HE WOULD DO THIS WHEN HE COULD. 5. CHARGE ADDED THAT AMINI HAS WORKED FOR THE AMERICAN EMBASSY (USIS) FOR OVER 30 YEARS. HE DOES WHAT IS NORMAL FOR SENIOR ADVISORS OF THE EMBASSY, A JOB WHICH HAS EXISTED IN IRANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TOO, CHARGE WAS SURE. HE HAS KNOWN DR. AMINI PERSONALLY OVER ONE YEAR AND FOUND IT HARD TO CREDIT SUCH CHARGES AGAINST HIM. POL COUNSELOR, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, ADDED HIS CONFIDENTIAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S CENTRAL INTEREST WAS THE INDE- PENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN AND THAT WE ARE CURRENTLY DOING NOTHING AND IN THE FUTURE WE WOULD DO NOTHING TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY. 4. AMIR ENTEZAM REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN THE SAME WAY IT DESIRED GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES; THE PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, HE NOTED, HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT PUBLICLY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES HAD TO APPRECIATE THAT FOR 25 YEARS THE U.S. HAS BEEN VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVIOUS MONARCHICAL REGIME AND IN 1953 HAD HELPED REVERSE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE BY RETURNING THE SHAH TO THE THRONE. IT WAS, THEREFORE, UNDERSTANDABLE THAT EMOTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WERE WIDESPREAD AND THAT NORMALIZATION MUST BE APPROACHED CAREFULLY. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE ASSURANCE THAT USG IS NOT INVOLVED IN TROUBLESOME EVENTS MENTIONED AND HOPED THAT WERE TRUE. 5. OTHER SUBJECTS RAISED WITH THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ARE REPORTED SEPARATELY. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL STATE CHG: CWNAAS CHG: CWNAAS NONE CHG, POL, ICA AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECSTATE WASHDC E.O. 12065: GDS 4/9/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, IR SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AMIR ENTEZAM 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. I MADE A COURTESY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM ON APRIL 7 AND INFORMED HIM THAT, ON THE BASIS OF A RECENT MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND IRAN'S NEW CHARGE IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS MY OWN RECENT CONVERSATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT, THE UNITED STATES DESIRES TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WTIH IRAN AT A STEADY PACE. I NOTED THAT, DESPITE THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN IRAN, SOME SHARED BASIC INTERESTS CAN BE THE FOUNDATION FOR GOOD RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE, STABILITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS ARE OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. 3. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE SINCE THE REVOLUTION FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS NOT TO EMBARRASS OR TO COMPLICATE THE LIFE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY THOUGHTS HE AND OTHERS MIGHT HAVE DURING THE PERIOD I WOULD BE CHARGE ON STEPS THAT EITHER SIDE MIGHT TAKE TO PUSH THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS FURTHER AHEAD. I SUGGESTED THAT WE HAVE FRANK DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN WASHINGTON AND NOT LET SUSPICIONS FESTER. FOR EXAMPLE, I NOTED, SOVIET PROPAGANDA IS COVERING IRAN WITH CHARGES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH PLACES AS KURDESTAN AND TURKESTAN AND THAT SOME PARTS OF THE IRANIAN PRESS WERE REPEATING THIS VERY PROPAGANDA. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, HIMSELF, HAD RECENTLY SAID AMERICAN AGENTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TROUBLES IN THESE TWO AREAS. I ASKED HIM TO ASSURE THE AYATOLLAH THAT THE CO RUEMO RUGNO NUSOLK RUDTC RUEMO DE RUDNHR 3117 2310900 ZNY SSSSS ZZH OR 220850Z MAR 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE NASHCO IMMEDIATE #88 INFO RUGNGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 015 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 022 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 02R RUEHMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 02K UT S E C R E T TEHRAN 3167 LIVES EQ 1206> GDS 3/22/35 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM H) OR-N TAGS: PIAS, IR SUJEJ: SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN REF:TEARAN3132 1. S - EAT IRE TEXT 2. ON MARCH 21, I MENTIONED TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM FACT THAT I HAD LEARNED FROM AN IRANIAN FRIEND ABOUT "AUTONOMY" COMMITTEES BEING FORMED IN AZERBAIJAN. ENTEZAM SAID HE HAD SIMILAR INFORMATION AND WAS DISTURBED BY ITS IMPLICATIONS. 3. HOWEVER, WHICH I ASKED TURKISH AMBASSADOR IF HE HAD ANY SUCH REPORTS, HE EXPRESSED GIVEN INFORMATION WAS EXAGGERATED. HE FELT AZERBAIJANLS SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH SAZARGAR, BECAUSE "HE WAS ONE OF THEIR OWN". 81 3167

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOFORN TAKE OFF AND MAX CLIMB OUT. WE RETURNED TO MEHRABAD AND WERE PLACED UNDER GUARD AGAIN. THE ISSUE OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE 24 AMERICANS WAS LENGTHLY DISCUSSED AND OUR FATE SEEMED TO BE A TRIP TO THE MAJOR KHOMEINI "COMMITTEE" IN TEHRAN. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE AGAIN CAME TO OUR AID, THE MUJAHEDEN COLONEL WHO HAS HELPED THE U.S. EMBASSY ON 14 FEB WAS ON THE SCENE AND ASSISTED US IN OUR RETURN TO THE EMBASSY INSTEAD OF THE "COMMITTEE." THE TRIP BACK WAS LIKE A TRIP THROUGH NO- MANS LAND. WE WERE STOPPED SEVERAL TIMES, BUSSES WERE SURROUNDED BY MANY HEAVILY ARMED MEN AND WE WERE HELD AT GUN POINT UNTIL PAPERS WERE CLEARED. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 WE ARRIVED SAFE, ONCE AGAIN IN TH WOMB OF THE EMBASSY. D. DURING OUR TIME SPENT AT MEHRABAD THE DATT SAW COL HOMAYOAN, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 1ST TRANSPORT WING AND COL HOSSEINI. THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS WERE NOT DIVULGED. THE DATT OBSERVED BRIG GEN IMAYAN AT 1ST TRANSPORT HQS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TALK WITH HIM. ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (S/NOFORN) THE TRIP WAS VERY ENLIGHTENING AS WE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS NO CENTRAL CONTROL AND EACH CHECK POINT/OFFICE IS ITS OWN COMMAND. WORK GETS DONE BUT IT IS VERY COMPARTMENTALIZED. ACTION IS SLOW BUT THE WHEELS ARE GRINDING. HOMOFARS ARE IN CHARGE IN SOME AREAS AND WE OBSERVED A FEW OFFICERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF HOMOFARS. HOWEVER, THE BASE CAMP AT KAPKAN WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT JA'AL FROM MASHAD. WITHOUT THE MUTUAL CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BEWTEEN GEN IMAYAN AND THE PRIME MINISTER REPRESENTATIVE, THE MISSION WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN FLOWN. REVIEW 03 MAR 85 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET SECRET NOFORN ORIGINATOR USDAO TEHRAN. DATED. 02 MARCH 79 CLASSIFICATION SECRET NOFORN CONTROL NUMBER 79-100 DATE RECEIVED IN DIA SUSPENSE DATE REGISTERED NL ER FILE DESIGNATION ICR 49210 DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL USDAO TEHRAN MSC ITD 6 046 0116 79, dt: 790002, SUBJ: TRIP REPORT TO KAPKAN (C), 4PPS, 1CY, SECRET DOTO:///////////// /////////////TO: TIC FOLLOW://///////////// OFFICE COPY DATE/TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE COPY DATE/TIME SIGNATURE 1 4 2 5 3 6 DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box) THE MATERIAL LISTED HEREON HAS BEEN ☐ DESTROYED ☐ TORN AND PLACED IN BAG NO. _____ AND COMMITTED TO THE AUTHORIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITY (DIAR 50-2) SIGNATURE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL OFFICE SYMBOL SIGNATURE WITNESSING OFFICIAL OFFICE SYMBOL DATE DATE DIA FORM 13 (1-68) DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD (Previous Edition is Obsolete) DIAR 50-2 U.S. G.P.O. 1976-721-484/59

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS S E C R E T NOFORN TAKE OFF AND MAX CLIMB OUT. WE RETURNED TO MEHRABAD AND WERE PLACED UNDER GUARD AGAIN. THE ISSUE OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE 24 AMERICANS WAS LENGTHLY DISCUSSED AND OUR FATE SEEMED TO BE A TRIP TO THE MAJOR KHOMEINI "COMMITTEE" IN TEHRAN. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE AGAIN CAME TO OUR AID, THE MUJAHEDDEEN COLONEL WHO HAS HELPED THE U.S. EMBASSY ON 14 FEB WAS ON THE SCENE AND ASSISTED US IN OUR RETURN TO THE EMBASSY INSTEAD OF THE "COMMITTEE." THE TRIP BACK WAS LIKE A TRIP THROUGH NO- MANS LAND. WE WERE STOPPED SEVERAL TIMES, BUSSES WERE SURROUNDED BY MANY HEAVILY ARMED MEN AND WE WERE HELD AT GUN POINT UNTIL PAPERS WERE CLEARED. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 WE ARRIVED SAFE, ONCE AGAIN IN TH WOMB OF THE EMBASSY. D. DURING OUR TIME SPENT AT MEHRABAD THE DATT SAW COL HOMAYOAN, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 1ST TRANSPORT WING AND COL HOSSEINI. THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS WERE NOT DIVULGED. THE DATT OBSERVED BRIG GEN IMAYAN AT 1ST TRANSPORT HQS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TALK WITH HIM. ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (S/NOFORN) THE TRIP WAS VERY ENLIGHTENING AS WE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS NO CENTRAL CONTROL AND EACH CHECK POINT/OFFICE IS ITS OWN COMMAND. WORK GETS DONE BUT IT IS VERY COMPARTMENTALIZED. ACTION IS SLOW BUT THE WHEELS ARE GRINDING. HOMOFARS ARE IN CHARGE IN SOME AREAS AND WE OBSERVED A FEW OFFICERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF HOMOFARS. HOWEVER, THE BASE CAMP AT KAPKAN WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT JA'AL FROM MASHAD. WITHOUT THE MUTUAL CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BEWTEEN GEN IMAYAN AND THE PRIME MINISTER REPRESENTATIVE, THE MISSION WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN FLOWN. REVIEW 03 MAR 85 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET S E C R E T NOFORN ORIGINATOR USDAO TEHRAN DATED 02 MARCH 79 CLASSIFICATION SECRET NOFORN CONTROL NUMBER 79-100 DATE RECEIVED IN DIA SUSPENSE DATE REGISTERED NL ER FILE DESIGNATION ICR 49210 DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL USDAO TEHRAN MSG ITD 6 046 0116 79, dt: 790302, SUBJ: TRIP REPORT TO KAPKAN (C), 4PGE, 1CY, SECRET DOTON/////////// ///////////TO FOLLOW/////////////// OFFICE COPY DATE/TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE COPY DATE/TIME SIGNATURE 1 4 2 5 3 6 DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box) THE MATERIAL LISTED HEREON HAS BEEN ☐ DESTROYED ☐ TORN AND PLACED IN BAG NO. ____ AND COMMITTED TO THE AUTHORIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITY (DIAR 50-2) SIGNATURE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL OFFICE SYMBOL SIGNATURE WITNESSING OFFICIAL OFFICE SYMBOL DATE DATE DIA FORM 13 (1-68) DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD (Previous Edition is Obsolete) DIAR 50-2 U.S. G.P.O. 1976-721-484/59

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS S E C R E T NOFORN (1ST TFB), VISIT AT THE COMMUNICATIONS SIGHT AND THE IMPRESSIVE 0200 RETURN TO THE EMBASSY FROM THE AIRPORT. 1/. THRU 21. OMITTED 22. DETAILS: (S/NOFORN) A. ON THE MORNING OF 27 FEB 79 DATT AND AAIRA WERE MET AT THE EMBASSY BY TWO MEMBERS OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM'S STAFF. WE WERE DRIVEN TO MEHRABAD AIRPORT WITH OUR MUJAHEDEEN GUARD AND THE STAFF MEMBERS MR. SARMARD AND MR. ZAGER-NADER. ALL MOVED SMOOTHLY UNTIL WE ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE STOPPED AND REQUIRED TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS FOR ENTRY. THE LETTERS FROM ENTEZAM CARRIED ONLY AS MUCH WEIGHT AS THE INSPECTORS WISHED TO GIVE. EACH NEW CHECK POINT OR MEETING IS A CONTACT WITH WHAT SEEMS TO BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT UNITS. ONE IS AT THE MERCY OF EVERY IRANIAN WITH A REASON TO CHECK PASSES. EACH IS IN CHARGE AND EACH MUST GIVE HIS APPROVAL. WITH THE FRONT GATE BROACHED IT WAS ONLY A SHORT DRIVE TO THE MILITARY BASE COMMITTEE', (LOCAL GROUP MADE UP OF A MULLAH AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PRECINCT OR FACILITY), WHICH AGAIN HAD TO PASS OUR CREDENTIALS. NEXT ON TO BASE OPERATIONS. THE BASE WAS FUNCTIONING AFTER A FASHION BUT WE WERE TOLD THE TRANSPORT WING WAS ON STRIKE! WE WOULD NEED APPROVAL OF A LARGER COMMITTEE' AND THEN ORDERS FROM THE C-130 CREWS SUPERIORS; AT THAT POINT THE CREW WOULD THEN DECIDE IF THEY WOULD FLY THE MISSION. AS STATED BEFORE AND DRIVEN HOME BY THIS EXCHANGE - IN THE REVOLUTION PEOPLE ARE FREE TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WISH. AN IRANIAN AF CAPTAIN TOLD THAT IN THE PAST THEY DID AS THEY WERE ORDERED, HOWEVER, NOW THEY COULD DECIDE IF IT WAS A GOOD MISSION. HOWEVER, PERSIAN CULTURE ALTERED OUR FATE. AS THE DATT AND MR. ZAGER-NADAR WERE SEARCHING FOR COMMITTEE APPROVAL THEY HAPPENED UPON THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, BRIG GENERAL ASGHAR IMAYAN, WHO WAS HAVING A STAFF MEETING WITH SOME OF HIS SENIOR HOMOFARS AND OFFICERS. BRIG GEN IMAYAN WAS A SCHOOL CHUM OF MR. ZAGER-NADAR, AND THE MISSION WAS THEN QUICKLY APPROVED. THIS MENT THAT WE COULD TAKE OFF, FOUR AND ONE-HALF HOURS AFTER ENTRY ONTO THE AF BASE. BEFORE DEPARTURE, WE HAD TO EAT LUNCH WITH THE PEOPLE'S SOLDIERS. LUNCH, UNLIKE IN TIMES PAST, WHICH WAS A VERY NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOFORN SECRET SECRET NOFORN DAO 030279 DATT:TESCHAE FER AAIRA:H FJOHNSON NONE DAO-1 USDAO TEHRAN IRAN DIA WASHDC/AH/AH-8/DN-2E1, USCINCEUR VATHINGEN GERMANY CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK CINCPAC HONOLULU HI NIACT IMMEDIATE RueKJCS RUSNAAA RUDONBA RUHQHQA 2653 1314 1 0306452 MAR79 S E C R E T NOFORN MAR 79 1. COUNTRY: IRAN(IR) 2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 011679 THIS IS IIR 6 846 0116 79 1. TITLE: TRIP REPORT TO KAPKAN (C) 4. OMITTED 5. DATE OF INFO: 790227. INFO: 790227 6. DATE OF REPORT: 790302 1. DATE/PLACE OF ACQ: 790227, KAPKAN, IRAN 12. PREPARING OFF: H. F. JOHNSON, CAPT, USAF, AAIRA 8. REFERENCE: U-UED-49218, M-2E1-15016 10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO (DATT/AAIRA) TEHRAN, IRAN 9. ASSESSMENT:SOURCE A. INFO 2 1). APPROVING AUTH: T. E. SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT 11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR 14. SOURCE: USDAO DATT, AAIRA 15. SPECIAL INST: NOFORN CAVEAT UTILIZED TO PROTECT THE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES OF THIS OFFICE: DIRC:NO. 16. SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) ON THE 27TH OF FEB, DATT AND AAIRA TRAVELED ON A NIIAF (NATIONAL ISLAMIC IRANIAN AIR FORCE) C-130 TO A REMOTE NORTHERN AIRFIELD (KAPKAN 3717E 5849N) TO EXTRICOTE 22 AMERICAN COMMUNICATION TECHNICALS REMAINING AT THE SIGHT. INCLUDED IS A NARATIVE OF THE DAYS EVENTS TO INCLUDE STOPS AT MEHRABAD TAN, FRAN Classified by Declassify on 03 MAR BS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS S E C R E T NOFORN 5 - 79 - 100

S E C R E T NOFORN LUXURIOUS AFFAIRS, CONSISTED OF LUBBO PALO (RICE, LIMA BEANS AND FAT MEAT) AND THE LOCAL LAUASH (BREAD). THE SIGNIFICANT THING ABOUT LUNCH WAS THAT OFFICER, ENLISTED, HOMOFARS AND DIPLOMATS ARE FROM A SINGLE POT AND ALL TOGETHER, UNHEARD OF IN TIMES PAST. AAAIRA TOLD BY TWO NIIAF LT'S THAT THEY HAD TO PULL GUARD DUTY THAT NIGHT. THEY WERE IN FACT SEEN ON POST AT 0200 IN THE MORNING. B. AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 WE MOVED TO THE FLIGHT LINE IN SEARCH OF OUR AIRCRAFT. NO ONE KNEW THE TAIL NUMBER. WE DROVE AROUND THE FLIGHT LINE UNTIL WE HAPPENED UPON ONE OF OUR CREW MEMBERS - HE KNEW THE TAIL NUMBER. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE AIRCRAFT WE WERE MET BY A HOSTILE, ANTI-AMERICAN AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. A HEATED DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEN AND OUR GUARD RESULTED IN HIS GRUDINGLY CONDESCENDING TO FLY THE MISSION. AFTER A GROUND KERKX BOUT FOR MAINTENANCE, A SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS FOUND AND THE FLIGHT TO KAPKAN WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE CREW IN FACT WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL IF NOT OBSTINATE. ARRIVAL AT THE FIELD WAS LIKE EVERY OTHER NEW MEETING OF THE DAY. WE WERE IN CUSTODY UNTIL PAPERS WERE APPROVED. CONSIDERING WE HAD 30,000,000 RIALS WE WERE QUICKLY APPROVED. THE DRIVE TO THE BASE CAMP WAS UNEVENTFUL, TWO MUD VILLAGES WITH NO ELECTRICITY, AND MANY PEOPLE OUT TO SEE THE NEW COMERS, WERE ALL WE PASSED. ARRIVAL AT THE CAMP FOUND US UNDER GUARD AGAIN AND PEARED AT BY THE LOCALS ANTICIPATING THEIR PAY. APPROXIMATELY 5 DAYS EARLIER THE AMERICANS TECHNICIANS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND TOLD TO SHUT DOWN THEIR EQUIPMENT. THEY HAD PERSONAL AFFECTS STOLEN AND THEIR TREATMENT WAS DETERIORATING UNTIL KHOMEINI TROOPS ARRIVED FROM THE AIRBASE AT MESHAD. THE MESHAD TROOPS TOOK GOOD CARE OF THE AMERICANS AND WERE ONLY HOLDING THEM UNTIL THE SALARIES AND ACCOUNTS WERE SETTLED. SETTLING AND PAYMENTS TOOK ABOUT FIVE HOURS. A POINT OF INTEREST IS THAT THE LT IN CHARGE OF THE MESHAD TROOPS ADMITTED TO BEING PLO AND BOOSTED OF HAVING FOUGHT ALONGSIDE YASSAR ARAFAT. THE LOCAL TROOPS WERE VISIBALLY AFRAID OF THE MESHAD TROOPS. C. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 ALL AMERICANS WERE RELEASED TO THE DAO. TAKE-OFF WAS AT 2300L AT NIGHT FROM A 3900 FOOT BLACKED OUT STRIP BETWEEN TWO MOUNTAIN RANGES. THE NIIAF CREW DID AN EXCELLENT JOB IN THEIR MIN-RUN NO T REI FACARE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS The problems essentially concern the inability of the Iranian Air Force to exercise authority at its two sites due to the intercession of local "committees" which have taken over the sites. At Behshahr, the Air Force commander, Lt. Sofazadi, reports that his own guard force has been melting away and that looting has begun. At Kapkan, General Zolali has been unable to establish any contact with Captain Mohammadi, who was last designated commander there. It is believed that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he has received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It is said that General Zolali's problem could be solved by a firm that would provide him with some document which would be the best of the information he had received from the government. It SECRET NOFORN If you agree with this suggestion, please make contact directly with the Iranian Air Force and advise me what function you wish my Air Attache to perform in this matter. Sincerely, William H. Sullivan Ambassador CONFIDENTIAL

Excellency: After the departure of U.S. personnel from the Iranian Air Force station at Kapkan, you and I discussed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the equipment at that site as well as at the similar site in the Air Force station at Behshahr. In pursuit of this subject, Brigadier General Zolali, Inspector General of the Iranian Air Force, recently asked my Air Attache, Colonel Schaefer, to provide him with some estimates of the sort of maintenance personnel who would be required to keep the sites and their associated equipment in serviceable condition. Colonel Schaefer gave this information to the Inspector General, as well as an indication that the United States Government would be prepared to continue to pay the salaries of these personnel until such time as the Government of Iran decides what action it intends to take with respect to these two sites. After reviewing this information and discussing it with General Immanian, the Chief of the Iranian Air Force, General Zolali suggested that this Embassy inform you of problems which the Iranian Air Force has encountered in attempting to assure the security and integrity of these two sites. He asked that you direct appropriate action to permit the Air Force to carry out its responsibilities in this respect. His Excellency Amir Entezam, Deputy Prime Minister of Iran, Tehran. CONFIDENTIAL 03109352AN79 PM AMEMBASSY YERRAN TO RUHEC/SKESATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3558 TO RUHEC/SKESATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3558 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3712 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 01547 E.O. 12865: RDS-4 1-31-86 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: (C) KHOMEINI RETURN SET: CONFRONTATION APPARENTLY DEFERRED REF: TEHRAN 1514 1 [?] (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY--KHOMEINI ARRIVAL SET, AYATOLLAH HAS AGREED TO CONSULT BEFORE CONFRONTING BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SECURITY PROVISIONS FOR ARRIVAL HAVE BEEN AGREED TO, BUT THERE REMAIN DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT ON CONTINUING SECURITY FOR KHOMEINI AND ENTOURAGE. END SUMMARY. 3. DR. MINATCHI INFORMED POLOFF EARLY MORNING JAN 31 THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR KHOMEINI ARRIVAL (REFTEL) WERE SET. SECOND MEETING HAD BEEN HELD BETWEEN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) LEADERSHIP AND GENERALS GCHARARAGHI AND MOGHADDAM EVENING JAN 30 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS. THIS HAD GONE WELL (MINATCHI PROMISED FURTHER DETAILS AT NOON MEETING.). 4. DURING TELEPHONE CALL LATE EVENING JAN 30, AT WHICH MINATCHI WAS PRESENT, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HIMSELF TOOK PHONE TO ASSURE HIS TEHRAN FOLLOWERS THAT HE WOULD CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL OR MAKING ANY MAJOR STATEMENTS ABOUT GOVERNMENT. BOTH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HERE AND LMI (ENTEZAM) SAY THIS WILL AVOID ARRIVAL CONFRONTATION WITH BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. (COMMENT: THEIR EVIDENT RELIEF REGARDING THE IMMEDIATE ARRIVAL MASKED THEIR CONCERNS OVER THE LONGER TERM. BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM, AS WELL AS OTHERS, SEEM VERY CONFIDENT THAT THE CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESS WILL PRODUCE MODERATION ENOUGH TO CREATE A WORKABLE DEAL WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ARMI. WE WOULD RAISE MORE CAVEATS, BUT CLIFARLY KHOMEINI'S DECISION TO CONSULT BEFORE CONFRONTING IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.) APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:LI CHRGE: STATE 1-31-79 CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS B. BOTH MINATCHI AND SEPARATE SOURCE AROUND BAZARGAN WHO SPOT TO BRITISH EVENING JAN 30 INDICATED THAT THERE MAIN DETAILS OF ONGOING SECURITY FOR KHOMEINI PARTY HIGH HAVE NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. THESE ARE EXPECTED TO SUBJECT OF ADDITIONAL MEETINGS BETWEEN ARMY AND LMI LEKING COURSE OF NEXT TWO DAYS. SULLIVAN DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM i DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM ECON-2 PM USICA OR SHIR TABR ISF CHRON/14

4. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM FELT CONFIDENT INITIAL DANGER OF MILITARY-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT CONFIDENT HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. NEITHER SOULD GIVE ANY ASSURANCES THAT KHOMEINI WILL NOT ANNOUNCE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND TRUS PROVOKE POLITICAL CONFORTATION, BUT MINATCHI THOUGHT KHOMEINI HAD PRETTY WELL COMMITTED HIMSELF TO CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ULEMA BEFORE MAKING DEFINITIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID SOMEINI HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO IRAN AGAINST ADVICE OF LMI. MAJOR FACTORS IN THAT DECISION AS KHOMEINI EXPLAINED PERSONALLY BY PHONE TO BAZARGAN AND ENTEZAM WERE: (A) FEELING THAT KHOMEINI'S PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY TO CONTROL BURGEONING COMMUNIST THREAT (WHICH LMI IS TAXING VERY BET VERY SERIOUSLY NOW); (B) NEED FOR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP TO PROMOTE PROPER SOLUTION AND MINIMIZE CONFRONTATION WITH MILITARY; AND (C) BELIEVE THAT IF CONFORTATION DEVELOPED, HIS PRESENCE WOULD INSIDE THAT TROOPS WOULD DESERT GOVERNMENT EN MASSE AND MINIMIZES VIOLENT PHASE OF REVOLUTION. LOOKS TO US AS IF KHOMEINI WILL THIS COME INTO IRAM PREPARED TO TAKE SITUATION AS HE FINDS IT AND REAL WITH MATTERS ACCORDING TO "FEEL" WE GETS ON ARRIVAL. ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM, HE DOES NOT WANT VIOLENCE, BUT ALSO LAITS VICTORY. THIS SUGGESTS THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES ON HIM, TEMPTATION TO ANNOUNCE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND "SHEEP AWAY CLAPTEAP OF THE OIL REGIME" MIGHT BE ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE. BEST HOPE FOR MINIMIZING VIOLENCE THEREFORE SEEMS TO REST ON LMI AND MOTURATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PERSUADING KHOMEINI TO TAX IT RASY ON ARRIVAL. THIS COULD BE A SHORT-ODDEROTATION. STILLAN 0 3013052 JAN 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3535 RUPNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3706 T CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 01514 2.0.12665: RDS-4 1-30-99 (STEMPEL. J.L.) OR-P TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: (U) KHOMEINI RETURN AWAITS AIR FRANCE OK LIMDIS TEHRAN 1514 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). SENIOR LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) OFFICIAL ENTEZAM TELEPHONE POLOFF AT 1330 LOCAL TIME TO SAY THAT AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. ONLY THING PREVENTING KHOMEINI'S ARRIVAL PLANS GOING FORWARD WAS AIR FRANCE APPROVAL FOR CHARTER. ENTEZAM NOTED (CORRECTLY) THAT TEHRAN AIRPORT IS OPEN, AND PRESUMABLY GO! IS GIVING ITS FINAL APPROVAL TO AIR FRANCE NOW. LMI HOPED TO HAVE FINAL APPROVAL BY MIDAFTERNOON OR EARLY EVENING. ASSUMING APPROVAL; KHOMEINI WOULD DEPART PARIS LATE EVENING JAN 30 FOR ARRIVAL TEHRAN JAN 31 ABOUT 0330 TEHRAN TIME. PLANS FOR HIS ARRIVAL ARE ESSENTIALLY THOSE WORKED OUT EARLIER (SEE REFETEL): KHOMEINI WILL ARRIVE, BE MET BY SELECT COMMITTEE THEN TAKEN TO BEHESHTI-E-ZARA CEMETERY VIA SHAHYAD MONUMENT (SPEECH THERE). AFTER SPEECH AT CEMETERY, HE WOULD RETIRE TO HIS QUARTERS TO RECEIVE VISITS FROM IRAN'S ULEMA AND PERHAPS PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR AND CABINET. HE WOULD REMAIN IN TEHRAN TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING FROM COM APPRV: DGM: CWNAAS CERGE: STATE 1/30/79 REF: TEHRAN 1261 (EXDIS, NOTAL) DRFTD:POL:JDSTEMPEL:C CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMERA 3. AT JAN 30 MEETING WITH POLOFF, DR. MINATCHI PROVIDED VILL-IN ON DEAL WITH GOI WHICH LED TO RETURN PLANS. GENERAL MOGHADDAM (SAVAK) AND GHARABAGHI (CHIEF OF STAFF) MET WITH ENG. MEDHI BAZARGAN AND DR. TADOLLAR SAHARI, TOP LMI LEADERS, EVENING JAN 29. UNFORTUNATELY, HOJATOLLAH BEHESHTI AND AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI (WHO HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO ATTEND) WERE NOT THERE; THEY EXCUSED THEIR NON-ATTENDANCE BY SENDING WORD THEY WERE PARTICIPATING IN TEHRAN UNIVERSITY SIT-IN PROTESTING ARMY KILLINGS JAN 28-29. (COMMENT: THIS IS SECOND TIME THAT BEHESHTI HAS IN EFFECT DUCKED FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH KEY MILITARY LEADERS, BUT APPARENTLY GHARABAGHI WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION TO MAKE A DEAL, BECAUSE THIS CAUSED NO DIFFICULTY.) BOTH MOGHADDAM AND BAZARGAN TOLD MINATCHI AFTERWARDS MEETING WAS VERY USEFUL, DESPITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS ABSENCE. ARMY AND LMI MEN AGREED TO DIVISION OF LABOR FOR KHOMEINI RETURN (MILITARY TO PROTECT AIRPORT AND ROAD TO SHAFIAD MOGHADDAM, LMI TO HANDLE SECURITY FROM THERE, AND GROUP AGRED TO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS OVER COMING DAYS AS DE-SIMPLE. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, MILITARY MEN SAID THEY AGRED POLITICAL CHANGES WERE NECESSARY AND MILITARY WOULD ACCEPT THIS IS CARRIED OUT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAB. DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM ECON-2 PM OR ADM CHRON/11

C C R E T SECTION 02 TEHRAN 21447 YETS 1.3 WITH SECURITY FORCES, CONVERSATION ENDED ON NOTES THAT LMI WOULD REDOBBLE EFFORTS TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT AND IDENTIFY THOSE WHO WILL DISRUPT ONE, AND US WOULD CRGE NON-VIOLENT RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATIONS. 7. COMMENT: EVENTS OF PAST 24 HOURS HAVE CLEARLY RAISED HACKLES ON BOTH SIDES, BUT ENCOURAGING FACTOR IS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TRY AGAIN. ACCORDING TO MODERATE POLITICAL FOLTERS, NASSER MINATCHI, MILITARY INDICATED THEY VERY MUCH WANT MEETING WEEFAS THEY HAVE BEEN STAND-OFFISH FOR PAST WEEK. ENTEZAM WAS PLEASED THAT SECURITY MEETING WOULD GO FORWARD, BUT PROCCUPIED WITH PROBLEM OF GETTING LINES OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BACK ON RAILS. HE SHED SOME LIGHT ON WARLIER EFFORTS WHEN HE NOTED THAT IN FIRST AGREEMENT HE HAD WORKED OUT WITH BAKHTIAR. PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED WELCOME KHOMEINI, THEN RESIGN. SOMEINI HAD AGREED TO REAPPOINT BAKHTIAR AND FINALLY TO LET HIM PICK HIS OWN CABINET. IN SECOND AGREEMENT, BAKHTIAR HAD PROPOSED TRIP TO PARIS WITHOUT CONDITIONS; THIS PALE EVENTUALLY SEEN FOUND UNACCEPTABLE. SCENARIO ABOUT SEENS REASONABLE, EXCEPT THAT KHOMEINI APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONVINCED TO AT LEAST TENTATIVELY DECIDE TO CANCEL ORIGINAL (FIRST) AGREEMENT BEFORE JAN 29 VIOLENCE GOT UNDERWAY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM DISCUSSION THAT ENTEZAM LINKS PARIS ENTOURAGE PROPERLY SPIKED FIRST AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT. ACCORDING TO ONE JOURNALIST WHO WAS AT BAKHTIAR PRESS CONFERENCE MORNING JAN 29, PRIME MINISTER DEFINITELY BELIEVED HE FAD HAD AN AGREEMENT FROM KHOMEINI SIFT THAT WAS RENEWED UPON. MINATCHI FEELS ORIGINAL AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY STILL WORABLE IN SOME FORM IF TALETIAR CAN SAY A FEW NICE WORDS ABOUT KHOMEINI PUBLICLY. APPROACH FROM THAT WE ARE BACK WHERE WE WERE FIVE POSITIONS LITTLE SITTER AND MOR THIS, LAI WAS GOING TO MEET WITH GENERALS MOPPAEAM AND GHAARACHI EVENING JAN 29 TO TRY AND WORK OUT SAFU ARRIVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BAKHTIAR PRESS CON-VERENCE MORNING JAN 29 HAD NOT IMPROVED MATTERS, BUT AT LEAST AIRPORT WAS GOING TO BE OPEN. ENTEZAM URGOLD USG IN STRONGEST TERMS TO PRESS MILITARY FORCES NOT EPT NOT TO FIRE WEAPONS AT CROWD PUT TO USN ANY OTHER METHODS OF CROWD CONTROL WHENEVER POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD MAXIMIZE POSSIBILITY SITUATION COULD BE RETRIEVED. EVEN SO, ENTEZAM WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. EMBOFF BLUNTLY TOLD ENTEZAM THAT IN VIEW OF USG, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT HAD TO WORK OUT ACCOMMODATION WITH MILITARY OR ELSE IT WOULD FALL PREY TO DEPREDATIONS OF OTHERS WHO WANTED VIOLENCE AND ANARCHY, NOT SETTLEMENT. ENTEZAM SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TRUST BAKHTIARI HE HAD NOT KEPT HIS WORD TO KEEP THE ARMY QUIET. EMBOFF SAID SOI FELT LMI HAD NOT KEPT ITS WORD, SINCE VIOLENCE HAD STARTED. EMBOFF AND ENTEZAM AGREED THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT COMPLICATED PROBLEM OF TRUSTS SITUATION WAS TOO CRITICAL TO STAND ON BYGONES; HOWEVER, AND BOTH SIDES HAD TO WORK FOR SOME KIND OF ARRANGEMENT TO PERMIT KHOMEINI TO ARRIVE SAFELY. 6. ENTEZAM SAID IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO GET KHOMEINI INTO COUNTRY AND "CUT OUT THE MIDDLE MEN". EMBOFF ASKED IF THIS MEANT PARIS STAFF. ENTEZAM REPLIED VERY CAREFULLY: YAZDI WAS ALL RIGHT; HE (ENTEZAM) HAD KNOWN HIM A LONG TIME. EMBOFF PRODDED HIM ON REST OF ENTOURAGE, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING UNLESS HE COULD SAY SOMETHING TOO AND WAS "THERE-FORE SAYING NOTHING". IN-COUNTRY RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND LMI LOCAL ORGANIZATION WERE MUCH MORE MODERATE THAN PARIS GROUP, UNDERSTOOD COUNTRY BETTER, AND HAD HEALTHIER RESPECT FOR RADICAL LEFTIST CAPABILITIES THAN PARIS BUNCH". EMBOFF ENCOURAGED LMI TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENT. ENTEZAM SAID HE HIMSELF WAS LMI OFFICIAL WHO HAD NEGOTIATED WITH BAKHTIAR AND WAS WILLING TO DO SO AGAIN IF NECESSARY! RIGHT NOW, LMI WAS FOCUSING ON UNDERSTAND-BT 1447 NNN

0 291328Z JAN 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3437 NT S E C R E T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01447 CHAG: STATE 1/29/7 APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS DRFTD: POLtJDSTEMPL CLEAR: 1. POL:GBLAM 7 TIS POL 12 DISTR: DCM-2 AMB D DUMMY/CHRON S.S. 12865: RDS-4 1-29-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAS: PORS, PINR, PINT, PGOI, IR SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) WILL TRY AGAIN FOR - REAL WITH GOI 1. (S - UNTIRT TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL SAYS DESPITE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ANGER OVER ARMY SHOOTINGS OF PAST TWO DAYS. MOVEMENT WILL ATTEMPT AT EVENING MEETING JAN 29 TO WORK OUT SUCCESSFUL DEAL WITH MILITARY TO ALLOW /HOMPINI TO RETURN TO IRAN. TWO PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT AGREEMENT WERE FRUSTRATED BY SHOOTINGS AND, SOURCE THOUGHT, PERHAPS BY "CONFUSION" IN PARIS. LMI HOPES HOMPINI CAN BE BROUGHT TO IRAN WHERE MODERATING ELEMENTS OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND IN-COUNTRY LMI ORGANIZATION CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEHAV. BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCK IS PUBLIC REJECTION OF BANTIAR BY KHOMEINI AND GREATER LEVEL OF EXASPERATION ON SOTH SIDES THAN EXISTED FIVE DAYS AGO. END SUMMARY. 5. LMI'S AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED FOR MEETING WITH POLOFF STRMPFL (AND TO UNDERLINE URGENCY, EVEN OFFERED TO COME TO EMBASSY'S CAPAVANSARI RESTAURANT IN VIEW OF DIFFICULT SECURITY SITUATION) LATE MORNING JAN 29. HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING LMI ANGER AT ARMY'S SHOOTING OF DEMONSTRATORS OVER PAST TWO DAYS, AND SAID LMI FIGURES FOR JAN 27 UNIVERSITY SHOOT-OUT VERE 4% DEAD, 130 INJURED. NOTED POLICE IN SAVANDAJ HAD "RUN WILD" ON JAN 28, AFTER KILLING OF POLICEMAN DAY BEFORE, AND SHOT DOWN 200. (COMMENT: THESE FIGURES ARE PROBABLY HIGH.) ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY HEARD PRIME MINISTER GIVE ORDERS TO ARMY TO APREFST ENTIRE SANANDAJ POLICE FORCE DURING MEETING JAN 26 AFTER READING SAVAK REPORT WHICH BLAMED POLICE FOR INCIDENT. 4. EMBOFF NOTED ARMY SEEMED UPSET WITH VIOLENCE OF PAST TWO DAYS, BUT OUR INFORMATION INDICATED BOTH DAYS' ACTIVITIES WERE STARTED BY THOSE OTHER THAN LMI-ASSOCIATED FORCES. ENTEZAM SAID HIS MOVEMENT WAS ALSO CERTAIN TUDEH ELEMENTS HAD BEGIN JAN 27 SHOOTING AT UNIVERSITY, AND THAT PERHAPS GOI PROVOCATEUR HAD STARTED ROCK-THROWNING JAN 29. ENTEZAM SAID VIOLENCE WAS STILL GOI'S FAULT, AND HAD DISRUPTED DEAL WITH KHOMEINI. EMBOFF SAID PER- CAPS THIRD PARTIES WERE TRYING TO DISRUPT DEAL. LONG AC-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON CAUSES OF VIOLENCE THAT FACT IT HAD INCREASED ANGER ON ALL SIDES AND INPIE- POLITICAL SOLUTION. ENTEZAM SAID BASIC PROBLEM NOW WAS KHOMEINI REJECT-ION OF BAKHTIAR BECAUSE OF THE FLOODLETTING. DESPITE FOUR MONTHS), AND RETURNING ON SAME PLANE WITH AYATOLLAH. ANOTHER SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR WORKING OUT AGREEMENT, RETURNING TO PACIFY ARMY AND THEN WELCOMING KHOMEINI. 6. IN EFFORT TO GIVE POLITICAL PROCESS TIME TO WORK, TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE ISSUED ANNOUNCEMENT MORNING JAN 28 UNDER SIGNATURE OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLING FOR 48 MORE HOURS CALM WHILE PRIME MINISTER "ARRANGES RETURN" OF KHOMEINI. BOTE ENTEZAM, AND MINATCHI THING SOLUTION AT LEAST TO ARRIVAL PROBLEM MUST BE SET BY THAT TIME, OR LMI AND OTHERS WILL HAVE TROUBLE CONTROLLING CROWD REACTION. 7. COMMENT: MINATCHI IS NOT USUALLY GIVEN TO CONCERN OVER VIOLENCE, AND HE IS CLEARLY WORRIED. NUMBER OF U.S. JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ABOUT IN CITY OVER PAST THREE DAYS REPORT MOOD BOTH OF CROWDS AND OF ARMY IS GENERALLY TOUGHER. GUT QUESTION AT THIS POINT IS WHETHER POLITICAL PROCESS CAN CREAK THROUGH TO ENOUGH OF A SOLUTION TO HEAD OF A CRUNCH BEFORE HOT HEADS TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. SULLIVAN ET 1379 N CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 0 2612462 JAY 72 TM EMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3454 C O N F I D E N T I A L T E H R A N 31379 F.O. 12065.0. 12065: RDS-4 1-28-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PINR, PORS, IR SUBJECT: POLITICAL POT BOILING VIGOROUSLY, THREAT OF VIOLENCE GROWS 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: BATHIAF'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WILL GO TO PARIS WAS TRIGGERED FRANCE MEETINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN AND BETWEEN TEHRAN AND PARIS. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY WANT HIM TO NEGOTIATE KHOMEINI RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE FOR FEAR OF VIOLENCE, WHILE LIEFRATION MOVEMENT (LMI) APPEARS TO BE MORE CONCERNED FOR A COMPLETE POLITICAL DEAL. CROWDS WHICH HAVE GATHERED (SOME FROM PROVINCES) TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ARE PESTIVE. TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE GALLED FOR CALM FOR 48 MORE HOURS, BUT POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IS SUBSTANTIAL. END SUMMARY. 3. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MODERATE POLITICAL BROKER MINATCHI AND LMI'S ENTEZAM OVER PAST 24 HOURS, IT APPEARS THAT BAKHIA'S DECISION TO GO TO PARIS WAS WORKED OUT WITH CHIEF KHOMEINI LIEUTENANT IN TEHRAN BEHESHTI AND NUMBER OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. IT ALSO INVOLVED CONSIDERABLE TELEPHONE WORK WITH PARIS. APPARENTLY DEAL AGREED TO LATE EVENING JAN 27 JUST INCLUDED BAKHIA-KHOMEINI MEETING; BALERS ARE MEETING VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGH DAY OF JAN 25 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS, AND UNCERTAINTY LEVEL IS HIGH ALL AROUND. 4. MINATCHI BELIEVES CRITICAL POINT IS TO GET BAKHTIAR AND KHOMEINI TOGETHER TO SET TIME FOR KHOMEINI'S RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. CROWDS WHICH HAVE ASSEMBLED IN TEHRAN OVER PAST FEW DAYS TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH ARE BECOMING RESTIVE. SPRAYERS AT MOURNING RALLY JAN 27 EXPLICITLY STATED THAT IF KHOMEINI DID NOT RETURN JAN 28, ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD BEGIN JAN 30. BOTH MODERATE TYPES AND LMI ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT UNDUE DELAY IN PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL DEAL THAT WILL BRING KHOMEINI BACK WILL MEAN VIOLENCE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. POTENTIAL FOR UNCONTROLLED REACTIONS BY GANGS OF PROVINCIAL VISITORS IS GROWING. THERE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED REPORTS OF SOME LOOTING IN SUTH TEHRAN AND OTHER INCIDENTS ELSEWHERE. SEVERAL OF OUR UNIVERSITY SOURCES SAY RADICAL FACTIONS TO LEFT OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ARE CALLING FOR MORE ACTIVE STRUGGLE. LOVER, SITUATION REMAINS UNDER CONTROL FOR NOW. U 6. LMI'S ENTEZAM BELIEVES BAKHTIAR SHOULD WORK OUT FULL POLITICAL DEAL IN PARIS BECAUSE, UNLESS HE DOES SO, HE WILL BE HOSTAGE TO ARMY WHEN IT COMES TIME TO IMPLEMENT ANY CAREERMENT IN TEHRAN. ONE SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR MAKING SHORT OF OBEISANCE TO KHOMEINI, GETTING THE AYATOLLAH'S NOD TO BE PRIME MINISTER UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD (THREE- CHRGE: STATE APPRV: DCMICWNA DRFTD: POL:JDSTEM CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRA DISTR: POL-3 AMB DC DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCON-2 PM OR CHRON/12 CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS 02213582 JAN 79 YM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3241 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01077 YDIS HAD HEARD TWO RUMORS: FIRST WAS THAT GEN OVEISSI HAD FLOWN BACK TO IRAN IN IRANIAN ARMY AIRCRAFT; SECOND WAS THAT SEVERAL GENERALS HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM IN U.S. EMBASSY. POLOFF FLATLY DENIED RUMORS AND ENTEZAM ACCEPTED THIS. a. IN SEPARATE BRIEF CONVERSATION, EMBOFF LEARNED FROM DR. NASSER MINATCHI (MODERATE RELIGIOUS POLITICAL BROKER) THAT MEETING BETWEEN LMI LEADERS AND MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY GO FORWARD EVENING JAN 22 OR EARLY MORNING JAN 23. MINATCHI COMMENTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO IRAN JAN 26 DESPITE ADVISE OF ALL HIS POLITICAL ALLIES HERE. (COMMENT: BOTH MINATCH AND ENTEZAM ARE DISDAINFUL AND DISTRUSTFUL OF THOSE AROUND KHOMEINI IN PARIS. THOUGH NEITHER WOULD SAY A DIRECT WORD AGAINST KHOMEINI CONPIDANTES YAZDI AND GHOTBZADEH, BOTH WERE QUITE CLEAR IN THEIR TEELINGS.) 9. MINATCHI ALSO ALLUDED TO CONFLICT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IN IRAN OVER HOW BEST TO HANDLE KHOMEINI PROBLEM. MINATCHI WAS GOING TO QOM AFTERNOON JAN 22 FOR LONG TALK WITH MAJOR AYATOLLAHS THERE ON HOW TO MINIMIZE VIOLENCE WHEN KHOMEINI RETURNS. HE SEEMED CERTAIN THAT QOM TRIANGLE OF AYATOLLAHS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BACK ANY KHOMEINI STRATEGY WHICH DID NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL FIG LEAF TO COVER IT. (COMMERCE WE HAVE HEARD BRAVE TALK FROM THE QOM GROUP BEFORE, BUT IT HAS MELTED AWAY BEFORE KHOMEINI ONSLAUGHT. ARE NOT RPT NOT CONVINCED THIS TIME WILL BE DIFFERENT.) 10. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: SITUATION IS TAKING ON RITUAL ELEMENTS: KHOMEINI IS PUSHING, HIS IN-COUNTRY ALLIES (LMI) ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES AND TRYING TO MAKE A DEAL, AND LOTS OF HINTS ARE BEING MADE THAT USG SHOULD CARRY THE BALL FOR BOTH SIDES. PERSIAN PENCHANT FOR PUTTING OFF SERIOUS COMPROMISE BETWEEN ON RUSHING OPPONENTS UNTIL THE LAST HOUR IS TURNING POLITICAL ARENA INTO ONE VAST GAME OF "CHICKEN." THIS DOES NOT HAVE STABILIZING EFFECT ON PARTICIPANTS WHEN DONE REPEATEDLY (NOV 5, MOHARRAM, ASHURA, ARBAEIN, AND NOW). MILITARY IS RACED WITH STRIKE OF SENIOR WARRANTY OFFICERS (HOMOPARSY IN ISFAN, HAMEDAN, DEZFUL, AND MASHAD, ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM. ON OTHER SIDE, BY ADMISSION OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, OPPOSITION'S MODERATE CLERGY ARE BECOMING RESTIVE WITH UNCOM-PROMISING KHOMEINI LINE. BEST HOPE FOR NOW IS THAT EACH PARTY'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS WILL INCLINE IT TO COMPROMISE OTHER THAN SEEK HARD-LINE CONFRONTATION. SULLIVAN

5. POLOFF REPLIED THIS WAS SOMETHING USG COULD NOT DO, NOR WOULD IT EVEN BE USEFUL -- RECIPIENTS OF THIS ADVICE WERE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO ENTRENCH AND SCREAM "AMERICAN PRESSURE," THAN TO HEED IT. ENTEZAM SAID THIS SEEMED ONLY WAY TO AVOID BLOOBATH OR ARMY TAKOVER. EMBOFF REPLIED COMPROMISE STILL SEEMED BEST SOLUTION. BAKHTIAR HAD LEGITIMACY, EVEN IF KHOMEINI DIDN'T ACCEPT IT. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI WOULD NOT ACCEPT LEGITIMACY OF ANY PRESENT RULING ORGANS -- PRIME MINISTER, PARLIAMENT OR REGENCY COUNCIL. POLOFF THEN BLUNTLY SAID PERHAPS IT WAS TIME SOMEBODY EXPLAINED TO KHOMEINI THAT COMPROMISE WAS ONLY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO BLOODSHED. GOVT DID NOT SEEM READY TO SURRENDER, NOR WOULD MILITARY LET IT GO EVEN IF IT DID. ATTEMPT BY KHOMEINI TO SET UP RIVAL GOVT UPON HIS ARRIVAL COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. ENTEZAM GULPED A BIT AND ASKED IF THIS MEAN IN� PROSIBILITY OF COUP, EMBOFF REPLIED THAT POSSIBILITY WAS NOT NOT BEEN WHOLLY ABSENT FROM SCENE AT ANY TIME IN RECEIVE NO ONE, NOT MILITARY, NOR USG, NOR OPPOSITION REALLY WANTED EVENTS TO COME TO THIS. 6. ENTEZAM THEN CHANGED SUBJECT, AND SAID LMI WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH A U.S. TEAM TO DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN AND TO TRY TO AVOID CONSUITS BETWEEN USG AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHICH WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. EMBOFF SAID HE WAS ALWAYS INTERESTED IN ANY POINTS LMI HAD TO MAKE, BUT IT SEEMS A BIT PREMATURE TO HAVE MAJOR DISCUSSIONS ON THIS POINT WHILE POLITICAL JOCKEYING WAS STILL SO INTENSE. ENTEZAM SAID OFFER REMAINED OPEN. IN RELATED MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS AT END OF CONVERSATION, ENTEZAM CONFIRMED CALL POLOFF HAD RECEIVED FROM LMI'S AVAILABLE TO EFFECT THAT ENTEZAM WOULD BE PRINCIPAL LMI CONTAIN WITH EMBASSY FROM HOW ON. ENTEZAM ALSO SAID LMI 0 2213587 JAN 79 TO SECSTATE VASHDCNIAGT INNMEDSTATE 3240 CONPIDEMTL SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01077 CHARGE: STATE 1/22/79 APPLY: MIN:CWNAAS DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:HG CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS DISTR: POL:AMB MIN-2 DUMMY/CHRON EXDIS E.O. 12865: RDS-4 1/L2/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOI SUBJECT: LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH; CONFLICT WITH MODERATES SHAPING UP REF:TEHRAN 957 1. (C. ENTER TEXT). SUMMARY: LMI'S ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF THAT LMI URGENTLY MEETING WITH SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO ARRANGE FOR PEACEFUL ARRIVAL OF KHOMEINI. LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH PRIME MINISTER, MAJLES, AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN. POLOFF STATED SUCCINGTY THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT SOME-TING U.S. COULD DO AND EVEN ATTEMPTING IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE HARMFUL. COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES SEEMS NECESSARY. KHOMEINI ATTEMPT TO SET UP RIVAL GOVERNMENT ON HIS RETURN COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. SOURCE SAID LMI STILL WISHED TO DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN TO AVOID FUTURE CONFLICT. MEANWHILE, MODERATE RELIGIOUS SOURCE INDICATED OPPOSITION MEETING WITH MILITARY WAS CRITICAL, AND OBLIQUELY CONFIRMED REPORTS OF RIFT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY 3. AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN. 23 THAT LMI MISSED URGENTLY TO SCHEDULE MEETING BETWEEN KHOMEINI CHIEF BEHESHTI, LMI LEADERS BAZARGAN, AND GENERALS MOGHADDAM AND GHARABAGHI TO DISCUSS UNFOLDING KHOMEINI RETURN SITUATION AND URGED USG TO CON- VINCE MILITARY THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. (MINATCHI, OF SHARIAT- MADAME MODERATES, MADE SAME PITCH WITHIN AN HOUR OF EVERZAM'S SOLD REPLIED TO BOTH THAT USG HAD DONE SO THE TERMINING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. ENTEZAM SAFETY WITHER APPROACH TO MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO THE MIN. 24 HOURS; A NEUTRAL PLACE HAD ALREADY BEEN REPRODUCED (ENTEZAM WOULD NOT SAY WHERE?), WAS VIT ORIENT TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEPOL KHOMEINI RETURN. (COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT ENTEZAM AND LMI REALLY NOW ACCEPT KHOMEINI'S JAN 26 RETURN AS A TURNING TO POLITICAL SITUATION, LMI SAID PROBLEM WAS NOW WITH PRIME MINISTER, WHO DID NOT WANT TO GIVE WAY, DESPITE "DISCUSSION" ON MATTER EARLIER. ENTEZAM SAID HE AND ONE OTHER LMI LEADER (NOT IDENTIFIED) WERE SCHEDULED TO SEBAKTIAR LATE AFTERNOON JAN 22. THEY WOULD PUSH LMI "COMPROMISE" (HIS WORD) WHEREBY REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD GIVE UP GOVERNING POWERS TO KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. ESTHAM SAID BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR USG TO PRESS BAKHTIAR PARLIAMENT AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN AND CLEAR WAY FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

GET PUBLIC SECTOR BACK TO WORK BEGINNING JAN. 21. IF COMMITTEE'S AIM WAS THE SAME, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF ITS WORK PROCEEDED FAST ENOUGH TO PREVENT CONFLICT FROM DEVELOPING, SINCE BOTH SIDES SEEM COMMITTED TO GOING BACK TO WORK. ENTEZAM UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, AND EMPHASIZED THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD ALSO HELP CONTAIN LEFTIST ELEMENTS WHICH ARE TRYING TO MAKE INROADS INTO LABOR MOVEMENT. (COMMENT: WE HOPE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS WILL MOVE FAST ENOUGH, BUT IT WILL BE CLOSE.) 3. TAVASSOLI SAID TUDEH ORGANIZERS HAVE PUT OUT BULLETINS CALLING FOR MASS LEFTIST (AND PRESUMABLY ANTI-RELIGIOUS) RALLY FOR MID-MORNING JANUARY 21. LOCATION OF DEMONSTRATION WILL BE MEIDAN-E-QAZVIN ABOUT A MILT NORTH OF TEHRAN RAILROAD STATION ON STENSHOM BASMAN STREET. (COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR TUDEH AND RADICAL LEFTIST PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES, THIS WOULD BE FIRST MAJOR TEST OF TUDEH STRENGTH IN WIDER PUBLIC COMMUNITY. THIS FIRST SALLY OF ORGANIZED LEFT, IF IN FACT IT OCCURS, MIGHT EXERCISE HELPFUL FROD TO LMI'S MODERATES TO INCREASE SEND OF THEIR EFFORTS TO MORT OUT A MODERATE POLITICAL SOLUTION.) 4. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, DR. MINATCHI (AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTER) CONFIRMED THAT TALKS BETWEEN OPPOSITIONISTS AND BAKHTIAR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GONE FORWARD ON QUESTION OF HOW TO RESOLVE CONFLICT BETWEEN REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI COUNCIL HAD NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN NAMED, PARTLY BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL GOING ON ABOUT PROJECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IT AND REGENCY COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAH'S RAFSANJANI AND MOTAHARI MAY LEAVE FOR PARIS JAN. 20 OR 21 IF DEAL APPEARS POSSIBLE. MINATCHI MAY ACCOMPANY THEM. PURPOSE OF TRIP WILL BE TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL MUST HAVE SOME LEGAL TIE TO PRESENT TIME OR MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADER HERE WILL NOT ET NAN CONFIDENTIAL/LIMITS CN71 DEMENTIAI SUCTION 21 TIAAN 7IS 1365: GLS-1- PINS, PINE, PORS, IR FR: "RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION: POST-MARCH ACTIVITIES MARY: LMI SOUFCNS PIFASWIL WITH OUTCOME OF JAN. 19 OF (BEING REPORTED SEPTEMBER). NO VIOLENCE NOTED. ONLY TWO LFFIST GROUPS TRIEND TO HORN IN. THESE DISPERSED BY PARADE MARSTRAILS WITHOUT TROUBLE. CONINI-APPOINTED STRIKE COMMITTEE BEGAN WORK MORNING WITH MANDATE TO GET KEY SECTORS, INCLUDING LIC MORERS, BACK TO WORK. LMI WAS WORD LEFTISTS TRY TO STAGE THEIR OWN MASS MARCH JAN. 21 IN TEHRAN. NEGOTIATIONS RETURN RELIGIOUS GROUPS BAKHTIAR STILL PROCEEDING; RELIGIOUS DELEGATION TO FO PARIS TO BE GURU WITH KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC CIL MUST BE ALLOWED WITH SOME LFGA FOUNDATION. WORRIED THAT BLIIAR AND AGENCY COUNCIL WILL NOT DEAD. THOSE PACKGOUNDING THIS SUBJECT SHOULD CIG UNWAREANTED OPTIMISM. FIND SUMMARY. 1. FOLLOVE STEMPEL SPACE WITH LMI OFFICIALS TAVASSOLI 2. ENTEZAM (STRONGLY PROTECT) LATE EVENING JAN. 19 3. GATEZAM AGAIN NOON JAN. 20. FOTH WERE PLEASED 4. IT OUTCOME OF PARADE. THEIR ASSESSMENT WAS TEAT 5. GIVITIES DREW 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE (OTHERS, INCLUDING 6. COAL PRESS, PUT FIGURE BETWEEN 1.4 AND 1.8 MILLION), 7. DAY PASSED WITHOUT VIOLENCE. TAVASSOLI NOTED TWO 8. TIST GROUPS HAD TRIND TO BECOME PART OF PARADE 9. IT WERE TOJENED AWAY WITHOUT INCIDENT BY PARADE MARSEALLS. 10. IS A SERE ALL ISIANIC. IMI MON ADMITTED CROWD 11. UNIT WAS A BIT MORE DRAGGY THAN AT ASHURA MARCH, BUT 12. IT (AS WELL AS MOST OTHERS WE HAVE TALKED TO) ATTPIEUTE 13. IS TO LETLOWN IN WAKE OF SHAR'S DEPARTURE. NOW TEAT 14. HAS GONE, PEOPLE HAD OTHER THINGS TO WORRY ABOUT— 15. WEATHER, THEIR CORNS, LACK OF GAS, ETC. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI-NOMINATED COMMITTEE ON ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI-NOMINATED COMMITTEE ON HIERS BEGAN FORY TODAY. DR. YADOLLAH SAHASI HAD IN NAMED CHAIRMAN, WITH DR. MOHAMMAD JAYAD RAGONAR, RELIGIOUS LEADER, AND ENG. ALL SYBAR KOINFAR AS EERS. THIS GROUP WILL NAME TWO ADDITIONAL MEENDS. IN ZAM SAID SAHASI WAS RECONSIDERING WHETHER HE 2 COOKDINATING WORK PLEASE HERE. ENTEZAM. ADDED HE BE FOLLOWING COMMITTEE'S WORK IN ANY CASE. IN OTHER TO QUESTION, ENTEZAM CONFIRMED COMMITTEE'S IS INCLUDED BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR, AND OF EFFORTS WAS TO GET COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN. THE NOTED PRIME INISTIE WAS MAKING MAJOR MOLE.

(SEE SRE INPORTFING). EVEN IF THIS IS THE CASE, LMI SEEMS TO BE IGNORING RIGHT OF MILITARY, WHICH ACCORDING TO OUR LIGHTS, IS BY NO MEANS READY TO LIE DOWN AND ACCEPT IMI SOLUTION WITHOUT SOME HARD ARGUMENT AND INFIGATING. 10. ON SUTION OF TIMING OF KHOMEINI RETURN, THIS IS FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD ANY RESPONSIBLE MOVEMENT FIGURE SUGGEST KHOMEINI WOULD DELAY RETURN TO IRAN AS LONG AS IT TOOK TO GET ISLAMIC STRUCTURE IN PLACE, EITHER THROUGH TAXEOVER OR COMPROMISE. PROBLEM WITH THIS PROJECTION, FROM KHOMEINI'S VIEW, MUST BE THAT HE IS ALREADY UNDER PRESSURE FROM IN-COUNTRY GROUPS TO RETURN. LOCAL PRESS HAD CARRIED SEVERAL APPEALS TO HIM TO COME BACK, AND ALI AMINI IS REPORTED IN PARIS TO URGE HIM TO RETURN. WE ASSUME AT LEAST SOME OF THESE APPEALS ARE GENUINE, NOT JUST THE UNPECTED PERSIAN "TAAROF". 11. CONVERSATIONS WITH LMI FIGURES OVER PAST TWO-THREE DAYS, PLUS KINDS OF STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF PARIS (SEE REF B FOR EXAMPLE) SUGGEST SOME UNCERTAINTIES IN KHOMEINI THINKING, AND INCREASING BACK AND FORTH COMMENTS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AIDES. APPEARS TO US AT THIS POINT THAT, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS AND TALKS GO ON HERE, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL INDECISION AND SORTING OUT GOING ON IN PARIS. GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES HERE IN IRAN AS WELL AS THOSE IN PARIS, IT IS CLEAR WE ARE NEITHER OUT OF THE POLITICAL WOODS, NOR YET FULLY ENGAGED IN WHAT COULD BE INTENSELY POLITICAL PROCESS OF RECONCILING IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES. ABOUT THE ONLY REALLY POSITIVE FEATURE OF THIS IS THAT KHOMEINI, FOR WHATEVER REASON, HAS HELE BACK FROM IMMEDIATE RETURN TO IRAN, THUS LEAVING SOME ROOM FOR MORE NEGOTIATION, AT LEAST FOR NOW. SULLIVAN BT 0926 NNN CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS SECSTATE VASEDO NIACT IMMEDIATE 3143 ON F I4D, E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00926 ARIM SANJABI WILL CERTAINLY BE ON COUNCIL, BUT OTHER AMES NOT RPT NOT KNOWN. ONE IMPORTANT POINT: THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON COUNCIL. TAVASSO-I SAID PRESENT PLANS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY WORKED OUT INCLUDE SPECIAL "ADVISORY GROUP" OF KEY RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON CH AS AYATOLLAH S TALEQANI, MONTAZERI, ETC. FOLLOWING NOUNCEMENT OF ISLAMIC COUNCIL, PRESUMABLY RESIGNATIONS MAJLES MEMBERS AND MINISTER, WHICH ALREADY STARTED AN 17, WILL CONTINUE. PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR IS SPECTED THEN "TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE" TO TRANSFER OVER TO THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH WILL SCHEDULE ELECTIONS FAIRLY SOON (TAVASSOLI THOUGHT ABOUT NO OR THREE MONTHS WERE THE WORKING TIME FRAME, BUT NO ARM DECISION HAD TET BEEN MADE). IMEIS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOMEINI COUNCIL AND REGENCY COUNCIL, TO WHICH ARMY WAS YAL, TAVASSOLI SAID HE KNEW EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO ORK OUT SOME KI ND OF A DEAL, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT COMMENT: TAVASSOLI IS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF MINATCHI PORTS —. SE REY A, PARA TWO). QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN IS STILL SOMEWHAT UN-AGAIN, BUT CURRENT THINKING OF KHOMEINI HIMSELF AS PRESSED TO BAZARGAN IS TO DELAY HIS RETURN UNTIL LAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS INHERITED MANTLE OF NER, AND "ARMI IS UNDER MORE CONTROL". THIS DECISION UNDER STEADY REVIEW. SOURCE THOUGHT THIS WOULD OPEABLY MEAN KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN IN SIX TO TEN DAYS NOW. DISCUSSION ENDED WITH SOURCE'S PROMISE TO IF IN MORE REGULAR CONTACT OVER NEXT FEW DAYS. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: TAVASSOLI WAR THE MOST FORTHING HE HAS EVER BEEN WITH REPORTING OFFICER, AND IPED TO SAY BY HIS MEANOR THAT USG WAS BEING MORE BALISTIC IN APPRAISAL OF SITUATION THAN IT HAD BEEN FORE. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS SPEAKING ON ORDERS FROM IARGAN, WHO THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT USG UNDERSTOOD UNITS HE PRESENTED. TO THIS DEGREE, HE WAS AS FORTHING ABOUT LMI FUTURE INTENTIONS AS HE HAS EVER BEEN NOTHING, AND WILLING TO SPECIFY AREAS IN WHICH HE NOT FULLY INFORMED. WHILE HE OTHER DOESN'T KNOW OUT EFFORTS TO RECONCILE REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI OCIL (REF A) OR IS A MASTER DISSWBLER (REPORTING VICER BELIEVES THE FORMER), HE IS CONVINCED THAT ACTION FOR TRANSFER WILL BE WOSSED OUT. BREEZI WAY TAVASSOLI AND ENTEZAM PASS OVER PROBLEMS OF IN LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ISLAMIC OR GESTERS HOME CREATION TO RUMORS THAT ALONE AGRAPHY COUR A STAGE OF COATS WITH KHOMEINI

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 2920 DICE AND AT JONKI STATION YESTERDAY. BUT AS OF NOW, JAN 17, PEOPLE HERE HUDDLED IN THEIR HOMES AND STREETS ARE CLEARED OUT. LMI ESTIMATES OF 1100 DEAD MAY BE HIGH. THESE SERIOUSLY INJURE. (COMPARISON WITH OTHER REPORTS OUT OF LINE WITH OTHER REPORTS.) 4. LMI SAYS SIMILAR BUT NOT AS VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAPPENED IN DEZFUL, GILAN, AND ARAX. LMI URGED USG TO CONTINUE TO PRESS MILITARY TO MAINTAIN RESTRAINT. EMGOF SAY WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT EMPHASIZED STRONGLY CONCURRENT NEED FOR LMI TO RESTRAIN EXCESSES OF CROWD ENTHUSIASM, AND TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH MILITARY LEADERS WHO, WE ARE CONVINCED, DO NOT WANT MORE BLOODSHED EITHER. SOURCE TOOK THIS POINT WITH MUCH MORE GRACE AND MUCH LESS ANGER THAN PREVIOUSLY. 4. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO POLITICS OF PRESENT SITUATION: PAPASSOLI SAID LMI BELIEVED LEFTISTS WERE GETTING STRONGER. YOUNG SPEAKERS, ESPECIALLY RECENTLY- RELEASED LEFTIST GUILTS (MOHAMMAD ETEMADEDEST) WERE CALLING FOR PLAIN REPUBLIC, NOT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, NOT CALLING FOR JIHAD. UNIVERSITY GROUPS WERE ALSO ACTIVE, AND SOME VIOLENCE ALREADY HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND POLITICAL LEFTIST STUDENTS AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. 5. SITUATION CLEARLY CALLED FOR RESTRAINT. SOURCE WAS UNWILLING TO COMMIT. BAZARGAN ACCEPTED THE WHOLE THING FOR THE MOMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE CONCERNED. HE WAS TO MEET WITH LMI TODAY. SOURCE SAID LMI WAS NOT UNREASONABLE ON THIS POINT. HE BELIEVED LMI WAS WILLING TO WORK WITH MILITARY IF ONLY "DISRUPTION" UNFOLDING AROUND USG SUPPORTED "GOSPEL, ORDERLY SO LMI TO WORK IT OUT WITH PRESENT THIS WAS UNDERWAY. 6. THIS, ACCORDING TO PAPASSOLI, IS WHAT LMI ANNOUNCED NIGHT OF JAN 16 TEHRAN 2920 CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 2920/1 CABLE: STATE 1/13/79 APPROVE: DCM:GKNAAS INFO: POL:JDS7EMPFL:CC CLEAR: 1.POL:G3CAMERA TELE: POL-3 AMB DCM PM OR ECON CERON/9 CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 2920/1 F.O. 12363: RPT-4 -10-00 (STEMPEL, J.O.) OP-P TAGS: PINS, PINT, TO , IC SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) SEEKS TO CALM SITUATION DOWN, ACCELERATE ITS PROGRESS. REF: (a) TEHRAN 2918, 16 JAN 1979, SUMMARY: LMI SOURCE (PAPASSOLI) FOR MEHDI BAZARGAN, URGED USG TO CONTINUE EXERTING ITS INFLUENCE ON THE IRANIAN MILITARY TO SHOW SIGN OF AND DEMONSTRATE AGAINST CROWDS. PAPASSOLI ALSO ASKED U.S. TO SHOW THAT ACCELERATED TIME- TABLE FOR LMI MOVE INTO GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY IF TO- BE-SEEN LEFTIST GAINS ARE TO BE POSTPONED. LMI FEELS IT CAN COEXIST WITH THE ARMY'S ALTERNATIVE COUNCIL AND PRESENT NOT WITH SHORT TERM BUT WITH MINIMAL PROBLEMS, ON THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL LAST ORDER. THIS SUGGESTS LMI HAS A DEAL WITH THE MILITARY AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MAY HAVE SOME INFLUENCE. UNWILLING OPINIONS OF FIVING LMI TO RETURN TO IRAN AND OTHER INVESTIGATIONS POLICIES FIGHTING OUT HIS LIVES AND CAREFULLY ANALYZING THIS SITUATION BEFORE THEY DECIDE WHICH WAY TO JUMP. TO SUMMARIZE. - MOHAMMED PAPASSOLI (AKA PAPADITY), SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL, CAME TO USG TO REPORT ON MEETING WITH LMI HE TOLD US HE MADE TWO POINTS: (A) LMI WAS GRATEFUL FOR ITS EFFORTS AT KEEPING IRANIAN MILITARY FROM INTERVENING VIA VIOLENCE, AND URGE USG TO CONTINUE, (B) LMI WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO END UP ITS "LIBERATION" BEFORE PEOPLE (COMMUNITY) INVOLVED WITH USG TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT IRANIAN BODY POLITIC. - ON QUESTION OF KEEPING MILITARY UNDER CONTROL, SOURCE COUNTED LMI VIEW OF SITUATION IN A WAY OF A FEW DAYS WHICH MAY BE THE ONLY OPTIONS ON THE TABLE: (A) SHUT DOWN SHARIF STREET TO PREVENT THE REFORMATION. CROWDS GATHERED, AND PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS. TO DO THIS, MILITARY MUST EXIST, AND WILL BE TAKEN. THIS IS A RISK AND MAY SPARK FINAL LETHAL VIOLENCE. (B) LET CROWDS TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO POLITIC. SUPPOSED THEY, CROWDS, JUMPED INTO OFFICE & REACHED, PLACING THEMSELVES. THIS MAY BE A RISK AND MAY BE A FUTURE. THIS COULD LEAD TO A GENERAL JAPANIAN AND A SITUATION. AS RESULT, "CROWDS" (LMI) IT IS POSSIBLE OFFICIALLY BECOME LEADERS, AND THEN WE ARE AT A LOSS. 3 3 CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 2920/1

010000 A. LAL SAYS SIMILAR RDT NOT US VIGOR OF THE CHILDREN HAPPENED IN DEFEND, GILAN, AND APAH. LUL PAST URG TO CONNILE TO PRESS MILITARY TO MAINTAIN DESTRIATION. IMPORT SAIL IN WORLD CONTINUED TO DO CO. BUT AMAZING SHOP OUST CONCURRENT NEW KORANMI TO RESTRAIN VOYSSSES OF STOCKENTHUSLASM. AND TO TOTAL FIRE [?] WILT CILIARY I CANDER WHO, WHO AND CONVISES, DO NOT REFINING ASIA FLOODS TO LITTLE. SEVERE SOON T T ILLINOIS WITH MOUTH MORE GRAIL AND MUCH LETS AND THE TIN PESTLETTLE. 4. DISCUSSION TAIN TURNED TO FOUNDING A PRESENT SITUATION: TRAINS ACQUIRE SAID LMI RELATED TIMING WEIGHTING STRONGNE. CHANGING SPEAKERS, INSPICIALLY REGENCY-REVISED TIMING ALUMINUM (MODERN AND DEVELOPMENT) WHO CALLS FOR LEARN GROWULIC, NOT ISLAMIC INVOLVING, INCPALING INVESTMENT. UNIVERSITY GROWTH ALLOWED ACCOUNTING, IN�S THE WILDLIFE ALTERNATIVE HAD OCCURRED AFTER ISLAMIC AND ANIMAL LIFESOL STUDENTS AT THE AND INDUSTRIAL […garbled run removed…] C. 202300 SCK #2250A 2329250UUU JIN13 P.1230.12385: 477-4 (0071-31111111, J.0.107-P.1435; FL05, FL77 CH:1/18/70 APPLY:1.POL:NAAS POL:JDSTEMPFL:CC 1.POL:GBLANERA.1 POL-3 AMR LCM PM OR XCON CEBON/9 COMPANY: COMPANY: CONSIDERATION AND INTELLIGENCE OF THE IRANIAN TO BE SITTING ON AND OVERVIEW OF ACTS CHAOS. THE COMPANY IS TO BE THAT ASSOCIATED TIME- TABLE THE NOVE INVO COTTENMENT IS NOTED IN IT BE- TREASURER THE AND TO BE POSSEDATION. LET FEES FOR CONCEPT RETAINING ANNUAL ALTERNATIVE COUNCIL AND FOR THE WITHART IN THE WITH MINIMAL PROPERTIES. FOR THAT ISLAND IN THE LAW OF OUR. THIS SUBJECTS TO BE ANALYSIS AND ULIANIC MOVEMENT BY PAPER SONG CHRISTMAS. THE WALL OF CHRISTIAN OF FINDING THE INDIAN OF THE LAW AND ACTS INTELLIGENCE VIGILANT INTELLIGENCE OF THE ATTORNEY CAREFULLY ANALIZING THE STRAIGHTNESS OF THE FOLIO WHICH MAY TO JUMP. AND SOURGY. CATIA 91K THE REVIEW OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE PAPER FROM LUI ON THE GRAPHIC ON CURSEIA OF SIDE IN MARATHRY OVER COOKS, SOVERSTREET AND IN THE INSTRUMENT OF IN A TALES OF THE STREET OF THE INSTRUMENT OF IN A TALES OF THE STREET OF THE STREET OF THE STREET OF THE STREET OF

REPLACEMENT BY HOMRINI-STAR LISSED SOLUTION. SEEMS TO BE ROOM POR HORSE-TRADING. HOW VTR.) 3. ENTEZAM SAIC ELOMBINI HAS JUST PSTAIRISER (11/107) COMMITTEE OF FIVE TO RESOLVE PRESENT STRIENS. MADEAS, WHO LED OIL COMMITTEE, WOULD IS BCKYDUE TO THE COOLD NON-TOR OIL SITUATION AND LNI'S TOLD STATESMAN OF YARDLLAH SARABI WOULD CLAIM NEW GROUP, OF WHICH NUTZAM IS TO THE A MEMBER. ENTEZAM EXCLINED TO NAME OTHER MEMBERS AT THIS TIME. COMMITTEE HAS JESSE STATING FOR THAT MORNING, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE MOST STRIENS WITHIN A FLOW DAYS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT EOSSTING TIME EFFORTS TO BLOCK STRIKE SETTLEMENT, ENTEZAM SAIC OIL FIELDS WERE SPECIAL CASE, AND RADICAL LEFTISTS DID NOT RPT NOT SEEM TO POSE A MAJOR THERAT TO SETTLEMENTS ELSEFIRE. (COMMENT: AS LONG-TIME RELIEVES IN MURRY'S LAW, WE ARE NOT SO SURE PROCESS WILL TO THAT SMOOTHLY.) SULLIVAN BT CHARGE: STATE 1/17/2 DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL:P YITS 4.0.12265: RDS-4 1/17/93 (STEEL, JOHN D.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PINS, FORS, IF SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) FORMS STRIKE COMMITTEE, OPPOSITIONISTS DISCUSSING NEXT STEPS SUMMARY: IN SPIELEVES SITUATION IN IRANWILL STABILIZE BY JAN 21, FROM INH HAS NO PIAN TO FETUEN TO IRAN BEFORE JAN 21, BUT DOLLS TO WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO A WEEK. INI WANTS REGENCY COUNCIL AND MAJLES TO MELT AWAY, BUT MODERATE OPPORTITIES IN SHARIA-MADARI CAMP ARE SEEING COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE NITHER JOINT OPERATION OF TWO COUNCILS OR MORE. LMI SOURCESAYS KHOMEINI HAS ESTABLISHED A COMMITTEE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING STRITES; IT BEGAN WORK JAN 17. END SUMMARY 1. LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AMIR ENTEZAM TOLD POLOFF STEMPEL THAT SITUATION AFTER SHAH'S DEPARTURE HAD DEVELOPED AFTER THE TSA ANYONE HAD HOPED. HE THANKED U.S. GRA- CIOUSLY AND EXTENSIVELY FOR WORKING WITH MILITARY TO PRE-VENT BLOWUP. ENTEZAM SAID LMI HAD CONTACTED KHOMEINI AND AYATOLLAH HAD DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO RETURN TO IRAN IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WHEN PRESSED, ENTEZAM SAID NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, BUT LMI THOUGHT SITUATION WOULD STABLIZE FAIRLY WELL -- CROWD WOULD HAVE ONE BIG CHANCE FOR EMOTIONAL OUTPOURING AT JAN 19 MARCH -- BY JAN.21. KHOMEINI WOULD NOT COME BACK BEFORE THEN, BUT MIGHT DO SO WITHIN NEXT SEVEN DAYS. DECISION STILL BEING CONSIDERED IN PARIS. 2. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUESTION AS TO HOW POLITICAL SITUATING WOULD DEVELOP, ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI WOULD INVITE MAJLES AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO MELT AWAY. IF THEY FAILED TO TAKE THE HINT, THEY WOULD BE PRESSED HARDER AND DUMPED BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. POLOFF GOT MORE CONCILIATORY VERSION FROM DR. NASSER MINATCHI, AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTER, WHO SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD BE MEETING WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS TO SEE HOW PROBLEM OF DUAL GOVERNMENT -- REGENCY COUNCIL AND ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL COULD BE RESOLVED. MINATCHI'S PREFERRED SOLUTION IS TO MERGE THE TWO COUNCILS, AND THIS HAS SOME STRONG SUPPORT. OTHER OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED ARE JOINT MEETING OF TWO GROUPS, OR PARALLEL ACTIONS (SUCH AS BOTH GROUPS DESIGNATING SAMV PRIME MINISTER). MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI HAS NOW RETURNED FROM PARIS AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SERIES OF MEETINGS. MINATCHI PROPOSED NOT TO KNOW WHAT WORD MONTAZERI WAS REMAINING BACK FROM PARIS. (COMMENT: WHILE KHOMEINI'S PERMITION MAY EVOLVE THROUGH DISCUSSION, ENTEZAM'S VIEW SUGGESTS LMI WILL GO INTO SUCH A MEETING ARGUING SIMPLY FOR DISAPPEARANCE OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 2024 CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS TEHRAN 2027 C 1612482 JAN 79\nFM EMBASSY TEHRAN\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3248\nBT\CONFIDENTIAL AL TEHRAN 22784 CHARGE: STATE 1-16-7\nAPRVE: ICM:CWNAS\nIRTTD: POL:JDSTEP\CLEAR: POL:SELAMER\nLISTR: POL-3 AMB L\nICON-2 PM US\nOR SHIP TARISF CHRON/15 ATANDGON VERWORN IN IMPLYING THAT FROMINI WOULD ATTACK ANT COUNTRY WHICH GIVES THE SHAR REDUCE. ENTEZAM SAID (AND WE HOPE HE SPEARS ACCURATELY FOR KHOMEINI CAMP) THAT KHOMEINI UNDERSTANDS IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO OFFER SHAR ASYLUM IN U.S. OR EUOPPT TO PUT HIM OUT OF IRAN. AND COUNTRY THAT DOES SO WOULD NOT BE PHEALIZED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. E.C. 12065: PIS-4 1-16-99 (STEMPEL, J.L.) OR-P\TAGS: PINT, FOPS\SUBJECT: KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN POSTPONED 5. GROUPS WHICH BEEN REPORTED TAKING OVER SECURITY FROM POLICE IN SEVERAL AREAS OF COUNTRY ARE "PROBABLY LMI ACTION TEAMS. ENTEZAM SAID ALL THOSE WHO HAD TAKEN OVER IN THE NORTH, AROUND TABRIZ AND EISHERER IN EAST AZAPBAIJAN PROVINCE WERE DEFINITELY LMI. REPORTS WERE NOT IN FROM MORE SOUTHERN CITIES SUCH AS SHIRAZ, ALSO ON POSITIVE NOTE, ACCORDING TO ENTEZAM, MASS UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATION JAN 13, WHICH HAD AT ITS PEAT 233,000 PEOPLE (ACCORDING TO LMI MORE EXFRIENCED OBSERVERS SAY JUST UNDER 123,200) WAS "ONE HUNDRED PER CENT CONTROLLED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT." ENTEZAM SAID LMI WAS ADREABELI SURPRISED BY THIS, SINCE TUDEH HAD BEEN STRONG IN UNIVERSITIES. (COMMENT: ENTEZAM CLEARLY THOUGHT THIS OUTCOME HAD RESULTED FROM GOOD ORGANIZATIONAL WORK WHICH LMI HAD DONE. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE LMI EXCLUSIVE CREDIT FOR THIS, SINCE HE AND OTHERS THOUGHT MARKETS MAY JUST HAVE BEEN A BIT OVERHEALTHED ON THIS OCCASION.) LMI WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATIONS WEEK-END OF JAN 16-19, REGARDLESS OF WEATHER SHAR IS STILL IN IRAN OR NOT. 2. ABOVE REPRESENTS LMI'S BEST INFORMATION, BUT ADDRESSES SHOULD NOT THAT A TIME FRAME IS UNSPECIFIED, AND B) LMI IN RECENT DAYS HAS COOLED ON IDEA OF IMMEDIATE KHOVENIKI PEURN. XHCEINI'S PARIS ENTERAGE MAY HAVE OTHER IDEAS WHICH COULD CHANGE KHOMEINI'S INTENTION ON SHORT NOTICE. SULLIVAN BT #9784 6. ENTEZAM NOTED THAT LMI HAD WELL-ADVANCED PLANNING AND DAY OF SHAR'S DEPARTURE. ATATOLLAHS HAD MADE SOME C LMIN STATEMENTS AND WOULD MAKE OTHERS. LMI HAD TEAMS O UITS ON PREPARED TO PROTECT STATES AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS. WHEN FOLLOFF ASKED ABOUT THESE GROUPS AND THOSE WHO HAVE BEH MAINTAINING SECURITY IN TOWNS, ENTREAM SAID THEY CAME FROM VARIETY OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS. (COMMENT: WE SUSPECT AT LEASE SOME OF THEM AND MOST OF THEIR ORGANIZERS ARE MUJAHIDDIN OR MUJAHIDDIV RELATED. ) SULLIVAN MT #670

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS TEHRAN 00670 C 1413133 JAN 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2974 BT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 00670 EXDIS F.O. 17063: RDS-4 1-14-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: LMI ON PRESENT EVENTS SUMMARY: ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF NAMING OF REGENCY COUNCIL GIVES LMI NO DIFFICULTY. LMI EXPECTS MAJLES WILL APPROVE BAKHTIAR. KHOMEINI'S PROJECTED RETURN TO IRAN NOT RPT NOT AS FIRM AS PRESS REPORTS INDICATE. SOME GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING OVER SECURITY ARE LMI UNITS, FULL INFO NOT AVAILABLE ON OTHERS. THERE WILL BE CONTINUED DEMON- STRATIONS THROUGH WEEKEND JAN 18-19. JAN 13 UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONTROLLED BY LMI. LMI PLANS FOR POST- SHAH CALM ARE ADVANCING. END SUMMARY. 1. POLOFF STEMPEL MET WITH AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH WAS NAMED JAN 13 GIVES LMI NO PROBLEMS. VARASTEH AND TEHRANI WERE FORMER OPPOSITIONISTS WITH GOOD RECORDS, AND ALIABADI IS WELL THOUGHT OF. (MINATCHI OF MODERATE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OFFERED SAME VIEW.) REGENCY COUNCIL SHOULD UNDERSTAND IT WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AROUND LONG, ONCE KHOMEINI RETURNS TO IRAN. ENTEZAM SAID PROMINENT OPPOSITIONISTS WERE CONTACTED BY COURT TO SERVE, BUT ALL DECLINED. WE PERSONALLY KNOW THAT KARIM SANJABI, YADOLLAH SAHABI, AND MEHDI BAZARGAN HAD ALL TURNED SHAH DOWN. 2. ENTEZAM SAID HE BELIEVES MAJLES WILL FUSS AND MUSS AND FINALLY APPROVE BAKHTIAR. WHILE SOME OF MAJLESMEN MAY PREFER MILITARY TAKEOVER (WHICH ALL BELIEVE WOULD FOLLOW REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR), BULK WILL VOTE FOR GOOD OF COUNTRY. LMI WILL BE DOING SOME DISCREET LOBBYING, HOWEVER, SINCE VOTE IS NOT RPT NOT FOREGONE CONCLUSION. 3. ON QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN TO IRAN, ENTEZAM SAID THAT CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, KHOMEINI HAS NOT RPT NOT MADE DECISION WHEN TO RETURN. LMI GROUP HERE, INCLUDING SEYED MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, WOULD PREFER DELAY HIS RETURN BEYOND FIRST OR SECOND DAY TO ALLOW MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION TO SETTLE. ENTEZAM SAID HE WAS FRANKLY AFRAID FOR KHOMEINI'S SAFETY, SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHO DO NOT WISH KHOMEINI WELL. FANATICISM HAS DONE IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR NATIONAL LEADERS IN PAST FIFTY YEARS AND LMI DOES NOT WANT KHOMEINI TO BE NEXT ON THE LIST. SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAN WOULD BE "TOO HORRIBLE TO THINK ABOUT" IF KHOMEINI WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON HIS RETURN TO IRAN. 4. ENTEZAM SAID COUPLES OF LOCAL PERSIAN PAPERS, INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS TEHRAN 00670 CHRG: STATE 1-14-79 APPRV: DCM;CWNAAS DRFTD: POL;JDSTEMPEL CLEAR: POL;OBLAMBRAY DISTR: DCM-2 AMB POL CHRON/5 CONFIDENTIAL ITS ECONOMIC EXPOSURE AFTER SHAH LEAVES. IT WOULD NOT BE FINISH TAKEN ON DETAILS, HOWEVER. 2. SECOND MEETING WITH DR. MINATCHI OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF), REVIVED SAME GENERAL AT PREVIOUS MEETING (CYPRUS). MINATCHI SAID MEETING OF CLERGY LEADERS' ORGANIZATION (CLO) ON JAN 9 WILL PRODUCE PLAN FOR COORDINATED EFFORT TO CLEAR COUNTRY- WIDE TO URG NON-VIOLENCE FROM MOSQUES. THIS WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN TEHRAN AS OF JAN 9. MINATCHI SAID CLO EXECUTIVE BOARD WOULD MEET JAN 14 TO DEFINE FULL COOPERA- TION WITH BAKHTIAR'S JUSTICE MINISTER BUT CAUTIONED THAT THIS COOPERATION WAS LIMITED TO JUSTICE MINISTRY AND AIMED BASICALLY AT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS. EMBOFF ENCOURAGED THIS. 3. MINATCHI SAID MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PROBLEM SOMWHAT VARIOUS ABOUT SHAH'S IMMINENT DEPARTURE. HE ABOUT DISCUSSED REGENCY COUNCIL IDEA WITH ALI MINI AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO INCLUDE SOME RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION ON COUNCIL. HE WOULD BE SEEKING AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI JAN 13, AND WOULD RAISE MATTER. HE WAS CONFIDENT "OUR TRIANGLE" WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SORT OF EFFORT. 4. MINATCHI SAID QUESTIONS SURROUNDING REGENCY COUNCIL ARE STILL TROUBLESOME. BAKHTIAR HAD TALKED ABOUT SHAH LEAVING COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE 36, BUT SHAH WOULD BE LEAVING UNDER ARTICLE 42, WHICH PERMITTED HIM TO NAME ANYONE TO AGENCY COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID RECENT DISCUSSION HAD CENTERED AROUND SEVEN-MEMBER COUNCIL WITH ONLY FIRST 3 ARTICLE 36 STATUTORY MEMBERSHIP. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT PRESENT THINKING WAS, BUT SUGGESTED THERE WOULD BE A LOT MORE DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH BEFORE ISSUE WAS SETTLED. SOLLYAN - T 1431 JAN CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 00670 4

01413137 JAN 79 PM AMEMEAST TEHPAIN TO SECURE WASHD CNIACT IMMEDIATE 2974 C ON FI D EN T I A L T E T E R A N 32673 CARGO: STATE 1-14-79 EXDISAPPRV: DCMICVNAAS DRFTD: POL1JDSTEMPELE CLEAR: POL:GELAMDRAK DISTR: DCM-2 AMB POL CHRON/5 EXIS F.O. 12063: RDS-4 1-14-98 (STEMPEL; J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: LMI ON PRESENT EVENTS SUMMARY: ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF NAMING OF REGENCY COUNCIL GIVES LMI NO DIFFICULTY. LMI EXPECTS MAJLES WILL APPROVE BAKHTIAR. GEOMEINI'S PROJECTED RETURN TO IRAN NOT RPT NOT AS FIRM AS PRESS REPORTS INDICATE. SOME GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING OVER SECURITY ARE LMI UNITS. FULL INFO NOT AVAILABLE ON OTHERS. THERE WILL BE CONTINUED DEMON-STATIONS THROUGH WEEKEND JAN 12-19. JAN 13 UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONTROLLED BY LMI. LMI PLANS FOR POST-SHAN CALM ARE ADVANCING. END SUMMARY. 1. POLOFF STEMPEL MET WITH AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. ENTEZAM SAID REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH WAS NAMED JAN 13 GIVES LMI NO PROBLEMS. VARASTEEAND TERRANI WERE FORMER OPPOSITIONISTS WITH GOOD RECORDS, AND ALIABADI IS WELL THOUGHT OF. (MINATCEI OF MODERATE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OFFERED SAME VIEW.) REGENCY COUNCIL SHOULD UNDERSTAND IT WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AROUND LONG, ONCE KHOMEINI RETURNS TO IRAN. ENTEZAM SAID PROMINENT OPPOSITIONISTS WERE CONTACTED BY COURT TO SERVE, BUT ALL DECLINED. HE PERSONALLY KNEW THAT NAIM SANJARI, YADOLLAH SAHARI, AND MEHDI PAZAERAN HAD ALL TURNED SHAR LOWN. 2. ENTEZAM SAID HE BELIEVES MAJLEZ WILL FUSS AND MUSS AND FINALLY APPROVE BAKHTIAR. WHILE SOME OF MAJLEZSMEN MAY PREFER MILITARY TAKOVER (WHICH ALL BELIEVE WOULD FOLLOW REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR), FULY WILL VOTE FOR GOOD OF COUNTRY. LMI WILL HE DOING SOME DISCREET LOBBYING, HOWEVER, SINCE VOTE IS NOT RPT NOT FOREGONE CONCLUSION. 3. ON QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN TO IRAN, ENTEZAM SAID THAT CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, KHOMEINI HAS NOT RPT NOT MADE DECISION WHEN TO RETURN. LMI GROUP HERE, INCLUDING SEED MOHAMMAD FEHESATI, WOULD PREFER BE DLAY HIS RETURN BEYOND FIRST OR SECOND DAY TO ALLOW MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION TO SETTLE. ENTEZAM SAID WAS FRANKLY AFRAID FOR KHOMEINI'S SAFETY, SINCE IT WAS DEVIOUS THAT THERE ARE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHO DO NOT WISH KHOMEINI WELL. PANATICISM HAS DONE IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR NATIONAL LEADERS IN PAST FIFTY YEARS AND LMI DOES NOT WANT KHOMEINI TO BE NEXT ON THE LIST. SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAN WOULD BE "TOO HORRIBLE TO THINK ABOUT" IF KHOMEINI WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON HIS RETURN TO IRAN. 4. NITRZAM SAID COUPLE OF LOCAL PERSIAN PAPERS, INCLUDING FINNESEANONATIALS.HOWTHEN. 2. KNOWS MEETING WITH DR. FINANCIAL OF COMMITTEE FOR THE IMAGING OF HUMAN FLIGHTS AND PERSONAL ACTIVITY. REVIEWED JAN 15, 2016 AT PERSONAL ACTIVITY MEETING OF PERSONAL ACTIVITY OF CHRIVIS LEARNS' ORGANIZATION (COOL ON JAN 5) IN PRODUCED PLAN FOR CONCERNED DEPARTMENT OF CLARITY COOPERATIVE TOoth MODELING, THIS WAS ALONE ADMINISTRATION IN THE FORM AS OF JAN 3, MINNESAS SALE OF THE SECURITIES MEASURED MEET JAN 14 TO PAYING THE COOPERATIVE ON WITH THE INDIVIDUALS JUSTICE MINISTER AND ATTENDED THAT THIS COOPERATION WAS LIMITED TO JUSTICE MINISTER AND ATTENDING TO THE INDIVIDUALS AS A CHILDREN AS A SINGLE FOR THE INDIVIDUALS. IMPOFIXING MINISTRY OF FOOD AND FOOD MINATCHI SEII QUESTIONS SUBROUNDINGI HENNOT COUNCIL IS STILL THOUGHELSONG — RABHTIAR HAD TALL TO ABOUT SEA - NOT BE COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE 35, BUT SHAR WOULD BE LAVING ENDING ARTICLES 40, WHICH PERMITTED HIM TO NAME A NOIP TO THE NOY COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID RECENT DISCUSSION AND INTEREST AROUND SIVIN MEMBER COUNCIL KITT ONLY FIRST OILS ILLICIOI BE STATUTORY MEMBERSHIP. HE DID NOT - ALL THAT PRESENT THINKING WAS, BUT SUMMERED THERE WOULD BE A LOT NOSE DISCUSSION RACK AND FOOD IS FORBED ISSUE WAS SETTLED. STILL I 4 ཡིན

"I AM UNQUIVOCALLY READY TO HELP." KHOMEINI DOES NOT SPT NOT WANT TO HARM TE ARMY "AFTER ALL, IT IS PART OF THE NATION." SOME BAKHTIAR MINISTERS HAD TOLD THE LMI AND NATIONAL FRONT (INF) THAT THEY WANTED TO RESIGN. LMI HAD AVISED THEM TO STAY ON; A TRANSITIONAL GOVT WAS NECESSARY TO "HAVE THE WAY FOR AN EVENTUAL NATIONAL GOVT OF GOOD MEN." HE PLEDGED LMI COOPERATION TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AND ARSON, AND SERIOUS EFFORT BY KHOMEINI FORCES TO CONTROL STREET MOBS. EMBOFF SAID THIS WOULD CERTAINLY REINFORCE OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP SITUATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANNEL. 4. AT THAT POINT, EMBOFF PAISED MATTER OF WHETHER LMI COULD CONTROL ALL STREET MOBS. ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LMI WAS FRANKLY CONCERNED ABOUT THOSE WHO ENGAGED IN RANDOM VIOLENCE, SUCH AS THE GRIMM ASSASSINATION. I CAN STATE POSITIVELY THAT NONE OF THOSE PEOPLE ARE PART OF OUR MOVEMENT. EMBOFF REMAINED SKEPTICAL, AND ASKED IF LMI AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD EXERCISE AN INFLUENCE THERE. ENTEZAM REPLIED THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO SO. 5. ENTEZAM THEN RAISED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "DELICATE POINT OF TIMING ABOUT TRANSITIONAL GOVT. LMI FEARS SHAH WILL TRY AND RETURN -- RUMOR ALREADY HAS IT THAT GEN. OVEISSI HAS MET. WITH PRESIDENT CARTER TO OBTAIN BACKING FOR A COUNTER-COUP. LMI FELT IT COULD NOT WAIT TOO LONG TO MOVE TOWARD TRULY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT." MOVEMENT UNDERSTOOD NEED TO LET BAKHTIAR RULE LONG ENOUGH TO GET SHAH OUT OF COUNTRY, BUT THOUGHT WITHIN THREE WEEKS TO A MONTH AFTER THAT, REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD BE OBLIGED TO INSTALL NEW GOVT APPROVED BY KHOMEINI. EMBOFF DESCRIBED OVEISSI RUMOR AS HEIGHT OF ABSURDITY AND LIMITED COMMENT ON SCENARIO TO SAYING USG APPROVED OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT, BUT DID NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ON IFS AND BUIS. 6. EMBOFF ASKED ENTEZAM IF ANY THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC STATUS--WOULD ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ALLOW OF ENCOURAGE RETURN TO WORK WHEN SHAH LEFT? IF NOT, THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO COUNTRY FOR IT TO EVENTUALLY TAKE OVERT ENTEZAM SMILED AND SAID YES, WE HAVE SOME PLANS FOR THAT. HE INDICATED LMI HAD BEEN GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO EASING ET 2431 I'M AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATEWASHDCNIACT IMMEDIATE2933 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00431 E.O. 12065:E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/9/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR=P TAGS: PINR, PINS, PORS, IR SUBJECT: TWO OPPOSITIONIST VIEWS -- BACKING OFF CONFRONTATION LIMDIS REF:TEHRAN357 SUMMARY: NEW LIBRATION MOVEMENT (LMI) SOURCE SAYS LMI WILL NOT PPT NOT CHALLENGE BAKHTIAR GOVT NOW, WILL HELP TO MAKE SHAR'S EVENTUAL DEPARTURE AS PEACEFUL AS POSSIBLE, AND UPGFS U.S. TO PREVENT ARMY FROM OVERTHROWING CIVILIAN EFFORT. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS MOVING FASTER IN SIMILAR DIRECTION TO TRY AND AVOID TROUBLE WHEN SHAR LEAVES COUNTRY. SOURCE BELIEVES RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION ON REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD HELP EASE SITUATION AND SAYS SHARIAT-MADARI GROUP IS PROBABLY READY TO PARTICIPATE. END SUMMARY 1. IN TWO CONVERSATIONS MORNING JAN 9, POLLOFF GOT IM-PRESSION THAT BOTH MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND LIMI ARE PREPARED TO TOLERATE BAKTHIAR GOVT FOR LIMITED TIME IN ORDER TO EASE SHOCK OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY. BOTH SOURCES NOW BELIEVE SHAH INTENDS TO DEPART, AND RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO EMBOFF-S. URGING THAT THEIR ORGANIFICATIONS PLAN NOW TO MAKE POST-DEPARTURE SCENARIO AS IDEALLY AS POSSIBLE. 2. EMROFF MET AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER. FOR FIRST TIME (STRONGLY PROTECT). PROF RICHARD COTTAM HAD VOUCHED FOR EACH OTHERS' BONA FIDES, AND DISCUSSION IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF POST-SHABIRAN. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED LMI RELIEF THAT "ARMY CAN NOT TURN AGAINST PEOPLE IF THE U.S. OPPOSES THIS." EMROFF REPLIED THAT U.S., IN ITS CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, WAS URGING CREDIENCE TO CIVILIAN GOVT, BUT LMI HAD BETTER STRAIGHTEN ITSELF OUT ABOUT EXTENT AND DEPTH OF U.S. INFLUENCE WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, ESPECIALLY ON VITAL ISSUES WHERE OFFICER PERCEPTIONS MAY NOT BE SUBJECT TO MUCH FOREIGN PERSUASION. AFTER SHORT DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTROL AND INFLUENCE, ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED LIMITATION ON U.S. ROLE (AT LEAST FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION). 2. EMROFF REITERATED THAT U.S. WAS OPPOSED TO IDEA OF MILITARY COUP, DID NOT THINK IT WAS A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO IRAN'S PROBLEMS, AND HAD SO STATED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRI- VATELY ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. FOR THIS REASON, USG WAS PAPICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT LMI AND OTHERS WERE DOING TREASENT PROVOCATION TO MILITARY WHICH WOULD LEND TO FINISHED AND CHAOS WHEN HEAH LEFT IRAN. ENTEZAM STATED DRFTD: POL:JDSTENPEL:HG CLEAR: POL:GELAMBRAKIS DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM ECON-2 PM OR CHRON/10 throw

3. COTTAM DESCRIBED AMIR AMIR-ENTEZAM, AN IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN, AS PROBABLY A VERY IMPORTANT LEADER AMONG THE KHOMEINI FACTION. AMIR-ENTEZAM TOLD COTTAM HE WISHED TO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY. COTTAM APPARENTLY ENCOURAGED HIM IN THAT DIRECTION. 4. MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS, ACCORDING TO COTTAM, WOULD TOLERATE BAKHTIAR AS LONG AS ANTI-SHAH MOVEMENT DID NOT LOSE MOMENTUM. SHOULD THEY SENSE THAT SPIRITS WERE WANING. AMONG DEMONSTRATORS THEY WOULD STEP UP ATTACKS ON BAKHTIAR. BAKHTIAR WAS REGARDED AS A WEAK PERSONALITY, UNABLE TO RESIST THE SHAH'S OFFER OF THE PRIME MINISTER-SHIP NO MATTER WHAT THE COST TO IRAN. 5. COTTAM DESCRIBED IN SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL REGENCY COUNCIL IDEA MENTIONED PARA. 4 REF'TEL. COUNCIL WOULD BE COMPOSED OF A GENERAL OFFICER SELECTED BY THE SHAN, ALI AMINI (WHOM THE SHAN BELIEVED WAS LOYAL BUT WHO REALLY SUPPORTED THE OPPOSITION), BEHESHTI (KHOMEINI'S CHIELEUTENANT IN IRAN), PROGRESSIVE LAWYER NAZIEH AND, TO BREAK TIE VOTES, EMPRESS FARAH. SANJABI WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER; PARLIAMENT WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND ELECTIONS CALLED, NEW MAJLIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REVISE THE CONSTITU- IION TO ELIMINATE THE SHAN. 6. FINALLY, COTTAM DESCRIBED A CONVERSATION WITH A RETIRED COLONEL WHO SAID THAT ALL OF THE RETIRED COLONELS (MEN FIRED BY THE SHAN) WERE REVOLUTIONARY BECAUSE THEY WERE LITERATE. MOST OF THE GENERALS WERE ILLITERATE AND INDEED THAT WAS WHY THE SHAN HAD PROMOTED THEM. THE GENERALS WOULD REMAIN LOYAL BUT THE COLONELS COULD ONLY TAKE SO MUCH STRAIN. LARGE NUMBERS OF COLONELS AND LOWER RANKING OFFICERS WERE BELIEVED TIED IN TO THE KHOMEINI ORGANIZATION. KHOMEINI'S GROUP HAD RECENTLY BEEN GIVING THE MILITARY PRIORITY ADDITIONAL ATTENTION. VANCE BT 4510 CONFIDENTIAL ① WWV ESA625BRA758 00 RUQ MHR AC DE RUEHC 4510 0080021 ZNY CCCCC ZZH 007016Z JAN 79 FIA SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 9302 BT CONFIDENTIAL STATE 004510 8 JAN 13 00 59Z 000413 E.0.112065 GDS, 1-7-85, (PRECHT, HENRY) TAGS: PINS, IR SUBJECT: FURTHER REPORT OF RICHARD COTTAM REF: TEHRAN 00366 1. DEP OFF CALLED COITAM JANUARY 7 FOR REPORT TO SUPPLEMENT REFIEL. COITAM STRESSED THAT GROUP AROUND KHOMEINI AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN WERE FEARFUL OF A MILITARY COUP WHICH WOULD LEAD TO BLOODY REPRESSION. HE SAID THAT IN HIS FINAL DAYS IN TEHRAN, JANUARY 2-3, OPPOSITIONISTS WERE QUITE DEFINITE IN THEIR INFORMATION ABOUT A COUP. THEY HAD HAMES OF SIX GENERALS, INCLUDING OVEISSI, RABII, AND KHOSROWDAD PLUS THREE OTHERS COITAM COULDN'T REMEMBER WHO WERE THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY LEADERS. COUP PLANS BEING DRAWN UP IN A BUILDING OWNED BY "RESEARCH CORPORATION" ON SHAH ABBAS AVENUE. ACCORDING TO THE OPPOSITION, THE PLANNERS HAD DIVIDED TEHRAN INTO SIX DISTRICTS EACH UNDER A GENERAL OFFICER. ARRESTS AND APPLICATION OF STRICT MILITARY CONTROLS WOULD BE SET IN MOTION AT A GIVEN SIGNAL. MANY IN THE OPPOSITION FEARED THE U.S. WOULD BACK SUCH A COUP. 2. DESPITE HATRED FOR U.S. AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION, COTTAM FOUND KHOMEINI'S CIRCLE AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN READY TO THINK IN SOPHISTICATED TERMS ABOUT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS AFRAID OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DESIROUS OF RELYING ON THE U.S. FOR IRAN'S DEFENSE. THEY DID NOT WANT A FORMAL DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP BUT DID WANT U.S. BACKING AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWERS THOUGHT MOSCOW WOULD BE GREATLY DISTURBED BY A GOVERNMENT IN IRAN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO MIGHT EXERCISE INFLUENCE BEYOND IRAN'S BORDERS, INGANDING AMONG SOVIET MOSLEMS.

In the name of Allah the most Compassionate and Merciful

In the Name of GOD, the Beneficient, the Merciful " Israel is the Enemy of Humanity and Man" - Imam Khomeini An evident characteristic of the regime which has been in the past half century by the name of Israel is its dependence on aliens and foreign support. This is a regime which has been formed on the initiative of English imperialism, through the usurption of the land of deprived Muslims and grown in the care of American imperialism. At the beginning, England in order to expand its satanic domination, under the pretext of "efforts to establish a national Jewish government" along with the Zionists proceeded to occupy a section of the lands belonging to Muslims. In reality, they established a base in the heart of the Islamic home land from which all satanic forces of the world could struggle against Islam and attack the Muslims or weaken the Islamic world through their plots and deception. Basically, the main motive for the foundation of the racist Zionist regime was confrontation with Islam, for if Muslims achieve unity, they will undermine world arrogance. This is why Imam considers The Day of Qods as the day of Islam. As the universal domination of England declined, a more powerful friend and ally, American imperialism, came to the help of Israel. The seemingly endless flow of American military and economical aid, increasingly encouraged this small entity to instigate new plots and disasters everyday. We have heard much about the massacres of the Qods occupying regime and how the Zionist network dominating it is coordinated and aligned with not only the oppressive power but all corrupt and treacherous regimes. It is for this reason that this regime does not refrain from any level of violence against the deprived and downtrodden people of Palestine. As we know, as long as the criminal Shah, the puppet of the Great Satan, controlled the destinies of the Iranian nation, our dil flowed to the usurper Israel so that its system of crime and murder would not stop for a moment. When the American puppet regime collapsed with the roar of the heroic nation and the help of GOD in the leadership of Imam Khomeini, American imperialism

did not sit idly by. Now it dares to compel dependent regimes which are apparently against Israel to supply oil to this criminal regime. In general, America monitors and directs the line of events in the Middle East so that the Zionist, racist elite which form the criminal government hierarchy of Israel can control the events of the region in all aspects and implement any plot and conspiracy they choose with the aid of the Great Satan. Hence it benefits in this way from the numerous efforts of other puppet Arab regimes which unjustly dominate Islamic countries and serve imperialism. The Islamic Ummah is under constant oppression here, an oppression which stems from the deep enemity and hostility of world arrogance against Islam and the Muslims. This ominous alliance encouraged the usurper Israel to occupy Jerusalem (Qods) the land of the Messengers and Prophets of GOD, in June 1967. Now for these years, the dear Qods, this first center of the followers of divine unity and the first shelter of the lovers of the vision of GOD has been captive in the claws of those who block the path of Allah. It's holy land has been the ground for the aggression and attacks of the enemies of GOD and the people and the murderers of Prophets and divine men. The dear Qods is now announced by the Zionist regime to be the capital of "oppression, aggression and usurpation". The Qods occupying regime has now made the land from which divine prophets and the land of the children of Habil (Abel), into a shelter for the descendants of Ghabil (Cain) and has established the domination of the followers of Namrood (Nimrod) in the land where Abraham grew. At this time, these rulers have launched a wild campaign of murder against the true owners of Qods, the oppressed yet brave palestinians and against the downtrodden and martyr giving people of Lebanon and ultimately against all Muslim of the world. What is clear today for all justice-seeking people of the world is that at the Qods occupying regime cannot continue its existence (not to mention its vast aggression against the Muslims) without American support and backing. For this reason, struggle against this fearful cancerous tumor is only possible through decisive struggle against the criminal America and hence in this warfront there is no place for American lackies. Puppet regimes like that of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Arabia, are not capable of fighting against the Zionist regime because of their dependence. Due to the commitment and responsibility that we have, we gathered parts from the remaining documents from the American spy den in Tehran, which describes the alliance of American imperialism and the Zionist regime in this connection. It may be that the increased consciousness of the Muslim world and the Mustaz'efin concerning these omnious alliance will lead them to the true basis for struggle which is Islam (not nationalism which is connected to racism) and along with the glorious Islamic Revolution of Iran they will undermine the pillars of world arrogance one after the other.

The first document is a relatively large pamphlet concerning the espionage and security system of Israel, and it has been prepared by the spies of the Great Satan. In this document in reality, the criminal America has projected a clear picture of the crimes and inhuman activities of the intelligence agency of the racist regime it supports. A regime which owes its existence to the oppressive powers of the world, is naturally compelled to establish a vast espionage network in a small land with a small population. As mentioned in the document, the domain of activity of the devilish Israel intelligence agencies is not limited to the region and Muslim countries, but encompasses the whole world. Corrupt and dependent regime in any part of the world enjoy the aid and cooperation of Israel intelligence and espionage agencies. Mossad operations which are only a part of this satanic system are so vast that they cover Russia, U.S.A., United Nations and Eastern Europe in matters of political, economical and scientific intelligence gathering. "Mossad has intelligence and espionage bases in most European capitals, Turkey, Latin America, Africa and Far East, and engages in various operations ranging from dependent official relations with host services (like CIA, SA-VAK) for intelligence exchange to taking part in special operations directed against Arab terrorists". They even go ahead to spy on their master, as they had installed a secret microphone in the office of American Ambassador. This document also reflects the plots and crimes done by Zionist lackies in embassies of the 2ods occupying regime under the cover of "diplomatic activities". In a section of this document, it is written "The collection agency the largest of the eight agencies Mossad has, operates under diplomatic cover in foreign countries. Now it is quite evident what role elements who work as ambassador, Charge d'Affaires and others in these centers of cons-piracies or embassies, play in reality. As we mentioned before, corrupt and oppressive regimes and their suppressive systems enjoy close cooperation and relations with Mossad and other Israel espionage services. The document mentions these instances: "Mossad is responsible for training the intelligence services of Turkey Ghana, and Japan". "Israel cooperates with South Africa intelligence and security services"

Naturally, the SAVAK which suppressed the revolutionaries and freedom seekers who opposed the criminal regime of Shah, had an important and long standing place in these collaborations. "Towards the end of 1958, an official dependent organization composed of Mossad, the Turkish Security Service and SAVAK was formed and named the THREE HEADED SPEAR". "Apart from regular intelligence exchanges, meetings at the level of the heads of these services took place every six months". Of course, the result of such close and continuous cooperation was something beyond the mere training of SAVAK prsonel. Through these relations, Mossad was able to impose the policies of international Zionism upon the American regime of the Shah and forcefully layed grounds for the suppression of the Muslims whether they are Iranians or Arabs. This fact is clearly projected in the document: "The main goal in Israel's relations with Iran was to form and increase Anti-Arab and Pro-Israel policies among Iranian officials. Following the end of 1950, for years, Mossad has had joint operations with SAVAK. Mossad has aided SAVAK in its activities and supported the Kurds of Iraq". It is evident how SAVAK and Mossad cospire against the Muslim Arabs from one side and brutally massacre the revolutionary Muslims in Iran from the other. Hence via this satanic thinking Mossad naturally sees the existence of different Christian and Muslim groups in Lebanon as a suitable ground for espionage and intelligence activities, thus it proceeds to form clandestine organizations. The first document contains an organizational chart of Israel espionage systems in complete detail and this can well serve as a guide for the increased understanding of Muslim warriors as to the nature of this ruthless system. With this increased understanding and with adherence to Allah and unity of expression they will inflict fresh worlds upon its deteriorating body. For the ultimate destiny of the oppressors in this world and the other is none other than annihilation. In the second document pertaining to 1965, we see how the Israel regime increased and broadened its activities in Iran and developed close relations with the Shah's regime even through agricultural and industrial projects. This was of course done quietly and secretly. In this area, the numerous efforts of the American ambassador and the representative of the Qods occupying regime, mentioned at the end of the document are noteworthy. In the third document, we witness the complete and multidimensional

support of the Shah for Israel. He guarantees the continued existence of Israel through the oil supply and inflicts excessive blows upon the unity of Muslim world. It is natural that the Shah, the number one agent of American imperialism in the region and the faithful ally of the Qods occupying regime would consider the defeat of Israel to be impossible, as he considered himself invulnerable as well. They are ignorant of the fact that just as the Muslim masses overthrew him, through adherence to the Almighty GOD and Islamic edicts, once again all Muslims of the region armed with weapons of faith and adherence to GOD shall punish the usurper Israel for the crimes it has done, even though today dependent regimes like that of Saudi Arabia have replaced the Shah in supplying Israel's and American's oil. In the first document it was mentioned how top Zionist intelligence agents work under diplomatic and embassy covers. The fourth and fifth documents are detailed evidence of this and how it manifested in Iran. Ben Eugenon who at one time was a close aide of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Qods occupying regime, acted as Charge d'Affaires in the Israeli espionage mission. This figure had such authority over affairs that the Great Satan refer to him for information and the American spies enthusiastically informed the Zionist agent in Iran of the pro-Israel tendencies of the Shah's puppet regime. The sixth document exposes the vast support of the Shah for Israel under the American umbrella. Fearful from the wrath of the Muslim masses of Iran, Israeli agents while keeping a low profile, have clandestinely engaged, like other so-called embassies of imperialist governments in the plundering of the wealth of the downtrodden masses of this land. The closeness of the regime of Israel and the Shah who both owe their political economical and military life to the direct support of America, is not surprising at all. However, what is surprising and raises many questions is the knowledge of various Arab embassies of these cooperations and their silence and agreement. After the overthrowing of the Shah's American regime by the Islamic Revolution, the severance of all relations with Israel and the establishment of brotherly ties with the palestinian people, these regime opposed and went ahead to side with Israel in joint plots for undermining the Islamic Revolution. In the seventh document spies who are "friends and allies" of one another exchange views on Iranian issue to attain necessary coordination for the plundering and suppression of the revolutionaries. As mentioned in the first document, the SAVAK and Mossad formed the THREE HEADED SPEAR organization for better cooperation. In the eighth document, a Zionist

agent informs his American friend of the precise events which took place in one of SAVAK's operation and the brutality and savagery (as Zionist spy calls it) of SAVAK. This treacherous alliance is again portrayed in the ninth document and hence it is not strange that the usurper Israel feared the Islamic Revolution so greatly, and supports and aids its former friends in the SAVAK today in Kurdestan and other areas where counterrevolutionaries have engaged in plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Another noteworthy point in the ninth document is Israel's concern over the probable disagreement between Iran and America in certain areas. This pion], \underline{\text{portrays the omnious dependence of Israel on America's universal domination}} . The tenth document is a CIA report pertaining to the background and reputations of the spies in the conspiracy center of the Qods occupying regime who generally had participated for long years in the murder and massacre of Muslim Arabs. Then to ensure the satanic domination of Zionism they continue their crimes in Iran (of course under the supervision of the Great Satan). The eleventh document like the others mentioned portrays America's monitoring and coordination of the Zionist regime and the deposed Shah's activities. American's and the Israeli's oneness in confronting the revolutionary Muslim movements in Palestine and other revolutionary Arab regimes is clearly exposed. This matter is further clarified in more detail in the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth documents. The sixteenth document concerns precise information from the Great Satan's spies as a weapon manufactured by the Zionist regime for the suppression of the Muslims. We hope the exposure of this information shall cause great damage to the Zionist regime. Finally, the seventeenth and last document is a biography of one of the Zionist leaders, the criminal Yitzhok Rabin, which has been prepared by CIA spies. Rabin is a man who through the massacre of the valiant Palestinian people climbed the ladder of power to the level of prime ministership of the Zionist regime. Yet his reaction to the Arab attack in 1967 was none other than fear and cowardice. The evident aspect of all documents which we briefly described is the oneness and complete coordination between the Zionist regime and the criminal America in their treacherous operations across the world and particularly in this region. It is clear that this usurper regime cannot exist for a moment without the direct and indirect support of the Great Satan. Thus, we stress upon the fact that this holy war against the Qods occupiers demands a decisive struggle against the Great Satan, and in this front American lackies, who served Zionism along with the Shah's regime and today replace the Shah in supplying oil to Israel can never fulfill their

historical obligation. (It is interesting to note that the same regimes which according to the American spy den documents had no opposition to the activities of Israel in Iran, today side with American imperialism in charging that Iran has relations with Qods occupying regime). Our prayer is that all Muslims unite around the axis of the life giving school of Islam, Armed with weapons of faith and oneness the Muslim will destroy this base of world arrogance in the heart of the Islamic Ummah. In this holy struggle the Muslims should take the glorious Islamic Revolution of Iran which follows the movements of the Prophets, as the best example. We are confident that the annihilation of this base of infidelity, which has a short duration according to divine laws, shall lay ground for the Government of the Imam of our time (Mahdi A,S,) and give good tidings for the emancipation of the Mustaz'efin from the claws of the Mustakberin. MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE LINE OF THE IMAM

secret noforn-nocontract-orcon March 1979 Israel Foreign intelligence and Security Services

This Foreign Intelligence and Security Services survey is prepared and published by the Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff and coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is the successor to the National Intelligence Survey, Section 56, Intelligence and Security and it will be revised and reissued at approximately the same intervals as was the National Intelligence Survey, or as developments may warrant. Initial dissemination or additional copies of this publication can be obtained through established channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. Warning Notice Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN (NF) Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT (NC) Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants PROPIN (PP) Caution—Proprietary Information Involved NFIBONLY (NO) NFIB Departments Only ORCON (OC) Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL... This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to... FGI Foreign Government Information This publication is available on microfiche. To get a microfiche copy of this publication call 7177 (OCR/DSB); for future issuances in addition to or in lieu of hard copies, call 5203 (PPG/RDB). Derivative classification by 059910 Review 30 years from date Derived from D9b.1 The Foreign Intelligence and Security Services survey is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

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H. Comments on principal sources ..... 40 1. Source materials ..... 40 2. Supplementary overt publications ..... 40 FIGURES Fig. 1 Soviet Agent Israel Beer (photo) ..... 8 Fig. 2 Organization of Israeli Intelligence and Security Services, 1977 (chart) ..... 9 Fig. 3 Organization of Mossad, 1977 (chart) ..... 11 Fig. 4 Eliahu Ben Shaul Cohen's transmitter on display in Damascus, 1965 (photo) ..... 12 Fig. 5 Johann Wolfgang Lotz illustrates the use of a transmitter during his trial in Cairo, July-August 1965 (photo) ..... 13 Fig. 6 Organization of Shin Beth, 1977 (chart) ..... 20 Fig. 7 Organization of Military Intelligence, 1977 (chart) ..... 25 Fig. 8 Organization of Naval Intelligence, 1974 (chart) ..... 31 Fig. 9 Organization of Israeli National Police, 1977 (chart) ..... 37 Fig. 10 Israeli National Police headquarters, Jerusalem, November 1972 (photo) ..... 38 Fig. 11 Israeli Border Guard post under construction at Kefar Rosenwald (Zarit), June 1970 (photo) ..... 39

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Intelligence and Security A. General Israel's principal intelligence and security authority is the Va'adat Rashet Hasherutim (the Committee of the Heads of Services), generally known as Va'adat. It coordinates the operations and activities of its members. Mossad Letafkdim Meyouchadim (the Secret Intelligence Service) or Mossad, its common name, has the primary responsibility for foreign operations and is subordinate to the Prime Minister. Sherut Bitachon Klati (Counterespionage and Internal Security), popularly known as Shin Beth, is responsible for security and is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. Agaf Modtin (Military Intelligence) has the main responsibility for strategic military intelligence and communications intelligence and is under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides support in research and political planning to the Israel intelligence community. The Ministry of Interior assists the National Police with police investigations and the maintenance of border security. 1. Background and development of services In 1948, when the British Mandate ended, the Jewish population of Palestine established the State of Israel. Among the agencies of government to emerge was the intelligence and security unit known as the Information Service (Sherut Yedtoth—popularly known as Shay). This organization, which was the intelligence arm of the Zionists' underground resistance force, the Haganah, during the years of the British Mandate, had begun to engage in operations on a worldwide scale with the founding of the Jewish Agency in 1929 at the Zionist Congress in Zurich, Switzerland. At that time, the Jewish Agency was composed of both Zionists and non-Zionists, including a strong American participation. The Jewish Agency, which was created to aid and support distressed Jews and to sustain the Palestine Jewish community, has been effectively under Zionist control over the years. All information in this survey is classified Secret, Noforn, Nocontract, Orcon. All information in this survey is classified Secret, Noforn, Nocontract, Orcon. It has also served as a cover for Shay, which extended its covert operations into Western Europe and the United States. From 1923 to 1948, Shay's objectives were to promote the establishment of an independent State of Israel; infiltrate Mandatory installations in order to apprise Zionist leadership of British attitudes and proposed actions; collect political intelligence that could be used in Zionist propaganda; penetrate Arab and anti-Zionist factions in Palestine and peripheral nations; monitor and control all extremist groups—left and right—among Jewish communities in Palestine and abroad; provide security for the arms smuggling and illegal immigration programs of the Haganah; and finally collect information on Nazi Germany to guarantee the security of the Jewish underground and escape channels throughout Europe before, during and after World War II. Shay consisted of the following components: Political Intelligence (Machlakit Medinit); Counterespionage and Internal Security (Sherut Bitachon Klati); Military Intelligence (Sherut Modtin); Police Branch of Military Intelligence (Sherut Modtin) and the Military Intelligence (Sherut Modtin, and the Intelligence and Security (Sherut Modtin or Betachon Kohot Ha Yam). These services worked independently on behalf of the different ministries to which they were individually responsible. This intelligence and security community was competitive and frequently acted on its own, a product of the general postwar chaos which required the accomplishment of many urgent tasks wherever and whenever they might arise. In some of the West European capitals all services were represented and competed for the same agents and sources. By April 1951, the Prime Minister and cabinet, seriously alarmed by the atmosphere of mutual jealousy and mistrust prevalent among the services at the increasing cost of their uncoordinated efforts in the field, decided to reorganize completely the basic SECRET

SECRET structure of Israel's intelligence and security community. The dynamic force behind the plan was the late Reuven Shiloah, who reorganized the services according to functions and responsibilities and established a mechanism to coordinate their activities. Shiloah was chairman of this authority, the Committee of the Heads of Services (Va'adat Rashei Hasherutim, called Va'adat). He integrated the Naval Intelligence and Security Service and the embryonic air intelligence unit into Military Intelligence (Agaf Modin). The Political Intelligence Service was made independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reorganized as the Secret Intelligence Service (Mossad Letafkidim Meyouchadim or Mossad). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained Research Division (Mashlet Hackerker). Shin Beth remained intact except for internal changes. The Special Tasks Division in the Investigation Department of the police became a part of the new apparatus. Shiloah's reorganization of the intelligence and security structure produced an efficient and well-coordinated community. The Israeli intelligence and security services retained this structure relatively unchanged throughout the Arab-Israel War in October-November 1956, the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. During the early and mid-1960s, however, the Israeli Government had considered changes in the structure and duties of the components of the intelligence and security community. Despite Shiloah's earlier reorganization, much of what happened in the Israeli services at this time depended on the personal relationships between Ben Gurion and the directors and chiefs. In early 1963, just before his retirement, Ben Gurion appointed a committee to review the situation. He was concerned that the intelligence and security establishment which, by virtue of his serving both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, usually functioned satisfactorily, might deteriorate when he left office. He also was reported to be dissatisfied with the lack of clarity in the community's chain of command and functions and ordered the committee to define the subordination and tasks of these bodies. In July 1963 the committee submitted its report to a new Prime Minister, the late Levi Eshkol. The committee stated that, while the functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense did not necessarily have to be concentrated in the hands of one person, the Prime Minister must know about all the activities of the national intelligence and security services and be given objective intelligence evaluations balanced and based on different viewpoints from more than one source. To accomplish these aims the committee recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Division be strengthened so that it would be capable of presenting independent political evaluations, both on Middle East issues and other political subjects. By upgrading the Research Division, the committee believed that a certain balance would be created for security and political evaluations, which were handled almost solely by the Military Intelligence Production Department. The committee also observed that the existence of Mossad, which controls secret foreign information gathering assets, facilitated to some extent the possible formulation of another independent evaluation unit. The committee also regarded as a matter of vital importance the appointment of a special adviser, subordinate only to the Prime Minister. He would be a person of high caliber who would aid the Prime Minister in keeping in touch with and monitoring the activities of the intelligence and security services. The committee's principal recommendations were not implemented at the time except for the establishment of the adviser position and the shift of responsibility for Shin Beth from the Minister of Defense to the Prime Minister. There was a brief interlude from September 1965 to July 1966 when Isser Harel, the former Chairman of the Va'adat and Director of Mossad, served as a special adviser to Prime Minister Eshkol on intelligence and security matters. Harel resigned as a result of internal policy disputes within the community and he was not replaced at the time. Following the alleged “intelligence failure” in the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Government established the Agranat Commission in November 1973 to investigate matters relating to the hostilities and the performance of the intelligence and security services. The commission in its Partial Report in April 1974 proposed reactivating and strengthening the post of special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence and security matters. The commission also recommended changes in the intelligence and security forces through the establishment of a research and evaluation unit in Mossad and the elevation of the Research Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The object

of this modification was to avoid relying exclusively on Military Intelligence for major estimates and assessments. The commission also emphasized the need for better operational coordination in the field of collection between the services but it opposed the coordination of their finished intelligence judgments. A full or final commission report, if there ever was one, was never made public. From 1974 to 1976 the recommendations of the Partial Report of the Agranat Commission were implemented. The Prime Minister appointed Reserve General Rehavam Zeevi as his intelligence adviser, a position that was purely advisory and carried no executive authority. Zeevi assumed this new job in addition to serving as the Prime Minister's adviser on counterterrorism. Zeevi was also to be the Prime Minister's liaison with the Director of Military Intelligence and was also to keep the Prime Minister alerted to differences of views among the intelligence and security services. In October 1976, however, Zeevi resigned from this post and was replaced by Brigadier (Ret.) Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former Director of Military Intelligence. The Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into operation in January 1975. Changes in the Military Intelligence structure were being carried out. A new research and evaluation unit for assessing information was established within Mossad. New appointees had taken over in most of the intelligence and security components. In June 1977 the Israeli Government established a Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs. 2. Objectives and structure The principal targets of the Israeli intelligence and security services are: (1) the Arab states—their capabilities and intentions toward Israel, their relations with the USSR and other powers, their official installations and representatives throughout the world, their leaders, internal and inter-Arab politics, morale, military preparedness and other order of battle; (2) collection of information on secret US policy or decisions, if any, concerning Israel; (3) collection of scientific intelligence in the US and other developed countries; (4) determination of government policy toward Israel in the USSR and East European nations and the problem of Jewish emigration from these areas; (5) close monitoring of anti-Zionist activity throughout the world; and (6) collection of political, and economic intelligence in other areas of interest to them, such as Africa. The Israeli services also make special efforts to counter Arab propaganda and to neutralize anti-Zionist activity. Within recent years the Israelis have devoted much operational activity to combating Arab terrorism, which has grown over the years from isolated cross-border raids by Palestinian Fedayeen to daring and deadly attacks, often international in scope, on Israeli personnel and property. The Israelis also have undertaken widescale covert political, economic and paramilitary action programs—particularly in Africa. Authorization for foreign intelligence and internal security organizations, while not defined by specific charter, is in Israeli legislation. Paragraph 29 of the Basic Law states: "The Government is authorized to carry out on behalf of the State, in accordance with any law any act whose implementation is not lawfully entrusted to any other authority." This implies that the government is entrusted with the management of intelligence and state security affairs since no other authority is empowered to act in this shape by any other law. Attempts have been made over the years by officials within the government and the community to have an act passed defining the status of foreign intelligence and security organizations and their operations, but nothing has come to these efforts. Internal security, on the other hand, is more clearly defined in law. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (established during the British Mandate), the Military Law of 21 June 1955 and the Penal Revision (State Security) Law of 31 July 1957, the Internal security, on the other hand, is more clearly defined in law. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (established during the British Mandate), the Military Law of 21 June 1955 and the Penal Revision (State Security) Law of 31 July 1957, the Israeli equivalent of the British Official Secret Act, all are concerned with internal security. The Emergency Regulations of 1945 gave the military administration the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements and to designate certain locations as "closed areas," thus requiring local inhabitants to possess travel permits to transit such places. While the regulations originally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine, they are now used largely to monitor the Arab community in Israel. Administration of the regulations was transferred from the military to the police in 1966. Internal security organs reportedly increased their agent activity to meet this responsibility. Israeli laws require severe punishment ranging from the death penalty or life imprisonment for treason or

SECRET assistance to the “enemy,” to terms of incarceration from three to 15 years for espionage, contact with foreign agents, aiding and abetting a crime against state security and unauthorized disclosure of information by a public servant. There is no statute of limitations regarding the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The central body in Israel's intelligence and security community is the Va'adat, which has as its primary function the coordination of all intelligence and security activities at home and abroad. The Va'adat consists of the Director of Mossad, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Director of Shin Beth, the Inspector General of Police, the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Director of the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the political, military, intelligence and antiterrorist advisers of the Prime Minister. The Head of the Special Tasks Division in the Investigations Department of the Police also occasionally attends the meetings with, or in place of, the Inspector General of Police. Meetings must be held biweekly but may be held more frequently. At these meetings each director usually provides a briefing on the key activities of his service during the preceding two weeks. The Director of Mossad chairs Va'adat and in this capacity is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The members of Va'adat are quasi-equal in status and the term memune referring to the Director of Mossad as chairman is designed to denote a concept of preeminence among equals. In actuality, however, the Director of Military Intelligence now overshadows the Director of Mossad in power and importance. This development resulted from the continuing Israeli reliance on military preparedness for national survival. Mossad is charged with the collection of foreign intelligence and the conduct of covert action programs outside Israel. Shin Beth is responsible for counterintelligence and internal security. It functions as the governmental authority on personnel security matters. It is also responsible for the personal safety of the Prime Minister and other high ranking Israeli officials. Shin Beth is in charge of physical security for ports, airports and key military/industrial installations in Israel and for Israeli missions and El Al operations outside Israel. Shin Beth does not have the power of arrest, this function being performed by the Special Tasks Division of the Investigations Department of the Police, which works in close collaboration with Shin Beth in Israel. Within the Administered Territories, which are controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces, Shin Beth applies to the military to undertake arrests and searches. A special component under the Inspector General of Police is the Border Guard, whose mission is that of guarding the cease-fire lines against Arab infiltration and of detecting and running down Fedayeen terrorists. In recent years Border Guard units have been used increasingly to control and suppress riots and demonstrations in the West Bank area. Military Intelligence, in addition to its responsibility for strategic and tactical intelligence, prepares the national intelligence estimates and evaluates all information dealing with the Arabs. It also is responsible for developing and protecting communication codes and ciphers for all the services and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and for communications intelligence. The Research and Political Planning Center, which was formerly the Research Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, analyzes raw intelligence from various sources for officials on the policymaking level. Other Israeli Government organizations that provide support to the intelligence and security community are the Ministries of Finance (Customs and Excise, Investment and Securities) and Tourism, the national airline, El Al, and the national shipping line, Zim. Unofficial Zionist organizations based in Israel and Jewish communities throughout the world also give aid to Israel operations when needed. There are between 1,500 and 2,000 personnel in Mossad, of whom about 500 are officers. Shin Beth has about 1,000 members of whom some 550 hold officer rank. In Military Intelligence there are about 7,000 personnel, of whom 450 are officers, the others being enlisted personnel and civilian clerks. The number of officials in the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ranges between 75 and 100. The police number about 12,000 and the Border Guards around 6,000. Since the financing of the intelligence and security services is a closely held secret, it is very difficult to

get accurate information on the total amounts expended for these purposes. The funds are concealed in the defense budget, and known to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, one or two of their top assistants, the Minister of Finance, the State Comptroller and his Defense Services Inspectorate. The Comptroller deals directly with the directors of the services, who request funds at the beginning of the fiscal year in April. The estimates of expenses by the directors, who have established reputations for honesty and integrity, are usually acceptable as a starting point for budget negotiations. The Ministry of Finance, however, does require a 10-year projection of expended financial needs (an impossible task which is not taken seriously). The Comptroller holds a series of meetings with the various service directors and their staffs, reviewing their programs in detail. These missions continue throughout May and result in a careful redefinition of the entire intelligence and security effort and its cost. By October, the determination of specific budget needs is completed, based on the program analysis completed in May. This is then submitted for higher approval and the planning and budgeting cycle is, upon budget approval, completed just in time to begin again. Much of the administrative support for the services is handled by the Ministry for Defense. Various types of cover are provided for and funded by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). There is close professional cooperation between the civilian intelligence and security services and military intelligence. These services, like all government offices, are subject to inspection by the State Comptroller's office. An Assistant Director-General is in charge of inspecting the defense and security services, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the police. The annual inspection covers bookkeeping, financial management and handling of administration. The Comptroller is required to see that the services are operating economically, efficiently and with irreproachable morality. Israeli governmental offices and departments are continuously borrowing money, personnel, equipment and material from one another and salaries are paid by the office to which the individual is assigned. An intelligence officer or a Ministry for Foreign Affairs official stationed in New York and assigned to the Jewish Agency is paid salary and allowances by the Agency but loses neither seniority nor retirement status while serving in that capacity. 3. Political aspects a. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SERVICES—The intelligence and security community enjoys a strong position in the government, and their affairs are well integrated into more general operations. Members of the generation which worked for the establishment of the state were companions of longstanding and joint veterans of such enterprises as illegal immigration and arms-running. Many of the current leaders came up through the ranks of the military in a series of wars with the Arabs and entered politics through affiliation with one of the major political parties. All of them had some experience in clandestine matters and have been personally convinced by stern lessons of the value of good intelligence and security. The intelligence and security services receive excellent support from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Many senior diplomats are former intelligence officers and therefore conversant with intelligence problems and operations. With their experienced observations and manifold talents, they serve as valuable auxiliaries to their covert colleagues, whose diplomatic cover is diligently sustained by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, almost every Israeli diplomat abroad has good foreign language and area knowledge or some specialization which enables him to pursue a much broader social life, with its resultant contacts, than is the case in most foreign services. In many instances, embassy officers, including chiefs of diplomatic missions, were former citizens of the countries to which they are accredited. Information developed by Israeli diplomats is made available to the intelligence and security community for immediate use of operational intelligence or inclusion in archives. As a final boon to covert intelligence personnel, the vigor and variety of a normal Israeli diplomat's life outside his installation usually renders detection of intelligence officers by the host country extremely difficult. The same kind of effective support regarding operations is given by the Ministry of Defense and the Jewish Agency. The Israeli intelligence and security services play an important role throughout the government and private

SECRET sector. Many leaders in both the civil service and industry have at some time in their careers been directly or indirectly involved with the intelligence community. Service assignments are not regarded as the end of a career, as persons with intelligence and security backgrounds frequently are selected for other jobs in the government. Thus the services are supplemented by persons who know and continue to relate their missions to intelligence and security responsibilities, in senior posts in both the public and private sectors. Officially, the services are nonpolitical and members of the community are not encouraged to enroll in any party or engage in political activity. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset is normally the government's point of discussion for the review and resolution of sensitive policies and activities. The Director of Mossad and the Director of Shin Beth are often present at sessions which are of concern to them. b. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SERVICES AND THE POPULACE—The current state of relations between the services and the populace is good as a result of the present position of the services as protectors of the Israeli state and people in the forefront of the struggle against Arab terrorists and military forces. Most Israelis are acutely aware of this situation and therefore support the services and their operations. The historical development of Israel and the long continuing struggle against the Arabs have contributed to this harmonious atmosphere. At times in the past as a result of political rivalries and disagreements on the kind of order that was to prevail in Israel, there have been occasional verbal and journalistic attacks against the services as instruments of a police state. In several instances, service representatives had to appear in closed court sessions to defend the intelligence and security community against accusations of kidnapping, brutality and illegality. Although debates in the Knesset occasionally have reflected probably illegal practices or procedures by the services, the intelligence and security community is completely loyal and if the government requested the execution of a certain task, legal and illegal, it would be accomplished. Confidence in the intelligence and security community also received a boost after the Six-Day War in 1967. The part played by Military Intelligence, Shin Beth and the police in contributing to the victory and controlling the newly-occupied Arab areas taken by Israel was followed by a plethora of praise in all Israeli media. The so-called "intelligence failure" in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, however, weakened popular trust in the services. The subsequent work of the Agranat Commission, undertaken to evaluate the community and its shortcomings and to improve cooperation among its members, contributed to a partial renewal of public confidence. The continuing battle by the services against terrorism has also kept Israelis loyal to the community. The Entebbe raid in July 1976, which resulted in the rescue of hijacked Israeli hostages, was one action in recent years which fired the public imagination and served as an example of a well-coordinated and well-executed Israeli operation. This raid and its success buoyed up the moral of the Israelis as nothing else has in recent years and certainly showed the intelligence and security community in a good light. 4. Professional standards a. Integrity—The directors and senior staff members of the intelligence and security community conform to the highest professional standards of integrity and honesty and impose these standards on the lower echelons. There is relatively little difference between the basic salary of a new employee and the staff member who enjoys a top position. The insignificant disparity has resulted in the granting of compensatory amenities and privileges such as expense accounts, purchasing of foreign goods that enter the country through devious tax-free channels, and "pro-tektsta," a magic word in Israel, which means that one can get items, housing or privileges at low cost through influential governmental connections. This is common practice throughout the government establishment, however. Because the intelligence and security services, especially Shin Beth, maintain a very tight cover within their own community, information on personnel, budgets and accounts is closely held by a few top people in the government and not subjected to widespread bureaucratic perusal and control. The higher echelons scrutinize the expenditure of funds by the lower ranks, and if financial dishonesty is discovered, the guilty individual receives very severe treatment.

b. EFFICIENCY—Israel's intelligence and security services are among the best in the world. Their expert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made them highly effective, and they have demonstrated outstanding ability to organize, screen and evaluate information obtained from recruited agents, Jewish communities, and other sources throughout the world. Israel's intelligence capabilities give it a significant advantage over the Arab states—an advantage which was an important factor in the 1967 war. Those members of the intelligence and security community who were identified with the Information Service and other components of the Haganah, before and during World War II, developed a high standard of efficiency and level of competence. The organizations succeeded in recruiting a core of capable and highly-educated individuals from Europe and the Middle East whose equal has been difficult to find, let alone attract, since the founding of the state. The corps of the "old guard," for example, is fluent in four or five languages, an accomplishment which alone raises their general average of efficiency. The younger generation has been given intensive training, including study abroad, to assist them in gaining these qualifications. It is not uncommon for students to engage in clandestine operations while pursuing their course of studies. Israeli signal intelligence successes against the Arabs in the past were of such high order that the Israelis had less need than at present for good agent operations against the enemy. Part of this success was due to poor Arab communications security. The Israelis now face some problems since Arab communications security is gradually improving. The Yom Kippur War intelligence failure is an example of inadequacies in their communications intelligence capability at that time. In recent years, as well, there also have been indications that Israeli intelligence on the Arabs, other than communications intelligence, has been somewhat inadequate in quality and their agent operations lacking in success. One of the principal weaknesses of Israeli intelligence and security system appears to be that the production of most finished intelligence and the preparation of national estimates is done by Military Intelligence rather than by an independent service. Inherent in such an organizational arrangement is the danger that the armed services will not be objective in observing and reporting foreign developments and making national intelligence estimates—a major problem in the Yom Kippur War—and their vested interests in military operations will influence intelligence assessments. The Agranat Commission has recognized this problem and recommended changes. c. SECURITY—The physical security of the civilian and military intelligence and security headquarters in Tel Aviv is reported to be excellent. Two services—Mossad and Military Intelligence—were formerly located within a general army compound in the heart of the city. The buildings were protected by high wire fences and military guards. Military Intelligence remains in this location but Mossad now occupies a wing of a multistory commercial office building across the street from the compound. Shin, Beth, which was formerly located in a rundown building in Jaffa, occupied new quarters just north of Tel Aviv in June 1970. This new building, which was designed for their use, is fenced in and contains a technical laboratory as well as regular offices. Guards control the entrance and badges bearing a photograph of the employee are worn within the compound. There is an elaborate protected government "guest house" for the training and accommodation of visiting foreign intelligence officers, foreign dignitaries and sensitive agents. There are a little over 1,000 persons working as staff officers for Mossad and Shin Beth, all of whom have been given a long, thorough security check. If there is the slightest doubt raised against an individual, the application is rejected. Personnel with leftist backgrounds generally are not trusted by leading members of the intelligence and security services. This attitude did not always apply to former members of European Communist parties, some of whom were eminently qualified for clandestine service, especially if they had renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated with the Israeli Labor Party. This exemption, however, has not applied since the exposure of several high-level espionage cases in governmental and political circles in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The cases of Aharon Cohen, a MAPAM party expert on the Middle East, and Israel Beer (Figure 1), a Defense Ministry contract employee and IDF Reserve lieutenant colonel, who spied for the USSR, and Dr. Kurt

Figure 1. Soviet Agent Israel Beer Site, a Gentile professor of physics at Haifa Technion, who worked for the Czech Service, caused Shin Beth to reconsider its own security procedures while stimulating considerable doubt about the reliability of recanted Marxists. The services have devised internal security systems to expose ideological weaklings by more thorough periodic security checks. The Israelis believe such individuals constitute a possible long-term security threat. Israeli citizens are subjected to stringent registration requirements and must carry identification papers. Within the intelligence and security community great pains are taken not to reveal the identities of personnel even to the average Israeli employed in the government at large. Compartmentation is strictly maintained between services with only designated individuals, usually members of the "hardcore," crossing lines. Intelligence and security personnel widely use and frequently change pseudonyms. The national practice of Hebraicizing European or Yiddish birth names also makes the identification of some Israelis difficult. Visiting foreign officials and agents never use the same car twice when meeting clandestinely with Israeli officers within the country. Certain unlisted official and personal telephone numbers are known only to relatively few people. This type of professional demeanor at home provides excellent daily training for intelligence and security personnel before receiving foreign assignments. Classified information may not be discussed over the telephone. Despite their relatively high standards of security, however, Israeli officials reportedly are occasionally careless in observing this restriction. They also have "an old boy network" much like the British. Israelis in the "network" are willing to discuss classified subjects whether or not there is a need to know. The Israelis also have problems dealing with overseas Jewry whose support they need but whose security is questionable because of the possibility of divided loyalty. Installations and storage containers must conform to rigorous security standards. Classification terms Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted (comparable to For Official Use Only) are used. Top Secret and Secret documents are transmitted by courier only in double envelopes and two receipts are required—one for the package and one for the contents. These documents are logged in and out by date, document number, title or subject, and the office accepting responsibility for them. At least three periodic inventories are held each year. A registry produces a computer printout four times a year listing all Top Secret material for which each unit is responsible. Electrical communication is handled entirely by teleprinter and other communication security devices. A record is made of documents to be destroyed and security officers must witness the destruction of all Top Secret and Secret material. All personnel requiring a clearance must complete a personal history statement and undergo a routine investigation. For higher clearances the investigations could include the applicant's entire family and a full field investigation. New immigrants from the USSR and East European countries are normally denied access to classified information for a minimum of four or five years. This ruling is not always possible to enforce because of "protektsia." Within the IDF security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closely supervised by the unit security officer, who is required to make periodic reports on the individual's activities. To stimulate and evaluate the security consciousness of

the IDF cadre, Field Security personnel circulate among the troops and attempt to elicit military information. d Morale and disciplinary methods—Mossad and Shin Beth are components of the Israeli civil service structure and applicants must pass a civil service examination. Those in their twenties with a university degree are preferred, although other individuals who have especially desirable qualifications are accepted. The intelligence and security services, in direct competition with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the rapidly expanding business community, are at a disadvantage. Most young Israelis do not like the anonymity of the secret service and prefer the more remunerative pay scales of the business world. Intelligence and security personnel who do not or cannot subscribe to the circumscribed life limited by security restrictions and operational considerations are either dropped or, if their actions should jeopardize the service or the state, are severely punished. To boost the morale of staff intelligence officers, the services in the early 1960s sought and secured from the Knesset a 30 percent annual bonus for their personnel to compensate for the risks and the anonymity involved (Figure 2). B. Mossad—Secret Intelligence Service 1. Functions Mossad is responsible for foreign intelligence collection, political action and counterterrorism. In carrying out its mission to collect positive intelligence, the principal function of Mossad is to conduct agent operations against the Arab nations and their official representatives and installations throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe and the United States, where the national interests of the Arabs in the Near East conflict with Israeli interest. Mossad collects information on the disposition, morale, armaments, equipment and state of leadership of every Arab Army that could be called into action in the case of another round of fighting; and all the information that illuminates Arab internal politics and relationships among the principal Arab leaders and the diplomatic activity of all countries in the Arab world. Mossad 192192-79 CIA Figure 2. Organization of Israeli Intelligence and Security Services, 1977

SECRET monitors Arab commercial activity, particularly in the field of arms purchases in the West, and attempts to counteract Arab recruiting of military, economic and political experts. In this case the principal desire is to recruit these persons as intelligence agents, or failing that, either to dissuade them from aiding the Arabs or to discover their precise functions. Mossad also is charged with inciting disturbances calculated to create mutual distrust among the Arabs and to draw Western sympathy away from the Arab cause, and monitoring and counteracting Arab propaganda and detecting and countering Arab terrorism. In the area of counterterrorism, at times the Israelis have carried the fight to Arab terrorists by taking executive action against them, especially in parts of the Near East and Western Europe. In particular, the fact that Lebanon has a mixed Christian, Druze and Moslem population has made that country attractive for intelligence projects. The Israelis have covert assets and run operations in their northern neighbor. In the past they have mounted paramilitary and executive action operations against Palestinian terrorist leaders, personnel and installations in Lebanon. They have also provided support to Christian rightists in the Lebanese civil war. In addition to running operations against the Arabs, Mossad collects political, economic and scientific intelligence in both the Eastern and Western worlds for the protection of the State of Israel, Zionism and Jews generally. Their collection efforts are especially concentrated in the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as at the United Nations, where policy decisions could have repercussions on Israel and Zionist goals. Intelligence objectives in the USSR and East Europe consist of determining governmental policy toward Israel and the problem of Jewish emigration; recruiting persons strategically located in Soviet and East European bureaucracies who, motivated either by conviction or corruption, are willing to assist Zionist action in those countries; and ascertaining the degree and quality of assistance made available to Near Eastern groups, whether in Israel or the Arab nations, by Soviet and East European Governments. Objectives in Western countries are equally important to the Israeli intelligence service. Mossad collects intelligence regarding Western, Vatican, and UN policies toward the Near East; promotes arms deals for the benefit of the IDF; and acquires data for use in silencing anti-Israel factions in the West. 2. Organization Mossad has eight departments: (1) Operational Planning and Coordination; (2) Collection; (3) Political Action and Liaison; (4) Manpower, Finance, Logistics and Security; (5) Training; (6) Research; (7) Technical Operations; and (8) Technology (Figure 3). The Operational Planning and Coordination Department is concerned with the management of Mossad resources and responsible for interdirectorate operational and administrative coordination within the organization and interservice liaison within the Israeli intelligence and security community. This department also deals with requirements and the development of overall collection plans. The Collection Department is responsible for foreign covert operations and the processing and production of reporting from clandestine sources. This component is the largest unit in Mossad. The department has offices abroad under Israeli diplomatic and nonofficial cover and is active mainly in Europe, where it concentrates on Arab targets through third-country operations. The Political Action and Liaison Directorate is in charge of political action and relations with friendly foreign services. This component also maintains contact with those nations and political groups with whom Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations (that is, African countries, Lebanon and/or Lebanese Christian rightist factions and Indonesia). There is also a Psychological Warfare or Special Operations Division, probably in the Political Action and Liaison Directorate, which runs highly sensitive covert action operations against Arab terrorists and ex-Nazis, and sabotage, paramilitary and psychological warfare projects, such as character assassination and black propaganda. In the absence of the Director of Mossad, the Director of the Operational Planning and Coordination Department now becomes acting Director, whereas in past years the Director of the Collection Department acted for the Director of Mossad. With the drive for greater and improved coordination within the intelligence and security community, the

B192172-79 C1A Figure 3. Organization of Mossad, 1977 Director of the Operational Planning and Coordination Department has apparently taken precedence over the Director of the Collection Department. In headquarters, the department directors direct the various area, functional, administrative, and financial controllers. The area departments under the control of the Collection and Special Political Action and Liaison Departments are: (1) Central America, (2) South America, (3) Eastern Europe including the USSR, (4) Africa, (5) Asia and Oceania, (6) the Mediterranean and Near East areas, (7) Europe, and (8) North America. Under each controller there are branches or desks which are responsible for one or more countries. Positive intelligence and counterintelligence reports are sent back to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, evaluated by the Research Department, and disseminated to various government offices. Intelligence reports on the Arabs are forwarded by Mossad to the Research Department of the DMI while counterespionage reports are sent through Mossad to Shin Beth, where they are given special processing by counterintelligence investigative departments. Mossad controls Israeli foreign intelligence activities except for operations launched from Israel against military objectives in peripheral areas of surrounding Arab countries, which are under the jurisdiction of DM1. Mossad operations abroad fall into two principal categories: those in the Near East, as a first line of defense, and those elsewhere. The Israelis have designated Egypt as the main target area for establishing intelligence networks. In 1970 the Israelis estimated that about 50 percent of their operational effort was directed against Egypt. The next priority is Syria. Much of this activity against the Arabs in the Near East is based on deep cover operations by Israeli

SECRET illegal or the recruitment of Arabs in third countries followed by their dispatch or normal rotation back home to an Arab area. Two good examples of Israeli keep cover illegal operations are the Cohen and Lotz ases. Eliahu Ben Shaul Cohen was an Egyptian-born Jew who was involved in Israeli sabotage operations against American and British installations in Egypt in 1952. Cohen succeeded in escaping detection, when most members of the ring were arrested by the Egyptians, and went to Israel. Eventually, Mossad recruited Cohen for an illegal operation designed to develop intelligence networks and acquire political and military information in Syria. He received intensive training, adopted the identity of the late Kamal Amin Thabet, a Syrian-born merchant, and emigrated to Argentina, where he became an active member of the Arab emigre community. Cohen eventually went to Syria, where he was assisted by two Arabs who had previously been recruited by the Israelis. From 1961 until 1965 Cohen was active as an illegal in Damascus, where he succeeded in making numerous contacts with political and military personalities in the Syrian establishment. He made occasional trips to Europe and Israel for extensive debriefings. Eventually, in January 1965, the Syrians did detect and locate Cohen while he was in the act of transmitting information to Tel Aviv. One cause of his downfall was that he was using hand horse radio equipment and had been on the air for an hour when he was caught (Figure 4). A Syrian court tried Cohen and found him guilty of espionage. He was publicly hanged in Damascus in May 1965. Johann Wolfgang Lotz (also known as Zeev Gur Arieh), was an officer in Military Intelligence. In 1859 during a Va'adat meeting, Mossad announced its need for a man to be a new illegal resident agent in Cairo under cover as a former Nazi officer. Lotz accepted the assignment, which was directed primarily against special weapons activity by German scientists in Egypt. He received intensive training in Israel, including equestrian instruction, and in early 1960 he went to Germany and surfaced as an East German refugee and former African Corps officer. Although Lotz had a wife in Israel, he eventually married a German woman to develop his legend. In 1961 he went to Cairo, where he opened a riding academy. Through his activities Lotz made a variety of contacts in the German community in the Egyptian capital and Figure 4. Eliahu Ben Shaul Cohen's transmitter on display in Damascus, 1965 in time made the acquaintance of a number of prominent and well-placed Egyptians. He made a number of trips from Egypt to Western Europe for debriefings. Finally, in 1964 Lotz began to mail threatening letters to selected German experts in Egypt. In February 1965, he was arrested by the Egyptians, who tried and imprisoned him. Eventually he was released and returned to Israel in 1968. The Israelis have stated that the operation cost them about $250,000. They have also admitted that errors by Lotz in handling his communications and his use in executive action operations may have led to his downfall. During his captivity Lotz was also forced to reveal the whole operation (Figure 5). Mossad stations outside of the Arab areas in the Near East are generally under diplomatic cover within the embassies and consulates of Israel. There are stations in the United States, most of the European capitals, Turkey, Iran and strategic centers in Latin America, Africa and the Far East. Operations range from formal liaison exchanges with host services through unilateral projects to special executive actions directed against Arab terrorists. There are also smaller stations, which run mostly unilateral operations and handle local liaison on such matters as Arab terrorists. The Collection Directorate and the Political Action and Liaison Directorate are separate components of

Figure 5. Johann Wolfgang Lotz illustrates the use of a transmitter during his trial in Cairo, July-August 1965 Mossad and are carefully compartmented at headquarters. Collection and Political Action and Liaison maintain separate permanent staffs outside Israel in larger stations. There are thus either two Mossad stations or two compartmented components in each station in some countries—one for unilateral clandestine collection and one for liaison. For example, at present in Paris the Israelis have an Embassy, Consulate-General and Ministry of Defense Mission. Under embassy cover, Mossad has a Collection Directorate regional controller and a Political Action and Liaison Directorate regional controller in the French capital, which has more or less over the years remained the fulcrum of Israeli intelligence activity on the continent of Europe. In Switzerland the Israelis have an Embassy in Bern and a Consulate-General in Zurich which provides cover for Collection Department officers involved in unilateral operations. These Israeli diplomatic installations also maintain close relations with the Swiss on a local level in regard to overt functions such as physical security for Israeli official and commercial installations in the country and the protection of staff members and visiting Israelis. There is also close collaboration between the Israelis and Swiss on scientific and technical matters pertaining to intelligence and security operations. Swiss officials have made frequent trips to Israel. There is a continual flow of Israelis to and through Switzerland. These visits, however, are usually arranged through the Political Action and Liaison regional controller at the Embassy in Paris directly with the Swiss and not through the officials in the Israeli Embassy in Bern, although the latter are kept informed. In Spain, on the other hand, there is no known official or semiofficial Israeli installation. There have been contacts, however, between Political Action and Liaison Directorate officials of Mossad and the Spanish service for some time. The original meeting apparently occurred in Paris in the late 1960s, since then there have been contacts in Madrid and Paris. There is a possibility that Mossad may also have a clandestine Collection Department station in Spain. In January 1973, Baruch Asher Cohen, a Mossad officer, was assassinated in Madrid by Arabs. Special operations are mounted on an ad hoc basis. Headquarters directs the effort from Israel and employs Mossad officers and agents on special temporary duty. In July 1973, an Israeli assassination squad of 16 was involved in the murder of a Moroccan Arab in Lillehammer, Norway. Norwegian authorities captured, tried and imprisoned six of the group, the rest escaped. It became clear in the course of the trial that the squad, which was composed of Israelis, who were Mossad officers, and European Jews, who were recruited for the mission, did much of its preparatory work in Paris and entered Norway on a specific assignment—the elimination of Arab terrorists. After the murder, two of the squad sought refuge with an Israeli Embassy security officer. The Norwegians declared the officer persona non grata, although he apparently was not privy to the operation. 3. Administrative practices The Israeli Prime Minister appoints the Director of Mossad. The Prime Minister does not need the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset for this appointment.

SECRET Chiefs of station and their staffs are Mossad careers officers but they function abroad on behalf of all the intelligence and security services. If a member of Shin Beth or the IDF is considered the most qualified individual in the community to do a particular foreign job, he still belongs to his parent organization, but he is assigned to, and subject to the control of, Mossad as long as he remains outside the borders of Israel. This rule does not apply, however, to military attaches (army, air, navy) who remain subordinate to the Director of Military Intelligence. Mossad does not have a logical career progression program. The organization promotes case officers who have been successful in the field to top managerial jobs. The results of this arrangement are mixed as some of the successful operators are often not necessarily the best managers or administrators. a. TRAINING—The Mossad training cycle encompasses a Basic Operations course for recruits and lower ranking personnel, and Operations course and a Field Operations course. All new officer candidates are required to take the four-month Basic Operations course before actually entering on duty. The entire training cycle takes almost two years and is generally given to classes of 12. Most of the training takes place in the Tel Aviv area. The instructors in these Mossad courses are teachers on permanent assignment, intelligence officers on temporary tours of duty, and headquarters personnel, including the Director of Mossad and department directors, who give occasional lectures on their specialties. The three services run a joint advanced school in Jerusalem that offers specialized courses of two to three months' duration on world political affairs, Israel's political and economic objectives, new technical operational aids, and the latest information on foreign intelligence services. All officers who are midway in their careers are required to attend this advanced school upon their return from a foreign assignment. As many as 40 to 50 students are reported to have been enrolled in a single running of this course. The faculty is composed of representatives of the three services and is directly subordinate to the Director of Mossad. The Prime Minister or some other high official has addressed graduating classes. Some younger Mossad officers, who may be weak in certain fields of higher education or languages, are sent to universities abroad, where their pursuit of an advanced degree simultaneously serves as cover for their extracurricular operational activities. One of the established goals of the intelligence and security services is that each officer be fluent in Arabic. A nine-month, intensive Arabic language course is given annually in the Tel Aviv area to students from each service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sends two or three officials to each course. Mossad officers who are going into Arab operations take the same Arabic language training as Shin Beth officers. As further training, these Mossad officers work in the Administered Territories for two years to sharpen their language skills before being posted abroad. During this period they usually serve in the Sinai and often run Bedouin agents into Egypt in conjunction with Military Intelligence. All Mossad officers are trained in the use of small arms and required to fire them at regular intervals. b. FUNDS AND SALARIES—The Director of Mossad is a civil service Class 1 officer. He receives generous expense and entertainment allowances. There are reported to be several Class 2 and Class 3 officers in Mossad as well. The monthly take home pay of a ranking Mossad officer, after taxes but including bonuses and cost-of-living and family allowances, is about IL4,000 per month (US$460). They also receive expense and entertainment allowances and are provided with a car and gasoline allowance as well. Higher academic degrees place intelligence officers in a higher pay bracket, thus a directorate director with an advanced degree makes the same as the Director. A middle-ranking officer with allowances for a large number of dependents would receive more than his seniors. In general, higher-grade civil service salaries are roughly comparable to those of higher-ranking military officers. The rather insignificant differential between grades is compensated by fairly impressive perquisites, especially in the senior ranks. Officers abroad are given generous cost-of-living allowances that conform to the allotments of the regular Foreign Affairs officers. For cover purposes these are paid by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. If, however, an intelligence officer needs a larger apartment or house for representation, operational purposes, or family requirements, his service quietly pays the difference. Officers and their families usually travel tourist class on Israeli carriers whenever possible but the absence of

firm rule permits them to travel on any air or steamship line at their discretion. Clerical employees travel tourist class. Each station abroad is granted funds for operational and entertainment expenses. Responsible individuals do not entertain any more than is necessary but when they do, it is done lavishly. Efforts to extend hospitality unstintingly are made at headquarters in Israel when favored agents or ranking foreign intelligence officers are guests. 4. Methods of operation Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly-placed persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel. Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and other purposes. Mossad directs clandestine operations throughout Europe, including the USSR and East European countries; North and South America; the Near East; Africa; and the Far East, including South East Asia. Mossad activities are generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial establishments, deep cover enterprises in the form of firms and organizations, some especially created for, or adaptable to, a specific objective; and penetrations effected within non-Zionist national and international Jewish organizations. The function of intelligence officers under cover of diplomatic establishments is to arrange information exchanges with officials of local services, manage communications, serve as accommodation addresses and funding channels, and direct agents toward targets of interest. Official organizations used for cover are: Israeli Purchasing Missions and Israeli Government Tourist, El Al and Zim offices. Israeli construction firms, industrial groups and international trade organizations also provide nonofficial cover. Individuals working under deep or illegal cover are normally charged with penetrating objectives that require a low range, more subtle approach, or with activities in which the Israeli Government can never admit complexity. than Israeli in speech, demeanor, and attitude. By forging passports and identity documents of Arab and western countries and providing sound background legends and cover, Mossad has successfully sent into Egypt and other Arab countries Israelis disguised and documented as Arabs or citizens of European countries. Many Israelis have come from Arab countries where they were born and educated and appear more Arab. There are numerous persons in Israel who have a thorough area and language knowledge of any area of interest to the intelligence services. These area experts can render extremely valuable assistance in analyzing intelligence information and formulating country requirements, thus contributing to the total operational potential since they enable Israeli intelligence officers to estimate rapidly the efficiency and reliability of their agents and informants. These persons are also useful for their ability to pass completely for a citizen of the nation in question. The Israeli talent for counterfeiting/for forging passports and documents ably supports the agent's authenticity. The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various Jewish communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general information. The aggressively ideological nature of Zionism, which emphasizes that all Jews belong to Israel and must return to Israel, had had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence operations, however, since there is considerable opposition to Zionism among Jews throughout the world. Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate discreetly within Jewish communities and are under instructions to handle their missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition. Despite such precautions, the Israelis frequently experience setbacks and there have been several cases where attempted recruitments of Americans of the Jewish faith have been rejected and reported to US authorities. Israel's program for accelerating its technological scientific and military development as rapidly as possible has been enhanced by exploiting scientific exchange programs. Mossad plays a key role in this endeavor. In addition to the large-scale acquisition of published scientific papers and technical journals from all over the world through overt channels, the Israelis devote a considerable portion of their covert operations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence

SECRET This had included attempts to penetrate certain classified defense projects in the United States and other Western nations. The United Nations is a major target for Mossad penetration because it is a major sponsor of international exchanges in all fields and because of its importance in settling disputes between Israel and the Arab States. Israeli agents operate at the UN under diplomatic and journalistic cover. Mossad recruitment, training and control of agents varies widely, depending upon the target, area of operation and the desk in headquarters. While there is a certain amount of standardization in the handling of operations, Israeli intelligence officers appear to have considerable freedom in running operations. There is no hard rule requiring specific headquarters' approval prior to the recruitment of an agent except in the case of Communist countries. Name traces are requested of headquarters's voluminous files but this is not a consistent routine. Contemplated operations against the USSR and the East European countries, however, are approached very cautiously, and entail a great deal of headquarters planning and control and a special branch composed of area experts is responsible for authorizing and directing this activity. Mossad is especially interested in early warning regarding such developments as the dispatch of Soviet military units from the USSR to the Near East. There also exists within, or affiliated with, Mossad a small unit whose sole objective is to remind the Soviets through propaganda and contacts about the Jewish question at any point throughout the world. All sorts of people, even Cyrus Eaton, have been stimulated to raise the subject. Israeli efforts must at times be effective because the Soviets often attack the Israeli service in their propaganda with detailed revelations of Israeli plots against allegedly innocent Soviet citizens. The Israelis select their agents almost exclusively from persons of Jewish origin. However, there are security hazards involved in cases of divided allegiance between dedication to the Zionist State of Israel and loyalty to a homeland. The recruitment of Gentiles is comparatively rare. Many Arabs, especially walk-ins, have directly or indirectly helped the services, usually as a result of monetary inducements, but the Israelis do not consider these Arabs good sources of reliable information. More often, they recruit Palestinians over whom they may have more control because of bank assets frozen in Israel since the war in 1948. In certain cases these bank assets have been released for intelligence services rendered. The Israelis are prepared to capitalize on nearly every kind of agent motivation. A substantial effort is made to appeal to Jewish racial or religious proclivities, pro-Zionism, dislike of anti-Semitism, anti-Soviet feelings (if applicable) and humanitarian instincts. Blackmail is also used. Other recruiting techniques include the proffer of money, business opportunities, or release from prison. Among the Arabs, money has been especially effective. Appeals have also been made successfully to other Arab vulnerabilities such as jealousy, rivalry, fear and political dissension. The Israelis have used false-flag recruitment pitches extensively and successfully. In several cases they approached citizens of Western European nations under the cover of a national NATO intelligence organization for operations in Arab target countries. While intelligence officers in the field recognize the importance of security, they tend to be careless. Although otherwise well trained, Israeli intelligence officers occasionally have been lax in their use of the telephone abroad. Also, they often have given away a considerable amount of information by confirming in agents and contacts with whom they have had only a slight relationship. Nonetheless, they periodically recall the basic principles of their profession, and for awhile complicate the lives of their agents with a welter of security regulations that they themselves eventually transgress. Occasionally a rendezvous arranged between an officer and an agent, is countersurveiled by two or more officers, both to spot possible surveillance of the meeting and to protect the officer. In the recruiting process, the officer generally uses a fictitious name, executes a secrecy agreement with the prospective agent, and provides him with a pseudonym or alias. Whenever money or other gratuity is given to an agent, an attempt is made to secure a signed receipt in the agent's handwriting. Although an agent occasionally may be sent to Israel for special training, this course of action is neither easy nor inexpensive to accomplish. Therefore, the intelligence officer himself is usually responsible for training the agent in the fundamentals of tradecraft, security

measures, and the use of radio and code communications. If the exigencies of the situation demand special training, the Israelis rent an apartment for this purpose in places like Paris and New York. Agents who have been so trained were taught to mix and use secret ink; conceal documents and letters on the person; deliver information to secure hiding places; and to communicate otherwise with the case officer and/or headquarters. The methods of communication vary greatly depending on locations and circumstances. Personal meetings between the agent and his case officer are arranged by secret writing, open mail, or oral message by couriers. The cities or towns to be used have code names and the meeting places are at specified times with alternative times and places. In case of emergency, the agent can alert the intelligence officer by use of a prearranged open code in cables or letters, or if time permits, by secret writing or courier. The Israelis place considerable emphasis on personal relationships with their agents. They have been known to be exceedingly generous in granting personal concessions and monetary assistance to keep their agents happy. One such individual, a journalist in Paris who recruited French officials and elicited information from witting and unwitting informants in the French political world, was paid the equivalent of US$1,000 per month. After years of steady employment and a succession of Israeli case officers, his services were gently but peremptorily terminated. Severance pay was calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each year of service to assuage any hard feelings. On the other hand, the Israelis can be absolutely ruthless to both the intelligence officer and the agent if the latter's disaffection or treachery should threaten a sensitive operation or endanger the security of the state. There are several cases of Jews in Europe who, while or after working for the Israeli service, trafficked with the Egyptians for substantial sums of money. These Jews were enticed into traveling to Israel or abducted, tried in camera, and given stiff prison terms of 10 to 14 years. Mossad headquarters controls the acquisition, flow and dissemination of reports in a rigid manner, which contrasts with the considerable freedom allowed in running operations. An Israeli intelligence officer abroad must accept all information reported by an agent and may not change a single word. The intelligence officer receives detailed, prepared questions from headquarters and is allowed little leeway in terms of what he submits. In a meeting with an agent, many of whom are low-level, the intelligence officer debriefs him on the basis of headquarters questions. The intelligence officer must then forward all the agent says, even overt information. The intelligence officer may if he wishes add his own remarks to the report. Mossad headquarters does not disseminate agents' reports to all customer agencies. The overwhelming bulk of the reports goes to one specific analytical unit, for example, usually reports on Arab affairs are sent to Military Intelligence, counterintelligence reports to Shin Beth. However, an exceptional agent report is disseminated to Israeli policymakers. The Mossad intelligence officer abroad does not show copies of his reports to the Israeli Ambassador but sends them only to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv. The Israeli services have a very keen interest in the use and development of technical equipment. As far back as 1947-1948, the Information Service conducted technical surveillance operations against Arab and British delegates to the UN. Mossad, with assistance from Shin Beth, has provided technical training to the Turkish and Ghanaian security and intelligence services. Exchanges of technical equipment and information have also been carried out with the Japanese intelligence and security services. Mossad receives support in external technical operations from Shin Beth and Military Intelligence. The technical capabilities of the Israeli services are adequate for normal demands. Moreover, the very close coordination existing between the services and the industrial concerns of the country ensure that technical equipment to support continuing audio operations is supplied and developed as needed. The existence of a limited research program, coupled with high Israeli competence in technical matters, indicates that the Israelis intend to remain abreast of advances in autiosurveillance and countermeasures. a. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SERVICES—Mossad has good relationships with Shin Beth, Military Intelligence, the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Special Tasks Division of the police. Successes like the Entebbe raid are illustrative of well-coordinated SECRET

SECRET planning and execution—a testimonial to good relations among the services. The Agranat Commission advocated greater coordination between the services and revived the post of intelligence adviser to monitor interdirectorate disputes. The exchanges between Mossad and the other services through the coordinating mechanism of the Va'adat and the use of ad hoc committees, however, continue to ensure coordination and cooperation between the services. b. Liaison with foreign services—Mossad has liaison relationships with many of intelligence and security services throughout the world. With a few exceptions, the Directorate of Foreign Liaison and Political Action is responsible for relations with most foreign organizations. In most instances the point of contact is abroad in foreign capitals, although some foreign services insist on liaison in Israel. At present Mossad, in coordination with Shin Beth, maintains liaison with foreign intelligence and security services through membership in the Kilowatt group, an organization which is concerned with Arab terrorism and is comprised of West Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Israel. The Israelis also have informal connections regarding terrorism with other European nations, including Spain, Portugal and Austria. The Israelis have over the years made efforts to break the Arab ring encircling Israel by involvement with non-Arab Moslem nations in the Near East. A formal trilateral liaison called the Trident organization was established by Mossad with Turkey's National Security Service (TNSS) and Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK) in late 1958. Since the original agreement there has been an addition to Mossad's bilateral relationship with each service. The Trident organization involves continuing intelligence exchange plus semiannual meetings at the chief of service level. The general terms of the original agreement with the Turks, aside from legitimizing Israeli liaison with Turkey, stated that Mossad would furnish information on the activity of Soviet agents in Turkey and those working against Turkey throughout the Middle East. In return, the Turks agreed to supply Israel with information on the political intentions of the Arab countries which could affect the security of Israel, and the activity and identifications of UAR agents working against Israel. The Israeli service has also given the Turks counterespionage and technical training. The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the development of a pro-Israel and anti-Arab policy on the part of Iranian officials. Mossad has engaged in joint operations with SAVAK over the years since the late 1950s. Mossad aided SAVAK activities and supported the Kurds in Iraq. The Israelis also regularly transmitted to the Iranians intelligence reports on Egypt's activities in the Arab countries, trends and developments in Iraq, and Communist activities affecting Iran. Israeli liaison in Africa has varied considerably from country to country, depending on the exigencies of the situation. Israeli intelligence activities in Africa have usually been carried out under the cover of military and police training, arms sales to national military forces, and aid and development programs. The Arab nations, in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity, have brought great pressure to bear on most African nations to break all formal ties with Israel. Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Israel and many of the African nations, the Israelis still maintain good intelligence liaison with certain African services. The Israelis also have relations with the Kenyan Service. In Central Africa the Israelis are still active in Zaire. In West Africa the Israelis trained the Liberian Security Service and police. They also helped establish the Ghanian Military Intelligence Service. In southern Africa the Israelis have a relationship with the South African intelligence and security services. The Israelis have been very active in Latin America over the years. One of the greatest intelligence coups, the capture of Adolph Eichmann, the former Nazi leader, occurred in Argentina. Recently, much of their liaison activity in Latin America has centered on training and antiterrorist operations. The Israeli Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, for example, provides cover for a Mossad regional station responsible for Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Officers from this post have gone to Buenos Aires to give training to the Argentines; in the course of these contacts the Israelis recommended greater involvement in joint antiterrorist operations. The Israelis also maintain

faison with security services of Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Caracas is the Regional Center for north and western Latin America and Central America. The Israelis have operated for sometime in East Asia. They have provided intelligence training to the Government of the Republic of China and maintain liaison with it. The Israelis also have relations with the Japanese, Thai, Indonesian, and South Korean services, especially on terrorist matters. The major Mossad regional center in East Asia is in Singapore. The Israeli station chief there frequently travels throughout the area and conducts business with services in the neighboring nations. Indonesia as a Moslem nation does not have formal diplomatic ties with Israel. The Mossad-Indonesian relationship, therefore, is very discreet. The Mossad representative in Singapore is accredited to the Indonesian service. There are also Mossad officers in Jakarta under commercial cover. The primary reason for the Indonesian liaison is to gain aid in counterterrorist efforts. The Israelis, on the other hand, are not only engaging in antiterrorist operations but also have an opportunity to collect information and engage in political action in another Moslem power. C. Shin Beth—Counterespionage and International Security Service 1. Functions Shin Beth has the responsibility in Israel for counterespionage and internal security and the service is basically internally oriented. Shin Beth is primarily responsible for collecting information on foreign intelligence organizations, both hostile and friendly, and their activities; protecting the security of Israeli officials and installations abroad; and investigating all forms of subversion directed by either internal or external forces, including sabotage and terrorism in Israel and abroad. Shin Beth evaluates all information developed, collates it with other material routinely and overtly available from both Israeli and foreign sources, and submits evaluated reports to the appropriate government agencies for action. Shin Beth operates to combat two main adversaries: the Arabs and the Soviet and Eastern European intelligence and security services. Shin Beth at one time engaged in positive intelligence operations and immigration affairs in the Balkan countries, particularly in Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and in Hungary, but no longer does Shin Beth is the government's authority on personnel and physical security matters, is responsible for the personal security of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense. Shin Beth does not have the power of arrest, which is the right only of the Special Tasks Division of the Investigations Department of the Israeli Police, a national force with headquarters in Jerusalem. When an arrest is desired, Shin Beth submits a detailed report on the case plus a request for an arrest warrant to the Ministry of Justice. The Legal Department transmits the request to the Special Tasks Division, which issues the warrant and makes the arrest. When more expeditious handling is justified, Shin Beth directly notifies the Special Tasks Division, which is empowered to take the suspect into temporary custody pending receipt of the warrant. On occasion a Shin Beth officer will sit in court with the prosecution staff as a special consultant. 2. Organization Shin Beth is organized into eight operational and functional departments: (1) Arab Affairs; (2) Non-Arab Affairs; (3) Protective Security; (4) Operational Support; (5) Technology; (6) Interrogation and Legal Counsel; (7) Coordination and Planning; and (8) Administration. Regional departments in the field are located in the Gaza/Sinai area with headquarters in Ashqelon; the Northern area with headquarters in Haifa; and the West Bank area with headquarters in Jerusalem. A unit within Shin Beth national headquarters in Tel Aviv serves as the fourth regional department. These regional departments are broken down into subdivisions identical to but smaller than those of the parent organization (Figure 6). The Arab Affairs Department is responsible for counterespionage, antiterrorist operations, control of political subversion, research and the maintenance of a counterintelligence index on Arabs. The components handling these activities are organized into offensive and defensive sections. This department operates through field offices controlled by regional officers. These officers report to the regional commanders but rely on the Arab Affairs Department for guidance and SECRET

519220 2-79 CIA Figure 6. Organization of Shin Beth, 1977

support, which includes aid in counterespionage, countersabotage and surveillance as well as research and records support. The overall headquarters function is that of determining doctrine, systematizing work and supervising. The Non-Arab Department handles counterintelligence operations dealing with all other countries, countersubversion (one component dealing with Communist subversion, the other with non-Communist New Left subversion), foreign liaison and research. Each unit dealing with these activities has offensive and defensive sections. The Non-Arab Department investigates and counters espionage activity by foreign powers, both hostile and friendly, by all known methods, including the penetration of their intelligence services and diplomatic installations in Israel. Operations against foreign missions within Israel were formerly conducted by Military Intelligence, but with the evolution towards greater centralization and professional specialization since the reorganization of 1951, this function has been the responsibility of Shin Beth. The Non-Arab Affairs Department engages in the penetration of extremist political parties such as MAKI (the Communist Party of Israel); RAKAH (the New Communist List), a largely Arab-supported splinter group; SHAH (the New Israel Left); and anti-Zionist and extreme rightist organizations. The Department also investigates counterfeiting, blackmarketing, the smuggling of money and goods in and out of the country, and violations of the economic control laws. It is responsible for tapping telephone lines and intercepting domestic and diplomatic telephone conversations. The Non-Arab Affairs Department is responsible for foreign liaison and handles all correspondence by Shin Beth with other foreign intelligence and security services. The interrogation of immigrants from the USSR and Eastern European nations is also undertaken by this department. The Protective Security Department is responsible for the protection of Israeli Government buildings and embassies, El Al and Zim installations and craft, defense industries and scientific establishments, and leading personalities. This department is also charged with the security of all important industrial plants, especially those of actual or potential military value, and is engaged in the prevention of leakage of industrial secrets such as patents, processes, statistics, etc. It also carries on liaison with security officers throughout the Israeli Government. Although guards and security officers are paid by the institutions to which they are assigned, their recruitment, training, and control is a Shin Beth responsibility. The Protective Security Department controls the security of internal communications and the secrecy of information. A small unit within the department, for example, handles all matters concerning espionage with the Office of Mail and Telegraph Censorship. The Protective Security Department directs Shin Beth security activities overseas including the protection of Israeli personnel, diplomatic and transport offices, facilities and equipment. Although Mossad has responsibility for unilateral operations and liaison on intelligence matters and Military Intelligence controls the attache system and military liaison, Shin Beth handles protective security and liaison with local security services abroad to safeguard Israeli personnel and property. For instance, there is a regional Protective Security office in Paris which is concerned primarily with EJ Al and Zim security. The Operational Support Department is responsible for assisting the operational departments with surveillance, observation, airport security, censorship, listening devices, special tasks and counteraudio support. This department has tactical components, which aid in counterintelligence operations, VIP protection and telephone taps. The Department provides support in running a highly developed intercept operation from a switchboard installed in Shin Beth offices. This enables the service to avoid having to make taps either across pairs in a local box or even in the telephone centrals under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Communications Telephone Services; and also avoids any possible compromise by leftist employees of the Telephone Services. The Technology Department lends support to the operating departments in electronics, mechanics, and chemistry. It provides technical support to operations in the following areas: audio and visual surveillance, communications, photography, surreptitious entry, telephone taps, mail censorship, security devices, etc. The Interrogation and Legal Counsel Department handles all counterintelligence and security interroga

SECRET tions for Shin Beth operating departments not handed over to the Special Tasks Division of the police. This department makes selective use of the polygraph. It also checks the reliability of Mossad sources, fabricators, and suspect double agents. Personnel in this component travel to the field as required to give polygraph tests and conduct interrogations. The department also assists in preparing cases for trial and provides other legal assistance to operating departments as needed. The Coordination and Planning Department has responsibility for coordination of counterintelligence and security methodology, training, security recruitment and the central registry. This department maintains the Shin Beth card files, with the exception of those on Arabs. In addition to ordinary carding procedures, there is an entry on every individual in the country who has a police record. This enables all government offices to make a quick check on the police record of present or potential employees through Shin Beth. All tracing procedures are channeled into this department, from name checks through neighborhood investigations. This registry uses a military computer. The registry on Arabs is not yet computerized because of the difficulty with Arabic names. The Administration Department performs the usual functions of personnel management, finance, supply, transport, communications, and security. A policy body within Shin Beth is called the Directorate of the Service. It normally meets once a month. Membership consists of department directors (including the regional directors), all of whom are of equal rank. 3. Administrative practices The Director of Shin Beth is appointed by the Prime Minister who may seek advice for the appointment but needs no approval from either the cabinet or the Knesset. Shin Beth is responsible for the security of all civilian intelligence and security personnel. Furthermore, it also recruits and selects personnel, according to specific requirements based on loyalty to the state, education, capability and potential, and subject to the approval of the individual civilian service. The military is somewhat more autonomous in regard to security procedures relating to their personnel because military security components handle most of these cases. Shin Beth, however, sets the policies and standards for military security controls. Among the 500 officers in Shin Beth are some 100 individuals who have been selected, screened, and trained to serve as security officers throughout the governmental structure. These officers are stationed in the Prime Minister's office, intelligence and security components including Mossad, scientific institutes, El Al installations, and foreign service posts. Most career employees, a few of whom are women, have broad educational backgrounds and experience. About one-third of Shin Beth officers are assigned abroad early in their careers as security officers where they come under the operational and administrative control of Mossad. Upon return to Israel from foreign assignment, Shin Beth officers revert to the internal security service. Because senior Mossad and Shin Beth officers are given identical training in a combined advanced operational school, their modus operandi is similar. There is a certain amount of personnel exchanged among the services. Shin Beth may accept an army major or colonel on temporary assignment or recruit a retiring officer on a permanent basis. All recruits are subject to a thorough background security investigation culminating in a physical examination, polygraph tests, and psychiatric screening. Security checks on native born Israelis are relatively easy to do, for the young Israeli, whose life is well documented, rarely enjoys the luxury of privacy. Police files, school records, university professors, army records, youth movements, political affiliations, voting records, family history, political persuasions, and friends are scrutinized. If the applicant is foreign born, detailed immigration records may reveal pertinent information which can be cross-checked. Loyalty to Israel is the principal criterion. If the subject was a Zionist from early youth, he belongs to a special category; if he has never belonged to the leftist parties, MAPAM, MAKE and RAKAH, or to Herut, a rightist party, his employment opportunities are considerably enhanced. It is almost impossible for a Jew to disguise his past when he is once in the hands of the authorities since there are in Israel many thoroughly reliable persons from every country which has or had a Jew.

community, who can be consulted for information on potential recruits. The Director of Shin Beth is a civil service Class 1 officer. He has an expense and entertainment allowance. There is a rather insignificant differential between grades which is compensated by fairly impressive perquisites, including living quarters, transportation and travel, especially in the senior ranks. 4. Methods of operation Shin Beth operations within Israel can be broken down into the four following categories: against foreigners in general, against Arabs, against Communists, and against Israelis. There appears to be little difference in the application of techniques, but a greater deal in intensity, much of which is directed against the Arabs. The activities and opinions of diplomats both within and outside their diplomatic establishments in Israel are of primary interest to Shin Beth. Generally, the Israeli Government tends to regard diplomats as being there to ferret information rather than to promote cordial relations. The degree of suspicion and intensity of operations against diplomats is conditioned by the prevailing relations between countries and their long-term diplomatic objectives. Shin Beth operations with the police and Military Intelligence are well coordinated. The Israeli police work very closely with Shin Beth in guarding foreign installations such as embassies and consulates, and in surveillance and journalists, and tourists of special interest. Police officers maintain a 24-hour watch in front of all embassies, legations, consulates, and ambassadorial residences. They record the comings and goings of foreign personnel, especially diplomatic officers who appear after regular office hours or on weekends. They also record the license numbers of vehicles in which the officers arrive and depart. Diplomatic license plates differ in color from civilian plates and carry a numerical prefix which identifies the country represented. The security of the border areas and the occupied territories is mainly the responsibility of Military Intelligence, the Border Guard and Shin Beth. Through the use of informants, who may be local Arabs or Oriental Jews posing as Arabs, Shin Beth has penetrated subversive Arab elements including Communist cells and Arab nationalist groups. They have also picked up local Arab espionage agents on their way back to neighboring countries and doubled them in coordination with Military Intelligence. Shin Beth is continually active in the fight against terrorism. Aside from the Arab target, Shin Beth is primarily concerned with the subversive elements of the left. MAKI and RAKAH owe their allegiance to the USSR but being legal parties, they have had representatives in the Knesset. Shin Beth has thoroughly penetrated the cells of the Communist apparatus, following its activities through informants, surveillance, and technical operations. Shin Beth agents attend many international Communist front meetings. Since all foreigners, regardless of nationality or religion, including Jews, are considered potential threats to the State of Israel, Shin Beth employs a large number of informants among local Israelis who are in contact with foreigners by reason of their employment or activities. In this category are bartenders, hotel clerks, telephone operators, secretaries, taxi drivers, caterers, maids, prostitutes, chauffeurs, and waiters. It also includes trade unionists, scientists, and others in the educational field. There is an Israeli law that authorizes the police and the security services to pick up and detain for questioning any Israeli citizen who is in contact with a foreigners without official permission or obvious reason such as employment or business. Since diplomats are subject to surveillance, Shin Beth soon becomes aware of their contacts with Israeli citizens. When a pattern develops, and suspicion is aroused, attempts are made to develop further information using wire tapping and other technical aids. It is not uncommon for representatives of Shin Beth to call on the Israeli and attempt to enlist his cooperation. If the individual refuses, the Penal Revision Law (State Security) is cited to him and he is threatened with dire consequences. This usually evokes compliance. The Israeli security authorities also seek evidence of illicit love affairs which can be used as leverage to enlist cooperation. In one instance, Shin Beth tried to penetrate the US Consulate General in Jerusalem through a clerical employee who was having an affair with a Jerusalem girl. They rigged a fake abortion case against the employee in an unsuccessful effort to recruit him. Before this attempt at blackmail, they had

SECRET tried to get the Israeli girl to elicit information from her boyfriend. Two other important targets in Israel are the US Embassy in Tel Aviv and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) with headquarters in Jerusalem. There have been two or three crude efforts to recruit Marine guards for monetary reward. In the cases affecting UNTSO personnel, the operations involved intimidation and blackmail. In 1954, a hidden microphone planted by the Israelis was discovered in the Office of the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv. In 1956, telephone taps were found connected to two telephones in the residence of the US military attache. In 1960, a microphone was discovered behind the wall plaster in what had been the office of the Operations Officer in the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Office. Recently, the Director of the Shin Beth, in testimony before a judicial committee of the Knesset, stated that Shin Beth makes entries and taps telephones in Israel with some frequency. Reportedly, the only concern of the committee members was with the disposition by Shin Beth of acquired information which did not bear on national security. It is noted that these activities have no basis in law and are conducted on the authority of the Director of Shin Beth alone. The Israelis have shown themselves to be most adept at surveillance and surreptitious entry operations. Men and women frequently are used together on surveillance teams in order to allay suspicion. If a person under surveillance stops to use a public telephone, the surveillance team reports the situation to the control center which immediately notifies the telephone tapping unit and an attempt is made to intercept the call. The conversation or pertinent information is then relayed to the team on street. Shin Beth personnel are experts at entering private quarters where they go through visitors' luggage and personal papers. Special portable camera equipment is used for this purpose and the results are processed in the Shin Beth laboratory. Shin Beth technicians have concealed radio transmitters in phonograph cases, in the false bottoms of coffee cans, and in the bottoms of portable cooking stoves which can be used as stoves without removing the communication equipment. D. Military Intelligence 1. Functions Military intelligence is charged with the collection and production and dissemination of military, geographic and economic intelligence, especially on the Armaations, and security in the Defense Forces and Administered Territories. This component is a element of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and a part of the Defense Forces General Staff. The Director of Military Intelligence (DMT) is a member of Va'ada Although Air Force and Navy Intelligence officers are subordinate to their respective commanders, they are members of the DMT's staff and attend his staff meetings. 2. Organization Military Intelligence headquarters consist of following departments: (1) Production; (2) the Intelligence Corps; (3) Foreign Relations; and (4) Field Security and Military Censorship. The DMI all directs Field Security Units, Territorial Command Combat Intelligence and Air Force and Navy Intelligence through coordination with their respective commanders (Figure 7). The Production Department is responsible for preparing the national intelligence estimates (version of which appear as the Middle East Review or Sura) for distribution to friendly liaison services). The department also produces daily finished intelligent reports and daily bulletins, which contains raw partially analyzed information. Estimates are prepared by Military Intelligence, Mossad and Research and Planning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Production Department is about 40 percent (approximately 2,800) of the personnel in Military Intelligence. About 600, whom 150 are officers and analysts, are involved intelligence production. The number of analysis, however, varies, as specialists are coopted by the department for special studies in technical economic matters. This department is under command of a deputy director of Military Intelligence. The Production Department is divided into following units: (1) Geographical (or Regional) Division; (2) Functional (or Technical) Division and Documentation (or Registry and Records) Division

Figure 7. Organization of Military Intelligence, 1977 T (RET

SECRET The Geographical Division evaluates information and compiles target studies on the Arab countries. It is divided into three area desks: the Western, consisting of Egypt, Sudan and Libya; the Eastern, consisting of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; and the Southern, consisting of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. Every effort is made in this division to create the narrowest type of specialist—a man who can devote himself to his material for over a period of years. For example, in the middle 1960s the Jordanian Desk Chief had held his job for 15 years and probably knew more about the Jordanian military than most Jordanian Army officers. The Functional Division is broken down into substantive units which deal with such subjects as Near Eastern economics, inter-Arab relations, Palestinian affairs and international activities in the Near East. The division produces intelligence on technical and economic matters, including weapons and electronics and production, and area developments: The unit draws heavily on the knowledge of the IDF technical services. There is close cooperation between the geographical and functional divisions in producing accurate and timely intelligence. The existence of a desk concerned with international activities in the Near East, including Soviet affairs, indicates that the functional division deals with the policies of other nations as they affect the area. The Documentation Division actually employs over half of the personnel in the Production Department. All reports are sent first to this component, which keeps a permanent record copy and numbers, cards, indexes and cross-references documents as necessary. It then forwards copies to appropriate offices. The Documentation Division reportedly has now installed computers to aid in the dissemination and research support process. The registry component of this unit services the entire Military Intelligence establishment. This Division is the repository for all Military Intelligence reports and publications and is responsible for the dissemination of finished intelligence and also supervises the intelligence operations center, which operates 24 hours a day. This center is the terminal for all direct access field communications and presumably is designed to provide rapid review and dissemination of information in a crisis situation. The Intelligence Corps is responsible for overt and covert collection operations, including all signal intelligence activities for the Israeli intelligence community, and for operational support functions. The Corps is subordinate to the DMI and is under the command of the Chief Intelligence Officer. This consists of a large headquarters staff which supervises subordinate operational field elements. Although it has no authority over area command assets, the Corps may levy requirements on these field elements. The Corps supervises the use of technical devices in operations. All requirements levied on the Corps must be validated by the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence. The Corps is broken down into the following divisions: (1) Collection, responsible for signals intelligence, agent operations, overt sources and long distance observation units; (2) General Headquarters which is in charge of the military intelligence school the Technical Development Institute, communication and cartography; (3) Training; (4) Organization, Logistics and Personnel; and (5) Research and Development. The Signals Branch of the Collection Division which includes communications and electronic intelligence and landline operations, collects communications intelligence for the entire intelligence and security community. The actual collection operation performed by the IDF Signal Corps. The Israeli Air Force also participates and maintains liaison with other service components on electronic warfare. The Israelis have been very successful in their COMING and ELINT operations against the Arabs. During the Six-Day War in 1967 the Israelis succeeded by intercepting, breaking and disseminating a tremendous volume of Arab traffic quickly and accurately including a high-level conversation between the President Kamal Abd-Nasser of the UAR and Kishun Hussein of Jordan. Over the years the Israelis have mounted cross-border operations and tapped Arab landline communications for extended periods. The Israelis have also on occasion boobytrapped the landlines. The Agents Branch is in charge of all age operations run by Military Intelligence. The Branch not permitted to run agent operations abroad but it is sole jurisdiction over agent operations across the borders of Israel into neighboring states. The Agent Branch has executive authority over Shin Be operations which are run against the intelligent service of a neighboring Arab State. Egypt and Syria are the prime operational targets. The Interrogati

that of the Agents Branch controls POW interrogation is which are especially trained and prepared to company any major IDF military operation beyond the ceasefire lines. These teams are keystones in Military Intelligence tactical operations. Interrogators are a variety of deception techniques in questioning, prisoners. Although prisoners are usually treated well, interrogators may give the initial impression that other prisoners have been mistreated or even executed for failure to cooperate. Arabic-speaking IDF interrogators sometimes pose as Arab officers and circulate coming prisoners to elicit information. These techniques usually produce a large quantity of information from captured enemy personnel. The Open Sources Division collects and collates all material from overt sources. This component, how-ext, does not evaluate the information. The Long Distance Observation Units are primarily concerned with visual sightings of Arab activity along the borders and armistice lines. These units also provide support to agent cross-border operations and leads to signal intelligence units based on observations. Arab movements across the borders. The General Headquarters Division runs the Military Intelligence School and the Technical Development Institute and is in charge of communications and artography. DMI has the largest technical capability of the Israeli intelligence services. It has a highly competent RD&E component which produces equipment needed for military intelligence operations. Because it is the largest, and at one time the only engineering shop in the Israeli intelligence community, it takes on some projects from other services. The Communications Branch handles all matters involving wireless communication for agent operations. Officials in this branch train agent operators, how up signal plans, and maintain radio contact with events in place. From time to time this branch also provides support for Mossad and Shin Beth. The Cartographic Branch has responsibility for map production and works in close cooperation with the Sector of the Survey Department in the Ministry of Labor. There are approximately 300 personnel assigned to the Map Survey Office (Survey of Israel). It is located near the intersection of Lincoln & Yehuda Halevi streets in Tel Aviv. The Training Division is responsible for the intelligence doctrine taught in the Military Intelligence School and in troop units. It has evidently absorbed the training responsibilities of Field Security and Combat Intelligence units. The Military Intelligence School curriculum includes combat intelligence, strategic intelligence and "special studies." The school may provide some training for personnel of other Israeli intelligence and security services. The Organization, Logistics and Personnel Division is responsible for administrative tasks. The head of this division functions as the DMI's designee on all logistical and personnel matters. The division consists of three components: Logistics, Personnel and Finance. The Research and Development Division is primarily concerned with computer operations and programming in support of Military Intelligence production, operations and requirements. The Foreign Relations Department is responsible for liaison between the IDF and foreign military organizations and for Israeli Defense Attache affairs. This department is reportedly divided into two companies: the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division and the Attaches' Division. The Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division conducts liaison with representatives of foreign intelligence services which have agreements with Military Intelligence. This division also has control over visits by officers and training of troops from foreign countries in Israel. Foreign Intelligence Liaison is also the official point of contact for all foreign defense attaches in Israel. Activities such as visits to installations, exchanges of routine information, briefing sessions, etc. must first be cleared with Field Security and submitted to the DMI for a policy decision, if necessary. Attaches accredited or otherwise working in Israel on intelligence matters can expect to receive select information concerning other Near East and foreign nations within perimeters set by the DMI; thus an attache seeking information on specific questions of Israeli capabilities and materials would receive the data through this division. It is considered a "violation" of IDF "unwritten" policy for foreign military personnel in Israel to collect this type of information in any other way. In the past, Military Intelligence has provided much information on technical equipment supplied to other Middle East nations by the Soviet Bloc. This was especially true on

SECRET the wake of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, when the Israelis captured vast quantities of Soviet material from the Arabs. It is believed that Foreign Intelligence Liaison may be divided into at least two components: General Intelligence and Technical Intelligence. Within or attached to the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division is a Secret Liaison unit which handles all operations outside the normal charter of activities previously described. This unit may be involved either directly or indirectly in bilateral intelligence operations conducted by Military Intelligence with other services. Thus when a special relationship between a foreign military establishment and the IDF is arranged, this unit supplies the officers and controls the activities. This unit was involved in the excellent liaison relationship which at one time existed with France. Further, if Mossad decides that an Israeli military officer is in the best position to carry out a specific foreign operation, this unit will handle the matter. Operations controlled from this office in all cases are coordinated with Mossad. The Foreign Relations Department directs the activities of Israeli Ministry of Defense Missions and Defense Attaches abroad through the Attaches' Division. Ministry of Defense Missions and Israeli Defense Attaches are located in Washington, New York City, London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Ankara, Tehran, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, Brasilia and Caracas. Several of these attaches are also accredited to adjacent countries. The true role of most defense missions and attache posts is to sell Israeli defense industry products and purchase defense equipment for the IDF. There are few posts which are actually attache offices in the traditional sense, the principal ones being in Washington, London, and Paris. Israeli defense attaches abroad advise their respective ambassadors, report on host country military matters, keep abreast of all research and development in the host country and in general, represent the IDF abroad. Attaches also do operational support work for Mossad. Israeli military missions have been sent to some countries for training and support purposes, but those missions have not been officially accredited to the country concerned. The Field Security and Military Censorship Department is responsible for counterintelligence within the IDF, and conducts physical and personnel security investigation. Field Security is also responsible for security clearances of all personnel assigned (Military Intelligence. This Department conducts daily liaison with Shin Beth, which is responsible for ID reserve personnel on inactive status and has first responsibility in counterintelligence and security case. In the middle 1960s the Security Department includes a Personnel Security Division to assign personnel supervise and coordinate clearances and conduct surveillance. A Counterintelligence Division had the responsibility of ensuring security regarding communications, documents and installations. An Education and Training Division was responsible for trouble security indoctrination. A computerized document checking office was set up in the early 1960s to control distribution and disposal of all Top Secret documents originating within the IDF. The Field Security Department coordinates and monitors the activities of the Field Security units attached to the IDF territorial commands to maintain order. Each territorial commander is responsible for security in his area and the Field Security units to preserve law and order. Israel divided into Northern, Central and Southern commands plus the Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Valid districts. Both Tel Aviv District and the Central Command, also located there, are separate from ID General Headquarters which is located in Tel Aviv. The Gaza Strip, although not contiguous to the Central Command, has been placed under that Command because pacification and antiterrorist operations in the past few years have succeeded in bringing relative stability to the area. Sinai is under the Southeast Command, which has two Field Security units. In the mid-1960s the Northern Command has three Field Security units. Field Security officers serve in the territorial commands where they direct the activities of the various Field Security units and serve as points contact for the Commands Security Departments and the territorial commanders. Field Security units are responsible for implementing and supervising security directives, including instructions, guidance and inspections. In the Administered Territories, Field Security Units cooperate with Shin Beth and the Border Guard to preserve security, combat terrorism and re-counterintelligence operations. At brigade level in the three area commands, Field Security has militants intelligence majors serving as security officers (and known as such) under the command of the Operational Command.

Section (G-3). Security officers at battalion and company level are "coopted" from the infantry but are known as security officers only to unit commanders on the battalion level. At the company level, security personnel are sergeants. The Military Censorship Office within the Field Security and Military Censorship Department is responsible for all censorship. In addition this component, by law, has extremely wide powers in dealing with the Israeli press and other mass media. In practice, the IDF has found it advisable to operate on a gentleman's agreement basis and depend largely on the good intentions of editors and the like to refrain from publishing stories about Israeli military secrets. This office operates on behalf of the entire IDF. Directors of Military Intelligence in the past have referred to Military Censorship as part of the "ballast" that they would prefer to see in the Chief of Staff's own office. The Chief of the Censorship Office is a member of the "Committee of Three" which acts as a Board of Appeal and final arbiter in all matters relating to censorship. The two other members are a representative of the press and a representative of the public at large. The last named must be agreed upon by both other parties. In effect all information is broken down into three categories: (1) items that are permitted without question, (2) items that are not permitted under any circumstances, and (3) items that must be cleared before publication. Blank spaces are bound only infrequently in the press owing to a regulation which forbids this practice; for example, an entire page must be reset if a single item must be withdrawn from publication. All IDF publications and press releases must be coordinated with and approved by the Censorship Office. All information media, foreign and domestic, must submit any item having a security or significant political implication to the Censorship Office prior to its release. Most press organizations have a teletype link with the IDF to expedite this process; others must handcarry their items to the office. In the mid-1960s, this office was staffed largely by female soldiers. The Censorship Office is in charge of monitoring and outgoing communications from Israel to ensure that no information of military value is transmitted. If the monitor hears a discussion involving matters of military importance, he will cut off the conversation. On one occasion a monitor reportedly listened in on a private conversation and reported gleefully to his colleagues in the room what he heard. The monitor was fired on the spot. Monitoring activity concentrates largely on international telephone calls from foreign media personnel in Israel to their home offices abroad. The Public Relations Office of Military Censorship has responsibility for all IDF press releases and all official contacts with the public. The Office handles relations with the press and the public in coordination with the Censorship Office. The Office also hosts foreign defense attaches in Israel in conjunction with the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division. As in the case of the Censorship Office, Directors of Military Intelligence would prefer to see the Public Relations Office directly under the command of the Chief of Staff. The intelligence process within Military Intelligence operates largely by means of three regularly scheduled meetings of the key intelligence officers. First, there is a meeting twice a week or every three days at which the Director of the Production Department holds a briefing for the DMI and other top officers. Depending on the nature of the intelligence discussed, other production officers may also be present. On the basis of this meeting, the DMI issues instructions for action or levies requirements for information to the assembled staff officers. One half day after each of these biweekly meetings, the directors of Production and the Intelligence Corps meet to work out detailed planning and tactics on what each should do to follow up the DMI's broad directives. Immediately after this, the Director of the Intelligence Corps gathers together his own division chiefs and gives them guidelines for carrying out their immediate responsibilities. The liaison officer assigned to Mossad sits in on this meeting. The DMI is always given finished intelligence. Individual items are summarized in not more than half a page and broken down into three paragraphs: (1) the facts; (2) comments; and (3) evaluation. These are put together on a “reading board” for selected top Israeli Government officials with appropriate marginal comments from the DMI. There are in addition daily, weekly, and monthly intelligence summaries which are designed to provide a continuing insight into the development of events or trends of interest to the government. These summaries, together with spot reports on separate items, fall much of the DMI's

SECRET responsibilities as the Prime Minister's staff officer for intelligence. The Production Department may also generate special research or "think" pieces. Special reports are also written in response to requirements levied by Israeli agencies other than military intelligence. One of the DMI's most important functions is to present the annual intelligence estimate during the latter part of December. While a precis is drawn up beforehand, the presentation is oral and is attended by senior government officials headed by the Prime Minister. The DMI uses the weekly summaries to a great extent in preparing his material. At the end of his formal remarks, the DMI opens the floor to questions. The minutes of the meeting are then put into finished form and circulated to key government officers on a need-to-know basis. The DMI's major aid in doing his job is a progress report drawn up every three months by each of his department directors. He also reads raw intelligence reports from time to time for the purpose of getting the actual flavor of information presented to him in the special item reports or to evaluate the usefulness or nature of agent operations. Although the DMI has an elaborate computer capability to assist in collating information, there is a need for more effective automatic data-processing equipment for the storage and retrieval of information. The DMI assigns intelligence officers to the three Area Commands, where they are attached to the various intelligence staffs down to brigade level. Territorial commanders direct the collection of intelligence in their geographical areas and for some distance across the border. The Northern Command is responsible for operations against Lebanon and Syria while the Central Command controls operations against Jordan, Egypt and perhaps Saudi Arabia. Information is collected through border observation, reconnaissance patrols and cross-border operations. Air Force and Navy Intelligence are small, highly specialized units concentrating on items of immediate concern to only the Air Force and Navy commands. The Directors of Air Force and Navy Intelligence attend the staff meetings of the DMI. Officers from each of these services are detailed to attend the regular meetings of the Research Department in order to coordinate reporting responsibility. Officers from both services are also permanently assigned to the Collection Department to coordinate requirements which are of particular concern to them. a. Air Force Intelligence is a relatively small but efficient organization. Its main functions are to conduct intelligence operations necessary to support air activities and to coordinate with the DMI regarding its collection efforts. Air Force intelligence is concerned almost exclusively with Arab air order of battle and the collection of Arab aerial target data. This information is largely collected by aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT, with supplementary information provided by agent reports and prisoner interrogations in hot war situations. The IDF relies heavily on photoreconnaissance for order of battle information. The Air Force has two photointerpretation facilities, but probably does not have more than 20 imagery interpreters. In 1970, all Air Force Intelligence facilities were permanent, although the Israelis planned to acquire several mobile facilities. While Air Force Intelligence does not produce estimates, it does prepare intelligence studies on air order of battle, threats and capabilities. The Air Force administers its own attaches abroad. Air Force procedures for handling imagery intelligence are highly centralized yet flexible. Israeli photoreconnaissance capabilities, however, are limited. Photographic coverage is not possible below 7,000 feet, and camera systems are not capable of revealing, for example, whether SAM (surface to air missile) sites are occupied. Additionally, Air Force photolaboratory quality control is almost nonexistent. Air Force Intelligence, despite its high standards, did not have enough imagery interpreters at the time of the Yom Kippur War and the overall skill level of those few was rather low. b. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE—Naval Intelligence is a small, centralized service of approximately 110 people operating in support of Navy units. Most of the personnel are located in the Navy headquarters building in Tel Aviv. The service deals mostly with naval order of battle, foreign capabilities and seaborne threats. Naval Intelligence operates as a semiautonomous unit of Military Intelligence and is not obliged to provide personnel at the national intelligence level. Naval Intelligence personnel are not subordinate to the

DMI except to give consultative assistance in naval matters. In the table of organization, the Director of Naval Intelligence falls under the Officer Commanding the Navy for operational and reporting matters and supports the top navy commands. The service is patterned after the Military Intelligence structure but is geared to the requirements and scope of navy functions and missions. The organization has a deputy director and Collection, Targeting, Production (Research) and Security Departments. It assigns officers to the naval bases at Haifa, Ashdod, Elat, Sharm el Shaykh and a commando unit based in southern Sinai. There is also a Protocol Department, which deals with foreign naval attaches in Israel, and a small organization and administration department (Figure 8). The Collection Department, with about 17 personnel, is one of the smaller components in the Naval Intelligence structure. It has few integral operational resources and support for most of its collection efforts must come from or be coordinated through the DMI. Exceptions to this arrangement are Collection Depart- Figure 8. Organization of Naval Intelligence, 1974 SECRET

SECRET ment control of Israeli naval attache activities abroad, small boat coastal operations. COMING, ELINT and aerial reconnaissance in cooperation with Air Force Intelligence, and a merchant marine program. The post-World War II Israeli endeavor in clandestine arms procurement and illegal immigration developed important commercial and shipping contacts, some of which may still be handled by or at least coordinated with Naval Intelligence. The Targeting Department, with about 20 personnel, is divided into two divisions: Syria/Lebanon and Egypt/North Africa. These divisions are responsible for: (1) preparing coastal studies for naval gunfire missions; (2) preparing beach studies for amphibious assaults; (3) preparing special target studies to support commanding operations; and (4) preparing and maintaining target folder on Lebanese, Syrian and Egyptian ports. The Department has access to all sources of information available to the DML. In addition to levying requirements for collection on the Military Intelligence Collection Department, the Director of Naval Intelligence is on regular distribution for information obtained by the DML related to naval affairs. The Production Department, with a staff of about 40, is the largest component of Naval Intelligence. This unit is divided into two divisions: (1) Arab Navies; and (2) the Soviet Navy. The Production Department handles research, analysis, production and dissemination of information on all mobile forces associated with Arab Navies and the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. This component is the primary user of all source material which flows into Naval headquarters, especially SIGINT information. The work of this department is mainly in support of units operating out of the four naval bases and the commando unit in southern Sinai. Production is limited largely to studies on enemy order of battle and special weapons. Those studies and others, including target folders, identification manuals and enemy tactics outlines, are disseminated to operational commanders and crews through the base intelligence officers. The base intelligence officer disseminates such information by briefing crews or updating a ship's intelligence library through additions, updates and changes. The Security Department, which has a staff of about 12, performs a limited counterintelligence function within Navy headquarters at all naval bases. Security Department personnel are navy officers and enlisted men who have been specially trained by the Field Security Department of Military Intelligence They perform basic countersubversion and counter-sabotage tasks at headquarters and at subordinate bases. They do not, however, carry out base security or personnel investigations, which are done by Military Intelligence Field Security units. The Organization and Administration Department with about six personnel assigned, provides secretarial support for the Director of Naval Intelligence. These personnel handle routine administrative duties. Naval Intelligence, although small, is a well-trained and evidently highly efficient service. Recruiting of personnel into Naval Intelligence is done by means of a very efficient, informal system which identifies individuals and matches them to the needs of the Director of Naval Intelligence. (This system is apparently in force throughout Israeli military intelligence organizations.) Naval Intelligence officer personnel are recruited through several different channels: Most younger junior officers enter directly from the universities while others transfer within the Navy from naval operations units to the intelligence service. A third source is enlisted personnel who have displayed the necessary qualities and have indicated an interest in following a career in naval intelligence. Once identified, such people are sent to a university at Navy expense. Upon completion of their training they are commissioned and pursue careers in Naval Intelligence. Israeli Navy enlisted personnel, both male and female, are mostly volunteers who have been screened by the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Naval Intelligence women serve 20 months, while the men serve 36 months. There are no special naval intelligence schools in Israel, and naval intelligence officers and key enlisted personnel are trained at the Military Intelligence School. In general women receive only on-the-job training; however, if a woman shows an interest in a naval intelligence career, she will be enrolled in the enlisted course of the Military Intelligence School. Naval Intelligence enlisted men attend an abbreviated course, enrollment in an expanded course depending on motivation and intended utilization. There appears to be very little problem with the retention of naval intelligence personnel. The primary constraint on the Director of Naval Intelligence is the total number

(officer and enlisted) of slots assigned. The centralized system combined with primary area of intelligence interest lends itself very well to the Naval Intelligence personnel structure. The close knit intelligence support system also works well considering the lack of integral collection assets. Intelligence, prior to and during the Yom Kippur War, was received in the Operations Center at Naval headquarters. During the war, the Director of Naval Intelligence worked very closely with the Officer Commanding the Navy in the Center during ongoing operations. Information from SIGINT and other sources was received in the Center as raw data. Correlation of all information was then done on the spot by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and passed on to the Officer Commanding the Navy. The information was disseminated in the form of orders or reports to operational commanders and units. Processing and dissemination of naval intelligence was accomplished in a highly professional manner with no major deficiencies or Arab naval surprises in the Yom Kippur War. Naval Intelligence also revealed a built-in flexibility when the service shifted quickly to a hot war situation and handled support for active naval operations including shore bombardment missions. One major area where Naval Intelligence has problems is the limited number of personnel. In case of continuous operations, similar to the Yom Kippur War, quality naval intelligence work would probably degenerate after a month of steady operations. 3. Administrative practices of the Directorate of Military Intelligence There are approaches to officers plus a larger number of NCOs, the personnel and civilian clerical personnel in the DMS. The service has priority in the selection of the field military personnel for intelligence assignment. Military Intelligence prefers to bring individuals into intelligence work while they are young and move them upwards as they acquire experience and can assume greater responsibility. Recruiters seek promising young people who are studying foreign languages or other subjects of interest to the service in secondary school. Prior to graduation, Military Intelligence officers contact selected young students—males and females—and offer them positions as interpreters during the two years of compulsory military service which follows at the completion of secondary education. Those who accept are assigned to Military Intelligence when they join the IDF. Promising young army personnel are then sent to the Military Intelligence School, following which they may be commissioned and assigned as assistants to intelligence officers in the field. When they attain the rank of captain, having served as intelligence officers, some are assigned to an area command headquarters or to the Directorate of Military Intelligence to expand their experience and qualify them for more responsibility and eventual promotion to higher rank. Thus, many of the officers now serving with Military Intelligence entered as young men and moved up through the ranks. Most Military Intelligence personnel are regulars, not reservists because the IDF requires career intelligence officers. All personnel, including conscripts, join Military Intelligence voluntarily. Female enlisted members, who often serve as translators, usually serve only 20 months whereas male enlisted personnel serve 36 months. Military Intelligence training is professional and extensive. Officers and analysts are well-trained and competent in their fields. The Military Intelligence School is located north of Tel Aviv on the road to Sde Dov airport. This school trains both officers and noncommissioned officers. Approximately 150 instructors and 90 support personnel train between 2,000 and 3,000 students annually. The school's usual course runs from September through February. This arrangement has been made to take advantage of new groups of high school graduates. This center is a relatively new facility which was established in the late 1960s. It was formerly part of the IDF Infantry School. The commander of the Military Intelligence School is responsible to the DMI for intelligence instruction and to the Intelligence Corps for training in general. Course content is the responsibility of the DMI. The training staff supervises training aids and instruction methods. A Combat Intelligence Branch provides instruction for operational personnel and a General Subjects Branch trains specialists. The General Subjects Branch, for example, teaches courses in field security, censorship, military drafting, photo interpretation, research for order of battle analysis, collection, and aerial observation. Other special courses are taught as needed. Field Security counterintelligence personnel,

SECRET Air Force and Navy students also take courses at the Military Intelligence School and Military Intelligence instructors are responsible to the DMI for intelligence training at the schools of other IDF branches. They are charged by the DMI for quality of intelligence teaching. These instructors usually have wartime assignments with tactical units. Military Intelligence personnel staff intelligence positions down through brigade level; line officers with intelligence training at the Infantry School staff the lower echelons. Field Security personnel are selected on the basis of strict criteria regarding personal security and loyalty to Zionism and the Israeli State. They are trained by Shin Beth. In general, Military Intelligence, although it has a good training program and tries to offer career inducements, has difficulty in retaining competent personnel because of low wages and slim opportunities for advancement. 4. Methods of operation Military Intelligence is responsible for cross-border operations into the neighboring Arab states. Its operations rely heavily on the exploitation of: Arabs within Israeli and the Administered Territories; Arab students, who though residents of Israel, attend universities in the Arab nations; Arab travelers and visitors; Arabs in Israeli prisons; and Arab military deserters, defectors, Bedouins and smugglers. Military Intelligence collection requirements cover political and economic subjects as well as military information and uses the information acquired both for policymaking purposes and as basic intelligence. Military Intelligence is also active in collecting information from sources outside Israeli terrorist and subversive organizations and activities. Although SIGINT sources acquire some information on these subjects, Military Intelligence officers believe that only agent sources can really obtain the data needed on various terrorist groups' policies and plans, methods of operation, equipment, training and relations with other groups. Primary Israeli interest in terrorism is to obtain early warning of impending operations. the type of sources desired. Once a spotter has reported a potential source, he steps aside and leaves the rest to Military Intelligence officers. Military Intelligence contacts the potential source, assesses him and, if appropriate, attempts to recruit him as an agent. This is described as the "direct method" of recruiting agents for Military Intelligence. The "indirect method" refers to recruiting sources by or through agents outside Israel. Both Field Security and the police investigate the backgrounds of potential agents for Military Intelligence. In each regional area of Israel, local citizens, in some cases Arabs, who are Israeli agents, act as spotters for Military Intelligence. Most of these spotters have long worked for Military Intelligence, which alerts them to The motives of the spotters and local support people are either monetary or a desire for services in the form of aid in reuniting families or representation on behalf of the spotter in some problem with the Israel Government. The basic agent motivation is generally economic gain in the form of salaries, loans (which are seldom repaid), and gifts. Another common incentive is a wish to move to Israel and rejoin relatives who reside there. In some cases the agent may be a Palestinian refugee, who believes that he still has a claim to property in Israel and wants either recompense or a guarantee of the eventual return of his property. Other agents are members of Arab minority groups or opponents of Arab regimes. Military Intelligence officers do have problems in handling Arab agents, who tend to exaggerate and often fail to report accurate details. Therefore, the Military Intelligence officers encourage their Arab agents to provide photographs, maps, and other corroborating documents. Military Intelligence officers also cross-check reports often by using other agents in the same region. Despite Israeli warnings during training, Arab agents tend to tell other members of their family about their association with Military Intelligence. Occasionally an Arab agent may recruit all the members of his immediate family as subagents and try to get his case officer to pay them salaries. The Israelis refer to these family subagents as "nonfunctionalist." These subagents sometimes compromise a whole operation as a result of boasting about their activities. Occasionally the Military Intelligence case officer will order these unwanted "nonfunctionalists" across the border into Israel for security briefings but Military Intelligence has not solved this problem completely. Military Intelligence trains its agents in tradecraft collection methods, security and reporting procedures

Military Intelligence runs its agents in networks or as ungletons; the latter are referred to as "lone wolves." For security reasons, Military Intelligence prefers that an agent with good access remain a "lone wolf." Agent networks consist of a primary source and subsources. Military Intelligence does not refer to sources as such, instead calling both primary and subsource "agents." Military Intelligence officers try to meet and train each agent personally on the Israeli side of the border. Networks usually include a radio operator and in some cases, a courier. When possible, Military Intelligence case officers prefer direct meetings with all agents inside Israel in order to receive their reports personally, to check requirements and to formulate future plans. One aspect of the relationship between Military Intelligence officers and agents is unique when compared to the techniques employed by other services. In many operations Military Intelligence headquarters analysts company case officers to personal agent meetings, in order to clarify certain details of the agent's reports and give him guidance on certain points or problems. These meetings are usually held in safehouses with both the case officer and the analyst present but if an agent is pressed for time, the case officer and analyst may meet him during darkness at a prearranged spot along the border. Military Intelligence also communicates with its agents by S/W letters posted in third countries, by agent radio and by deaddrops. Military Intelligence operations have been marked by flexibility, economy in the use of assets and by responsiveness to requirements; the system worked well prior to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Agents reported early warning information which, in retrospect, contained reliable indications of a coming Arab attack. Direct communication with agents, however, virtually ceased during hostilities and what little agent reporting there was during the war was of limited value to Israeli Military headquarters and field commanders. The principal problem faced by Military Intelligence in the acquisition and reporting of intelligence by agents is the lack of modern equipment. Although many of the agents have radios (mainly receivers) and cameras, and are familiar with secret writing, the sophistication level of techniques and equipment is low. This adversely affects the quality, security and timeliness of collection operations. Military Intelligence employs a SIGINT system that is modern, sophisticated and effective. The DMI is responsible for providing technical support to other directorates, but the technical services of the various military intelligence directorates are inferior to the technical groups of Shin Beth. The DMI's technical equipment, such as that used in audio surveillance or that employed in work agent support is generally high although it is less good in some special fields such as miniaturization. In the use and application of infrared devices, however, the DMI capability is usually good. Military Intelligence personnel are capable of making ad hoc modifications of existing equipment and are up to date on technical advances concerning remote control and activation of transmitters, and in the field of low-light photography. Military Intelligence relies heavily on aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT for timely order of battle information. Aerial reconnaissance is apparently a primary instrument for locating fedayeen groups, although such organizations are well penetrated by field agents. Military Intelligence is capable of providing timely and detailed information on Israel's primary neighboring enemies through agent operations that are well planned and highly imaginative. The main purpose of Military Intelligence Field Security units is to control the local Arab population in the Administered Terrorities and to minimize their participation in terrorism. In this endeavor, Field Security of the Administered Territories works closely with Shin Beth and the Border Guard. Residents are required to carry ID cards, curfews have been imposed, suspected resistors have been detained, and the houses in the area of persons presumed to know of terrorist activities have been demolished, even though the inhabitants were not directly involved. In the early 1970s it was estimated that the Israelis had some 900 residents of the Administered Territories under administrative detention. Personnel of Field Security units have carried out sweeps in searches for terrorists and arms caches through areas in the West Bank where terrorism has occurred. On some occasions Israeli operations have taken place at night, apparently intended at least in part to intimidate the populace. In December 1969 the Defense Minister announced that 516 buildings had been demolished in the occupied territories since the 1967 war—265 in the

SECRET West Bank, 227 in Gaza and 24 in Jerusalem. While these Israeli policies and actions have intimidated many Arabs who might otherwise have engaged in resistance activities or in terrorism, in many cases they have been counterproductive in that they have aroused deep and widespread resentment among the residents of the Occupied Territories. In areas where buildings have been destroyed, an atmosphere of personal anger and resentment has been added to the natural bitterness of a defeated people, particularly among the younger Arabs. 5. Relations with other services There appears at the present time to be a very harmonious relationship between Military Intelligence and the other Israeli intelligence and security services. Most Israeli intelligence and security personnel, especially on the policy and coordination level, realize that their very national existence depends on an effective and smoothly functioning intelligence and security community. In addition, officers at the department chief and even more so at the division chief level all have known each other personally for a long period of time. These relationships have been forged during troubled times seldom experienced by any other nation and now provide a framework for cooperative teamwork and coordination among the services. Liaison between Israeli Military Intelligence and foreign organizations have varied over the years from good to poor, depending on the exigencies of the situation and the demands of policy. In recent years the Israelis have provided military and security aid and training to various African nations, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire. They have also engaged in military and security training and equipment exchanges with Latin American and Asian services. The Israelis have maintained good relations with Turkey and Iran in military and security matters. While the Israelis do not have full diplomatic relations with Iran; they have an overt official mission whose members have diplomatic titles, including that of military attache. E. Research and Political Planning Center Foreign Affairs, prepares analysis based on raw intelligence for government policymakers. Its office is located in a separate fenced compound within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complex in Jerusalem. A guard at the compound gate prevents unauthorized entrance into the Center, and photo ID cards are required for admittance. The Research and Political Planning Center, formerly the Research Division in the Ministry for The Center presently employs fewer than 100 people, both analysts and support staff, who were recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Israeli universities. The Center has six divisions: North Africa; the Fertile Crescent; the Arabian Peninsula; other Geographic Regions; Economic; and Strategic. Some 70 percent of the Center's personnel are employed in the three Arab units. The Center prepares its analyses on the basis of raw intelligence data available to the Israeli intelligence community. The Center produces short papers on current intelligence and longer analytical memoranda, as required. The Center's products are disseminated to all ministries of the government. The Foreign Minister uses the Center as his personal braintrust to give him an independent means of judging the products of Military Intelligence and Mossad. Although its analyses are sent to Israel's top decisionmakers, the Center's role in the Israeli intelligence and security community probably is still a modest one. The Center reportedly has few problems arising from competition within the community, probably because of a lack of status in comparison with the established and larger intelligence and security organizations. F. The National Police The Israeli Police Force is a national organization headed by an Inspector General responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The national headquarters moved in mid-1969 from Tel Aviv-Yafo to Jerusalem. The force is comprised of the following departments (1) Administration, which is responsible for transport, supplies, communications, property and finances; (2) Investigations, which is concerned with criminal and fraud investigations and special tasks in support of the intelligence and security community; and (3) Operations, which is in charge of training, patrols and traffic. There are also personnel, research, planning and development offices. The Prison Services and the Civil Guard are also part of the Police (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Organization of Israeli National Police, 1977

SECRET The force is divided territorially into districts, subdistricts, zones, police stations, and posts. The three police districts are: Northern, including Haifa; Tel Aviv; and Southern, including Jerusalem. Attached to the Haifa subdistrict is a small coast guard or marine police force, which is based in the port of Haifa and patrols the whole coastline to prevent smuggling, infiltration, and illegal fishing. This unit also has patrol craft on Lake Tiberias and at Elat on the Gulf of Aquaba. The Southern District includes a special unit at Ben Gurion (Lod) airport (Figures 10 and 11). A special component of the national police force is the Border Guard, whose missions are to guard the ceasefire lines against Arab infiltration and detecting and running down terrorists. It works closely with the Army and patrols the Administered Territories and the border areas. The Border Guard also trains settlers in defense measures against infiltrators, and schedules guard duty in border villages. Military conscripts who elect to fulfill their term of service by joining the Border Guard are the principal sources of new recruits for this component. The Border Guard, which number about 6,000, is integrated into the Army in time of war. The effective strength of the police force (not including the Border Guard) reached about 12,000 at the end of 1969. Roughly 1,100 of the police, including 768 Arabs, were employed in the Territories in 1969. Over half the police force are few of Oriental background and, in fact, the police force is a branch of government to which the assignment of Oriental Jews has been particularly encouraged. The police force is capable of maintaining public order and safety under normal circumstances. It has however, been troubled by a manpower shortage caused by resignations resulting from low pay overwork and the attraction of higher paying job elsewhere. Despite the persistent shortage of manpower, police discipline is generally satisfactory and, in the case of the Border Guard, excellent. The public attitude toward the police has improved since the

Figure 11. Israeli Border Guard post under construction at Kefar Rosenwald (Zarit), June 1970 early days of statehood, despite scandals involving smuggling and the acceptance of bribes. The police force has worked hard to overcome the traditional Jewish fear of police authority stemming from the historic oppression of Jews. The Israeli Police Force in effect acts as a very important auxiliary to Shin Beth in the preservation of internal security throughout the country. The police support Shin Beth in investigations, by providing cover and making arrests. C. Key officials Achi-Tuv, Avraham Achi-Tuv became Director of Shin Beth in the summer of 1974. He is a career security officer. His reputation was established as chief of Shin Beth's Arab Affairs Department, where he was responsible for conducting operations in the Administered Territories and within the Arab community in Israel. He served briefly as Deputy Director of Shin Beth prior to his appointment as Director. Achi-Tuv is of German background. He is married and has a daughter. He earned a law degree at the University of Tel Aviv in the early 1970s while serving in Shin Beth. He is extremely bright, hard-working, ambitious and thorough. He is also known to be headstrong, abrasive and arrogant. Hoffi, Yitzhak Major General (Ret.) Yitzak Hoffi became Director of Mossad on 1 September 1974. He was born in Tel

SECRET Aviv on 25 January 1927. He joined the Haganah in 1944 and commanded a company in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. He continued to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces in a variety of command, staff and training posts, including the command of the Paratroop Brigade. Hoffi was Acting Chief of Staff for a brief period in April 1974, but retired from the IDF at that time, apparently because he was not appointed Chief of Staff. Hoffi attended the US Army Command and General Staff College in the mid-1960s. He has also visited the US on many occasions. In 1968 he inspected police units and participated in army exercises in Uganda. He traveled as a tourist to Hawaii, Japan, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tehran in 1970 and went to Singapore on undisclosed business. He inspected Israeli advisory efforts in Ethiopia in 1972 and also went to other parts of Africa. Although not an intelligence officer by background or training, Hoffi apparently demonstrated his flair for intelligence analysis as Commander of the Northern Command in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 by sensing the impending Syrian attack and requesting the Defense Minister to reinforce the Golan Heights with an armored brigade. Hoffi reportedly has expanded Mossad's role in the collection of intelligence on Arab capabilities and the interpretation of such information. Hoffi is reserved and quiet but can be warm and genial among friends. He is married and has two daughters. He speaks English. Neither as flashy nor as imaginative as some of his predecessors in Mossad, he is reported to be meticulous and somewhat dour. Sagi, Yehoshua General Yehoshua Sagi, born 27 September 1933, Jerusalem, Palestine (Israel), entered the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in 1851 and was commissioned in 1953. From 1953 to 1964 he served in the Southern Command, fulfilling field duties. During the Sinai Campaign he served as intelligence officer of the Armored Corps and as commander of a reconnaissance unit. Following the 1956 war, he served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Brigade and later as an assistant Intelligence officer, Southern Command. In 1965 he graduated from the IDF Command and Staff College. Following his graduation he served as commander of an Intelligence Officer Training Course, and as an Intelligence officer with the Southern Command before returning in 1971 as an instructor with the Command and Staff College. In 1972 he became commander of the Intelligence School but left in 1973 to become intelligence officer with the Armored Division, Southern Command. On 19 May 1974 Sagi was appointed Deputy Director, Military Intelligence, Production and Estimates. On 2 February 1979 he assumed the Directorship of Military Intelligence. Sagi is soft-spoken, direct and has no non-sense outlook. He considers himself an Arab expert. He married and has three daughters. He speaks English. H. Comments on principal sources 1. Source materials Most of the information in this publication has been derived from a variety of sources including assets of the Central Intelligence Agency, publication of the Israeli Government and reports prepared by the United States Department of Defense. Research was basically completed in December 1976. 2. Supplementary overt publications a. Aldouby, Zwy and Ballinger, Jerrold. T Shattered Silence; the Eli Cohen Affair. New Yow Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971. b. Arendt, Hannah. Etichmann in Jerusalem New York: Viking Press, 1963. c. Bar-Zohar, Michel. The Avengers. L Arthur Barker, 1968. d. Bar-Zohar, Michel. Spies in the Pro Land; Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972. e. Ben-Hasan, Eli, Our Man in Damascus York: Crown Publishers, 1969. f. Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Secret War. N York: Sabra Books, 1970. g. Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Spy from Israel New York: Tower Publications, 1969. h. El-Ad, Avri and Creech III, James. DecimHonor. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1976. i. Eytan, Steve. Repeated Triumphs Score: Israel Spy System. Washington: Joint Public Research Service, 1970.

) Harel, Isser. The House on Garibaldi Street; the Capture of Adolf Eichmann. London: A. Deutsch, 1975 k. Israel Government Year Book 5735-6 (1975-1976). Jerusalem, 1975. 1. Lotz, Johann Wolfgang. The Champagne Spy. New York: Manor Books, 1973. m. Pearlman, Moshe. The Capture of Adolf t. hmann. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961. n. Pickalkiewicz, Janus. Israel's Longer Arm. Frankfurt (Main): Goverts, 1975. o. Rabin, Jacob. Elie Cohen, L'espion de Damas. Paris: Flammarion, 1967. p. Shlaim, Avi. Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. Princeton: World Politics, April 1976. q. Tadmar, Joshua. The Silent Warriors. Edited and translated by Raphael Rothstein. Toronto: MacMillan, 1969. r. Tinnin, David B. and Christensen, Dag. The Hit Team. Boston: Little Brown, 1976. s. Who's Who in Israel, 1976. Tel Aviv: Bronfman and Cohen, 1976.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Participants: Mr. David Tourgeman, Second Secretary, Israeli Mission Thomas Greene, Political Officer Place : Tehran Palace Hotel Garden Restaurant Time t Friday, April 2, 1965; 11:30 a.m. Mr. Tourgenan commented that the Israeli operations here in Iran are almost clandestine. He said that while his Government was eager to expand relations with Iran, it realized the delicate position of the Iranian Government in recognizing both Israeli and many Arab countries, and therefore did not push contacts too much. He said that, given the position of Iranian Jews who have immigrated to Israel, Iranians who study in Israel can be trained by former Iranians in the Persian language. This gives Israel a uniquely effective position in training agricultural technicians for small projects and small industrial projects. Tougeness says his government will try disorately to expand Israeli aid to Iran in the coming year. COM33T Tourguan was very cordial and seemed interested in maintaining a contact with the American Embassy. Our conversation lasted for over an hour, at the end of which he urged me to call him when I return from home leave. POL:T200 Distrbutions MPH-POLreading W TO BIO C KU

SECRET OFFICIAL-INFORMAL February 13, 1969 The Honorable Armin H. Meyer American Ambassador Tehran Dear Mr. Ambassador: In our sessions with the oil companies and the British, when we were comparing notes on the Shah's January 31 meeting with Consortium representatives, we learned of a definite statement by the Shah about the Israeli pipeline. He said that Iran had a financial interest in the line and planned to continue using it regardless of any Arab complaints. He added that he was confident that the Arabs would not be able to defeat Israel and Israel looked to Iran as a friend. All the best. Sincerely, Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. also reported U_{100} to u_{100}. n_{1}

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTMemorandum TO : The Charge DATE: November 10, 1970 FROM : POL - Donald N. Toussaint SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Mr. Ben-Yohanan of the Israeli Mission, November 12 at 11:00 a.m. Mr. Ben-Yohanan, "Counselor" of the Israeli Mission in Tehran, is calling on you at his request on November 12 at 11:00 a.m. Mr. Ben-Yohanan has been in Tehran only about three months, and our biographic files contain no information on him. Using Iranian support of the original Afro-Asian resolution in the UNGA debate as a starting point, you might find it useful to sound out Tohanan on the current status of Iranian-Israeli relations with a view to finding out whether the Israelis have detected--as we have--a slight change in the Iranian attitude toward Israel. We are attaching for your information a copy of our A-148 of May 12, 1970. It would be interesting to get his assessment of the reasons/significance behind renewal of Iran-UAR relations--and to sound him out on Iraq. We have heard via the press that several high-ranking Iraqi Army officers--presumably supporters of General Hardan Takriti who was exiled--were recently executed. Radio Baghdad has not, to our knowledge, mentioned this yet. All signs indicate that a power struggle has been going on inside Iraq for some time. Do the Israelis have any information on what is going on there? We have heard that the census of the Kurdish areas has been postponed and that other differences are arising between Barzani and the Government in Baghdad. Do the Israelis have any information on developments in Iraqi Kurdistan? Finally, do the Israelis have any information on the Iraqi forces in Jordan Attachment: A+148 POL: CWMcCaskill:psk Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

CONFIG_INITIAL SPITAL FORM INB. 10 MAT 192 EDITION USA PPMR (a CFR) 101-11.0 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum POL - Mr. Toussaint DATE: Nov. 12, 1970 L. Douglas Heck Visit of Mr. Ben-Yohanan of the Israeli Mission Mr. Ben-Yohanan tells me that he has been in Tehran for about two and a half months. He came here from eight years in Israel, and he said he was pleased to have a change from assignments within Israel. He spent five years in Israel attached to the Prime Minister's office as a Political Assistant and the last two years in the same capacity with Foreign Minister Eban. He said the latter job took him on numerous missions with the Foreign Minister and he had little time at home. Before this assignment he served with the Israeli Mission in Helsinki. He considers himself a career foreign service officer. Ben-Yohanan was not very forthcoming on the state of Iran-UAR relations. He said that economic relations were improving with Israel landing an increasing number of contracts for construction, etc., in Iran. Politically he said that relations had not changed much one way or the other in the last five or six years. On the question of Iraqi forces in Jordan he had no information suggesting that King Hussein was being successful in ousting them. In fact, the failure of the Iraqi forces to participate in the recent conflict between Jordan and the Palestinians might make it more difficult for King Hussein to arrange for their removal from Jordan. Ben-Yohanan said there were approximately 3,000 Jews left in Iraq. He doubted there was much hope of their early departure from that country. Things were increasingly unstable in Iraq and there were rumors of new executions, but he had no definite information.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION October 14, 1972 PARTICIPANTSMr. Amnon BEN YOHANAN, Itself Minister in TehranAndrew I. Killgore, Political Counselor PLACE: Israeli Mission, Tehran DATE: October 12, 1972 Unusual Status of Israeli Mission in Tehran Mr. Ben Yohanan stated that the Israeli Mission in Tehran is in every substantive respect treated by the Government of Iran like any other Embassy. Ambassador Meir EZRI has ready access to the Shah and other high officials of the Iranian Government. When the Ambassador is away, Mr. Ben Yohanan is also able to see those Iranian officials, including the Shah, that he needs to see to carry on business between Israel and Iran. It is only on the ceremonial side that the Israeli Mission is treated differently from other regular Embassies in Tehran. No Israeli flag is shown at the Mission and no sign on the front of the building identifies it as the Israeli Mission. Ambassador EZRI does not attend ceremonies which protocol requires other Ambassadors to attend. However, Ben Yohanan saw an advantage in not having to play a ceremonial role which often took up too much of the time of the other Ambassadors. The Embassies of the Arab countries in Tehran were fully aware, Ben Yohanan said, that the Israeli Embassy was actually like all other Embassies here except for the ceremonial aspects. They fully accepted this unusual state of affairs and made no remonstrations about it with the Iranian Government. Thus, the Israeli Minister continued, the situation was that the Israelis were willing to forego the ceremonial trappings of diplomacy as long as the real substance was present while the Arabs could tolerate the substance of close Iran-Israel relations as long as this was not apparent from surface indications. Ben Yohanan realized that the strongly Islamic orientation of many Iranians, including them to sympathize with their fellow Muslims in the Arab-Israel dispute, made it useful for Iran to mask it; true policies by publicly pretending not to recognize Israel. The Shah is a Brilliant Leader In the context of Iran's rapid emergence as a leading country in this part of the world, the Israeli Minister referred to the current trip to the Soviet Union of the Shah. Looking at the Shah's domestic and international moves over the past 10 years, Ben Yohanan found the Iranian Sovereign to be a man of

CONFIDENTIAL extraordinary shrewdness as a leader. When I asked the Minister if he perhaps thought the Shah's ambitions for Iran overreached the country's realistic possibilities, he responded that he did not think so. When the Shah said Iran would bring itself up in every respect to Great Britain within a decade or two, who could say that he was wrong. Of course, the Shah would have to expend funds very heavily on education in order to have a population with the educational and technical levels to run the kind of society he envisaged. However, in view of Iran's rapidly increasing income from petroleum and other sources, there was no objective reason why this could not be accomplished. Biographical Note Ben Yobanan is probably in his late fortiel. He speaks perfect English and says he is a career Israeli diplomat. He worked several years in the office of the late Israeli Prime Minister Levi Enbkol. After that he worked more than two years for Foreign Minister Abba Eban to whom he is devoted. The Minister expected that if General Moshe Dayan and Finance Minister Pinhas Baphir became deadlocked for the Prime Ministership, after 1.rs. Their stepped down, Foreign Minister Eban stood a chance of becoming Prime Minister of Israel. It was apparent that he hoped events would work out this way. Ben Yohanan has been in Tehran two years and expects to stay at least one more year, perhaps two. He struck me as extremely intelligent and well informed on Iranian affairs. POL:AIKillgore:cak

Tel Aviv, Israel Official-INFORMAL CONFIDENTIAL Hawthorne Q. Mills, Esquire Counselor for Political Affairs American Embassy Tehran Dear Hawk: I am writing with regard to an Israeli who has been friendly and helpful to us here at the Embassy and who will be coming to Tehran to reside for an indefinite period. Ovadia Damon has been the Special Assistant for Occupied Territories Affairs to the National Commissioner of Police since 1968. In that position, he has been a regular contact of the Political Section and has been very helpful to us in providing information regarding Israeli policies and activities on the West Bank. He is an Egyptian Jew by birth. He will be coming to Tehran in the near future on assignment with the Jewish Agency. He has told us that Israeli leaders are somewhat concerned about the Jewish community in Iran; he described that community to us as being wealthy but becoming increasingly Persian. The community has been generally supportive of Israel but not as helpful as would be desired. Danon's job will be essentially one which is concerned with cultural affairs and Jewish traditions, as he described it to us, but we believe his primary purpose is to do what he can to strengthen the ties between the Jewish community there and Israel. For your information we also believe he may be somewhat involved with Israeli intelligence activities. This week's edition of Newowcek magazine has an article on the Passover march through the occupied West Bank by the Gush Emunim group of fanatics; you will find in it an interesting quotation by Danon. With best regards. Sincerely, John E. Cruaap Political Counsel

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Subject: Iranian Politics Participants: Yoram Shani, First Secretary, Israeli Mission, Tehran i John D. Stempel, AmEmbassy Tehran Time & Place: Shani residence, March 6, 1977 Distribution: AMB/DCM | USIS | NEA/IRN POL | BIO | INR/RNA OR | | INR/OIL/B The Shanis had invited my wife and me to dinner to talk about our forthcoming trip to Israel. In the course of the evening the following interesting tidbits emerged: 1. According to Shani's sources, about three or four months ago SAVAK surrounded the wrong house in a terrorist raid. He could not place the time exactly, but it was apparently just prior to or during the November-December 1976 roundups. SAVAK shot the house up rather badly, killing all occupants, whereupon the terrorists emerged from a building close by (probably next door) and engaged in a full scale shootout with the Security Services which resulted in the deaths of all the terrorists and two or three security officers. Shani said this is really the only major mistake in identity he knows of which resulted in "several" unnecessary civilian deaths. 2. Fariborz Atapour, a prominent Iranian journalist, is the Israeli Mission's favorite villain. About 18 months ago Shani gathered a number of Atapour's anti-Israeli writings and complained to the Foreign Ministry. They promised to restrain Atapour but did not do so until Shani had repeated his demarche every two weeks for the next three months. In the process, Shani learned that Atapour had taken considerable amount of money from the Syrian Government and indeed was regarded by his colleagues as being very much a "man on the take." Shani said of all the journalists he has talked with over lunch or cocktails, only Atapour has been unusually rude and offensive. POL:JDStempel/bjh

CONFIDENTIAL 3. Shani said he had traveled a great deal in Iran during his two plus years here but had always registered as an Australian at hotels to avoid embarrassment to the GOI. This led to a discussion of basic Israeli-Iranian contacts. Shani said these were very open and free at most levels. In reply to offhand question about his ties with the local Jewish community, he said there were no special efforts made. In our discussion of Iran, however, it was obvious that his contacts in the Persian Jewish community are excellent. Shani himself is 38 years old and has been in the Israeli Foreign Ministry between 12 and 14 years. He has served in Jerusalem and spent a four-year tour in Sydney. His Persian is fair to good and he describes himself as the Mission's political officer. He says he does most of the contact work with the 8th Political Division at the Foreign Ministry. His wife, Raya, is an attractive 30-year-old art historian who is working toward a PhD in Islamic Art at the Hebrew University. They met in Jerusalem some four years ago shortly before coming to Iran. Both speak excellent but accentuated English. They have no children.

SECRET/NOFORN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: John D. Stempel, Political Officer, US Embassy Yoram Shani, Israeli First Secretary SUBJECT : Terrorists in Iran and Miscellaneous DISTRIBUTION: Charge/ADCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B DATE & PLACE: May 18, 1977, Xanadu Restaurant, Tehran I briefed Shani on Secretary Vance's visit and indicated the trip had gone well. Shani said he had heard there was concern over the Secretary's comment which suggested the US and Iran did not agree on everything. I offered to provide him a transcript of the press conference to illustrate that this concern was unnecessary. Alleged Terrorist Activity at Jewish Immigration Agency -- Shani said newspaper reports of an attempt by two terrorists to shoot their way into the Jewish Agency were only semi-correct. There were two men involved and both were killed. They had no connection with known terrorists movements, though one had served a prison sentence, allegedly for crimes against the state. Shani said it was not even clear that the pair were going to attack the Jewish immigration agency. Police stopped them on the street; the pair opened fire and in the ensuing gun battle one terrorist took refuge in the Jewish agency where he was killed. The Iranians believe the pair were fanatical right-wing Moslems who may have been casing the Jewish Agency for future action. A Second Terrorist Battle? -- Shani said friends of his reported there had been a terrorist shootout May 16 somewhere in Tehran when police cornered a group in two safe houses. The battle lasted two hours and security forces reportedly lost seven men when some of the terrorists were killed, but noted his friend said that all involved were eventually shot. New Local Version of Rockwell Killings - Shani said a close friend of his, who said he had talked to a peripheral member of terrorist group which shot three Rockwell employees in August 1976, told him the following story which is being spread by the terrorist group: The terrorist group was really after just one of the men -- a CIA Major (sic) who had landed in Iran about 14 hours before the killing, ostensibly with a complete scheme for tapping Tehran's telephone lines. The two other people killed were shot because they drew revolvers, but the principal target of the operation was "the CIA Major". (Comment: All of the employees killed had lived in Iran for sometime though one had just returned the night before from leave -- none were carrying weapons. The flaws in this story suggest an obvious propaganda attempt.) SECRET/NOFORN

Israeli Elections -- In response to my query, Shani said the situation in Israel was wholly confused. Begin's victory took everyone here in the Israeli mission by surprise and people were just beginning to sort out the implications of Israel's first real change of government since independence. SECRET/NOFORN Nasser Assar -- Shani said someone close to Assar said Assar was very bitter at his being placed on leave after his recent press conference which reportedly annoyed the Shah. According to Assar's friend, Assar, ForMin Khalatbary, and the Shah discussed the press conference beforehand and Assar was given the royal OK to discuss all the topics that he mentioned. Apparently, Assar will be named Iranian Ambassador to Paris to salve his irritation. POL:JDStempelTab:May 23, 1977

SRF Memo #17721 June 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Political Section FROM : SRF SUBJECT : Background Information on Israeli Trade Mission, Tehran Following are SRF Headquarter's traces on members of the Israeli Trade Mission: 1. Uriel LUBRANI, born 7 October 1926, has been unofficial ambassador to Iran since June 1973. Received BA (Honors) from University of London. Served in Haganah (Resistance) and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 1944-48. Entered Foreign Ministry (MFA) in 1950 and first served in Middle East Division, then as private secretary to Foreign Minister Sharett 1951-53. Assigned London 1953-56. 1957-61 Assistant Advisor, then Advisor, on Arabic affairs to Prime Minister (PM) Ben-Gurion. (During this period, his unsympathetic attitude toward Arabs drew criticism from Israeli Press at least twice.) When Ben-Gurion resigned in 1963, was appointed Ambassador to Burma, but never assumed his post. Stayed on as Political Secretary and Director of PM Eshkol's private office. 1965 resigned post because of loyalties to Ben-Gurion. 1965-68 Ambassador to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, during which time implemented Israel's Aid Program which placed advisors in Uganda Army, Air Force, and police; these contacts made him one of best-informed men in Uganda, and U.S. Embassy found him to be valuable and cooperative friend. 1968-71 Ambassador to Ethiopia. 1971-73 was on Koor Industries management board as Director of Joint Enterprises and Projects Abroad; this board determines basic policy for Koor Industries LTD, Israel's largest industrial corporation. Married to Sara nee L E V I; four children. Said to be a capable civil servant, but a rather colorless person. 2. Arieh (or Aryeh) L E V I N, formerly named Lova Lewin, born circa 1927 in Iran, is suspected Intel officer. Apparently is former IDF officer (Lt. Col) on loan to MFA. 1963-65 First Secretary, Addis Ababa. 1966-unknown date Charge D'affaires, Kigati, Rwanda. Senior Foreign Liaison Officer since 1965. (One Arieh Lewin, probably identical, was Chief Military Censor, IDF Intel Directorate 1968-69.)

Counselor, Paris, 1969-70. Described as specialist on Iran, where he grew up. Educated in U.S. protestant mission schools. Speaks fluent Russian (Russian Jewish background), French, English, native Hebrew, and Arabic. Has reportedly traveled and lived in U.S. (no dates given). Very openly pro-U.S. while in Rwanda, was object of some Soviet interest. 3. Yoram S H A N I, born circa 1939, has been First Secretary, Tehran, since 1973. In MFA since circa 1965. Served in Jerusalem (dates unknown), and as Vice Consul, Sydney, Australia for four years (circa 1969). 4. Eliezer Y O T V A-T (or YOTVATH) served at Israeli Consulate New York City 1960-61 where was in charge of archives and diplomatic couriers. Second Secretary (Admin), Rome 1968-72. In 1970 one Colonel Yotvat, Milatt in Tokyo, was reportedly traveling to Taiwan to discuss Israeli munitions purchases. 5. Abraham Lunz, aka Rami Lunch (or Luntz), born February 1931 in Tiberias, Israel, has been Milatt Tehran since 1975. Prior to this assignment, was Director of Naval Intelligence, IDF-Navy (since 1971). Described as highly intelligent and capable line officer, apparently has had no formal intel training. Experienced in common and electronics, has served as Commander of Submarine Chaser (1964) and as Deputy Commander, Haifa Naval Base (1971). Received officer training at French Naval School, Best, France (1950-53), and attended Royal Navy Navigation and Direction School, Southwick, England (1962). Speaks good French and English, possibly some Arabic. Wife Ada, born 1932 in Haifa, was formerly nurse in IDF (prior to 1963). His brother-in-law, Captain Emmanuel KLEMPERER, was Deputy Commissioner of Shipping in 1969. Lunz and his Deputy, Moshe Moussa Levi (below), were both known personally and professionally to Defense Attache's Office Tel Aviv in 1975 as outstanding intel officers. 6. (Lt Col) Moshe Moussa L E V I was Foreign Liaison Officer at IDF Hqs prior to Tehran assignment in 1974. In August 1966 one Major fnu L E V Y (possibly identifiable) was reportedly assisting Iranian instructor at newly-established intelligence school; apparently helped arrange training schedules and organize instructional material. This man, in Iran on loan, was then commander of the "Direct Secret Collection Agency" on Israel/Jordan border. Lt Col Levi, a multi-lingual specialist (speaks Arabic, French, English, Hebrew, and is studying Persian) was reportedly disillusioned when he first assumed his current post, because of lack of work. However, he soon created tasks for himself, including

developing info on Iranian order of battle and cultivating Iranian officer. Wife is Ambassador's secretary and is also multi-lingual. Both have been described as personable and well-versed in developing contacts among foreign military circles, including U.S. military personnel. NATION NOTICE NALONALES INVOLVED SUBJECT TO CEETAL CE LEGATION SXECULE OF E. O. 11922, ABTSANT CILLY 898489 LED AT TWO YEAR ENTERIS TWO E-LCC LEGON IMPOSSIBLE TO. PETERMINIE IMPOSSIBLE TO. DETERMINE (Insert date or avert)

Dear Mr. Minister: Enclosed is a brief account of the outcome of Foreign Minister Dayan's recent visit to Washington, which I would appreciate your bringing to His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr's attention at your earliest convenience. I shall be leaving Tehran for Washington the morning of February 20 to attend the U.S.-Iranian Joint Commission Meeting. If you or His Imperial Majesty have any questions regarding the enclosed, or any comments you wish conveyed to Washington, my Deputy, Jack Miklos, who will be in charge in my absence, is an courant and of course available. We are most appreciative to His Majesty for the continuing exchange on this matter and look forward to hearing the results of His Majesty's meeting with the important visitor expected later this week. With high esteem and warmest personal regards. Sincerely, William H. Sullivan ambassador His Excellency Amir Abbas Hoveyda Minister of the Imperial Court Tehran SECRET

Dayan's brief visit to Washington produced no new developments of any moment. He continues to believe efforts should be pursued to get a declaration of principles agreed with Sadat but was not interested in discussing specific language of declaration while here. We did ask our help in getting formal meetings of political Committee resumed, on grounds that there was undesirable asymmetry in continued meetings of Security Committee in Cairo while Political Committee was suspended. We undertook to raise this with Egyptians but indicated we did not think he would be responsive until a declaration of principles had been agreed to. Dayan also, predictably, expressed Israeli concern over aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia (very little was said about proposed sale to Egypt). Israelis have expressed unhappiness with our recent references to "withdrawal on all fronts" under UN Res. 242. Secretary pressed Dayan as to Israeli acceptance that 242 does require withdrawal on all fronts, assuming agreement can be reached on border adjustments, security arrangements and political linkage at West Bank to Jordan. Dayan avoided direct answer, saying only that Israelis have "their own plan" (i.e., the "Begin Plan") for the West Bank. From our recent exchanges with Israelis, it is apparent that Begin is not yet prepared to accept the principle of withdrawal from West Bank, understandable in view of his long-held ideological commitments, but of crucial importance if there is to be a successful solution to problem and any prospect of a peace settlement. We believe this will be the most difficult decision for Israelis to face in coming weeks. We are certain that His Majesty will recognize the significance of this particular point. (ABOVE TEXT FROM STATE 044031 OF 18 FEB 1978) SECRET

NNNF LWV ESA158BRA003 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHC #8204/01 1300745 ZNY SSSSSSS ZZH P 100237Z MAY 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMZN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9061 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3902 RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0723 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9100 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2212 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0970 RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7714 RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4500 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9245 RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6088 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9393 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0910 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7054 RUDTC/EMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2260 RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8174 RUQNAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4500 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1273 RUQMD1/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4660 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0722 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7821 RUQMGQ/AMEMBASSY MICOSIA PRIORITY 6463 RUFOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7597 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2356 RUDBKT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1586 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2259 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3139 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8662 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3064 RUQHNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 3676 RUEMDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0354 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2106 SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 118204/01 E.O. 12863 GDS 5/9/85 (GRIFFIN, PHILIP J.) TAGS1 EG IS P1MR SUBJECT: INTSUM 807 - MAY 9, 1979 LONDON FOR GLASPIE PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION 1. (C) THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL BEGIN SUBMITTED TO THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE LAST WEEK THAT DEALS WITH ISRAEL'S STAND ON THE NATURE OF AUTONOMY IS APPARENTLY BASED ON BE;IN'S ORIGINAL AUTONOMY PLAN OF DECEMBER 1977. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE CURRENT PROPOSAL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CAMP DAVID FORMULATIONS. HAAREIZ COMMENTATOR BENZIMAN SAID BEGIN'S PLAN CONCLUDES WITH TWO UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS.

(A) THE FIRST STATES THAT "ISRAEL WILL NEITHER TOLERATE NOR PERMIT A PALESTINIAN STATE EVER BEING ESTABLISHED IN THE TERRITORIES OF JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA..... (B) THE SECOND STATES THAT AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS OF AUTONOMY, "ISRAEL WILL DEMAND THE REALIZATION OF ITS UNQUESTIONABLE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY" OVER THOSE TERRITORIES. ACCORDING TO BENZIMAN, A "DIVIDING LINE" SEPARATES THESE TWO DECLARATIONS FROM THE 30 CLAUSES IN THE PROPOSAL, SUGGESTING TO HI THAT THEY ARE NOT PART OF THE PLAN BUT THAT THEY REPRESENT ISRAEL'S POSITION. 2. (U) PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT SEVERAL OF THE CLAUSES IN BEGIN'S PLAN HAVE AROUSED CO;TROVERSY IN THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE. HAWKS ALLEGEDLY ARE CONCERNED THAT TWO ARTICLES ARE AMBIGUOUS: (1) "UNCULTIVATED PUBLIC LAND WILL BE UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL"; (2) "THERE WILL BE NO EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE LAND (AS DEFINED BY THE GOVERNMENT) BUT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC NEEDS SUCH AS THE LAYING OF RAILROADS, ROAD PAVING, AS WELL AS FOR PURELY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS." SOME MINISTERS REPOPIEDLY CONTEND THAT THESE ARTICLES SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO GUARANTEE UNRESTRICTED ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES. 3. (U) HAWKS ARE ALSO DESCRIBED AS WORRIED THAT THE PLAN GRANTS TOO MUCH AUTHORITY TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL. MAARIV COMMENTATOR SHARIF -- A GENERALLY WELL-INFORMED OBSERVER -- REPORTS THAT, AT THE MAY 8 MEETING OF THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE, SEVERAL MINISTERS WERE EXPECTED TO ARGUE THAT THE PROPOSALS SHOULD STATE THAT THE SOURCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY DERIVES FROM ISRAEL. (BEGIN'S DRAFT REPORTED) STATES ONLY THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL "WITHDRAW.") 4. (C) ALIMOUGH THE PRECISE CONTENT OF BEGIN'S PROPOSALS IS NOT YET KNOWN, THE PRESS ACCOUNTS SEEM AUTHORITATIVE. BEGIN'S RESOUNDING PROCLAMATIONS THAT ISRAEL WILL NEVER ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE AND WILL INSIST THAT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY BE IMPOSED IN "JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA" AFTER THE FIVE YEARS OF AUTONOMY ARE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO REASSURE HAWKS WITHIN HERUT AND THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP). 5. (S) BEGIN'S PROBLEM AS HE MOVES INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BOTH POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, HE WILL HAVE TO WALK A NARROW LINE BETWEEN THE DEMANDS OF INTERNAL POLITICS AND THOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. BEGIN'S DIFFICULTIES WILL INCREASE AS THE NEGOTIATIONS BECOME MORE CONCRETE. HIS EFFORTS TO BALANCE ET 08204

NNNVV ESA159BRAO05 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHC #8204/02 1300747 ZNY SSSSSS ZZH P 100237Z MAY 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMZN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9062 INFO RUGBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3903 RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0724 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9101 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2213 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0971 RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7715 RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4501 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9246 RUESHS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6089 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9394 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0911 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7055 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2261 RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8175 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4501 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1274 RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4661 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0723 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7822 RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6466 RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7598 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2357 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1587 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2260 RUEHIV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3140 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8663 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3065 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 3677 RUEHDI/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0355 RUEAIRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2107 BT SECRET SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 118204/02 THESE CONSIDERATIONS INEVITABLY WILL PRODUCE BACKING AND FILLING, ESPECIALLY WHEN CRUCIAL DECISIONS ARE AT HAND. BEGIN'S TASK WILL BE COMPLICATED BY THE SENSITIVITIES OF HIS NRP COALITION PARTNER ON WEST BANK ISSUES. AND THE NRP HAWKS, FOR THEIR PART, WILL BE DIFFICULT TO LULL WITH RINGING DECLARATIONS IN THE FACE OF ANY CONCESSIONS BEGIN MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS ALIVE. BEGIN WILL BE MINDFUL OF THE INSECURITY OF HIS PARLIAMENTARY POSITION IF THE NRP BECOMES DISAFFECTED. 6. (S) BEGIN'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NRP WILL BE EXACERBATED BY GUSH EMUNIM ACTIONS. WHILE NRP DOVES DISLIKE THE GUSH, THE NRP'S DOMINANT YOUTH FACTION ENJOYS CLOSE TIES WITH THE GUSH. THE GUSH HAS DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO PULL THE NRP AFTER IT AND WILL EXERT HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE THAT COULD GREATLY EMBARRASS BEGIN, FOR EXAMPLE, BY EXPANDING THE EXISTING SETTLEMENT EFFORT IN HEBRON. BEGIN WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY USING FORCE TO BLOCK LARGE-SCALE GUSH SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS.

7 (S) PSYCHOLOGICALLY, BEGIN SEEMS TO HAVE A DEEP-SEATED NEED TO CONVINCE HIMSELF THAT HE IS NOT BETRAYING HIS PRINCIPLES. ACCUSATIONS TO THIS EFFECT BY FORMER COMRADES-IN-ARMS AND CLOSE ASSOCIATES AROUSE FEELINGS OF GUILT AND ANXIETY AND A NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CHARGES ARE FALSE. 8. (U) ON MAY 8 AP REPORTED THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD VOTED TO SET UP TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK. A CABINET COMMUNIQUE SAID DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YADIN OPPOSED THE MOVE. ISRAELI RADIO REPORTED A NUMBER OF MINISTERS JOINED YADIN AND OTHERS ABSTAINED BUT THE ACTUAL VOTE TALLY WAS NOT ANNOUNCED. 9. (U) JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED THAT THE ALIGNMENT FACTION IN THE KNESSET WOULD SUBMIT A NO CONFIDENCE MOTION, BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE OF PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS IN EXCHANGE FOR AN ISRAELI SOLDIER TWO MONTHS AGO. THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF CRITICISM SINCE AN ISRAELI PAPER PUBLISHED THE NAMES OF THE PALESTINIANS WHO WERE RELEASED AND THE NAMES WERE LINKED WITH SPECIFIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS SUCH AS HIJACKING 18. (C) EGYPT-ISLAMIC CONFERENCE: THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS RELEASED A STATEMENT ABOUT THE DECISION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE TO RECOMMEND THAT THE CONFERENCE SUSPEND EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION. EGYPT'S MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) SAYS THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY "HAS EXPOSED THE MANEUVERS CARRIED OUT BY THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT EGYPT FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE." MENA REPORTS THAT THE STATE-MENT CONDEMNED MOROCCO'S ATTITUDE AND WARNED THAT EVERYONE WHO HAS PARTICIPATED IN THIS "RASH ACTION" MUST BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES. ACCORDING TO REUTER, THE STATEMENT ALSO CLAIMED THAT EGYPT HAS RECEIVED OFFICIAL WORD FROM MOROCCO THAT THE PLANE CARRYING THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO LAND. OVER THE WEEKEND EGYPT, AN OFFICIALS HAD RECEIVED A MOROCCAN ENVOY, WHO THE EGYPTIANS BELIEVED WAS TRYING TO COORDINATE STRATEGY TO PREVENT EGYPT'S SUSPENSION. THE EGYPTIANS ON THAT BASIS AGREED TO POSTPONE SENDING THEIR DELEGATION TO FEZ IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD AID THE MOROCCAN STRATEGY. THE EGYPTIANS EVIDENTLY NOW BELIEVE THEY WERE DOUBLE CROSSED BECAUSE THE MOROCCANS WISHED TO ENSURE A NON-DIVISIVE CONFERENCE. 1. (U) PLO-ISRAEL: ADDRESSING A PALESTINIAN COMMANDO GRADUATION CEREMONY ON MAY 8, ARAFAT PROMISED TO STEP UP GUERRILLA ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND CALLED FOR STRONG BT

NNNNVV ESA16BRABDS PP RUQMHR DE RUEHC 18204/03 1300748 ZNY SSSSSS ZZH P 100237Z MAY 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMZN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9063 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3904 RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0725 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9102 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2214 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0972 RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7716 RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4502 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9247 RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6090 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9395 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0912 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7056 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2262 RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8176 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4502 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1275 RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4662 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0724 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7823 RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6467 RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7599 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2358 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1588 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2261 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3141 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8664 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3066 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 3678 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0356 RUEAIRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2108 BT S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 118204/03 ARAB ACTION AGAINST THE US. ME ASKED THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MEETING THIS WEEK TO ANSWER THE US "CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE." 12. (U) LEBANON: ISRAELI PLANES STAGED TWO RAIDS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON ON MAY 8, MARKING THE THIRD STRAIGHT DAY OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST WHAT THE ISRAELIS DESCRIBE AS "TERRORIST CONCENTRATIONS." AP QUOTED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES SAYING THREE CIVILIANS WERE WO;HDED IN ONE ATTACK. 13. (U) ON MAY 8 THE MIDDLE EAST REPORTER SAID THAT LEBANON "WAS SHAKEN" BY BEGIN'S STATEMENTS WHICH COULD HERALD THE BEGINNING OF A "BIG BLOW UP." AS SAFIR QUOTED GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAYING THE BEGIN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEBANESE ENCOURAGED HADDAD TO CONTINUE THREATENING THE VILLAGES IN THE SOUTH IN PREPARATION FOR AN ALL-OUT ISRAELI MILITARY STRIKE. SEVERAL PAPERS CARRIED PRIME MINISTER HUSS' STATEMENT THAT BEGIN'S OFFER WAS "BLACKMAIL." AS OF THE 8TH, EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTED, THE RIGHTIST PRESS HAD MADE NO COMMENT ON BEGIN'S SPEECH.

14. (C) YEMEN: THE F-5 PROGRAM IN THE YEMEN ARABIC REPUBLIC (YAR) USING US PLANES AND TAIWANES PILOTS, ALL MAID FOR BY THE SAUDIS IS OFF TO A PROBLEM-FILLED AND EMBARRASSING START, ACCORDING TO OUR EMBASSY IN SANA. SIX OF THE 16 F-5S DESTINED FOR THE YAR HAVE ARRIVED ALONG WITH AN 81 MEMBER TAIWANES TEAM OF PILOTS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THE F-5S HAVE NOT BEEN OFF THE GROUND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL APRIL 30. THE TAIWANES TEAM HAS ENCOUNTERED NUMEROUS OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING MISSING EQUIPMENT AND LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES (THREE SPEAK ENGLISH AND NONE SPEAK ARABIC). NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS AND FLIGHT CONTROL PROCEDURES HAVE NOT BEEN INSTITUTED. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT TIME AND EXPERIENCE MAY CORRECT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS BUT IN THE MEANTIME, WORD ON THE SITUATION HAS SPREAD AND WILL BE AN INCREASING POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE US AND THE SAUDIS. SOVIET MIGS FLYING FROM THE YAR CITY OF MODEIDAH HAVE MADE DAILY PASSES OVER THE CAPITAL EVERY DAY SINCE THE F-5S ARRIVED AND HAVE, ON AT LEAST ONE UCCASION, BUZZED THE F-5S' PARKING AREA, A DEMONSTRATION FOR AT LEAST SOME YEMENIS OF THE BENEFITS OF SOVIET US. US MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAMS. 15. (U) FRANCE-PEACE TREATY: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET IN A MAY 3 ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SAID THAT, "THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS NEITHER ONE OF HOSTILITY NOR OF OPPOSITION (TO THE (EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY). THE POSITION RECOGNIZES THAT (THE AGREEMENT HAS COST A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT AND THAT IT SIGNIFIES A REAL DESIRE. IT CANNOT FAIL TO RECORD, MOVER, WHAT IS MISSING IN THIS AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO TRULY OPEN THE PATH TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. AT THE HEART OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OF WHICH THE MAJORITY HAS KNOWN EXILE AND WHICH ASPIRES TO A HOMELAND. THERE WILL NOT BE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND THUS NOT A DURABLE PEACE, IF THIS PROBLEM ALSO DOES NOT FIND A JUST SOLUTION..." THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BEGIN ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE BUT SAID THE "OBJECTIVE IS NARROW AND BLL-DEFINED." 16. (U) FRANCE-IRAQ: A WESTERN NEWS SERVICE QUOTES MENCH OFFICIALS AS HAVING SAID ON MAY 8 IN PARIS THAT WAQ WILL SOON SIGN A DOLS 1.5 BILLION DEAL TO PURCHASE 100 MIRAGE F-1 FIGHTER-BOMBERS AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED ARMS FROM FRANCE IN EXCHANGE FOR OIL. FINAL NEGOTIATIONS

NNNNVV ESA161BRA010 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHC #8204/04 1300750 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 100237Z MAY 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUQMZN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9064 10 May 70 17 242 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3905 RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0726 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9103 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2215 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0973 RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7717 RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4503 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9248 RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6091 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9396 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0913 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7057 RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2263 RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8177 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4503 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1276 RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4663 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0725 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7824 RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6468 RUFOHX/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOIT PRIORITY 7600 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2359 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1589 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2262 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3142 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8665 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3067 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 3679 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0357 RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2109 BT SEC R E T FINAL SECTION OF 04 STATE 118204/04 WERE HELD DURING IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER TALFAH'S RECENT VISIT TO PARIS, AND THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTRY'S DIVISION FOR INTERNATIONAL ARMS SALES REPORTEDLY WILL GO TO BAGHDAD TO SIGN THE CONTRACT. VANCE BT 8204

VV ESA 194BRA960 PP RUGMHR 19 Jul 75 09 DE RUEHC #5946/01 2000611 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 182151Z JUL 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY INFO RUEAIRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2474 RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY PT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 185946/01 E.O. 12065 GDS 7/18/85 (ROBERTS, SAMUEL) TAGS: EG, IS, PINR SUBJECT: INTSUM 855 - JULY 18, 1979 LO·DO· FOR GLASPIE PAR IS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM OTHER ADDR"SEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION 1. (U) ISRAEL: ISRAEL'S TWO LARGEST KIBBUTZ FEDERATIONS, BOTH AFFILIATED WITH FACTIONS OF THE LABOR PARTY, HAVE ANNOUNCED PLANS TO MERGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. 2. (C) A CIA ANALYSIS NOTES THE FOLLOWING: THE MERGER, WHICH WILL BRING TOGETHER THE KIBBUTZ MEUHAD--AFFILIATED WITH LABOR'S AND AVODA FACTION--AND THE MAPAI-BASED IHUD HAKVUTZOT VEHAXIBUTZIM, WILL GIVE THE SMALL BUT WELL-ORGANIZED KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT A MAJOR VOICE IN LABOR DECISIONMAXING. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLOW, WHO HAS CLOSE TIES TO THE-MEUHAD, MAY WANT TO USE THE KIBBUTZ UNION AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO CHALLENGE LABOR PARTY CHIEF SHIMON PERES. MOST KIBBUTZ POLITICAL LEADERS, HOWEVER, ARE BIDING TH"IR TIME AND CONSOLIDATING THEIR TIES WITH OTHER SEGMENTS OF THE PARTY BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES IN THE INCREASINGLY INTENSE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE DEVELOPING BETWEEN ALLOW, PERES, AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN. 3. (U) THE TWO KIBBUTZ MOVEMENTS HAD BEEN SEPARATE SINCE 1951, WHEN IHUD SPLIT FROM MEUHAD IN A BITTER DISPUTE OVER IDEOLOGY. THE DIFFERENCES HAVE BLURRED OVER THE YEARS, AND THE RISE TO POWE OF A NEW GENERATION OF KIBBUTZ LEADERS NOT INVOLVED IN THE-ORIGINAL DISPUTE MADE THE MERGER ACCEPTABLE TO OOTH MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT CONSTITUTES LESS-THAN 3 PERCENT OF ISRAEL'S POPULATION, ITS FINANCIAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND MANPOWER RESOURCES CAN BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

4. (U) A PRIMARY TASK OF THE NEW FEDERATION WILL BE THE REBUILDING OF LABOR'S SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY. IHUD SECRETARY MUSA SHARIF TOLD REPORTER HE WANTED TO USE THE FEDERATION TO BUILD AND IMPLEMENT A "SOCIALISM FOR THE 805. MOST K,BBUTZ MEMBERS HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THE "IR BELIEF THAT LABOR LOST THE 1977 ELECTION BECAUSE THE PARTY PLAYED DOWN ITS SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY AND ACQUIRED THE IMAGE OF A COLORLESS, CORRUPT POLITICAL MACHINE. A MORE IDEOLOGICALLY OR IENTED PARTY, KIBBUTZ LEADER'S MAINTAIN, WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD WINNING BACK THE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS-OF KIBBUTZ MEMBERS WHO DEFECTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE OR SHELL 14 THE 1977 ELECTIONS. 5. (U) KIBBUTZ LEADERS ALSO WANT AN END TO WHAT THEY CALL THE LIKUD'S MISGUIDED SETTLEMENT POLICIES. SEVERAL KIBBUT, LEADERS SPOKE OUT AT THE RECENT FEDERATION CONVENTIONS AGAINST PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S POLICY OF SETTING UP AND FUNDING SETTLEMENTS IN POPULATED ARAB AREAS OF THE WEST BANK, WHILE, ACCORDING TO KIBBUTZ MEMBERS, DELIBERATELY U;DERFUNDING KIBBUTZ SETTLEMENTS IN THE GALILEE. WHILE OPPOSING THE POLICY OF SETTLEMENTS-IN POPULATED AREAS OF THE WEST BANK, THE KIBBUTZ LEADERS MADE IT-CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD CONTIM DNCBPUSH FOR SETTLEMENTS ALONG THE JORDAN RIFT AND IN THE GOLAN.- 'ARDLINE KIBBUTZ LEADERS, MOSTLY FROM THE IHUD, ENDORSED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN. POLICY TOWARDS THE GOLAN, WHERE IHUD AND MEUHAD HAVE NUMEROUS SETTLEMENTS, IS LIKELY TO BE A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN THE PROPOSED FEDERATION. MORE DOVISH MEMBERS WA;T TO AVOID CALLING FOR ANNEXATION OF THE AREA, WHILE OTHERS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT MAY MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS THERE AND WANT THE FEDERATION ON RECORD AS OPPOSING ANY TERRITORIAL PULLBACK. 6. (C) THE NEW KIBBUTZ FEDERATION IS LIKELY TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE NOW DEVELOPING FOR LABOR PARTY LEADERSHIP. BUOYED BY POLLS SHOWING LABOR POPULARITY ON THE INCREASE, ALLOW AND RABIN HAVE BEGUN LINING UP SUPPORT FOR THE OCTOBER PARTY CONVENTION, AT WHICH THEY APPARENTLY PLAN TO CALL: NGE SHIMON PERES FOR CONTROL OF THE PARTY. ALLOW, WHO IS A MAJOR ARCHITECT OF THE PLANNED KIOBUTZ MERGER, MAY BE HOPING THAT HIS BACKGROUND AS A KIBBUTZ LEADER CAN BE PARLAYED INTO SUPPORT FOR HIS CHALLENGE TO PERES. THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF KIBBUTZ LEADERS--INCLUDING SHARIF WHO APPEARS TO BE DEVELOPING A STRONG FOLLOWING--HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WANT TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE OLD-STYLE POLITICS IN LABOR AND ARE NOT EAGER TO SUPPORT THE 61-YEAR-OLD ALLOW'S PLANS. MOST KIBBUTZ MEMBERS APPARENTLY BACK PERES. 7. (C) THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE KIBBUTZ UNION WILL PROBABLY BE ENHANCED BY A GROWING ALLIANCE BETWEEN ITS LEADERSHIP AND A FACTION LED BY CHAIRMAN OF THE %OARD OF DIRECTORS OF BANK HAOPOLIM, YAACOV LEVINSON. LEVINSON, A 47-YEAR-OLD ACTIVIST WHO SOME OBSERVE RS BELIEVE HAS A BT

YNNVV ESA197BRA962 RUQMHR RUEHC #5946/02 2000613 NY CCCCC ZZH 1821512 JUL 79 19 Jul 75 312 SECSTATE WASHDC INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY NFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2475 KEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY 02 STATE 185946/02 MOD CHANCE OF EVENTUALLY BECOMING PRIME MINISTER, DEVELOPED CLOSE TIES WITH THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT DURING HIS 10 YEARS IN IHUD KIBBUTZ ROSH HANIKRA AND THROUGH HIS FADERSHIP OF THE MAPAI YOUTH MOVEMENT. HE AND SHARIF WE LONGTIME POLITICAL ALLIES. THE KIBBUTZ-LEVINSON ALLIANCE HAS WIDEMED IN RECENT MONTHS TO INCLUDE SOME KBAN POWERBROKERS LIKE NA AMAT (PIONEER WOMEN) SECRETARY GENERAL NAVA ARAD AND JERUSALEM LABOR PARTY BOSS UZI ARAM. THE COMBINATION OF A KIBBUTZ UNION, URBAN PARTY ASSES, AND LEVINSON'S BACKERS COULD MAKE THIS DEVELOPING LE VANCE THE MOST IMPORTANT POWER DASE IN THE LABOR PARTY AS IT PREPARES FOR THE 1981 KNESSET ELECTIONS. 1. (UD ISRAEL-CONSULATE GENERAL'S ACTIVITIES: IN AN ARTICLE JULY 17 ON THE CONTROVERSY IN ISRAEL OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN JERUSALEM, DAVID AND AU OF THE JERUSALEM POST WROTE THAT ANY ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST US CONSULAR OFFICIALS WOULD BOOMERANG MAINST THE ACTIVITIES OF ISRAELI LEGATIONS ABROAD. LANDAU SAID ISRAELI LEGAL SOURCES SAY US OFFICIALS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK BUT POLITICAL SOURCES ARE AGAINST MAKING AN ISSUE OF THIS. IT WOULD BE "MADNESS" TO THROW THE BOOK AT THE US, ONE SOURCE SAID, BECAUSE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON COULD EASILY BE ACCUSED ON OCCASION OF CROSSING... THE THIN LINE BETWEEN NORMAL BUSINESS AND INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS. (THE ARTICLE ALSO NOTES US DENIALS OF ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.) LANDAU CONCLUDES THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PRESS THE POINT TOO STRONGLY AT THIS TIME WITH THE US GOVERNMENT. (LOU) ISRAEL-COURT-SETTLEMENTS ISRAELI LAWYER TLICIA LONGER, WHO IS REPRESENTING PALESTINIANS IN TWO ASES IN WHICH ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT SEIZURE OF PRIVATE LAND IN THE WEST BANK IS CLAIMED, TOLD OUR CONSULATE GENERAL JERUSALEM THAT THE CASES WERE BEING BROUGHT FORWARD ON ME BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE QUESTION OF PRIVATE OWNERS; IF AND USE OF LANDS WOULD NOT BE NEGLECTED, HOWEVER, SHE SAID. IN THE CASE OF A CANNED NEW SETTLEMENT NEAR BETHLEHEM, MS. LONGER SAID TO IS TO BE SETTLED BY AMERICAN JEWS INCORPORATED IN A COMPANY KNOWN-AS THE "JUDEA AND SAMARIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION."

10. ISRAEL-SETTLEMENTS: JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED ON JULY 17 THAT TWO WAHALS (PARA-MILITARY SETTLEMENTS) WERE "CIVILIANIZED" LAST YEAR BUT THE CHANGE IN STATUS WAS NOT PUBLICIZED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM "A HIGHER AUTHORITY." ONE SETTLEMENT WAS IN GAZA AND THE OTHER ON THE WEST BANK. THIS ALLEGATION WAS MADE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AGRICULTURAL UNION AT A NEWS CONFERENCE IN TEL AVIV. THEY ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF NOT DOING ENOUGH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT-OF SETTLEMENTS. 11. (U) BEGIN-SADAI-KNESSET: IDF RADIO REPORTED JULY 17 ON BEGIN'S REMARKS TO A KNESSET COMMITTEE ON HIS TALKS WITH SADAT. BEGIN SAID THE TWO AGREED THAT ISRAELI TANKERS WOULD LOAD UP WITH OIL FROM THE ALMA FIELD THE DAY AFTER THE FIELDS ARE RETURNED TO EGYPT. BEGIN SAID HE AND SADAT HAD AGREED TO DISAGREE ON SETTLEMENTS. ON AUTONOMY, HE SAID ISRAEL NEEDS THE COOPERATION OF WEST BANK AND GAZA RESIDENTS TO ENSURE THEM FULL AUTONOMY BUT IT WILL NOT FORCE THEM TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS. AT ANY RATE, BEGIN SAID, THERE WILL BE NO PLO STATE IN "JUDEA AND SAMARIA." BEGIN SAID HE AND SADAT ARE NOT ATTENDING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING IN OCTOBER BUT ARE SENDING THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. 12. (UD KUWAIT-US ENE"GY PLAN:- KUWAIT'S MINISTER OF STATE FOR CABINET AFFAIRS JULY 17 SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMES PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY PLAN AND HOPES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OIL PRODUCING AND CONSUMING NATIONS ON ENERGY MATTERS. THE MINISTER SAID KUWAIT ALSO WAS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE EFFORTS TO FIND SUBSTITUTES FOR OIL. VANCE BT

NWNVV BSE356BRA298 NWNNVVNWNNV BSE356BRA298 PE RUQMHR DE RUEHC #1959/01 2152023 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 251944Z AUG 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2586 RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY RT S E C R R T SECTION 21 OF 02 STATE 201959/01 8.0.12065 GDS 8/3/05 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.) TAGS: EG, IS, PINR SUBJECT: INTSUM P67 - AUGUST 3, 1979 LONDON FOR GLASPIE PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION (PARAGRAPHS 1-5 SECRET) 1. PROSPECTS FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT: APART FROM A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT RESULTING FROM THE DEATH, INCAPACITATION, OR RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, THERE IS SOME CHANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT FALL SUDDENLY. THIS WOULD OCCUR IF THE GOVERNMENT LOST A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE KNESSET, OR IF IT RESIGNED IN ANTI-CIPATION OF SUCH A DEFEAT. IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE, SUCH A COLLAPSE PROBABLY WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY NEW ELECTIONS, RATHER THAN BY A REFORMATION OF THE COALITION OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LABOR-LED CABINET. CABINET. 2. THERE ARE THREE SETS OF ISSUES THAT COULD BRING ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S FALL: RELIGION, THE ECONOMY, AND FOREIGN POLICY. 3. RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES ARE HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE IN ISRAEL. NOT ONLY DOES THE COALITION DEPEND FOR SURVIVAL ON THE VOTES OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES—THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP) AND AGUDAT ISRAEL—THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT MILITANT SECULARIST COMPONENTS OF THE COALITION THAT ARE UNFRIENDLY TO THE ORTHODOX. (THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, IN PARTICULAR, ARE

STRONGLY SECULARIST IN TONE.) IN ADDITION, ULTRA-ORTHROBOX ELEMENTS, WFICE ARE INTERESTED SOLELY IN MOVING ISRAEL TOWARD A MORE ORTHODOX STANCE, EXERT CONSTANT PRESSURE ON THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. AS A RESULT, A DOMINO REACTION, BEGINNING WITH PUBLIC PRESSURE FROM THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX NATURE KARTA AND CULMINATING IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES FROM THE COALITION, COULD QUICKLY COME ABOUT. 4. ECONOMIC ISSUES ALSO COULD PROVIDE A POLITICAL FLASE POINT. PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION WITH THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES IS MIRRORED WITHIN THE KNESSET AND EVEN WITHIN THE COALITION. THE NUMEROUS OPPONENTS OF IPE PRESENT GOVERNMENT COULD USE A VOTE ON AN ECONOMIC ISSUE AS A PRETEXT FOR VOTING AGAINST THE CABINET, OR THEY COULD ABSTAIN OR ABSENT THEMSELVES AT A CRITICAL MOMENT. 5. FINALLY, CONCESSIONS ON SENSITIVE AUTONOMY-RELATED ISSUES COULD BE THE STRAW THAT BREAKS THIS GOVERNMENT'S BACK. THE ABSTENTION ON ABSENCE OF SEVERAL LIKUD AND NRP KNESSET MEMBERS ON A CLOSE VOTE COULD SPELL THE END FOR THE CABINET. 6. (U) REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S NY TIMES INTERVIEW: ISRAELI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YADIN SAID ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE UN RESOLUTION 242 IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT PLO OPPOSITION WOULD BE A GRAVE OBSTACLE TO ADVANCING NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD PEACE. COMPARISON OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM TO THE US CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT WAS UNFORTUNATE. YADIN SAID. (A) JUSTICE MINISTER AMIR SAID THE "OIL ISSUE" PROMPTED THE US TO TRY AND ACCELERATE THE TALKS. HE SAID AN ISRAELI "NATIONAL CONSENSUS" WOULD RESIST ATTEMPTS TO GO BEYOND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY FOR PALESTINIANS. (C) MAARIV SAID THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ARE SUPPLYING AN IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION; FOR PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS. (B) A YEDIOT AHARONOT ARTICLE SAID THE US POLICY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO WAS OF "GRAVE CONCERN" TO ISRAEL. THE PAPER WONDERS IF ISRAEL IS REQUESTED TO RECOGNIZE A PLO STATE. (D) WEST BANK PRESS REACTION WAS MIXED WITH ONE MODERATE PAPER ENCOURAGED BY THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS AND TWO OTHER PAPERS REJECTING THE INTERVIEW.

". (C) BURG-AUTONOMY TALKS: ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTER BURG HEAVILY CRITICIZED WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS THE US ROLE IN THE LAST ROUND OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS IN REPORTING TO THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTONOMY TALKS. HE CHARGED INADMISSABLE US INTERVENTION IN THE TALKS AND EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT THE "ONE-SIDED" PROPOSALS THE US ALLEGEDLY INTRODUCED. "WE ARE NOW ENTERING A MINEFIELD," BURG SAID. HE REITERATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US COULD MAKE PROPOSALS ONLY IF NEGOTIATIONS REACHED A DEADLOCK. EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT ISRAELI PRESS IS NOT CHALLENGING BURG'S VERSION OF THE TALKS. THE EMBASSY ALSO COMMENTS THAT WITH AUTONOMY BT

NNNNVV 25B053BRA301 PP RUQMER DK RUEHC #1959/02 2152025 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 031944Z AUG 79 PM SECSTATE WASHDC TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2587 RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY BT SEC RIT FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 201959/02 TALES GETTING DOWN TO SUBSTANCE, ISRAELI CRITICISM IS PROBABLY UNAVOIDABLE UNLESS THE US SIDE CHOOSES TO REMAIN COMPLETELY PASSIVE. 8. (U) ISRAEL-POLL: HA'ARETZ REPORTS THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S POPULARITY CONTINUES TO BE LOW. IN THE POLL HELD IN JULY ONLY 43 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH BEGIN AS PRIME MINISTER AS OPPOSED TO 62 PERCENT A YEAR AGO AND 40.6 PERCENT LAST MONTH. 9. (LOU) PLO-INTERNAL POLITICS: REUTER REPORTS THAT THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) UNDER GEORGE HABASH WOULD AGAIN ASSUME A SEAT ON THE PLO'S 15-MAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AFTER AN ABSENCE OF ALMOST FIVE YEARS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE LATE EXCOMM MEMBER ZUEAIR MUHSIN WOULD ALLEGEDLY PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESTRUCTURE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. REUTER FURTHER REPORTS THAT TWO SMALL IRAQI-BACKED EXTREMIST PALESTINIAN FACTIONS, THE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT AND THE PALESTINE LITERATION FRONT MIGHT ALSO RECEIVE SEATS ON THE COUNCIL. WE NOTE THAT HAPBASE'S GROUP WAS SUPPOSED TO REJOIN THE EXCOMM IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR DURING THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. IT DID NOT BECAUSE OF RICKERING BETWEEN THE REJECTIONIST FACTIONS AND FATAH OVER INCLUDING THE TWO AFOREMENTIONED EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS ON THE EXCOMM. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY COMPROMISE HAS BEEN WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE PFLP TO TAKE ITS EXCOMM SEAT. 10. (U) EGYPT-TRIPARTITE TALKS: THE EGYPTIAN MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) REPORTS THAT IT HAS LEARNED THAT EGYPT WILL ADOPT A FINAL DECISION ON THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATING IN THE TRIPARTITE MEETING CALLED FOR BY THE US UPON THE RETURN OF PRIME MINISTER KHALIL AND MINISTER OF STATE BUTRUS GHALI FROM ISRAEL.

11. (C) IRAQ-TRIAL OF PLOTTERS: THE SPECIAL COURT TRYING THE CONSPIRATORS IN IRAQ HELD ITS SECOND SESSION AUGUST 2. NO RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCED. USINT BAGHDAD REPORTS THE CITY HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE IDEA OF SIRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE "PLOT" CONTINUES. TWO PROMINENT SIRIAN BAATHISTS, BOTH ANATHEMA TO THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP, APPEARED AT A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CEREMONY AUGUST 2. THIS CONSTITUTES AN IRAQI SLAP AT DAMASCUS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ IS, AS YET, DIRECTLY BLAMING ASSAD FOR THE EVENTS IN IRAQ. 12. (U) ISRAELI COMMANDO STRIKE: JERUSALEM RADIO HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IN TEE NIGHT OF AUGUST 2-3 AN IDF ASSAULT FORCE ATTACKED TERRORIST BASES IN SOUTHERN FATHALAND. THE ISRAELI FORCE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES AND, ACCORDING TO THE IDF SPOKESMAN, SEVEN TERRORISTS WERE KILLED. VANCE IT

YXVRVV ESA636ESA635BRA758 PP RUQMR DE RUEHC #6132/01 3260823 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P12225Z NOV 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC 003504 TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 3099 RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC BT SEC R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 286132/01 E.O. 1203 GDS 11/1/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.) TAGS EGp ISp PINR SUBJECT: INTSUM 929 - NOVEMBER 1, 1979 LONDON FOR GLASPIE PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM OTHER ADDRESSES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (PARAGRAPHS 1-8 CONFIDENTIAL) 1. ISRAEL: THE CABINET RESHUFFLE: THE OCTOBER 29 CABINET REORGANIZATION, WHICH LEFT BEGIN AS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, SHOULD SLIGHTLY STRENGTHEN THE COALITION'S BASE IN THE KNESSET WHILE BUYING TIME FOR BEGIN TO FIND A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER. IT DOES NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS TRIGGERED BY THE ELON MORE DECISION AD DOES NOT BY ITSELF GUARANTEE A LONG LIFE FOR THE CABINET. IN OUR JUDGMENT, BEGIN WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RUN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ADDITION TO DISCHARGING HIS DUTIES AS PRIME MINISTER. 2. THE TWO KEY ASPECTS OF THE RESHUFFLE WERE THE FAILURE TO NAME A REGULAR FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE COOPTION OF HOROWITZ INTO THE CABINET. BEGIN'S INABILITY TO FIND A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR DAYAN ATTIESTS TO THE INTENSITY OF INTRA-COALITION DIFFERENCES, AS WELL AS TO BEGIN'S GROWING INABILITY TO EXERCISE STRONG L"ADERSHIP. 3. BEGIN REPORTEDLY APPROACHED BOTH YADIN AND BURG ABOUT BECOMING FOREIGN MINISTER. YADIN REPORTEDLY DEMANDED THAT HE CONDUCT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS IF HE SECAME FOREIGN MINISTER. HE FURTHER INSISTED THAT MINISTER OF LABOR KATZ, A MEMBER OF HIS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (DM). BE ALLOWED TO RETAIN HIS PORTFOLIO. ▲ BEGIN COULD NOT ACCEPT THESE DEMANDS. THEY WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE DM TO HOLD THREE SUBSTANTIVE CABINET PORTFOLIOS DESPITE THE FACI THAT IT HAS ONLY SEVEN KNESSET MEMBERS, A SITUATION THAT THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (KNP) WOULD NOT COUNTENANCE. THE NRP HAS FREQUENTLY COMPLAINED THAT THE DM IS CVERREPRESENTED IN THE CABINET. MOREOVER, THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS ARE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE MP. AND THE PARTY WILL NOT RELINGUISH ITS KEY WALL IN THEM.

As FOR BURG, HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO RELINGUISH THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF POWER AND PATRONAGE FOR THE NRP AS A WHOLE AND FOR BURG'S LAMIFNEH FACTION IN PARTICULAR. MOREOVER, BURG UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZES THAT HE IS CURRENTLY PERFORMING AN IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE ROLE WHICH NORMALLY WOULD BELONG TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONDUCT OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. 6. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS AN INSTITUTION HAS NEVER PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY. THE MINISTRY'S EXPERTISE HAS BEEN NOTABLY LACKING IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CABINET REGHUFFLE INSOFAR AS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS CONCERNED IS THE DEPARTURE OF DAYAN, A MAN WHO HAS ENJOYED GREAT IMPLIENCE OVER BEGIN, AND CONSEQUENTLY OVER ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY. 7. THE COMPTION OF HOROWITZ INTO THE CABINET IS A SIGNAL ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY. HOROWITZ IS AN ADAMANT HAWK, WHO RESIGNED FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN PROTEST OVER THE CONCESSIONS ENTAILED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. HERUT AND THE NRP HAVE PUSHED HARD FOR HOROWITZ. (THE LIBERALS WANTED HOROWITZ BECAUSE ME IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE FIRM LEADERSHIP IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AND BECAUSE THERE WAS WIDESPREAD LIBERAL ANTAGONISM TOWARD EHRLICH.) HOROWITZ WILL BE LIKELY TO STIFFIN THE CABINET'S NEGOTIATING POSITION ACROSS THE BOARD. HIS PRESENCE IN THE CABINET ALSO INSURES BEGIN THE SUPPORT OF THE THREE-MAN RAFI FACTION THAT HOROWITZ LEADS. IF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT SURVIVES ITS CURRENT CABINET CRISIS, THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE THAT BEGIN MIGHT NAME KNESSET MEMBER YEHuda BEN-MEIR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE MINISTRY. BEN-MEIR IS AN AGGRESSIVE, HAWKISH NRP FIGURE. HIS PRESENCE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WUD STRENGTHEN FURTHER THE HOLD OF THE HAWKS OVER THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. 9. (U) NEW ISRAELI POLL: A PUBLIC OPINION POLL PUBLISHED BY HAARETZ SHOWS THAT IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD NOW, LABOR WOULD RECEIVE 38.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTES; LIQUID 16.5; AND THE NEW ULTRA-RIGHT TEHYA PARTY, 3. OTHER RESULTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: (A) 84 PERCENT ARE GENERALLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE BT (A) 84 PERCENT ARE GENERALLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE BT

MINNVV E5A664E1B338 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHC 06132/02 3000025 ZNY SCSSS ZZH P 012225Z NOV 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 3100 RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC BT SE C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 286132/02 GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE (B) ONLY 30.8 PERCENT ARE SATISFIED WITH BEGIN'S PERFORMANCE AS PRIME MINISTER AND (C) 50 PERCENT ARE PREPARED TO MAKE "TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS" IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE, ALTHOUGH 82 PERCENT OPPOSE "SHARING" JERUSALEM WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT. 10. (U) NEW SETTLEMENTS: ACCORDING TO RADIO JERUSALEM, THE DIRECTOR OF THE JEWISH AGENCY'S SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED OCTOBER 31 THAT ISRAEL WILL ESTABLISH THREE NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS THIS YEAR. 1. (U) IRAQ-VIETNAM: REUTER REPORTS THAT VIETNAM WILL SEND IRAQ 75 COMBAT PILOTS IN RETURN FOR AN IRAQI LOAN OF 70 MILLION DOLLARS. 12. (S/NF) YAR PRIVATE ARMY: EMBASSY SANA REPORTS THAT RECENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN YAR MILITARY AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENT SALIH MAY BE FORMING A PRIVATE ARMY TO KEEP HIMSELF IN POWER. INDICATIONS ARE THAT SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US EQUIPMENT DELIVERED IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAVE BEEN USED TO ARM THIS FORCE. TO INSURE THE LOYALTY OF THE FORCE, SALIH HAS ASSIGNED MEMBERS OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY TO KEY POSITIONS. 13. (C) EGYPT-SUBSIDIES: EMBASSY CAIRO REPORTS THAT IN AN OCTOBER 29 MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY COOPER AND A US BUSINESSMAN, EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF ECONOMY HAMED AL-SAYIH SAID THAT THE EGYPTIAN CABINET HAD AGREED ON THREE ALTERNATIVES PERTAINING TO THE SUBSIDY ISSUE WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED TO SADAT (A) ABOLISHING THE SUBSIDIES OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD: (B) KEEPING THE ALLOCATION TO SUBSIDIES UNCHANGED IN THE 1980 BUDGET (THUS, EFFECTIVELY DECREASING THEM); AND

(C) INCREASING THEM BY 10 PERCENT SURPRISINGLY, AL-SAYID DID NOT MENTION "RATIONALIZING" SUBSIDIES TO INSURE THAT THOSE MOST IN NEED, RATHER THAN ALL EGYPTIANS, QUALIFIED FOR THEM. 14. (U) PLO-WEST GERMANY: WEST GERMAN SECRET SERVICE CHIEF MANFRED SCHUELER STATED ON OCTOBER 30, ACCORDING TO REUTER, THAT THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT "COULD NOT RULE OUT FURTHER COOPERATION WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE." REUTER ALSO REPORTED THAT THE AMBASSADORS OF SYRIA, IRAN, AND KUWAIT CALLED ON THE WEST GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ON OCTOBER 30 TO DISCUSS THE INTERROGATION OF JAILED PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS IN WEST GERMANY BY ISRAELI AGENTS AND PLO CHARGES THAT THE INTERROGATION WAS PART OF A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE A SENIOR PLO LEADER. RECORDING TO THE CLANDESTINE VOICE OF PALESTINE RADIO STATION, FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYAD) HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 30 IN WHICH HE SAID THAT IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THE ACTIONS OF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, THE PALESTINIANS "WILL NOT RESORT TO ILLEGAL METHODS." CHRISTOPHER BT

VV ESA543EIA076 RR RUQHMR DE RUEKJCS #1437 3000044 ZNY SSSSS RUWNZXB T USS OURBPSBEACH RHTMMSS T USS AYLWIN RHTMMSS T USS JULIUS A FURER RULYMTZ T USS NIMITZ RUCLFEA T USS ELMER MONTGONERY RUWNNUL T AIRANTISUBRON THREE EIGHT RUWFAAA T HELANTISUBRON TWELVE RULYOWA T CG FOURTH MAB RULYALA T USS SARATOGA RUHGZFF T AIRANTISUBRON TWO ONE RULYHOV T USS SAIPAN RUHGQAA T USS BLUE RIDGE RUWNNUL T USS CONSTELLATION RUEBLBA T USS JOHN F KENNEDY EWDXAA T USS NEW ORLEANS RUWNLHA T USS TARAWA RUWDXAA T USS ENGLAND RUHJHNA T USS TUSCAL OOSA RULYIKE T USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER RUHGZFF T USS KITTY HAWK RULYEHA T COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE RULYXXG T CTG SIX TWO PT TWO RULYAHA T CTG SIX TWO PT ONE RUHGQXA T CTG SEVEN SIX PT THREE RUWNROP T CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR RUHGPBPA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT THREE RUHGPBPA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE RUHGPBPA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ONE RUHGPBPA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX RUHGQHA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FOUR RUYNSDFT CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE RHMPMDD T CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT FOUR PT ONE RUWFAAA T HELANTISUBRON LIGHT THREE ONE RUWFAAA T HELSUPPRON ELEVEN RUWFAAA T HELANTISUBRON TWO RUWDXAA T USS ANCHORAGE RHCFMDD T USS AUSTIN RUWMBWA T USS ENTERPRISE RUHGIIW T USS MIDWAY RUEOHUA T USS MOUNT WHITNEY RUWNHKG T USS RAH ER RULYMKA T CTF SIX TWO RUWDFVA T COMPHIBGRUEASTPAC RULYUSA T USS AMERICA RULYOSA T COMCARGRU SIX RHHMBRA T USS JOSEPH STRASS R 0105372 NOV 79 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//JSI-7// D DIACURINTEL AIG 7011 AIG 7033 BT SE C R E T NOFORN 2966 DIADIN 304-2A (AS OF: 1500 EST 31 OCT 79) SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (D

ISRAEL: NEW TANK. 1. (S/NOFORN) ON 29 OCTOBER, THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE (IDF) FOR-MALLY ACCEPTED THE MERKAVA TANK. THIS WAS THE CULMINATION OF AT LEAST 6 YEARS OF INTENSIVE R&D TO FIELD A MAIN BATTLE TANK TAILORED TO ISRAELI DOCTRINAL AND TACTICAL CONCEPTS. THE FIRST COMPANY OF 12 MERKAVA TANKS WAS ASSIGNED TO THE CRACK 7TH ARMORED BRIGADE, 36TH ARMORED DIVISION, ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. 2. (S/NOFORN) IN A CEREMONY CELEBRATING THIS EVENT, MAJ GEN PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 1437 S E C R E T ISRAEL TAL, DESIGNER AND DIRECTOR OF ISRAEL'S TANK PROGRAM, TOLD THE TROOPERS, "THE MERKAA IS A VERY GOOD TANK." 3. (S/NOFORN) THAT TANK'S STRONG POINTS ARE: 1) A PROVEN MAIN GUN; 2) GOOD PROTECTION FOR THE CREW; 3) PALLETIZED AMMUNITION; 4) EASY ACCESS THROUGH REAR DOORS; 5) INFANTRY PERSONNEL CAN BE CARRIED; 6) SMOOTH RIDE; AND 7) FORWARD PLACEMENT OF THE ENGINE. THE TANK IS LIMITED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS UNDERPOWERED BY NORMAL TANK STANDARDS AND HAS A RELATIVELY HIGH SILHOUETTE. THE NEW TANKS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE PRODUCED AT A RATE OF UP TO 10 PER MONTH, WHICH WILL BUILD THE TEL AVIV ARMORED INVENTORY TO APPROXIMATELY 435 MERKAVAS OVER THE NEXT 4 TO 5 YEARS. THIS NEW MODEL WILL ENHANCE THE IDF ARMORED FORCE'S CAPABILITY BY THE MID-1980S, WHEN IT IS MORE WIDELY INTEGRATED INTO THE IDF INVENTORY. ISRAEL'S TANK OF THE 1980S ) CREW WEIGHT SPEED MERKAVA ("CHARIOT") PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 1437 S E C R E T PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 1437 S E C R E T CRUISING RANGE 500 KM (EST) ENGINE 900-HP DIESEL FIRE CONTROL LASER RANGE FINDER AND BALLISTIC COMPUTER ARMAMENT 105-MM MAIN GUN (60-100 ROUNDS) TWO X 7.62-MM MACHINEGUNS (1 COAXIAL, 1 TURRET) ARMOR PROTECTION SPACED ARMOR, BOTH HULL AND TURRET ) PREPARED BY: MAJ J. HOBRLE, USA, JSI-5 (REVW 31 OCT 85) JT 1437

Biographic Report Yitzbak RABIN Prime Minister of Israel Confidential BR-74-30 June 1974

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 004050 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: § 5B(1), (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on: Date Impossible to Determine

The New Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL ISRAEL Prime Minister On 22 April 1974 the Israel Labor Party (ILP) nominated Yitzhak Rabin (pronounced rahBEEN) to succeed Golda Meir as Prime Minister. He was charged with forming a government to replace the one he had joined as Minister of Labor the previous month. Unable to come to terms with a former coalition partner, the National Religious Party, Rabin formed a Cabinet consisting of members of the Labor Alignment (the ILP and MAPAM—the United Workers' Party), the Independent Liberal Party and the Citizen's Rights Movement (CRM). The new coalition gives the government 61 of the 120 votes in the Knesset, which approved the Cabinet on 3 June. Decidedly more "dovish" than many members of his own ILP, Rabin, by including the leftist CRM in the coalition, has offended a number of colleagues, including former Prime Minister Meir. Because he was Army Chief of Staff during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Rabin is a popular public figure, but his political strength comes from his relations with key members of the ruling elite rather than from any organizational power base. The endorsement of Pinchas Sapir, the powerful former Minister of Finance, was crucial to his election. After returning from a 5-year tour as Ambassador to the United States in early 1973, Rabin worked on the 1973 Labor Alignment election campaign. He was first elected to the Knesset on 31 December 1973 as a member of MAPAI (Israel Workers' Party), the ILP's largest faction. Because he had not been involved in the pre-October government, Rabin could not be accused of sharing any responsibility for its shortcomings in the conduct of the October 1973 war. During the war itself Rabin headed Israel's voluntary war loan drive. In selecting Rabin as its head, the ILP Central Committee chose not to be influenced by charges that he had collapsed in a state of acute anxiety on the eve of the 1967 war. The allegations, contained in a memorandum released by his former Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Ezer Weizman, just

CONFIDENTIAL before the Central Committee vote, produced a strong negative reaction—Rabin's defenders included leaders of the conservative opposition Likud (Unity) bloc. This account of Rabin's breakdown had been public knowledge for some years, and Rabin readily admits that he asked Weizman to take charge for 24 hours but claims it was only because he was fatigued and needed rest. Rabin was also accused of accepting fees for personal appearances while he was Ambassador to the United States. In acknowledging this, Rabin stated that the practice was entirely legal and that he had made speeches to explain Israeli policy or for fund-raising purposes without charge. "The Sons of the Founding Generation..." Rabin represents a marked break with the past generation of Israeli leaders and personifies many changes the public has been clamoring for. He is the first sabra (Israeli-born) Prime Minister, and at 52 he is the youngest. The election process itself was hailed in Israel as a watershed in ILP politics—for the first time the party machinery did not predetermine the outcome; Rabin and his RAFI (Israel Workers' List) opponent, then Information Minister Shimon Peres, ran on a personal basis without reference to their factional affiliation within the ILP; and voting was by secret ballot. In accepting the nomination Rabin said, "The sons of the founding generation have come of age, and with them, the immigrants who came since national independence... a generation that pursues continuity but has its own uniqueness." The businesslike ex-general also admitted that he had, characteristically, prepared two speeches, "just in case." Outgoing Prime Minister Golda Meir toasts her successor, Yitzhak Rabin

CONFIDENTIAL Military Hawk/Political Dove Israel's security is more important to Rabin than an actual peace document because he considers security the key to attaining "unconditional recognition" from the Arabs. In his view, Israel has been fighting for recognition as an independent state, not for territory. The new Prime Minister has been characterized as a "military hawk and a political dove"—committed to seeking a negotiated peace but prepared to use force to protect Israel's security. He believes that negotiations with the Arab states will take time and thinks that Israel will have to remain in a state of constant alert for any military exigencies. Pragmatic and less doctrinaire than previous Israeli leaders, Rabin feels that the government must take a chance for peace and show flexibility. Rabin has little regard for the usefulness of international organizations in peace negotiations. In July 1971 he called the United Nations a “place of demagogy” and accused it of having played a negative role with regard to Israel for 15 years. Before the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973, Rabin was inclined to believe that Israel could give up most of the occupied territories, retaining only Sharm al-Shaykh and strategic parts of the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Since the war he has publicly advocated partitioning the Sina'i and the Golan Heights into three zones—one under Israeli sovereignty, one with Israeli military presence and one demilitarized but under Arab control. Rabin favors the return of populated Arab areas of the West Bank to Jordan and the rehabilitation and relocation of refugees, believing that these actions would eventually lead to the "Palestinianization" of Jordan. At the same time, he believes that Israeli civilian settlements on the West Bank are an integral part of Israel. During a March 1974 interview with a British reporter, Rabin said that Israel could not accept a separate Palestinian state. Later, during an off-the-record conversation with the same correspondent, Rabin said he felt that history was moving in the direction of a separate state and Israel might have to move with it. Rabin would like to reach a further settlement with Egypt before beginning any negotiations with Jordan. The General as Ambassador Rabin's only diplomatic assignment, that of Ambassador to the United States, was marked by an unprecedented improvement in Israeli-US relations and a corresponding deterioration in his personal relations with the Foreign Minister Abba Eban and the Ministry's hierarchy. In his blunt, unadorned style, Rabin went after his primary objectives in the United States: armaments and economic support for Israel and assurances that the United

CONFIDENTIAL States would remain a deterrent to the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean. Rabin felt that an Ambassador should help formulate policy, not just implement instructions. He was critical of the Ministry's ceremonial trappings. He often bypassed Eban on important matters to deal directly with the Prime Minister, who credited him with a profound understanding of American politics and a good grasp of Israeli-US relations. In June 1972 Rabin referred to US Presidential candidates in terms that left no doubt that he thought Richard Nixon would be the best President as far as Israel was concerned. Eban felt that Israel should stay out of US politics. Rabin also alienated some members of the American Jewish establishment by refusing to use them as middlemen in dealing with the US Government. One US official said that Rabin could “appear to be an S.O.B. at times,” but that he was an effective one. A highly placed US official credits Rabin with having been “formidable in diplomatic give-and-take, a master of the facts, brilliant in analysis, articulate in presentation and cogent in debate.” "Exodus" Hero Yitzhak Rabin was born on 1 March 1922 in Jerusalem. He wanted to become a farmer, so he entered Kadoorie College, an agricultural boarding school. Upon his graduation in 1940 Rabin was awarded a scholarship prize from the British High Commissioner of Palestine. Later that year Yigal Alon, a commander of Palmach (shock troops of Haganah, the Jewish underground), recruited him to join that organization. During World War II Rabin fought for the British and saw action in the Vichy French areas of Syria and Lebanon. In 1946, once more with Palmach, he was imprisoned for 6 months by the British on charges of smuggling refugees into Palestine. His exploits, during 1946-48, including raids to liberate detainees who had immigrated illegally, inspired many of the episodes in which Leon Uris later cast the fictional character Ari Ben-Canaan in his novel Exodus. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Rabin commanded the brigade that secured the road to Jerusalem. He was also executive staff officer to Alon, then head of Palmach. At one point during the war in the Negev, Rabin and the late Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, then an army officer, met, discussed the military situation and shared a bowl of fruit. After the ceasefire, Rabin was a delegate to the Arab-Israeli armistice talks in 1949 on the island of Rhodes. That occasion was supposedly the first time he wore a necktie. The youngest colonel in the new Israeli Army, Rabin was put in charge of the battalion commanders training school; he also acted as head of operations on the General Staff. After attending the Staff College at Camberley,

CONFIDENTIAL England, during 1952-53, Rabin was appointed head of military training. He served as commander of the Northern Command from 1956 until 1959, when he became chief of operations of the General Staff. He spent 2 months at a modern weapons familiarization course in Texas in 1960 before returning to Israel to be named Deputy Chief of Staff. In 1964 Rabin was promoted to Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). A brilliant military tactician, he presided over the modernization of the IDF and prepared the basic strategy that was successfully used in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. A man who seldom shows emotion, Rabin was deeply affected by his responsibilities in 1967. The strain from the demands made upon him in the tense days prior to the war began to tell on the Chief of Staff; he slept little and smoked continuously. On 23 May Rabin was no longer able to carry out his duties—whether from the mental breakdown claimed by Weizman, the nicotine poisoning reported by his staff, the extreme fatigue he himself admits to, or a combination of all three—and he asked his deputy Rabin (r), with Generals Narkis and Dayan, entering the old city in Jerusalem, June 1967 to take charge. By the evening of the next day, however, Rabin had resumed command, and the ultimate credit for Israel's victory in the June 1967 war is given to the military forces built and led by him. Strong Beliefand Extreme Caution The Prime Minister's personality has been described as a combination of strong belief and extreme caution. He has a reputation for being introspective, for seeing a problem in the round and for having a tendency to worry, but for acting resolutely once he makes a decision. A stickler for detail and a perfectionist with an encyclopedic memory, Rabin insists that things be done his way when he is convinced he is right, and he personally sees to it that they are. At the same time, he refrains from even commenting on matters with which he is not familiar. In his new post, Rabin, who favors the telephone to correspondence, usually arrives at his office about 7:00 a.m. and works straight through until 11:00 p.m. An introvert, Rabin is uncomfortable in crowds. He is reserved at social gatherings and does not engage in small talk, although in the company of close friends he is the center of attention, talkative and sociable. When his children were born, Rabin reportedly waited outside the hospital all night.

being too shy to enter. He dislikes formality, and open-necked shirts and apple-eating became the symbols of his tenure as Chief of Staff. Rabin abhors offcolor jokes and does not drink alcoholic beverages. Formerly a chain-smoker, he has attempted to curtail the habit. He is an accomplished amateur photographer, and he enjoys action movies but seldom has time to attend them. Immediately after the 1967 war Rabin was awarded an honorary doctorate by Hebrew University. He has also received four honorary degrees from US schools. He likes to swim and play tennis. Rabin speaks fluent English except when he is nervous. A Fighting Family Rabin's parents were born in Russia. His father, Nehemia, spent 15 years in the United States before volunteering for service with the Jewish Legion in Palestine during World War I. There he met and married Rosa Cohen, the daughter of a wealthy timber merchant. Both were active in the Jewish labor movement and Haganah; Rosa was a commander in the latter organization. Known as "nurse Rosa," she encouraged Jewish resistance during the Arab riots of 1920 and smuggled arms to Jewish self-defense units. She was also one of the founders of a cooperative banking system. Yitzhak and his sister were often left to their own devices, almost to the point of neglect, but Yitzhak nevertheless adored his mother. She died when he was 17. Nehemia, Rabin lived with his daughter Rachel in Kibbutz Manara until his death in 1971. The Prime Minister's wife, the former Leah Schlossberg, was also active in Palmach, which she joined after graduating from high school in 1947. She Vitzchak and Leah Rabin at home

was born in Germany and emigrated to Palestine with her family in 1933. An active extrovert, Mrs. Rabin claims it has never occurred to her to be afraid for herself. During her husband's tour as Ambassador to the United States, she would not curtail Embassy activities for fear of possible incidents because, she said, to give terrorists the satisfaction of stopping things would be "too much." A delightfully frank person, Mrs. Rabin has traveled throughout the United States seeking support for the United Jewish Appeal and Israeli bonds. She insists on writing her own speeches. Mrs. Rabin, who likes to play tennis, says the only benefit left from her rigorous Palmach training is that it helps her breathing on the court. Mrs. Rabin speaks fluent German, French and English. The Rabins are a close family. There are two children — a daughter, Dahlia, in her mid-20's, and a son, Yuval, 19. Dahlia, married to an IDF officer, is expecting her first child. Yuval had just entered military service prior to October 1973 and was said to be very disappointed at being given guard duty instead of a frontline post. Mrs. Rabin's sister, Aviva, is married to Brig. Gen. (Res.) Avraham Yoffe. Yoffe, who has been director of the Nature Reserves Authority since 1964, was elected to the Knesset in December 1973 as a member of the Likud bloc.

Documents From The U.S. Espionage on (12) FORM ECREET THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTISCAL RESULT IN SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE UNITED STATES 1. Exercise the necessary for the to prevent unauthorized disclosure by never leaving the documents unattended except when properly secured in a locked safe. 3. Obtain help whenever requiring control of the document(s). STORAGE STORER prescribed in A338-5. ACTION 1. SECRET material originating in an agency outside the Department of Defense will not be reproduced; copied, or extracted without the consent of the originating agency 3. Reproduction of Joint Chiefs of Staff papers is not authorized. DISPOSITION This cover sheet should be removed when document(s) are filed in a permanent file, declassified, destroyed, or mailed. E [?] M om Stu dener Following the Imam

COUNTRY POLICY SUMMARY ANDPROGRAM ANALYSIS. IRAN (Extract) I. BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 1. To maintain the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of Iran. This requires: a. The will of Iran to reamin independent and to defend itself. b. The ability to discourage limited Soviet attacks on Iranian territory and, in the case of outright Soviet or Soviet- supported aggression, to delay it until Iran's allies can react. c. Enhancement of internal loyalties, especially in areas of Iran which might become subject to foreign-inspired insurgency. d. Ability to control such insurgency if it occurs e. The ability to discourage and, if necessary, to resist alone an attack by a neighboring country unsupported by the USSR. 2. \underline{\text{To maintain the cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Iran, particularly in military matters.}} This requires: a. Continued Iranian understanding of the mutuality of Iranian interests and those of the Free World. b. A mutually beneficial military relationship between Iran and the U.S. c. A favorable U.S. image as effective guarantor of Iranian security and as a friendly power interested in Iranian independence and progress. d. Specifically, such an image not only with the present governing elite but also with the likely successors to that elite. e. Demonstration of our devotion to the objective of making Iran progressively less dependent on foreign assistance.

3. \underline{\text{To assure stability, with its necessary concomitant of orderly evolutionary change}} . This requires: a. Maintenance of the Shah's position as a fulcrum of power and as a symbol of national unity. b. A sound balance between military programs on the one hand and economic and social programs on the other. d. A sense of dynamism, a spirit of reform, and an expectation of social justice. c. Economic growth that substantially exceeds population growth and visibly benefits the Iranian people or holds out the prospect of tangible benefits in the foreseeable future. e. Capability to control internal disorders, and maintenance of internal security by means that are not arbitrarily repressive. f. Increasing national consensus by giving especially urban Iranians an increasing sense of "government by the consent of the governed." g. Increasing skills in operating a modern economy and an effective government. 4. \underline{\text{To assure continued availability of Iranian oil to our European allies}} . This requires: Maintenance of the existing climate of cooperation between Iran and Western oil companies. SECRET/NOFORN NATIONAL POLICY PAPER (Excerpt) C U S O b j e c t i v e s United States objectives in Iran are pursued within the framework of our particular relationship with the monarchy of that country. The Iranian monarchy provides the stability not yet available through popular institutions or long popular experience in organized political affairs. It is, at present, the sole element in the country that can provide continuity for public policy. While there are areas of divergence between us and the Shah, they have remained thus far more matters of emphasis than of essence, not particularly significant within the broad consensus we share with him on most of the really fundamental issues of foreign and domestic policy. While the United States is not necessarily committed to the support of any particular form of Government in Iran, the Shah at present affords the best means for the safeguarding of our basic security interests in Iran and is the only personality on the scene who can lead the anarchically-bent Persians. Thus, until another potentially viable power source appears, which we do not expect during the next two to five years, support for the Shah and his reformist programs will form the basic condition of our pursuit of the following objectives: 1. An independent and increasingly self-reliant Iran, free from any foreign domination or aggression, and motivated to cooperate with the West in: a. Taking such measures as lie within Iranian power to frustrate Soviet clandestine activities within Iran and Soviet expansion toward Suez and the Persian Gulf; b. Providing access to Iranian soil for Western forces in the event of conflict, including retention of over-flight privileges; c. Stimulating developing relations with neighboring countries so that there evolves in the course of time a more friendly relationship between Iran and its non-communist neighbors to promote greater stability and cooperation in the Middle East, particularly Persian Gulf, area. 2. Evolution of a new but still mutually rewarding relationship between the United States and Iran, in a climate of increasing Iranian public understanding that the United States role is that of assisting Iran in its national development rather than of directing its course. 3. An effective Iranian Government which, through the increase of strength and the improvement of administrative efficiency, will command the respect and support of broader segments of the population, especially among intellectuals -- teachers, university students, professional men, etc. -- and provincial leaders.

SECRET/NOFORN -2- 4. A sound, well managed economy which properly balances military and development expenditures so that the already large and rapidly growing wealth of the country can be used for orderly, self-sustaining economic growth and steady improvement of the standard of living. 5. The development and strengthening of political, social and economic institutions which will provide the means for orderly and peaceful transfer of power, as necessary, and in the longer term facilitate increased parti- cipation of ever-widening sectors of society in their own government. 6. Continued access for the West to Iranian resources, principally petroleum, on acceptable terms. 7. Continued United States access to expanding Iranian markets. SECRET/NOFORN -4- An Embassy TEHRAN ACTION: AMB 32 NOC (TELEGRAM) CONMUL NO. 14687 (9.10.77) INFO: R 122350Z DEC 77 FM SECSTATE 143777 AMB TO AMEMBASSY TE 1225 DCM 1 BT SA SECRET STATE C95436. POL 2 FOR THE [illegible] ECON 4 PM 1 E.O. 11652: GDS USIS 1 TAGS: IR CONS 1 OR 2 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN ADM 1. THIS TELEGRAM TRANSMITS A STATEMENT OF US FOREIGN GSO POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN. A SEPARATE MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE EXPLANATORY INFORMATION ON THE PURPOSE, BF IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF THESE STATEMENTS. PER RSO 2. BEGIN TEXT. I. A SUSTAINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC MSG RELATIONSHIP BUILT UPON TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. TSO -- DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND SCRO CONFIDENCE WITH THE SHAH. CKO -- ASSESS THE RANGE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE IMPORTANT CEO SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY AND INITIATE STEPS, IF MP NECESSARY, TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS, ALSO TAKING INTO DAO 1 ACCOUNT THE POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY THE NEW MAAG 2 POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN IRAN. AGR -- WORK AS CLOSELY WITH PRIME MINISTER AMOUZEGAR AND DEA HIS CABINET AS THEY WILL PERMIT ;O ASSIST AND ADVISE IRS THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO CORRECT THE MOST SERIOUS IM- BALANCES WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE LAST THREE YEARS. TCTR FAA II. AN ENHANCED US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN NON-MILITARY FIELDS. TU CRU 1 -- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF A RELIABLE PETROLEUM SUPPLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES AND THE ADOPTION OF A MODERATE PRICING POLICY. EXPLAIN U.S. SHIR 1 ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND THE NEED OF THE WORLD TABR 1 ECONOMY FOR OIL AT BEARABLE PRICES. ISFA 2 -- FACILITATE AN INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES' SHARE OF THE MARKET IN IRAN AND BE PREPARED TO USE THE WEIGHT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE IN SUPPORT, AT A MINIMUM, OF NON- DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY AMERICAN FIRMS TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAN. -- ASSESS HOW WE CAN MAKE THE U.S.-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION MORE EFFECTIVE, INCLUDING HOW TO INVOLVE THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR MORE FULLY. -5-

SECRET/NOFORN -2- 4. A sound, well managed economy which properly balances military and development expenditures so that the already large and rapidly growing wealth of the country can be used for orderly, self-sustaining economic growth and steady improvement of the standard of living. 5. The development and strengthening of political, social and economic institutions which will provide the means for orderly and peaceful transfer of power, as necessary, and in the longer term facilitate increased parti- cipation of ever-widening sectors of society in their own government. 6. Continued access for the West to Iranian resources, principally petroleum, on acceptable terms. 7. Continued United States access to expanding Iranian markets. SECRET/NOFORN -4- An Embassy TEHRAN ACTION: AMB 32 NOC (TELEGRAM) CONMUL NO. 14687 (9.1.78) INFO: R 122350Z DEC 77 FM SECSTATE 14377 AMB TO AMEMBASSY TE 1225 DCM 1 BT SA SECRET STATE C95436. POL 2 FOR THE [illegible] ECON 4 PM 1 E.O. 11652: GDS USIS 1 TAGS: IR CONS 1 OR 2 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN ADM 1. THIS TELEGRAM TRANSMITS A STATEMENT OF US FOREIGN GSO POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN. A SEPARATE MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE EXPLANATORY INFORMATION ON THE PURPOSE, BF IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF THESE STATEMENTS. PER RSO 2. BEGIN TEXT. I. A SUSTAINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC MSG RELATIONSHIP BUILT UPON TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. TSO -- DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND SCRO CONFIDENCE WITH THE SHAH. CKO -- ASSESS THE RANGE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE IMPORTANT CEO SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY AND INITIATE STEPS, IF MP NECESSARY, TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS, ALSO TAKING INTO DAO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY THE NEW MAAG 2 POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN IRAN. AGR -- WORK AS CLOSELY WITH PRIME MINISTER AMOUZEGAR AND DEA HIS CABINET AS THEY WILL PERMIT ;O ASSIST AND ADVISE IRS THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO CORRECT THE MOST SERIOUS IM- BALANCES WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE LAST THREE YEARS. TCTR FAA II. AN ENHANCED US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN NON-MILITARY FIELDS. TU CRU 1 -- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF A RELIABLE PETROLEUM SUPPLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES AND THE ADOPTION OF A MODERATE PRICING POLICY. EXPLAIN U.S. SHIR 1 ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND THE NEED OF THE WORLD TABR 1 ECONOMY FOR OIL AT BEARABLE PRICES. ISFA 2 -- FACILITATE AN INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES' SHARE OF THE MARKET IN IRAN AND BE PREPARED TO USE THE WEIGHT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE IN SUPPORT, AT A MINIMUM, OF NON- DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY AMERICAN FIRMS TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAN. -- ASSESS HOW WE CAN MAKE THE U.S.-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION MORE EFFECTIVE, INCLUDING HOW TO INVOLVE THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR MORE FULLY. -5-

Sogiri 2-14687 -- WORK CLOSELY WITH THE SWIN AND DR. ETEMAD OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN TO FIED WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN GET THE PRESIDENT'S NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND REACH A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH IRAN. -- MAINTAIN U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING PRIVILEGES IN IRAN. -- SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE GOI MORE FULLY IN THE NARCOTICS PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTAN. IMPROVE PROCEDURE'S RELATED TO THE HEAVY DEMAND FOR U.S. COLLEGE EDUCATION BY IRANIAN STUDENTS AND COOPERATE AS APPROPRIATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN'S UNIVERSITY SYSTEM. -- CONTINUE TO PRESS IRAN FOR FULL PAYMENT OF THE DELINQUENT SURPLUS PROPERTY DEBT. III. ; CAREFULLY COORDINATED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING GOING THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM. -- CAREFULLY SUPERVISE EXISTING AND ANTICIPATED FOREIGN MILITARY SALE CASES. -- OPEN A CAREFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE SHAH ON HIS MILITARY NEEDS WITH THE AIM OF AVERTING UNESSENTIAL MILITARY SALES REQUESTS. - CLOSELY MONITOR ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF U.S. ARMS MANUFACTURERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE OBSERVING THE NEW REGULATIONS ON SALES PROMOTION AND SEEK WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF U.S. DEFENSE-RELATED CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAN TO THEIR ESSMVTIAL NUMBERS. MONITOR OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE IRANIAN DEFENSE NEEDS ARE MET WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT ARMS TRANSFER GUIDELINES. -- MAINTAIN U.S. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO IRANIAN PARIS FOR NAVAL SHIPS. IV. MAINTENANCE OF IRAN'S BALANCED POSTURE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS. -- ENCOURAGE IRAN'S BALANCED APPROACH TO ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS AND ITS SUPPORT FOR62 OUR MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. -- ENCOURAGE THE MAINTENANCE OF A POSITIVE IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, INCLUDING AN OIL SUPPLY LINK. SUBCRAT -- MAINTAIN IRAN'S OPPOSITION TO PAKISTAN REPROCESSING. - SUPPORT SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN COOPERATION CONCERNING PERSIAN GULF SECURITY AND KEEP INFORMED, ALONG WITH IRAN, ON RELEVANT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS AMONG IRAN'S NEIGHBORS. - ENCOURAGE IRAN TO SUPPORT OUR PRINCIPAL INITIATIVES IN AFRICA. V. IMPROVEMENT IN IRAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. -- REVIEW WITH THE SHAH AND OTHERS, ON APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS, UNITED STATES HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES. ENCOURAGE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN IRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, BY NOTING FAVORABLE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND BY EXPLAINING THE REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAN'S UNFAVORABLE HUMAN RIGHTS IMAGE. END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

TELEGRAM 11269 INDICATE □ COLLECT □ CHARGE TO 210819Z DEC 77 FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11269 E.O. 11652: N.A. TAGS: OREP (WOLFF, LESTER) SUBJECT: CODEL WOLFF TEHRAN SCHEDULE REF: (A) STATE 302205; (B) TEHRAN 11074; (C) TEHRAN 10732 1. PRIME MINISTER HAS OFFERED TO HOST WORKING LUNCH FOR CODEL WOLFF TO BRIEF CODEL ON ITS INTERESTS. CONGRESSMEN PLUS SENIOR STAFF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE INCLUDED. EMBASSY WOULD PROVIDE 'IN-HOUSE BRIEFING (REF C) EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER LUNCH, DEPENDING ON TIMING. WIVES AND REMAINING STAFF WOULD BE PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO TOUR CITY BY BUS AND VISIT SHAHYAD MONUMENT, PER REF (C). ALTERNATIVELY, IF CODEL DESIRES, PRIME MINISTER PREPARED TO BRIEF ENTIRE GROUP WITHOUT LUNCH. 2. AMBASSADOR STRONGLY ADVISES CODEL TO ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION. AMOUZEGAR IS AN ASTUTE, ARTICULATE, DYNAMIC INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GOI SINCE LATE FIFTIES, PARTICULARLY IN RECENT YEARS AS IRAN'S OPEC DELEGATE. WHILE MINISTER OF INTERIOR FROM 1974-76, HE WAS ALSO KEY FIGURE IN GETTING IRANIAN NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM GOING. 3. FAILURE OF CODEL TO ACCEPT AT LEAST BRIEFING BY PRIME MINISTER AFTER COURT MINISTRY (SHAH) ASKED HIM TO UNDERTAKE TASK WOULD BE POORLY UNDERSTOOD AND MIGHT LEAVE NEGATIVE IMPRESSION WHICH EMBASSY, AND WE CONFIDENT CODEL, WOULD WISH TO AVOID. 4. PLEASE ADVISE. MIKLOS DRAFTED BY: POL: JDStempel:nbt DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. 12/21/77 1112 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: CHARGE: JACK C. MIKLOS CLEARANCES: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CLASSIFICATION -8- OPTIONAL FORM 15 (Formerly FS-41 January Dept. of LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification -9- OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H) (Formerly FS-413(H)a) January 1975 Dept. of State 50152 101

TELEGRAM 11269 INDICATE □ COLLECT □ CHARGE TO 210819Z DEC 77 FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11269 E.O. 11652: N.A. TAGS: OREP (WOLFF, LESTER) SUBJECT: CODEL WOLFF TEHRAN SCHEDULE REF: (A) STATE 302205; (B) TEHRAN 11074; (C) TEHRAN 10732 1. PRIME MINISTER HAS OFFERED TO HOST WORKING LUNCH FOR CODEL WOLFF TO BRIEF CODEL ON ITS INTERESTS. CONGRESSMEN PLUS SENIOR STAFF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE INCLUDED. EMBASSY WOULD PROVIDE 'IN-HOUSE BRIEFING (REF C) EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER LUNCH, DEPENDING ON TIMING. WIVES AND REMAINING STAFF WOULD BE PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO TOUR CITY BY BUS AND VISIT SHAHYAD MONUMENT, PER REF (C). ALTERNATIVELY, IF CODEL DESIRES, PRIME MINISTER PREPARED TO BRIEF ENTIRE GROUP WITHOUT LUNCH. 2. AMBASSADOR STRONGLY ADVISES CODEL TO ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION. AMOUZEGAR IS AN ASTUTE, ARTICULATE, DYNAMIC INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN POL3 AMB DCM SA ADMIN RSO CRU 9sa DRAFTED BY: POL:JDSt[illegible]pel:nbt DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. 12/21/77 1112 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: CHARGE: JACK C. MIKLOS CLEARANCES: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CLASSIFICATION -8- OPTIONAL FORM 15 (Formerly FS-41 January Dept. of LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification Page 2 of TEHRAN MRN GOI SINCE LATE FIFTIES, PARTICULARLY IN RECENT YEARS AS IRAN'S OPEC DELEGATE. WHILE MINISTER OF INTERIOR FROM 1974-76, HE WAS ALSO KEY FIGURE IN GETTING IRANIAN NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM GOING. 3. FAILURE OF CODEL TO ACCEPT AT LEAST BRIEFING BY PRIME MINISTER AFTER COURT MINISTRY (SHAH) ASKED HIM TO UNDERTAKE TASK WOULD BE POORLY UNDERSTOOD AND MIGHT LEAVE NEGATIVE IMPRESSION WHICH EMBASSY, AND WE CONFIDENT CODEL, WOULD WISH TO AVOID. 4. PLEASE ADVISE. MIKLOS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification -9- OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H) (Formerly FS-413(H)a) January 1975 Dept. of State

TELEGRAM 072 JUN 11 11:07 INDICATE [] COLLECT [] CHARGE TO FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION SECRET E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: DCM2 AmB 2 POL 2 ECON2 PM USIS CONS OR2 DAO MAAG2 CRU1 POUCH SHIR TABR ISFA2 20/reh ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC SECRET TEHRAN 00367 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, IR SUBJ: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN (A) REF: /77 STATE 291277; (B) 77 STATE 295486 1. WE NOTE WITH APPRECIATION DEPARTMENT'S RECOGNITION THAT AS STATEMENTS OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED/WITH FIXED OR IMMUTABLE. WE HAVE EXAMINED WITH CARE THOSE SET FORTH IN REFTel B. IN LARGE MEASURE WE BELIEVE THEY ARE REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE AND ADDRESS OUR CENTRAL CONCERNS AND INTERESTS IN IRAN. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MODIFIED AND EXTENDED THIS STATEMENT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SLIGHTLY ALTERED PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT OUR CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OUGHT TO BE. THERE FOLLOWS A FULL RESTATEMENT IN THE FORMAT USED IN REPTEL B. 2. BEGIN TEXT. I. A SUSTAINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BUILT UPON TRUST, CONFIDENCE, AND MUTUAL RESPECT. DRAFTED BY: DCM:JCMIKLOS/sw DRAFTING DATE 1/10/76 TEL. EXT. 1102 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:JCMiklos/sw CLEARANCES: SECRET CLASSIFICATION -10- -- MAINTAIN AND REINFORCE THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SHAH. -- ASSESS THE RANGE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY AND INITIATE STEPS TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH THOSE FORCES AND GROUPS WHICH ARE EVOLVING INTO IMPORTANT CENTERS OF INFLUENCE AS IRAN MODERNIZES. THIS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY RECENT EASING OF SOME GOVERNMENT STRICTURES ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY, RECOGNIZING THAT SOME RISKS MAY BE INVOLVED IN CERTAIN CASES REQUIRING THAT WE PROCEED SELECTIVELY AND PRUDENTLY. -- ENCOURAGE PRIMIN AMOUZEGAR AND HIS CABINET TO REFLECT ON IRAN'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GOALS AND TO PLAN A SPECIFIC AND INTEGRATED PROGRAM OF INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC MOMENTUM AS OIL REVENUES INEVITABLY DIMINISH. IN THIS RESPECT ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT IRANIAN INITIATIVES TO SEEK OUTSIDE EXPERT ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE FROM THE IBRD AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SOURCES. -- ENGAGE FULL RANGE OF USIS CAPABILITIES IN KEEPING IRANIAN DECISIONMAKERS AND OPINION MOLDERS INFORMED OF US POLICIES AND ATTITUDES AFFECTING IRANIAN INTERESTS AND IRANIAN-US RELATIONS. II. AN ENHANCED US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN NON-MILITARY FIELDS. SECRET Classification -11- OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H) (Formerly FS-413(H)a) January 1975 Dept. of State

TELEGRAM 072 JUN 11 11:07 INDICATE [] COLLECT [] CHARGE TO FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION SECRET E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: DCM2 AmB 2 POL 2 ECON2 PM USIS CONS OR2 DAO MAAG2 CRU1 POUCH SHIR TABR ISFA2 20/reh ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC SECRET TEHRAN 00367 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, IR SUBJ: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN (A) REF: /77 STATE 291277; (B) 77 STATE 295486 1. WE NOTE WITH APPRECIATION DEPARTMENT'S RECOGNITION THAT AS STATEMENTS OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED/WITH FIXED OR IMMUTABLE. WE HAVE EXAMINED WITH CARE THOSE SET FORTH IN REFTel B. IN LARGE MEASURE WE BELIEVE THEY ARE REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE AND ADDRESS OUR CENTRAL CONCERNS AND INTERESTS IN IRAN. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MODIFIED AND EXTENDED THIS STATEMENT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SLIGHTLY ALTERED PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT OUR CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OUGHT TO BE. THERE FOLLOWS A FULL RESTATEMENT IN THE FORMAT USED IN REPTel B. 2. BEGIN TEXT. I. A SUSTAINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BUILT UPON TRUST, CONFIDENCE, AND MUTUAL RESPECT. DRAFTED BY: DCM:JCMIKLOS/sw DRAFTING DATE 1/10/76 TEL. EXT. 1102 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:JCMiklos/sw CLEARANCES: SECRET CLASSIFICATION -10- SECRET Classification Page 2 of 2 M&N -- MAINTAIN AND REINFORCE THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SHAH. -- ASSESS THE RANGE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY AND INITIATE STEPS TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH THOSE FORCES AND GROUPS WHICH ARE EVOLVING INTO IMPORTANT CENTERS OF INFLUENCE AS IRAN MODERNIZES. THIS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY RECENT EASING OF SOME GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY, RECOGNIZING THAT SOME RISKS MAY BE INVOLVED IN CERTAIN CASES REQUIRING THAT WE PROCEED SELECTIVELY AND PRUDENTLY. -- ENCOURAGE PRIMIN AMOUZEGAR AND HIS CABINET TO REFLECT ON IRAN'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GOALS AND TO PLAN A SPECIFIC AND INTEGRATED PROGRAM OF INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC MOMENTUM AS OIL REVENUES INEVITABLY DIMINISH. IN THIS RESPECT ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT IRANIAN INITIATIVES TO SEEK OUTSIDE EXPERT ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE FROM THE IBRD AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SOURCES. -- ENGAGE FULL RANGE OF USIS CAPABILITIES IN KEEPING IRANIAN DECISIONMAKERS AND OPINION MOLDERS INFORMED OF US POLICIES AND ATTITUDES AFFECTING IRANIAN INTERESTS AND IRANIAN-US RELATIONS. II. AN ENHANCED US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN NON-MILITARY FIELDS. SECRET Classification -11- OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H) (Formerly FS-413(H)a) January 1975 Dept. of State

-- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF A RELIABLE PETROLEUM SUPPLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES AND THE ADOPTION OF A MODERATE PRICING POLICY. EXPLAIN U.S. ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND THE NEED OF THE WORLD ECONOMY FOR OIL AT BEARABLE PRICES. -- FACILITATE AN INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES' SHARE OF THE MARKET IN IRAN AND BE PREPARED TO USE THE WEIGHT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE IN SUPPORT, AT A MINIMUM, OF NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY AMERICAN FIRMS TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAN. -- ASSESS HOW WE CAN MAKE THE US-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION MORE EFFECTIVE, INCLUDING HOW TO INVOLVE THE US PRIVATE SECTOR MORE FULLY. --- PURSUE WITH DR. ETEMAD AND HIS ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATES FORMULATION OF FINAL TEXT OF US-IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS PRESIDENT'S NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. -- MAINTAIN US INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING PRIVILEGES IN IRAN AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE QUID PRO QUO LIAISON SUPPORT IN RESPONSE TO THESE PRIVILEGES. CAREFULLY WEIGH ANY PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL PRIVILEGES TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT ENDANGER EXISTING ASSETS. -- SEEK TO ENGAGE IRAN MORE FULLY IN REGIONAL NARCOTICS EFFORTS AIMED AT REDUCING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND REDUCING ILLICIT NARCOTICS SECRET Classification TRAFFIC INTO AND THROUGH IRAN. WORK WITH GOI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO IMPROVE PROCEDURES IN THE EVALUATION AND PROCESSING OF IRANIANS SEEKING AN EDUCATION IN THE US. -- EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IRANIAN STUDENTS PLANNING TO STUDY IN THE US TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE ORIENTATION, COUNSELING, AND ENGLISH INSTRUCTION PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE. -- CONTINUE TO PRESS IRAN FOR FULL PAYMENT OF THE DELINQUENT SURPLUS PROPERTY DEBT. III. CAREFULLY COORDINATED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM. -- MAINTAIN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE SHAH AND HIS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISORS ON HIS MILITARY NEEDS WITH THE AIM OF AVERTING NONESSENTIAL MILITARY SALES REQUESTS -- CAREFULLY SUPERVISE EXISTING AND ANTICIPATED FOREIGN MILITARY SALE CASES. -- CLOSELY MONITOR ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF US ARMS MANUFACTURERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE OBSERVING THE NEW REGULATIONS ON SALES PROMOTION AND SEEK WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF US DEFENSE-RELATED CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAN TO THEIR ESSENTIAL NUMBERS -- MONITOR OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE IRANIAN DEFENSE NEEDS ARE MET WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT ARMS TRANSFER GUIDELINES.

REEXAMINE US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE THAT IT IS, CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC LAW 95-92. ENCOURAGE GO TO ACCEPT INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED MILITARY MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND INTERNAL STAFFING TECHNIQUES WITH THE ULTIMATE DEPENDENCE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING ON US MILITARY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE. -- MAINTAIN US OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO IRANIAN PORTS FOR NAVAL SHIPS. IV. MAINTENANCE OF IRAN'S BALANCED POSTURE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS. -- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF IRAN'S BALANCED APPROACH TỦ ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS AND ITS SUPPORT FOR OUR MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. -- ENCOURAGE THE MAINTENANCE OF A POSITIVE IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, INCLUDING AN OIL SUPPLY LINK. -- MAINTAIN IRAN'S OPPOSITION TO PAKISTAN REPROCESSING. -- SUPPORT IRAN'S COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, AND OTHER ARABIAN PENINSULA STATES ON PERSIAN GULF RELEVANT SECURITY, KEEPING INFORMED ON/SEXING INFORMED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ AND IRAN'S OTHER REGIONAL NEIGHBORS. ENCOURAGE --/BRAKING A CONTINUATION OF RESPONSIBLE IRANIAN COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES. -- ENCOURAGE IRANIAN SUPPORT OF OUR PRINCIPLE POLICIES IN AFRICA. V. IMPROVEMENT IN IRAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. -- REVIEW WITH THE SHAH AND OTHER RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS, ON APPROPRIATE OCCASION, US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES, FOCUSING ON IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS (WHICH IS ATTAINABLE) AS OPPOSED TO PUSHING FOR CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (WHICH MAY SMACK OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE), NOTING THE IMPACT AN UNFAVORABLE IRANIAN PUBLIC IMAGE ON THIS ISSUE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE. SULLIVAN

RA/R FEP AIRGRAM FOR RM USE ONLY ARA EUR FE SECRET Tehran A-10 NEA CU INR NO HANDLING DIRECTION P IO TO Department of State FBD AID FROM Amembassy TEHRAN DATE: January 11, 1978 AGR COM FRB E.O. 11652: GDS INT LAB TAR SUBJECT: Ambassador's Goals and Objectives in Iran TAGS: AMGT, IR TR XMB AIR REF: (A) State 295486; (B) State 291277; (C) Tehran 0367 ANMY EIA NAVY [?] I welcome the opportunity to discuss in this airgram the approaches which I intend to follow in order to ensure that this Mission effectively pursues the goals and objectives which the United States Government seeks to achieve in Iran. In Ref (C), the Country Team and I have commented on the statement transmitted by Ref (A). We indicated that we considered that statement a reasonable and satisfactory program for our diplomacy. My first approach to this program has been organizational I have attempted to make the Country Team a more tightly-knit unit. To this end, I have instituted daily meetings of the Te and have particularly included the Chief of Armish-Maag in the daily sessions. Since he controls the largest element of the Mission (over 1300 U.S. military officers, enlisted men and U.S. civilian employees) and handles the most expensive program ($18 billion), I believe that this move has significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the Mission's organization. B2 Following patterns I have employed in the direction of other large Missions, I attempt to handle the largest possible volume of our activities in our daily meetings so that each element of the Country Team is aware of the actions and the problems of all other elements. I encourage the broadest possible sharing of information within the Country Team and the participation of all members, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Mission, in the formulation of all policy recommendations. OR 13sa SECRET FOR DEPT. USE ONLY FORM 4-62 1/11/78 Contents and Classifications Approved by: AMB Proceeding of the Department of the University of California, Berkeley, CA 98792. I. A Sustained Political/Economic Relationship Built Upon Trust and Confidence When the Carter Administration took office, the Shah and the Government of Iran were uncertain about its interests in this part of the world, its commitments to previous agreements, and its attitude towards the Shah as a ruler. As a result of the Shah's State Visit to Washington in November and President Carter's official visit to Tehran at the end of December, these uncertainties have been totally dissipated. In the area of this situation, I feel I have been able to develop a relationship of trust and confidence with the Shah. I regularly have long talks with him on a whole range of subjects and these discussions are marked by candor on both sides. To maintain this sort of relationship, I will need to be able to provide him authoritative information on matters of mutual interest, such as the Middle East, the SALT talks, the Indian Ocean discussions, etc. While the President has made clear that he wishes this sort of information passed to the Shah, the bureaucracy is sometimes reluctant to disgorge it in a timely fashion. I shall continue to press Washington on these matters. From time to time I shall also suggest the president to be a strong part of the relationship between the two parties. This will be on subjects which have been discussed between the two parties. This will be on subjects which have been discussed between the two parties. For example, the president of the country has been to take a strong position in the relationship with the other party. This will be on subjects which have been discussed between the two parties. For example, the president of the country has been to take a strong position in the relationship with the other party. Washington may generate on its own initiative. Given the high personalized structure of leadership in this country, such personal correspondence is an excellent vehicle of confidence. Due to the new liberalization in Iran, the Embassy has received letters and other contacts from different countries. We have responded to these and will seek cautiously to build up an expanded range of interlocutors in these groups which are outside the official "ring around the Embassy". On macro-economic problems, we have begun intensive discussions with the new, young, and technically competent ministers.

in the Amouzegar cabinet. I believe it would be useful for both the United States and Iran to have an objective international body such as the World Bank make an intensive study of Iran's economic future, looking towards the era when petroleum resources will no longer underpin Iran's development. While the Bank is willing, I have encountered Iranian resistance to the idea, but will continue to work at it. II. An Enhanced U.S.-Iranian Relationship in Non-Military Fields We believe we have had significant success in improving U.S.-Iranian relations in the field of energy, particularly petroleum. Iran took the lead in calling for an OPEC price freeze for 1978. Iran remains a reliable source for petroleum to the U.S. and our closest friends. This development came about partly because of the world oil supply situation, partly because of the Carter Administration's energy program, and partly because of some blunt talk to the Shah about the problems which Iran's price policies were causing our bilateral relations. I believe we can maintain Iran in the camp of moderation if we demonstrate convincingly that our energy program will cut back on petroleum imports and will seriously exploit other sources of energy. In the general economic sphere, we will continue to push energetically for a fair U.S. share of the market. This push will be aided by lower U.S. inflation and by the willingness of U.S. business, with U.S. Government support, to arrange parallel oil purchases to offset the dollar costs of U.S. contracts with Iran. One major American commercial sale to Iran over the next few years should be approximately 10 billion in nuclear power reactors, to result from early signature of a U.S.-Iran bilateral on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The President and the Shah announced agreement in principle on this matter December 31, and I hope to have the agreement actually signed on February 28 during the next meeting of the U.S.-Iran Joint Commission. That date could be affected if the Senate fails to pass controlling legislation by that time. This, plus other arrangements in the field of housing, agriculture, and civil aviation, should enable us to enhance the status of the Joint Commission, the Tehran element of which I have brought directly into my own office. Our intelligence collaboration with Iran remains well established and I believe will be enhanced by certain new Technical proposals we expect to make in the near future. Our cooperation with Iran in the narcotics program for Afghanistan will receive additional attention in 1978. The problem of Iranian students going to the United States. One which will be with us for many years. We have made significant progress in the last few months in the establishment of orientation programs and screening procedures worked out jointly with the Ministry of Education. We have also submitted number of proposals to Washington for improvements which we believe would materially assist in mastering this problem, especially in the administration of I-20 forms by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. On the question of obtaining full payment from Iran of the delinquent surplus property debt, I have encountered difficulties flowing from a tangled legal situation in which the Indians believe there should be offsetting payments i. consideration of damages sustained by their railroad. Progress is further complicated by the wartime British role in the matter and by the reluctance of both British and Iranian governments to supply us with pertinent documents. We will continue to work on this matter. III. Carefully Coordinated Military Relationship Including the Military Supply Program As a result of administrative changes resulting from the President's arms restraint policy, I have assumed a far more direct role than my predecessors over the provision of military equipment to Iran. In execution of this role, I have worked out with the Shah and his military officials a long-term projection of Iran's needs in the way of military equipment to be procured from the United States. Due to a number of factors, this projection is markedly more modest than earlier projections had suggested. This reduced program will be discussed with the Congress in the near future. I have also, in conformity with the President's policy, met with all U.S. defense contractors here to explain our new policies and to inform them of the requirements of our new regulations. IV. ^{*} $ intenance of Iran's Balanced Posture in Regional Affairs Most of my long discussions with the Shal in recent months have been on regional matters. I have also had numerous discussions on the same subjects with Foreign Minister Khalatbary

\underline{\text{SECRET}} Tehran A-10 Page 5 From these discussions I conclude that Iranian foreign policy is responsible and constructive, and that we can influence it to remain so. In the Arab-Israel dispute, in the Indian Ocean, nuclear non-proliferation, the Horn of Africa and the Southern Africa, Iran plays constructive roles. In order to continue our influence on these roles, I need to know at least as much as my Iranian interlocutors about the areas and events in question. For this reason, I welcome the various intelligence summaries I receive, especially the daily Middle East INTSUM. I would also welcome receiving policy papers from the NSC or S/P relating to these subjects as they are produced. V. Improvement in Iran's Human Rights Performance This is the most delicate aspect of our relations with Iran. I believe we have already made some progress on this subject in the last several months. This has been accomplished by touching the Iranians -- especially the Shah -- in their pride about their international image on the subject. The two conversations which the President has had with the Shah on this subject have also made a major contribution to progress. One of the more effective means I have found in dealing with this subject is to work through the intermediation of a private, non-governmental organization. A distinguished representative of that organization, who is responsive to my suggestions, makes proposals for the amelioration of human rights to Iranian authorities in his own name. Although he consults me on tactics, he assumes full responsibility for his suggestions. In this way, the Iranian can, and have been, able to improve their performance on human rights without the appearance of having been hectored into these improvements by a foreign, albeit friendly, government. TELEGRAM 1978 JAN 19 P1 12:59 INDICATE 007 FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC 7 INFO: AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 00719 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: OREP SUBJECT: CODEL WILLIAMS/STEVENS 1. SUMMARY. CODEL WILLIAMS/STEVENS HAD USEFUL THIRTY-SIX HOUR VISIT TO TEHRAN JANUARY 9-11. SENATORS HAD DINNER WITH THE SHAH JANUARY 10, WHICH WAS CLEARLY \text{(STIMULATING EXCHANGE WITH} HIGHLIGHT OF THEIR ALL TOOBRIEF VISIT. CODEL ALSO HAD PRIME MINISTER AMOUZEGAR, AND USEFUL EXPOSURE TO IRAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION EFFORT AT LUNCH WITH GENERAL TOUFANIAN. END SUMMARY. 2. CODEL HAD UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION WITH WITH SHAH AT LONG DINNER JANUARY 10 IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHAH'S RETURN FROM MEETING SADAT IN ASWAN AND BRIEF STOPOVER IN RIYADH FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH KING KHALID AND SAUDI OFFICIALS. FOCUS OF DINNER DISCUSSION, THEREFORE, Martin:ag DRAFTING DATE 1/19/78 TEL. EXT. 1104 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:JCMiklos CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION

CENTERED ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. OTHER KEY DISCUSSION TOPICS RELATED TO HORN OF AFRICA AND GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION IN THIS REGION. 3. SHAH MADE CLEAR TO SENATORS HIS VIEW THAT SADATE HAS GONE EXTRA MILK, AND THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT--MADE AT LEAST AS YET--MADE/ADEQUATE RESPONSE. DISCUSSION WAS FRANK AND CANDID, AND SHAH WAS IN GOOD FORM. HE MADE CLEAR TO SENATORS HIS VIEW THAT IT UP TO ISRAEL TO ENSURE THAT PROCESS STARTED BY SADAT INITIATIVE BE CARRIED THROUGH TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. SHAH UNDERSTANDS FULL WELL THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT; HOWEVER, IT IMPERATIVE FOR ISRAEL TO RESPOND TO SADAT MOVE FULLY ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT FRAGILE FLOWER BROUGHT TO LIFE BY SADAT DOES NOT WHITHER AND DIE. 4. TWO HOUR SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER AMOUZEGAR BEGAN WITH PM PROVIDING CODEL TOUR D'HORIZON ON IRAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS, PROGRESS AND ADMITTEDLY GREAT DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS. PM ALSO, IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, GAVE ADDITIONAL TOUR D'HORIZON COVERING IRAN'S SECURITY SITUATION VIZ-A-VIZ EACH OF HER NEIGHBORS, AS WELL AS GENERAL SITUATION IN THE REGION. THERE WAS ALSO FRANK, CANDID EXCHANGE ON ENERGY GENERALLY, AND OIL IN PARTICULAR. TARIFFS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER WERE ALSO ADDRESSED. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO US THAT PM-AND THE SENATORS GAINED A GREATER APPRECIATION OF ALL THESE QUESTIONS. SENATOR RIBICOFF SUMMED IT UP WELL, WE BELIEVE, BY EMPHASIZING THAT NO ONE HAS A MONOPOLY ON INTELLIGENCE, IT AND/IS USEFUL TO HAVE IRANIANS AND AMERICANS DISCUSS QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH TOTAL CANDOR SO THAT WE CAN ALL LEARN FROM ONE ANOTHER. 5. GENERAL TOUFANIAN DESCRIBED IRANIAN PROCUREMENT PROCESS, AMBASSADOR OUTLINED GENERAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE SITUATION RELATING TO IRAN, AND CARMISH/MAAG REVIEWED IN-COUNTRY US MANAGEMENT OF THE IRANIAN PROGRAM. 6. SENATORS ALSO HAD BREAKFAST MEETING WITH IRAN/AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE WITH OPPORTUNITY FOR SOME DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR. DISCUSSION WAS ANIMATED, AND INTRODUCTION TO IT BY CHAMBER PRESIDENT LEHFELDT REQUESTED THAT THE TAX ISSUE NOT BE RAISED IN ORDER TO PERMIT MORE GENERAL EXCHANGE.

TELEBAM FROM CLASSIFICATION AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECRET/NOFORN E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON ACTION: SECRET TEHRAN 96/ NOFORN E.O. 11652: XGDS-4 TAGS: SHUM PINT PINS IR SUBJECT: RELIGION AND POLITICS: QOM AND ITS AFTERMATH REF: A. TEHRAN 0548, B. TEHRAN 0389, C. TEHRAN 0665 D. 77 TEHRAN A-124 POL-3 SUMMARY: RELIGIOUS DISTURBANCES WIDESPREAD OVER WEEKEND AMB DCM ECON-2 PM USIS OR CRU JAN. 14-15. AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI'S INTERVIEW WITH THREE OPEN FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS WAS/(AND UNPRECEDENTED) PUBLIC REFUTATION OF GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS. AS RESULT OF QCM INCIDENT ORGANIZED MOSLEM ESTABLISHMENT POTENTIALLY IN SHIR TABR 13/ STRONGEST POSITION SINCE 1963 VIS-A-VIS GOI. MOSLEMS FAR FROM WHOLLY UNIFIED, BUT GOI IS DEMONSTRATING CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY IN FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE. END SUMMARY. 1. FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS WERE GLEANED FROM IRANIAN CONTACTS CLOSE TO RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND TWO DRAFTED BY: POL:JDstempl:lab DRAFTING DATE 1-24-78 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED CLEARANCES: POLCOUNS:GBLambrakis OR(draft) DCM: JCMiklos SECRET/NOFORN OPTIONAL FORM (Formerly FS Jarub Depth) 50152-101 CLASSIFICATION OF THREE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WHO INTERVIEWED AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS. EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE OF QOM EVENTS AND AFTERMATH GIVEN IN PARAS SIX THRU NINE. 2. AS FULL REPORTS COME IN, IT APPEARS WEEKEND JAN. 14-15 SAW MAJOR RELIGIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS IN MASHAD, ABADAN, AHWAZ, DEZFUL, KHORRAMSHAR, SHUSTAR, ZANJAN AND PERHAPS OTHER CITIES. AHWAZ BAZAAR WAS CLOSED FOR TWO DAYS AND 50 CITIZENS WERE REPORTED "EXILED" TO FORCED RESIDENCE IN QOM AS A RESULT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS. UNCONFIRMED RUMORS INDICATE SEVERAL PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN ABADAN RIOT AND NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INJURED AT OTHER LOCATIONS. UNCONFIRMED RUMOR IN TEHRAN INDICATES THREE PEOPLE DIED AS RESULT OF INJURIES SUSTAINED AT ARYAMEHR TECHNICAL COLLEGE RIOT JAN. 11 AND 12. MANY IRANIANS APPEAR TO HAVE CEASED TO BELIEVE NEWSPAPER REPORTS OF RELIGIOUS INCIDENTS AND REGARD COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS (REPORTED REFS .A AND C) AS GOVERNMENT INSPIRED. 3. JOURNALISTS WHO INTERVIEWED AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI IMPRESSED WITH HIS SINCERITY. AYATOLLAH WAS UNWILLING TO BE INTERVIEWED FOR PUBLICATION BUT WAS FINALLY CONVINCED HIS STATEMENTS WOULD BE MUCH LESS MEANINGFUL IF HIS NAME WERE NOT ATTACHED TO THEM SHARIATMADARI CONTINUALLY STRESSED DESIRE NOT TO ENTER INTO CONFLICT.

WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES. HE SAID HE HAD NOT ORDERED BAZAARS IN COUNTRY TO CLOSE DOWN AND HAD ENCOURAGED RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN EACH TOWN TO MAKE THEIR OWN DECISION REGARDING MEMORIAL SERVICES FOR THOSE KILLED IN QOM. NEVERTHELESS, SHARIATMADARI'S STATE ENTS IN BRANIGIN WASHPOST STORIES (JAN. 20, USINFO) WERE A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT'S VERSION OF EVIDENCE SURROUNDING KILLINGS AT QOM. 4. AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI WAS TREATED WITH OBVIOUS RESPECT BY OTHER LEADERS OF QOM THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE WHO WERE PRESENT DURING INTERVIEW. RELIGIOUS LEADERS AGREED POLICE HAD OVERREACTED AND INSISTED SHOOTINGS WERE UNPROVOKED. AYATOLLAH ASKED QUESTION (NOT REPORTED BY NEWSMEN) WHY POLICE HAD NOT USED TEAR GAS OR FIRE HOSES? SHARIATMADARI AND HIS COLLEAGUES SAID ORIGINAL CROWD HAD BEEN AROUND 5000. HE SAID SOME 30 INDIVIDUALS WERE KILLED WHEN SHOOTING STARTED--MORE DIED LATER BRINGING TOTAL AROUND 70. (COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED REPORT THAT PARS NEWS AGENCY, AFTER FIRST REPORTS, CAME UP WITH FIGURE OF 76 KILLED BUT WAS ORDERED BY GOI NOT TO USE THIS FIGURE. MORE ACCURATE FIGURE IN OUR JUDGEMENT IS REPORT FROM OPPOSITION INFORMANT WHO CLAIMS THAT 14 DEATH CERTIFICATES WERE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN SIGNED (SEP MEMCON). THE LATER TRACKS WITH OTHER RELIABLE REPORTS EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED.) SECRET/NOFORN Classification 5. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH REPORTERS, SHARIATMADARI INDICATED RELIGIOUS COLLEGE AND MOSQUE AT AHWAZ HAD BEEN CLOSED FIVE DAYS BECAUSE RELIGIOUS LEADERS THERE HAD BEEN IN FOREFRONT OF DEMONSTRATORS. SHARIATMADARI AND HIS COLLEAGUES LEFT DEFINITE IMPRESSION WITH JOURNALISTS THAT THEY HAD CONTACTS IN MOST MAJOR AND MANY MINOR IRANIAN CITIES. TWO MULLAHS WHO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM KHUZISTAN PROVINCE TOLD OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS THERE. JOURNALISTS' IMPRESSION WAS THAT SHARIATMADARI WAS EMERGING AS FOREMOST LEADER OF MOSLEM REACTION TO GOVERNMENT. OTHER EMBASSY SOURCES DESCRIBE HIM AS ONE OF EIGHT LEADING IRANIAN AYATOLLAHS AND POSSIBLY THE MOST EMINENT ONE, AFTER JAILING OF AYATOLLAH TALEQUANI AND BANISHMENT TO PROVINCES OF SEVERAL OTHERS LAST FALL. ONE SOURCE NOTED THERE WAS NOW NO RPT NO AYATOLLAH IN MASHAD, ONE OF IRAN'S THREE MOST RELIGIOUS CITIES. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY FILES, AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI HAD BEEN KNOWN IN EARLIER YEARS AS PROGRESSIVE THINKER (IN MOSLEM CONTEXT), ONE WHO HAD SERIOUSLY STUDIED ISLAMIC REFORMERS OF LATE19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY. JOURNALISTS WERE INTRODUCED TO AYATOLLAH BY SENIOR FIGURE IN TEHRAN'S "HOSSEYNIYEH ERSHAD" RELIGIOUS CENTER WHICH MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH SHARIATMADARI AND OTHER AYATOLLAHS. 6. EMBASSY ANALYSIS: FROM POLITICAL STANDPOINT, MOST SECRET/NOFORN Classification

INTERESTING ELEMENT OF SHARIATMADARI'S PRONOUNCEMENTS WAS STATEMENT THAT WEARING OF VEIL WAS UP TO INDIVIDUAL WOMAN AND THAT ISLAM WAS NOT AGAINST LAND REFORM BUT MERELY AGAINST WAY GOVERNMENT HAD CARRIED OUT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF SHAH-PEOPLE REVOLUTION. TWO LOCAL CONTACTS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH RELIGIOUS CURRENTS HERE BELIEVE IF SHARIATMADARI CAN MAKE THIS POSITION MAIN THESIS OF ISLAMIC OPPOSITIONISTS (MANY OF WHOM ARE MUCH MORE REACTIONARY THAN THIS) HE WILL HAVE TURNED MOVEMENT IN DIRECTION WHICH MIGHT COMMEND IT TO THOSE WHO HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ALIENATED FROM OPPOSITION POLITICS BUT WHO ARE ALSO NOT INTERESTED IN RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM--MEMBERS OF IRAN'S EMERGING MIDDLE CLASS 7. IN COMING MONTHS EMBASSY WILL BE ATTEMPTING TO WORK AT INHERENTLY DIFFICULT TASK OF LEARNING MORE ABOUT RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS OF OPPOSITIONIST MOVEMENT, INCLUDING DOCTRINES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEING ESPOUSED BY BOTH PROGRESSIVES AND REACTIONARIES. WHAT QOM INCIDENT AND ITS AFTERMATH HAS DONE, HOWEVER, IS TO ELEVATE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO MORE VISIBLE, SIGNIFICANT POSITION AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE THUS FAR TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF NEW LIBERALIZATION. ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF AYATOLLAHS AND MULLAHS IN RESPONSE TO QOM EVENTS SEEM IMPRESSIVE, THOUGH THEY WOULD PROBABLY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO GENERATE ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS IMMEDIATELY FOR PURELY POLITICAL SECRET/NOFORN Classification PURPOSES IN ABSENCE OF ADDITIONAL CRYSTALLIZING INCIDENTS (QOM DEMONSTRATION WAS TOUCHED OFF BY ARTICLE IN DAILY NEWSPAPER ETELAAT WHICH SEVERELY ATTACKED EXILED RELIGIOUS LEADER KHOMEINI.) FOR EXAMPLE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT RELIGIOUS FACTIONS COULD BE MOBILIZED IN NEAR FUTURE TO SUPPORT ANY LEGISLATION IN PARLIAMENT OR TO DEMONSTRATE IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. POTENTIAL BLEND OF RELIGIOUS FERVOR WITH THE POLITICAL, HOWEVER, HAS KEPT GOI, AND SHAH, ALERT TO DANGERS OF RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. 8. INITIAL SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT GOI HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE TO MOBILIZE MIDDLE CLASS AROUND SLOGANS DEPICTING RELIGIOUS DEMONSTRATORS AT QOM AS HOPELESS REACTIONARIES. "WORKERS AND PEASANTS" PLUS BUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, STUDENTS AND SOME INTELLECTUALS HAVE TURNED OUT DUTIFULLY FOR GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT THIS HAS NOT BOUND MIDDLE CLASS MORE CLOSELY TO GOVERNMENT. POTENTIAL DANGER, OF COURSE, IS THAT GOI MIGHT LOSE CONTROL OVER RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS, INXNXIONALXYXRXONXNTENTXNXEXXKIXNXXLOWXTHE THE INHERENTLY MORE DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION OF SECULAR MODERNIZERS AGAINST FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHICH HAS BEEN AVOIDED FOR SOME 15 YEARS. 9. THUS FAR, AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN INCLUDED EVEN INDIRECTLY IN ATTACKS ON GOI. SECRET/NOFORN Classification

GIVEN DEEP XENOPHOBIC STREAK IN FUNDAMENTALIST MOSLEMS, HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THIS CONDITION CAN HOLD UNLESS PROGRESSIVE AYATOLLAHS ARE ABLE TO IMPOSE MORE STRICT DISCIPLINE ON THEIR FOLLOWERS THAN SEEMS POSSIBLE FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY IF ISLAMIC MARXISTS MUDDY THE WATERS. SULLIVAN INHIBITION CU EA INR IQ PER PM SS SY AIR ARMY DOD DOT INT LAB NSC OPEC TRSY USIA SECRET/NORM MES1000 E-COMMERCE 2023-01-10 TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFO: DEPT PASS TO AMEMBASSY LONDON FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN DATE: PER. 1, 1978 E.O. 11652: XGDS-4 TAGS: SHUI, YNT, PINS, IR SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION A. 77 TEHRAN A-124, B. TEHRAN 390 Summary: This airgram identifies opposition groups and individuals who have emerged during the past eight months during which the Iranian government (GOI) has increased its toleration of opposition views. These groups run the spectrum from left to right and include those who have some contacts with elements of terrorist groups. Probably the most articulate of their spokesmen come from the "liberal moderate" opposition which has advocated return to "constitutional" rule, including new elections and greater independence for the judiciary. In recent weeks, a more conservative religious opposition has also manifested itself publicly. Dissidence connected with religious beliefs continues to be the most potentially dangerous type of opposition in GOI eyes. The government has acted to restrict public meetings but allows dissemination of letters and circulars issued by the dissidents. On the other hand, the GOI has mobilized individuals for pro-GOI demonstrations through Iran's only legal political party. For now, the majority of opposition groups are working within, or at the edges of, the system. Should they perceive that the GOI cannot be significantly influenced in this way, at least some of them could move toward use of violence. The overwhelming majority of these opposition groups perceive the U.S. as capable SECRET/NOFORN DRAFTING DATE PHONE NO. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: 2-1-78 DCM: JCMiklos

SECRET/NOFORN Tehran A-19 Page two of influencing the GOI to allow them a role. Should they feel this hope is disappointed, the relative (and surprising) level of anti-Americanism could give way to greater anti-U.S. sentiments and action. End Summary. Introduction This airgram attempts to sketch out what we know of Iranian oppositionists who have emerged during the recent 8-month period in which the GOI has shown greater tolerance for public expression of dissent. Since the Iranian opposition has been "underground" for so long, and since it is still relatively cautious about revealing itself to outsiders, this airgram should be considered a rough cut at a description of various opposition groups, not a definitive analysis of everyone on the scene. This is especially true since various oppositionists hold overlapping membership in several definite groups or organizations. The description below begins with those groups considered to the left of the spectrum and proceeds across through those generally considered the "moderate liberal" opposition to the religious conservatives of the right. Groups with Possible Terrorist Links To the very far left of the ideological spectrum are left.st revolutionary groups such as the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party, which is active in Europe and apparently maintains a tightly-knit organization in Tehran. We know very little about this group, except that one of their members was captured in a terrorist shootout in December, 1976. Other similar radical marxist groups exist primarily in Europe, but appear to us as small, shadowy organizations with little impact in Iran. Probably the largest and best known of the leftist groups is the National Liberation Front (NLF), including its emerging offshoot, the Iran Freedom Seekers Liberation Movement. The NLF was organized about 1964 in Paris by Beneh Sadr. One of its principal members and organizational contacts in Paris, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, has been responsible for a number of letters written to individuals within Iran. Although the NLF has terrorist links, it has tried to portray itself as an umbrella organization for all moderate dissident groups to the right of the marxists, though the others do not accept this claim. The NLF appears to have small, tightly-knit groups in Tehran and in several European and American cities, its headquarters in the U.S. is reportedly in Houston. Its main contact in Tehran may be Ahmad Sadr-Haj-Sayed-Javadi, an ex-judge who has been involved with a number of opposition projects, including the recent letter to UNSYG Waldheim. SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN Tehran. A-19 Page three Some Moslem Ayatollahs have contact with some Mujahidin-e-khalq (People's Strugglers) guerrillas. They do not, as far as we know, form a specific group for this purpose. At the present time, we do not know how these connections take place, but they have been hinted at second and third hand by a number of individuals who have dealt with the oppositionist movement. Through these Ayatollahs, the main, but much more fluid and fundamentalist, anti-leftist mass of religious oppositionists may maintain at least a liaison with some factions of the Mujahidin. It appears that the terrorists' action teams are kept separate from these contacts. Additionally, a great deal of support for the religiously oriented opposition movement comes from the Bazaar--an important center of opposition at this point on the political spectrum. While there are a number of people who call themselves communists or Tudeh-Party supporters, the Party remains illegal and its organization, if any, is underground. The Embassy believes the local leader of this faction may be Abdol Ali. Partovi-Alavi, an ex-university professor and former Tudeh Front Organization chief who is the brother of Bozorg Alavi, a Tehran leader who remains in exile in East Germany. Little is known about possible other members of this group, but it has contacts among leftist personalities in other universities in Iran and several university professors feel that marxists who are "fellow travelling" with this group currently wield substantial ideological and intellectual influence among students More Moderate Descendants of the Older National Front iThe organizational structure of the center of the oppositionist movement is so fluid as to make exact description problematic. Nevertheless, we discern the following major elements, many of whose personalities hold overlapping membership in one group or another. The Union of National Front Forces of Iran which was organized in November 1977 draws together a number of individuals such as Dariush Foruhar, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Shahpour Bakhtiar, and Ali Sheygan. This group has worked for a return to constitutional government and a dismantling of the Shah's "dictatorship" Ali Asghar Haj-Sayed-Javadi is probably the leading writer who is connected with this group. Most of the moderate groups accept the major lines of Haj-Sayed-Javadi's thoughts as laid out in a long, 200-page letter written in April 1977. The Embassy has been trying to obtain a copy, thus far without success. Its orientation is leftist, and it includes many alumni of the (Mossadeq's period) National Front. The Radical Movement of Iran was founded in 1975 by Engineer Rahmatollah Noghadam-Naraghe'h and several friends. The Embassy believes that Mohammad Hossain Maleki and Eng. Kazem Hassibi are probably members of associates of this particular unit. The Radical Movement of Iran takes a line similar to the Union of National Front Forces and calls for the abolition of Iran's SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN single party, a free press, new and free elections, and unshackling of the judiciary. Its principal points of difference with the Union of National Front Forces appear to be ones of personalities which may go back as much as 25-30 years. It seems to be situated less to the left (in the fashion of the "Radical Party" in France) and be a bit better disposed to Americans. The Toilers Party is led by Dr. Mozaffar Baghai Kermani. The Party is essentially the personal creation of the Dr. who has been an inveterate writer since he was a Mossadeq supporter who broke with the prime minister in 1953. There are a number of other significant individuals, many of whom are members of the outlawed Iranian Writers Guild which has been trying to reestablish itself. Among these are Hedyatollah Matin-Daftari, a Tehran lawyer and grandson of Mossadeq; Ali Amini, ex-liberal prime minister and close friend of a number of the oppositionists of all factions; Fereidun Adamyat, a former Iranian ambassador to Holland and India; Moghadam-Maraghe'h of the Radical Party (above); and Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, the first managing director of NIOC and a long-time opponent of the Shah. Bazargan has been a prominent speaker at several rallies and is one of the most articulate spokesmen for a return of constitutional government, expanded freedom of the press, total independence of the judiciary, and completely new and free elections for Parliament. Several groups and individuals have organized themselves in a "new National Front" with a directorate of seven leaders--Eng. Moghadam-Maraghe'h, Eng. Bazargan, Karim Sanjabi, Dr. Kazem Samii, Ayatollah Haj-Sayed Abolfazle Moosavi-Zanjani, a Mr. Sangabodi and one other. This group cooperates with the new founders of the Iranian Human Rights Committee formed in January 1978, and indeed memberships overlap. It also coordinates with Foruhar's group, but--despite the presence of some religious figures in the "new National Front"--there would appear to be little coordination with religious conservatives and fanatics. In addition to these long-time oppositionists, there are a number of figures who have become important either because of incidents they have been involved in or because of foreign connections. Chief among these are Gholam Hassan Sa'edi, a writer who has come to the attention of American publishers; Dr. Homa Nateq, a Tehran University history professor (and member of the writers guild); and Ali Asghar Massoudi, a former army officer and ex-counsel for political prisoners in military courts. Most of these moderate oppositionists eschew violence and believe as an article of faith that the U.S. could play a major role in inducing the Shah to deal with what they call the "liberal opposition." SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN It is this seeming dependence upon American action which has caused them to urge a suspension of terrorist activities through intermediaries with the terrorist groups. They would be potentially dangerous, however, should substantial numbers of them become convinced that the U.S. cannot or will not cause the Shah to treat with them. While we know the Iranian government is sensitive toward American efforts to deal with them, over the past eight months the Embassy has received no indication that the government openly frowns on contact with these individuals, people close to them, and other oppositionist supporters. This presumably could change if the government felt threatened or became uncertain of the USG's basic support. Religiously Oriented Groups In the past two weeks, primarily as a result of the Qom incident and its aftermath (see ref B), the outlines of a religious opposition have become clearer. Ayatollah Sayed Ghassem Shariatmadari has emerged as the public spokesman for this group, primarily because of his interview with three foreign journalists (Tehran 0961). A behind-the-scenes supporter of the "progressive" Ayatollahs and a link with the Tehran religious faction is Dr. Nasser Minatchi who is a lawyer and head of the board of directors of Hosseyenyeh Ershad Religious Center near the Friday Mosque on Cld Shemiran Road. The Center was closed five years ago because of some speeches made against the government. The GOI quietly allowed it to reopen in the past few months and it may again become a center for at least tacitly accepted dissident religious opinion. Another Ayatollah, Haj Sayed Abolfazle Moosavi-Zanjani, has been linked to the more moderate oppositionists listed in the last section. It appears that there are a number of religious factions that may come to cluster around Ayatollah Shariamatdari. For most of them, the Ayatollah Khomeini, exiled to Iraq in 1963, is considered the true leader of the Shiite faithful. Khomeini's principal disciple has been Ayatollah Mahmud Talequani, who was jailed for ten years in August 1977. Another of these, Talequani's close associate, Moslem theologian Hossein Ali Montazari, has been in prison for sometime. The Embassy understands that several, perhaps as many as ten, ayatollahs and mullahs were imprisoned or exiled in the fall of 1977 for anti-government statements. One source believes this has been a prime reason why other religious leaders have come forward to challenge the interpretation of their stance as reactionary, and why the GOI has tolerated their emergence. The Qom incident has caused religious figures to look to their organizational situation. The loose and fluid religious structure of Iran offers perhaps the only country-wide network SECRET/NOFORN

for an oppositionist group. Thus far, anti-government sentiment has largely remained beneath the surface due to assiduous work by Savak and because religious leaders have (we believe) continually assessed their prospects for confrontation with the government as unfavorable. We have no hard facts, but there is some indication that moderate oppositionists and more progressive religious leaders have talked about joining together for certain demonstrations similar to those which eventually led to confrontation with the GOI in 1963. Circumstances would appear to be important --if additional incidents involving the religious community, such as firing upon marchers, either occur or can be generated, religious fervor could be activated to provide the mob manpower for demonstrations. It is difficult to get an accurate reading of religious/political beliefs. Progressive figures speak in terms which would accommodate the secular state. They accept "human rights", land reform and tacit separation, in practice if not in theory, between church and state. Basic Shi'ite doctrine, however, has always emphasized the importance of religion in everyday life, and in Iran Shi'ism has always been closely tied to Iranian nationalism. Those familiar with Shi'ite doctrine believe more fundamentalist Shi'ite mullahs will have difficulty supporting a more progressive doctrine. This could result in an important doctrinal dispute between those Moslems, both laymen and clerics, who wish to accept some form of separation of church and state by referring such matters as wearing the veil to individual conscience, and those who will insist on the application of "true" Shi'ite principles to every sphere of human life. The former would be consistent with the beliefs of many of Iran's new emerging middle class and would open the way for the more religious of them to support a movement combining religion and politics. Religious opposition which emphasizes fundamentalist Shi'ism would probably chase more enlightened moderates into tacit if unhappy alliance with the government. Miscellaneous This airgram has not dealt with groups deliberately connected to active terrorists, the Mujahidin-e-khalq (Peoples' Strugglers and the Charikha-ye-Fada'i-Khalq (Peoples' Sacrifice Guerillas). Thus far, we find no hard indications of direct links between the action teams of either of these groups and the more moderate oppositionists noted above, but this may be due merely to good security practice. There is a strong supposition (but only a supposition) that moderate oppositionists have prevailed upon terrorist groups to desist from active violence against Americans while the Carter administration is given a chance to see if it can or will influence the Shah and the GOI. There have been a number of incidents of violence over the past year, several related to the Carter visit to Iran, December 31 to January 1, which suggests either that the prohibition is not absolute or that terrorist discipline is not complete. What may reasonably be expected, however, is that there will remain some loose coordination between the various opposition figures and the terrorist movement. At times, the moderates may restrain the extremists; it is also possible that the extremists will influence the moderates in the direction of stimulating (or at least condoning) greater violence. Iranian Government Reaction The Iranian government has thus far permitted at least some public meetings, though it clamped down on such gatherings rather severely in late Nov-Dec 1977. The dissidents have been allowed to issue letters, but these have been covered only sporadically (and always negatively) in the press. There have been indications that the GOI intends to mobilize groups and individuals through the Resurgence Party in counter-demonstrations desired to show support for progressive government programs against reactionary oppositionist activities. Such counter-demonstrations have taken place since November 22, 1977, climaxed by the nationwide January 26 parades in favor of the Shah-People Revolution. The government has not dealt with the substance of the oppositionists' challenge that Iran has strayed from the constitutional path. Rather, it has suggested that the Monarchy, the Constitution and the Shah-People Revolution are basic elements on which all components of the Iranian nation agree. The GOI has not yet drawn a stark line between the government as a force for progress and all oppositionists as reactionary, but the thrust of its statements and those of speakers at pro-government rallies suggest this line. Opponents of the GOI are repeatedly being tarred as agents of renascent colonialism (taken in the broadest historical sense) to suggest that the nefarious past interference in Iran's affairs by Russia and Britain might be revived through such dissidents. By drawing the mantle of patriotism around the Shah and his four-decade-old rule, spokesmen are trying to broaden the appeal of the government beyond specifics such as the Party or the Shah-People Revolution to patriotism in a more general sense. Some GOI and Resurgence Party (RPPI) officials harbor the belief that some oppositionists might be induced to bring their activities into some sort of association with the RPPI. At present this appears a vain dream. Those who might consider this line of action are not the committed oppositionists listed above, but rather people who have remained apathetic non-participants in the Iranian political system; Iran's emerging middle class. To a considerable degree, one could say that the struggle over the coming months and years will be one between the GOI and the oppositionists for

the allegiance of a substantial majority of those now moving into Iran's modernizing elite. Should the government succeed in retaining and strengthening the allegiance of this group, oppositionists would remain at the best a minor irritant on the national scene. Alternatively, in the unlikely possibility that the oppositionists win the allegiance of many in this strata of the population, the way would be open for another severely dichotomous split similar to that which evolved in 1963, with a like potential for schizophrenic domestic strife. Potential for Increased Anti-Americanism Until late 1977, increased opposition activity in Iran had not resulted in stronger anti-Americanism per se. However, since December, leaflets emanating from both the marxist left and the religiously-oriented right of the opposition spectrum have carried explicitly anti-U.S. overtones and statements, and the volume of such leaflets has increased in the past month. Given intensive American interaction with Iranian society at all levels, and the inevitable resultant strains between two cultures in friction, the extent of current restraint in overt anti-Americanism is surprising. One significant reason is the virtually unanimous oppositionist perception (regardless of what may actually be the case) that the USG, with its substantial influence and power within Iran, could compel the Shah to open up the political system if it wanted to. This led the oppositionists to play down their dismay at what they consider to be U.S. "support" for the Shah and to discourage religious opposition from voicing their natural anti-foreign sentiments. Should oppositionist elements begin to believe, as some extremists are already doing, that the U.S. either can not or will not act as the midwife for oppositionist entry into the Iranian political system, the current constraint on latent anti-Americanism may be reduced and overt manifestations of it increase. The Embassy will be commenting more fully on this phenomenon in other contexts. SULLIVAN PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3659 INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1336 RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 1010 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5593 RUEHDN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0706 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 2064 RUCMD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2798 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3779 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4030 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5194 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4928 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4290 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1359 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1440 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0787 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3437 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3722 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0354 RUFRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1341 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 0303 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1619 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0544 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0304 BT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01691 E.O. 12065: GDS 2/2/85 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: (U) IRAN: UNDERSTANDING THE SEI 'ITE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: THOUGH BASED ON INCOMPLETE EVIDENCE, OUR BEST ASSESSMENT TO DATE IS THAT THE SHIA ISLAMIC MOVEMENT EO-MINATED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS FAR BETTER ORGANIZED, ENLIGHTENED AND ABLE TO RESIST COMMUNISM THAN ITS DETRACTORS WOULD LEAD US TO BELIEVE. IT IS ROOTED IN THE IRANIAN PEOPLE MORE THAN ANY WESTERN IDEOLOGY, INCLUDING COMMUNISM. HOWEVER, ITS GOVERNING PROCEDURES ARE NOT CLEAR, AND PROBABLY HAVE NOT BEEN TOTALLY WORKED OUT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PROCESS OF GOVERNING MIGHT PRODUCE ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE ANTI-CLERICAL, INTELLECTUAL STRAINS WHICH EXIST IN THE OPPOSITION TO PRODUCE SOMETHING MORE CLOSELY APPROACHING WESTERNIZED DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES THAN MIGHT AT FIRST BE APPARENT. END SUMMARY CHARGE: STATE 2/2/79 APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS DRFTD: POL:GBLAMERAKI 3. AS DEPT AND OTHER ADDRESSES ARE AWARE. WE HAVE FOR SOMETIME BEEN LABORING WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING THE LIFATH AND DEPTH OF THE RENASCENT SHIITE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN IRAN BOTH FOR ANALYTICAL AND POLICY PURPOSES. WHILE CUR STUILY IS FAR FROM CONCLUDED. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAKE SOME TENTATIVE JUDGMENTS AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE IN IRAN'S CNCING REVOLUTION. CLEAR: NONE DISTR: POL 3 AMB MIN ECON-2 PM ICA OR ADM SY DAO AFOSI CERO 4. FIRST, WE HAVE AMASSED ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO DATE TO BE

REASONABLY SURE THAT THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HEADS THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION BOTH IN THE PERSON OF THE SYMBOLIC LEADER, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND IN THE ORGANIZATION, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY INTERLOCKING ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH SUPPORT HIM. IRANIAN GOVT SPORESMEN HAVE FOR A LONG TIME PEDDLED THE CHARGE THAT KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWERS ARE FOR THE MOST PART CRIPTO COMMUNISTS OR LEFTISTS OF MARXIST STRIPE. THIS BELIEF IS SHARED QUITE WIDELY BY OTHERWISE WELL-INFORMED IRANIANS, INCLUDING JOURNALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN AS WELL AS GOVT SERVANTS. TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT IT IS BASED ON A FABLE THAT COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN INFILTRATED AS YOUTH SENT TO THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND NOW CONSTITUTE THE MULLAHS AND OTHER ORGANIZERS OF THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT. "PROOF OF THIS IS DEDUCED FROM THE ASSUMPTION MADE GILBY BY MANY IRANIANS THAT THE RELIGIOUS PEOPLE, INDEED IRANIANS IN GENERAL, ARE TOO DISORGANIZED AND INCAPABLE OF PUTTING TOGETHER AN EFFICIENT MOVEMENT UNLESS THIS IS DONE FOR THEM BY THE ONLY ORGANIZED GROUP IN IRAN" -- THE TUDEH PARTY 5. THESE DETRACTORS APPEAR TO BE LABORING IN AN IGNORANCE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHICH IS IN SOME CASES GREATER THAN THAT OF WESTERN OBSERVERS. WESTERNIZATION IN IRAN ACHIEVED A STATUS AND LEGITIMACY UNDER THE TWO PAHLAVI MONARCHS WHICH HAS PRACTICALLY WIPED OUT MEMORIES OF THE ISLAMIC PAST FOR LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WHO WENT TO SCHOOL IN THE WESTERNIZED IRANIAN SCHOOL SYSTEM AND DID THEIR HIGHER STUDIES FOR THE MCST PART ABROAD. FOLLOWING THE MODEL OF KEMAL ATATURK IN TURKEY AND CONTINUING INTO THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD, THE PAHLAVI SHAHS HAVE SOUGHT TO BRAND THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT AS AN IGNORANT REACT-TICNARY REMNANT OF THE PAST WHICH IS FAST BECOMING OBSO-LETE. STEPS WERE TAKEN TO RENDER THIS A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. THE GOVT HAS MADE EFFORTS TO CUT OFF THE MULLAHS FROM DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY THE PEOPLE AND TO MAKE THEM DEPEND ON GOVT SALARIES. BY KEEPING THE MULLAHS AS FAR OUT OF PUBLIC SIGHT AS POSSIBLE, SEEKING TO RIDICULE THEM, LOCKING UP MANY OF THE LEADERS IN SAVAK PRISONS. AND BT NNN CONFIDENTIAL FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3660 INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1337 RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 1011 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5594 RUQHLM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0707 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DRAHRAN 2065 RUQMCL/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0799 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3780 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4231 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5195 RUQMKE/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4929 RUITC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4291 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1360 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1441 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0788 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3438 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3723 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0355 RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1342 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 0304 RUFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1620 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0545 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0305 BT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01691 INSISTING ON NON-RELIGIOUS MODELS OF THE FUTURE FOR IRAN, THE SHARS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PUSH IRAN THROUGH A PERIOD OF WESTERNIZATION INVOLVING A SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE WHICH TOOK CENTURIES TO DEVELOP IN EUROPE. 6. NEVERTHELESS, IT HAS BECOME OBVIOUS THAT ISLAM IS DEEPLY IMBEDDED IN THE LIVES OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. IN ITS SHI'ITE FORMAT, IT HAS OVER THE CENTURIES BECOME STRONGLY IDENTIFIED WITH IRANIAN NATIONALISM, EVEN BEFORE THE AGE OF MODERN NATIONALISM PENETRATED THE EAST. THE PAHLAVIS ATTEMPTED TO SUPPLANT THIS ANCIENT NATIONALISM WITH A MODERN VERSION BASED ON A RETURN TO TRADITIONS, LEGENDS AND GLORIES OF THE PRE-ISLAMIC PAST. THAT EFFORT MIGHT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE UNCHALLENGED FOR MANY MORE DECADES OR CENTURIES. ITS SUCCESS DEPENDED ON CREATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH ROOTS AMONG THE PEOPLE TO COMPETE WITH THAT OF SHI'ITE ISLAM. 7. HOWEVER, THE REFORMING PAHLAVI MONARCHY WAS CHALLENGED EARLY ON BY ANOTHER WESTERN IDEOLOGY --- COMMUNISM. ITS INFANT PARLIAMENTARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS. CAME CLOSE TO BEING TAKEN OVER IN THE LATE 1940S AND FARLY 1905 BY THE COMMUNIST METHOD OF WESTERNIZATION. THE PRESENT SHARE'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE AGAINST THE CHALLENGE AND HIS ABSORPTION IN THE CREATION OF A MODERN, SECULAR AND INDUSTRIALIZE IRAN BLINDED HIM TO THE MORE ANCIENT CHALLENGE OF ISLAM AND ITS HOLD ON THE PEOPLE. WHILE HIS EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW IRANIAN IDEOLOGY BASED ON "2500 YEARS OF IRANIAN KINGSHIP" AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

TREAT CIVILIZATION WERE DIRECTED PERSONALLY AND APPEARED TO BE MAKING SOME HEADWAY. IT IS CLEAR TODAY THAT THEY DEPENDENT THE RESENTMENT OF SHIITE ISLAM AND BROADENED THE OPPOSITION TO HIS REGIME AMONG MORE AND MORE CLASSES OF PEOPLE WELL BEYOND THOSE STRICTLY PRACTICING RELIGION. TODAY, EVEN THE SHAR'S USE OF THE PERSIAN LANGUAGE IS RIDICULED. IT SEEMS THE SHAH REGULARLY MAKES ERRORS IN HIS USE OF THE LANGUAGE, WHICH ONLY REINFORCES THE CHARGE THAT HE IS AN IMPLANT OF FOREIGN INTERESTS SERVING FOREIGNERS RATHER THAN HIS OWN PEOPLE. p. HISTORICALLY, ISLAMIC SCHOLARS HERE TRACE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHI'ISM IN TERMS OF ITS RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY AT SEVERAL STAGES. ORIGINALLY A MARK OF PERSIAN RESISTANCE TO ARAB AND MONGOL INVADERS, IRANIAN SHI'ISM SPLIT AND THE MAJOR DIVISION IN A SENSE "WENT UNDERGROUND" AFTER THE SAFAVID RULERS ADOPTED IT AS THE OFFICIAL COURT RELIGION. THESE POWERFUL PERSIAN RULERS TRANSFORMED SHI'ISM INTO A TYPE OF SUNNISM, PERSIAN SCHOLARS TELL US. THAT IS, THEY DEMANDED AND GOT SUBSERVIENCE OF A PART OF THE SHI'A ESTABLISHMENT TO THE KING. ACQUIES HENCE WAS GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE "HIDDEN 12TH IMAM," THE KING COULD MAKE NECESSARY TEMPORAL DECISIONS. CONCURRENT WITH THIS OFFICIAL ("SAFAVI") STRAIN. HOWEVER, WAS THE UNOFFICIAL STRAIN OF SHI'ISM ("ALAVI") WHICH BELIEVED AND PREACHED RESISTANCE TO UNJUST AND CORRUPT RULERS AND LID BEHIND THE ANCIENT SHI'ITE DOCTRINE OF CONCEALMENT. 9. THE EXISTENCE OF BOTH STRAINS IN SHI'ISM IS MARKED BY PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF MOSQUES, DATING ESPECIALLY FROM THE TIME OF FATHI ALI SHAH QAJAR, IN MANY IRANIAN CITIES -- THOSE BUILT BY THE SHAH AND SUPPORTED BY HIM, THOSE BUILT BY THE PEOPLE AND PRAYED IN BY THEM. THE "IMAM JOM'EHS" APPOINTED BY THE GOVT TO PRESIDE OVER THE SHAH MOSQUES WERE NOT RESPECTED BY THE BELIEVERS WHO SOUGHT OUT THEIR OWN MULLARS AND MOJTAHEDS, TO WHOM THEY RENDERED OBEDIENCE AND PAIL THEIR TITHS. THIS UNDERGROUND "ALAVITE" STRAIN CAME TO THE SURFACE IN THE 19TH CENTURY WITH THE TOBACCO BT 1691 NNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN PM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1621 RUCKR/AMEMBASSY TONS 0306 RUEHG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5595 RUERDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0708 RUCMH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 2066 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0800 RUSPQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3781 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4032 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5196 RUCMK/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4930 RUITC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4292 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1361 RUEFMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1442 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0789 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3439 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3724 RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0356 RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1343 RUQMS/AMEMBASSY SANA 0305 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1621 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0546 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0306 BT CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 TEHRAN 01691 REBELLION, WHEN THE CLERGY SUCCESSFULLY LED A BOYCOTT AGAINST THE KING'S GRANT OF A TOBACCO MONOPOLY TO THE BRITISH. IT WAS THE KEY FORCE BEHIND THE REVOLUTION AT THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY WHICH PRODUCED THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION IN 1906 AND 1907. FORCED AGAIN INTO AN INACTIVE ROLE BY THE PAHLAVI SHAHS, THE ALAVITE STRAIN IS THE HEART OF THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION TODAY. 10. IF ONE EXAMINES IRAN FOR POLITICAL STRUCTURES TODAY, ONE IS STRUCK BY THE APPEARANCE OF A WASTELAND. MODERN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY HAS HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN THE SHORT PERIOD WHEN IT HAS BEEN TRIED, AND IT IS AN ADAGE HERE THAT THE ONLY RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE POLITICAL PARTY IN THE PAST HAS BEEN THE COMMUNIST, OR TUDEH, PARTY. NOTABLES AND OTHER POWERFUL PERSONS, INCLUDING MANY MULLAHS, HAVE BEEN REPRESENTED IN THE PARLIAMENT AS INDIVIDUALS WITH PERSONAL FOLLCWINGS, WHO MAKE TEMPORARY ALLIANCES WITH EACH OTHER BUT HAVE DONE FRECIOUS LITTLE TO ADVANCE THE INSTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVT AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST. THE ONE PRIME MINISTER WHO ACHIEVED A DEGREE OF POWER TO CHALLENGE THAT OF THE SHAH, MOSSADEQ, OPERATED IN A PER- SCNAIIZED AUTHORITARIAN WAY WHICH LEFT A MEMORY AND A POLITICAL LEGACY IN IRAN, BUT NO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OR PROMISE OF FUTURE INSTITUTIONALIZATION. IN SHORT, A CENTRAL POWER WITH A GRIP ON THE PEOPLE HAS ALWAYS BEEN NECESSARY TO RULE IRAN. 11. THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT HAS DRAWN RENEWED VIGOR FROM THE LITERACY AND EDUCATION DRIVES WHICH HAVE TRANSFORMED SO MUCH OF THE IRANIAN POPULATION OVER THE PAST

FOUR OR FIVE DECADES. MOSLEM LEADERS CAN CALL ON EDUCATED MOSLEM YOUTH, MANY OF WHOM HAVE LEARNED WESTERN ARTS OF PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION IN THEIR U.S. OR EUROPEAN SCPECOLS AND UNIVERSITIES. THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT ITSELF, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY THE ONSLAUGHT OF MARXIST IDEOLOGY, HAS OVER THE PAST TWO OR THREE DECADES DIGESTED AND APPARENTLY GONE FAR TO IMMUNIZE ITSELF AGAINST THIS WESTERN IDEOLOGY. MEANWHILE, IT HAS MOVED TO MODERNIZE ITS OWN PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD IS THE ROLE SHI'ISM CAN PLAY IN GOVERNING IRAN. 12. AS EXPLAINED BY SCHOLARS HERE, SHIA ISLAM TEACHERS NOT ONLY ADHERENCE TO THE UNCHANGING VALUES EMBODIED IN THE KORAN AND IN THE SUNNA (TRADITIONS OF THE DEEDS AND SAYINGS OF THE PROPHET) BUT ALSO THE NEED FOR REINTERPRETATION TO KEEP UP WITH CHANGING TIMES. THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW THAT ARE CONCEIVED AS DYNAMIC IN THIS SENSE ARE "FJTEHAD," OR PHILOSOPHICAL REINTERPRETATION OF THE ETERNAL VERITIES, AND "EJMA" OR "CONSENSUS," I.E., AGREEMENT BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS THAT CERTAIN NEW INTERPRETATIONS ARE SANCTIFIED AND HAVE THE FORCE OF THE LAW. WHAT THIS AMOUNTS TO IS A CONTINUING GRIP ON THE IRANIAN POPULATION BY A CLERICAL ORDER WHICH IS NUMEROUS, AT LEAST PARTIALLY MODERNIZING SUPPORTED BY ITS OWN SOURCES OF FUNDS, AND ORGANIZING ITS OWN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION AMONG THE FAITHFUL. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT MOST OF THE BAZAAR MERCHANTS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP WITH LARGE AND REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS. MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PASS THROUGH THE HANDS OF THE TOP AYATOLLAHS EVERY DAY OR WEEK. THESE GO FOR A VARIETY OF GOOD WORKS AND SUPPORT THE MOVEMENT. 13. AN EXAMPLE OF ORGANIZATION IN THIS REGARD IS A RELIGIOUS SCHOOL SYSTEM BEGUN 32 YEARS AGO BY AN AYATOLLAH WHO IS STILL ALIVE, WHICH HAS GROWN TO 1500 SCHOOLS SPREAD ALL OVER IRAN. THE SCHOOL SYSTEM IS ENTIRELY SUPPORTED BY BAZAARI FUNDS, AND STUDENTS FROM PROMINENT RELIGIOUS, BAZAARI AND OTHER FAMILIES TAKE NOT ONLY THE BT NN CON.FI DEN TIAL F78 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3662 INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1339 RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 1013 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5596 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0709 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 2067 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0801 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3782 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4033 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5197 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4931 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4293 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1362 RUEEMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1443 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0790 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3440 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3725 RULKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0357 RUPHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1344 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 0306 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1622 RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0547 RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0307 BT C O N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 04 TEHRAN 01691 REQUIRED GOVT COURSES, TAUGHT IN GOVT SCHOOLS, BUT ALSO SOME RELIGIOUS COURSES WHICH THE GOVT HAS BANNED IN ITS SCHOOLS. AN EFFORT BY THE GOVT TO TAKE THESE SCHOOLS OVER A FEW YEARS AGO WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED BY THE RELIGIOUS/BAZAARI ESTABLISHMENT. ENOUGH UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AND OTHER LEARNED PERSONS VOLUNTEER THEIR SERVICES TO SUCH SCHOOLS SO THAT THE STUDENTS GRADUATE WITH SUFFICIENTLY RESPECTABLE KNOWLEDGE AND CREDENTIALS TO ASSURE THEIR SUCCESS IN THE UNIVERSITIES. WE HAVE SEEN A WIDE VARIETY OF FAMPHLETS AND BOOKS PRODUCED FOR USE IN SUCH SCHOOLS WHICH INDICATE THE EXTENT OF ORGANIZATION IN THE MOSLEM COMMUNITY. 14. THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROMINENT RELIGIOUS MILITANTS MUCH IN EVIDENCE ARE CRIPTO-COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH SUCH ILK MAY WELL HAVE INFILTRATED THE KHOMEINI CAMP FURTHER ICWN. THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT IS NEITHER AS WEAK NOR AS IGNORANT AS THE SHA'S GOVT AND SOME WESTERN OBSERVERS WOULD PORTRAY IT. IT HAS A FAR BETTER GIP ON THE EMOTIONS OF THE PEOPLE AND ON THE MONEY OF THE BAZAAR THAN ANY OTHER GROUP. IN MANY WAYS IT SUPPORTS A REFORMIST/TRADITIONALIST VIEW OF IRAN WHICH IS FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE TO MOST IRANIANS AT THIS TIME THAN THE MODELS OF COMMUNISM REPRESENTED BY THE SOVIET UNION OR MAINLAND CHINA. 15. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS NOT GUARANTEED TO OPERATE IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRATIC FASHION AS WE UNDERSTAND IT IN THE WEST. IN FACT THE IDEA OF MERITOCRACY ("TAQVASALARI") IS SAID TO BE IMBELDED DEEPLY IN ITS APPROACH. ELEMENTS

OF AUTHORITY APPEAR TO BE COLLECTIVE (AS SUGGESTED BY THE PRINCIPAL INDIVIDUALS OF "EJMA"), RATHER THAN REPOSING IN A SINGLE INDIVIDUALS, EVEN IN THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF "THE INDIVIDUALS") AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF AUTHORITY APPEAR TO BE COLLECTIVE (AS SUGGESTED BY THE PRINCIPAL INDIVIDUALS OF "EJMA", RATHER THAN REPOSING IN A SINGLE INDIVIDUALS, EVEN IN THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE) AND THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE FUTURE (THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE 16. ALL THIS IS VAGUE AT THIS STAGE, HOWEVER, AND WE SUSPECT THE MOSLEM ESTABLISHMENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID MAKING SOME ACCOMPLISHMENTS WITH WESTERNIZED IDEAS OF GOVT HOLD BY MANY IN THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE RECEIVED AS AN INDIVIDUAL AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL COMMON SENSITIVITY. IT WOULD BE ALONE. IT WOULD BE NN CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFIED YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AND DISTRIBUTION AND TE TEHRAN

SECRET/NOFORN DRAFT LETTER TO CONSULATES TO ACCOMPANY POL/ECON REPORTING GUIDELINES Dear Attached are the political and economic reporting guidelines for your area for this coming year. We naturally don't want to limit you in reporting what you, who are on the spot, consider as important from your area. However, we would like to give you these guidelines on reporting which should serve to alert you to topics we here in Tehran on feel are the most important and the ones/which we would like more information. In general, I feel that the reporting from the field in Iran has been excellent, but I also feel that it can be improved and perhaps, more sharply defined. However, I'd like to have your views on the attachment, especially if you find yourself in sharp disagreement with any portion of it. As you all requested, we will be having more frequent Principal Office Meetings, the next, hopefully, in late March or early April. While the primary subjects to be discussed at that meeting will be Consular and Administrative, we can also certainly discuss the political and economic reporting guidelines in more detail if you like. With all best wishes. Jack C. Miklos Minister SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN (For David McGaffey, Isfahan) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING GUIDELINES FOR ISFAHAN POLITICAL: Isfahan is a special case for several reasons, but in terms of reporting the main one is that so few comprehensive pieces have come from there since the Consulate was reopened in 1975. There were reasons for this, but now in terms of general background we need a couple of longer analytical pieces giving the basic structure of city/provincial power, social, economic and political. While major decisions are made at the center in Iran, that is less so in the economic realm, and even in the politics of decentralization and party organization. Isfahan and the other consulates provide useful benchmarks against which to measure tehran's progress, or lack of it, as well as the claims of RPPI men. We have had hints that Amouzegar plans to push forward party work and encourage more interest aggregation and resource allocation activity -- at least gathering information on preferences -- in party circles. It would be helpful to have your comments on this, at least in a preliminary way, by No Ruz. Similarly, decentralization is being pushed again, at least vocally. Governor Zad's reaction to this latest effort will be instructive. In this connection, any links between political activity and development policy which you can delineate would be helpful. Since Isfahan is one of the holy cities, we also look to you more than the other consulates for some insight into the religious SECRET/NOFORN

community and religious activities in general, especially those which either lead to, or imply, some sort of dissidence or possible opposition. Perhaps the more fundamentalist moslems in Isfahan are really a significant part of the establishment in Isfahan as they are not elsewhere in Iran? While the rosy glow of the Carter visit has taken a bit of the "instant imperative" off the human rights problem, it still remains the major issue POL deals with on the strictly political front. Information on this subject is always helpful. We will continue to welcome your telephone reports and will gladly consolidate them with ours as we successfully did on several occasions last year. (Personally, I don't mind if our listening friends get the message that we continue to be interested in the subject if the reports are purely factual or can be desensitized for phone transmission.) On a related subject, the tensions created by the industrial development always make good reading, especially if you can plan the time to do a consolidating piece which draws together your thoughts on such incident as the Fluor "strike" of recent days and other unrest over either U.S. or third-country workers. Sometime later in the year an update of Gene's piece on the American community in Isfahan, problems, prospects etc., would make good reading. (If we have immediate or impending problems, get the word up quickly and don't wait for a longer piece, but a round-up with more perspective will be useful.) University activity which relates to possible oppositionist movements and university student attitudes in general are helpful to have, again benchmarks, There is ferment in the educational sector, and personnel and ideas may again be drawn from Isfahan, as they have been in the past. SECRET/NOFORN since you have a resident Soviet Consulate, we hope to have at least some attitudinal material for the CERP-2 report on relations with communist countries. Deadline for the report itself is November 15; we'd like to have your stuff about a month before, if possible. POLITICAL-MILITARY: In the Political-Military area much, if not all, of the work, including reporting, related to the Iranian military modernization effort and our security assistance program is, of course, handled by POL-MIL in the embassy and ARMISH/MAAG. What might be termed the day-to-day operational aspects of the broader political-military areas are comparably handled by POL-MIL and the Defense Attache Office. That being said, there still is most useful reporting, comment and even analysis to be done by the consulates in the POL-MIL field. Consular districts. Both from Isfahan, Shiraz and Ta for example, all of you have military bases and install while travelling around within your districts, it would. If you would note the impact of such bases and installa... (the associated personnel) on the areas in which they are One ought to be able to gain some sense, at 1 the bases and installations are providing a sent in the civil sector in the given opposite is true; or whether th other words, as SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN a function of having the base or installation where it is, new roads must have been constructed, possibly new schools or other facilities constructed, a water supply developed and an electricity source created. Perhaps even small businesses, shops and other commercial activity have developed as a result of the base being built, or bein operated there (wherever it is). With a number of new bases and installations planned, we can hope the Regional Governor General is taking such planning into account as his overall regional development planning proceeds. It should be possible to get some information relating to this. Additionally, it would be of great interest to have some better sense of the attitudes of the members of the military living in any particular area: -- Are they happy with their military jobs? -- Is the operation of a given base or installation effect -- Are they doing them well? -- What are their attitudes towards the Shah and the way which development is proceeding in Iran generally, and in the individual area specifically? It would also be interesting to know the degree of dedication to a military career that the service members have. For example, is ther a trend towards many of them leaving the service (assuming that this is possible with respect to their enlistment or duty status) at the end of their tours at any given base, or is the norm for the great SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN majority to move on to new military assignments? Perhaps there is no norm. To the degree that local labor is required for a base, is the avail able supply adequate? Are civil sector labor force needs impacted diversely by base requirements? We recognize that it may be difficult to acquire some of this information and, in some instances, it may even be impossible. We further recognize that it may take some time to acquire it in any event. Indeed, it would be appreciated if you would think about this general subject and suggest additional questions that could be pursued usefully and even additional subjects that seem to fit into the Pol-Mil area. Even if you turn up some information that may not appear to be complete or fully formed, it would be useful to send it in to POL-MIL at the Embassy even informally prior to using it in a more formal report of some sort. This is probably more the case initially as we work with POL-MIL to try to develop the most useful and coherent approach to contributing to the total Mission effort in the political-military field. ECONOMIC: In the economic area, you have a rich terrain to cover. Annual or spot reporting on NISOC's steel mill, as well as NISIC's steel programs, are useful to us and Washington. Spot visits to prominent industries, with key businessmen and Chamber of Commerce officials and bankers provide good grist for reports. As an old hand in economic reporting, your problem will be one of time, not know-how. But you may find useful a listing of subjects to consider when doing industrial and other economic research: -- \underline{\text{The Enterprise}} : founding, principal officers, amount and date of investment, source of capital, nature/profile of SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN Isfahan 6. business capacities, equity by percentages, size and location, expansion plans. Foreign Involvement: equity, royalties, licensings (if so, conditions, such as on exports), managerial/technicians' presence and characterization. -- Programs for training, research, servicing, marketing. Operation: recent years' output in absolute and percent-of-capacity terms, productivity (if possible, relate to U.S., Japanese or European norms), quality control, infrastructural handicaps (electricity, water, etc.), number of shifts, prospects. -- Inputs and Outputs: Source by country of major inputs, problems (such as serving of capital equipment -- sniff for competitive factors), inventories' levels and desires, present and proposed markets (domestic and foreign), product servicing. Government Involvement: tax and other assistance and tariff and other competitive protection, problems in relations with, pricing problems, etc. -- Financial: recent and projected gross and net earnings, return on investment, shares (if public) and involvement in the share participation program, tax experience (e.g. disputes) and any problems in obtaining credit, servicing debt, etc. SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN Isfahan -- Labor: Number and profile of employees (e.g. men/women, white and blue collar, foreign), how recruited and trained, turnover rates, organization and effectiveness, wage rates, trends and how determined, profit sharing, benefits, problems. Such reporting should also contain an informative slant toward possible U.S. opportunities, for example in an expansion program, and related to a desire to enter into foreign licensing arrangements. We benefit from your reporting concerning such national economic issues as price control policy; inflation (land and rent price trends); determination of wages; the perceptions, as well as actually, of the share participation program (13th principle); problems/improvement in supply and distribution (i.e. transport system, warehousing, markets); availability and allocation of credit; investment/business climate in general (including capital flight); factor's influencing that climate (e.g. the decision to or not to invest); and governmental operations (efficiency of bureaucracy, decision-making (regional or all Tehran); impact of spending; curtailments of development projects, etc.

SECRET/NOFORN (For Victor Tomseth, Shiraz) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING GUIDELINES FOR SHIRAZ POLITICAL: First, our reaction to your very well done outline: With respect to political reporting, it is true that the center is controlling nevertheless, regarding university disturbances, decentralization. and rise of religious feeling-, what happens in Shiraz is also important if only as a benchmark against which to measure what Tehran has been saying and doing. In the case of "human rights," broadly defined, misinformation is often at least as prevalent as information here, and your's and Mike's timely reports/calls have helped us quite significant and not just with Shiraz incidents. What we're calling for here is fine tuning, not a change of emphasis. Ideally, we'd like to see something about mid-year or earlier generally reviewing the rise of religious feeling in Shiraz, how it is being manifested in the social and political arena and economic impact, if any. (For example, in Isfahan, there have been one or two letters to firms suggesting that Bahais should not be hired.) If this fits in a general review of dissidence, that would be fine, to If this development results in actual or potential problems with the resident American community, that will be of interest here. On decentralization and provincial government, we'd like to know of any major personnel changes right away, but otherwise, you could use major events to peg a general description of what's going on. Sometime before No Ruz it would be useful to have an update on what the Amouzegar SECRET/NOFORN-56- SECRET/NOFORN government's impact in Shiraz and your district has been, even if the report is negative or neuter. We personally share your view that politics and economics are intertwined, though for reporting purposes, we can separate some things out. We agree that semi-annual reporting on the port situation seems called for. POL would like something, if possible, tying economic development to emerging choices on resource allocation, if that's not too much like trying to analyse the one-celled amoeba with a complex electron microscope. We are generally agreed here that you have reached the use of a free spot-mem [?] for your use. For the use of a free spot-mem [?] for your use, you should not use it for any purpose. For the use of a free spot-mem [?] for your use, you should not use it for any purpose. longer analytical pieces, ones that would put developments in perspective a bit without going the route of becoming an INR study. For example, in addition to the rise of the religion, Chancellor Mehr and Pahlavi University are two very interesting subjects -- Pahlavi because it illustrates problems of rapid academic development, which is becoming a national issue; and Mehr because he is not only one of the more outspoken and competent chancellors, but because he is being, or will be, seriously considered as a replacement for the present education minister, or for a new university job -- perhaps chancellor at Tehran University, or a super-Undersecretary with responsibilities for all universities. Similarly with Azmoun -- he is a subject of interest here, and his style is watched with interest by people who knew him, particularly those interested in cabinet shuffles. We're still interested in spot reporting on human rights, though the rosy glow that surrounds the recent presidential visit has taken some

SECRET/NOFORN of the direct heat off. If you wish to telephone in minor items, they will be welcomed and consolidated. Personally, I don't think it hurts our listening friends to be reminded of our interest in this subject, if the report or source is not too sensitive. Regarding communist activities, if any in your area, we would like to have any input for CERP-2 (deadline normally November 15) in hand about a month ahead, if possible. POLITICAL-MILITARY: In the Political-Military area much, if not all, of the work, includes reporting, related to the Iranian military modernization effort and security assistance program is, of course, handled by POL-MIL in the Embassy and ARMISH/MAAG. What might be termed the day-to-day operations aspects of the broader political-military areas are comparably handled by POL-MIL and the Defense Attache Office. That being said, there is most useful reporting, comment and even analysis to be done by the Consulates in the POL-MIL field. For example, all of you have military bases and installations in your Consular districts. Both from Isfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz, as well as while travelling around within your districts, it would be most helpful if you would note the impact of such bases and installations (including the associated personnel) on the areas in which they are located. One ought to be able to gain some sense, at least over time, of whether the bases and installations are providing a useful impetus to develop in the civil sector in the given area; whether, perhaps, the opposite is true; or whether the result is mixed. In other words, as a function SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN of having the base of installation where it is, new roads must have been constructed, possibly new schools or other facilities constructed, water supply developed and an electricity source created. Perhaps even small businesses, shops and other commercial activity have developed as a result of the base being built, or being operated there (wherever it is). With a number of new bases and installations planned, we can hope that the Regional Governor General is taking such planning into account as his overall regional development planning proceeds. It should be possible to get some information relating to this. Additionally, it would be of great interest to have some better sense of the attitudes of the members of the military living in any particular area: -- Are they happy with their military jobs? -- Are they doing them well? -- Is the operation of a given base or installation effective? -- What are their attitudes towards the Shah and the way in which development is proceeding in Iran generally, and in the individual area specifically? It would also be interesting to know the degree of dedication to a military career that the service members have. For example, is there a trend towards many of them leaving the service (assuming that this is possible with respect to their enlistment or duty status) at the end of their tours at any given base, or is the norm for the great majority SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN Shiraz 5. to move on to new military assignments? Perhaps there is no norm. To the degree that local labor is required for a base, is the available supply adequate? Are civil sector labor force needs impacted adversely by base requirements? We recognize that it may be difficult to acquire some of this information, in some instances, it may even be impossible. We further recognize that it may take some time to acquire it in any event. Indeed, it would be appreciated if you would think about this general subject and suggest additional questions that could be pursued usefully and even additional subjects that seem to fit into the Pol-Mil area. Even if you turn up some information that may not appear to be complete or fully formed, it would be useful to send it in to POL-MIL at the Embassy even informally prior to using it in a more formal report of some sort. This is probably more the case initially as we work with POL-MIL to try to develop the most useful and coherent approach to contributing to the total Mission effort in the political-military field. ECONOMIC: Your memcons and reports on industrial visits and other economic issues have been excellent. Since much focus on your district regards energy, an assessment of the new sources of energy, e.g. the Shah Reza Dam, and their impact regionally and nationally would be useful. We have discussed before and continue to encourage you to present, your material with the non-governmental audience in mind, separating out classified items where possible. This is especially helpful in your transportation and port reporting, which has high SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN business interest. When visiting industries, you may find useful the following list of subjects, not inclusive, however, which could be covered and reported on: -- \underline{\text{The Enterprise}} : founding, principal officers, amount and date of investment, source of capital, nature/profile of business capacities, equity by percentages, size and location, expansion plans. -- \underline{\text{Foreign Involvement}} : equity, royalties, licensings (if so, conditions, such as on exports), managerial/technicians' presence and characterization. -- \underline{\text{Programs}} for training, research, servicing, marketing. Operation: recent years' output in absolute and percent-of-capacity terms, productivity (if possible, relate to U.S., Japanese or European norms), quality control, infrastructural handicaps (electricity, water, etc.), number of shifts, prospects. -- Inputs and Outputs: Source by country of major inputs, problems (such as serving of capital equipment -- sniff for competitive factors), inventories' levels and desires, present and proposed markets (domestic and foreign), product servicing. -- \underline{\text{Government Involvement}} : tax and other assistance and tariff and other competitive protection, problems in relations with, pricing problems, etc. SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN Financial: recent and projected gross and net earnings, return on investment, shares (if public) and involvement in the share participation program, tax experience (e.g. disputes) and any problems in obtaining credit, servicing debt, etc. -- Labor: number and profile of employees (e.g. men/women, white and blue collar, foreign), how recruited and train turnover rates, organization and effectiveness, wage rate trends and how determined, profit sharing, benefits, problems. Such reporting should also contain an informative slant toward possible U.S. opportunities, for example in an expansion program, and related to a desire to enter into foreign licensing arrangements. We benefit from your reporting concerning such national economic issues as price control policy; inflation (land and rent price trends); determination of wages; the perceptions, as well as actually, of the share participation (13th principle); problems/improvement in supply and distribution (i.e. transport system, warehousing, markets); availability and allocation of credit; investment/business climate in general (including capital flight); factors influencing that climate (e.g. the decision to or not to invest); and governmental operations (efficiency of bureaucracy, decision-making (regional or all Tehran); impact of spending; curtailments of development projects, etc. SECRET/NOFORN (For Mike Metrinko, Tabriz) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING GUIDELINES FOR TABRIZ POLITICAL: \underline{\text{General Background}} : Over the past two to three years, we have had very good spot reporting from Tabriz. Over the next six months, it would be desirable if you could sketch out the basic structure of the province, who's powerful, who opposes the powerful (if any), and delineate the activities and key leaders of the Party, if any. This could take one, two or three airgrams; how you handle it is pretty much up to you. At some point in the spring, it would be useful to have an update to the airgram on security similar to the one David McGaffey did last spring. If it seems warranted, you might cover oppositionist groups, estimate terrorist presence in Tabriz, and look at police effectiveness. If you have an opportunity to do a broader round-up on Iran's military presence at the Tabriz-Soviet border area, I am sure our colleagues in DAO and Political/Military would find this useful. Beginning to shade over into spot reporting, we come to the question of the Kurds. In terms of sexy, international items, reports on the Kurdish sector have been Tabriz' basic input for the last seven years. We would hope you could maintain and develop new contacts to keep us apprised -- at least semi-annually -- re Kurdish thinking on such things as their Iraqi brothers, their potential for supporting dissidence in Iraq, and views of the U.S. from our conversations in Tehran, you are aware that there is active Kurdish dissidence in Iraq. This, SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN combined with some Iraqi activities in recent months, has brought the question of Iraqi Kurdish human rights to the visible stage, both in the U.S. and UN forum. From time to time, we get asked about Kur refugees in Iran. Any evidence you have that they are being treated well/average/badly will be most welcome. From the standpoint of present political interests, we want you to continue monitoring the university scene. This is perhaps more useful to us than you realize, since we are dealing with a very sensitive area. Misinformation frequently outweighs information here, and the reports done by you and the other Consuls give us a baseline for judgments. We will be particularly interested in any signs that the Resurgence Party is showing life, either in official or unofficial channels. Amouzegar and some of the people we talk to here have indicated that the Prime Minister expects the Party to play a greater role in aggregating constituent interests and suggesting resource allocation to Tehran. On the regional and local government scene, we understand the mayor of Tabriz finally threatened to retire once too often and was invited to do so. More on this and urban developments (including trade opportunities would be welcome. Again, your reporting on municipal and provincial government gives us a good benchmark against which to test the claims of Tehran's proponents and opponents of decentralization. The activities of Soviet officials in your area remain of considerable interest. We suggest that, in following reporting requirements calling for a memorandum of conversation to be forwarded to the RSO for each contact, you place special emphasis on describing in detail the SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN attitudes and behavior of Soviets whom you meet. Such reporting could prove of great help in identifying possible Soviet officials who could provide significant intelligence information. POLITICAL-MILITARY:POLITICAL-MILITARY: In the Political-Military area much, if not all, of the work, including reporting, related to the Iranian military modernization effort and our security assistance program is, of course, handled by POL-MIL in the Embassy and ARMISH/MAAG. What might be termed the day-to-day operational aspects of the broader political-military areas are comparably handled by POL-MIL and the Defense Attache Office. That being said, there still is most useful reporting, comment and even analysis to be done by the Consulates in the POL-MIL field. For example, all of you have military bases and installations in your Consular districts. Both from Isfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz, as well as while travelling around within your districts, it would be most useful if you would note the impact of such bases and installations (including the associated personnel) on the areas in which they are located. One might be able to gain some sense, at least over time, of whether the bases and installations are providing a useful impetus to development in the civil sector in the given area; whether, perhaps, the opposite is true; or whether the result is mixed. In other words, as a function of having the base or installation where it is, new roads must have been constructed, possibly new schools or other facilities constructed, a water supply developed and an electricity source created. Perhaps even small businesses, shops and other commercial activity SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN have developed as a result of the base being built, or being operated there (wherever it is). With a number of new bases and installations planned, we can hope that the Regional Governor General is taking such planning into account as his overall regional development planning proceeds. It should be possible to get some information relating to this. Additionally, it would be of great interest to have some better sense of the attitudes of the members of the military living in any particular area: -- Are they happy with their military jobs? -- Are they doing them well? -- Is the operation of a given base or installation effective? -- What are their attitudes towards the Shah and the way in which development is proceeding in Iran generally, and in the individual area specifically? It would also be interesting to know the degree of dedication to a military career that the service members have. For example, is there a trend towards many of them leaving the service (assuming that this is possible with respect to their enlistment or duty status) at the end of their tours at any given base, or is the norm for the great majority to move on to new military assignments? Perhaps there is norm. To the degree that local labor is required for a base, is the available supply adequate? Are civil sector labor force needs impact adversely by base requirements? We recognize that it may be difficult to acquire some of this inform SECRET/NOFORN SECRET/NOFORN and in some instances may even be impossible. We further recognize that it may take some time to acquire it in any event. Indeed, it would be appreciated if you would think about this general subject and suggest additional questions that could be pursued usefully and even additional subjects that seem to fit into the Pol-Mil area. Even if you turn up some information that may not appear to be complete or fully formed, it would be useful to send it into POL-MIL at the Embassy even informally prior to using it in a more formal report of some sort. This is probably more the case initially as we work with POL-MIL to try to develop the most useful and coherent approach to contributing to the total Mission effort in the political-military field. ECONOMIC: A visit and report concerning the new refinery would be useful. A discussion in advance with Richard Bash would, no doubt, provide specific guidance. If possible, an annual update of the industrial part would be valuable. Items covered should include, as in any industrial visit: -- \underline{\text{The Enterprise}} : founding, principal officers, amount and date of investment, source of capital, nature/profile of business capacities, equity by percentages, size and location, expansion plans. -- \underline{\text{Foreign Involvement}} : equity, royalties, licensings (if so, conditions, such as on exports), managerial/technicians' presence and characterization. SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN -- \underline{\text{Programs}} for training, research, servicing, marketing. -- Operation: recent years' output in absolute and percent-of-capacity terms, productivity (if possible, relate to U.S., Japanese or European norms), quality control, infra-structural handicaps (electricity, water, etc.), number of shifts, prospects. Inputs and Outputs: Source by country of major inputs, problems (such as serving of capital equipment -- sniff for competitive factors), inventories' levels and desires, present and proposed markets (domestic and foreign), product servicing. -- \underline{\text{Government Involvement:}} tax and other assistance and tariff and other competitive protection, problems in relations with, pricing problems, etc. -- Financial: recent and projected gross and net earnings, return on investment, shares (if public) and involvement in the share participation program, tax experience (e.g. disputes) and any problems in obtaining credit, servicing debt, etc. -- \underline{\text{Labor:}} number and profile of employees (e.g. men/women, white and blue collar, foreign), how recruited and trained, turnover rates, organization and effectiveness, wage rates, trends and how determined, profit sharing, benefits, problems. SECRET/NOFORN Such reporting should also contain an informative slant toward possible U.S. opportunities, for example in an expansion program, and related to a desire to enter into foreign licensing arrangements. We benefit from your reporting concerning such national economic issues as price control policy; inflation (land and rent price trends); determination of wages; the perceptions, as well as actually, of the share participation program (13th principle); problems/improvement in supply and distribution (i.e. transport system, warehousing, markets); availability and allocation of credit; investment/business climate in general (including capital flight); factors influencing that climate (e.g. the decision to or not to invest); and governmental operations (efficiency of bureaucracy, decision-making (regional or all Tehran); impact of spending; curtailments of development projects, etc.

AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION February 12, 1978 SUBJECT : Mullahs; Corruption; SAVAK PARTICIPANTS: Parviz RAEIN, AP and TIME Magazine Representative in Iran Roger C. BREWIN, Counselor of Embassy for Economic and Commercial Affairs, TEHRAN COPIES TO : AMB/DCM INR/BIO OFF. SHIRAZ USIS COPIES TO : AMB/DCM INR/BIO OFF. SHIRAZ USIS POL 2 INR/RNA TABRIZ OR NEA/IRN INR/OIL/B ISFAHAN Parviz Raein has become well known to the Embassy over the years and I have generally found him to be a \underline{\text{reliable reporter}} . With-in limits, he speaks his mind and I have the impression that he is fairly well plugged-in around town. He has prospered under the present regime but his remarks obviously reflect a fairly strong wish that some things should change. I understand that he does see the Shah with some frequency. The Mullahs Raein finds the mullahs generally to be an untrustworthy, conspiratorial and thoroughly selfish lot. Raein believes that the bulk of them in their hearts have never forgiven the Shah for divesting them of their political and economic power in the early 1960s and, given the right circumstances, would not hesitate to cause trouble for the government and the nation generally. Raein feels that the mullahs are now exploiting the current dissidence, assuming postures favoring greater political liberties for the people, but in fact they would like to return Iran to the 15th century, recovering their expropriate property along the way. Raein's distrust for the mullahs apparently has its origins in a bloody incident which occurred in Sarah Square in the early 1960s. According to Raein the mullah mounted a demonstration against the Shah and organized a number of school children to proceed the mullahs in moving against armed police. When the police gave an order to the children to stop, the mullahs urged them on; finally, the police, under strict orders to shoot if the demonstration did not turn back, did open fire, killing several of the school children. Raein found this "strategy" of the mullahs to be thoroughly contemptible LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Raein was not at all pleased with the recent international press coverage given to Ayatollah Khomeini of Qum, in which the latter is depicted by the three foreign newsmen who interviewed him as a great libertarian. Raein said he is nothing of the sort. \underline{\text{corruption}} The corruption in Iran is pervasive, Raein said, and the only way it can be curtailed is by action "from the top." According to Raein, the principal offenders are "the generals and the royal family." He said that these two groups acquired vast estates near the Caspian for virtually nothing and are now offering parcels for sale at exorbitant prices. Both groups, he said, had succeeded in extracting money from the government for the purpose of building roads into their properties. Such construction with public monies benefits no one except the owners. \underline{\text{SAVAK}} Raein said that of course prisoners are tortured in Iran and all Iranians know this, but went on to say "What is torture? Even 24 hours in prison can be a form of torture for some people." While readily conceding that there was a proper role for SAVAK, citing a continuing intelligenceneed vis-a-vis Iraq and the USSR, Raein believes that the senior officers in SAVAK, including General Nasseri, ought to be retired. These senior SAVAK officials have outlived their usefulness, living Iran a bad name and causing misery to a lot of people. He mentioned a Dr. (?) Hogseinzadeh (whose real name is Atapour) who as SAVAK's chief interrogator only lives to convict people through his interrogations--guilty or innocent. Raein recounted the following story which landed him in jail for a few hours. Raein said that he filed a routine story with AP in New York concerning heavy snows which had isolated several Iranian villages. When Raein's brief cable on the subject reached New York, Raein's editor there thought he would jazz up the story a bit and added the following concluding line which was duly printed in the U.S. press: "And while several Iranian villages struggled to dig their way out of heavy snows, the Shah was enjoying himself on the ski slopes of St. Moritz." Raein said that SAVAK promptly clapped him in a cell when it learned of this story. In the end, said Raein, an urgent phone call from Ambassador Zahedi in Washington the Shah, confirming that the offending line had been added New York, got Raein out of jail. ECON:RCBrewin:db;2/15/78

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTE: February 15, 1978 The Ambassador announced that he will be leaving on February 20 for Joint Commission meetings in Washington. He reported that his recent trip to the southern region of Iran had been very educational. The petroleum industry is very impressive; the IIN operations are potentially impressive. Following his return, the Ambassador had an audience with the Shah in which the Middle East and Horn of Africa conflicts were discussed. The Shah also indicated some dissatisfaction with bilateral relations with the British. The Shah expressed concern that there be no gap in U.S. arms deliveries, and the Ambassador cautioned that Iran should not become enmeshed with the current congressional debate on the package of Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Israeli arms transfers. The Shah well understood the point and agreed. The Ambassador noted that the Joint Commission agenda seem to be firming up. There will be a large Iranian contingent, if all the potential attendees show up in Washington. (The Minister mentioned that a number had fallen by the wayside already.) The Executive Committee of the Iran-American Joint Business Council is visiting and had futile discussions on social security, double taxation and equity sharing. They will not produce a paper on investment climate in Iran until May. The Ambassador asked that anyone who has information regarding the drug problem at TAS advise Pete Dedich. The USEA Board of Directors has determined that wine is a food supplement and as such should remain unrationed. The Ambassador has determined that wine should not become a supplement for the Tehran bazaar, and must, therefore despite its obvious nutritional value, be rationed. The Ambassador will hold a meeting this morning with regard to the Mission's employment policy for wives and dependents. General Gast indicated that Armish wanted more precision with respect to current guidelines. In response to a question from the Ambassador, Mr. Brewin said he will cable the South Korean social security agreement to Washington and will ask for instructions on how to proceed with our bilateral agreement. The Minister reported on agendas for the Joint Commission meetings, noting that all arrangements will probably not be completed until the last minute. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Zischke announced that American composer-conductor David Amram will be arriving for programs at the IAS and then down-country next week. The Ambassador noted that Arnaud deBorchrave will be calling on him for an interview and will also be seeing the Shah. General Gast asked if the Ambassador requires background material for his Washington trip and was requested to provide information on the construction requirements and schedules for the F-16, AWACS, and additional F-14s. The Ambassador said that he had conveyed our appreciation to the Shah for Iranian efforts in attempting to locate the lost American boy. General Gast gave a full report on the circumstances surrounding the hiking accident. Yesterday General Toufanian called General Gast for a briefing on enhancing the capability of the M-60 tank. It was pointed out that such a program might be possible but that GOI tank personnel require further training than they receive at present. Mr. Brewin remarked that we have received a cable regarding the NIOC dispute with Sharja. It is a very complicated exercise involving NIOC and a US firm in which NIOC is pressing for financial terms which may force the American firm out of operation in Sharja. In another case, Mr. Brewin has heard rumors that the U.S. firm, LSC, had their contract cancelled and that the manager was given 24 hours to leave Iran. He will check into the story. Mr. Lambrakis reported on some of today's press highlights. The Majlis is considering a bill to grant suspended sentences to any foreign nationals caught entering Iran illegally. Kayhan International carried an article on human rights by Jahangir Amuzegar. Mr. Ferree said that the first of the U.S. veterinary contingent has arrived and is working on a joint commission training program. A one-day food products show will be held on April 4 to display a cross section of edibles. Cmdr. Haack announced that the USS Davis and USS Furer will not call at Bandar Abbas but will remain in the Red Sea area. Mr. Goelz introduced Tim Skud who will serve temporarily at the Consulate and then be posted to Shiraz. POL:JWMartin DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM USIS DEA NEA/IRN POL MAAG OR AMCONSUL ISFAHAN POL/M ADMIN DAO SHIRAZ ECON CONS INR/RNA TABRIZ CONFIDENTIAL -73-

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES FEBRUARY 22, 1978 The Minister opened the meeting by noting that the American National Newspaper Association had a good session with Minister Yeganeh yesterday and will have a full program today, including a meeting with the Prime Minister. In reviewing incoming cables Mr. Miklos referred to a message from Embassy Khartoum which reports on the Chad situation. He also called attention to the upcoming annual visit of the National Defense University group which will be on a more modest scale this year. We also have confirmation of the visits of MajGen Clark and General Huyser. The Minister remarked that it was rather unlikely that Egypt would join CENTO, as rumored in a cable from Ankara. The Ambassador has received a letter from William H. Courtney, a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who will visit Iran in April. Among other interesting mail received by the Ambassador was a request for "hard to find" pictures of the Shah and Queen Elizabeth. Mr. Goelz, who was given responsibility for this task, said he might forward a couple of postage stamps to the writer. Mr. Gingles was alerted to the employment benefits which were recently gained by Iranian bank employees. He replied that he was aware of the generous provisions of the agreement and has kept his copy hidden from Embassy staffers. Another CT member suggested sending the agreement to AFSA as a model for future negotiations with State management. Mr. Shellenberger reported that Professor Abraham, from the University of Virginia, will meet with faculty and students at National University today if the school is open. Mr. Shellenberger was told by Ambassador Forough that he believes the riots in Tabriz spread because of economic dissent from the lower middle class. Forough said that the "have-nots" of Iranian society has an abiding suspicion of corruption in high places. As an example Forough referred to a recent Parsi press report on a lavish par given in Tehran where a local dancer was paid $50,000 to take of her costume. Mr. Shellenberger commented that this really arouses the people. Following brief commentary, CT discussion turned to next month's demonstration in Shiraz of micro-wave landing approach systems and traffic control. USIS has an officer monitoring this visit. General Gast said that a plan has been completed with the IIAF to undertake a joint analysis of recent accidents. The investigation will begin February 27 and will entail visits to each air-base and IIAF headquarters. General Gast has been informed that CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL the Secretary of the Air Force has received an invitation, through Ambassador Zahedi, to visit Iran during the period April 5-9. Armish, in conjunction with the Embassy, will prepare an itinerary for the visit. A team of three generals will arrive February 25 to have discussions about the management of the F-16, AWACS and Iranian air defense programs. Armish believes the air defense program should be under FMS. General Gast spoke with DOD officials last night and there seems to be some thought in Washington that the Long Range Iran Procurement Plan is a "wish-list" rather than representing a set of Iranian requirements. Mr. Martin commented that the LRPP in essence represents an LOI. The Minister asked that this be made clear to Washington and General Gast said he would take appropriate action. Mr. Lambrakis cited press reports today on the number arrested and killed in Tabriz riots. It is interesting that those arrested are being brought before civil courts. We do not as yet have all the background on the riots and there are many theories, but it appears that the authorities were caught flat-footed and that some officials will be held accountable. There are rumors of a threat of further demonstrations if those arrested in Tabriz are not released. The Farsi press reports that the Shah has replied to a letter from Arafat, the contents were not divulged. Despite a somewhat apologetic editorial in today's Tehran Journal, a MFA source told Mr. Lambrakis that the GOI Embassy is packing up in Nairobi, indicating an extended break in relations. Mr. Ferree reported on a number of visitors: an Uncle Ben's representative leaves today; a pulse study group arrives shortly; a farm leaders group arrives in mid-March. Mr. Martin said that General Williams, President of BHI, will call on him today for a general review. Mr. Gingles introduced Bob Watson, Iran's Post Management Officer, who is here on an orientation visit. Mr. Bannerman was pleased to report that the FBI fugitive did not slip off the plane in Paris and was picked up by authorities in New York. Mr. Dedich was welcomed back and he reported on his official trip to Paris and Nice to ferret out the Cote d'Azur Iranian connection in drug trafficking. Mr. Ryno said he has a wait-and-see attitude toward the closing of the Tehran Trade Center. There has been talk in Washington of closing a number of centers. Mr. Miklos remarked that any message from Washington should be asking for our view's before a final decision is taken. Mr. Ryno is continuing his efforts to resolve the customs guarantee problem. POI:JWMartinag CONFIDENTIAL

**IRAN: 3 MARCH 1978** -- The Fourth Session of the U.S.-Iran Joint Commission concluded on February 28 in Washington with the issuance of a Joint Communique and Agreed Minutes by the co-chairmen, Secretary Vance and Mohammed Yeganeh, Iran's Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance. The formal Commission session was preceded by meetings of the five joint standing committees during the previous week. These meetings produced several tangible suggestions for joint technical co-operation in such areas as agricultural development, manpower training, and scientific research. The Commission participants put particular emphasis on trade expansion which, the two sides noted, had not lived up to previous expectations. While unspectacular in nature, this Commission was probably the most productive meeting to date; both sides came armed with much greater specificity and interest. (UNCLASSIFIED) -- Congressman Fraser's subcommittee held hearings on February 28 to update the human rights situation in Iran. (Hearings on other countries had been scheduled earlier.) The only witness at the Iranian session was Brian Wrobel of Amnesty International who made the claim that it remained "impossible" to get a fair trial in Iranian military courts. The Department is expected to provide witnesses at a later date. (UNCLASSIFIED) -- Fallout from the February 18 religious riots in Tabriz suggests that the GOI may be bracing for future demonstrations. For the time being, however, the government is awaiting the outcome of a special investigation before taking further action. Preliminary results reveal some negligence on the part of several provincial officials including the East Azerbaijan Governor who has been sacked. The Shah, meanwhile, has stated publicly that political liberalization will continue, despite "abuses by reactionary groups." (CONFIDENTIAL) -- Embassy Tehran has taken issue with a recent CIA estimate which lowers Iranian oil productive capacity from 6.7 million b/d to 6.1 million b/d. The Embassy feels this is overly pessimistic and cites industry sources in Tehran who feel 6.8 million b/d is a more realistic assessment. (CONFIDENTIAL) NEA/IRN: MJVinson:rr 3/3/78 x.20915 NEA/IRN:CWNae8 CONFIDENTIAL GDS -76- ---

CONTROL NO. NWC **CONFIDENTIAL** MAR 19 1978 P R 101605Z MAR 78 TO CMDT MWC WASH DC TO PUSHER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN INFO RUEHC/ SEC STATE WASH DC CONFIDENTIAL SUBJ: NWK-9 FIELD STUDY TRIP 1. YOUR MSG 220759Z FEB 78 1. APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S ASSISTANCE. 2. GROUP WILL HAVE EIGHT MEMBERS, AS FOLLOWS:

MAJOR O'NEILL IS THE GROUP FACULTY SUPERVISOR AND COL CLARK IS THE GROUP LEADER. 3. REVISED ITINERARY NOW FIRM. ETA TEHRAN APRIL 9, 2030 HOURS VIA PAA 110. ETD APRIL 13, 0930 HOURS VIA IR409. PLEASE RESERVE FOUR DOUBLE ROOMS AT MEDIUM PRICE HOTEL. 4. FOCUS OF GROUP INTEREST IS US SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN PERSIAN GULF AREA. OF SPECIFIC INTEREST IN IRAN COULD BE: INTERNAL POLITICS AS THEY RELATE TO STABILITY AND NATION-BUILDING; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING, AND TRENDS AND ISSUES OF OIL REVENUES; THE IRANIAN PERCEPTION OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA AND IRAN'S ROLE; AND THE DEVELOPMENT, READINESS, AND MORAL OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. 5. GROUP APPRECIATES SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT BE OCCASIONED BY NEW YEAR HOLIDAY BUT DESIRES MEETING AT HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. PAST GROUPS HAVE MET WITH HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND CURRENT GROUP WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR EMBASSY ATTEMPTS TO SCHEDULE SIMILAR CALL. OTHER DESIRED CALLS INCLUDE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, WAR MINISTER, FINANCE MINISTER, MINISTER OF PLANNING, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. TIME PERMITTING, A MEETING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL, RASTAKIZ PARTY AND VISIT TO NATIONAL DEFENSE CONFIDENTIAL -77-

CONFIDENTIAL UNIVERSITY WOULD ALSO BE EXTREMELY USEFUL. GROUP STRONGLY DESIRE A COUNTRY TEAM OR TEAM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INDIVIDUALS. IN THE INDIVIDUALS, IN THE INDIVIDUAL TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL INDICATE 02550 COLLECT CHARGE TO FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 11852: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: USIB5 AMB DCM POL ECON CRU 10 ACTION: USIA WASHDC PRIORITY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 02550 USIA E.O. 11652: N/A SUBJ: COUNTRY PLAN INSTRUCTIONS: BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS RELATIONSHIP REF: A. USIA 6048, B. USIA 6473 1. BEGINNING LATE IN THE LAST CENTURY, IRAN TURNED TO THE UNITED STATES AS THE PREFERRED PATRON FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL DEALINGS. THE UNITED STATES RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY AND, PARTICULARLY AFTER WORLD WAR II, MADE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY. WHILE THE NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECT IS FOREMOST IN IRAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, THIS COUNTRY IS ONE OF THE UNITED STATES' TEN MOST IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNERS, AND AN INTEGRAL SUPPLIER OF OIL TO THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES. IRAN CAN AND DOES CLAIM A VERY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WHICH IS RECIPROCATED. MAFTED BY: USIS: PAO: JHShelle/Berger: plw DRAFTING DATE 3/13/78 TEL. EXT. 1433 (0):Sullivan (draft) LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CLASSIFICATION OPTIONAL FORM 153 (Formerly F8-4131 January 1975 Depth. of Blow

2. THE COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN IS ONE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES TAKE SERIOUSLY AND SEED TO EXTEND. 3. AT POLITICAL ELITE LEVELS, INTERCOMMUNICATION IS EASED BY THE FACT THAT MANY SUCH IRANIANS ARE THE MOST LINGUISTICALLY SKILLED, WIDELY TRAVELLED, HIGHLY EDUCATED (MOSTLY IN THE U.S.) OF ANY GROUP IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON. SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES, MOREOVER, ARE READILY AVAILABLE THROUGH LOCAL MEDIA AND OTHER OUTLETS, NONE OF WHICH SYSTEMATICALLY DISPARAGES THE U.S. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE RADIO AND TV CHANNELS ARE MAINLY VEHICLES FOR USUALLY BENIGN AMERICANS AND ARE AUDITED BY INTERESTED IRANIANS WHOSE TOLERANCE OF CULTURAL IMPORTS REMAINS RELATIVELY HIGH. FACE TO FACE CONTACTS WITH AUTHORITATIVE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE AMERICANS IN SPHERES RELEVANT TO MISSION GOALS IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE BUT FREQUENT UNDER BOTH USG AND OTHER AUSPICES. 4. WITH SOME 60,000 IRANIANS STUDYING AT ALL LEVELS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE CADRE OF PROFESSIONALS HERE CONVERSANT WITH THE U.S. AND ITS WAYS INCREASES GEOMETRICALLY AT THE END OF EACH ACADEMIC YEAR. CONNECTIONS THROUGH MARRIAGE ARE ON THE RISE. THERE ARE SOME 50 FORMAL UNIVERSITY AFFILIATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S., ABOUT 250 AMERICAN EDUCATORS ON THE FACULTIES OF IRAN'S MAJOR UNIVERSITIES (SEVEN FULBRIGHTERS) AND SCORES MORE IN THEIR TRAINING INSTITUTIONS. THERE IS A LARGE, VARIED AND ACTIVE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY RESIDENT IN TEHRAN. 5. IN SHORT, DIALOGUE BETWEEN IRAN'S COSMOPOLITAN INFLUENTIALS AND AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS IS INTENSE, SUSTAINED, AND IS CONVEYED THROUGH EVERY IMAGINABLE MEDIUM. THE ELITE STRATUM, HOWEVER, INCLUDES SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS WHOSE KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH IS RUDIMENTARY. DIALOGUE WITH LESS SOPHISTICATED INFLUENTIALS IS LIMITED FOR, BOTH LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL REASONS; ITS ABSENCE COULD PROVE AN ADVERSE FACTOR SHOULD PRESENT UNSETTLED CONDITIONS AMONG THE LEAST EDUCATED WORSEN. THE DILEMMA FOR ICA IS HOW AND WHETHER IT CAN COMMUNICATE PURPOSEFULLY WITH AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AUDIENCE UNIVERSE TRADITIONALLY REMOVED FROM USIS ACTIVITY. MEKIIA MEDIUM WAVE AND SHORT WAVE FARSI LANGUAGE BROADCASTS FROM ABROAD ATTRACT THE POLITICALLY CURIOUS AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS. ALTHOUGH NOT DISCUSSED IN MISSION GOALS, GREATER ICA ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER IS IN ORDER. 6. A SOURCE OF UNDERLYING TENSION IN THE COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN, NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO ICA TREATMENT, IS WHAT ONE SPECIALIST DESCRIBES AS A QUOTE PERCEPTIBLE DISCONTENT AMONG MIDDLE CLASS PROFESSIONALS WITH THE PATRIMONIAL BASIS OF POLITICS IN IRAN UNQUOTE. KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL VALUES, THOUGH NOT UNCRITICAL, LEADS MANY IRANIANS TO BECOME FRUSTRATED AND UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE

CAPRICIOUSNESS OF THEIR OWN SYSTEM. HARKENING TO PERSIAN'S SPECIAL CHARACTER AND TRADITION PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT RATIONALE FOR MANY THOUGHTFUL PROFESSIONALS WHOSE GOAL OR DREAM IS TO EMIGRATE TO THE U.S. 7. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT FACE TO FACE COMMUNICATION. IN TEHRAN, CONGESTED, CHAOTIC TRAFFIC AND POLLUTION, INFLATION, SOCIAL SERVICE BREAKDOWNS, PREOCCUPY RESIDENT AND VISITING AMERICANS (TEHRANIS AS WELL) WHOSE INTEREST IN AND UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN ARE ORDINARILY MINIMAL. IN THE U.S., IRANIAN STUDENT GHETTOS, PEOPLE BY THE UNQUALIFIED IN TERMS OF LANGUAGE ABILITY AND CULTURAL RAPPORT, SUPPORTED BY AMERICAN DISSIDENTS, BECOME SPAWNING GROUNDS FOR ANTI-REGIME POLITICAL ACTIVISM--DISINFORMATION TO DISCREDIT THE U.S.-IRAN RELATIONSHIP--RATHER THAN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT. THE IMAGE OF IRAN AMONG SOME INTELLECTUAL GROUPS IN THE U.S. IS NEGATIVE. THIS AFFECTS THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF AMERICANS WILLING TO CONNECT WITH IRAN. ICA OVER THE SHORT TERM CAN ASSIST IN TREATING CERTAIN OF THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH ORIENTATION PROGRAMS IN BOTH THE U.S. AND IRAN. 8. ESCAPE VALVES FOR DISCONTENT HERE ARE IN EVIDENCE. MEDIA RESTAINTS HAVE BEEN EASED. DESPITE DISORDERS, THE SHAR HAS YET TO REVERSE LIBERALIZATION MEASURES. IRAN'S ENFORCED EVOLUTION TOWARDS GREATER DECENTRALIZATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS SHOULD BE AMELIORATIVE. AS IRAN MODERNIZES, NEW LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification FORCES AND GROUPS ARE EVOLVING INTO IMPORTANT CENTERS OF INFLUENCE. ICA AND THE EMBASSY WILL COLLABORATE IN ASSESSING SUCH COMERS, IN TERMS OF ICA PRODUCTS AND PROGRAMS. 9. MILITARY MODERNIZATION, MAINTENANCE OF ECONOMIC MOMENTUM, OIL PRICE DECISION TAKING, REGIONAL POLITICAL/ECONOMIC INITIATIVES, INTERNAL SECURITY ARE THE SORTS OF PREOCCUPATIONS WHICH SUBSTANTIVELY INVOLVE A VERY LIMITED IRANIAN POLITICAL ELITE WHO HAVE UNLIMITED AND IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO RELEVANT AND AUTHORITATIVE U.S. INFORMATION AND PERSONALITIES. SUCH ACCESS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT EASILY PERSUADE IRAN'S INNER CIRCLE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF U.S. POLICIES. THE USG SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES, ADMIRED IN THEORY, INTERRUPTS THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND MARS THE U.S. IMAGE AS A RELIABLE ALLY IN MEETING PRESSING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES (E.G., HORN OF AFRICA, ENERGY LEGISLATION). THE IRANIAN INNER CIRCLE REGARDS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AS MISPLACED, GIVEN THE PRIMACY IT RHETORICALLY ASSIGNS TO MEETING HUMAN NEEDS. CERTAIN NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES ARE XK VIEWED DISSIMILARLY WITH IRAN SUBSCRIBING MORE DOCTRINARILY TO THE NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER CONCEPT. IRAN'S LINK TO THE DOLLAR IS TROUBLING TO SOME. ATTITUDES ON THE ROLE OF MEDIA DIFFER WITH IRAN SYMPATHETIC TO CHARGES THAT THE THIRD AND FOURTH WORLDS ARE CONSCIOUSLY MISREPRESENTED BY WESTERN MEDIA. ICA CAN ADDRESS CERTAIN OF THESE CONCERNS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification

THROUGH MULTIREGIONAL EXCHANGE PROJECTS, SEMINARS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION. 10. THERE ARE IMPORTANT SUBJECT AREAS WHERE ICA-U.S.-IRANIAN COMMUNICATION OVER THE LONGER TERM WILL ENHANCE THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP. THESE ARE FIELDS WHERE THE U.S. EXPERIENCE AND TENDENICES ARE RELEVANT TO BOTH U.S. AND IRAN INTERESTS AND NEEDS, WHERE THE CIRCUITS ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS (ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE TEHRAN AND AT CERTAIN OF THE NEWER ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS) AS TO AVOID REDUNDANCIES. THEY INCLUDE ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES AND THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION QUESTION, EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, AMERICAN AND PERSIAN STUDIES, COMMUNICATIONS IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, STUDENT ORIENTATION/COUNSELING, ENGLISH TEACHING, TRADE PROMOTION AND THE FINE ARTS. March 29, 1978 The Ambassador reviewed his flight to Kish Island and his discussions there with the Shah regarding Begin's U.S. trip, dissidence, South Lebanon and General Motors. Following a brief discussion on the proper acronym for the new International Communications Agency, the Ambassador asked Mr. Westley to put out the information regarding the "Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad". U.S. companies should know that failure to reply is a punishable offense. The Ambassador said he understood that General Rabii had told Armish/MAAG that the Boeing AMST had been certified for civilian procurement. General Gast said he had checked that out with the Pentagon and learned that Rabii's information was incorrect. General Gast will so inform General Rabii. The Ambassador discussed several SY matters: (1) the letter delivered to USIS Kabul, purportedly by the Chariks; (2) the order for us to convene the Mission Watch committee; (3) the bomb threat to the Community Church; (4) the instruction on how to deal with hijackings, threats of hijacking and threats of sabotage; (5) the cable on possible damage to petroleum installations. The Ambassador asked Mr. Westley to go ahead and prepare a survey on potential footwear sales to Iran even though it seems a bit like carrying soles to Newcastle. On the subject of ocean-going tugs, the Ambassador asked Mr. Martin to cable that we should proceed on a LOA basis, switching later to commercial if necessary. The Ambassador asked Mr. Ferree to handle the Boy Scouts' request to plant trees here during their 1979 Jamboree. Mr. Ferree said it sounded like a cultural event. The Ambassador said it was agri-cultural. The possibility of using chromed shovels to dig the holes was briefly reviewed. The Ambassador asked that Mr. Taylor be sure and follow up on the recommendations recently made concerning the child abuse problem. The DCM said there would be gatherings in several cities tomorrow to commemorate the fortieth day after the Tabriz riots. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Shellenberger said he had talked with Washington concerning "Tehran '78" and they will try and get in touch with Nelson Rockefeller and Nancy Hanks. The Germans and British will each provide modest displays. The word from Isfahan is that the government is ready to donate some land to the IAS in a symbolic gesture. General Gast said General Huyser would be delighted to have a family dinner with the Sullivan's. He also reported that the Bandar Abbas airbase lost an F-4 yesterday on a training mission. He said he understood that Secretary Alexander will delay his trip to Iran by thirty days. Mr. Lambrakis reported briefly on his travels in the Gulf area. Mr. Ferree reported on his travels to the USSR. Mr. Martin said he had been visited by a Mr. Geiss of TRW concerning TRW's push to become systems interpreter for the air defense system. The Army Attache spoke briefly about Iran's presence in Dhofar. Mr. Westley reported that he met with representatives of the U.S. company that sold the GOI its tunneling equipment for the Metro. Concerning the \underline{\text{ganats}} and sewers, he said the machines will be protected, but the crews will need foul weather gear. DISTRIBUTION: Mr. Goelz introduced new employees Sandra Mendyk and Bob Sorenson. S/A:RBoyce:lab:4-4-78 AMB DAO DCM ARMISH/MAAG POL CONS POL/MIL DEA OR NEA/IRN ECON INR/RNA ADMIN AMCONSUL ISFAHAN USIS AMCONSUL SHIRAZ S/A AMCONSUL TABRIZ CONFIDENTIAL APRIL 5, 1978 The Ambassador said he and Mr. Brewin had visited the Ministry of Industry yesterday to discuss three American investment projects, none of which seems to be prospering. Ford Motor Company, on the other hand, appears to be heading towards a contract for a major car manufacturing plant. The Ambassador was called to the Foreign Ministry late, yesterday to hear the Acting Foreign Minister read him parts of the GOI's response to the U.S. human rights statement. The Ambassador said he would ask Dr. Stempcl to go down to the MFA for a copy when it becomes available. A message has arrived concerning Mrs. Azhari's admission into Bethesda Naval Hospital. Colonel McKenzie will ensure that she knows about it before the morning of April 6, Washington time. On the message regarding acceptance procedures for crude oil for the U.S. petroleum reserve, Mr. Brewin will ask Mr. Bash to reply. One of the Pahlavi Princes is going to the U.S. for eight months of helicopter training. The Ambassador wondered if U.S. security organizations had been informed. Mr. Martin will check with OSI. The latest in a flood of messages on personnel ceilings arrived this morning, asking for reductions of one each US and FSL core position and one each US and PSL program position. Mr. McLaughlin will look into our situation. The Ambassador asked Mr. Brewin for the latest on the Rumanian Intelsat matter and Mr. Martin for the same on howitzers for Morocco. In both cases, the Now Rouz problems of establishing contact with Iranian officials appear to be lingering on. The DCM spoke last night with the East German Ambassador, who reported that things look brighter for their relations with Iran. A high-level representative will come to Tehran in the near future. Mr. Shellenberger said Roloff Bény will be contacting us for our good offices in arranging for his photos to be displayed in the U.S. There was some discussion of whether such a show, were it to be sponsored by the COI, might attract disruptive Iranian students and other such hooligans. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL MPA spokesman Parviz Adl was on TV last night explaining a new MPA group to be formed to inform overseas Iranians of the "true story" behind the recent disruptions. General Gast is going to Shiraz this afternoon to meet Secretary Stetson. There was some discussion about possible topics which the Shah might raise in their meeting. The Ambassador suggested looking at Mr. Martin's list of items approved for sale by President Carter. He also asked that General Gast look into certification of AMST. General Gast said he has spoken with Rabii. On the safety survey, two bases are completed with another expected soon. Mr. Brewin introduced Ralph Buck, a new Econ/Commercial officer. Mr. Brewin said he had spoken with Mr. Sober last night on Lend-Lease. There was some discussion as to what Mr. Garnitz of Commerce may want to talk about regarding the Trade Center's future. Mr. Brewin and Mr. Ryno will see the Ambassador to shape a coherent and unified Mission policy. Mr. Lambrakis reported on the latest rumors of disturbances, bombings, demonstrations and general rowdyism. The GOI is obviously committed to publicizing all the activity, perhaps as a means to build public sentiment against the thuggery. In Rezaieh, Majidi presided over the first meeting of a Rastakhiz group formed to counter the troublemakers. The Ambassador commented that the new Rastakhiz Party building, which is going up very rapidly, has very few windows. Mr. Ferree thanked the Ambassador for appearing at last night's Food Show. He said the Bean Man and the Meat Man did a lot of business. Mr. Mahdavi's remark that Iran wants more joint ventures rather than more sales of foreign foods was noted. Mr. Martin reported that he received GE's brochure promoting the German frigates this morning. He also discussed a visit from representatives of the company producing the Mark 48 torpedo. They are still pursuing the possibility that it may be released to Iran. The National War College itinerary is firming up nicely. Mr. McLaughlin reported that John Conley of NEA/EX arrives tomorrow and that work continues to secure a student visa annex before June. S/A:RBoyce:lab:4-5-78 DISTRIBUTION: DEA NEA/IRN AMB OR S/A INR/RNA DCM ECON DAO AMCONSUL ISFAHAN POL ADMIN ARMISH/MAAS AMCONSUL SHIRAZ POL/MIL USIS CONS AMCONSUL TABRIZ CONFIDENTIAL -88- CONFIDENTIAL \underline{\text{COUNTRY}} \underline{\text{TEAM}} \underline{\text{MINUTES}} 19 April 1978 Ambassador Sullivan opened the meeting with a review of this busy week's events. The Iranians have agreed to send additional troops to South Lebanon; the GOI will become chairman of the Fifth Committee; CENTO Foreign Ministers are meeting in London; General Huyser visited Tehran; General Graves is here now; the Panama Canal vote went through this morning; and Secretary Vance is headed for Moscow. The Ambassador asked Mr. Lambrakis to report on Iranian attendance at the Special Session on Disarmament in New York. He asked Colonel Vandermeer to get a copy of the message on compatibility of Iranian and Turkish AWACS. He asked Mr. Shellenberger about the USICA Country Plan. The DCM asked all Counselors writing OERs to please finish and get them to the reviewing officer by tomorrow. Mr. Shellenberger reported on current USICA activities. The mime troupe will appear in Isfahan and Shiraz in the next few days. A secondary school group from the U.S. is in town working on improvement of curriculum concerning foreign lands. Next week, Judge Shirley Hofstedler will arrive. The Ambassador said a group of women including Mrs. Potter Stewart is in town. They are scheduled to meet the Empress and Princess Ashraf. The Ambassador asked about the group pictured in today's papers presenting greetings from Mrs. Carter to the Shahbanu. No one knew who they were (Note: They were Mr. and Mrs. Carlton Hicks and Mr. and Mrs. James Bishop, personal friends of the Carters.) Colonel Vandeermeer said General Gast is downcountry with General Graves. He asked the Ambassador about an April 23-29 visit by General Stone, who is replacing General Mueller. Mr. Lambrakis reported the \underline{\text{Journal de Tehran}} 's swipe at official spokesmen making statements such as "Iran is going through the most dangerous period in its history.". He also discussed the report by Majidi, Ansari and Ameli. Ameli's statements on foreign interference in Iran were also interesting. The Ambassador asked about the restaurant advertisements painted on the Embassy wall. [Unlabeled]

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Lambrakis said he heard from the British that the Italian Joint Commission had been cancelled and reported speculation that the British would soon follow. The rumor is that the Amouzegar Government has decided that Joint Commissions are not the wave of the future. Mr. Boyce reported on the visit of Assistant Secretary of Transportation, who is in town to follow up on Joint Commission business discussed in Washington. Mr. Ryno discussed the Trade Center meeting with State and Commerce representatives, calling it "good and useful" He thanked the Ambassador for his low-key presentation. The Ambassador asked Mr. Dedich if he would be here during Ms. Falco's visit. Mr. Dedich said he would be, but that Dr. Stempel would be on R & R. They are suggesting that Falco alter her itinerary so as to be able to visit with the Doctor. Mr. Bannerman reported on the finishing touches to our new, improved lobby. He asked for a week's grace period before the criticism starts. S/A:RBoyce:lab:4-20-78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB USIS AMCONSUL ISFAHAN DCM DAO AMCONSUL SHIRAZ POL ARMISH/MAAG AMCONSUL TABRIZ POL/MIL CONS OR DEA ECON NEA/IRN ADMIN INR/RNA 118F2: EMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL TAGS: ACTION: SECURITY WASHDC ECT: INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON TION: AMEMBASSY JIDDA CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 3.0/ 3 E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 -2 TACS: PGOV, PINT, IR, UK SUBJECT: BRITISH VIEW OF SITUATION IN IRAN RCF: LONDON 6269 (NOTAL) 1. WE WERE INTERESTED BY ACCOUNT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS' DISCUSSIONS WITH FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY WEIR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD LUCIS ON APRIL 18 REGARDING THE SITUATION IN IRAN. WE SHARE MOST OF THE PERCEPTIONS MENTIONED BY THE FCO OFFICIALS, BUT WOULD DIVERSE FROM THE OVER-ALL TONE COMMUNICATED PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF COMPRESSION IN RELATIVELY SHORT CONVERSATIONS. 2. THE SHAH HAS PREPARATION TO AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN AND ALSO PUBLICLY REGARDING HIS DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH HIS INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM. AS NOTED BY THE BRITISH THIS HAS PRESENTS A NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES AND LD BY: 6/x ENAFFING CATS TEL. RAT. POLCOUNS:GBLambrakis:lr 4/25/78 1110 DCM:JC:Hiklos ACICS:

DILEN'S. WE HESITATE TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT TE SHAH "HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO INTRODUCE GENUINE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS" SINCE WHAT IS "GENUINE" IN A PERSIAN CONTEXT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY. IT IS HARD TO RECALL A PERIOD OF MODERN IRANIAN HISTORY WHEN SUCH POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS EXISTED AND WERE EFFECTIVE. 3. THE SHAH'S PROBLEM APPEARS TO US RATHER ONE OF PUSHING THE PROCESS OF CREATION OF MODERN INSTITUTIONS, WHILE PROTECTING HIS FLANKS FROM EXTREMISTS OF LEFT AND RIGHT AND MAINTAINING A VIABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS GREAT INFLUENCE WITH HIS PEOPLE. THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF "ACCIDENT" IN SOME OF THE COOPERATION CURRENTLY EXISTING BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER (INTELLECTUAL LEFT WING) DISSIDENTS, BUT ACCIDENT IS HARDLY THE KEY ELEMENT. RATHER, WHAT WE ARE BEGINNING TO ANALYSE AS A BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MODERNIZING ESTABLISHMENT AROUND THE SHAH AND THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS INTERNAL INSTABILITY WHICH THE TRADITIONAL LEFT WING AND NATIONAL FRONT OPPONENTS OF THIS CONSERVATIVE MONARCHY WOULD CONSCIOUSLY SEEK TO CAPITALIZE ON. AS THE BRITISH SUGGEST, A GOOD DEAL OF THIS IS OF THE SHAH'S OWN MAKING, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE SERIOUS RELIGIOUS OUT BREAK AT GHOM IN JANUARY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TRIGGERED BY AN AWKWARD AND PERHAPS ILL-CONSIDERED NEWSPAPER ATTACK ON A RIGHT WING RELIGIOUS OPPONENT (AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI) IN CONFIDENTIAL THE PROCESS OF SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE POPULACE IN MORE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DIALOGUE. 4. WHILE WE AGREE WITH THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE AND THE FCO THAT THERE IS AN ECONOMIC DIMENSION TO THE DISSATISFACTION AT PRESENT, THE ROOTS OF DISSIDENCE DATE BACK MANY YEARS DERIVING FROM PAST POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND BATTLES, AND WE DOUBT THE BRITISH ANY MORE THAN WE WOULD EXPECT THE CURE TO LIE IN ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS. THE SHAH'S TECHNIQUE OF CONTROLLING THE ARMY SECURITY FORCES, MINISTRIES, AND OTHER POTENTIAL CHALLENGERS TO HIS MONARCHY INDEED RESEMBLES PARALLEL PILLARS MORE THAN A PYRAMID, BUT IT HAS WORKED PRETTY WELL FOR HIM, PARTICULARLY WHEN COMPARED WITH WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN MANY SURROUNDING COUNTRIES. 5. WHILE THE DISTURBANCES IN IRAN ARE INDEED THE WORST FOR 15 OR SO YEARS (SINCE 1962-63), THE SHAH'S METHOD OF REACTING TO THEM IS QUITE COMPLEX. EMBASSY HAS IN PREPARATION, AND WILL SOON BE SENDING, A LONGER PIECE ANALYZING SOME OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN OVER THE PAST YEAR, OUR VIEW OF THE SHAH'S AIMS AND POLICIES, AND ESTIMATES AS TO WHERE THEY MAY BE LEADING. ___ CONFIDENTIAL Classification

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES 26 April 1978 Ambassador Sullivan opened the meeting by reporting that we have finally received instructions to move on the nuclear bilateral negotiations. Mr. Miklos is to see Mansour today. In other news from Washington, the Middle East jet sales package appears to be in trouble. If Congress shoots it down, sales to Iran would also be affected during this session. The Ambassador commented on our distinguished visitors-Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Margaret Thatcher--and commented that Tehran seems to be the site for an opposition parties congress. The Ambassador asked Dr. Stempel about the Majles member who spoke up against the Tehran bombings. Dr. Stempel said he was the same gadfly who presented the recent motion to ensure the government over Tabriz. Mr. Miklos noted that we have been reprimanded by the Department for not getting our financial program on our language program in on time. He said PER had been "sensitized" to this. The Ambassador asked Mr. Goelz about the purported requirement for Bell employees to surrender their passports to the company. Mr. Goelz said the company merely needed the passports to obtain the employees' working papers, etc. The process takes a long time, but the passports are returned. Mr. Shellenberger reported on USICA's current visitors. Judge Shirley Hufstedler, Yale professor David Abter, solar energy expert Jerry Weingarter and the U.S. Citizens for Congressional Education are all in town or on their way. The last group includes among its entourage Rabbi Korff, his daughter, her governess and Frances Knight. Mr. Shellenberger said he had heard of a serious clash at Tehran University yesterday, involving "pro-regime" against "anti-regime" groups. Classes were suspended in three faculties. He also said leaflets were all over National University depicting the Shah as the stooge of President Carter. It was noted that these were the work of "antis". Mr. Shellenberger invited those interested to see a videoctone of the head for Reinhardt explaining the recognition CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL In response to a question from Mr. Brewin, the Ambassador said he had spoken with Ambassador Parsons regarding the deep seabed mining idea. The British have put the idea to the Iranians though not directly to Ansari at NIOC. Dr. Stempel reported Rastakhiz's correction of the Shah's statement that inflation had been cut to 12.6%. Citing a typographic error, the paper reported a true figure of 17.6%. The whereabouts of the printer who made the error are not presently known. In another party note, the constructive wing of the Rastakhiz Party is off to Isfahan today to attend further mass rallies of popular support. Mr. Ferree had nothing to report save his trip to Mahdavi's farm. Mahdavi sent the Ambassador some fresh strawberries which the Ambassador will give the Governor Reagan in lieu of sour grapes. Commander Haack reported that the Dutch still appear to hold an 8 to 4 edge in the frigate-selling area. The German delegation left yesterday and is scheduled to return in July. The Ambassador said some GE people told him the Iranians are keeping their options open until they see if the U.S. will give approval to use a complete U.S. weapons suite. Mr. Dedich reported on the new major violator program. Dr. Adler said that rumors indicate that the scientists who accompanied President Scheel might have been talking with the GOI about two additional nuclear units. He said this was disturbing, as it runs counter to the Westinghouse information on Iranian purchasing plans. S/A:RBoyce:lab:4-27-78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB USIS DCM DAO POL ARMISH/MAAG POL/MIL CONS OR DEA ECON NEA/IRN ADMIN INR/RNA AMCONSUL ISFAHAN AMCONSUL SHIRAZ AMCONSUL TABRIZ CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION - COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES. AMB Amconsul ISFAHAN DCM Amconsul SHIRAZ POL Amconsul TABRIZ OR NEA/IRN POL/MIL INR/RNA ARMISH/MAAG ECON/COMM DAO ADMIN CONS DEA S/A ICA CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES May 3, 1978 Ambassador Sullivan opened the meeting by saying that events in Afghanistan had resulted in a major change in the area's strategic situation. For the Iranians, the coup is a nightmare come true; we can expect changes in the treatment of Soviets, Afghans and Iranian dissidents. He said we are moving towards recognition of the new regime. William Butler of the International Commission of Jurists was in town. He saw the Shah down South and made his points about changes in the judicial system, etc. The Shah apparently accepted Butler's remarks. Mr. Lambrakis will prepare a cable. We have a message from Nelson Rockefeller regarding his plans to see the Shah on Kish Island on May 5. Colonel McKenzie is looking into the fuel supply situation. The Ambassador asked Mr. Martin about the neutron bomb issue. Mr. Martin will take it up with Goodarznia. The Ambassador noted that this was Mr. Miklos' last Country Team meeting. Mr. Miklos, after thirteen years of Iran-related work, said he will continue to keep a close eye on Iranian affairs from his next vantage point. Mr. Miklos then discussed Iran's offer to supply more UNIFIL troops to Lebanon provided the Israelis withdraw. In his final note, he announced that the Department has decided that the Law of the Sea reports have been too detailed, and we will now start receiving weekly summaries only. Mr. Shellenberger reported on the "Moral Education through Art" show, which was fittingly opened by Princess Ashraf. While he was there, he spoke with the Deputy Chief of Protocol, who said he was positive the Afghan Coup was Soviet-inspired. Judge Shirley Hufstedler had a good visit, and Yale Political Scientist David Apter is coming in this weekend. The Ambassador mentioned that he had seen Rabbi Korff yesterday; the Rabbi and his entourage are developing a fairly large project. Admiral Conolly reported that officers who had been placing orders with the local Ford representative had learned that he has not been entering their orders with the dealer. Mr. Bannerman will investigate. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 2. Mr. Brewin reported on our new data on Iran's foreign trade over the past fiscal year. Non-military imports are up 3.4% and non-oil exports are up 7%. Both increases are due largely to inflation. Mr. Lambrakis discussed the continuing incidents and the visits of the Moroccan and Italian Foreign Ministers. Mr. Ferree reported on the proposed call by the Minister of Agriculture on Secretary Bergland. The Ambassador asked whether this had been coordinated with the State Department to ensure a proper reception at the U.S. port of entry, etc. Mr. Ferree said he would check. Mr. Martin discussed the Gould effort to sell Iran the MK-48 Torpedo. Apparently Admiral Habibollahi wrote to the U.S. Navy and asked for information on the torpedo to see if, when and if it is released, it might fit with the German submarines. Admiral Conolly said the torpedo probably never will be released. Mr. Gingles said he has a meeting this Saturday regarding the Tabriz land issue. He indicated that the deal was "still moving. Mr. Byrnes reported that FAA now has six of its nine permanent experts on board. A budget of $18.5 million has been submitted to the Imperial Ministry of War, of which a major portion is for U.S. goods and services. It is hoped that one of the major components will be the new Mehrabad tower. The Ambassador asked about the T-34 crash. Mr. Byrnes explained that the plane was on a training demonstration. Mr. Westley, freshly returned from Afghanistan, reported on one man's view of the coup d'etat. Mr. Ryno combined an announcement of International Sun Day with report that the solar energy show was probably the Trade Center's best ever. Mr. Snow reported on the IAS display of twelve contemporary US artists. Mr. Miklos, in his final comment, said that "contemporary" usually translates as "crazy as hell." CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES May 10, 1978 The Minister chaired the meeting in the absence of Ambassador Sullivan who is attending an ICA-sponsored American Studies Conference in Shiraz. Mr. Naas requested that Mr. Gingles prepare a list of Embassy committees and to arrange a schedule of committee meetings prior to the Inspectors' arrival. Last night Mr. Naas was the recipient of a lecture on the ineffectiveness of U.S. foreign policy from visiting Pak Foreign Adviser Agha Shahi. Mr. Zischke reported that demonstrations at Pahlavi University have not affected the American Studies Conference sessions. There was a bomb threat at IAS Isfahan yesterday. The building was subsequently evacuated and no bomb was discovered. General Secord said that Armish-Maag has received reports from Tabriz on the demonstrations which took place there yesterday. Mr. Brewin noted that a large Norwegian trade delegation is in Tehran and the Economic Section will report on the outcome of their visit. An American firm, National Homes Co., has received one half of a new contract for pre-fabricated houses. The other half was received by a Swiss consortium which has some U.S. participation. Mr. Lambrakis reviewed today's press stories on demonstrations around the country. Apparently a Shiraz doctor arrested for distributing subversive literature, was remanded to military court because the civil court judge was unaware of new procedures in this regard. Mr. Naas remarked that it is difficult to keep accurate figures on prisoners released and those detained and cautioned that Embassy reporting take this into account. Mr. Ferree reported on visiting representatives from the American Poultry and Egg Institute and representatives from Uncle Ben's Rice. Latter product has had distribution problems with only 5,000 tons of a half million ton shipment sold. Mr. Martin said that a moment from the USS Caron (DD-970) was given to General Azari yesterday by Army Secretary Alexander, assisted by USAF Maj. General Gast, in the presence of GOI Adm. Habibollahi. In another matter, we have learned that the GOI will decrease several elements in the long range military

CONFIDENTIAL procurement package, principally with respect to artillery tubes. Mr. Gingles announced two upcoming Embassy events. Tomorrow a video tape on the "Selling of the F-14" will be shown at the Caravansari. On May 12 there will be a party to open the Embassy swimming pool. Mr. Goelz introduced Cy Richardson, a new member of the Consular Section. Mr. Fulmer was asked by Mr. Naas to obtain figures from the Department of Commerce on American export sales relating to the Tehran Trade Center promotion activities. Mr. Dedich will assist with an Iranian National Police training course for customs officials. He also reported on the arrest of two Iranians in Holland for heroin trafficking. Mr. Bannerman reported that La Fontaine restaurant in Isfahan received a bomb threat prior to a scheduled dinner for Secretary Alexander. The Secretary's party transferred their patronage to their hotel. The threat does not appear to have been directed against the American party. Mr. Carleton has learned of reports that the Germans and French may each sell two more reactors here -- the Japanese are also rumored to have possibilities. Such sales would put us out in the cold. POL:JWMartin:lr:5/10/78 DISTRIBUTION: CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES MAY 17, 1978 The Ambassador opened the meeting by noting that things have calmed down somewhat lately. He said he would like to learn exactly what the police have been instructed to do in the event of disturbances. With the Senate vote on the jet sales to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, the way is now clear to move ahead on some of our military sales. General Gast and Mr. Martin will consult with the Iranians and then send a paper to Washington. The Ambassador discussed rumors of a high-powered Aspen meeting to be held in Tehran. Reportedly, Edward Heath and perhaps Henry Kissinger will be among the delegation. The Ambassador asked Mr. Westly about the investment climate paper. The first draft is in, but it will not be finalized until July. The Ambassador then brought up the instructions on the Crescent Petroleum matter, saying he felt they should send their lawyers here first. Mr. Naas will draft something. It was noted that Mrs. Esther Baldwin is not coming. There is no answer yet on poppy production and aid to Pakistan: Dr. Stempel is in Mashad, but Mr. Lambrakis will speak with Mr. Dedich. The Ambassador said he had asked Mr. Bash to draw up the figures on U.S. dependency on Middle Eastern oil. The Shah and others have been saying that 50% of U.S. imported oil is from the Middle East. For the record, the actual figure is 17%. Mr. Naas said he had spoken with Mr. Nosenzo and is now waiting for a cable before seeing Mansur. He said inspection preparations seem to be going well. He also asked each section chief to prepare a memo on his anticipated representational needs over the coming year so as to better proportion out the anticipated extra money in the DCM's fund. Mr. Shellenberger announced an upcoming IAS luncheon with Daniel Lerner. The topic will be "Mass Media and Its Effect on Social Development in Iran." Another upcoming event will feature the work of Milton Glazer, the "father of graphic arts." Mr. Shellenberger asked Mr. Lambrakis about the \underline{\text{Journal de Teheran's}} item which relays the fraternal greetings of the Italian Communist Party to the Tudeh Party. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Lambrakis reported general quiet yesterday save for an incident at Tehran University. The police drove student demonstrators off campus with batons. Reviewing other events, he concluded that there was lots of talk, lots of uncertainty, lots of turmoil, but nothing serious. Commander Haack reported that the USS Barney will arrive at Bandar Abbas Saturday for a four-day visit. The Ambassador asked Ms. Dearsman for the latest on Section 911, and the meeting was adjourned. DISTRIBUTION: S/A:RBoyce:5-21-78 AMB DEA DCM S/A AMB POL ICA OR AMCONSUL ISFAHAN POL/MIL SHIRAZ ARMISH/MAAS TABRIZ ECON/COMM NEA/IRN DAO INR/RNA ADMIN CONS CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: Armenian Leader's Views on Iranian Political Stability PARTICIPANTS: Diyair Panossian, Armenian Archbishop of Tabriz Der Houanessian Vartan, local businessman and Tabriz delegate to the National Armenian Council Michael J. Metrinko, American Consulate, Tabriz, Iran DATE & PLACE: May 20, 1978, The Archbishop's Residence in Tabriz DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, CRU, CON, RSO, NEA/IRN, ISFAHAN, SHIRAZ BIO, IRN/OIL/B During the course of a four hour conversation and dinner held at the Archbishop's residence, Panossian expounded at great length on his fears for Iranian political stability. He claimed he has already voiced his views to the Armenian Catholics and to his own local advisory council, and that since the February events in Tabriz and the spread of violence throughout Iran, both the local Azarbaijan Advisory Council and the National Council in Tehran have begun to take the matter under very serious consideration. In his recent meetings with members of the upper hierarchy in Isfahan and Tehran, proposals for action in the coming troubles were a major topic of discussion. It is no longer a question of "if there is trouble," said the Archbishop, but exactly "when" the trouble will really begin. Panossian claimed he has been undergoing a severe trial of conscience in the matter of Iran's future, and especially as it affects the present viability and future of his own episcopal see. At one point the Armenian congregation in the Azarbaijan numbered 200,000 people, he said, and now at the very most there are perhaps 7,000 left. The cultural and historical heritage of the Armenians in this area is immeasurable, even to the extent of Tabriz having been founded by an Armenian king and having gotten its name from the Armenian language. There are countless remnants of the Armenian presence scattered throughout the area, vacant monasteries, churches, old graveyards, etc., and the Archbishop feels a definite responsibility for these historical remains. When he first came to Tabriz, Panossian said he was following instructions and his own urges to try to maintain the Armenian community here as a viable and living one. He has now changed his mind, and albeit with deep regret, is establishing a personal policy of helping his followers to leave Iran. He cannot see any real future here for Armenians or Christians as a whole, and is caught between maintaining a very ancient and valuable religious presence in the Azerbaijan, or thinking about the real safety of his people. PO:MJMetrinko/pjn CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 2 Referring to our conversation immediately after the Tabriz rioting in February, Panossian said that he had not fully formulated his thinking re the stability of the Iranian regime at that time, and was more affected by feelings of relief that his community had not been targeted. The events had also been too recent to be thorough analyzed. Since then, however, he has been traveling constantly throughout his see, has made a hurried trip for consultation to Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut, and has taken part in meetings with the Armenian hierarchy in Isfahan and Tehran. The reports he has received and meetings and discussions he has had all point to seri trouble, he said, and he no longer believes the Pahlavi regime will survive it. Panossian feels that the police and gendarmerie will be unable to maintain order, and speculated on a scenario where th army would eventually take control of Iran. It is not a vision he relishes, and he especially fears the interregnum, with the hither untouched Armenian community being targeted by fanatical elements for its supposed wealth and non-Moslemness before order can be restored. NOTE: Panossian has recently been contacted by the Armenian hiera in the United States since high-ranking clerical and over one hund lay pilgrims want to come to the Azarbaijan in July to participate in the annual ceremonies at the "Black Church" (Kara Kilisa). He has not yet decided what his answer should be, but I suspect that if he informs them that the trip should be canceled because of poli instability here; the reverberations in both the U.S. and Iran wil be serious. If so many wealthy and Iran-connected Armenians cancel their long-planned trip, it could be openly construed that this still influential group has lost confidence in the regime here. CONFIDENTIAL -104- [illegible] 73 Mar 21 10:14 INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO 04836 FROM AMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: INFO: ACTION: POL-3: AMB DCM CON-2 PM USIS OR CRJ SHR TAGR 13gum AMBASSY TEHRAN 04836 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR SUBJ: PUBLIC REACTION TO SHAH'S INTERVIEW REF: TEHRAN 04584 (NOTAL) 1. OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBOFFS HAVE BEEN GETTING REACTIONS FROM VARIOUS INFORMED AND LESS- INFORMED MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TO THE SHAH'S INTERVIEW OF MAY 13. A LARGE BODY OF OPINION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SURPRISED, DISAPPOINTED, AND PERHAPS EVEN A LITTLE SCARED BY WHAT THESE PEOPLE PERCEIVED AS INDECISIVENESS, NERVOUSNESS, AND IMPRECISION IN THE WAY THE SHAH CONDUCTED THE INTERVIEW. THEY TELL US THEY HAD EXPECTED THIS FIRST INTERVIEW GIVEN ONLY FILED BY: POLCOUNS:GBLambakis:lr DRAFTING DATE 5/21 TEL. EXT. 1110 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:CWNaas (cleared in draft) CONFIDENTIAL -105- OPTIONAL FORM 152(H) (Formerly FS-413-H) January 1975 Dept. of State

CONFIDENTIAL Referring to our conversation immediately after the Tabriz rioting in February, Panossian said that he had not fully formulated his thinking re the stability of the Iranian regime at that time, and was more affected by feelings of relief that his community had not been targeted. The events had also been too recent to be thorough analyzed. Since then, however, he has been traveling constantly throughout his life, has made a hurried trip for consultation to Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut, and has taken part in meetings with the Armenian hierarchy in Isfahan and Tehran. The reports he has received and meetings and discussions he has had all point to serious trouble, he said, and he no longer believes the Pahlavi regime will survive it. Panossian feels that the police and gendermerie will be unable to maintain order, and speculated on a scenario where the army would eventually take control of Iran. It is not a vision he relishes, and he especially fears the interregnum, with the hitherto untouched Armenian community being targeted by fanatical elements for its supposed wealth and non-Moslemness before order can be restored. NOTE: Panossian has recently been contacted by the Armenian hier in the United States since high-ranking clerical and over one hundred lay pilgrims want to come to the Azarbaijan in July to participate in the annual ceremonies at the "Black Church" (Kara Kilisa). He has not yet decided what his answer should be, but I suspect that if he informs them that the trip should be canceled because of policy instability here, the reverberations in both the U.S. and Iran will be serious. If so many wealthy and Iran-connected Armenians cancel their long-planned trip, it could be openly construed that this still influential group has lost confidence in the regime here. INCITE I. CHANGE TO 04536

FOR IRANIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AND CONCENTRATING MAINLY ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS TO BE DEFINITIVE AND GIVE THE LEAD TO GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN FACE OF A VARIETY OF UNCERTAINTIES CREATED HERE BY ALMOST DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS AND VANDALISM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS SOME PRETTY WILD-RUMORS. 2. UNLIKE HIS BEHAVIOR IN THE PAST IN SUCH APPEARANCES, THE SHAH WAS PERCEIVED AS NERVOUS, SOME THOUGHT PERHAPS EVEN A BIT SHAKEN OR SCARED. HE DID NOT ANSWER QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM, FOR EXAMPLE A DIRECT QUESTION ON THE REASON BEHIND THESE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AND OUTBURSTS. HE DECLINED TO GIVE THE FIGHTING ANSWER AS HE HAS IN THE PAST, I.E., BLAMING FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND RED AND BLACK REACTIONARIES, BUT NEITHER DID HE TRY A CONCILIATORY LINE, WHICH WAS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY. MANY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT WHO SUPPORT THE SHAH AND COUNT ON HIS LEADERSHIP FELT THAT HE HAD FALLEN BETWEEN TWO VIABLE APPROACHES: EITHER FIRM AND HARD LINE OR SOFT AND CONCILIATORY. INSTEAD, THEY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET WHAT HE SAID OR GLEAN AN IDEA OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH HE WANTS THEM TO GO. 3. INTERESTING, ONE EMBASSY CONTACT WHO SEES A GOOD DEAL OF THE CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT SAYS THAT THE INTERVIEW WAS RELATIVELY WELL RECEIVED IN THOSE CIRCLES IT WAS PERCEIVED AS SUFFICIENTLY CONCILIATORY TO PERMIT HOPE OF SOME SORT OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF ___ 4. COMMENT: EMBASSY SEES THIS INTERVIEW AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE SHAH'S UNCERTAINTY AT THIS STAGE OF HIS INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM. HE IS EMBARKED ON AN UNFAMILIAR VENTURE: TO LOOSEN THE REINS OF POWER AND PERMIT EXPRESSIONS OF OPPOSITION FROM A VARIETY OF QUARTERS WITHOUT ALLOWING THE FORMATION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT TO HIS DYNASTY. HE ALSO HOPES BY THIS MEANS TO CREATE GREATER POPULAR ENTHUSIASM FOR HIS RULE AND PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, HIS EXPERIENCE OF POWER TO DATE HAS INVOLVED WINNING IT FROM OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WHO RESISTED HIS TAKING IT AND THEN CONSOLIDATING HIS HOLD WITHOUT MUCH REGARD FOR HIS OPPONENTS' LIBERTY OF EXPRESSION. WHILE POLITICAL SKILLS MUST HAVE PLAYED SOME ROLE IN THE INITIAL CONSOLIDATION OF POWER, AGAINST HEAVY ODDS AT TIMES, OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS STEADFASTNESS AND FIRMNESS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY, COMPLETE LOYALTY, MILITANCY AND READINESS TO CONFRONT BY FORCE AS NECESSARY, ALL PLAYED A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE. 5. THE LONG PERIOD OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS DURING WHICH THE SHAH HAS BEEN PUSHING HIS "SHAH-PEOPLE REVOLUTION" RIDING OVER OPPONENTS OF A RELIGIOUS AS WELL AS LEFTIST CAST HAS DONE LITTLE TO DEVELOP HIS POLITICAL SKILLS. HE HAS GAINED EVEN MORE SELF-CONFIDENCE AND GRADUALLY WORKED HIMSELF INTO A POSITION WHERE HE CONSULTS FEWER AND FEWER PEOPLE IN THE SENSE OF GETTING THEIR ADVICE. MANY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT ISLAM AND THEIR MONARCH. CONFIDENTIAL Classification

REMARK ON THIS SHRINKAGE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SHAH AND HIS RELATIVELY CLOSE SUPPORTERS. SINCE HIS RULE CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY PERSONAL AND ALL DECISIONS OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE MUST BE MADE BY HIM, THE PERCEPTION OF WHAT DIRECTION HE IS MOVING IN BECOMES VERY IMPORTANT FOR HIS FOLLOWERS AS WELL AS THE OPPOSITION 6. YET LIBERALIZATION IS PRECISELY SOMETHING WITH WHICH THE SHAH IS PERSONALLY LESS FAMILIAR. HIS DOUBTS AS TO TACTICS TO USE TRANSLATE THEMSELVES TO HIS FOLLOWERS AS SELF-DOUBT: HIS LAUDABLE WILLINGNESS TO EXPERIMENT IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE MORE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MAY APPEAR AS INABILITY TO MAKE UP HIS MIND. THE NORMAL CONCLUSION THAT MANY DRAW IS THAT HE IS LOSING HIS TOUCH. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT THE SHAH HAS SUFFICIENT FEEDBACK TO REALIZE THIS IS THE IMAGE HE IS PROJECTING AT LEAST IN SOME QUARTERS. THUS, THE GAP GROWS EVEN GREATER BETWEEN THE SHAH AND MANY OF HIS FOLLOWERS AS HE STRIVES FOR A VIABLE POLICY WHICH WILL BE AS CONSISTENT AS HIS POLICIES HAVE GENERALLY BEEN IN THE PAST. IRONICALLY, THE SHAH'S OWN WELL DOCUMENTED RECORD OF UNUSUAL CONSISTENCY ON MOST QUESTIONS (SOME CALL IT STUBBORNESS) WORKS IN THIS REGARD AGAINST HIM. 7. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT IN OUR MINDS THAT THE SHAH REMAINS MASTER OF ALL NECESSARY INSTRUMENTS OF POWER. THUS, THE REALITY IS DIFFERENT FROM HIS IMAGE. THE SHAH IS MORE OPEN-MINDED AND READY TO SHIFT TACTICS CONFIDENTIAL THAN MANY OF HIS HARD-LINE FOLLOWERS. WHAT MIGHT SUGGEST WEAKNESS AND SELF-DOUBT TO SOME OF THEM IS PROBABLY SEEN BY THE SHAR AS THE WORKING OUT OF A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. [?] SULLIVAN

"EMBASSY TEHRAN "CONFIDENTIAL" E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC INFO: AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY LONDON USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USINT BAGHDAD CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 05132 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PEPR, IR, PINS SUBJ: IRAN: WHY THE SUDDEN QUIET? 1. DESPITE AN OCCASIONAL INCIDENT HERE AND THERE, ADDRESS WILL HAVE NOTED THAT RELATIVE QUIET HAS REPLACED THE RECENT TURBULENCE ON IRAN'S INTERNAL DISSIDENT FRONT. WHILE ONE MORE INCIDENTS OCCURRED ALMOST DAILY OVER THE PAST COUPLE MONTHS, THE NUMBER HAS RECENTLY FALLEN TO THREE OR FOUR A IN ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS IS HAPPENING WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS. 2. THE CRACKDOWN ON STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND VANDALISM ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND PUT INTO EFFECT BY THE SEC SERVICES AS OF MAY 11 WAS PROBABLY ONE REASON. ARRESTS OF SEVERAL HUNDRED DEMONSTRATORS IN TEHRAN ALONE (ONLY SOME OF THEM SINCE RELEASED) HAS PROBABLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE, TRUSTWORTHY CADRES AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO WOULD DRAFTED BY: POL:GBLmbrakis/ bjn 5/28 TEL:EXT. COMICNAAS CONFIDENTIAL 50152-101 CLASSIFICATION -110- MEKE TROUBLE ON THE STREETS. IT HAS PROBABLY SCARED OFF CASUAL DEMONSTRATORS WHO WOULD PREFER TO HIT AND RUN WITHOUT BEING ARRESTED, WHILE FORCING THE LEADERSHIP (PRO-KHOMEINI OR OTHERWISE) TO GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO RATIONING ITS CADRES FOR THE LONG RAIL. AT THE END OF HOURING PERIODS FOR DEMONSTRATORS KILLED IN CLASHES WITH SECURITY SERVICES PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES. FOR/EXCESSING IN A MORE FAVORABLE CONTEXT THAN OTHER TIMES. ATTENDANCE AT MOSQUES ON SUCH OCCASIONS GIVES POTENTIAL DEMONSTRATORS AN INNOCENTLY LEGITIMATE PURPOSE TO CONGREGATE AND BUTTRESSES THEIR PLEAS OF INNOCENCE IF THEY ARE SUBSEQUENTLY HAULED BEFORE A CIVILIAN COURT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, SUCH OCCASIONS HELP TO MOBILIZE MORE DISINTERESTED RELIGIOUS PEOPLE IN SUPPORT OF THE RING LEADERS, THUS SWELLING THE SIZE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND GIVING GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICES A MORE TYRANNICAL APPEARANCE AS THEY TRY TO ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER. 4. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL REASONS. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL REASONS. THE MOTIVATION OF THE MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THE COUNTRY. THESE CONSERVATIVES HAVE FOUND IT USEFUL, OR NECESSARY, TO JOIN THE EXTREMISTS MANAGED FROM HIS IRAQI EXILE BY

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, BUT THEIR MOTIVATION IS DIFFERENT FROM HIS. UNLIKE KHOMEINI, WHO HAMES NO SECRET THAT HIS INTIS TO OVERTHROW THE SHAH AND SEVERELY RESTRICT THE MONARONESE LEADERS HAVE MORE LIMITED AIMS IN MIND. CHIEFLY, WISH TO CALL ATTENTION TO THEIR GRIEVAN CES. AS LONG AS GOVERNMENT WAS PAYING LITTLE ATTENTION TO THEM, THEY HAD REASON TO WITHOLD SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI. NOW THERE ARE CATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS BEGINNING TO LISTEN. THE SHAH'S INTERVIEW TO IRANIAN PRESS MEN ON MAY 13 STRICT SO OF THESE LEADERS AS REASONABLY CONCILIATORY--WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN THE REACTION OF OTHERS CLOSE TO THE SHAH (TEHRAN 4836) OR IN THE NATIONAL FRONT LAY OPPOSITION (BEING REPORT SEPARATELY). WE KNOW THAT EFFORTS ARE ON THE WAY BEHIND SCENES TO GET DIALOGUE GOING WITH THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATION SPLITTING THEM OFF FROM KHOMEINI IF POSSIBLE. SINCE MANY THESE RELIGIOUS LEADERS SEE THE MONARCHY AS A NECESSARY INSTITUTION WHICH HELPS PROTECT ISLAM AGAINST COMMUNIST CHILENGES, AND NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE SHAH IS APPARENT TO ANYONE THEY PROBABLY ARE PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE AND SETTLE FOR A RATIONAL, RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONS. RATHER, THEY FOR A MORE UNDERSTANDING APPLICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATION AND A GREATER, MORE PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN IRANIAN LIFE. 5. OF COURSE, THE DIALOGUE PROCESS HAS NOT GONE VERY FAR AND ONLY A FEW TOP LEALERS ARE AWARD OF IT. THIS THERE ARE KELLY TO BE MORE RELIGIOUSLY ORIENTATED DISTURBANCES IN THE COMING WEEKS, BUT THEIR MAGNITUDE MAY BE REDUCED AND LONGER PERIODS OF CALM BETWEEN INCIDENTS. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MINOR DISTURBANCES ARE POSSIBLE AROUND JUNE 5, THE OCCASION BEING OBSCURE, BUT PROBABLY RELATED TO SOME TURNING PERIOD. WE ARE ALSO TOLD TO EXPECT MORE SERIOUS STURBANCES AROUND JUNE 19, WHICH IS 40 DAYS AFTER THE ILLING OF SOME ACOLYTES OF AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI IN HIS M HOUSE BY POLICE MAY 10. OUR PURPOSE IN SUPPLY THE ABOVE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MAINLY MARK THE OCCASIONS OF REDUCED VIOLENCE AND TROUBLE HERE WITHOUT IMPLYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS YET OUT OF THE WOODS. AND, DEDICATED EFFORTS WILL STILL BE REQUIRED ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT LEALERS SUCH AS COURT MINISTER HOVEY DA BEFORE THE TREND OF THE PAST FIVE OR SIX MONTHS CAN BE REVERSED. OUR A BEGINNING IS BEING MADE.

ORIGIN, ACTION DEPARTMENT OF STATE RAIN/PEP AIRGRAM FOR RM USE ONLY AREA EJUR FE A-80 CONFIDENTIAL NEA CU INIT NO.: HANDLING INDICATE E P 10 TO Department of State INFO: AMMAN, ANKARA, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS DOHA, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KATHMANDU, KUWAIT, LONDON, MANAMA, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, NEW DELHI, PARIS ROME, TEL AVIV, CINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE AOR COM FRB FROM AmEmbassy Tehran DATE: 01 JUN 79 BRT LAB TAR SUBJECT: Iran in 1977-78: The Internal Scene E.O. 11652: XGDS-2, 4 TRA XMB AIR REF TAGS: PEPR, IR ARMY CIA NAVY O3D USIA NSA SUMMARY: Liberalization and uncertainty have key-noted Iran internal political situation in 1977-78. The Shah has stake his prestige on a degree of permissiveness in civil rights freedom of expression which has drawn oppositionists into the open, but he has displayed a measure of uncertainty in inditing how he intends to deal with them. For a variety of reasons, he has desired to create more liberal political institutions in the creation, but the innovation involved in the process of succeeding raises uncertainty in the minds of his followers questions as to how long he will be able to keep this "Pandorate Box" propped partly open. Not desiring to yield the ultimatic control of his present policy-making power, the Shah never is trying to instigate and encourage the voice of the "sile of majority" to participate in government. The Rastakhiz Party Amouzegar Government has so far had only very limited success and the Shah has resorted to a variety of legal and extra-police punitive measures to keep opposition activity under control. Meanwhile, the conservative religious leadership entered the political arena as a disenchanted dissident, ad its considerable voice to that of National Front and other oppositionists. The Shah is attempting to split off the religious mass from the influence of extremist religious in gators under Ayatollah Khomeini and from the leftist opposition. His approach is still an experimental one, however. End S po13 amb dcm or usis pm econ2 cru shir tabr 13j Iran is in a turbulent transition both economically and social and this circumstance is producing a new political dynamic in this country. It is not yet clear how this dynamic will be channeled or who will ultimately control it. However, this airgram makes an effort to analyze its causes and effects. FORM 4-02 CONFIDENTIAL FOR DEPT. USE OF: [in ☐] Draked by: ROL:GBLamBrakis /AMB:WHSulFFIVan/Bjh Clearances: The most significant events in Iran derive largely from the great spread of oil and oil-free oil. The great spread of oil and oil-free oil is due to the concentration of oil and oil-free oil in the great population. The great population of Iran is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of Iran is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The population of the country is approximately 1,400,000 people. The most significant events in Iran derive largely from the great spurt of affluence which has resulted from the 1973-1974 quadrupling of the price of petroleum. This affluence has permitted the rapid development of basic infrastructure projects, a forced pace of industrialization, a wave of prosperity which reaches down even to the lower social levels, a vast increase in the number of Iranians traveling abroad, a quantum jump in the number of young Iranians able to afford a university education, sharply higher levels of economic consumption, including an improved diet, better medical facilities and health care, and an inflow of cosmopolitan foreigners to the Iranian cultural scene. At the same time, the new influence has produced double-digit inflation, distorted capital values, generated mass internal migration from the rural to the urban areas, attracted illiterate foreign laborers from Asia, lowered labor productivity, produced urban pollution and congestion, broken up the Islamic family and cultural patterns of society, stimulated conspicuous consumption and capital flight, and, in general, raised popular expectations of economic and social improvement to levels which the leadership is unable to fulfill. F Faced with this tumultuous situation, the Shah has come to realize that it is not a result of the power of the [?] to manage and direct exclusively. He feels a genuine need for therefore, to decentralize some of his current authoritarian controls and devolve responsibility upon subordinates. His theory is that if he deliberately creates a prosperous middle class, and if that group feels a grateful identity with the monarchy, his position and that of the dynasty will be strengthened. He therefore deliberately sponsors the broadest access to university education and seeks to attract university graduates into state and para-statal institutions by the provision of significant material rewards. These rewards are further enhanced by the opportunities for "bakshish" and corruption which unfortunately permeate the traditional Iranian social system. Thus, the young, newly educated Iranians readily accept the opportunities open to them and become inducted into the middle class as servants of the system. Politically, however, they remain aloof and privately they are cynical about the structure of their state. They are, consequently, questionable candidates for the role which the Shāy foeesees for them. Their attents are further complicated by the fact that the Shah has not yet decided what political institutions he will be. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL create to permit a political forum for the new middle class. The Senate and the Majles are little more than government instruments--as is the Rastakhiz Party, the one-party political organizations to which, in theory, all Iranians of voting age belong. However, the party (created in 1975) is lethargic and uncertain about its own function except as a mouthpiece of the monarch. The monarch, in the meantime, proceeds with what he likes to call "liberalization." This means a considerable relaxation of press censorship, a tolerance of political criticism and of minor manifestations of dissent, and a more genteel system of police controls than in the recent past. He is nettled by the consequences of this change, and puzzled by the failure of external critics (primarily western) to appreciate his enlightenment. He is also perplexed about how to deal with the sort of dissidents who abound in the latter part of the decade of the 70's. In this report we shall attempt to trace some of the events which have occurred in the last year and a half or two and examine the juncture to which these events have led the country. The Shah's basic commitment to liberalization made its appearance in mid-1976. One can speculate as to his reasons. Undoubtedly the Shah wishes to prepare the succession of the Crown Prince and knows his successor cannot rule in the same autocratic manner that the Shah has gradually assumed over 36 years of sometimes hazardous experience. Again, there probably was a realization on the Shah's part that a society as large and complex as Iran is getting can not be run by as small a group as before. While this is an old thought, said to be in his mind as long ago as 1961, his difficulties in coordinating economic development and avoiding economic problems probably brought home. The need in 1976 for more two-way communication with knowledgeable technicians and others so that he could be assisted in formulating policy and be better served in having it carried out. The need was felt all the more strongly as trusted advisors died off or appeared less capable of providing answers to the problems of the modern technocratic society. This in turn probably convinced him that some political means of mobilizing popular opinion was necessary both as a check on the power of individuals in the large bureaucracy and as a source of initiative in the provinces beyond Tehran. Finally, it could not have escaped so astute an observer of the world scene as the Shah that criticism emanating from the U.S. Congress on human rights policies in Iran and elsewhere by mid-1976 would be reinforced if candidate Carter became president and implemented his own serious human rights concerns. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL The First Stage: Early signs of the liberalization came in exhortation to the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) party to consult more with its membership in depth and discuss issues of importance to the country. This process was couched in the belief that the Rastakhiz Party could operate as separate from the government but a critic of the bureaucracy both in Tehran and the provinces. When the party was not very effective in this task over the period mid-1976 to mid-1977 the cure attempted was to transform it in effect into another instrument of government, presumably so that its cadres and the public would take it more seriously. A second aspect of liberalization was the introduction of some changes in legal procedures affecting political detainees or prisoners so as to give them greater access to civilian attorneys, provide for better due process and generally reduce or abolish abuses such as torture. These changes were eventually incorporated into a bill passed by parliament which officially went into effect in November 1977. A dialogue was maintained by the Shah with William Butler, President of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), which helped trigger some of these legal reforms. Less fruitful contact in Tehran and in London with Amnesty International's Martin Ennals continues, though its effect has yet to be felt in any direct significant way. There were also very useful prison visits by the International Red Cross, which have by May 1, 1978, resulted in the assignment of a resident ICRC representative in Tehran. A third aspect was more permissiveness in regard to freedom of expression. Mimeographed leaflets attacking the government, calling for a return to constitutional law, for more freedom of expression and better jurisdictional practices, and a variety of smaller demands were allowed to circulate albeit informally and by hand, and their signers were not arrested. These people were for the most part educated professionals: businessmen, teachers, writers, even judges and lawyers. They did not preach violence but derived many of their ideas from the 1950s, a period in which the National Front under Mossadegh presented the Shah his most serious, and almost lethal, challenge. Groups believing in 19th century liberalism came to be lumped in with left wing and communist groups in the "national front" opposition to the Shah. Despite this long history, the writers of the tracts in 1977-78 were for the most part acting as individuals or leaders of small groups of educated, non-violent, people who had no obvious ties to the small terrorist groups with extremist CONFIDENTIAL

Islamic or Marxist ideology that have operated in Iran for several years. They did serve to inspire the students, however, who contributed the spark of violence in this first stage. While student demonstrations have been traditional in Iran, even during the later 1960s and early 1970s when no other signs of disdience (leaving aside occasional terrorist incidents) were manifest, those which occurred in late 1977 spilled beyond university campuses and caused greater commotion than anyone remembered since 1963. Police eventually brought these demonstrations under control and for the most part to a halt. But they were assisted on one or two occasions by disciplined groups of so-called "workers" in civilian clothes who obviously acted as extra-legal arms of the government. A group of these people also broke up the one large meeting that left-wing intellectuals of the old National Front tried to hold in a private home near the city of Karaj, outside of Tehran. The Government was also concerned by signs of cooperation among all opposition groups with each other, the students, the terrorists and beyond them the religious mass of the population. Opposition Reaction: Opposition reaction to these Government measures had several aspects. The terrorist movement, partly through persuasion by leaders among the oppositionists whom they respect, desisted from further incidents and agreed to wait and see what results this internal liberalization would lead to—particularly as everyone assumed the Shah was acting under U.S. pressure. Some of the leaders who were at the Karaj meeting went back underground, and created a coordinated front or two among various small groups which have continued to distribute broadsides critical of the government. Others formed a "Commission for Human Rights and Freedom" which, while unregistered and unrecognized by the government, has set itself up as a distinct organization in opposition to the formal government burcaocracy headed by Princess Ashraf which represents Iran in international fowa dealing with human rights. Another section renewed the activities of the "Iran Writers Association," which has never been allowed to register since its creation some eight years ago but has fairly effectively challenged the credentials of the more formal organization for writers and artists which the government has patronized. Links were undoubtedly extended with religious oppositionists—the most important being Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled to Iraq after the 1963 disturbances which accompanied the Shah's land reform legislation, legislation to give more rights to women, and other aspects of the "White Revolution." The extent to which such links were forged is not exactly known, but their existence became important in the second stage. CONFIDENTIAL The Second Stage: The oppositionist links with religious leaders jumped into prominence in January 1978 when a large, significant anti-government demonstration in the religious center of Qom broke out on the anniversary of the Shah's White Revolution. Its proximate cause is said to be an ill-timed and perhaps misguided article attacking Ayatollah Khomeini which appeared a day or two before in the daily Ettela'at. Far from being Khomeini benchmen, the demonstrators represented a cross-section of conservative religious feeling and their main spokesman became Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a religious leader with even more impressive credentials that Khomeini. Up to that time, Shariatmadari had been cooperating with the government. The Ettela'at article was printed at express government insistence, and spokesmen for the religious conservatives claim to have been outraged when their demands to print a reply in the same pages went unheaded by the Minister of Information. The violence at Qom, which resulted in close to two dozen deaths, set off a brush fire of religious opposition which manifested itself regularly over the months that followed in a variety of small incidents all over the country. It has rehabilitated Khomeini in the eyes of his fellow religious leaders, so that tape recordings and leaflets by him or his supporters get wide circulation in Iran today through the bazaar underground. The 40-day commemoration of the death of the "martyrs of Qom" resulted in an even more serious outbreak in the northern city of Tabriz, where mobs rampaged through the city gutting banks and many other public institutions with particular emphasis on the bank Saadarat, whose main owner, a Bahai by religion, has been unpopular with conservative religious Islamic leaders for some years. Tabriz is a center of the Turkoman culture—people who take their religion more seriously than others and owe particular allegiance to Shariatmadari as a native son. The severity of this outbreak, too, is generally blamed on mishandling by government authorities, who, according to various reports, insulted and/or killed one or more leaders of groups which were seeking to assemble for prayer in the main city mosques in response to Shariatmadari's call for a memorial on that 40th day anniversary after the Qom "massacre." The decision to close these mosques and other mismanagement were attributed to the provincial governor, chief of police and other security forces, and they were replaced after the February events. One government reaction has been the "exiling" of several top religious leaders by uprooting them from their followers and forcing them to live in other parts of the country. This measure has never been mentioned by any of the media, as the government presumably understands the counter-reaction it might provoke if such measures were generally known and publicized. CONFIDENTIAL

The bombing of the homes of a few well-known dissidents (of a non-religious cast) and severe beatings administered to two of them were other examples of government reaction. The government, including the Prime Minister, claims no responsibility for, or knowledge of these outrages which were performed by an organization which identifies itself as the "Underground Committee for Vengeance." But there is little doubt in the popular mind that some section of the government is responsible, with most believing it is SAVAK, the secret security service, under explicit sanction of the Shah. Still another tentative government reaction has been the rounding of demonstrators by a new group which made its appearance in April under the name of the "Resistance Corps." Supposedly acting as a successor or arm of the "Civil Defense Corps," which was formed a few years ago and resuscitated with some fanfare by Prime Minister Hoveyda in May 1977, the Resistance Corps appears to consist of able-bodied young men who are prepared to tackle students and other miscreants and to turn them over to the police for legal arrest. The organization falls under authority of the Gendarmarie, but we have heard that many other security instruments and ministries contribute to its manpower and its work. Its largest manifestation to date was an attack launched on some 200-300 students in the hills above Tehran's National University on a Friday in April when the students had gathered to exchange anti-government slogans and make anti-government speeches. "Resistance Corps" men met resistance from the students and a dozen helicopters full of riot police then arrived on the scene to arrest most of the students after extensive bloodying of many. Since they were arraigned before civilian court, according to the new procedures, the state prosecutor's office reportedly ordered an investigation into why many of them were so seriously injured in the process of arrest. Nothing more has been heard of this investigation, but neither has the Resistance Corps been heard from in the past few weeks. Opposition Reaction: The opposition's counterreaction at this stage has been notably in taking advantage of the government's increasing use of the civilian court system. The trial of a number of students arrested in connection with disturbances in December permitted a field day to some 43 lawyers defending 16 of those charged (many were released for lack of evidence), and some of the top lawyers in opposition made ringing statements in defense of freedom of expression. Despite the eloquence of the defense most of the defendants (11 of 16) were eventually sentenced to five-month prison terms. That case is still under appeal, and the lawyers are preparing for more cases. An example is the complaint lodged by six of the opposition leaders whose homes were bombed or who were beaten (first paragraph above). CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL The most serious counterreaction, however, continues to come from conservative religious elements, whose supporters are obviously very angry at the government and who account probably for the vast majority of small incidents that have been occurring almost daily around the country. The issue has been joined and the government and the religious opposition are having difficulty communicating with each other. Unless there is some better dialogue it is difficult to foresee an early end to these repeated disturbances. Assessment: There is little reason for us to doubt the Shah's commitment to liberalization, which he has stated publicly on several occasion and has confirmed privately to the Americans and other ambassadors here. It is obvious, however, that he is having trouble keeping Pandora's box only partly open. His original experience at encouraging freedom of expression led to vitriolic attacks on the government and built expectations of more serious internal reform than what he perhaps had in mind when he started. (The extent of the public reaction appears to have given him pause.) It is extremely doubtful that the Shah wishes or would ever accept any serious diminution of his policy-making power. It is equally obvious that he will not permit events to escalate to the point where national security, as he sees it, would be threatened. Yet events have escalated, partly because moderation seems foreign to the Persian soul, partly through his own doing or through the mistakes and vacillation of his assistants (SAVAK, police, administrators, Party officials). He has therefore improvised a patchwork of ad hoc measures which have not always been well constructed and are unlikely to remain for long. More important, he has failed to provide clear operational guidelines for his administrators and security people in dealing with dissenters. Among the methods most outraging liberal opinion, both in Iran and elsewhere, are the bombings and beatings of respectable opponents who are able professionals (lawyers, writers, doctors, engineers, businessmen), and the use of strongarm squads against students or oppositionists either under the guise of "irate workers" or of the "Resistance Corps." Efforts by the Resurgence Party faithful to explain away these extra-legal steps as the resentful wrath of a silent majority are not persuasive, and the Party is losing what few chances it has of mobilizing general public opinion. At the same time, it is not clear how the Shah evaluates the seriousness of and potential dangers from the conservative religious *(Since this was first drafted, a tentative dialogue has begun.)* CONFIDENTIAL

opposition. The Embassy's soundings among religious leaders suggest an underlying basis of loyalty to the Monarchy and to the independence of Iran as the Shah revisions it, but increasing unhappiness at the breakdown of communications between the religious leadership and the Shah. These leaders view themselves as the backbone of opposition to the spread of communism in Iran and, indeed, the people chiefly responsible for having saved the Shah his throne, and an independent Iran during the Mossadeq crisis of 1953 (which is true to a considerable degree if one overlooks the role of the Army itself, or subsumes it as being responsive--in its draftee ranks--to the appeal of Islam against unbelievers). They resent the prominence in the GOI bureaucracy attained by many former Tudeh communist party leaders. They suggest a possible conspiracy by such leaders to cut the Shah off from his people. They naturally view the various secularizing programs in which the Shah is interested as inimical to the true Islamic character of Iran. At the same time, the Shah's new directives to his security forces, such as instructions to desist from torture, to bring people arrested up for charges soon after their arrest, to use civilian rather than military courts, to discontinue preventive arrest on suspicion, are disorienting. Those in charge of security are being told they will be held responsible for any major new outbreaks (such as those in Tabriz and Qom) but are also being prevented from using the time-honored methods of arrest, long imprisonment, and manhandling--if not worse--to get at the threat. Security forces were not very effective in Tabriz, and there is obviously considerable trepidation in official circles as to the extent of their effectiveness when challenged again. Riot police and units of the military have been used to assist the regular police but it would be foolhardly to rule out more serious incidents occurring, and the Shah being faced with the predicament of going back on his promise of liberalization or facing a serious breakdown in the morale and capabilities of his security forces. The rioting in Tabriz, Qom, and Tehran May 8-11 which elicited the Government's announcement of a crackdown on street demonstrations is the first of a possible series of steps backing away from liberalization which the Shah might undertake. The Chinese experience of letting a "Thousand Flowers Bloom" and then chopping them down would be pertinent. It would reinstall firm rule as it existed prior to the reforms of 1976-78. But it would also represent a retreat from the reasons he had for starting that liberalization (the succession, more delegation and advice, greater political maturity of the population) and diminish his prestige. It is too early as of this writing to be definitive CONFIDENTIAL the direction the Shah will take. He himself is undoubtedly still feeling his own way. For the moment (May 11) he has announced that liberalization will continue. Therefore, if our arcsement is essentially accurate, the Shah will have to make some hard decisions in the near future, particularly if the summer turns out to be violent. At present, government spokesmen are still taking of "Islamic-Marxist opposition" and lumping together "red and black" or "left and right" reactionaries. They are also alleging foreign influences behind this opposition, presumably in an effort to save face and preempt the appeal of patriotism on behalf of the government. Some of the Shah's own recent attacks on "old and new colonialism" can be seen as a conscious effort to draw the mantle of patriotism more tightly around himself and attract positive political support as well as discredit the opposition. All this plays into the hands of his opposition. It unites rather than divides them. In the past, the Shah successfully divided his opponents. Iran undertook and won the battle against Russian encroachment in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan before turning against the British oil interests. The Shah's defense against left-wing elements led by Mossadeq prospered because conservative Islam was behind him. When he struck against land owners and the Islamic establishment in 1962 and 1963, the left-wing had been reduced to impotence. He seems to have been neglecting those lessons to date—though some of his recent comments to the Ambassador (and at least one article in a local newspaper) suggest he may be beginning to revert to that strategy. There are plenty of seeds of division among the opposition. The religious people themselves make no secret that they are divided into many groups and strains of opinion, and all that has coalesced them is the dominant resentment of government behavior. The so-called "National Fronters" in fact include groups from far left socialism to 19th-century-liberalism, who are by no means prepared to work for the victory of each other. The violent and nonviolent, the Khomeini extremists and the small groups of terrorist guerrillas, all represent diverse interests which would not combine against the government if the government were clever in keeping them divided. There is little doubt that the Shah will not abandon his vision of a secular Iran allied with the secular West rather than with Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Pakistan, but his movement toward that goal has to allow for the tactic of comparison with the powerful religious conservatives, on whom, in the final analysis, he is still heavily dependent if challenged by some elements of the left or by international subversion with more obvious Soviet backing. He is attempting, therefore, to CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 'tehran A-80 Page 11 open better channels to the religious leadership and will doubt act on some of their complaints. If done deftly, this should to a long way to assuage them and lead to a breakdown of opposition unity. This still would not in itself get the Shah closer to the greater degree of political participation which he requires both for better management of his complex economic and social system and for preparing the way of a successor. But it would divide the opposition repair his links with his natural conservative allies and restore some sense of law and order in which he can continue to pursue his basic objectives. SECRET CONSULATE RAINTRAL DE PICENS CONFERENCE TEHRAN, JUNE 5, 1978 THOSE ATTENDING: Dowling, Thomas Grierson, Jack Hart, Howard Higham, James Kleiber, Micki Cusack, Thomas Lambrakis, George Martin, Joanna McGaffey, David Netrinko, Michael Naas, Charles Rogers, Kenneth Stempel, John Taylor, Clyde Tomseth, Victor George Lambrakis reviewed political developments over the past year, noting that the Shah has begun to liberalize the Iranian system. The government has expressed a belief in political participation and recent demonstrations have raised the question whether the Shah is in full control or not. Has the process come so far as to be irreversible? Old political leaders of the National Front are reemerging in opposition. Religious people, including several Ayatollahs, are becoming more political This has been reflected in increased student activity which reflects all groups and not a unified student point of view. The army and senior civil servants are becoming concerned about this process and there is a question whether they will react against liberalization. DISCUSSION: Tomseth noted that the National Front groups were not active in Southern Iran. In Kerman, however, the National Front was the best organized opposition element and had finally surfaced in May 1978. Religious elements are basically split into two groups: 1) those with well thought out political positions on the Monarchy and the Islamic Community, and 2) a larger group from traditional or rural backgrounds who are unhappy with modernization. These derive leadership from the first group. Students in Shiraz are ambivalent; they favor modernization but reflect the uncertainties of traditional backgrounds. McGaffey noted that the Shah certainly has the power to do what he wishes and enforce policy. In Isfahan people believe that the Shah does not know the breadth and depth of popular discontent. There is a major new element: civil servants and Ministry officers fear the Shah may give into the traditionalists and destroy the precarious position of the modernists. Hence, there is pressure from the bureaucrats favoring strong action against discontent. Ayatollah Khomeini is very powerful in the Isfahan bazaar. Many Isfahari religious leaders do not like him out feel chevy must access him since he has widespread popular support. There is also discontent among other modernists. i.e., investors, factory owners, workers. Investors feel they have been tricked into reinvesting their profits locally while workers who were promised participation have seen their salaries fall back in real terms over the past year. $ \underline{\mathrm{~S~E~C~R~E~T~}} $

Metrinko said Tabriz is "Tyrgent country". People do not speak Persian, and the history of Azarbaijan has always been one of separatism. City government has virtually ceased to exist due to constant transfers--sometimes 2-3 men in four months in the same office. The University at Azarbadegan has only held four of its sixteen weeks of classes. The killing of students in early May turned the University staff against the government. Religion is a vital force in Tabriz, which is not a progressive city. Virtually the only entertainment that exists is through the mosque. The normal social structure has been reduced. Social clubs and movies have been closed. Tabriz, Empress Farah (who is widely respected elsewhere) is despised even by members of her family, who claim the Tehran Dibas have ceased being Turkish. There is some belief the Shah is not fully informed about what has been unleashed in Tabriz. Metrinko noted it would be difficult to reimpose strict author There is some belief that conscript troops might not fire on Tabrizis if they believed people were rioting for religious reasons. In February, troops were told communists were trying to take over. The officers now realize the rioters were not communists and sense they were fooled. However, the army staff feels it could handle any eventuality McGaffey interjected that when the Isfahan helicopter base went on alert after the Afghani coup, only the officers flew these aircraft--enlisted trainees were assigned to classroom work. Many feel the GOI ha-lied about the demonstrations. MODERNIZATION AND RELIGION: Tomseth noted that a whole range of discontents arising from modernization are beginning to surface. Iranians claim modernization is taking away a sense of identity. If so, political liberalization has merely made manifest a process going on for some time. McGaffey noted younger Air Force officers in Isfahan are committed to modernization and very uneasy about a liberalization which would give substantial concessions to those opposed. Many of the modernizing elitists see the police as a problem, an obstacle to modernization. Dowling noted that the police officials with whom he deals are committed to their organizations, but modernizers would support the GOI, particularly if they viewed the choice as between a modernizing government and a conservat religious government. Most do not yet view the situation this Naas raised the question of whether there are such fundamental differences between Shia clergy and civilian government that the could not be compromised. Could the GOI deal with the clergy without being perceived as weak? Some external ideological S E C R E T influences on Islamic conservationism was noted. McGaffey thought ideology was in second place—which individual was interested in his own well-being and advancement. The emphasis on religion comes from desire for a political comeback by religious leaders. Dowling noted the increase in religious feeling has clearly increased the number of minorities who are seeking US visas. The Armenian archbishop is reportedly encouraging his supporters to leave Iran. The Tideh organization is actively organizing by concentrating on propaganda. It is preparing to take advantage of a future situation and ingratiating itself with the mullahs. McGaffey said police remained essentially inactive in Isfahan in the face of growing demonstrations, but were delighted when they were given orders to fire as necessary. The general Iranian belief is that "while the Shah shows moderation, his opponents never will". Belief was expressed that the military will be the final arbiter in a succession crisis. Although there is some religious influence in the military, it is expected to remain loyal to the Empress or the Crown Prince. If the entire royal family is killed, Iran will be up for grabs. ECONOMIC SITUATION: Taylor noted that the decision-making mechanism has not proved capable of handling advanced problems of industrialism. Concerning GOI efforts at decentralization, only "In the budget area is there effective initiative, and delegation of authority has gone only to the cabinet or highest subcabinet levels. There is lack of an overall labor policy. Worker frustration is becoming visible because of a decline in real wages and the economic slowdown, particularly in the construction industry which has been the chief source of employment for the illiterate and unskilled. There will be large budget deficits now, not beginning in 1981 as earlier projected. There has been a tilt in economic planning toward autarchy, i.e., the meeting of basic human needs rather than a singleminded commitment to making Iran a "West Germany" by the year 2000. As a result, Iran is making mistakes in the mineral sector, curtailing exploration when it needs more. A main element in developing a viable economic strategy will be to convince the Shah to lower his expectations. Iran can do better than BHN but must abandon the illusions of being a West Germany. Income distribution is badly skewed and the wealthy lack a commitment or confidence which sustains investment. This gives rise to political discontent and economic stagnation. McGaffey suggested people are blaming the economic downturn on the Shah and are looking for a new "great idea"--the functional equivalent of a new oil discovery. Tomseth suggested the GOI will have to make very tough decisions, particularly to placate the middle class which increasingly wants a piece of one action in determining its own fate. Neas noted that one of the major emerging

controversies will be the division of resources between military spending and economic development. It has no political implications and it was agreed that there are substantial military spinoffs to civilian development in certain sectors, but not in the area of used equipment. In response to a question Taylor suggested ways money could be spent which would increase long-range development without fueling the fires of inflation: 1) provide more training in the technical sector areas--vocational training, auto maintenance, etc.; 2) housing--put resources in and eliminate the materials on the black markets--improve worker housing, not luxury construction; 3) phase agricultural spending away from purchasing foreign products toward subsidies which encourage greater local production. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.: The principal officers agreed the U.S. is becoming, to some degree a fall guy for Iran's problems. The U.S. is supporting the Shah, hence religious ideologues attack the U.S. as a supporter of the government. Modernists believe the U.S. presence in Iran has pushed up rents and food costs. Students favor the U.S. as a place which offers many benefits, but neither they nor their elders believe it has anything to recommend it to Iran in terms of political philosophy. At the moment, U.S. power is not respected and we are seen as a weak, indecisive nation. At the moment, this view is not making serious inroads on the reservoir of good will held by the overwhelming majority of Iranians. Nevertheless, there are situations in which the U.S. could turn very swiftly into a scapegoat for Persian problems. Modernists will blame the U.S. for the government's economic failings, and oppositionists will blame us for not foisting "our" (their) conception of a political structure upon the Shah. Draft: POL: JDStemp1:lab:7-16-78 Clearance: POL:GBLambrakistECON:CDTaylor DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM USIS AMCONSUL SHIRAZ POL-2 CONSULATE '' TABRIZ POL/M DAO '' ISFAHAN ECON NEA/IRN OR INR/RNA DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM INDICATE □ CHARGE TO 05451 FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC INFO: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 05451 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PEPR, IR, BA SUBJ: IRAN'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS: NEED FOR INFORMATION 1. MANAMA, AS WELL AS DOHA, JIDDA, KUWAIT AND MUSCAT, ARE ADDRESSEES ON TEHRAN A-80 POUCHED JUNE 1, WHICH IS ENTITLED "IRAN IN 1977-1978; the internal SCENE." THRUST OF THAT ANALYSIS IS THAT INTERNAL DISTURBANCES DERIVE FROM CONSCIOUS POLICY OF LIBERALIZATION BEGUN BY THE SHAH IN 1976 AND STILL CONTINUING. WHILE LIBERALIZATION HAS ALLOWED/UNDERLYING COMPLAINTS AND SOME SERIOUS HOSTILITIES TO THE REGIME TO SURFACE, SHAH AND HIS ESTABLISHMENT WITH STAY FIRMLY IN ANALYZES CONTROL. STUDY/VARIOUS TYPES OF OPPOSITION INCLUDING TWO KINDS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS, SEVERAL SHADES OF FORMER AND NEWER NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS, TERRORISTS AND STUDENTS. DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: POL:GBLambrakis/bjh 6/7 DCM:CWNaaS CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION

2. WE SHALL INCLUDE GULF POSTS MORE FREQUENTLY IN OUR LARGER ASSESSMENTS, THOUGH WE HAVE SO FAR KEPT DISTRIBUTION OF OUR FREQUENT STATUS REPORTS VERY LIMITED. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO SEND COPY OF A-80 TO OTHER POSTS IN THE AREA THAT REQUEST INFORMATION AND ANALYSES ON CURRENT EVENTS IN IRAN. Ambassador Sullivan opened the meeting by describing his call with Mr. Naas yesterday on Prime Minister Amouzegar. Among the subjects discussed were the Rastakhiz Party, the nuclear accord, and Colonel Sanders. The Prime Minister indicated he was not too impressed with the idea of a third wing of the Rastakhiz Party. On the nuclear issue, Amouzegar made a constructive suggestion regarding the "time frame" clause and the question of MFN status for Iran. We heard from Washington by telephone that the agencies involved are pleased and are moving ahead on proposing alternative language. The Ambassador also gave the Prime Minister the note concerning Colonel Sanders' copyright problems. The Prime Minister said he would move to have the offending signs changed from "Kentucky Fried Chicken" to "Kashani Fried Chicken." The Ambassador asked Mr. Lambrakis to do a biographic study of the various Majles members who have been elected to the Rastakhiz politburo. Mr. Lambrakis was also asked to see that the communique stemming from the Emir of Bahrain's visit to Iran is passed to all our posts in the Gulf area. At the same meeting, the Ambassador gave Bayandor information on the construction budget for Tabriz University. There has been no new Chancellor appointed as of yet and none likely to be in the near future. Mr. Naas will keep tabs on this issue while the Ambassador is away. The Dutch Ambassador told Ambassador Sullivan that he had heard that the U.S. Navy wanted to build all the frigates. The Ambassador explained that a team of experts was coming to examine what sort of U.S. armor would go on the Dutch frigates. The Ambassador asked Messrs. Brewin and Gingles about the Brewin-Mills overlap problem and advised them to try and have Mills reinstalled on the Geneva delegation. The Ambassador gave Mr. Goelz two recent cables concerning our policy on Afghan refugees. He also asked whether anyone was interested in attending a gala performance of Carmen at Poudaki Hall. After a brief pause, Mr. Shellenberger said he would like to write.

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Shellenberger described his discussions with Andrew Whitley of the BBC and then read a long list of complaints about the state of affairs in Iran. The list had been drawn up at the request of His Imperial Majesty by a group of noted intellectuals. Mr. Brewin reported that he and Mr. Westley have been hearing laments from the Westinghouse people that the Metro project will go to the French, thanks to the closed nature of the bidding. Mr. Lambrakis announced that June 19 will apparently occur on June 18 this year. The religious activists have all agreed to stay home on that day rather than demonstrate. Mr. Shellenberger said that tracked with Whitley's feeling that the disturbances had peaked. Mr. Ferree then took over center stage with reports on crop predictions for the coming year and the visit of the Minister of Agriculture to Australia and the United States. To conclude his report, he announced that he had received a request to help Iran find a market for its franckincense and myrrh. Mr. Adler said he had learned this morning that I. Sihweil, the NRC safety expert, will not be coming to Iran after all. He wondered if perhaps the rejection might be a signal of Iran's displeasure with the lack of progress in the nuclear area. The Ambassador said that the Germans would be affected by the rejection as well, since they had been counting on U.S. safety controls for their reactors. Mr. Adler will follow up with Cyrus Mansur. Mr. Adler also reported on his attendance at the recent meeting of the Iran Family Planning Association. The word is that the Ministry of Health is not helping at all. The Ambassador suggested that Messrs. Naas and Adler might bring up the topic in any future call on Minister Sheikh. Mr. Byrnes introduced Robert Powell, the new Acting CAAG. Ms. Dearsman discussed her meetings with Iranian tax officials who requested "assistance and advice from IRS" computer experts. The Ambassador asked to check with John Macy and Jack Vaughan as such a program may already exist. Mr. Dedich reviewed his meeting with representatives of the Iranian National Police concerning training in Iran for CONFIDENTIAL The author would like to apologize to Mr. Martin for not including his comment that the Westinghouse representatives were fission for complements. DISTRIBUTION:

OPTICAL FORM NO. 10 JULY 1998 EDITION DRA FURNAL OFR) 101-11,6 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum TO : CONS - Mr. Goelz FROM : SHIRAZ - Victor L. Tomseth DATE: 6/1/98 Subject: Principal Officers' Meetings While I cannot speak for my colleagues, I found our recent principal officers' meeting convincing proof of the utility of holding these gatherings on a regular basis. I continue to believe that some kind of specific theme for each session tends to focus the participants' attention, and hence is a useful device for maximizing what can be accomplished during the relatively short time allotted. I think the first day's seminar on internal politics amply demonstrated this point. For the future I suggest the following as possible themes: --The Iranian educational system, the role of students in society, and the impact of study abroad. In addition to the principal officers themselves, I think it would be useful to include individuals from JCA, POL and CONS as key participants. --Economic development in Iran, prospects for continued growth, and the implications for future political stability. ECON would clearly have to take the lead, but the Agricultural Attache, CONS and POL could also make valuable contributions. --The country commercial program and the role of the constituent posts. The Commercial Attache and the Trade Center would have to do most of the work, but I would think that considerable emphasis should be given to consideration of practical techniques for improving the constituent posts' contribution to the overall effort. The Iranian military's role as an agent for modernization and a political force. If some military officers with field advisory experience could be recruited to participate along with elements from various Embassy sections and the principal officers, such a session could provide valuable insights to the behavior of a key group in this country. As for organization of the meetings, I offer the following thoughts: First, sufficient time is needed to fully explore each theme. Three hours proved insufficient to cover all important aspects of the internal political scene. Perhaps a split session--10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 to 4:00 p.m.--would be better. Second, some kind of outline made available to key participants in advance of the session helps establish the parameters of the discussion. Third, a chairperson keeps the discussion from drifting. Fourth, key participants might be asked to take responsibility for a specific aspect of the topic, thereby allowing coverage in greater depth than is perhaps otherwise possible. As far as the administrative and nuts-and-bolts aspects of consular matters are concerned, I find the roundtable discussion approach a good one. My only complaint in this area is that we have had insufficient time devoted to consular issues. Perhaps an extra hour in the afternoon, say from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m., would be better.

SECRET BV ESA188BRA651 RUCHR DE RUEMC 7949 1821922 ZNY 9555 ZZH R 011919Z JUL 78 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN - 5248 SECRET STATE 167949 E.O. 116521GDS TAGS: PINT, IR SUBJECT1 REPORTED SAVAK REFORMS REF:CI-315/8758-78 OF JUNE 27, 1978 ACTION DEVELOPMENTS OUTLINED REFMSG ARE MOST ENCOURAGING IF FULLY CARRIED OUT. PLEASE CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY AND REPORT ANY INDICATIONS OF CHANGE IN SAVAK POLICIES OR OPERATIONS. VANCE CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES JULY 5, 1978 The Charge asked that each Section chief be liberal in granting leave for the afternoon of July 6 to allow time off for those who wish to attend the Independence Day celebration at Lavison. Mr. Naas noted that we shall be flooded with visitors over the weekend. The first to arrive will be Deputy Assistant Secretary Lou Nozenso from the Department of State who will attempt to push along the nuclear bilateral agreement. Undersecretary Newsom who is visiting South Asia, the Middle East and Europe, will arrive to discuss recent events in the area and will have an audience with the Shah. In addition, Deputy Permanent Representative James Leonard will arrive July 8 to discuss United Nations matters with various GOI officials. Mr. Lambrakis reviewed local press coverage and remarked that the BBC is in the dog house again following the Whitley report from Afghanistan. There is relative quiet on the internal front. A Resurgence Party official, in castigating those candidates who defect from Resurgence Party, implied that they will be able to run as independents. During our 4th of July reception Nahavandi, in response to a query, said his organization is not going to be quite a "third wing" of the Resurgence Party but rather a "group" The Charge welcomed our new Agricultural Attache Koy Neeley. Mr. Martin said he is pursuing the Jordanian Ambassador's request for a status report on the proposed third country transfer of training rockets for use by the Jordanian Air Force with the US-origin F-5s acquired by the RJAF from Iran. Col. Schaefer introduced the new Naval Attache Capt. Roy Hollingworth. He also announced the proposed visit of Maj. Gen. Sadler, commander of the 21st Air Force at McGuire AFB, to inspect the MAC Terminal. Mr. Adler reported the Joint Economic Committee visitors concluded the market for solar power is very bright. They found that the Ministry of Energy budget has been increased five fold in this area and there may be market for US companies. Mr. Dedich will be traveling to the Persian Gulf next week. Mr. Ryno, following up Mr. Adler's remarks, noted that the Trade Center has filed cables and a final report on the solar energy show. Exhibitors found that there is a most interesting potential market for US firms. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Cdr. Haack announced the visit of the USS Barney to Bandar Abbas to participate in exercises with Iranian naval units. The Charge congratulated Mr. Bannerman for a fine job at the 4th of July reception where security was good but not oppressive. POL:JWMartin:lab:7-5-78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB CONS DCM DEA AMCONSUL SH1RAZ POL DAO ARMISH/MAAG ISFAHAN ECON ICA POL/MIL S/A OR NEA/IRN ADMIN INR/RNA CONFIDENTIAL JULY 12, 1978 The Charge opened the meeting by announcing that the nuclear bilateral accord was initialled yesterday. The main problem on reprocessing has been worked out, thanks in large measure to Ambassador Sullivan's suggestions of five weeks ago. The Charge said that Under Secretary Newsom's visit went very well. The main objective in Iran had been to share opinions on the eastern situation. The Shah was sympathetic towards helping Pakistan should they drop their reprocessing plant. If they go ahead with it, the U.S. is constrained by legislation from any further economic or political aid to Islamabad. Mr. Shellenberger asked whether the nuclear accord would require Senate approval. The Charge said that the treaty would go into force after sixty working days unless either House disapproves. Mr. Shellenberger reported that political scientist William Griffith is in town and will meet with both the Shah and the Prime Minister. In other ICA news, the Tabriz IAS is turning the corner in terms of having a solvent and flourishing academic program. Colonel Vander Meer reported that General Gast was with the Command and Control Steering Group. General Azhari is favorably impressed so far and will take up the subject with the Shah this weekend. Mr. Brewin, the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, said that the oil consortium representatives were in Tehran last week to reach an agreement to replace the 1973 accord. The Iranians agreed to the new 20¢ discount per barrel, which is down 2¢ from the earlier agreement. The consortium will lift 3.3 million barrels a day. Mr. Brewin and Economic Counselor- designate Mills met with the head of the Iranian Social Security Administration to discuss the possibilities for an agreement. Within a week or so, Embassy representatives will meet with CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Social Security representatives to work out a draft to send to Washington. We want to keep it fairly simple, but Washington may want something along the lines of the German and Italian models. Mr. Boyce gave the day's report for the Political Section. After reviewing the latest rumors on Ambassadorial shifts, he reported that the new group of Iranian jurists has recently named its officers and has announced that it will seeks contacts with U.S. human rights groups and the U.N. Human Rights Commission Nahavandeh's "Third Wing" has published a report criticizing the Amouzegar government's economic policies. The report blamed the Chamber of Guilds for much of the inflation, and now the Chamber has declared its opposition to the report. This move may affect Majlis members who were considering joining the Nahavandeh faction. Finally, the Mayor of Meshed has announced that any municipal employees found to be involved in corruption or bribery will have their heads shaved (by Madame Mayor) and will be driven through the streets in an open convertible car. This announcement has touched off a hot debate in the halls of the Majlis over the Mayor's legal right to do this. Mr. Neeley reported that the volume of U.S. exports to Iran totaled $423 million last year and this year appears to be approaching a similar level. Pregnant cows continue to be a popular item. On the wheat crop, he said that, despite the drought earlier this year, the level will reach last year's mark. Mr. Mills reported on the new Commissary's hours and on the "7-11" store that will remain on the compound. Mr. Richardson reported that Mr. Goelz left this morning on extended leave for four, six, eight or ten weeks. Mr. Bannerman introduced new TSO Paul Tubbs and new RSO Dave Marshall. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL M1. Snow reported that IAS is beginning predeparture orientations for Iranian students going to the United States. A:RLBoyce:hg 8/24/78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB CONS AMCONSUL SHIRAZ DOM DEA ISFAHAN POL DAO TABRIZ FON ICA ARMISH/MAAG POL/MIL S/A ER NEA/IRN ADMIN INR/RNA CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES July 19, 1978 The Charge opened the meeting by saying that Under Secretary Newsom's talks in Kabul and Islamabad were completed, with the Pakistanis offering their traditional position in a number of areas. We are expecting to receive a summary of the Newsom trip which we will share with the Iranians. Meanwhile, Under Secretary Cooper may visit Iran next week. Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Roger A. Brewin bade farewell to the Country Team after four years of service to the cause of US-Iranian friendship. General Gast said he spoke with General Graves last night regarding the Charge's message on the F-4 program. We have recommended that the program be re-examined so as to include Group A wiring. This would allow the Wild Weasel to be put on the F-4s at a later date, should we decide to release those missiles to the Iranians. Without the Group A wiring, the GOI probably won't buy the planes. Mr. Lambrakis reviewed the internal political situation, announcing that the opposition is planning a mass rally for tomorrow evening on the corners of Takht-e-Jamshid and Pahlavi Boulevard. Mr. Richardson told the Charge that the Consulate is issuing 600 to 700 NIVs a day. SA:RLBoyce:hg 8/24/78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB CONS AMCONSUL SHIRAZ AMB AMB DCM DEA AMCONSUL ISFAHAN POL DAO AMCONSUL TABRIZ ECON ICA ARMISH/MAAG POL/MIL S/A OR NEA/IRN ADMIN INR/RNA CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES JULY 26, 1978 The Charge opened the meeting by discussing the telegram he sent last night describing his conversation with General Toufanian. The General said the GOI doesn't want the F-4E's unless they carry Group A wiring. He said that the Strike offer had confused him and that he and the Shah had decided that the USG must be trying to unload the Shrikes. They decided to take the Shrikes off our hands if that is what it would take to get Group A wiring. Dr. Stempel will call the British to see if they have made an approach on Namibia. The Charge will probably go to the Foreign Ministry today on Mauritania and the Middle East. The Charge gave Mr. Mills the results of a recent survey of Embassy personnel management. Mr. Mills will circulate it. Mr. Zischke reported that IAS Tehran has received a building permit for the construction of a new academic center. Dr. Stempel introduced a new employee, Larry McKinney, from DEA. He then reported on the story in today's paper on riots in Meshed. He said there were demonstrations all over the country during last weekend, which were mostly peaceful save for one in Jahrom. Mr. Martin said he spoke with Mr. Precht about the Wild Weasel matter. Undersecretary Newsom is now working to get approval to release the Wild Weasel to the IIAF. This comes after congressional staffers' negative reaction to State's earlier presentation which had called for installation of Group wiring without a commitment to release Wild Weasel until further down the road. Mr. Taylor reported on the recent Cabinet shifts, noting that PBO has now had three Ministers in one year. He also discussed some rumors coming out of yesterday's Bankers' luncheon concerning the Shah's health. S/A:RBo:7/30/78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB POL/MIL CONS S/A AMCONSUL SHIRAZ DCM OR DEA NEA/IRN " ISFAHAN POL ADMIN DAO INR/RNA " TABRIZ ECON CONS ICA ARMISH/MAAG CONFIDENTIAL

June 28, 1978 Charles Naas, Esquire Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Tehran Dear Mr. Naas: The attached letter from Ambassador Little is self-explanatory. The Intelligence Community Staff is undertaking a follow-up experiment primarily to review the validity of the priority national intelligence needs and to assess the impact and effectiveness of the initial FOCUS review. Must keep in business you know! We would very much appreciate your candid opinion. Our deadline for getting State views to Ed Little is August 11. If you do have any comments would you drop me a note or send a STADIS telegram Attn: INR/OIL, CCMoor. As Ambassador Sullivan was in the Department, I showed him the attached package. He pencilled in an additional item on the list of priorities, and agreed that we should go ahead with the review. Carol C. Moor Office of Intelligence Liaison Bureau of Intelligence and Research DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Human Resources Committee Office of the Chairman HRC-C-78-04321 JUN 1978 Charles W. Naas, Esquire Chargeé d'Affaires, a.i. American Embassy Tehran Dear Mr. Naas: For some three years the interagency Human Resources Committee has conducted a FOCUS Review Program--assessments of human source reporting from selected US missions abroad in response to national intelligence needs. We enjoy full participation of the Department of State and the various intelligence agencies represented on the National Foreign Intelligence Board. A FOCUS Review on the Mission in Iran was conducted about a year and a half ago, and its results were forwarded to Chargeé d'Affaires Jack Miklos by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on 26 January 1977. A list of priority national intelligence interests which were derived from the FOCUS Review process was forwarded to you on 17 May 1977. On a trial basis, the Secretariat of the Human Resources Committee, in cooperation with the principal intelligence agencies and the Department of State, is embarking upon a selected FOCUS Follow-up Program of previously conducted reviews. The purposes of FOCUS Follow-ups are to review the validity of the priority national intelligence needs (or interests) and to assess the impact and effectiveness of the initial FOCUS Review in terms of reporting from all elements of the mission. In view of the continued high national interest in the reporting from your mission, and its importance to policymakers in Washington, a FOCUS Follow-up on Iran is one of the initial candidates for this new program. As an integral part of the follow-up, we would appreciate having your views and those of the country team about the mission's current reporting program and the usefulness of the earlier FOCUS Review. Any suggestions you may have with regard to current reporting guidance and requirements would also be helpful to us. The FOCUS Follow-up will be conducted in a relatively informal manner and should take six to eight weeks to complete. I am enclosing for your

SECRET convenience a brief summary of the FOCUS Review format along with copies of the earlier correspondence cited above. I hope that you will be able to assist us. Sincerely, 18 Little Ambassador Edward S. Little Chairman Enclosures:As stated Tehran, Iran CONFIDENTIAL August 1, 1978 Ms. Carol C. Moore Office of Intelligence Liaison Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State Washington, D.C. Dear Carol: Re your letter of June 28, in view of the Shah's political liberalization process and the attendant political unrest in the country, I suggest a sub-para under Internal, 1, along the lines: strength, nature, programs, etc., of the opposition elements and extent of their threat to the regime. Otherwise, the list has held up well with time. Sincerely, Charles W. Rees Charge d'Affaires ad interim

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES AUGUST 2, 1978 The Charge informed Country Team members that a pipebomb had been thrown over the wall of the Consulate at Isfahan late last night. There were no injuries and no serious damage. We consider this an isolated incident not one involving any of the sophisticated terrorist groups. Mr. Naas cautioned all to review their personal security precautions. On a more pleasant note, the Ambassador's office has received some tickets for the members pavilion at Farahbad race course and Mission staff may sign up for them. With regard to rumors concerning the Shah's health, news photos show him rested, relaxed, tan and fit. A recent personal contact also found him in fine form. Mr. Zischke reported that the proposed Fulbright agreement seems to be back to square one. The Charge commented that he has studied the question and seems no need for undue haste in pressing ahead with a revised agreement since the old agreement is basically satisfactory to us. Mr. Westley said the Vice President of International Underwriters attended a recent US-Iran Business Council meeting in London and gave a very upbeat briefing on the meeting which participants found most productive. Mr. Stempel passed along a Rastakhiz newspaper stoi, which criticized Dr. Amini for his premature declaration of political activity. The local press also reported a UN request to Iran, among others, for contributions to a UN peacekeeping force for Namibia. OSI/Armish Maag has alerted us to a possible demonstration tomorrow at the Tajrish main mosque. Mrs. William Woodside, a Senate Judiciary Committee staffer, called for a briefing on the narcotics scene. She will also see Mr. Dedich. Her husband, the president of American Can Co., will call on David Westley regarding business opportunities. Mr. Thomas has reported Isfahan bomb incident to OSI and Mr. Bannerman has gone to make an on-the-scene investigation. Col. Philips has asked if the Embassy has objection to issuing an advisory on tomorrow's demonstration which will come at the beginning of Ramazan. Following Country CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Team discussion it was decided to issue a low key advisory pegged to the start of Ramazan. Mr. Carleton said that the Ministry of Energy has shown interest in obtaining U.S. solar energy experts under AID's 661 provision. The Charge commented that AID is always looking for good projects for that money and solar energy is a possible area for U.S. business opportunity in Iran. POL:JWMartih:8/2/78 ADMIN NFA/IRN AMCONSUL SHIRAZ DCM CONS INR/RNA ISFAHAN POL DEA ARMISH/MAAG TABRIZ ECON DAO POL/MIL ICA OR S/A

Documents From the U.S. Exchange on (12) FORM SECRET THIS IS A COVER SHEET THEUNAUTHORIZEDDISCLOSUREOFTHEINFORMATIONCONTAINEDIN THEATTACHEDDOCUMENTISCUILRESULTIN SERIOUSDAMAGE TO THE UNITED STATES 1. Exercise the necessary experts to prevent unauthorized disclosure by never leaving the documents unattended except when properly secured in a locked safe. the t. 4. Obtaining capacity to purpose (healed to know and who possess STORAGE IN THE clearance. Store: prescribed in A1885. IRAN (3) ACTION 1. SECRET material originating in an agency outside the Department of Defense will not be reproduced; copied, or extracted without the consent of the originating agency has spec. only 3. Reproduction of Joint Chiefs of Staff papers is not authorized. DISPOSITION This cover sheet should be removed when document(s) are filed in a permanent file, declassified, destroyed, or mailed. E CREST Student Following Imam the ۲۸. زیال

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES AUGUST 9, 1978 The Charge opened the meeting by welcoming Harry Burton, the new FAA chief. He then briefly discussed the upcoming Camp David summit, noting that our efforts to have a high-level official come to Iran to brief the Shah on this latest stage in the Middle East peace process have so far been unsuccessful. The Charge asked all Counselors and section chiefs to prepare "While You Were Away" memos for the Ambassador's return later this month. The memos should be turned in to Mr. Boyce by August 22-23. General Huyser, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of European forces and Vice Admiral Foley, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, will be visiting Iran in the near future. Mr. Zischke introduced Richard Aker, a new junior officer trainee for ICA. He then discussed recent incidents in Shiraz concerning the Iran-America Society there. Mr. Bannerman reported on the most recent incident, which occurred last night when a crowd of 200, marching directly on the IAS, was dispersed by police. This would be the first time that IAS was specifically singled out, as opposed to being merely one stop enroute to many others. General Gast introduced General George Kertesz, who is General Secord's replacement and who will be acting as Chief of Armish-MAAG in General Gast's absence. General Gast reported the latest news on the F-4s and the Wild Weasel. The Iranians now say they are not interested in the F-4s (sans Group A wiring) because, to meet attrition needs, they prefer the higher-technology F-16s. The same view applies to the Shrikes. On the frigates, the GOI has decided that it wants the NTDS, which provoked some discussion among the Country Team members as to how the Dutch and Germans will feel about this. It was concluded that the Germans will be somewhat happier with the news. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL General Rabii told General Gast that the Iranians are not going to pursue the ATLIS II Laser Designator System until the USG decides whether or not it will use it. General Gast said he had left a paper on the Roving Helicopters on Mr. Martin's desk. The Charge briefed the Country Team on the revived criticism of our military sales program to Iran stemming out of the incident. Dr. Stempel reviewed various social notes from around town as well as the latest political news. He reviewed the basic issues in the problems with the religious leaders, advising also that this appears to be the silly season for the rumor-mongering set. He reported a number of approaches by various high level Iranians who asked him what the Americans were planning to do to help Iran fight communism. He advised the Country Team to be on the lookout for similar odd probes, queries and interrogations. Dr. Stempel continued his report by noting that the Khomeini faction of the religious group are starting to play fairly rough, especially concerning minorities. Mr. Neeley reported that Iran will probably import more feedgrains this year than last. Dr. Adler said he has a copy of the Farsi text of the nuclear bilateral accord and will send it to the Department with a Washington-bound traveler. Mansur told Dr. Adler that he sees August 20 as a likely signing date. Mr. Taylor has finished collating his confidential bank survey. The banks greatly exceeded their expectations regarding loans to Iran, with exposure rising 64% in the last year. S/A:RLBoyce 8/10/78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB ADMIN NEA/IRN AMCONSUL SHIRAZ DCM CONS INR/NEA ISFAHAN POL DEA ARMISH/MAAG TABRIZ ECON DAO POL/MIL ICA OR S/A CONFIDENTIAL

His ExcellencyAmir Abbas HoveydaMinister of the Imperial CourtTehran Excellonay: I have received a letter for His Imperial Majesty The Shahanshah from President Carter concerning the forthcoming meeting at Camp David on the Middle East peace process. I would very much appreciate your having this letter passed to His Imperial Majesty, who is aware that he is to receive a message from the President. With high esteem and warm personal regards. Sincerely, Charles W. Nana Charge d'Affaires ad interim CHARGE: CWNaas/sw

His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr Shahanshah of Iran Your Imperial Majesty: I have appreciated the conversations and correspondence we have had in the past on matters of high concern to our two countries. I know how seriously you regard the need for real progress towards a lasting settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict and I wish to share with you some thoughts on the forthcoming Middle East meeting at Camp David. We are gratified that Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have both responded positively to the invitation to meet with me next month in a major new effort to establish a framework for a Middle East peace settlement. We have purposely not set a fixed duration for the talks, scheduled to begin on September 6, so as to be able to allow as much time as is needed for our efforts to succeed. This is an encouraging indication of the seriousness with which all parties are approaching this meeting. I extended this invitation because I believe we have reached a crucial point in the search for peace in the Middle East. Nine months have passed since President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin opened significant new possibilities for negotiating with the historic meetings in Jerusalem and in Ismailia. The sides have made progress toward resolving some of the issues that divide them at

this time, but recently, as you are aware, an impasse was threatened. I am convinced that we cannot afford an impasse, since the positions would then harden and the atmosphere deteriorate to the point where the present opportunity for peace could well become another of the lost opportunities that have marked the history of this tragic conflict. The objective at the Camp David meeting will remain as it has been defined by the two sides themselves in negotiations this year: To make progress toward agreement on a framework, based on Security Council Resolution 242, that would allow steady progress toward agreement on specific issues, within the context of the agreed goal of a stable, just, and comprehensive peace. Such an agreed framework might help to bring other parties to the conflict into the peace negotiations. Our experience in attempting to facilitate and promote negotiations this past year has demonstrated that it is impossible to carry negotiations beyond a certain point on the crucial issues unless the Heads of Government themselves can be engaged in a direct exchange. This was one of the considerations that led me to the decision to extend invitations to the two leaders to meet with me at Camp David. Our objective will be to achieve agreements at the political level which can provide guidance for the negotiators on the key issues. I plan to do everything within my power to help President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin achieve the progress for which we are all searching. As we move into this crucial new phase of Middle East negotiations I wanted to share with you my reasons for taking this step and thoughts about what we hope to accomplish. I know you will agree with my sense of the importance of these talks, which hold the prospect of a major step forward, despite the real difficulties. I hope that I can count on you for understanding and full support in the task on which we are embarking.

You have met recently with some of the participants and key observers of the negotiations and I would value your impressions. Iran's support for the peace process has been extremely valuable and we look forward to continuing cooperation in the interest of world peace. With my best wishes, Sincerely, Jimmy Carter

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES August 16, 1978 The Charge opened the meeting by saying that the Embassy would be issuing a precautionary bulletin concerning the security situation. The period of "deep mourning," i.e., August 24-27 and August 31, is to be considered a good time to be quiet and fairly circumspect in one's movements about town. Section chiefs will inform their employees. The Charge said that the Marine Guards have had trouble recently in locating the duty officer. He stressed the serious responsibility borne by the duty officer to let the Marines know his whereabouts at all times. The Charge reported on his recent audience with the Shah. The occasion was General Huyser's visit. The Shah strongly affirmed that the liberalization process will continue. However, he is also determined that recent "senseless vandalism" should end. Dr. Stempel reported on "a couple of odd items." After six or seven nights of steady violence in south Tehran, the tenor of the demonstrators' rhetoric is swinging toward Cafahan-style anti-Westernism. In a related note, the political section will be covering the upcoming military trials here in Tehran. Mr. Taylor commented on the divergence in the local press' coverage of the passage of the foreign aid bill. Depending on which paper you read, it represents either a slap at, or a victory for, President Carter. Mr. Taylor continued his analysis by disclosing the Central Bank's balance of payments forecast, which sees a 17% increase in payments for imports. During a brief discussion of the status of the nuclearbilateral accord, the Charge asked Mr. Carleton to report on yesterday's editorial on the Australian deal.

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Snow reviewed plans for construction of a new IAS academic building. He hopes to sign the contract and begin construction within three weeks. S/A:RLBQyce 8/20/78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB ADMIN NEA/IRN AMCONSUL ISFAHAN DCM CONS INR/RNA SHIRAZ POL DEA ARMISH/MAAG TABRIZ ECON DAO POL/MIL ICA OR S/A CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM 1978 AUG 17 AM 11:36 File INDICATE □ COLLECT □ CHARGE TO Pol 1-1 07882 US-Iran FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO: AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KABUL USCINCEUR SECRET TEHRAN 07882 NOFORN E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, IR SUBJ: IRAN: WHERE ARE WE NOW AND WHERE ARE WE GOING? REF: A) TEHRAN 7659 (NOTAL) B) TEHRAN 7456 (NOTAL) C) TEHRAN 7700 (NOTAL) D) TEHRAN A-80 (NOTAL) E) TEHRAN 7702 (NOTAL) SUMMARY: THE SHAH'S CONSTITUTION DAY SPEECH AND THE IMPOSI- TION OF MARTIAL LAW IN ISFAHAN INDICATE THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO THE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS BUT THAT THE GOI WILL DEAL MORE FIRMLY WITH THOSE WHO STIMULATE VIOLENCE. MAJOR QUESTION IS WHAT IMPACT RELIGIOUSLY INSPIRED AGITATION WILL HAVE ON IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND WHAT GOVERNMENT'S REACTION WILL BE. POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS BEEN TRADITION IN IRAN. SHAH IS ON A TIGHT ROPE -- TRYING TO MINIMIZE VIOLENCE WHILE CHANNELING POLITICAL CONFLICT INTO FROM: CWNaas/POL:JDStemple DRAFTING DATE 8/17/78 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: CHARGE:CWNaas SECRET/NOFORN CLASSIFICATION -9- OPTIONAL FORM 152(H) (Formerly FS-413(H)) January 1975 Dept. of State

ELECTORAL REALM. SUCCESS IS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT DEPENDENT ON CONTINUED EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT BY ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES. WE BELIEVE HE MUST MANEUVER CAREFULLY, PERHAPS INCLUDING SOME STEPS TO MEET OPPOSITION DEMANDS, IF VIOLENCE IS TO BE REDUCED. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION, HOWEVER, THE SHAH MAY ULTI- MATELY HAVE TO RESORT TO FORC. THE PRIMARY HOPE OF AVOIDING THIS OPTION IS TO RESHAPE MODERATE OPPOSITION ATTITUDES AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT SENSITIVITY IN THE PROCESS OF FURTHER POLITICAL ACTIVITY. END SUMMARY 1. WITH THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN ISFAHAN AND THE STATIONING OF MORE MILITARY UNITS ELSEWHERE FOLLOWING CLOSELY ON THE HEELS OF THE SHAH'S CONSTITUTION DAY SPEECH (REFS A AND B) which REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, IT SEEMS A GOOD TIME TO REVIEW WHERE WE ARE AND TAKE A TENTATIVE AND SPECULATIVE LOOK AHEAD. THIS IS A PERIOD OF CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN IRAN FROM WHICH MANY OUTCOMES ARE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE. MANY OF THE GIVENS OF THE PAST ARE BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION, NOT ONLY BY VOCAL OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME BUT BY THE SHAH HIMSELF. 2. IT IS CLEAR TO US AND THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HERE THAT THE SHAH IS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO LEAD IRAN TOWARD LIBERALIZED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (REF C). THERE IS SOME QUESTION IN HIS SECRET/NOFORN Classification 50152-201

OWN MIND AS TO EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTS AND HOW HE IS TO ACHIEVE HIS BROAD OBJECTIVE, AND THERE REMAINS DEEP SUSPICION OF HIS INTENTIONS AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE LONG OPPOSED HIM. AFTER ALL, HE HAS NOT EVER WILLINGLY PLAYED THE DEMOCRATIC GAME BEFORE: WHY NOW? THE ANSWER, WE BELIEVE, IS IN HIS REAL BELIEF THAT HIS SON CANNOT SUCCESS- FULLY SUCCEED HIM UNLESS IRAN'S POLITICAL TRANSITION TO MORE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IS MANAGED BEFORE THE CROWN PRINCE TAKES THE THRONE. THE SHAH, MORE THAN ANY OTHER MODERNIZING MONARCH, IS CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION. HE HAS STRESSED THE NEED TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR HIS SON TO THE AMBASSADOR, TO ME, AND MOST FOREIGNERS HE RECEIVES. HE REMEMBERS HIS OWN DIFFICULT FIRST YEARS AND HAS GRADUALLY COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ROOM MUST BE MADE FOR IRAN'S EXPANDING MIDDLE CLASS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS PREPARED TO TURN THE COUNTRY OVER TO MEN HE REGARDS AS UNPATRIOTIC, OBSCURINTIST AND IRRECONCILABLY HOSTILE TO THE MONARCHY. THE EX�STXXX OF THE MONARCHY FOR THE SHAH IS MORE THAN SIMPLY AN ARROGANCE -- HE WANTS THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY/SURVIVE AND CONTINUE HIS POLICIES. HE DEEPLY BELIEVES THAT IRANIAN HISTORY PROVES THE NEED FOR A MONARCH TO GIVE THE LEAD TO HIS DISPARATE AND HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY. HE IS, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO BEGIN A POLITICAL PROCESS DESPITE MISGIVING ABOUT SOME

OF THE PLAYERS. 3. HOWEVER, MANY SO-CALLED LIBERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS AT HEART BELIEVE HE SHOULD REMOVE HIMSELF FORTHWITH FROM THE GOVERNING PROCESS. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS WHO ADMIRE AND SUPPORT THE SHAH BELIEVE AS WELL THAT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN MOST DECISIONS SETS HIM UP AS THE TARGET FOR CRITICISM WHEN THE POLICIES IN PRACTICE DO NOT WORK WELL AND THAT HE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD REIGNING AND NOT RULING. A SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT OVERWHELMING, MAJORITY OF IRANIANS HOWEVER AGREE WITH THE SHAH THAT THE MONARCH REMAINS NECESSARY FOR THE COUNTRY BUT THEY WISH TO SEE ITS OPERATIONS ADJUSTED. 4. THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE MOSSADEQ PERIOD (1949-53) SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT MANY OF THE OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE CHANGED THEIR OWN AUTHORITIIARIAN COLORATION DESPITE THEIR RHETORIC TODAY ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION RETAINS THE VIOLENT ELEMENT THAT HAS MARKED SHIITE ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT SINCE THE EIGHTH CENTURY. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, ALL STRAINS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP, FROM THOSE FAVORING MODIFIED CONSTITUTIONAL RULE TO THOSE SEEKING A RETURN TO THE DAYS OF SHAH ABBAS. THERE IS ALSO AN ESSENTIALLY ANARCHIC MASS RESPONSIVE TO THE LOUDEST VOICE. THOSE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS PRESENTLY DOMINATING THE IRANIAN SCENE, BOTH ORGANIZATIONALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY, ARE COMMITTED TO VIOLENCE AND OBSTRUCTION SECRET/NOFORN Classification

AS TOOLS FOR ATTAINING POWER. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR THE SHAH'S VIOLENT REMOVAL AND SOME OF HIS FOLLOWERS IN ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ HAVE OPENLY CALLED FOR THE DEATH OF THE SHAH. (THIS EXTREMISM WAS IN PART THE REASON THE POLICE CRACKED DOWN ON THE HUNGER-STRIKING MULLAHS -- TEHRAN 7618). MODERATES SUCH AS AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI DO NOT AT THIS TIME FEEL CAPABLE OF OPPOSING KHOMEINI OPENLY, THOUGH THEY REPORTEDLY STILL WORK FOR MODERATION WITHIN THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT AND WOULD DOUBTLESSLY WELCOME A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ELECTORAL PROCESS WHICH MIGHT NOT LEAVE THEM WHOLLY SUBSERVIENT TO KHOMEINI, WHO REMAINS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. IN SHIA ISLAM THERE IS NO INSTITUTIONALIZED HIERARCHY: A RELIGIOUS LEADER

ATTAINS HIS PROMINENCE BY CONSENSUS WITHIN HIS PARISH. SOME OF THE VIOLENCE WE ARE WITNESSING HERE RESULTS FROM A FERVID COMPETITION FOR EMINENCE BY THE AYATOLLAHS; MODERATION APPARENTLY DOES NOT BEGET FOLLOWERS FROM THE WORKERS, SMALL SHOP KEEPERS AND ARTISANS AT THIS TIME. A TRADITION OF THRONE/OPPOSITION DIALOG DOES NOT EXIST IN IRAN, AND NEITHER TEMPERMENT NOR TRADITION FAVOR WESTERN CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL CONCILIATION AND BROKERAGE. 5. WHATEVER THE SHAH WISHES TO DO NEXT, HE MUST MEET HEAD ON THE VIOLENT CHALLENGES TO BOTH HIS GOVERNMENT AND IRAN'S SOCIAL FABRIC. IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS SEEN HERE AS A SIGNAL TO VIOLENT ELEMENTS THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WILL NOT BE TOLERATED. FOR IRAN, IT IS A SURPRISINGLY RESTRAINED REACTION SO FAR. THE ARMY HAS BEEN ORDERED TO HOLD ITS FIRE AND RESTRAINTS AGAINST PREMATURE POLICE USE OF WEAPONS REMAIN IN EFFECT. IRONICALLY, THIS LAUDABLE RESTRAINT HAS ITS DISADVANTAGES: MANY IRANIANS OF THE MIDDLE AND WEALTHY CLASSES BELIEVE THE SHAH IS NOT ACTING FORCEFULLY ENOUGH, THAT HE IS WEAK AND INDECISIVE. SOME BELIEVE THE AMERICANS FORCED HIM TO BE RESTRAINED, SINCE THEY CANNOT CONCEIVE OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO DO SO IN HIS OWN INTEREST. THE IMMEDIATE DANGER IS THAT THE SHAH HIMSELF (OR ARMY UNITS GOADED BEYOND PATIENCE) WILL REACT INDISCRIMINATELY AND ATTEMPT SOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH BULLETS INSTEAD OF BALLOTS. SECRET/NOFORN

THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO DO SO UNLESS OPPOSITIONISTS MOVE FROM STONES TO FIREARMS. 6. MANY OBSERVERS HERE HOPE THAT THE END OF RAMAZAN WILL BRING SOME SURCEASE BUT WE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DUBIOUS. THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, EVEN THE MODERATES, ARE FEELING THEIR OATS AND ARE UNLIKELY, WE BELIEVE, TO EASE OFF THE PRESSURES UNTIL THEY RECEIVE AT LEAST SOME SATISFACTION. THE SHAH IS ON A CLEFT STICK AT THE MOMENT. SUCCESSFULLY HE COULD ALMOST CERTAINLY/SUPPRESS the RELIGIOUS DISSIDENTS FOR THE TIME BEING BY MASS ARRESTS AND VERY CONSIDERABLE BLOOD LETTING. IT WOULD NOT BE EASY, HOWEVER BECAUSE UNLIKE 1963, DISIDENT ACTIVITIES ARE WIDESPREAD IN THE COUNTRY AND VANDALISM IS USUALLY PERPETRATED BY A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN SEPARATE PARTS OF THE CITIES AND TOWNS. IF HE TAKES THIS PATH, HOWEVER, IT WOULD NEGATE HIS OBJECTIVE OF LIBERALIZATION AND BRING DOWN ON HIMSELF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CRITICISM TO WHICH HE IS SENSITIVE. 7. THE SHAH AND THOSE AROUND HIM, WE NOW BELIEVE, HAVE UNDERESTIMATED THE CHALLENGE. IRAN REMAINS BY AND LARGE A CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC STATE AND, ONCE LIBERALIZATION OPENED THE POLITICAL SCENE, THE LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS AGAIN BECAME CENTERSOF POLITICAL POWER--AS THEY WERE WHEN THE LID WAS PUT ON IN 1963. (OUR A-80 DEALT WITH SOME OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL/ECONOMIC/SOCIAL FACTORS WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE FRUSTRATIONS HERE.) ALSO, SINCE THAT SECRET/NOFORN Classification

TIME COMMUNICATIONS HAVE VASTLY IMPROVED IN THIS COUNTRY AND THE VARIOUS LEADERS CAN DAILY STAY IN TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER. NEITHER THE INTELLECTUALS AND BUREAUCRATS OF THE RASTAKHIZ PARTY, THE OLD NATIONAL FRONTERS, NOR THE LEADERS OF THE NEW GROUPS HAVE DEEP-ROOTED POLITICAL POWER OR INFLUENCE. IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCENE, THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AVOID DEALING WITH THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS. 8. THE EARLIER EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH THE MORE MODERATE LEADERS WERE NOT PURSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND THE OBJECTIVE OF SPLITTING THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP HAS SIMPLY NOT WORKED SO FAR. PART OF THE REASON FOR THIS LATER FAILURE HAS BEEN THE THREATS AND HARASSMENT OF THE MODERATES BY THE WELL-ORGANIZED KHOMEINI FANATICS; ALSO, AS NOTED EARLIER, NO AYATOLLAH WISHES TO LOSE HIS FOLLOWERS BY APPEARING SOFT. FURTHERMORE, THE AMOUZEGAR GOVERNMENT (AS OPPOSED TO THE SHAH AND THE COURT) HAS PROVED SURPRISINGLY INEPT AT DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS. 9. IF OUR GENERAL ASSESSMENT IS VALID, THE SHAH HAS TO FIND A WAY TO OPEN SERIOUS GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH THE SO-CALLED RELIGIOUS (AND SOME POLITICAL) MODERATES (THIS WILL BE HARD TO SWALLOW BECAUSE OF HIS UTTER DISDAIN FOR "THE PRIESTS"). WE SHOULD REALIZE AT THE OUTSET THAT THIS

MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THEIR ULTIMATE DEMANDS (AS OPPOSED TO WHAT THEY MIGHT ACCEPT AS PART OF AN ON-GOING PROCESS) WOULD MEAN RELIGIOUS CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND REDUCTION OF THE SHAH TO A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH. THE SHAH WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE FIRST AND WOULD SEE THE LATTER EMERGING ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF RULE PASSING TO HIS SON. THE CURRENT "WANT LIST" OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IS UNCLEAR, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT A CHANGE OF PRIME MINISTER AND AT LEAST SOME CABINET MEMBERS TOPS THE LIST--THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TOO TARRED WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS AND IS SEEN AS NOT AT ALL RESPONSIVE TO THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUENCY. EVEN SOME ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES NOW TALK THIS WAY PRIVATELY. ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE WIDELY PERCEIVED TO HAVE CORRUPTLY BENEFITTED FROM IRAN'S RECENT DEVELOPMENT IS NEXT. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY TOUGH ONE BECAUSE THE POPULACE HAS SEEN ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS COME AND GO AND A NEW EFFORT WILL HAVE NO CREDIBILITY UNLESS PERSONS VERY CLOSE TO THE SHAH ARE AT LEAST REPRESENTED IN ANY ROUNDUP. A NUMBER OF LESSER MATTERS ALSO REQUIRE ACTION: MORE HAJ SEATS AND BETTER ALLOCATION OF EXISTING CAPACITY BY IRANAIR, MORE RESTRAINED MOVIE ADVERTISING, ETC. 10. CONCESSIONS OF THIS NATURE MIGHT AT LEAST BRING THE MODERATES INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND PERMIT THE GOI TO DIRECT ITS POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS AGAINST SECRET/NOFORN Classification

EXTREMISTS WHO ARE UNDOUBTEDLY RECEIVING HELP FROM EX-TUDEH PARTY ELEMENTS, AND OTHER OUTSIDE FORCES. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL FLUIDITY OF THE OPPOSITION, ITS PENCHANT FOR PRESSING FOR THE JUGULAR RATHER THAN COMPROMISING AND SIMPLY THE EVANESCENT NATURE OF PUBLIC OUTBREAKS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, EVEN THIS MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH. AT SOME POINT, THE SHAH MAY BE FORCED TO REPRESS AN OUTBREAK WITH THE IRON FIST AND NOT THE VELVET GLOVE IF IRAN IS TO RETAIN ANY ORDER AT ALL. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL DO SO IF THAT BECOMES ESSENTIAL. HE IS NOT DEALING WITH DEMO-CRATIC GROUP POLITICS AS WE IN THE WEST KNOW AND PLAY THEM, AND HE IS MINDFUL OF WHAT VACILLATION BROUGHT AYUB KHAN AND BHUTTO IN PAKISTAN. 11. FOR THE U.S. AS WELL THIS IS A DELICATE PERIOD. AS WE HAVE MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS REPORTING, VIRTUALLY ALL IRANIANS BELIEVE THAT FOREIGN HANDS ARE INVOLVED IN WHATEVER HAPPENS HERE. WHATEVER WE AS A GOVERNMENT OR AS OFFICIALS SAY WILL BE MISCONSTRUED BY SOMEBODY HERE EITHER AS SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH. THIS PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE IN FACT GIVES US SOME INFLUENCE. WE WILL HAVE FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON OUR ROLE HERE OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AFTER THE AMBASSADOR RETURNS. 12. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED. SECRET/NOFORN Classification NAAS OPTIONAL FORM 10 (Formerly FS-411 January Dept. of

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM 1978 AUG 17 AM 11:55 F_{4}Cl INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO BL 2-2 07890 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN SECRET NOFORN ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC 7 INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA\nUSINT BAGHDAD\AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD\AMEMBASSY LONDON\SECRET TEHRAN 07890\NOFORN E.0: 11652: XGDS-4\TAGS: PORS, PINS, IR\SUBJECT: INCREASE IN RELIGIOUS PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT REF: A. TEHRAN 7311, B. TEHRAN 7793 SUMMARY: RHETORIC AND CROWD ACTIVITY IN TEHRAN IS INCREASING SLIGHTLY. RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS APPEAR TO BE PLANNING SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THREE-DAY MOURNING FOR DEATH OF IMAM ALI. SECRET TALKS BETWEEN GOI AND GOVERNMENT CONTINUE. RELIGIOUS LEADERS SEE CHANGE NECESSARY. END SUMMARY. 1. EYEWITNESS IRANIAN SOURCE TELLS US THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST CONTINUAL MINOR UPHEAVAL IN SOUTH TEHRAN FOR PAST SEVEN TO TEN DAYS. AYATOLLAHS AT MAJOR MOSQUES HAVE BECOME MORE ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND IN SOME CASES ANTI-FOREIGN AND DIRECTLY ANTI-AMERICAN. RESULT HAS BEEN SMALL GROUPS OF MEN IN THEIR TEENS OR TWENTIES HAVE BEEN ROAMING THE STREETS BREAKING WINDOWS. 24.1ab DRAFTING DATE\n9.17.79 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: GUADOR embal:1ab

THE LOW LEVEL VIOLENCE THUS FAR HAS BEEN SPORADIC. 2. FIRST SERIOUS INDICATIONS THAT MOSQUE CROWDS MAY BE PREPARED FOR DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOWING EARLY AFTERNOON PRAYER SESSIONS CAME AUG. 15. LARGE CROWD LEAVING MOSQUE AT SHAHNAZ SQUARE REFUSED TO DISPERSE WITH USUAL ENCOURAGEMENT BY POLICE AND LED AUTHORITIES ON A BIT OF A CHASE UP TO THE CORNER OF TAKE JAMSHID AND OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD, SOME SIX BLOCKS FROM THE EMBASSY. GOI THAT DAY BEGAN PRECAUTIONARY STATIONING OF MILITARY UNITS AT KEY POINTS IN THE CITY. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, THERE HAS BEEN NO OUTBREAK OF SIGNIFICANT VIOLENCE, BUT POLICE REMAIN IN POSITION AROUND MOSQUES TO ENCOURAGE SUFFICIENT SWIFT DISPERSAL AFTER MAJOR PRAYER MEETING. ON AUG. 16, TEHRAN BAZAAR WAS CLOSED, BUT TROOPS WERE NEEDED TO BREAK UP CROWD EXITING FROM BAZAAR MOSQUE. 3. OUR SOURCES CLOSE TO THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY SAY THAT MORE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PLANNED FOR THE AUG. 24 TO 26 PERIOD, THE VERY EMOTIONAL MOURNING OF THE DEATH OF IMAMALI. ONE SOURCE TELLS US THAT SOME SOUTH TEHRAN MOSQUES ARE CIRCULATING SIGN-UP LISTS FOR A SIT IN TO BE HELD ON THE SHAHANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY AUG. 26. WE UNDERSTAND THE ARMENIAN MOSQUE NEAR THE BAZAAR HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR A WEEK. 4. POLITICAL BYPLAY AMONG RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND BETWEEN THEM AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED RAPIDLY OVER THE PAST SECRET/NOFORN Classification

FEW WEEKS. AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI TOLD AGENCY FRANCE PRESS (AFP) THAT HIS PEOPLE WERE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND THAT THE SHAH HIMSELF SHOULD SPEAK WITH THE PEOPLE. SHARIATMADARI CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN SHIRAZ AND OPPOSED MARTIAL LAW IN ISFAHAN. HE STRONGLY OPPOSED VIOLENT ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF HIS FOLLOWERS BUT SAID THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE FOR THE PEOPLE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM ONE WELL PLACED SOURCE THAT COURT MINISTER HOVEYDA WAS VERY IRRITATED WITH THIS INTER-VIEW, BUT WAS TOLD BY A SENIOR IRANIAN THAT "AFTER ALL, SHARIATMADARI IS NOT A MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF." 5. WITHIN PAST FEW DAYS AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI SENT SHARIAT-MADARI A MESSAGE TO STOP TALKING ABOUT A CONSTITUTION AND PARLIAMENT SINCE KHOMEINI OPPOSED THEM ALL. SOURCE WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT/RELIGIOUS DISCUSSIONS TELLS US SHARIATMADARI SENT KHOMEINI "PUT UP OR SHUT UP" MESSAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT IF KHOMEINI WAS SO STRONG, HE SHOULD COME TO TEHRAN AND SPEAK FACE TO FACE WITH THE AYATOLLAHS WHO LIVE IN IRAN. SHARIATMADARI NOTED KHOMEINI LIVED FAR AWAY FROM IRAN AND HAD REFUSED TO CRITICIZE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WHEN IT TOOK SEVERE ACTION AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS IN NAJAF ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. SHARIATMADARI HAS TOLD HIS ADVISORS THAT HE "DOES NOT WISH TO BE SHAH" BUT WANTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND A PARLIAMENT. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS, KHOMEINI REPORTEDLY ISSUED A PROCLAMATION CALLING ON ARMY SECRET/NOFORN Classification

AND POLICE OFFICERS NOT TO FIRE ON THEIR BROTHERS AND GO AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. ONE SOURCE REPLIED THIS IS THE FIRST OCCASION IN SOME TIME THAT ONE OF HIS MESSAGES HAS FALLEN ON DEAF EARS. 6. VERY SENSITIVE SOURCE RELAYED TO US THE SUBSTANCE OF A MEETING BETWEEN SAVAK CHIEF MOGHADDAM AND SHARIATMADARI'S SON-IN-LAW ABBASI NIGHT OF AUG 15. MOGHADDAM REPORTED ASKED WHAT THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WANTED AND ABBASI TICKED OFF FOLLOWING POINTS: A) THERE MUST BE A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE PRESENT CABINET IS UNRESPONSIVE TO THE PEOPLE AND IS BLAMED FOR THE KILLING THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE JANUARY. B) THE NEXT GOVERNMENT MUST AT A MINIMUM CALL TO ACCOUNT SOME OF THE MAJOR INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF CORRUPTION, SUCH AS ALI REZA'I, MANSOUR YASSINI AND MAJOR INDUSTRIALISTS LAJEVARDI AND FOULADI. C) THE ACTIVITIES OF PRINCESS ASHRAF ANATHEMA ARE MUSHTURA TO THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY. SHE MUST BE CURTAILED THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY, GHOLAM REZA, AND MAHMOUD REZA MUST AT A MINIMUM BE REINED IN. ABBASSI TOLD MOGHADDAM CRITICALLY THAT MAHMOUD'S FRIEND MOZZAFARI JANDARI SHOULD BE FORCED OUT OF THE OPIUM GROWING BUSINESS. D) THE PEOPLE MUST BE FREE TO TALK AND WORSHIP, SHARIATMADARI'S PEOPLE GREATLY APPROVED OF THE SHAH'S CONSTITUTION DAY SPEECH AND MOGHADDAM WAS TOLD TO TELL THE SHAH THIS. MOGHADDAM REPLIED HE WOULD BE SEEING THE SHAH THAT EVENING. SECRET/NOFORN Classification

7. AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, THREE MAJOR AYATOLLAHS, SHARIATMADARI, GOLPAYGAN AND MARIASHI, DECIDED TO ISSUE A BULLETIN WHICH, WHILE ANTI-GOVERNMENT IN TONE, WILL CALL FOR MOSLEMS TO STOP KILLING THEIR BROTHERS AND TO REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC DISORDER. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR BEST SOURCE THAT RELIGIOUS GROUPS AT SOME POINT HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE PRIME MINISTERS TO REPLACE AMOUZEGAR. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP BELIEVES SENIOR STATESMAN IS NECESSARY, SOMEBODY WITH CONFIDENCE OF BOTH SHAH AND PEOPLE. OUR SOURCE THOUGHT TWO NAMES HAD BEEN BANDIED ABOUT: ALI AMINI AND SENATE PRESIDENT SHARIF EMAMI. HE HIMSELF ADDED SHAH'S ADVISORS FARDUST AND MOINIAN. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, SHARIF EMAMI WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE BEST CANDIDATE BECAUSE HE IS A VERY RELIGIOUS MAN HIMSELF AND HAS SOLID POLITICAL BACKING. 8. OUR RELIGIOUS SOURCES ARE ALL PESSIMISTIC THAT FURTHER VIOLENCE CAN BE AVOIDED UNLESS THERE ARE SOME CHANGES IN THE OFFING. RADICAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP PLAYS ON EVERY INCIDENT TO WHIP UP MORE FEELING AND THE MOOD, PARTICULARLY IN TEHRAN, IS COMING TO AN ACCEPTANCE OF MORE DEMONSTRATIONS. NAAS SECRET/NOFORN Classification

Memorandum TO : Ambassador DATE: August 22, 1978 FROM : John D. Stempel, Acting Head of Political SUBJECT: While You Were Away ... ...the place really didn't turn to crap, but it might have looked like it: Domestic Scene --July and August saw an increase in religious pressure on the government (Tehran 7890 and 7311). A discreet split between the Khomeini and Shariatmadari factions may have become public as a result of the Abadan Theatre disaster, when the moderates condemned the firebombing and nothing has yet been heard from the Khomeiniites. Anti-western and anti-American sentiment has increased significantly in the past two-three weeks. --The Shah's Constitution Day speech (Tehran 7456) put Iran squarely on the road to liberalization in a public way. This may undergo some shifts, as the Shah noted on August 17 (Tehran 7949), if violence continues. Rumors of the Shah's ill health (Tehran 7043) caused much going and froing, but now appear laid to rest. --Earlier in the summer, a number of older politicians, such as Ali Amini, began to take advantage of the liberalization to make political statements. We received a number of approaches from people who want our aid or seek support for their own anti-communist (of course!) schemes. --The July Cabinet shift made no major changes (Tehran 6975). --The Prime Minister finished a year in office. Our assessment (Tehran 7702) suggested he needs more political finesse. Foreign Affairs --Iranians were delighted with the Sino-Japanese peace treaty and the forthcoming visit of Chairman Hua will probably be the major foreign policy event of the year. --Iran has been itchy over potential communist threats--castigating Castro (Tehran 7187); worrying about the Mauretanian coup; seeing two choppers shot down by the Soviets (Tehran 6912), and, most recently, making us aware of their concerns over the "Sovietization" of Afghanistan (Tehran 7770) CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Human Rights --We are following the story of 38 prisoners who were allegedly tried by civil court, released and then picked up by SAVAK for Military Trial. --The 28th Amordad (Shah returns in 1953) Amnesty on August 19 saw 62 anti-state prisoners released in a flock of 711. No names yet. --The new Bar Association leadership remains active, and progressive faction lawyers have continued to defend demonstrators--some get off, some don't. The Next Few Days You could have a busy weekend ahead. August 24 to 26 are the high mourning days of Ramazan. Until the Abadan Theatre tragedy, many demonstrations were expected, perhaps even a sit-in on the Shahanshahi Expressway. The fire may bring a public reaction against violence. We also understand the GOI has recently picked up a number of the more fractious mullahs, so the expected confrontation may not be as great as previously expected. August 26, the day which commemorates the actual death of Imam Ali, could still be a very sticky 24 hours given the emotionalism and fanaticism which has come to mark demonstrations in the past two weeks. POL: JDStemp21: 1ab:8-22-78

His Excellency Jafar Madim Undersecretary for International and Economic Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tehran Dear Jafar: In view of our recent discussion on the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, I thought you would be interested in the following statement which was released by the White House on August 18. I very much appreciate the encouraging words on this subject which you passed to me the other evening. "This week representatives of many nations are meeting in Geneva in a world conference to combat racism and racial discrimination. "The Conference marks the mid-point of the United Nations Decade for Action to combat racism and racial discrimination, a decade whose initiation the United States supported strongly. But the United States is unable to participate in this potentially important conference, although we will closely monitor the proceedings, because the definition of "racism" has been perverted for political ends by including Zionism as one of its forms. The United States cannot associate itself with the Decade so long as it endorses the patently false definition of Zionism as a form of racism. "Instead, we hope that this Conference will return to the original purpose of the Decade, so that we might rejoin this international effort to eliminate racism throughout the world. We will work towards this end because we know the challenge that racism poses, and for more than a century we have struggled to heal its scars. We know our goals have not been fully accomplished, yet we are encouraged and deeply committed to them. Domestically and internationally, we will continue to

pursue this great common purpose in the context of other uncompromised efforts. "We call on all nations to respect the original objectives of the United Nations Decade Against Racism and to resist efforts that distort its purpose and erode its moral force." With high personal regards. Sincerely, Charles W. Naas Minister-Counselor CWNass/ sw

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES August 23:1979 The DCM opened the meeting by introducing new members of the Country Team to Ambassador Sullivan. The Ambassador said he will spend today and tomorrow morning reading and catching up, and will see section chief's starting tomorrow afternoon. The Ambassador reviewed his two stopovers in Washington. He said the first period, back in June, focused primarily on language for the nuclear bilist etal accord and on arrangements for a PRC meeting. The second visit was more concerned with events in Iran. He said there is great concern in Washington and in neighboring countries over the recent activity here. On the nuclear bilateral, the Ambassador reported that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission split 2-2 on it, which will attract a certain amount of attention before it goes before Congress. The Ambassador said he went to the Hill and spoke with a number of key legislators about the accord. No real problems are foreseen, aside from the expected effort to use the issue as a means for giving adverse publicity to Iran. The Ambassador reviewed other news from Washington, noting that Congress will probably return for a lame-duck session following the elections. Iranian students in the U.S. remain as active as ever. There is a certain amount of concern in Washington over the geopolitical stability of this region, particularly in the aftermath of the Afghan coup. The DCM reported on the extensive changes made by the Iranians in the Farsi text of the nuclear accord, noting that the GOI hopes to sign the document by September 10. Mr. Shellenberger discussed the inflow of Western press to Iran following the Abadan disaster. He announced that Mayor Bradley may come to Tehran and take part in an IAS program on municipalities. General Kertesz reported on the Crown Prince's activities in the U.S. The Ambassador inquired about the GOI's decision to buy the 31 F-4E's, saying that he hoped they were under no illusions that they would eventually be able to put Group A wiring in. CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Westley reported on the visit of Westinghouse's Chairman of the Board. The Ambassador said he had had a long session with Messrs. Bergesten and Solomon, who are concerned with the oil price. He said that Secretary Blumenthal may come to Iran in October. The Ambassador also suggested to Under Secretary Cooper that he consider coming to Iran later this year to chair another session of the U.S.-Iran Joint Commission. Dr. John Stempel reported on news accounts of the recent Abadan theater fire. He noted that moderates who earlier were not wont to criticize Ayatollah Khomeini were using this opportunity to do so indirectly by condemning the fire. The Ambassador characterized this as "true Khomeini grit." Dr. Stempel noted that today's Kayhan is carrying Senator Naini's statement that the Monarch is not being kept fully informed. Mr. Mills reported that the Regional Medical Officer will be in town from August 24 to 28. Those wishing to see him should call the Health Unit for an appointment. on the subject of building construction, the Ambassador reported that Mr. Gingles has secured the necessary 2.3 million for the new office building, effective fiscal 1980. This was followed by some discussion of the Iranshahr vs. Iran Galleries locations as sites for interim operations. Mr. Taylor reported that figures now available for economic accounts for the first four months of the year show a 1.3 billion deficit. With an anticipated 8 billion to 10 billion budget for the entire year, such a deficit is not running at a pro rata level. Meanwhile, balance of payments accounts for the first quarter are in balance but showing signs of moving into deficit. We expect a $1 billion deficit over the year. A budget directive has gone out to the Ministries for preparation of the 2538 budget, indicating that it may be prepared on time this year. Mr. Snow reported that, save for student orientation, IAS has no programs during Ramazan. The Center has no extra police assigned to it, but more are available if necessary. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Ryno offered the latest news on the Trade Center. He announced that the Trade Fair will open on September 19, with the U.S. hoping to have the best presentation in history. DISTRIBUTION: AMC ADMIN NEA/IRN AMCONSUL ISFAHAN DCM CONS INR/RNA SHIRAZ POL DEA ARMISH/MAAG TABRIZ ECON DAO POL/MIL ICA OR S/A S/A: RL Boyce: mam 8/27/78 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL-INFORMAL David McGaffey, Esquire American Consul American Consulate Isfahan, Iran Dear David: In recent weeks the Ambassador and I have received from several high-level officials thinly veiled accusations that the U.S. is somehow involved in the demonstrations and is supporting the opposition. The Ambassador met these charges directly with firm denials and the offer to meet at any time to review or analyze any evidence they thought indicated U.S. finagling. You should, if it is necessary, be just as firm. In the months ahead Iranians of all political hues will be looking for indications of the U.S. attitude on the domestic developments. This will present for all of us tricky and delicate situations which can easily lead to misunderstandings. Therefore, I am certain you will be very discreet and mild the following points as appropriate into your discussions: -- U.S.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly based on enduring mutual interests. -- Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to the U.S. since World War II by both Republican and Democratic Presidents; in December 1977 President Carter said, "our strength is Iran's strength and Iran's strength is ours." The U.S. wishes Iran to be strong economically and militarily and politically stable;

CONFIDENTIAL The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization policy" which aims to develop over time a democratic political system; we have no doubts as to his sincerity about the process; The monarchy is a deeply important institution in Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual most suited to lead the Iranian people to a more democratic system; -- It is signally important that responsible political figures work within the system as it develops to assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor; -- Violence will only work against the achievement of a democratic system and play into the hands of those forces of the extreme left and right who do not want Iran to prosper; I am writing similarly to your colleagues at the other Consulates. Sincerely, Charles W. Naas Minister-Counselor CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL Victor Tomseth, Esquire American Consul American Consulate Victor Tomseth, Esquire American Consulate Shiraz, Iran Dear Vic: In recent weeks the Ambassador and I have received from several high-level officials thinly veiled accusations that the U.S. is somehow involved in the demonstrations and is supporting the opposition. The Ambassador met these charges directly with firm denials and the offer to meet at any time to review or analyze any evidence they thought indicated U.S. finagling. You should, if it is necessary, be just as firm. In the months ahead Iranians of all political hues will be looking for indications of the U.S. attitude on the domestic developments. This will present for all of us tricky and delicate situations which can easily lead to misunderstandings. Therefore, I am certain you will be very discreet and mild the following points as appropriate into your discussions: -- U.S.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly based on enduring mutual interests: -- Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to the U.S. since World War II by both Republican and Democratic Presidents; in December 1977 President Carter said, "our strength is Iran's strength and Iran's strength is ours." The U.S. wishes Iran to be strong economically and militarily and politically stable;

C ON F ID E N T I A L The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization policy" which aims to develop over time a democratic political system; we have no doubts as to his sincerity about the process: The monarchy is a deeply important institution in Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual most suited to lead the Iranian people to a more democratic system; It is signally important that responsible political figures work within the system as it develops to assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor; -- Violence will only work against the achievement of a democratic system and play into the hands of those forces of the extreme left and right who do not want Iran to prosper. I am writing similarly to your colleagues at the other Consulates. Sincerely, Charles W. Naas Minister-Counselor CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL-INFORMAL Michael Metrinko, Esquire Michael Metrinko, Esquire American Consul American Consulate Tabriz, Iran Dear Mike: In recent weeks the Ambassador and I have received from several high-level officials thinly veiled In recent weeks the Ambassador and I have received from several high-level officials thinly veiled accusations that the U.S. is somehow involved in the demonstrations and is supporting the opposition. The Ambassador met these charges directly with firm denials and the offer to meet at any time to review or analyze any evidence they thought indicated U.S. finagling. You should, if it is necessary, be just as firm. In the months ahead Iranians of all political hues will be looking for indications of the U.S. attitude on the domestic developments. This will present for all of us tricky and delicate situations which can easily lead to misunderstandings. Therefore, I am certain you will be very discreet and meld the following points as appropriate into your discussions: -- U.S.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly based on enduring mutual interests. Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to the U.S. since World War II by both Republican and Democratic Presidents; in December 1977 President Carter said, "our strength is Iran's strength and Iran's strength is ours." -- The U.S. wishes Iran to be strong economically and militarily and politically stable; CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL -- The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization policy" which aims to develop over time a democratic political system; we have no doubts as to his sincerity about the process; The monarchy is a deeply important institution in Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual most suited to lead the Iranian people to a more democratic system; It is signally important that responsible political figures work within the system as it develops to assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor; -- Violence will only work against the achievement of a democratic system and play into the hands of those forces of the extreme left and right who do not want Iran to prosper. I am writing similarly to your colleagues at the other Consulates. Sincerely, Charles W. Naas Minister-Counselor DCM:CWNaas/sw CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES September 6, 1978 The Ambassador opened the meeting by discussing the large but nonviolent demonstrations September 5 in Tehran. He said it is unclear whether a new pattern has been set by the peaceful character of those demonstrations. It is, in any case, a double-edged tactic, possibly meant to discourage security forces from vigorous action in the future. The Ambassador will query the Iranian Minister of Interior for his view of future prospects during his visit today. Tomorrow is the traditional seventh day of mourning for those killed in earlier demonstrations. The Bazaar will be closed, as will shops elsewhere. Mr. Bannerman said shopkeepers have been told to keep shops closed tomorrow. Dr. Stempel said that tomorrow is meant to be a quiet day, not an actual general strike. The Ambassador said talks are continuing with Iranians who are trying to persuade the Shah to be conciliatory. One of these men, Hushang Ram, has supported rumors that the mullahs are out to get Hoveyda. Although Hoveyda is a practicing Muslim, his father was linked to the Bahais, and he is thereby tainted. There are heavy rumors to the effect that Zahedi, who has returned from the United States, will replace Hoveyda. The Ambassador said he met last evening with some Israelis who expressed concern that Jews will be the next target of Muslim fanatics. The Israelis do not, however, seem worried about the impact of such an eventuality on Iran-Israeli relations. He asked the DCM to have a cable sent, giving the Israeli analysis of the situation. The Ambassador asked Dr. Stempel to prepare a cable on the Shah's visit to Romania and East Germany. He requested a report from Berlin, since that is the headquarters of the Tudeh Party. The Ambassador mentioned the international women's meeting underway in Tehran. He called for a cable on the state of women's affairs, now that the Ministry for Women's Affairs has disappeared. Someone should contact Afkhami; perhaps Lauri Tracy can take over this area after she arrives. The Ambassador asked Mr. Westley to have Mr. Bash examine a CIA study regarding projected oil production in Iran. The study predicts a sharp drop in production. The Ambassador asked COL. Finehout to look into the matter of a lost wallet and Imperial Iranian Car Company. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL The Ambassador announced that the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan will visit Tehran. Mr. Shellenberger recounted his conversation with a NIRT commentator, who said NIRT's International broadcasting will be less open than the Farsi reporting. The NIRT reporter also revealed that relations between the International and Farsi staffs at NIRT are poor. Mr. Shellenberger said he spoke with someone from Abadan who said Tehran is like Cedar Falls in comparison, due to the tense security situation in Abadan. Mr. Shellenberger reported rumors that the Embassy has issued instructions regarding evacuation procedures. The Ambassador noted that one-half of the population of Abadan is Arab, a fact which may affect the response there toward the security situation. Mr. Shellenberger said he expects to receive a list today of the sixteen university presidents. Not all will necessarily be new to the position. COL. Finehout said this is the day for LOA's but only four have been issued. The Ambassador attributed this to the current budget crunch. COL. Finehout reported that an Iranian police garrison, which shares facilities with his transportation section, was hit this morning; a guard was killed. A Citroen was left there ready to explode, but failed to do so. This took place about 0530. Mr. Westley said Glenn Watts of AFL-CIO will be visiting Tehran. He has made his own travel arrangements. The Ambassador asked Mr. Westley to confirm Mr. Watts' hotel reservations. Mr. Westley said he spoke with the head of Pepsi distributing company, who revealed that four years ago, Shariatmadari was paid to promote Pepsi operations in Iran. Mr. Westley said the American Chamber of Commerce has invited the Ambassador to speak at a luncheon in November. The Ambassador agreed in principle. There was discussion as to whether Secretary Blumenthal would address the chamber when he visits Iran. It will have to be a breakfast, due to his tight schedule. Dr. Stempel reported that Tabriz Majles Deputy Nejad, the number two man in the Workers' Organization, has announced he is joining the opposition. Dr. Stempel said Arya Mehr University will remain open this year. He reported that 134 teachers at Tehran University have refused to teach this fall unless other faculty who were forced into early retirement are reinstated. He discussed a peaceful demonstration last night at Jaleh Mosque. Demonstrators have begun to offer money to security forces, telling them they are not paid enough to do that kind of work. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Neeley said crop conditions in the north are good. The road south of the mountains to Mashad is very poor; one should take an alternate route. The Ambassador asked whether there was any special reason why Elam should have had so much trouble. Mr. Greene said with reference to a newspaper story that no U.S. rifles are being used by the Iranian Army The Gendarmerie does, however, still use some M-1 rifles they received a long time ago. Mr. Burton said Moniri is out of the country. He would like to be the next head of Iran Air but has no support. Mr. Dedich reported that several Asian traffickers have been arrested in Amsterdam. Evidence points to a link between Asian and Iranian traffickers. Yesterday two tons of hashish were seized near Maku; it was destined for Europe. There is no sign that Afghanistan is drying up. Mr. Adler reported information from a non-GOI source which indicated Iran is reassessing nuclear power According to this contact, no additional units will be purchased beyond current 9,000 megawatts. This is the first sign of a radical shift and cutback. The Ambassador said he had heard France will get all the nuclear business here as compensation for restraint in Pakistan. COL. Schaefer reported loss of a helicopter flown by police; it may have been IIAF A First Sgt. was killed: Mr. Bannerman discussed the security situation for tomorrow. We expect stores to be closed throughout the city and peaceful marches. He announced, in order to get a consistent policy, that the Embassy recommends any scheduled events to take place as scheduled. For example, the chili cookout will be held. The Ambassador endorsed this recommendation, adding that on the other hand, he would not recommend a ladies club tour of the bazaar. He instructed section heads to relay Mr. Bannerman's assessment. Mr. Snow said IAS has scheduled normal registration for English classes 8:00 to 12:00 tomorrow. He reported that last Monday night the police were doubled up at the Vozara facility, but it seems police are spread fairly thin. Mr. Bannerman said this has been the case, but with Ramazan over, the police will go back to keeping a mobile reserve force. Mr. Snow noted there is an archeological lecture scheduled for tomorrow night. It will take place as scheduled. POL:WGPerett:9/10/78 CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES-9/6/78 DISTRIBUTION: AMB DCM POL ECON POL/MIL OR ADMIN CONS DEA DAO ICA S/A NEA/IRN INR/RNA ARMISH/MAAG AMCONSUL ISFAHAN SHIRAZ TABRIZ

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES FROM: POL - John D. Stempel DATE: September 7, 1978 The evening of September 3 I was invited to the Foreign Ministry club for cocktails with Special Assistant to the Prime Minister Darious Boyandor. Boyandor wanted to talk with me about recent events in Iran and my views on them. I noted that the U.S. was watching with interest and approval the Shah's and Prime Minister's efforts to liberalize the political system and conciliate the religious leaders. In response to a question from Boyandor, I reaffirmed that the U.S. felt the monarchy was an important institution in Iran and that the Shah is a key figure in the liberalization process. I concluded with the hope that responsible political figures from all quarters would work within the system. We discussed the hard-line the opposition had taken toward government concessions in the political sphere and Boyandor confirmed the government's intention to go forward with considerable liberalization of the political atmosphere. However, the Prime Minister and others, he said, were becoming concerned that there was no sense of give within the opposition and that religious and other figures felt they had the government on the run and would press for concessions or demand changes which would be impossible. Violence, he added, might continue. This would raise two fundamental questions: 1) What happens if the "crunch" comes? What would be the USG's attitude toward the reestablishment of order by force? 2) Would democracy work in Iran? Are there enough good leaders and modern political figures to prevent the country's regressing to a fundamental religious form of government? With respect to U.S. attitudes toward the maintenance of public order, I pointed out that the so-called "American emphasis" on human rights had not, contrary to the opinion of many, advocated chaos instead of public order. Speaking personally, I thought the U.S. government would be sympathetic towards efforts to establish public order if taken within the context of a system which offered ample opportunity for political participation. The Embassy understood that the Prime Minister had in effect taken the lid off a very difficult situation. We were hopeful that the government will do what is necessary to limit unrestrained force to maintain order. The better the political case for the use of force, the easier it would be for Iran's friends abroad in Europe and the U.S. to defend it. CONFIDENTIAL

With respect to the question of whether Iran could support democracy, I replied that this seemed to be a question for Iranians themselves to work out. Boyandor replied more leadership was needed and expressed his personal belief that the government had to do more. The supporters of the government should organize themselves better. He expressed some doubt that the Prime Minister himself was willing to do this and was not optimistic about the groups he had already seen enter the political arena. We concluded the discussion with expressions of hope for a successful outcome of the political liberalization process. Boyandor, who is a career foreign service officer, said he had been asked to remain on the Prime Minister's staff and, of course, would do so. Personally, however, he hopes to go back to foreign affairs within two to three months because "it takes ten months to break in a Prime Minister and this will be my third." Comment: I don't believe Boyandor was specifically directed by his boss to raise the question of U.S. reaction to confirm measures against anarchy, but I have no doubt that my basic response to Boyandor's questions will reach senior levels in the Prime Minister's office. POL:JDStempel17lab:9/11/78 CC:NEA/IRN

Memorandum All Section Chiefs (see distribution) DATE: Sept. 7, 1978 : POL - John D. Stempal JUST: U.S. Posture Toward GOI At staff meeting September 3, the Ambassador spoke of the need to make clear the U.S. Government's attitude toward the changes now going on in Iran. Accordingly, he has approved the talking points listed below for use with your Iranian contacts: --U.S.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly based on enduring mutual interests. --Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to the U.S. since World War II by both Republican and Democratic Presidents; in December 1977 President Carter said, "our strength is Iran's strength and Iran's strength is ours" --The U.S. wishes Iran to be strong economically and militarily and politically stable. --The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization policy" which aims to develop over time a democratic political system; we have no doubts as to his sincerity about the process. --The monarchy is a deeply important institution in Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual most suited to lead the Iranian people to a more democratic system. --It is signally important that responsible political figures work within the system as it develops to assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor. --Violence will only work against the achievement of a democratic system and play into the hands of those forces of the extreme left and right who do not want Iran to prosper. Distribution AMB ADMIN-5 DEA ARMISH/MAAG-6 DCM CONS-4 IRS POL POL/MIL DAO AGR ECON USICA-4 FAA OR-5 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TELEGRAM 08614 FROM CLASSIFICATION AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: POL-2 AMB DCM P/M OR CRU-2 ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY KUWAIT: AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY TEL XK AVIV 08614 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN LIMDIS" E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT, IR SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN 1. DURING PAST THREE DAYS, I HAVE MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ASHRAF, EDUCATION MINISTER NAHAVANDI (LEADER OF LARGEST BLOC IN CURRENT GOVT), SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, AND HAD AN AUDIENCE OF OVER AN HOUR WITH THE SHAH. IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR DEPT AND INFO ADDRESSEES TO HAVE SOME FLAVOR OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. DRAFTED BY: AMB:WHSullivaram DRAFTED BY: AMB:WHSullivaram CLEARANCES:

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOM I MET SEPT 8, SHORTLY AFTER DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, SPENT MOST OF OUR MEETING EXPLAINING AND JUSTIFYING THE INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW. SINCE THE MEETING WAS AT HIS REQUEST, HE WAS WELL PREPARED WITH COPIES OF STATEMENTS MADE BY OPPOSITION, WITH TEXTS OF BANNERS DISPLAYED IN MANIFESTATION SEPT 7, AND WITH RATIONALE FOR GOVT ACTION. HE WAS UNWILLING TO CONCEDE ANY DEFICIENCIES EXTERN ON THE PART OF THE SHAH OR THE GOVT AND PERSISTED IN DEPICTING THE DISTURBANCES AS FOREIGN-INSPIRED. HE SHOWED LITTLE SENSITIVITY TO THE DEATHS THAT HAD OCCURRED IN THE CLASHES EARLIER THAT DAY AND INSISTED THAT NO MORE THAN TEN HAD DIED. (HE LATER TELEPHONED ME AT HOME TO CHANGE THAT FIGURE TO "ABOUT 100.") HE SEEMED EAGER TO HAVE AN OFFICIAL U.S. REACTION TO EVENTS AND ASKED IF I HAD ANY VIEWS ABOUT NEXT STEPS IRAN MIGHT TAKE. 3. EDUCATION MINISTER NAHAVANDI, BY CONTRAST, INDICATED GREAT CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MARTIAL LAW. DURING SEPT 9 MEETING (WHICH WAS HELD AT MY REQUEST) HE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE TELEPHONE REPORTS ON VARIOUS POCKETS OF VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT CITY. HE SAID CABINET MEETING NIGHT OF SEPT 7 WHICH HAD DECIDED ON MARTIAL LAW HAD BEEN AN EMOTIONAL ONE, AND HAD BEEN HELD UPON THE INSISTENCE OF THE MILITARY. HE SAID HE

AND HIS GROUP HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESIS THAT "FOREIGNERS" HAD CAUSED ALL RECENT DISTURBANCES AND HAD PROPOSED SWEEPING REFORMS ("NETTOYAGE TOTAL"). HE OBVIOUSLY FEELS THAT HIS VIEWS HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY ACCEPTED AND HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT SAYING THAT HEE REFORMS MUST FOLLOW MARTIAL LAW. 4. HE THEN WENT ON TO MAKE "ONE OBSERVATION INFANTILE." HE SAID THE UNITED STATES GOVT COULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN CURRENT SITUATION. PERHAPS WE HAD MORE INFLUENCE WITH SHAH THAN THE GOVT DID. WE SHOULD ACT TO USE THAT INFLUENCE. "FAITES VITE." 5. IN TALKING TO SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, I FIND THEM, ON THE SURFACE, EXPRESSING GREAT SATISFACTION WITH DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. THEY, LIKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, EXPAND AT GREAT LENGTH ON THE MALICIOUS INTENTIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS AND THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT TO THE NATION. IN THE COURSE OF DETAILED DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, THEY DISPLAY REAL NERVOUSNESS ABOUT FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS. THEY EXPECT TERRORISM, SABOTAGE, AND INDUSTRIAL STRIKES. THEY WERE CLEARLY SHAKEN BY THE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF SEPT 7. 6. AS FOR THE SHAH, WHOM I MET SEPT 10, I FOUND HIM TIRED AND UNHAPPY, BUT CONSIDERABLY MORE SPIRITED THAN CONFIDENTIAL Classification

HE WAS A WEEK AGO. HE DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLY GREATER SENSITIVITY TO THE DEATHS THAT HAD OCCURRED THAN DID HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. HE PERSISTS IN SAYING THAT HE SEES THE SOVIET HAND IN ALL THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND DISTURBANCES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAYS THAT "PAST MISTAKES" MUST BE CORRECTED. HE SAYS HE HAS ORDERED A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION. NINE ARRESTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE AND WILL SHORTLY BE ANNOUNCED. MORE ASSISTANCE WILL BE GIVEN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE PROCESS OF LIBERALIZATION WILL CONTINUE. LEGISLATION ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND OF PRESS WILL BE INTRODUCED IN INTO THE PARLIAMENT. THE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD--AS FREE ELECTIONS--IN JUNE. 7. HE IS EAGER FOR SOME PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIM, FOR HIS REGIME, AND FOR HIS PROGRAM. HE HAS A MORE COHERENT PLAN OF ACTION THAN HE EARLIER DISPLAYED. HE CATEGORICALLY ESCHEWS ANY SUGGESTION THAT HE WILL ABDICATE OR FLEE THE CURRENT SITUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DOES NOT MINIMIZE THE PROBLEMS HE FACES. HE REALIZES THAT MARTIAL LAW MAY FORCE HIS OPPOSITION UNDERGROUND AND INTO ACTS OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE. HE IS CONCERNED THAT A WAVE OF INDUSTRIAL STRIKES MAY BE IN THE OFFING. HE APPRECIATES THAT THE IMAGE OF MARTIAL LAW WILL BE OFFENSIVE TO MANY INTERNATIONALLY INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. CONFIDENTIAL Classification

8. THE NET IMPRESSION I. DERIVE FROM THESE SEVERAL INTERVIEWS IS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN IRAN IS BADLY SHAKEN BY RECENT EVENTS. THERE IS STILL A STRONG ELEMENT, NOT ONLY IN THE MILITARY, BUT ALSO IN THE CABINET WHICH FAVORS THE RETURN TO A HARSH, AUTHORITARIAN ROLE TO SUPPRESS THE OPPOSITION. THERE IS, AT THE SAME TIME, A SIGNIFICANT GROUP IN THE LEADERSHIP THAT BELIEVES REPRESSIVE ACTION WILL NOT WORK AND THAT THE TIME IS OVERDUE FOR ACTIONS WHICH WILL MEET LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES. THE SHAH, IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, HAS PLAYED A HAMLET-LIKE ROLE, WITHOUT ASSERTING HIS INFLUENCE IN EITHER DIRECTION. HE SEEMS, AS OF TODAY, TO HAVE RECOVERED SOME OF HIS FORMER CONFIDENCE AND TO HAVE RESUMED CONTROL OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION. HE IS CONVINCING WHEN HE SAYS THAT HE HAS SIDED WITH THOSE WHO WANT REFORM AND WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT THOSE CHANGES. 9. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY, HOWEVER, TO ESTIMATE WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO DO WHAT HE SAYS HE WANTS TO DO WHILE HE IS SADDLED WITH THE HUBRIS OF A SULLEN POPULATION SULLIVAN L CONFIDENTIAL Classification OPTIONAL FORM (Formerly FS-4) January Dept.

OFFICIAL FORM NO. 10 NLY 1870 EDITION 66A FPMR (41 CFR) 181.11.6 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum DCM - Mr. Naas Arnb Jg.hchnto Chadnto Date:9/12/78 SHIRAZ - Victor L. Tomseth The Security of American Citizens Living in Southern Iran zens Living in Southern Iran Juridicale Prior to the first of September the Consulate in its discussions with members of the American community in southern Iran, both with individuals and with groups, had been taking the line that while civil unrest here has had an underlying anti-foreign bias, it had neither been directed at foreigners in general nor Americans in particular. Under such circumstances, we advised that it was unlikely that Americans were in serious danger as long as they avoided situations where they might be caught by accident or as targets of opportunity in protest activities. More recently, conversations that Consulate staff members (and spouses) have had with a broad cross-section of Iranians in Shiraz, Ahwaz, Khorramshahr and Abadan indicate a shift in attitudes that may make our earlier assessment invalid. While viewpoints vary, the rapid emergence of anti-American sentiment in recent days in almost every instanced can be traced to widespread dissatisfaction with the regime, continuing powerlessness of opponents to bring about fundamental change in the situation (in this regard, the appointment of the Sharif-Emami government is overwhelmingly seen as no more than cosmetic), and a widely shared belief that the United States is capable of doing much more to manipulate events than is in reality the case. Thus, a single individual can blame us both for the unrest (the Administration's human rights policy) and for the regime's ability to maintain itself in power (military equipment sales and support). Expressions of anti-American sentiment (aside from Yankee go home posters and graffiti which blossomed before the imposition of martial law) have been indirect for the most part, often taking the form of, "We have nothing against CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL you personally, but Iranians dislike Americans because 1) you keep the Shah in power, 2) American weapons kill our people, 3) you are a bad moral influence on our children, 4) you do not respect Islam, 5) you have caused inflation and shortages, etc." Several people, out of genuine concern for individual Americans they know, have advised that they leave Iran quickly lest something happen to them. This concern may be exaggerated, but it is indicative of a situation they unquestionably perceive as inhospitable to Americans. The Americans living in southern Iran are not oblivious to these sentiments. Colleagues at work and neighbors see to that. Perhaps because they feel more isolated than Americans in Tehran, they have tended to be extremely nervous about the security situation and to look to the Consulate for advice and regular reassurance. While our assessment of the situation does not lead us to conclude that Americans should start packing their bags, the potential for trouble involving Americans does seem to have increased considerably in recent days. Conveying this view to the American community involves some risk of exacerbating fear which is perhaps already overblown among many of its members, but if we are too relaxed, we stand in danger of loosing our credibility. There has already been some talk to the effect that the U.S. Government cares less about its citizens than about its relationship with the Shah. While the analogy is both far-fetched and inaccurate in its details, the case of Vietnam has been cited as an example of our sacrificing the safety of American citizens for the sake of an illusion. Given the circumstances here, we believe that for the time being we should take the following line when approached by Americans regarding the security situation: Conditions are not such to warrant an organized evacuation of Iran, either on a selective basis or in toto. Indeed, the imposition of martial law in several cities throughout the country generally seems to be having a salutary effect as far as civil unrest is concerned. However, anti-American sentiment among certain segments of the Iranian population appears to have increased recently. Its emergence suggests that American citizens living in southern Iran need to be especially conscious of precautionary measures that will help them to avoid situations which potentially could be dangerous to them. These measures, if adhered to, as well as martial law provisions themselves, will inevitably entail a certain degree of restricted freedom, particularly as they affect dependents. It is up to each individual to determine whether or not this restricted freedom will be within the bounds of tolerance for him or her and his or her family members. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL While such advice may lead to some individuals sending their dependents home and make it relatively more difficult for companies and organizations to recruit for Iran, we think it will reassure members of the American community in general of our concern for their welfare without leading to a panic. The number of dependents has been falling in any event, and what appears in the news media in the United States will have greater impact on recruiting than what we say here. Thus, in effect we would not be in the vanguard of a policy shift but rather lending a rationale to trends already underway. On balance, a reduced presence might not be such a bad thing. cc: CONS - Mr. Goelz SY - Mr. Bannerman POL - Mr. Stempel CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES September 13, 1978 The Ambassador opened the meeting with a review of the activities of the past week. He said the Thursday demonstration caused great concern within the government due to its size and obvious organization. He characterized the Friday shootings at Jaleh Square as unfortunately indicative of the nature of the martial law authority the troops were dressed in full battle gear and using combat rather than crowd control weapons. He said the government's task now is to sort out the orderly from the disruptive elements of the opposition. He stressed the importance for the official community to observe the martial law regulations. He instructed that Mission reporting should emphasize the factual rather than analytic for the time being. The Embassy has been commended by Under Secretary Newsom for its reporting during the recent period. In running through several other odds and ends, the Ambassador noted that he had been hearing complaints from American businessmen concerning tardy payments by the Iranians for services rendered. This fits in with our growing impression of a severe budgetary crunch. Such a situation could be due to paralysis under the new ministers or fear of making payments that have the possible taint of corruption. Anyone hearing more in this area should report to John Mills. On the subject of corruption, we may be on the verge of losing a number of friends and contacts. For example, Etemad and Mansur have been ordered not to leave the country as they are under investigation. The Ambassador discussed a message he has received from Deputy Under Secretary Read announcing plans for FY 80 budget and position cuts. The Department is to take a cut of $55 million and 461 positions, many of which will be overseas. One proposal under consideration would be to cut NIV slots in low-fraud countries. Mr. Goelz scoffed at this idea, saying it would not release many positions. The head of the Consortium has scheduled a cocktail party for the same time as the Ambassador's reception for John Mills. The Ambassador wants to meet with the Consortium people at some point, but will regret the invitation. Secretary Blumenthal will visit Iran later this year. Messrs. Naas and Mills will begin putting together a program. The Secretary will be invited to stay at the Residence. SA:RBoyle/bjh CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Mr Shellenberger discussed the live TV coverage of the Majlis, saying that it is having a tremendous effect, acting as a sort of safety valve for letting off steam. ICA has received an hour-long videctape from Washington, depicting a group of Iranian students discussing their experiences. The film will be available at the student counseling center. Mr. Mills discussed the effect recent events have had on the economy, noting that there does appear to have been a shift in budget priorities from defense to agriculture. In political news, the Noori arrested today is the same mullah who has been pushing the anti-Jewish line. He was also involved in the Jaleh Square incidents. Mr. Butler confirmed the new availability of funds for agriculture. The Ambassador is to call on the new Minister in the near future. Colonel Schaefer reported that William "Your Man" Branigan had called the DAO, expressing chagrin over his erroneous reporting that Iranian riot troops had been using American rifles. Mr. Bannerman reported on a recent security meeting attended by over 187 companies. Mr. Goelz reported the not-too-surprising news that inquiries concerning U.S. visas have zoomed. Mr. Ryno confirmed that the Trade Fair will open as scheduled on September 19. DISTRIBUTION: AMB ARMISH/MAAG DCM AGR POL ICA POL/M D CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO 08794 FROM CLASSIFICATION AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7 INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY TOKYO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE POL-3 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 08794 AMB DCM P7M OR CRU-2 LIMDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: MOPS, PINS, IR NEED FOR SUBJECT: MASSER/CROWD CONTROL EQUIPMENT IN IRAN 1. ONE TROUBLING FEATURE ABOUT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN IRAN IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY UNITS WITHIN THE IRANIAN ARMY WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FOR NON-LETHAL CROWD CONTROL. WHEN TROOPS WERE BROUGHT INTO TEHRAN LAST WEEK TO TAKE OVER FROM THE POLICE, THEY CAME EQUIPPED IN FULL BATTLE DRESS, ARMED WITH G-3 RIFLES, WITH FIXED BAYONETS. DRAFTED BY: AMB: WHSullivan: Ham DRAFTING DATE 9/14/78 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: AMB DRAFTED BY: AMB: WHSullivan.ham CLEARANCES:

2. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN THESE TROOPS WERE ATTACKED BY A STONE-THROWING, CLUB-WIELDING CROWD AT JALLEH SQUARE, THEY HAD NO WEAPONS WITH WHICH TO RETALIATE OTHER THAN THEIR RIFLES. THEY WORD HELMETS, BUT CARRIED NO SHIELDS. WHEN THEIR RIFLE BURSTS INTO THE AIR FAILED TO STOP THE ADVANCING CROWD, THE RESULTING SLAUGHTER WAS INEVITABLE. 3. IT IS SIMILARLY INCONGRUOUS TO SEE THE CHIEFTAN TANKS POSTED CONSPICUOUSLY AROUND THE CITY, WITH THEIR ENORMOUS, LONG-BARRELLED CANNONS. IT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE HOW THEY COULD BE USED AS A CROWD-CONTROL INSTRUMENT EXCEPT TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION WELL BEYOND THE NEEDS OF ANY ANTICIPATED CIRCUMSTANCE. 4. THE INCONGRUITY OF IRANIAN MILITARY WEAPONRY FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION IS EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT IRAN, DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS WHICH HAVE SEEN CIVIL UNREST IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, HAS NEVER EXPERIENCED THIS PHENOMENON DOMESTICALLY UNTIL RECENT MONTHS. PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES HAVE USUALLY BEEN ABORTED BEFORE THEY BEGAN BY THE CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE OF SAVAK. 5. WHEN IRANIAN AUTHORITIES BEGAN TO RELAX SAVAK CONTROLS AND PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES BEGAN TO TAKE PLACE OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS, IRAN BELATEDLY UNDERTOOK TO ACQUIRE A LIMITED NUMBER OF SHIELDS, HELMETS, AND TEAR GAS FOR THEIR POLICE FORCES. HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROFESSIONAL

TRAINING ASSISTANCE FOR THESE FORCES, THE POLICE PROVED SIGNIFICANTLY INEPT IN THEIR NEW ROLES. 6. THE RESULT OF ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS AN UNEASY SITUATION IN WHICH A RENEWED OUTBREAK OF PUBLIC AGITATION COULD PREDICTABLY RESULT IN MORE VIOLENT DEATHS. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THAT FACT MAY SUCCEED IN INTIMIDATING POTENTIAL DEMONSTRATORS AND, INDEED, SOME SENIOR ARMY OFFICIALS ARE COUNTING ON THAT VERY FACT IN THEIR ASSURANCE THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL SUCCEED. 7. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS THE SHAH'S AND THE GOVT'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION WHICH WILL PERMIT PUBLIC ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE TRANSITION TO THIS NEW FEATURE OF PUBLIC LIFE IN IRAN WILL REQUIRE A READJUSTMENT OF OFFICIAL IRANIAN THINKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF CROWD CONTROL. 8. I HAVE SPOKEN IN RECENT DAYS TO THE SHAH, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER'S STAFF, GENERAL AZHARI, AND TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. I HAVE DESCRIBED DEMONSTRATIONS I HAVE SEEN IN TOKYO WITH FAR GREATER NUMBERS OF PARTICIPANTS AND FAR GREATER PROVOCATION BY THE PARTICIPANTS WHICH WERE EFFECTIVELY BROKEN UP WITHOUT A SINGLE FATALITY. THEY ALL AGREE THAT IRAN MUST CHANGE ITS CURRENT POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDER. (GEN. AZHARI GAVE ME A GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF FINDING HIMSELF IMMOBILIZED IN HIS AUTO- CONFIDENTIAL Classification

MOBILE ON THE FIRST NIGHT OF MARTIAL LAW BY A SOLDIER WHO HAD HALTED HIS CAR AND KEPT ITS OCCUPANTS UNDER THE MUZZLE OF HIS GUN FOR OVER TEN MINUTES UNTIL A POLICEMAN "SLOWLY" CAME TO CHECK IDENTITIES.) 9. THE NET RESULT SEEMS TO BE A CRASH EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR TO OBTAIN NON-LETHAL CROWD CONTROL EQUIPMENT. AT THE MOMENT, FOCUS SEEMS TO BE ON BRITISH AND GERMAN EQUIPMENT WITH SOME GROWING INTEREST IN THE JAPANESE. I ASSUME THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE USUAL DEMAND FOR PATT DERIAN'S TEAR GAS FROM THE USA. SULLIVAN CONFIDENTIAL Classification

SECRET/NOFORN September 18, 1978 Dear George: Thank you for including me in the September 7 meeting. As promised, here are comments on issues raised there. Iranian Character - Alternate Leaders At the meeting, a number of conclusions were drawn on the basis of sweeping assumptions about the Iranian character and its unchangeability. There are, it is true, well-known negative characteristics in the Iranian personality such as cynicism, self-consciousness, and archaic individualism which are personally and socially negative. These have been described over and over again by commentators on Iran, and are catalogued in Zonis' book, The Political Elite of Iran. (I hope that sometime soon you will be able to read the last chapter of this book -- only 11 pages -- if you have not already.) Some of the speakers in the meeting seemed to think that the only effect of these characteristics is to strengthen the Shah. However, that is only part of the story, the importance of which is rapidly ebbing. Iranians have always been intensely and unashamedly aware of these defects and now resent the way in which the Shah's method of rule reinforces them. It is a cliche of both standard academic literature on politics in Iran (Bill, Zonis, Cottam, Binder, Jacobs), and of the common conversation of Iranians themselves, that the Shah's system of control and governance uses and depends on the failings in the Iranian characters thereby strengthening them. The Shah himself admits as much in Mission for My Country. This way of governing associates the Shah in the minds of Iranians with what they most dislike in themselves, continually generating profound and continuing resentment against him. It has done much to prevent him from being accepted (as he years to be by his people) as the supreme nationalist. Furthermore, many Iranians believe that the same defects on which the Shah capitalizes politically also seriously retard economic development, education, social respectability, and the growth of modern consciousness. Their awareness of these vices, and the way in which the Shah plays on SECRET/NOFORN